



Urban Order or Urban Exclusion?

About Centre for Inclusive Social Development

The Centre for Inclusive Social Development (CISD) is a non-profit and non-governmental organisation committed to building a society where everyone, regardless of gender, background, or circumstance, can access quality healthcare, education, and opportunities for meaningful participation.

Our foundation is rooted in a vision of creating inclusive systems driven by rigorous evidence, co-created through genuine community partnerships, and firmly grounded in the principles of social justice.

CISD collaborates with local communities, volunteers, and donors to achieve its goal of making a meaningful and positive impact on people's lives. CISD is committed to transparency and accountability, and its work is evidence-based, consistently striving to improve its impact through innovative solutions.


Contact: cisdnigeria.org, +234 704 764 7745

Address: G104, NA AKA Hub, Off Odumegwu Ojukwu Way, Gudu District, Abuja

Rethinking Lagos' Approach to Its Most Vulnerable Residents

It is a Tuesday morning in Agege, and the city is already in motion: danfos are honking, traders are calling, and pedestrians are weaving through traffic. Then a black government van cuts through the noise and pulls sharply to the kerb. Four officials in matching vests step out, moving with quiet urgency. By the roadside, beside an open drainage channel, a man in torn trousers sits with a small plastic bowl at his feet. In minutes, the rhythm of the street shifts. He is on his feet, guided toward the van. No one asks his name. No one asks where he sleeps. The bowl, with its few naira, was left behind. The van pulls away, and the street swallows the moment as if nothing happened. But this keeps happening again and again; small, quick removals that, over time, shape what the state calls "urban order."

On January 27, 2026, the Lagos magistrate courts sentenced 26 young people described as "street-connected" to three months' imprisonment, while 115 street beggars were arrested in a single enforcement sweep.¹ In March 2026, the Lagos State Ministry of Environment arrested 86 beggars in Agege and Ketu, including nine children, as part of what officials described as a strategy to "improve environmental order."² A few weeks later, 275 residents were arrested for open defecation.³ And in a demolition drive that began on December 23, 2025, over 40,000 people were displaced from Makoko and its surrounding waterfront communities, a campaign that the United Nations condemned, in February 2026, as potentially constituting domicile: the deliberate destruction of home as a crime against humanity.⁴



The question this article asks is not whether Lagos faces genuine urban challenges. It does, and they are serious. The question is whether the city is addressing those challenges or simply managing them out of view. When the government arrests beggars without providing shelters, criminalises open defecation without providing toilets, and demolishes informal settlements without offering alternatives, it is not solving problems. It is relocating them or, more precisely, relocating the people who embody them.

Lagos spent N3.367 trillion in its 2025 budget on development and governance.⁵ Against that number, its social protection allocation stands at N80.08 billion. Meanwhile, it allocates 2.72 per cent to Public Order and Safety, the budget line that funds the vans, the officers, and the arrests.⁷ A city's budget is its most honest policy document. Lagos' budget reveals the city's real priorities, beyond its speech.

Two Visions of Urban Order



Before examining the evidence, it is necessary to name the distinction at the heart of this article. There are two fundamentally different ways a city can pursue urban order.

The first approach criminalises the symptoms of poverty without addressing its causes. It arrests beggars and does not ask why they beg. It fines people for open defecation and does not build public toilets in the areas where it occurs. It demolishes informal settlements without rehousing their residents. It measures success by whether poverty is, not by whether poverty has diminished. It produces cosmetic change for investors and media while leaving structural conditions untouched. It is the approach of a city more interested in how it looks than in how it works.

The second approach asks the harder questions: What drove this person to beg? Where is the nearest public toilet to where this arrest was made? Where will this family sleep after the bulldozer leaves? It invests in welfare, infrastructure, and consultation before enforcement. It measures success by reduced poverty incidence, not reduced visibility of poverty. It is the approach of a city that understands itself as a social contract.

Lagos, in 2025 and 2026, is practising the first approach, with expanding confidence, increased resources, and diminished accountability. The evidence is not circumstantial. It is documented in court records, UN press releases, civil society statements, budget lines, and the lived experience of several hundred thousand of the city's most vulnerable residents.

Case Study One: Beggars on the Road: Criminalising Vulnerability



Let us be clear from the outset: begging is not dignified. The conditions that drive a person to beg are poverty, disability, mental illness, displacement, and exploitation by criminal networks; they are themselves affronts to human dignity. This article does not romanticise street begging or present it as a lifestyle choice.

But neither is criminalisation dignified. The question is not whether begging is desirable.

The Lagos State Street Trading and Illegal Markets Prohibition Law, along with the Nigerian Criminal Code Act, provides the legal basis for arresting individuals who occupy public spaces for unauthorised activity.⁸ When enforcement is triggered, arrested individuals are processed through magistrate courts, held briefly, and, according to government officials, “profiled and transferred to appropriate government agencies” for social intervention.⁹ Academic research examining this pipeline has found it to be, in practice, circular. Recidivism rates among those who cycle through Lagos’ arrest-and-detention system remain high, with rehabilitation programs consistently failing to provide the housing, income support, or mental health services that would allow an individual to leave the street permanently.¹⁰

The January 2026 arrests are instructive. 115 people were swept up in a single operation. Twenty-six received three-month jail sentences.¹ What awaited them after release? The same street. The same poverty. The same absence of shelter, welfare support, or economic opportunity that had placed them there to begin with. The operation produced a cleaner pavement for approximately ninety days. It produced nothing else.

The March 2026 arrests introduced a more disturbing dimension: nine out of the 86 people arrested in Agege and Ketu were children.² Children begging on the streets of Lagos are not a law enforcement problem. They are, in their entirety, a child welfare failure, a failure that begins with inadequate investment in child protection services, poverty alleviation, and family support.

This ends, apparently, with a child in the back of a government van. Under the Child Rights Act, any arrest involving a minor should trigger a specific child protection pathway: a welfare assessment, contact with family or guardians, and referral to social services. Whether this pathway is consistently activated in Lagos’ enforcement operations remains publicly undocumented.

The structural argument is not complicated: begging is driven primarily by poverty, disability, displacement, and mental illness, not by choice. Lagos’ enforcement approach arrests the symptom without treating the cause. After arrest, the pipeline leads to a magistrate’s court, brief detention, and return to the street because no sustainable alternative has been created. Meanwhile, enforcement operation budgets are spent on vans and personnel rather than welfare budgets on shelters and services.

Across Lagos, there is no public registry of state-funded shelters for former street beggars. There is no published data on rehabilitation capacity. The Budget for 2025 makes no specific, disaggregated allocation for beggar rehabilitation or homeless shelter provision visible.¹¹

Case Study Two: Policing Open Defecation Without Infrastructure

Open defecation is wrong. It is a first-order public health crisis, with consequences that are severe and disproportionately borne by children and the poor. Cholera, typhoid, and diarrhoea remain persistent threats. In July 2024, a cholera outbreak in Lagos recorded 1,661 suspected cases, 70 confirmed cases, and 58 deaths directly linked to open defecation and contaminated water sources. UNICEF estimates that over 100,000 Nigerian children under five die annually from diarrhoea, with 90 per cent of cases tied to unsafe water and poor sanitation. Open defecation is not a matter of culture or individual negligence; it is a public health emergency. Precisely because of this, an uncomfortable truth must be stated: people cannot be punished for failing to use infrastructure that does not exist.



As of early 2026, Lagos State has approximately 8,710 public toilet units serving a metropolitan population of over 20 million. That translates to roughly one toilet for every 2,300 residents, an alarming ratio on its own. It becomes even more troubling when distribution is taken into account. Of these 8,710 units, about 1,710 are government-built public facilities; roughly 3,000 are located within petrol and gas stations; and only about 150 are situated in markets, with an additional 250 under a private partnership model. These numbers map a system of access that largely bypasses the very places where the need is greatest, that is, the informal settlements, high-density motor parks, and roadside markets.

A PUNCH Healthwise investigation starkly illustrates this gap. Major Lagos motor parks, including Oshodi, Mile 2, and Iyana-Iba, reportedly lack public toilet facilities, leaving thousands of commuters, traders, and transport workers without a viable sanitation option. For the individual arrested for open defecation near a bus park, a prior question demands an answer: Where, exactly, is the nearest public toilet? Is it mapped and accessible? Is it open? Is it affordable? Is it safe, particularly for women, after dark?

The state's response to this deficit has largely taken the form of plans. In November 2024, the government approved the construction of 100 new public toilets on World Toilet Day, a figure so small relative to the need that it reads. In August 2025, a more ambitious plan for 10,000 units was announced, but it remains at the planning stage. Meanwhile, in March 2026, 275 people were arrested for the very behaviour these unbuilt facilities are meant to prevent.

The sequence for just enforcement is straightforward: provide adequate, accessible, and affordable sanitation; invest in public health education; then enforce compliance. Lagos has followed a different order: enforce, announce, enforce again, extend timelines, and enforce once more. Those arrested in the gap between promise and delivery bear the real cost of this approach.

As of 2023, nearly 18 per cent of Nigerians still practice open defecation, ranking the country ninth globally. In a population of 220 million, that amounts to approximately 48 million people. Lagos, as Nigeria's commercial capital and largest city, has the power to set the standard. At present, it is setting the wrong one.

Case Study Three: Makoko: When Urban Order Becomes Domicide

Makoko has always lived with water. What it has not learned to live with is the certainty of return of bulldozers, of fire, of displacement that repeats itself across generations. In the early hours of December 23, 2025, that cycle began again. Excavators, accompanied by armed security personnel, moved into the waterfront community, tearing through wooden homes built on stilts. The Lagos State Government justified the operation as a safety measure to remove structures within a 30-meter corridor along a high-tension power line. But on the ground, the demolition did not stop there. Homes, schools, churches, and small businesses were destroyed far beyond the designated setback.



For residents, the distinction between policy and practice collapsed instantly. What they experienced was not a targeted safety intervention but a sweeping erasure. By early 2026, the scale of the impact had become clear. Human rights experts reported that over 40,000 people were displaced in the Makoko demolition alone.

Other assessments, using narrower counts, documented more than 3,000 homes destroyed and over 10,000 people displaced, reflecting the difficulty of capturing the full extent of loss in a community where population figures are fluid and largely undocumented. What is consistent across all accounts is the humanitarian outcome: thousands rendered homeless, many forced to sleep in canoes, on open streets, or in makeshift shelters built from salvaged debris. The demolitions were not without casualties. Civil society groups and investigations reported at least 12 deaths, including infants, with several linked to the use of tear gas during the operation and subsequent protests. Other reports documented additional fatalities, including newborns and elderly residents, underscoring the human cost of the exercise.

3,000 homes destroyed and over **10,000 people** displaced





Beyond the immediate destruction of shelter, the demolitions dismantled entire systems of livelihood. Makoko is not just a residential settlement; it is a working ecosystem built around fishing, canoe transport, and fish processing. When homes were destroyed, so too were boats, nets, drying racks, and informal markets, erasing both income and the social structures that sustain it.

The international response was swift and unusually direct. In February 2026, United Nations human rights experts condemned the demolitions, warning that such large-scale destruction of homes could amount to domicile, the deliberate destruction of homes, under international law. They also noted that displaced families were left in a “protection vacuum,” without adequate shelter, services, or resettlement plans. This is not an isolated incident. Makoko has faced repeated demolitions in 2005, 2012, and subsequent years, each time displacing thousands.


Across Lagos more broadly, at least 91 forced evictions between 1973 and 2024 have affected over two million residents, embedding displacement as a recurring feature of urban governance rather than an exception.

What the Makoko demolitions reveal is not simply a housing crisis but a deeper contradiction at the heart of the city: a model of urban development that removes the poor in the name of order while offering them no place within the future it is building. In Makoko, the water always returns. But for thousands of its residents, home does not.

Budget Spotlight: What the Numbers Actually Say

Policy is rhetoric until it meets the budget. At that point, the choices become visible. The 2025 Lagos State budget, signed into law on January 9, 2025, totals N3.367 trillion, a figure the governor's office described as a “Budget of Sustainability” committed to, among other things, “social inclusion and human capital development.”²⁷ The budget speech specifically referenced “a safety net for the most disadvantaged in our society” and “targeted programs for vulnerable groups, including women, children, and persons living with disabilities.”²⁸

The sectoral allocation tells a different story:



Sector	2025 Allocation (₦)	% of Budget
General Public Services	₦1,076 billion	32.0%
Health	₦242.6 billion	7.2%
Education	₦235.06 billion	6.9%
Public Order & Safety (Enforcement)	₦122.1 billion	3.6%
Environment	₦235.9 billion	7.0%
Recreation, Culture & Religion	₦73.2 billion	2.2%
Social Protection	₦80.08 billion	2.4%
Housing & Community Amenities	₦236.2 billion	7.01%
TOTAL BUDGET	₦3.367 trillion	100%

The 2025 Budget Implementation Report, which tracks actual expenditure through Q4 2025, adds an additional layer of detail that the headline figures cannot convey. Within the N80.6 billion social protection final budget for 2025, the year-to-date expenditure reached N59.7 billion, a 74% performance rate, leaving 20.9 billion unspent.²⁹ The largest single component was the Old Age subcategory, covering pension obligations through the Lagos State Pension Commission (LASPEC), which recorded only 60.6 per cent performance, the lowest of any Social Protection subcategory, with nearly N19.5 billion unspent.²⁹ This means that even the modest resources allocated to the state's most vulnerable citizens are not being fully delivered.

Under the People with Disabilities (PWD) program, the Office of Disability Affairs, the single MDA received a final budget of just N589.7 million and spent every naira of it.³⁰ That is 0.017 per cent of the total budget, directed toward a population that, by the government's own enforcement actions, clearly requires sustained, structured state support. The procurement of hearing aids and wheelchairs for PWD consumed N31.9 million; entrepreneurship support consumed N82.5 million, line items so small they would barely register as rounding errors in the public order and safety budget.³⁰

The waterfront infrastructure budget, the line items with the most direct relevance to communities like Makoko presents a different problem. The Ministry of Waterfront Infrastructure Development received a Final Budget of N15.6 billion and achieved 90.6 per cent execution, spending N14.2 billion.³¹ However, an examination of specific capital projects reveals that the overwhelming majority of this spending was directed at ferry terminals, shoreline protection for established corridors, and bathymetric surveys. The one line item most directly relevant to social protection, electronic surveillance, solar lighting, and toilets across waterfront schemes, achieved only 40.8 per cent performance, with 352.4 million unspent out of a N595 million allocation.³¹ The infrastructure that would most directly benefit waterfront communities was the infrastructure least likely to be delivered.

The Lagos State Urban Renewal Authority spent N3.4 billion on the Isalegangan redevelopment and N2.6 billion on slum regeneration across the state.³² Against a backdrop of 40,000 people displaced from Makoko with no resettlement plan, these allocations are nothing but inadequate, uncoordinated with affected communities, and overwhelmingly delivered after displacement rather than as an alternative to it.

The budget, when read in full, reveals a state that has made a choice. It has chosen to manage the consequences of poverty rather than invest in reducing it. It has chosen enforcement over provision, visibility management over structural change, and cosmetic urban order over the harder, less photographable work of building a city that actually works for its poorest residents.

What a Genuine Approach Would Look Like

A. Replace Arrest with a Welfare Pipeline for Street Beggars

The international standard for street begging response involves identification through outreach, not arrest; assessment of individual need covering mental health, disability, displacement, and trafficking; referral to appropriate services, including shelter, healthcare, and legal support; and structured economic reintegration. Lagos has the Ministry of Women Affairs and Poverty Alleviation and the Lagos State Social Protection Programme. Both are chronically underfunded and poorly coordinated with enforcement operations. The minimum standard of a just response is a mandatory welfare assessment pathway triggered by any arrest for begging; a public registry of shelter beds with real-time capacity data; and a budget reallocation that shifts resources from arrest operations to welfare provision. The goal must be to get people off the streets and into a life, not to move them from one invisible corner to another.

B. Build Toilets Before Enforcing Toilet Laws

Lagos state's plan for 10,000 public toilet units. This initiative is a good start, but it is a plan announced for a deficit that has existed for decades, while enforcement continues against people living in that deficit today. The minimum standard is a published timeline and a publicly accessible map of planned toilet locations, prioritising informal settlements and motor parks; free access for the lowest-income users; and a moratorium on open defecation enforcement in areas where the nearest public toilet is not within a reasonable distance. Build first. Enforce after.

C. Adopt Slum Upgrading, Not Slum Clearance

Upgrading the Slum is not an abstract ideal; it is a proven, widely studied approach practised in cities such as Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Accra. Rather than displacing communities, it begins with them: involving residents in planning from the outset and delivering essential services—water, sanitation, and electricity, within existing settlements. It includes securing land tenure, limiting demolition to cases where it is truly unavoidable, and ensuring that any such actions are preceded by genuine consultation, adequate notice, fair compensation, and resettlement options that offer comparable living conditions. Crucially, it also recognises and supports the local economies that sustain these communities. In Makoko, this means protecting not just structures but livelihoods, particularly those tied to fishing. The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are not optional guidelines; they are binding standards that should shape how states act.²³

D. Disaggregate the Social Protection Budget

The N80.08 billion Social Protection allocation for 2025 must be broken into publicly trackable line items: how much for shelter, how much for welfare transfers, how much for disability support, how much for children in need of care, and how much for post-arrest rehabilitation. Without this disaggregation, which is currently absent from the budget and the published sectoral breakdown, there is no way for citizens, legislators, or civil society to hold the government accountable for whether any of this money reaches the people it is intended for. Budget opacity is not an administrative inconvenience. It is an accountability failure.

Who Is This City Being Built For?



Somewhere in Agege, a nine-year-old child who was arrested in an environmental enforcement sweep is cycling through a system that has no plan for her beyond the back of a van and a magistrate's courtroom.

Lagos is a city that has built a light rail line, reclaimed the ocean for luxury estates, and attracted multinational investment. It has demonstrated beyond any doubt that it can build what it chooses. The question is, what does it choose?

Every arrest of a beggar who has no shelter to return to is a choice. Every fine for a person who urinated in the open because no public toilet was reachable is a choice. Every home demolished without a replacement being offered, while a luxury development rises on adjacent land, is a choice. These are not failures of enforcement capacity. They are answers to the question of who this city is being built for.

How a city treats its most vulnerable residents is the truest measure of what it values. A city with 2.4 per cent of its budget directed toward the welfare of its poorest citizens and nearly three times that allocated to enforcing laws against them has not yet answered that question in a way that any of its residents should find acceptable.

References and Footnotes

- ¹ Premium Times (January 27, 2026). "26 street-connected people jailed, 115 beggars arrested in Lagos." premiumtimesng.com
- ² QNC News (March 11, 2026). "Lagos Government Arrests 86 Street Beggars and 12 Miscrants in Enforcement Operation." qncnews.com; African Health Report (March 11, 2026). "Lagos Arrests 107 Beggars in Agege, Ketu."
- ³ The Times Nigeria (March 2026). "Lagos Arrests 275 for Open Defecation Despite 8,710 Public Toilets." thetimes.com.ng
- ⁴ UN OHCHR (February 2026). "Nigeria: UN Experts Condemn Continued Demolitions of Informal Settlements in Lagos." ohchr.org — Over 40,000 people displaced; demolitions began December 23, 2025; "domicide" warning issued.
- ⁵ Lagos State Government (January 9, 2025). "Governor Sanwo-Olu Signs 2025 Appropriation Bill." lagosstategov.com; Channels Television (November 21, 2024). "Sanwo-Olu Presents 3trn 2025 Budget to Lagos Assembly." channelstv.com
- ⁶ Vanguard (February 9, 2025). "No Borrowing: Lagos Targets Increased IGR to Fund 2025 Budget." vanguardngr.com; Lagos State Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget (2025). Y2025 Citizens Budget. lagosmepb.org
- ⁷ Ibid. Public Order and Safety sector allocation: 91.5 billion = 2.72% of 3.367 trillion total budget. Social Protection: 32.8 billion = 0.97%.
- ⁸ Lagos State Street Trading and Illegal Markets Prohibition Law; Nigeria Criminal Code Act, Cap. C38, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004; Ishaq, A. (2023). Lagos State Street Trading & Illegal Markets Prohibition Law – Legal Analysis. African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration, Vol. 7(3), pp. 54–68.
- ⁹ Fatai et al. (2020). Police Enforcement of Anti-Begging Laws in Nigeria.
- ¹⁰ Alamu & Makinde (2019). "Recidivism and the Failure of Rehabilitation Programmes for Street Beggars in Nigeria." Nigerian Correctional Service Research Series; African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration (2024). "A Legal Examination into Eradication of Street Begging in Nigeria." Vol. 7(3).
- ¹¹ Lagos State Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget (2025). Y2025 Citizens Budget. lagosmepb.org — No specific line item for beggar rehabilitation or homeless shelter provision is publicly disaggregated in the Citizens Budget document.
- ¹² HumAngle Media (January 22, 2026). "Nowhere to Shit: Lagos's Toilet Crisis." humanglemedia.com — July 2024 cholera outbreak: 1,661 suspected cases, 70 confirmed, 58 deaths.
- ¹³ UNICEF Nigeria (2022). Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Report — Nigeria. "More than 100,000 Nigerian children under five die annually from diarrhoea; 90% linked to unsafe water and poor sanitation."
- ¹⁴ The Times Nigeria (March 2026). Op. cit. — 8,710 public toilet units across Lagos metropolitan area.
- ¹⁵ Premium Times (November 20, 2025). "Lagos Reaffirms Push to End Open Defecation by 2030." premiumtimesng.com — Breakdown: 1,710 government-built; ~3,000 in petrol/gas stations; 150 in markets; 250 under private partnership.
- ¹⁶ Punch Healthwise (August 22, 2025). "Open Defecation: Lagos to Build 10,000 Public Toilets after PUNCH Healthwise Report." healthwise.punchng.com — Oshodi, Mile 2, and Iyana-Iba motor parks documented to lack public toilet facilities.
- ¹⁷ Nairametrics (November 19, 2024). "Lagos Govt Approves Construction of 100 New Public Toilets to Tackle Open Defecation." nairametrics.com
- ¹⁸ Prime Progress Nigeria (August 25, 2025). "Lagos' Ambitious Battle Against Open Defecation." primeprogressng.com — 10,000-unit public toilet plan announced; still at planning stage as of 2026 enforcement operations.
- ¹⁹ HumAngle Media (January 22, 2026). Op. cit. — Nearly 18% of Nigerians (~48 million people) still practising open defecation; Nigeria ranked ninth globally.
- ²⁰ Aderoju, O. (2021). UCLG-CISDP. "Forced Evictions and Lagos Mega-City Creation." — Community leader killed during 2012 demolition; process halted after five days due to international outcry.
- ²¹ African Elements (February 2026). "Why Forced Evictions Continue in Lagos." — Otodo-Gbame 2016–17: over 30,000 displaced; security forces burned community; people drowned in Lagos Lagoon; court orders ignored.
- ²² CAPPAA — Corporate Accountability and Public Participation Africa (January 25, 2026). "Lagos State's Systemic, Illegal, Cruel and Deceitful Forced Evictions: A Demand for Justice." cappaafrica.org — At least 12 deaths including two infants reportedly from tear gas.
- ²³ UN-Habitat / OHCHR. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 1998); UN CESCR General Comment No. 7 (1997) on Forced Evictions; UN CESCR General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing.
- ²⁴ Lagos State High Court (2017), as cited in CAPPAA (2026) Joint CSO Statement. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Section 34 — Right to Dignity of the Human Person.
- ²⁵ ISS Africa (2026). "Deadly Forced Evictions Add to the Security Crisis in Lagos." issafrica.org — 91 forced evictions in Lagos from 1973 to 2024; over 2 million residents directly affected.
- ²⁶ EnviroNews Nigeria (January 11, 2026). "Worry as Forced Eviction of Lagos Waterfront Communities Threatens Thousands." environewsigeria.com — FBT Coral Estate Limited luxury sandfilling documented on adjacent land between high-tension powerline and Third Mainland Bridge.
- ²⁷ Lagos State Government (January 9, 2025). 2025 Appropriation Bill signing. Budget themed "Budget of Sustainability" structured around five pillars including "Social Inclusion and Human Capital Development."
- ²⁸ Channels Television (November 21, 2024). Op. cit. — Budget speech referenced "safety net for the most disadvantaged" and "targeted programs for vulnerable groups."
- ²⁹ Lagos State Government. Budget Implementation Report Q4 2025. Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, Lagos. Social Protection YTD: N59,670,585,680.06 (74.0% of N80,656,301,992.36 final budget). Old Age sub-category: 60.6% performance; 19,472,799,126.98 unspent.
- ³⁰ Ibid. Office of Disability Affairs Final Budget: 589,672,899.62; YTD Actual: 589,672,899.62 (100% performance). Capital line items: PWD equipment procurement N31,872,899.62; PWD entrepreneurship support 82,500,000.00. Total MDA allocation = 0.017% of 3.367 trillion total budget.
- ³¹ Ibid. Ministry of Waterfront Infrastructure Development. Final Budget: 15,613,757,798.34; YTD Actual: 14,152,987,573.20 (90.6% performance). Waterfront community amenities sub-item (electronic surveillance, solar lighting, and toilets across waterfront schemes): Final Budget 595,269,750.00; YTD N242,907,900.00 (40.8% performance); Balance unspent: 352,361,850.00.
- ³² Ibid. Lagos State Urban Renewal Authority (LASURA). Isalegangan Redevelopment: 3,354,731,752.00 (100% performance). Slum Regeneration/Degeneration Statewide: 2,620,164,607.00 (100% performance).

4

Ways You can Support CISD

Read Our Research

Explore evidence that
informs better
governance.



Join The Conversation

Attend our events and
contribute to policy
discussions.



Spread The Message

Help more Nigerians
understand how public
decisions affect everyday
life.



Partner With CISD

Work with us to build
stronger institutions and
more informed
communities.



**Together, we can make governance more
transparent, inclusive, and accountable.**

    @cisdnigeria | www.cisdnigeria.org