

*Statement from Chief Superintendent who was in overall command of venue as to his duties on that day.*

STATEMENT NUMBER S213

Station

N 1108

Surname DUCKENFIELD

Forenames DAVID GODFREY

Age \_\_\_\_\_ Date of birth \_\_\_\_\_

Address ECCLESFIELD POLICE STATION  
THE COMMON, ECCLESFIELD, SHEFFIELD

Occupation POL CSU

Telephone

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Hair type \_\_\_\_\_

Eyes \_\_\_\_\_ Complexion \_\_\_\_\_

Facial hair \_\_\_\_\_

Glasses \_\_\_\_\_ Use \_\_\_\_\_ Accent \_\_\_\_\_

Number of Pages 17

Dated 050589

Signed

*Indexed  
3698*

At 10am (1000) Wednesday 22 March 1989 (220389), I attended a planning meeting at Hammerton Road Police Station, chaired by Chief Superintendent <sup>N4700</sup> MOLE to discuss the organisation of the F.A Cup Semi Final tie between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest Football Clubs.

On Monday 27 March 1989 (270389), I was promoted Chief Superintendent of 'F' Division and assumed responsibilities for the forthcoming football match.

In the period which followed leading to the semi final I liaised with Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) Mr <sup>N505 N2831</sup> JACKSON regarding the arrangements.

At 10am (1000) Wednesday 29 March 1989 (290389), I had a meeting with <sup>N1112 N504 N2584 N221 N6071</sup> Superintendent MURRAY, Chief Inspector BEAL and Inspector SEWELL in my office to discuss the operational order and our arrangements for

the day and to ensure these were progressing satisfactorily.

At 2.30pm (1430) on 10 April 1989 (104089) I had a meeting with the Sector Superintendents, representatives from 'D' Division, Road Traffic and British Transport Police to discuss our arrangements.

At 2pm (1400) Wednesday 12 April 1989 (120489), I held a press conference at Hammerton Road Police Station and met with media representatives.

At 10am (1000) Friday 14 April 1989 (140489), I held a pre match briefing in the North Stand at the Hillsborough Football Stadium for officers of Inspector and above. See Appendix 'A'. *Senior Officers*  
The purpose of this was to give a full briefing to supervisory officers and then for them to have the opportunity to examine their respective areas of responsibility and familiarise themselves with the ground.

I conducted the main briefing with Superintendent MURRAY, and then the respective area Superintendents held their own briefings, in and around the ground, dealing more specifically with their needs, and requirements of their areas of responsibility.

At 10am (1000) Saturday 15 April 1989 (150489), I briefed the officers on duty for the semi final tie in the North Stand of the Hillsborough Football Stadium. See Appendix 'B'. *Robbies 5/40/89*

It was a shortened version of the previous day's briefing.  
*N504 N1112 : N1113 N7908*  
Superintendent MURRAY, Detective Sergeant CHARLESWORTH and Inspector SEWELL also dealt with matters such as Emergency Evacuation Procedure, Crime Intelligence, and Administration.

On completion of the briefing I spoke with officers in the ground and toured the area.

I re-entered the ground about 1.15pm (1315) and in due course made my way to the Police control Box about 1.50pm (1350) and liaised with Superintendent MURRAY. *N1112*

*North Stand Briefing*

We left a short time later to see the referee and linesmen to advise them of our emergency procedures.

They were on the pitch and eventually they left and we followed them to the official's room.

On leaving there about 2pm (1400) we returned to the Police Control Box and met with Mr <sup>N2831</sup> JACKSON, Assistant Chief Constable (Operations).

In the Control Box were the regular operators - <sup>N6032</sup> POL PS <sup>N17</sup> GODDARD, PC <sup>N5895</sup> RYAN and PC <sup>N17</sup> BICHARD.

I had a general discussion with Mr JACKSON about the operation, which was progressing satisfactorily at this stage. He left a little while later.

About 2.30pm (1430), when examining the ground situation, I noted that the Spion Kop was almost full with the Nottingham Forest fans, and that was the general view in respect of their other areas of the ground.

A number of Liverpool supporters had obtained tickets for the Spion Kop and were accommodated in the North East part of this section of the ground. They were segregated from the Nottingham Forest supporters by a line of police officers.

The North Stand for Liverpool supporters was possibly half full at this time, the West Stand was filling, but there was space at the front and sides of the Leppings Ln Terrace. I asked for a tannoy message to be relayed for fans to move forward and spread along the terrace.

I can recall about this time <sup>N1109</sup> Superintendent MARSHALL asked for Leppings Ln to be closed and saw on the CCTV monitor the crowd situation and a SYNTE double decker bus passing.

I was aware of a crowd build up but traffic was still able to flow and I questioned in my mind the need for the closure.

At this time there must have been some difficulty in closing the road

Action for statements from these 3 officers  
Action to establish what date Mr Jackson took up after leaving Control Room

Action for Mr Kay to confirm time this occurred.

S219  
Pg 15  
Refers.

1452 19 Secs.

because I remember more than one request for this to be done as though the first had not been implemented.

I was aware from the CCTV monitor of the increasing number of supporters in Leppings Ln and in those waiting to enter the ground.

Whilst examining the situation outside I visually made an assessment from the Control Box of the way in which the ground was filling and

N1112

asked Superintendent MURRAY for his assessment of the situation, bearing in mind the crowd outside and the space inside at this time. This was about 2.30pm (1430) and he said that with half an hour to kick off we should get them all in on time.

N1112

About this time I asked Superintendent MURRAY to clarify with me the circumstances under which we would consider delaying the kick off. We had previously agreed that if there was an identifiable problem, e.g. a serious incident, accident on the motorway or fog on the Pennines which would prevent large numbers of fans arriving on time we should consider a delay as opposed to those who had been brought to the area within a reasonable time but had chosen not to enter the ground as soon as possible.

I took the view that at this time, with all the information available, there were no grounds to delay the kick off.

Between 2.30pm (1430) and 2.40pm (1440) the crowd continued to increase and I monitored the Liverpool fans on the Spion Kop and actions being taken by officers there.

I examined the situation at the Leppings Ln End of the ground from the CCTV monitor and saw the increasing crowd situation.

I was aware that action was being taken to increase the number of officers at this location as horses and reserve serials were being directed to assist by Control Room personnel.

In addition, a tannoy message was being relayed to the crowd outside at the Leppings Ln end to ease back and not to push forward against

*Action for Insp Hayton to confirm this action to establish what horses and serials were sent as message A5208. We had a loudspeaker message to crowd from Land Rover which Supr Chapman released*

the turnstiles.

About 2.40pm (1440) the radio developed a fault and there were obvious communication difficulties.

A request was made for a Communications Officer to attend and repair the fault and he arrived almost immediately.

He restored communications and we were able to contact officers once more.

The crowd was continuing to increase at the Leppings Ln end turnstiles, and Superintendent MARSHALL asked for POL PC BUXTON to attend with the Land Rover which is equipped with a public address facility.

In addition, at 2.44pm (1444), I requested a traffic mobile to assist and for continued tannoy messages to the crowds outside to relieve the pressure upon the turnstiles.

The crowd had by now increased considerably and fans were beginning to climb over the walls into the ground.

The crowd situation was changing rapidly, it had increased in numbers, Superintendent MARSHALL had asked for a vehicle with a P.A. facility, tannoy messages were being relayed to ease pressure, Mounted officers were having difficulty and extra resources had been sent to assist.

I looked at the situation on the Leppings Ln terrace and saw there was room for supporters, and considered because of the deteriorating situation whether or not to delay the kick off to ease the difficulties. I looked through the Control Box window to my right and saw a half circle of press photographers on the pitch at the players' tunnel, obviously waiting for the teams to appear, and at that point, whilst considering the position, the first team ran out onto the pitch.

I considered this option had been removed.

Action for Home Office & Radio Engineers of fault report (Comm Officer)

Action to statement from PC Buxton A4549 Refers.

Action to establish traffic mobile that attended

A5210

Action to establish the time this option was removed.

1454.09

N7628 51516

N1109

N7850

N1109

1454 hrs 09 seconds

I looked at the CCTV camera trained on the service road at the Leppings Ln end showing Gate C, and a Mounted officer was in some difficulty as his horse was being jostled by the crowd.

It was about this time, 14.47pm that the first message came over the radio from Superintendent MARSHALL with a request to open the gates.

I again looked at the CCTV monitor showing Gate C and my immediate reaction was not to do this. We had supporters outside the ground who may not have tickets, some may be drunk or worse for drink, they were not co-operating with the police nor responding to our requests. To open the gates and allow them into the ground would defeat our objective that no one would get in without a ticket, who was drunk or may be carrying weapons.

The crowd situation was extremely difficult and this was an unusual request, and whilst I was considering the position, assessing the space in the ground and looking at the CCTV monitor, I saw Gate C burst open and supporters enter the concourse area at the rear of the Leppings Ln stand and terrace.

I remember thinking, 'the gates's open anyway': I had not given permission, but at that point a Mounted Officer retrieved the situation and closed the gate.

A further message came over the radio from Superintendent MARSHALL to open the gates and he used words to the effect that if the gates were not opened someone was going to be killed.

This was an urgent message which conveyed to me by the tone of his voice that this was a serious situation and was a demand rather than a request.

The previous thoughts crossed my mind once again about monitoring and control of supporters entering the ground.

It was a serious step to take. I looked at the CCTV monitor - there was crushing outside, supporters were climbing over the turnstile

*Actions of Spectator to Houghton & confirm these matters. Chief Superintendent is accurate with time. Was there a log to the effect of this to check please.*

*A32 Refers.*

*this should be on film. Spectator Houghton & chief this is*

*A34  
A35  
Refers.*

N1109

N1109

walls, officers were under pressure.

VIA CCTV

On the inside of the ground there was space in the terrace, there was space on the inside of the turnstiles in concourse, and room to ease the situation.

If the gates were opened there may be crushing and injury on the inside but the message I was receiving from the outside was that unless I opened the gates and eased the pressure people would be seriously injured or killed.

<sup>N1109</sup>  
Superintendent MARSHALL is a very experienced police officer and if he wanted the gates opened, which is not normally a consideration, then the situation must be very serious indeed.

Whilst I am considering the position and considering the options Superintendent MURRAY said to me,

"Mr DUCKENFIELD, are you going to open the gates?"

I remember standing there and saying my thoughts aloud so that others, if they heard it, would realise it was a considered decision. I said,

"If there's likely to be serious injury or death I've no option but to open the gates - open the gates".

<sup>N1112</sup>  
Superintendent MURRAY passed this message.

About this time I heard another radio message from someone who said words to the effect,

"It does not matter whether you open the gates or not, this gate's going in anyway".

I was advised this was 'A' Gate.

I took this to mean that crowd pressure on a particular gate was such that it was in danger of collapsing and people being injured.

My immediate reaction to that was that if a gate collapsed due to crowd pressure those immediately in front of the gate would fall and no doubt be injured. In addition, those falling may be trampled upon.

GATE A

The gate to the North Stand was opened and I immediately issued instructions for extra resources to be deployed into the area to provide cover on the landings and prevent a pitch invasion from non ticket holders.

I also asked for manpower for the perimeter track to monitor the position.

I watched the Leppings Ln terrace intently for any developments as a result of the gates opening.

In taking stock of the situation I looked at the West Stand and it appeared full. The centre two pens of the terrace appeared to be almost full, but there was still some room at the front of the two wing pens.

I saw a PC opening either Gates 3 or 4 from the Leppings Ln terrace onto the perimeter track and a handful of people were coming out on to the track and walking towards Gate 1. They seemed to be calm and appeared to stand aimlessly on the track without any direction. The policewoman standing at Gate 1, who was only a few yards away, was totally unaware of their presence. There was room at the front of

this pen and there was a need to open this gate and allow these people into this part of the ground. Chief Inspector McROBBIE who was in the Control Room in civilian clothing went down on to the track to assist her and draw her attention to what was happening.

There was an increasing number of people coming onto the track from Gates 3 and 4 area. No radio traffic was being received and I was still unable to assess the situation but considered there may have been a pitch invasion or that people were being taken out for re-location in the two wing pens.

I asked for Superintendent GREENWOOD to go to Leppings Ln end and find out what was happening. I saw him coming from the players' tunnel, walking along the perimeter track towards the Police Control

Action to establish what resources were deployed in this area  
What several officers were deployed on track at the time

A5213

Action for Supt Payne to confirm action / statement from PCs who opened gates

A5216

Action of CI Nichol to make statement to Supt Payne & ID details of instructions given

A64 S1852

A5225

N8687

N506

N1110



Box and the incident behind the Leppings Ln end goal. An increasing number of people were now being helped on to the track through the gates and some were climbing over the perimeter fencing on to the track.

The supporters from this location were now spilling on to the track and were standing on the grass behind the touch line. I was not aware of any radio messages but then saw <sup>N1110</sup> Superintendent GREENWOOD standing head and shoulders above the people at the back of the goal, presumably standing on an advertising hoarding and waving his arms. He was waving his arms and crossing them as he did so, which indicated to me he wanted the game to be stopped. I agreed the game should be stopped and I sent <sup>N1112</sup> Superintendent MURRAY from the Control Room on to the track to stop the game. I then saw Superintendent <sup>N1110</sup> GREENWOOD running onto the pitch to stop the game. Superintendent <sup>N1112</sup> MURRAY then returned to the Control Room.

I saw officers trying to indicate to fans in the rear of the pens to move back.

People were spilling onto the pitch and were moving further across and towards the centre line. I was still unaware of any radio traffic and exactly what the problem was, but some people were now sitting on the pitch.

<sup>N2831</sup>  
The Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) Mr JACKSON joined me in the Control Box and asked for an appraisal of the situation. I was unable to give an accurate account of what the situation was other than a possible pitch invasion which had resulted in us stopping the game.

The Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) went to the pitch and a short while later returned.

<sup>N1112</sup>  
Superintendent MURRAY was asked to return to the pitch and try and get it cleared so that from the Control Box we could assess the

Action to establish from Comm office of people who still working  
51516  
Refers

situation, especially as now people appeared to be on the pitch who were injured.

An ambulance was requested but I was unaware of any radio message asking for this and was still relying on my visual assessment of the situation.

It was difficult to assess as the crowd was flowing onto the pitch in increasing numbers, police officers were present, and there was a movement of supporters towards the centre line.

I was concerned about the crowd situation: a difficult situation was developing and we could not control the pitch. It was necessary to form a cordon to continue segregation and further assistance was requested to help with the increasing injuries I could see in front of me from the Control Box.

I called for 'Operation Support'. In turn I was aware of a request for a fleet of ambulances, and as a result of that message I became aware of the gravity of the situation.

I then began to give instructions to the Control Room staff in conjunction with Mr JACKSON for the implementation of the Major Disaster Plan.

I asked for the Casualty Bureau to be set up, to warn hospitals of the large number of injuries, any doctors in the ground to Leppings Ln goal for deployment, off duty police officers to be called to duty and rendezvous at Hammerton Road Police Station.

Mr JACKSON supplemented my requests, asking Superintendent TORR to attend in respect of the Casualty Bureau; Detective Chief Superintendent ADDIS to attend to co-ordinate the investigation side of the enquiry. I asked for a Counselling Service and Victims Support Staff.

I was aware of a request for wire cutters and following on from that the attendance of the Fire Service.

D320 Refers

Action to establish who made the request and what time  
A5227

Action to copy of instructions if not already obtained

A5230  
A4823  
D376

Action to establish when contact was first made with all relevant services, name of person contacted and action taken

N/H. N8985

N8944 N8269

N8986

*Author's statement from P. Bryan as were heard by crowd*

Whilst all this was taking place I asked POL PC BRYAN to continue broadcasting for calm among the supporters and for them to clear the pitch so we could determine what people were injured and where because the fans were milling around and obstructing the view. Advertising hoardings were by now being broken up for use as stretchers and injured people were being removed across the pitch towards the exit by the police room.

Fans were distressed and a single ambulance was in position behind the Leppings Ln goal.

The Fire Service cleared a gangway near the Police Control Box in front of the South Stand to remove casualties from the ground by a more expedient route.

<sup>N1112</sup> Superintendent MURRAY returned to the Police Control Box and told me that there were many injuries and possibly some fatalities.

I was later requested to attend the Board Room with Mr JACKSON, the ACC (Operations) and left <sup>N1112</sup> Superintendent MURRAY in charge of the operation in Police Control.

We attended the Board Room within the Directors Lounge at the football club and saw officials of both clubs and the F.A.

I was asked for an assessment of the situation and I told them there had been a serious incident and a large number of casualties.

I was told by one gentleman that he had seen two dead supporters on the pitch.

I related the situation as I saw it at that time, and that in my view the game would have to be postponed but that I did not want this communicating to the crowd.

The reasons for this were that they may create an additional public order problem - at this state I did not have the manpower to deal with this - and it was essential that all the casualties and dead were removed from the area before any announcements were made.

It was agreed the game would be postponed but that no one in the crowd would be told until I gave permission. Mr JACKSON reinforced this, and we very quickly left.

I returned to the Police Control Box with ACC (Operations) and continued to monitor the situation. The rescue was progressing, we now had fatalities and a temporary mortuary had been arranged in the gymnasium.

I was approached in the Police Control Box by Mr CLOUGH and Mr DALGLEISH. 51104

They asked for an assessment of the situation and whether or not the game was postponed. I told them it was my intention to postpone the game but asked them not to tell anyone and gave my reasons for this. Mr CLOUGH left but I asked Mr DALGLEISH to make an announcement to the Liverpool fans for calm and to bear with us for the time being. It is my view that this was beneficial to the operation.

The rescue operation progressed and eventually, about 4pm (1600) that afternoon, there was only one casualty awaiting transportation to hospital and the point had arrived where the crowd could be told of the situation.

I asked for an assurance that all trains and buses were available to transport the supporters away from the ground, all available officers were patrolling the streets and that we were ready for the crowd dispersal.

The final ambulance left the ground and an announcement was made by Superintendent MURRAY to the crowd that the match had been postponed and they were asked to leave.

The crowd applauded the decision and left without any major difficulty. After the ground and the surrounding area had cleared Chief Superintendent MOLE arrived and took over responsibility for the ground.

*Active /  
Cotnamer of  
Mr Clough  
and Mr  
Dalgleish*

*N6191 -> 5966*

*N6130*  
*51104*

*N1112*

*N4700*

I left the Police Control Box with Mr JACKSON and walked across the pitch to the Police Room. We met with N8996 a Director of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club, and passed comment about the disaster - he was in tears but praised the police operation.

I left the football ground for Force Headquarters about 5.15pm (1715), together with the Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) Mr JACKSON and Superintendent MARSHALL. N2831 N1109

On arrival at Force Headquarters, about 5.45pm (1745), I met with the Deputy Chief Constable, Mr HAYES, and in due course the Chief Constable. N8998

About 9pm (2100) that evening I left Force Headquarters for Niagara Police Sports Ground to meet the Minister for Sport who was due to arrive by helicopter to meet with the Chief Constable. N9003

He arrived about 10.20pm (2220) and I escorted him to the football ground where he met with Mr WRIGHT, the Chief Constable. N9001

I was present whilst he tourled the ground and met with the press. When he concluded his visit to the football stadium, I escorted him to Force Headquarters to see Mr HAYES, the Deputy Chief Constable. N8998

I returned to the Police Sports & Social Club at Niagara and counselled officers who had been involved in the events that afternoon who had just retired from duty.

I eventually returned to Hammerton Road Police Station and went off duty at 1.30am (0130).

D DUCKENFIELD SIGNED

STATEMENT TAKEN  
PLACE:

TIME: DATE:

WITNESS TO SIGNATURE:

OFFICERS SIGNATURE:

END OF REPORT

5213

NOTEPAD TEMPLATE

This template is intended to assist the Receiver/Statement Reader to identify those documents which are to be flagged by use of the NOTEPAD +IN.

CODING

INTERPRETATION

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| ***INOUTY***     | INSIDE/OUTSIDE THE GROUND & MATERIAL      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| ***INOUTX***     | " " " " & NON-MATERIAL                    | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| ***INY***        | INSIDE THE GROUND & MATERIAL              | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
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| ***DECX***       | " & NON-MATERIAL                          | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| ***INJY***       | INJURED PERSON & MATERIAL                 | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
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| ***POLYSY***     | POLICE, SOUTH YORKS & MATERIAL            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| ***POLXSY***     | " " " & NON-MATERIAL                      | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| ***POLYMS***     | POLICE, MERSEYSIDE & MATERIAL             | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| ***POLXMS***     | " " " & NON-MATERIAL                      | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| ***POLYNC***     | POLICE, NOTTS & MATERIAL                  | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
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| ***POLPRAISE***  | POLICE ACTION PRAISE, APPRECIATION        | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| ***POLADVERSE*** | POLICE ACTION CRITICISED, ADVERSE COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/>            |

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THE RECEIVER/STATEMENT READER SHOULD TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOX(ES) TO DIRECT THE INDEXER TO ATTACH THE MARKED CODING TO THE DOCUMENT BRING INDEXED VIA +IN.

Pol on CSUPT

CP 153

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**CATEGORY TEMPLATE. (Version III)**

Please tick those category boxes which are applicable for indexing.

**STANDS**

Splon Kop  
North Stand  
South Stand - Seated  
                  Standing

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

**WEST STAND**

Pen 1&2  
Pen 5-7  
PEN 3  
PEN 4

**POLICE OFFICER ON DUTY.**

South Yorkshire  
Herseyside  
Nottinghamshire

  
  

**POLICE OFFICER OFF DUTY**

Herseyside  
Nottinghamshire  
South Yorkshire  
Others

  
  
  

**MEDIA**

Press  
TV  
Radio

  
  

**GROUND STAFF.**

Steward  
Turnstile Operator  
Catering  
Other

  
  
  

**LOCAL RESIDENTS**

Close to House  
Shopping  
Other

  
  

**PUBLIC**

Letter  
Telephone  
Visit to Police Station

  
  

**ANY CATEGORY NOT SPECIFIED**

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**MEDICAL**

Doctor  
Police Surgeon  
Surgeon  
Pathologist  
Nurse  
St Johns Amb

  
  
  
  
  

**SUPPORTERS**

Liverpool  
Notts Forest  
Other

  
  

**EMERGENCY SERVICES**

Fire Brigade  
Ambulance

  

**RECOGNITION**

Bravery Acts  
Awards  
Appreciation  
Adverse Comments  
Complaint

  
  
  
  

**PUBLIC BODIES**

Local Authority  
Health & Safety  
FA  
Football Trust

  
  
  

**CONSULTANTS & FIRMS**

Safety  
Construction  
Other

  
  

Broken Barrier Pen 3  
Surges in Crowd  
Attended semi final  
in 1988.

  
  

**COACHES** - Alcohol  
              - Disorder  
              - Police  
              Check

  
  

**LETTER REQUIRED Y/N**