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## **Hanoi's potential to learn from Beijing's past experience in addressing air pollution caused by vehicle emissions.**

### **Abstract**

Air pollution is a major environmental problem across the world, especially in developing countries, and Vietnam is no exception. A national political and economic hub, Hanoi is facing severe pollution, even topping the global chart of most polluted cities in early 2025. Current levels of air pollution in Hanoi are exceptionally high, with research indicating vehicles are the primary factor. This situation mirrors the past experience of Beijing, a famous success story in addressing air pollution through constant regulatory adjustments. This paper reviews previous academic studies and news articles to produce a comprehensive table that compares policies implemented in each city. It also gathers PM<sub>2.5</sub> levels in both cities to show that Hanoi's values exceeded those of Beijing in recent years, suggesting a lack of timely, effective policies. The analyses conclude that some of Beijing's policies may be suitable for Hanoi to apply locally, such as low-emission zones (LEZs) establishment, scrappage programs and camera-based law enforcement. Other strategies like the license-plate lottery or last-digit bans, by contrast, appear impractical for adoption. Ultimately, these findings are intended to guide Vietnamese policymakers in tackling air pollution more effectively.

**Keywords:** air pollution, PM<sub>2.5</sub>, transportation, policy, Hanoi, Beijing.

### **1. Introduction**

Despite its current relatively low urban population, Southeast Asia has been experiencing rapid urban growth (Das & Paul, 2021). This trend is reflected by the case of Vietnam: in 1986, Vietnam's urban population was under 13 million, but by 2019, it reached 37 million (World Bank, 2020). Given that Vietnam's national transport structure—characterized by space constraints and inadequate infrastructure—is strongly conducive to personal vehicle use, a growth in population likely increases private vehicle ownerships, specifically cars and motorbikes. In 2011, the numbers of registered cars and motorbikes in Hanoi were estimated at 235,000 and 4 million, respectively.

Thanks to Hanoi's strikingly high growth rates of vehicle ownership (22.8% for cars and 13.1% for motorbikes, annually) (Bray & Holyoak, 2015), local traffic emissions of CO, NO<sub>x</sub>, Particulate Matter (PM), and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the city have increased such that they became the primary factor behind air deterioration in Hanoi (Sakamoto et al., 2018). Therefore, it is important that the municipal government address air pollution with a focus on transportation, particularly through policy implementation.

Otherwise, public health as well as the sustainability of urban environments may be put at serious risk.

Colonized by China for over a millenium, Vietnam has been subject to heavy Chinese influences in culture, customs, and religions; politically, both countries are socialist states led by their respective Communist party. Nevertheless, a divergence emerges when it comes to present air quality. On one hand, China has remarkably progressed in tackling air pollution through enforcement since its 2014 declaration of a “war against air pollution”. Statistics have shown sharp declines in PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5µm or less), NO<sub>2</sub> (Nitrogen Dioxide), SO<sub>2</sub> (Sulfur Dioxide) and CO (Carbon Monoxide) nationwide (Silver et al., 2025). On the other hand, Vietnam was listed as the second most polluted country in Southeast Asia by IQAir, a world leader in air quality apps. Its capital, Hanoi, was named the eighth most polluted city in the world (Unicef, 2024). As a result, an essential question arises: Can air pollution control policies from China be applied to Vietnam, and if so, to what degree? Considering the status of this issue in both countries, it is advisable for Vietnam to look at the key drivers of China’s success so far in combating air pollution and see whether they are applicable in the Vietnamese context.

While many studies dedicated to air pollution have examined China and Vietnam separately, no research on this topic covering both nations has been conducted. Hence, this paper aims to offer an overview of the recent battle against air pollution in both countries, thereby drawing lessons for application to the Vietnamese context. By reviewing the scholarly literature, this paper, with a focus on Beijing (China) and Hanoi (Vietnam), examines the current state of air pollution in both cities. It also compares their transport-related anti-air pollution policies and identifies Hanoi’s areas for improvement based on Beijing’s past experience while accounting for certain limitations in policy transfer between the two cities.

## **2. Methodological Approach**

In order to understand air pollution policies of Hanoi and Beijing, a scoping review was conducted using Google Scholar and Google News to search for previous studies in the field, as well as recent regulatory updates of the government. In this paper, major policy changes were introduced, briefly summarized, and then compared in light of municipal differences in socioeconomic and political contexts.


## **3. What does recent data show?**

To analyze the most recent trends in air pollution for Hanoi and Beijing, this paper used PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations—a widely adopted metric for air quality assessments—as the key indicator. In the United States, PM<sub>2.5</sub> is classified as one of the criteria air pollutants under the Clean Air Act (1971), which helped establish safe levels of pollutants in the National

Ambient Air Quality Standards (Suh et al., 2000). These fine particles are also considered a major cause of premature death and illness, and no PM2.5 threshold for absolute safety against adverse health effects has been determined (Yu et al., 2023). Moreover, in its updated Air Quality Guidelines (2021), the World Health Organization (WHO) recognised PM2.5 as a classical air pollutant and recommended a threshold of 5  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  for annual PM2.5 levels exposure. Additionally, concentrations of PM2.5, alongside PM10, are made Indicator 11.6.2 under Target 11.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aims to reduce cities' negative environmental impact.

This review compares the quarterly average of PM2.5 from 2016 to 2024 in Beijing and in Hanoi to understand how and to what extent the policies reviewed in each city may have impacted air quality. In order to account for the huge difference between Beijing's and Hanoi's sizes of urban population, the quarterly average PM2.5 concentrations are evaluated per capita ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3/\text{person}$ ) for a fairer assessment and comparison (Figure 1).

### PM2.5 PER CAPITA IN BEIJING AND HANOI



**Figure 1** PM2.5 concentrations per capita in Beijing and Hanoi, June 2016 to September 2024

Both cities show strong seasonality, but Hanoi's is generally higher and more volatile. The most pronounced spikes occur in late 2017–early 2018, with winter peaks in 2018–2019 and 2020–2021. Dips occurred around mid-2020 and mid-2021, which likely reflected pandemic-era slowdowns, were followed by a rebound in late-2021. From 2022 onwards,

most of Beijing's values were between ~2–4  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  with smaller seasonal swings, whereas those of Hanoi were higher, roughly ~4–6  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  with occasional winter bumps. Overall, while Beijing's amplitude seems to have dampened over time, Hanoi's remains high with less evidence of a structural step-down. These patterns suggest the effectiveness of Beijing's measures, and imply that Hanoi still has substantial challenges to resolve.

Taken against policy timing, the contrast is consistent with each city's strategy. Beijing's earlier fuel and vehicle controls, scrapping of high emitters, and long-running traffic restrictions align with a lower baseline and smaller seasonal peaks in recent years (Yang et al., 2015). Hanoi's 2019–2021 actions targeted household fuels and open burning, which likely helped curb the most extreme spikes seen in 2017–2018, but its transport levers (motorbike testing, LEZ/cordons) only begin in 2025–2028, so an extensive, durable transport-driven drop is yet to be observed in the series (Vietnam News, 2023; Vietnam News, 2019; Vietnam News, 2024; Vu Tuan, 2025). In short: Beijing resembles a mature, policy-stabilized regime; Hanoi appears mid-transition, with time needed for transport measures to prove their efficacy.

Health-wise, the World Health Organization's annual guideline on PM<sub>2.5</sub> is 5  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . Recent months' PM<sub>2.5</sub> levels in Beijing often fall near or below that threshold; meanwhile, Hanoi still records many months above it. That said, month-to-month variation reflects weather and region-wide influences (e.g., stagnation events, biomass burning), so regulatory effects are better analyzed from sustained changes than single spikes.

#### **4. A brief review of Beijing's major transport-related air pollution policies**

Beijing's set of actions against vehicular air pollution has developed over more than two decades, characterized by a structured framework across five key fronts: fuel quality and vapor recovery, vehicle emission controls, traffic management, compliance, and alternative-fuel fleets (Environment, 2019; Wu et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015). The city's effort marked its beginning with the 1997 *Strategies and Implementation Plan for Controlling Motor Vehicle Emissions in Beijing*, which served as the cornerstone for applying Euro-equivalent standards to all newly registered vehicles starting in 1999 (Yang et al., 2015). From 1999 to 2015, Beijing took complementary measures targeted at both new and in-use vehicle emissions while controlling how, when, and which vehicles could access the urban centre (Environment, 2019; Yang et al., 2015).

On fuels, Beijing acted earlier and more aggressively than stipulated by national requirements. It first banned lead and then limited sulfur content in fuel, enabling modern after-treatment technologies (Yang et al., 2015). Within less than two decades, the city replaced poorly quality-controlled fuel with lead-free gasoline and diesel capped at 10 ppm sulfur, facilitating sizable tailpipe reductions. Beijing also addressed evaporative losses by

mandating Stage I and Stage II gasoline vapor recovery at filling stations beginning in 2000, three years ahead of national rules. In 2007, Beijing funded a large-scale retrofit program that equipped over 1,000 stations and tanker trucks with the required vapor recovery systems for the 2008 Olympics, cutting VOC emissions by an estimated 20,000 metric tons annually (Fung & Maxwell, 2011; Z. Yang et al., 2015).

Emission standards for both light-duty gasoline and heavy-duty diesel vehicles (China I-V and China 1-5, respectively) were adopted by Beijing in an accelerated manner, helping to close its gap with the EU and U.S. as well as reduce new-vehicle emissions (Environment, 2019). To manage the in-use fleet, the city successfully utilized a color-labeling system that laid the groundwork for subsequent scrappage and retrofitting programs. Scrappage programs were carried out in phases, restricting certain types of vehicle from entering central areas and providing subsidies that encouraged the retirement of high emitters (Environment, 2019; Wu et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015). Meanwhile, despite several preliminary pilot programs, retrofits (e.g. three-way catalysts, flexible-fuel engines, diesel particulate filters) met with mixed reception due to their transient benefits but high operation-maintenance costs and limited lifespan (Yang et al., 2015).

Traffic control policies implemented by the Beijing government have significantly decreased demand for and access to new vehicles. In 2011 the city initiated its license-plate lottery to cap new registrations, and the average 26-month queue time to be given an official plate reduced winners' likelihood of actually switching to driving by 16% (J. Yang et al., 2014). The city also enacted several restrictions: spatially, motorcycles are prohibited within the Fourth Ring Road, and yellow-label vehicles have been fully forbidden from the metropolitan area since late 2014 (Z. Yang et al., 2015; The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015); temporally, weekday "last-digit" driving restrictions—which ban vehicles from entering the Fifth Ring Road on designated days according to their license-plate numbers—were first piloted for the 2008 Olympics. Afterwards, they were extended due to their effectiveness, and have continued to help manage peak-hour traffic ever since. For non-local vehicles (excluding already-banned yellow-label vehicles), a provisional City Pass is required to access the Sixth Ring Road; otherwise, they can only travel beyond the Sixth Ring Road from midnight to 6 a.m. (Beijing Municipal Government, 2025; Z. Yang et al., 2015).

Compliance measures were implemented to augment these aforementioned controls. Beijing's inspection-and-maintenance (I/M) program mandates periodic safety and emissions testing. National and local guidelines were introduced to standardize procedures and verification of type-approval criteria; testing intervals vary depending on vehicle type and age (Z. Yang et al., 2015). Concurrently, roadside remote sensing contributes to enhanced enforcement by spotting high-emitting vehicles, tracking fleet trends, and

checking I/M program performance despite its inaccuracies in monitoring vehicles individually (Z. Yang et al., 2015). However, loopholes exist: old, unqualified vehicles may slip in ring-road boundaries; some Beijing-registered vehicles may refuel outside the city, where sulfur levels are higher because of inadequate regulation. Both of these scenarios can increase real-world emissions and risk catalyst failure, thus calling for regionally coordinated policies on fuel standards and enforcement to ensure enhanced regulatory efficacy (Zhang et al., 2014).

Finally, Beijing coupled restrictions with cleaner, more sustainable vehicle technologies. The city has strongly promoted new energy vehicles (NEVs) and built one of the world's largest fleets of natural-gas buses, employing both CNG and LNG, technologies that cut life-cycle CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 18-25% compared to gasoline buses (Hao et al., 2016). In an attempt to foster NEV adoption among its citizens, the government released a separate license plate cap for this type of vehicle (Z. Yang et al., 2015). Together, these complementary measures—including cleaner fuels, tighter standards, targeted scrappage, access controls, rigorous compliance tools, and alternative-fuel deployment—create the backbone of Beijing's transport-focused anti-air pollution strategy.

## **5. A brief review of Hanoi's major air pollution policies**

This section reviews Hanoi's city-level efforts to curb transport-related air pollution from mid-2000s to 2025. Due to the recent nature of Hanoi's policies targeted at vehicular air pollution, it also briefly examines related measures, such as the charcoal stoves ban and control on open burning, as key drivers of observed air-quality trends in Hanoi.

The backbone of Hanoi's approach has been a 2017 People's Council resolution to rein in private motorbikes (Nguyen Thuy, 2017), followed by legal authority in the revised Capital Law (effective from 2025) that lets the city create low-emission zones and apply more stringent rules on local vehicles (Ngoc Mai - Nguyen Quy, 2025). In parallel, Hanoi banned honeycomb charcoal stoves, curbed open burning, and began relocating polluting factories out of the urban core, while upgrading its monitoring and enforcement toolkit (Vietnam News, 2019; Vietnam News, 2023; Vietnamnet, 2021).

Unlike Beijing's early fuel-quality push, Hanoi's most impactful fuel actions have targeted household sources. In late 2019 the Chairman of the People's Committee ordered the elimination of honeycomb (beehive) charcoal stoves, which the city had identified as a major PM contributor in dense districts (Vietnam News, 2019). In September 2020, a law under Instruction 15/CT-UBND formally banned the open burning of agricultural residues (notably rice straw) and trash; subsequent reporting highlights both the rule and the continuing enforcement challenge in suburban districts (Vietnam News, 2023). To ensure household-fuel compliance, Hanoi's 2019 stove directive shifted from education and

support in 2020 to penalties from 2021, with enforcement handled by the city's environmental protection units (Vietnam News, 2019). For open burning, Instruction 15/CT-UBND tasks the Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) and district authorities with inspections and sanctions, though coverage gaps remain in peri-urban rice areas (Vietnam News, 2023). The city has also run a long-standing program to relocate polluting factories away from central districts; by 2021 it had listed around 90 establishments for removal and reported partial progress, with the program continuing as sites and financing line up (Vietnamnet, 2021).

For new policy architecture, Hanoi's 2017 People's Council resolution laid out a phased restriction on motorbike circulation through 2030, explicitly linking traffic control to air-quality gains and public-transport expansion (Nguyen Thuy, 2017). The 2024 Capital Law then empowered Hanoi to set low-emission zones (LEZs) and adopt stricter local emissions measures; pilots are slated in central districts from January 1, 2025, prioritizing cleaner vehicles and public transport access (Ngoc Mai - Nguyen Quy, 2025). Translating framework into timelines, the city has announced a staged ban on fossil-fuel motorbikes: a first cordon within Ring Road 1 from July 1, 2026, expanding to tighter two-wheel and car restrictions between Rings 1-2 from January 1, 2028 (Vu Tuan, 2025).

In parallel, Hanoi is preparing periodic emissions testing for in-use motorbikes, with a national roadmap pointing to a Hanoi/HCMC start in 2027 and phased coverage by model year thereafter (Vietnam News, 2025). Hanoi's LEZ pilots operationalize zone-based access management, restricting high-emitting fossil-fuel vehicles in core districts, pairing the rule with investment in public transport and charging (Ngoc Mai - Nguyen Quy, 2025). The Capital Law text and city briefings emphasize LEZ authority, phased expansion after 2030, and the use of fees/charges to reinforce behavior change (Ngoc Mai - Nguyen Quy, 2025). These zone-based controls complement the 2017 resolution's longer-run intent to progressively limit motorbike circulation citywide as transit supply improves.

In terms of public transport, to align access rules with cleaner fleets, Hanoi has adopted a green-bus roadmap: targets announced in 2025 aim for a full switch to electric/green-energy buses by 2030, with interim milestones ( $\approx 10\%$  in 2025; 20-23% in 2026) and supporting infrastructure/finance measures (Vietnam News, 2024). Several statements and press briefings also reference taxi electrification by 2030 (some sources cite "all taxis," others "at least 50% buses and all taxis"), reflecting evolving targets as plans are finalized (Vietnam News, 2024). Earlier than these transport measures, Hanoi set a foundation for monitoring and dust control: Decision 355/QĐ-UBND (Jan 13, 2012) approved a fixed air-quality monitoring network to 2020, while Decision 02/2005/QĐ-UB and Decision 55/2009/QĐ-UBND require construction sites to control dust and maintain

sanitation. These actions were important for PM reductions alongside traffic measures (Vietnam News, 2022).

## **6. Comparison of Beijing and Hanoi's air pollution approaches**

Overall, Beijing and Hanoi are working towards the same objective, cleaner air, but with different approaches. Beijing started early by addressing what enters the tank. It pushed cleaner fuels (down to 10 ppm sulfur and no lead) and required gas stations to capture gasoline vapors, which allows modern emissions equipment to work better. Meanwhile, Hanoi can't set its own fuel rules (those are nationally determined), so its new powers focus on access: starting in 2025, the city uses low-emission zones (LEZs) and road "cordons" to favor cleaner vehicles in key areas.

For new and in-use vehicles, Beijing moved faster in implementing standards and enforced them more rigorously. It introduced strict limits for new cars and trucks; used a color-label system, roadside remote sensing; and ran an inspection/maintenance program to identify and retire the most polluting vehicles. Hanoi follows national standards for new vehicles and is now developing its enforcement tools: periodic emissions testing for motorbikes slated for 2027 (which are piloted in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City before expansion).

Traffic management also reflects different strategies. Beijing limits car ownership with a license-plate lottery (since 2011), lays down weekday "last-digit" driving rules, bans motorcycles inside the 4th Ring Road, and keeps high-emitting yellow-label vehicles out entirely. Hanoi, by contrast, doesn't use lotteries or last-digit rules; instead, it's restricting in phases where higher-emitting vehicles can go: a 2017 decision sets up a phase-out of gasoline motorbikes in the urban core by 2030, with a firm cordon inside Ring Road 1 on July 1, 2026, and a wider zone in 2028. LEZs will then scale up thereafter.

Beyond traffic, while Beijing's headline moves were mostly on-road, Hanoi prioritized major non-traffic contributors inside the city: it eliminated honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021 and banned open burning of crop waste and trash from 2020. Both cities are also pushing cleaner fleets, but in different ways: Beijing built large CNG/LNG and NEV programs whereas Hanoi is linking bus and taxi electrification to its LEZ and cordon timelines toward 2030.

On monitoring and enforcement, Beijing already has a mature system: an extensive air-quality network, roadside testing, and large scrappage programs. Hanoi has a city AQ (air quality) network and district enforcement teams for stove and burning bans, and upcoming testing centers to police motorbike emissions.

Beijing’s model is largely based on technological upgrade and strict enforcement with controls on when and how many cars can drive. Hanoi’s model is based on zones and access rules, paired with household-fuel crackdowns and a staged build-out of emissions testing, reflecting its more limited regulatory authority and later policy start.

Based on these comparisons, a comprehensive table was created (Table 1).

Air Pollution Policy/Strategy	Beijing	Hanoi
Fuel quality & vapor recovery	Led the nation on cleaner fuels (to 10 ppm sulfur) and gas-station Stage I/II vapor recovery with retrofits before the 2008 Olympics.	No city-specific fuel-quality mandates; fuel is set nationally. LEZ authority (2025) can indirectly tighten via access rules.
New-vehicle emission standards	Applied Euro-pathway early (Beijing 1 in 1999 and China 5 by 2013), often ahead of the national timeline.	Follows national standards; new local authority (Capital Law 2025) to set tighter access by emission tier within LEZs.
In-use vehicle controls (I/M, remote sensing)	Robust I/M and roadside remote sensing; color label system (green/yellow) enabled targeted scrappage.	Periodic emissions testing for motorbikes slated to begin in 2027 (Hanoi/HCMC first), phasing nationwide by 2030.
Traffic control and usage restrictions	Odd-even/last-digit weekday restrictions started during the 2008 Olympics and continued (modified).	Not citywide last-digit rules; instead, phased access limits for high-emitting/fossil-fuel vehicles via LEZs and cordons.
Vehicle population control	License-plate lottery since 2011; annual caps tightened (240k to 150k).	No lottery; strategy is to restrict where/when certain vehicles can circulate (zone-based).
Low-emission zones (LEZ)	Piloted YLV bans and zone-based controls; studied broader LEZ in the mid-2010s.	Legal authority from 2025; pilots in central districts from 2025 with expansion after 2030.

Motorbike restrictions	Motorcycles restricted within 4th Ring Road; focus on YLV ban (2014).	2017 resolution to phase out gasoline motorbikes in urban core by 2030; firm cordon inside Ring Road 1 on 1 Jul 2026, expand in 2028.
Alternative-fuel fleets	CNG/LNG bus rollout; NEV promotion, including separate license caps for NEVs.	EV transition targets for public transport/taxis toward 2030 aligned with LEZ/cordon rollout.
Monitoring & enforcement tools	Expanded AQ network; empowered BEPB for roadside testing; strong scrappage programs for YLVs.	City AQ monitoring network; district-level enforcement for stove/open-burning bans; building out motorbike testing centers.
Household fuels & Open burning	Controls exist but less emphasis citywide; focus remained on transport and industry (coal-to-gas campaign was mostly regional/national).	Directive to eliminate honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021 (support in 2020; fines from 2021). Instruction 15/CT-UBND (Sep 2020) bans open burning of agricultural waste and trash; ongoing enforcement.

**Table 1.** Beijing and Hanoi’s transport-related policies targeted at air pollution

**7. Discussion:**

Ultimately, the review of policies and recent data show that Beijing has experienced a steady decline in PM2.5 per capita. This trend reflects the relative success of Beijing’s efforts to tackle air pollution. On the contrary, Hanoi’s PM2.5 per capita values fluctuated more dramatically throughout the recorded period, displaying a stable or slightly upward trend over the last 4 years. This suggests that air pollution in the city remains insufficiently addressed or is worsening. Furthermore, among the 100 months illustrated in the chart, Hanoi’s PM2.5 per Capita exceeded Beijing’s in 70% of the cases. This reality serves as a wake-up call for Hanoi, urging it to take prompt action or risk the city’s public health and environment.

Hanoi can clean up its air, but it needs to introduce its new measures in a logical sequence and reinforce them with steady enforcement. Beijing’s success in tackling vehicular air pollution highlights that progress comes from a set of actions maintained over the years. They include tight vehicle regulations, clear restrictions on where gross-emitting vehicles can operate, and rigorous follow-through. While Hanoi has already addressed several

non-traffic sources, such as charcoal “honeycomb” stoves and open burning, its next goal should be to implement low-emission zones (LEZs) and inner-city cordons in a straightforward, equitable, and consistent way.

However, to be more impactful, some policies could be transferred or adapted from Beijing to Hanoi. For instance, zone access with clear rules. Hanoi could start small (inside Ring Road 1), expand on a published schedule, and use cameras so enforcement needn’t depend on spot checks. Additionally, Hanoi could target the worst polluters first and use emissions testing (and quick roadside checks where possible) to find “super-emitters,” then offer trade-in or scrappage bonuses tied to cleaner replacements—ideally electric motorbikes. Hanoi could also make compliance easy by standardizing inspection procedures then linking test results to LEZ access, and storing everything digitally for better organization.

However, it should be emphasized that a difference in cultural contexts between Beijing and Hanoi does exist. Thus, there are some policies that were successful in Beijing, but would likely not be successful in Hanoi. For example, Beijing’s license-plate lottery and weekday last-digit bans worked there, but they’re not a great fit for Hanoi. Hanoi is a motorbike city, and many people use their bikes to earn a living. Limiting how many vehicles exist (lottery) or which plates can drive on a given day (last-digit) could hit lower-income riders the hardest and deliver less air-quality benefit than smarter where-you-can-go rules. Also, Beijing could order cleaner fuel and early vapor recovery systems at gas stations; however, Hanoi can’t set fuel specs on its own. Instead, it should push nationally for those changes while using city purchasing (e-buses, e-taxis, municipal fleets) to promote cleaner technologies into the market.

Local context matters. To keep the transition fair, any LEZ should include subsidies in the form of hardship exemptions, vouchers or micro-loans to help riders switch to cleaner motorbikes, and practical charging or battery-swap options in dense neighborhoods. Hanoi’s budgets and staffing are more limited than Beijing’s, so it is recommended that Hanoi roll out cameras, test centers, scrappage funding in phases and clearly signal what’s coming ahead a sufficient amount of time (e.g., 2026 inner cordon, 2028 expansion). It should keep working on non-traffic sources too: make the open-burning ban doable by funding straw collection and alternative uses (compost, biochar), and continue moving heavy industry out of residential districts.

## **8. Conclusion**

In this paper, I examined the current status of air pollution in Hanoi and Beijing from mid-2016 to mid-2024, using PM<sub>2.5</sub> as the core metric. The findings suggested that: while Beijing has successfully mitigated the impacts of air pollution through rigorous regulatory measures, Hanoi is lagging behind. Policies aimed at improving air quality were then

reviewed for both cities, focusing on transport-related measures for Beijing and a broader range of fields for Hanoi. A thorough table was compiled, categorizing and contrasting policies in both cities. Main differences in each category were then identified and briefly discussed. Subsequently, Beijing's policies were assessed if they are suitable for Hanoi's local application, proposing the municipal government with recommendations for air pollution abatement. The review also took into account cultural and socioeconomic factors to outline potential adjustments for effective policy adoption.

This comparative survey aims to help Vietnam and other countries streamline existing policies to accelerate progress towards better air quality through transport measures. Nevertheless, there are certain shortcomings in this study that can be resolved in future research. First, air pollution in Hanoi and Beijing is evaluated exclusively through PM2.5 values, which may overlook the significance of other pollutants in degraded air quality and risk oversimplifying their relationships. Second, improvements in Beijing's air quality may have been the collective efforts of multiple sectors, not transport alone. Thus, it is recommended that extensive studies covering policies across various sectors be conducted for a more comprehensive understanding. Still, this paper serves as an introduction to comparative air pollution and related policies in Hanoi and Beijing, laying the foundation for further studies into this topic and aiding Hanoi in its ongoing battle against air pollution.

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This is a promising paper with a timely, relevant topic and well-structured argument. The research question is clear, the paper is well-organized, and the narrative is both clear and strong throughout. The paper features a good synthesis of existing scholarship, with draws from peer-reviewed sources, international reports, and government documents, showing extensive and real research effort. Generally speaking, the trajectories of Beijing and Hanoi's trajectories in terms of air pollution appear to be pretty accurate, fairly nuanced, and well-described in the paper.

However, before we can send it to peer review, we need clarification on (and perhaps expansion to) the methodology (mainly the use of PM2.5 per capita to quantify emissions), a more formal academic tone, and slightly stronger engagement with the literature and limitations. While we believe that these relatively minor fixes could be fixed upon peer review with *Convergence Journal* (and peer reviewers are well-placed to critique and guide the author to fix these things), we believe that the paper will leave a stronger first impression with them and benefit upon further revisions after these initial fixes have been taken:

1. The unconventional yet interesting PM2.5 per capita metric could perplex reviewers, even though it makes sense when trying to connect environmental concerns with sociopolitical ones. The author should clarify or justify this metric before review.
  - a. Where else has this been used in the literature? Could you discuss this a bit more. Since PM2.5 alone is a bit more common, it might be good to actually feature both values.
  - b. (Optional) maybe you can include at least one additional pollutant, such as NO<sub>2</sub> or O<sub>3</sub>, in your analyses/discussion to avoid over-reliance on PM2.5 alone
2. The author should be more careful about how they establish causality between specific policies and PM2.5 trends. After all, many other factors influence air quality, and I am not sure if the data presented account for this. Maybe this should just be mentioned or touched on somewhat!
3. Some of the phrasing seems a bit informal and presents as if you are advocating for policy in a more popular sphere rather than stating more academic, scholarly analysis and synthesis (e.g., "wake-up call," "super-emitters"). This sort of language could be toned down and replaced with more academically precise phrasing. There is nothing wrong with making informed policy recommendations carefully backed up, supported, and tied to evidence, but these should be more formal.
4. The limitations section could be further expanded (influence of meteorology, industrial relocation, regional transport policy)
  - a. This sort of relates to point 2 above. For instance, how do we know that these countries are not just relocating or curbing industries/factories that pollute the inside of cities and moving/expanding production into less populated areas? Or vice-versa?

Overall, this is already a fairly strong submission, but some fairly quick fixes and touch-ups could greatly benefit it if the student is ultimately going to resubmit their paper to *Convergence Journal*.

[Redacted by Managing Editor]

## **Hanoi's potential to learn from Beijing's past experience in addressing air pollution caused by vehicle emissions.**

### **Abstract**

Air pollution is a major environmental problem across the world, especially in developing countries, and Vietnam is no exception. A national political and economic hub, Hanoi is facing severe pollution, even ranked among the world's most polluted cities in early 2025. Current levels of air pollution in Hanoi are exceptionally high, with research indicating vehicles are the primary factor. This situation mirrors the past experience of Beijing, a famous success story in addressing air pollution through constant regulatory adjustments. This paper reviews previous academic studies and news articles to produce a comprehensive table that compares policies implemented in each city. It also gathers PM<sub>2.5</sub> levels in both cities to show that Hanoi's values exceeded those of Beijing in recent years, suggesting a policy gap and delayed responses. The analyses conclude that some of Beijing's policies may be suitable for Hanoi to apply locally, such as low-emission zones (LEZs) establishment, scrappage programs and camera-based law enforcement. Other strategies like the license-plate lottery or last-digit bans, by contrast, appear impractical for adoption. Ultimately, these findings are intended to provide Vietnamese policymakers with regulatory insights to tackle air pollution more effectively.

**Keywords:** air pollution, PM<sub>2.5</sub>, transportation, policy, Hanoi, Beijing.

### **1. Introduction**

Despite its current relatively low urban population, Southeast Asia has been experiencing rapid urban growth (Das & Paul, 2021). This trend is reflected by the case of Vietnam: in 1986, Vietnam's urban population was under 12 million, but by 2019, it reached nearly 37 million (World Bank, 2024). Given that Vietnam's national transport structure—characterized by space constraints and inadequate infrastructure—is strongly conducive to personal vehicle use, a growth in population likely increases private vehicle ownerships, specifically cars and motorbikes. In 2011, the numbers of registered cars and motorbikes in Hanoi were estimated at 235,000 and 4 million, respectively.

Thanks to Hanoi's rapid growth rates of vehicle ownership (22.8% for cars and 13.1% for motorbikes, annually) (Bray & Holyoak, 2015), local traffic emissions of CO, NO<sub>x</sub>, Particulate Matter (PM), and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the city have increased such that they became the primary factor behind the deterioration in Hanoi's air quality (Sakamoto et al., 2018). Therefore, it is important that the municipal government address air pollution with a focus on transportation, particularly through policy

implementation. Otherwise, public health as well as the sustainability of urban environments may be put at risk.

Having been under China's rule for over a millennium, Vietnam has been subject to heavy Chinese influences in culture, customs, and religions; politically, both countries are socialist states led by their respective Communist party. Nevertheless, a divergence emerges when it comes to present air quality. On one hand, China has made substantial progress in tackling air pollution through enforcement since its 2014 declaration of a "war against air pollution". Statistics have shown sharp declines in PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5µm or less), NO<sub>2</sub> (Nitrogen Dioxide), SO<sub>2</sub> (Sulfur Dioxide) and CO (Carbon Monoxide) nationwide (Silver et al., 2025). On the other hand, Vietnam was listed as the second most polluted country in Southeast Asia by IQAir, a world leader in air quality apps. Its capital, Hanoi, was named the eighth most polluted city in the world (UNICEF, 2024). As a result, an essential question arises: Can air pollution control policies from China be applied to Vietnam, and if so, to what degree? Considering the status of this issue in both countries, Vietnam may benefit from investigating the key drivers of China's success so far in combating air pollution and see whether they are applicable in the Vietnamese context.

While many studies dedicated to air pollution have examined China and Vietnam separately, no research on this topic covering both nations has been conducted. Hence, this paper aims to offer an overview of the recent battle against air pollution in both countries, thereby drawing lessons for application to the Vietnamese context. By reviewing the scholarly literature, this paper, with a focus on Beijing (China) and Hanoi (Vietnam), examines the current state of air pollution in both cities. It also compares their transport-related anti-air pollution policies and identifies Hanoi's areas for improvement based on Beijing's past experience while accounting for certain limitations in policy transfer between the two cities.

## **2. Methodological Approach**

In order to understand air pollution policies of Hanoi and Beijing, a scoping review was conducted using Google Scholar and Google News to search for previous studies in the field, as well as recent regulatory updates of the government. In this paper, major policy changes were introduced, briefly summarized, and then compared in light of municipal differences in socioeconomic and political contexts.


## **3. What does recent data show?**

To analyze the most recent trends in air pollution for Hanoi and Beijing, this paper used PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations—a widely adopted metric for air quality assessments—as the key indicator. In the United States, PM<sub>2.5</sub> is classified as one of the criteria air pollutants under

the Clean Air Act (1971), which helped establish safe levels of pollutants in the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Suh et al., 2000). These fine particles are also considered a major cause of premature death and illness, and no PM2.5 threshold for absolute safety against adverse health effects has been determined (Yu et al., 2023). Moreover, in its updated Air Quality Guidelines (2021), the World Health Organization (WHO) recognised PM2.5 as a classical air pollutant and recommended a threshold of 5  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  for annual PM2.5 levels exposure. Additionally, concentrations of PM2.5, alongside PM10, are made Indicator 11.6.2 under Target 11.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aims to reduce cities' negative environmental impact. These statistics serve as background information, providing context for the analysis of air pollution trends in Hanoi and Beijing that form the core focus of this paper.

This review compares the quarterly average of PM2.5 from 2016 to 2024 in Beijing and in Hanoi to understand how and to what extent the policies reviewed in each city may have impacted air quality. In order to account for the huge difference between Beijing's and Hanoi's sizes of urban population, the quarterly average PM2.5 concentrations are evaluated per capita ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3/\text{person}$ ) for a fairer assessment and comparison (Figure 1). PM2.5 per capita refers to the concentration of PM2.5 normalised by population, which offers a measure of individual exposure and allows equitable comparisons across cities with different population sizes. While this approach has not been applied directly to PM2.5, it has been used in other contexts. For example, IPCC's Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023) adopts GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions per capita as a key metric. Likewise, Indicator B-3.1 in the UNECE Guidelines for the Application of Environmental Indicators recommends GHG emissions per capita as a statistical recommendation with a view to "harmonising the absolute value of GHG emissions for international comparisons" (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE], 2025). Extending this precedent to PM2.5, this study employs PM2.5 per capita to provide a more balanced comparison of air quality impacts in Hanoi and Beijing by accounting for their demographic variations (Figure 1).

## PM2.5 PER CAPITA IN BEIJING AND HANOI



**Figure 1** PM2.5 concentrations per capita in Beijing and Hanoi, June 2016 to September 2024

Both cities exhibit strong seasonality, but Hanoi's is generally higher and more volatile. The most pronounced spikes occur in late 2017–early 2018, with winter peaks in 2018–2019 and 2020–2021. Dips occurred around mid-2020 and mid-2021, which likely reflected pandemic-era slowdowns, were followed by a rebound in late-2021. From 2022 onwards, most of Beijing's values were between  $\sim 2\text{--}4\ \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  with smaller seasonal swings, whereas those of Hanoi were higher, roughly  $\sim 4\text{--}6\ \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  with occasional winter bumps. Overall, while Beijing's amplitude seems to have dampened over time, Hanoi's remains high with less evidence of a structural step-down. These patterns suggest the effectiveness of Beijing's measures and imply that Hanoi still has substantial challenges to resolve.

Taken against policy timing, the contrast is consistent with each city's strategy. Beijing's earlier fuel and vehicle controls, scrapping of high emitters, and long-running traffic restrictions align with a lower baseline and smaller seasonal peaks in recent years (Yang et al., 2015). Hanoi's 2019–2021 actions targeted household fuels and open burning, which likely helped curb the most extreme spikes seen in 2017–2018; however, its transport levers (motorbike testing, LEZs/cordons) only begin in 2025–2028, thus, an extensive, sustained transport-driven reduction has not yet been observed in the series (Vietnam News, 2023;

Vietnam News, 2019; Vietnam News, 2024; Vu Tuan, 2025). In short, Beijing resembles a mature, policy-stabilized regime, whereas Hanoi remains in transition with time needed for transport measures to prove their efficiency.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish a direct causality between PM<sub>2.5</sub> fluctuations and specific policy outcomes, as other factors—such as meteorological conditions, regional pollution transport, and biomass burning—may also influence air quality. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to produce a high-level overview of PM<sub>2.5</sub> patterns in both cities, framing them within policy contexts to demonstrate how regulatory trajectories may correspond with observed changes while acknowledging that policy-specific efficacy must be concluded from a wider body of literature and not solely from this high-level PM<sub>2.5</sub> time series.

Health-wise, the World Health Organization's annual guideline on PM<sub>2.5</sub> is 5 µg/m<sup>3</sup>. Recent months' PM<sub>2.5</sub> levels in Beijing often fall near or below that threshold; meanwhile, Hanoi still records many months above it. That said, month-to-month variation can result from temporary events or region-wide influences, so regulatory effects are better analyzed from sustained trends than single spikes.

#### **4. A brief review of Beijing's major transport-related air pollution policies**

Beijing's set of actions against vehicular air pollution has developed over more than two decades, characterized by a structured framework across five key fronts: fuel quality and vapor recovery, vehicle emission controls, traffic management, compliance, and alternative-fuel fleets (UNEP, 2019; Wu et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015). The city's effort marked its beginning with the 1997 *Strategies and Implementation Plan for Controlling Motor Vehicle Emissions in Beijing*, which served as the cornerstone for applying Euro-equivalent standards to all newly registered vehicles starting in 1999 (Yang et al., 2015). From 1999 to 2015, Beijing took complementary measures targeted at both new and in-use vehicle emissions while controlling how, when, and which vehicles could access the urban centre (UNEP, 2019; Yang et al., 2015).

On fuels, Beijing acted earlier and more aggressively than stipulated by national requirements. It first banned lead and then limited sulfur content in fuel, enabling modern after-treatment technologies (Yang et al., 2015). Within less than two decades, the city replaced poorly quality-controlled fuel with lead-free gasoline and diesel capped at 10 ppm sulfur, facilitating sizable tailpipe reductions. Beijing also addressed evaporative losses by mandating Stage I and Stage II gasoline vapor recovery at filling stations beginning in 2000, three years ahead of national rules. In 2007, Beijing funded a large-scale retrofit program that equipped over 1,000 stations and tanker trucks with the required vapor recovery

systems for the 2008 Olympics, cutting VOC emissions by an estimated 20,000 metric tons annually (Fung & Maxwell, 2011; Z. Yang et al., 2015).

Emission standards for both light-duty gasoline and heavy-duty diesel vehicles (China I-V and China 1-5, respectively) were adopted by Beijing in an accelerated manner, helping to close its gap with the EU and U.S. as well as reduce new-vehicle emissions (UNEP, 2019). To manage the in-use fleet, the city successfully utilized a color-labeling system that laid the groundwork for subsequent scrappage and retrofitting programs. Scrappage programs were carried out in phases, restricting certain types of vehicle from entering central areas and providing subsidies that encouraged the retirement of high emitters (UNEP, 2019; Wu et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015). Meanwhile, despite several preliminary pilot programs, retrofits (e.g. three-way catalysts, flexible-fuel engines, diesel particulate filters) met with mixed reception due to their transient benefits but high operation-maintenance costs and limited lifespan (Yang et al., 2015).

Traffic control policies implemented by the Beijing government have significantly decreased demand for and access to new vehicles. In 2011 the city initiated its license-plate lottery to cap new registrations, and the average 26-month queue time to be given an official plate reduced winners' likelihood of actually switching to driving by 16% (J. Yang et al., 2014). The city also enacted several restrictions: spatially, motorcycles are prohibited within the Fourth Ring Road, and yellow-label vehicles have been fully forbidden from the metropolitan area since late 2014 (Z. Yang et al., 2015; The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015); temporally, weekday "last-digit" driving restrictions—which ban vehicles from entering the Fifth Ring Road on designated days according to their license-plate numbers—were first piloted for the 2008 Olympics. Afterwards, they were extended due to their effectiveness, and have continued to help manage peak-hour traffic ever since. For non-local vehicles (excluding already-banned yellow-label vehicles), a provisional City Pass is required to access the Sixth Ring Road; otherwise, they can only travel beyond the Sixth Ring Road from midnight to 6 a.m. (Beijing Municipal Government, 2025; Z. Yang et al., 2015).

Compliance measures were implemented to augment these aforementioned controls. Beijing's inspection-and-maintenance (I/M) program mandates periodic safety and emissions testing. National and local guidelines were introduced to standardize procedures and verification of type-approval criteria; testing intervals vary depending on vehicle type and age (Z. Yang et al., 2015). Concurrently, roadside remote sensing contributes to enhanced enforcement by spotting high-emitting vehicles, tracking fleet trends, and checking I/M program performance despite its inaccuracies in monitoring vehicles individually (Z. Yang et al., 2015). However, loopholes exist: old, unqualified vehicles may slip in ring-road boundaries; some Beijing-registered vehicles may refuel outside the city,

where sulfur levels are higher because of inadequate regulation. Both of these scenarios can increase real-world emissions and risk catalyst failure, thus calling for regionally coordinated policies on fuel standards and enforcement to ensure enhanced regulatory efficacy (Zhang et al., 2014).

Finally, Beijing coupled restrictions with cleaner, more sustainable vehicle technologies. The city has strongly promoted new energy vehicles (NEVs) and built one of the world's largest fleets of natural-gas buses, employing both CNG and LNG, technologies that cut life-cycle CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 18-25% compared to gasoline buses (Hao et al., 2016). In an attempt to foster NEV adoption among its citizens, the government released a separate license plate cap for this type of vehicle (Z. Yang et al., 2015). Together, these complementary measures—including cleaner fuels, tighter standards, targeted scrappage, access controls, rigorous compliance tools, and alternative-fuel deployment—create the backbone of Beijing's transport-focused anti-air pollution strategy.

## **5. A brief review of Hanoi's major air pollution policies**

This section reviews Hanoi's city-level efforts to curb transport-related air pollution from mid-2000s to 2025. Due to the recent nature of Hanoi's policies targeted at vehicular air pollution, it also briefly examines related measures, such as the charcoal stoves ban and control on open burning, as key drivers of observed air-quality trends in Hanoi.

The backbone of Hanoi's approach has been a 2017 People's Council resolution to rein in private motorbikes (Nguyen Thuy, 2017), followed by legal authority in the revised Capital Law (effective from 2025) that lets the city create low-emission zones and apply more stringent rules on local vehicles (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025). In parallel, Hanoi banned honeycomb charcoal stoves, curbed open burning, and began relocating polluting factories out of the urban core, while upgrading its monitoring and enforcement toolkit (Vietnam News, 2019; Vietnam News, 2023; VietNamNet News, 2021).

Unlike Beijing's early fuel-quality push, Hanoi's most impactful fuel actions have targeted household sources. In late 2019 the Chairman of the People's Committee ordered the elimination of honeycomb (beehive) charcoal stoves, which the city had identified as a major PM contributor in dense districts (Vietnam News, 2019). In September 2020, a law under Instruction 15/CT-UBND formally banned the open burning of agricultural residues (notably rice straw) and trash; subsequent reporting highlights both the rule and the continuing enforcement challenge in suburban districts (Vietnam News, 2023). To ensure household-fuel compliance, Hanoi's 2019 stove directive shifted from education and support in 2020 to penalties from 2021, with enforcement handled by the city's environmental protection units (Vietnam News, 2019). For open burning, Instruction 15/CT-UBND tasks the Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) and

district authorities with inspections and sanctions, though coverage gaps remain in peri-urban rice areas (Vietnam News, 2023). The city has also run a long-standing program to relocate polluting factories away from central districts; by 2021 it had listed around 90 establishments for removal and reported partial progress, with the program continuing as sites and financing line up (VietNamNet News, 2021).

For new policy architecture, Hanoi's 2017 People's Council resolution laid out a phased restriction on motorbike circulation through 2030, explicitly linking traffic control to air-quality gains and public-transport expansion (Nguyen Thuy, 2017). The 2024 Capital Law then empowered Hanoi to set low-emission zones (LEZs) and adopt stricter local emissions measures; pilots are slated in central districts from January 1, 2025, prioritizing cleaner vehicles and public transport access (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025). Translating framework into timelines, the city has announced a staged ban on fossil-fuel motorbikes: a first cordon within Ring Road 1 from July 1, 2026, expanding to tighter two-wheel and car restrictions between Rings 1–2 from January 1, 2028 (Vu Tuan, 2025).

In parallel, Hanoi is preparing periodic emissions testing for in-use motorbikes, with a national roadmap pointing to a Hanoi/HCMC start in 2027 and phased coverage by model year thereafter (Vietnam News, 2025). Hanoi's LEZs pilots operationalize zone-based access management, restricting high-emitting fossil-fuel vehicles in core districts, pairing the rule with investment in public transport and charging (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025). The Capital Law text and city briefings emphasize LEZs authority, phased expansion after 2030, and the use of fees/charges to reinforce behavior change (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025). These zone-based controls complement the 2017 resolution's longer-run intent to progressively limit motorbike circulation citywide as transit supply improves.

In terms of public transport, to align access rules with cleaner fleets, Hanoi has adopted a green-bus roadmap: targets announced in 2025 aim for a full switch to electric/green-energy buses by 2030, with interim milestones ( $\approx 10\%$  in 2025; 20–23% in 2026) and supporting infrastructure/finance measures (Vietnam News, 2024). Several statements and press briefings also reference taxi electrification by 2030 (some sources cite “all taxis,” others “at least 50% buses and all taxis”), reflecting evolving targets as plans are finalized (Vietnam News, 2024). Earlier than these transport measures, Hanoi set a foundation for monitoring and dust control. Decision 355/QĐ-UBND (January 13, 2012) approved a fixed air-quality monitoring network to 2020, establishing the city's long-term infrastructure for air-pollution observation (Hanoi People's Committee, 2012). Meanwhile, Decision 02/2005/QĐ-UB and Decision 55/2009/QĐ-UBND required construction sites to control dust and maintain sanitation

(Hanoi People's Committee, 2005; 2009). These actions were important for PM reductions alongside later traffic-related measures.

## **6. Comparison of Beijing and Hanoi's air pollution approaches**

Overall, Beijing and Hanoi are working towards the same objective, cleaner air, but with different approaches. Beijing started early by addressing what enters the tank. It pushed cleaner fuels (down to 10 ppm sulfur and no lead) and required gas stations to capture gasoline vapors, which allows modern emissions equipment to work better. Meanwhile, Hanoi can't set its own fuel rules (those are nationally determined), so its new powers focus on access: starting in 2025, the city uses low-emission zones (LEZs) and road "cordons" to favor cleaner vehicles in key areas.

For new and in-use vehicles, Beijing moved faster in implementing standards and enforced them more rigorously. It introduced strict limits for new cars and trucks; used a color-label system, roadside remote sensing; and ran an inspection/maintenance program to identify and retire the most polluting vehicles. Hanoi follows national standards for new vehicles and is now developing its enforcement tools: periodic emissions testing for motorbikes slated for 2027 (which are piloted in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City before expansion).

Traffic management also reflects different strategies. Beijing limits car ownership with a license-plate lottery (since 2011), lays down weekday "last-digit" driving rules, bans motorcycles inside the 4th Ring Road, and keeps high-emitting yellow-label vehicles out entirely. Hanoi, by contrast, doesn't use lotteries or last-digit rules; instead, it's restricting in phases where higher-emitting vehicles can go: a 2017 decision sets up a phase-out of gasoline motorbikes in the urban core by 2030, with a firm cordon inside Ring Road 1 on July 1, 2026, and a wider zone in 2028. LEZs will then scale up thereafter.

Beyond traffic, while Beijing's headline moves were mostly on-road, Hanoi prioritized major non-traffic contributors inside the city: it eliminated honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021 and banned open burning of crop waste and trash from 2020. Both cities are also pushing cleaner fleets, but in different ways: Beijing built large CNG/LNG and NEV programs whereas Hanoi is linking bus and taxi electrification to its LEZs and cordon timelines toward 2030.

On monitoring and enforcement, Beijing already has a mature system: an extensive air-quality network, roadside testing, and large scrappage programs. Hanoi has a city AQ (air quality) network and district enforcement teams for stove and burning bans, and upcoming testing centers to police motorbike emissions.

Beijing’s model is largely based on technological upgrade and strict enforcement with controls on when and how many cars can drive. Hanoi’s model is based on zones and access rules, paired with household-fuel crackdowns and a staged build-out of emissions testing, reflecting its more limited regulatory authority and later policy start.

Based on these comparisons, a comprehensive table was created (Table 1).

<b>Air Pollution Policy/Strategy</b>	<b>Beijing</b>	<b>Hanoi</b>
Fuel quality & vapor recovery	Led the nation on cleaner fuels (to 10 ppm sulfur) and gas-station Stage I/II vapor recovery with retrofits before the 2008 Olympics.	No city-specific fuel-quality mandates; fuel is set nationally. LEZs authority (2025) can indirectly tighten via access rules.
New-vehicle emission standards	Applied Euro-pathway early (Beijing 1 in 1999 and China 5 by 2013), often ahead of the national timeline.	Follows national standards; new local authority (Capital Law 2025) to set tighter access by emission tier within LEZs.
In-use vehicle controls (I/M, remote sensing)	Robust I/M and roadside remote sensing; color label system (green/yellow) enabled targeted scrappage.	Periodic emissions testing for motorbikes slated to begin in 2027 (Hanoi/HCMC first), phasing nationwide by 2030.
Traffic control and usage restrictions	Odd-even/last-digit weekday restrictions started during the 2008 Olympics and continued (modified).	Not citywide last-digit rules; instead, phased access limits for high-emitting/fossil-fuel vehicles via LEZs and cordons.
Vehicle population control	License-plate lottery since 2011; annual caps tightened (240k to 150k).	No lottery; strategy is to restrict where/when certain vehicles can circulate (zone-based).
Low-emission zones (LEZs)	Piloted YLV bans and zone-based controls; studied broader LEZs in the mid-2010s.	Legal authority from 2025; pilots in central districts from 2025 with expansion after 2030.

Motorbike restrictions	Motorcycles restricted within 4th Ring Road; focus on YLV ban (2014).	2017 resolution to phase out gasoline motorbikes in urban core by 2030; firm cordon inside Ring Road 1 on 1 Jul 2026, expand in 2028.
Alternative-fuel fleets	CNG/LNG bus rollout; NEV promotion, including separate license caps for NEVs.	EV transition targets for public transport/taxis toward 2030 aligned with LEZs/cordon rollout.
Monitoring & enforcement tools	Expanded AQ network; empowered BEPB for roadside testing; strong scrappage programs for YLVs.	City AQ monitoring network; district-level enforcement for stove/open-burning bans; building out motorbike testing centers.
Household fuels & Open burning	Controls exist but less emphasis citywide; focus remained on transport and industry (coal-to-gas campaign was mostly regional/national).	Directive to eliminate honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021 (support in 2020; fines from 2021). Instruction 15/CT-UBND (Sep 2020) bans open burning of agricultural waste and trash; ongoing enforcement.

**Table 1.** Beijing and Hanoi’s transport-related policies targeted at air pollution

**7. Discussion:**

Ultimately, the review of policies and recent data show that Beijing has experienced a steady decline in PM2.5 per capita. This trend reflects the relative success of Beijing’s efforts to tackle air pollution. On the contrary, Hanoi’s PM2.5 per capita values fluctuated more dramatically throughout the recorded period, displaying a stable or slightly upward trend over the last 4 years. This suggests that air pollution in the city remains insufficiently addressed or is worsening. Furthermore, among the 100 months illustrated in the chart, Hanoi’s PM2.5 per Capita exceeded Beijing’s in 70% of the cases. This pattern indicates that air pollution remains a major concern for Hanoi, underscoring the importance of timely government regulations to protect public health and the environment.

Hanoi can improve its air quality, but this means introducing its new measures in a logical sequence and reinforcing them with steady enforcement. Beijing’s success in tackling vehicular air pollution highlights that progress comes from a set of actions maintained over the years. They include tight vehicle regulations, clear restrictions on where high-emitting

vehicles can operate, and rigorous follow-through. While Hanoi has already addressed several non-traffic sources, such as charcoal “honeycomb” stoves and open burning, a recommended next step is to implement low-emission zones (LEZs) and inner-city cordons in a systematic, equitable, and persistent manner. To ensure this transition is socially just, especially for low-income motorbike users, phased implementation must be paired with financial support mechanisms, such as hardship exemptions, vouchers, or micro-loans, to facilitate the switch to cleaner motorbikes.

However, to be more impactful, some policies could be transferred or adapted from Beijing to Hanoi—for instance, zone access with clear rules. Hanoi’s phased implementation could start from within Ring Road 1, followed by a scheduled expansion, and employ cameras to reduce the dependence on manual spot checks for enforcement. Additionally, Hanoi could prioritize the highest polluters for targeting and use emissions testing (and quick roadside checks where possible) to find vehicles with disproportionately high emissions, then offer trade-in or scrappage bonuses tied to cleaner replacements—ideally electric motorbikes. Hanoi could also foster compliance by standardizing inspection procedures then linking test results to LEZs access, and storing everything digitally for better organization.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a difference in cultural contexts between Beijing and Hanoi does exist. Thus, there are some policies that were successful in Beijing, but would be less feasible in Hanoi’s context. For example, Beijing’s license-plate lottery and weekday last-digit bans worked there, but they’re not as suitable for Hanoi. Hanoi is a motorbike city, and many people use their bikes to earn a living. Limiting vehicle operation through lottery or alternating-day license plate permits could adversely affect lower-income riders, many of whom rely on motorcycles for livelihood, while yielding more limited environmental benefits than spatial restrictions. Also, Beijing could order cleaner fuel and early vapor recovery systems at gas stations; however, Hanoi can’t set fuel specs on its own. Instead, it should push nationally for those changes while using city purchasing (e-buses, e-taxis, municipal fleets) to promote cleaner technologies into the market.

It is also crucial that local context be considered. To ensure an equitable transition, LEZs should be accompanied with subsidies like hardship exemptions, vouchers or micro-loans to help riders switch to cleaner motorbikes. In addition, practically sufficient charging or battery-swap options should be offered in dense neighborhoods. Hanoi’s budgets and staffing are more limited than Beijing’s, so it is advisable for Hanoi to roll out cameras, test centers, scrappage funding in phases and clearly signal what’s coming ahead a sufficient amount of time (e.g., 2026 inner cordon, 2028 expansion). It should keep working on non-traffic sources too: facilitate the open-burning ban by funding straw collection and alternative uses (compost, biochar), and continue moving heavy industry out of residential districts.

## **8. Limitations:**

Several limitations should be noted when interpreting these findings. First, PM<sub>2.5</sub> per capita was used as the sole indicator of air quality in this paper, potentially overlooking other air pollutants that also affect public health, such as NO<sub>2</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub>, and VOCs. Second, the study only focuses on Beijing and Hanoi, making the results less appropriate for generalization and transferral to urban contexts with different population densities, infrastructures, or governance systems. Third, while PM<sub>2.5</sub> trends are analysed alongside policy timelines, proving a direct causality is impossible given other external influences on air quality, including industrial relocation, regional pollution transport, weather, and temporary events. Finally, not all policies are transferable across cities due to socioeconomic, cultural, and regulatory variations. Hence, future research could expand to multiple pollutants, additional cities, and cross-sector policy influences for a more comprehensive assessment of urban air quality management.

## **9. Conclusion**

This paper examined the current status of air pollution in Hanoi and Beijing from mid-2016 to mid-2024, using PM<sub>2.5</sub> as the core metric. The findings suggested that: while Beijing has successfully mitigated the impacts of air pollution through rigorous regulatory measures, Hanoi has shown modest progress. Policies aimed at improving air quality were then reviewed for both cities, focusing on transport-related measures for Beijing and a broader range of fields for Hanoi. A thorough table was compiled, categorizing and contrasting policies in both cities. Main differences in each category were then identified and briefly discussed. Subsequently, Beijing's policies were assessed if they are suitable for Hanoi's local application, proposing recommendations for air pollution abatement to the municipal government. The review also took into account cultural and socioeconomic factors to outline potential adjustments for effective policy adoption.

This comparative survey aims to help Vietnam and other countries streamline existing policies to accelerate progress towards better air quality through transport measures. Nevertheless, there are certain shortcomings in this study, which can be resolved in future research. As the analysis is limited to two cities and only focuses on PM<sub>2.5</sub>, future studies should expand to cover multiple pollutants (such as NO<sub>2</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub>, and VOCs) and include additional urban contexts with varying population densities or governance systems to improve generalizability. Furthermore, research should also explore cross-sector policy influences, as improvements in Beijing's air quality resulted from multiple factors, not transport alone, while accounting for the non-transferability of some policies due to socioeconomic and cultural differences. Still, this paper serves as an introduction to comparative air pollution and related policies in Hanoi and Beijing, laying the foundation for further studies into this topic and supporting Hanoi's efforts in mitigating air pollution.

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1 [Name redacted by Managing Editor]

2

3 **Hanoi's potential to learn from Beijing's past experience in addressing air pollution**  
4 **caused by vehicle emissions.**

5

6 **Abstract**

7 Air pollution is a major environmental problem across the world, especially in developing  
8 countries, and Vietnam is no exception. A national political and economic hub, Hanoi is  
9 facing severe pollution, even ranked among the world's most polluted cities in early 2025.  
10 Current levels of air pollution in Hanoi are exceptionally high, with research indicating  
11 vehicles are the primary factor. This situation mirrors the past experience of Beijing, a  
12 famous success story in addressing air pollution through constant regulatory adjustments.  
13 This paper reviews previous academic studies and news articles to produce a  
14 comprehensive table that compares policies implemented in each city. It also gathers  
15 PM2.5 levels in both cities to show that Hanoi's values exceeded those of Beijing in recent  
16 years, suggesting a policy gap and delayed responses. The analyses conclude that some of  
17 Beijing's policies may be suitable for Hanoi to apply locally, such as low-emission zones  
18 (LEZs) establishment, scrappage programs and camera-based law enforcement. Other  
19 strategies like the license-plate lottery or last-digit bans, by contrast, appear impractical  
20 for adoption. Ultimately, these findings are intended to provide Vietnamese policymakers  
21 with regulatory insights to tackle air pollution more effectively.

22

23 **Keywords:** air pollution, PM2.5, transportation, policy, Hanoi, Beijing.

24

25 **1. Introduction**

26 Despite its current relatively low urban population, Southeast Asia has been experiencing  
27 rapid urban growth (Das & Paul, 2021). This trend is reflected by the case of Vietnam: in 1986,  
28 Vietnam's urban population was under 12 million, but by 2019, it reached nearly 37 million  
29 (World Bank, 2024). Given that Vietnam's national transport structure—characterized by  
30 space constraints and inadequate infrastructure—is strongly conducive to personal vehicle  
31 use, a growth in population likely increases private vehicle ownerships, specifically cars and  
32 motorbikes. In 2011, the numbers of registered cars and motorbikes in Hanoi were estimated  
33 at 235,000 and 4 million, respectively.

34

35 Thanks to Hanoi's rapid growth rates of vehicle ownership (22.8% for cars and 13.1% for  
36 motorbikes, annually) (Bray & Holyoak, 2015), local traffic emissions of CO, NOx, Particulate  
37 Matter (PM), and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the city have increased such that  
38 they became the primary factor behind the deterioration in Hanoi's air quality (Sakamoto et  
39 al., 2018). Therefore, it is important that the municipal government address air pollution

1 with a focus on transportation, particularly through policy implementation. Otherwise,  
2 public health as well as the sustainability of urban environments may be put at risk.

3  
4 Having been under China's rule for over a millennium, Vietnam has been subject to heavy  
5 Chinese influences in culture, customs, and religions; politically, both countries are socialist  
6 states led by their respective Communist party. Nevertheless, a divergence emerges when  
7 it comes to present air quality. On one hand, China has made substantial progress in tackling  
8 air pollution through enforcement since its 2014 declaration of a "war against air pollution".  
9 Statistics have shown sharp declines in PM2.5 (particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5µm  
10 or less), NO<sub>2</sub> (Nitrogen Dioxide), SO<sub>2</sub> (Sulfur Dioxide) and CO (Carbon Monoxide) nationwide  
11 (Silver et al., 2025). On the other hand, Vietnam was listed as the second most polluted  
12 country in Southeast Asia by IQAir, a world leader in air quality apps. Its capital, Hanoi, was  
13 named the eighth most polluted city in the world (UNICEF, 2024). As a result, an essential  
14 question arises: Can air pollution control policies from China be applied to Vietnam, and if  
15 so, to what degree? Considering the status of this issue in both countries, Vietnam may  
16 benefit from investigating the key drivers of China's success so far in combating air pollution  
17 and see whether they are applicable in the Vietnamese context.

18  
19 While many studies dedicated to air pollution have examined China and Vietnam separately,  
20 no research on this topic covering both nations has been conducted. Hence, this paper aims  
21 to offer an overview of the recent battle against air pollution in both countries, thereby  
22 drawing lessons for application to the Vietnamese context. By reviewing the scholarly  
23 literature, this paper, with a focus on Beijing (China) and Hanoi (Vietnam), examines the  
24 current state of air pollution in both cities. It also compares their transport-related anti-air  
25 pollution policies and identifies Hanoi's areas for improvement based on Beijing's past  
26 experience while accounting for certain limitations in policy transfer between the two  
27 cities.

## 28 29 **2. Methodological Approach**

30 In order to understand air pollution policies of Hanoi and Beijing, a scoping review was  
31 conducted using Google Scholar and Google News to search for previous studies in the field,  
32 as well as recent regulatory updates of the government. In this paper, major policy changes  
33 were introduced, briefly summarized, and then compared in light of municipal differences  
34 in socioeconomic and political contexts.

## 35 36 **3. What does recent data show?**

37 To analyze the most recent trends in air pollution for Hanoi and Beijing, this paper used  
38 PM2.5 concentrations—a widely adopted metric for air quality assessments—as the key  
39 indicator. In the United States, PM2.5 is classified as one of the criteria air pollutants under  
40 the Clean Air Act (1971), which helped establish safe levels of pollutants in the National

**Commented [1]:** I also intend to add NO2 concentrations to avoid PM2.5 overreliance

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1 Ambient Air Quality Standards (Suh et al., 2000). These fine particles are also considered a  
2 major cause of premature death and illness, and no PM2.5 threshold for absolute safety  
3 against adverse health effects has been determined (Yu et al., 2023). Moreover, in its updated  
4 Air Quality Guidelines (2021), the World Health Organization (WHO) recognised PM2.5 as a  
5 classical air pollutant and recommended a threshold of 5  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  for annual PM2.5 levels  
6 exposure. Additionally, concentrations of PM2.5, alongside PM10, are made Indicator 11.6.2  
7 under Target 11.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aims to reduce cities'  
8 negative environmental impact. These statistics serve as background information, providing  
9 context for the analysis of air pollution trends in Hanoi and Beijing that form the core focus  
10 of this paper.

11  
12 This review compares the quarterly average of PM2.5 from 2016 to 2024 in Beijing and in  
13 Hanoi to understand how and to what extent the policies reviewed in each city may have  
14 impacted air quality. In order to account for the huge difference between Beijing's and  
15 Hanoi's sizes of urban population, the quarterly average PM2.5 concentrations are evaluated  
16 per capita ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3/\text{person}$ ) for a fairer assessment and comparison (Figure 1). PM2.5 per  
17 capita refers to the concentration of PM2.5 normalised by population, which offers a  
18 measure of individual exposure and allows equitable comparisons across cities with different  
19 population sizes. While this approach has not been applied directly to PM2.5, it has been  
20 used in other contexts. For example, IPCC's Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report  
21 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023) adopts GHG (greenhouse gas)  
22 emissions per capita as a key metric. Likewise, Indicator B-3.1 in the UNECE Guidelines for  
23 the Application of Environmental Indicators recommends GHG emissions per capita as a  
24 statistical recommendation with a view to "harmonising the absolute value of GHG emissions  
25 for international comparisons" (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE],  
26 2025). Extending this precedent to PM2.5, this study employs PM2.5 per capita to provide a  
27 more balanced comparison of air quality impacts in Hanoi and Beijing by accounting for their  
28 demographic variations (Figure 1).


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**Commented [3]:** The unconventional yet interesting PM2.5 per capita metric could perplex reviewers, even though it makes sense when trying to connect environmental concerns with sociopolitical ones. The author should clarify or justify this metric before review.

Where else has this been used in the literature? Could you discuss this a bit more. Since PM2.5 alone is a bit more common, it might be good to actually feature both values.

(Optional) maybe you can include at least one additional pollutant, such as NO2 or O3, in your analyses/discussion to avoid over-reliance on PM2.5 alone

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**Figure 1** PM2.5 concentrations per capita in Beijing and Hanoi, June 2016 to September 2024

Both cities exhibit strong seasonality, but Hanoi's is generally higher and more volatile. The most pronounced spikes occur in late 2017–early 2018, with winter peaks in 2018–2019 and 2020–2021. Dips occurred around mid-2020 and mid-2021, which likely reflected pandemic-era slowdowns, were followed by a rebound in late-2021. From 2022 onwards, most of Beijing's values were between ~2–4 µg/m<sup>3</sup> with smaller seasonal swings, whereas those of Hanoi were higher, roughly ~4–6 µg/m<sup>3</sup> with occasional winter bumps. Overall, while Beijing's amplitude seems to have dampened over time, Hanoi remains high with less evidence of a structural step-down. These patterns suggest the effectiveness of Beijing's measures and imply that Hanoi still has substantial challenges to resolve.

Taken against policy timing, the contrast is consistent with each city's strategy. Beijing's earlier fuel and vehicle controls, scrapping of high emitters, and long-running traffic restrictions align with a lower baseline and smaller seasonal peaks in recent years (Yang et al., 2015). Hanoi's 2019–2021 actions targeted household fuels and open burning, which likely helped curb the most extreme spikes seen in 2017–2018; however, its transport levers (motorbike testing, LEZs/cordons) only begin in 2025–2028, thus, an extensive, sustained transport-driven reduction has not yet been observed in the series (Vietnam News, 2023;

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- what is unconventional about this study is that it uses per capita values.

- Beijing's larger population logically emit more pollutants than Hanoi's smaller population do. Therefore, analyses based solely on absolute values may risk underestimating the severity of Hanoi's air pollution (esp relative to Beijing's), as is the case for other small but rapidly urbanizing cities. Even though their aggregate averages are lower than larger counterparts, their dwellers may actually bear a heavier exposure burden.

-> adding per capita values beside absolute ones provide a fairer assessment of air status + health burden inflicted across cities with different sizes.

Other literature: although using per capita values for analyses is unconventional in air quality research, it is practiced in other branches of environmental studies. For instance, greenhouse-gas emissions (in IPCC report) & energy consumption (in World Bank report) are employed to account for equity, highlight the average access/exposure, and imply the sociopolitical consequences of those figures.

I intend to include both absolute PM2.5 and per capita values in this paper. While the former ensures comparability with existing research, the latter provides additional basis for sociopolitical insights.

1 Vietnam News, 2019; Vietnam News, 2024; Vu Tuan, 2025). In short, Beijing resembles a  
2 mature, policy-stabilized regime, whereas Hanoi remains in transition with time needed for  
3 transport measures to prove their efficiency.

4  
5 Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish a direct causality between PM2.5 fluctuations and  
6 specific policy outcomes, as other factors—such as meteorological conditions, regional  
7 pollution transport, and biomass burning—may also influence air quality. Therefore, the  
8 purpose of this research is to produce a high-level overview of PM2.5 patterns in both cities,  
9 framing them within policy contexts to demonstrate how regulatory trajectories may  
10 correspond with observed changes while acknowledging that policy-specific efficacy must  
11 be concluded from a wider body of literature and not solely from this high-level PM2.5 time  
12 series.

13  
14 Health-wise, the World Health Organization's annual guideline on PM2.5 is 5 µg/m<sup>3</sup>. Recent  
15 months' PM2.5 levels in Beijing often fall near or below that threshold; meanwhile, Hanoi still  
16 records many months above it. That said, month-to-month variation can result from  
17 temporary events or region-wide influences, so regulatory effects are better analyzed from  
18 sustained trends than single spikes.

#### 20 4. A brief review of Beijing's major transport-related air pollution policies

21 Beijing's set of actions against vehicular air pollution has developed over more than two  
22 decades, characterized by a structured framework across five key fronts: fuel quality and  
23 vapor recovery, vehicle emission controls, traffic management, compliance, and alternative-  
24 fuel fleets (UNEP, 2019; Wu et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015). The city's effort marked its beginning  
25 with the 1997 *Strategies and Implementation Plan for Controlling Motor Vehicle Emissions in*  
26 *Beijing*, which served as the cornerstone for applying Euro-equivalent standards to all newly  
27 registered vehicles starting in 1999 (Yang et al., 2015). From 1999 to 2015, Beijing took  
28 complementary measures targeted at both new and in-use vehicle emissions while  
29 controlling how, when, and which vehicles could access the urban centre (UNEP, 2019; Yang  
30 et al., 2015).

31  
32 On fuels, Beijing acted earlier and more aggressively than stipulated by national  
33 requirements. It first banned lead and then limited sulfur content in fuel, enabling modern  
34 after-treatment technologies (Yang et al., 2015). Within less than two decades, the city  
35 replaced poorly quality-controlled fuel with lead-free gasoline and diesel capped at 10 ppm  
36 sulfur, facilitating sizable tailpipe reductions. Beijing also addressed evaporative losses by  
37 mandating Stage I and Stage II gasoline vapor recovery at filling stations beginning in 2000,  
38 three years ahead of national rules. In 2007, Beijing funded a large-scale retrofit program  
39 that equipped over 1,000 stations and tanker trucks with the required vapor recovery

**Commented [6]:** The author should be more careful about how they establish causality between specific policies and PM2.5 trends. After all, many other factors influence air quality, and I am not sure if the data presented account for this. Maybe this should just be mentioned or touched on somewhat!

**Commented [7]:** does this overlap with the idea in the previous paragraph?

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1 systems for the 2008 Olympics, cutting VOC emissions by an estimated 20,000 metric tons  
2 annually (Fung & Maxwell, 2011; Z. Yang et al., 2015).

3  
4 Emission standards for both light-duty gasoline and heavy-duty diesel vehicles (China I-V  
5 and China 1-5, respectively) were adopted by Beijing in an accelerated manner, helping to  
6 close its gap with the EU and U.S. as well as reduce new-vehicle emissions (UNEP, 2019). To  
7 manage the in-use fleet, the city successfully utilized a color-labeling system that laid the  
8 groundwork for subsequent scrappage and retrofitting programs. Scrappage programs were  
9 carried out in phases, restricting certain types of vehicle from entering central areas and  
10 providing subsidies that encouraged the retirement of high emitters (UNEP, 2019; Wu et al.,  
11 2011; Yang et al., 2015). Meanwhile, despite several preliminary pilot programs, retrofits (e.g.  
12 three-way catalysts, flexible-fuel engines, diesel particulate filters) met with mixed  
13 reception due to their transient benefits but high operation-maintenance costs and limited  
14 lifespan (Yang et al., 2015).

15  
16 Traffic control policies implemented by the Beijing government have significantly decreased  
17 demand for and access to new vehicles. In 2011 the city initiated its license-plate lottery to  
18 cap new registrations, and the average 26-month queue time to be given an official plate  
19 reduced winners' likelihood of actually switching to driving by 16% (J. Yang et al., 2014). The  
20 city also enacted several restrictions: spatially, motorcycles are prohibited within the Fourth  
21 Ring Road, and yellow-label vehicles have been fully forbidden from the metropolitan area  
22 since late 2014 (Z. Yang et al., 2015; The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015);  
23 temporally, weekday "last-digit" driving restrictions—which ban vehicles from entering the  
24 Fifth Ring Road on designated days according to their license-plate numbers—were first  
25 piloted for the 2008 Olympics. Afterwards, they were extended due to their effectiveness,  
26 and have continued to help manage peak-hour traffic ever since. For non-local vehicles  
27 (excluding already-banned yellow-label vehicles), a provisional City Pass is required to  
28 access the Sixth Ring Road; otherwise, they can only travel beyond the Sixth Ring Road from  
29 midnight to 6 a.m. (Beijing Municipal Government, 2025; Z. Yang et al., 2015).

30  
31 Compliance measures were implemented to augment these aforementioned controls.  
32 Beijing's inspection-and-maintenance (I/M) program mandates periodic safety and  
33 emissions testing. National and local guidelines were introduced to standardize procedures  
34 and verification of type-approval criteria; testing intervals vary depending on vehicle type  
35 and age (Z. Yang et al., 2015). Concurrently, roadside remote sensing contributes to enhanced  
36 enforcement by spotting high-emitting vehicles, tracking fleet trends, and checking I/M  
37 program performance despite its inaccuracies in monitoring vehicles individually (Z. Yang et  
38 al., 2015). However, loopholes exist: old, unqualified vehicles may slip in ring-road  
39 boundaries; some Beijing-registered vehicles may refuel outside the city, where sulfur levels  
40 are higher because of inadequate regulation. Both of these scenarios can increase real-world

1 emissions and risk catalyst failure, thus calling for regionally coordinated policies on fuel  
2 standards and enforcement to ensure enhanced regulatory efficacy (Zhang et al., 2014).

3  
4 Finally, Beijing coupled restrictions with cleaner, more sustainable vehicle technologies. The  
5 city has strongly promoted new energy vehicles (NEVs) and built one of the world's largest  
6 fleets of natural-gas buses, employing both CNG and LNG, technologies that cut life-cycle  
7 CO2 emissions by 18-25% compared to gasoline buses (Hao et al., 2016). In an attempt to  
8 foster NEV adoption among its citizens, the government released a separate license plate  
9 cap for this type of vehicle (Z. Yang et al., 2015). Together, these complementary measures—  
10 including cleaner fuels, tighter standards, targeted scrappage, access controls, rigorous  
11 compliance tools, and alternative-fuel deployment—create the backbone of Beijing's  
12 transport-focused anti-air pollution strategy.

#### 13 14 **5. A brief review of Hanoi's major air pollution policies**

15 This section reviews Hanoi's city-level efforts to curb transport-related air pollution from  
16 mid-2000s to 2025. Due to the recent nature of Hanoi's policies targeted at vehicular air  
17 pollution, it also briefly examines related measures, such as the charcoal stoves ban and  
18 control on open burning, as key drivers of observed air-quality trends in Hanoi.

19  
20 The backbone of Hanoi's approach has been a 2017 People's Council resolution to rein in  
21 private motorbikes (Nguyen Thuy, 2017), followed by legal authority in the revised Capital  
22 Law (effective from 2025) that lets the city create low-emission zones and apply more  
23 stringent rules on local vehicles (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025). In parallel, Hanoi banned  
24 honeycomb charcoal stoves, curbed open burning, and began relocating polluting factories  
25 out of the urban core, while upgrading its monitoring and enforcement toolkit (Vietnam  
26 News, 2019; Vietnam News, 2023; VietNamNet News, 2021).

27  
28 Unlike Beijing's early fuel-quality push, Hanoi's most impactful fuel actions have targeted  
29 household sources. In late 2019 the Chairman of the People's Committee ordered the  
30 elimination of honeycomb (beehive) charcoal stoves, which the city had identified as a major  
31 PM contributor in dense districts (Vietnam News, 2019). In September 2020, a law under  
32 Instruction 15/CT-UBND formally banned the open burning of agricultural residues (notably  
33 rice straw) and trash; subsequent reporting highlights both the rule and the continuing  
34 enforcement challenge in suburban districts (Vietnam News, 2023). To ensure household-  
35 fuel compliance, Hanoi's 2019 stove directive shifted from education and support in 2020 to  
36 penalties from 2021, with enforcement handled by the city's environmental protection units  
37 (Vietnam News, 2019). For open burning, Instruction 15/CT-UBND tasks the Department of  
38 Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) and district authorities with inspections and  
39 sanctions, though coverage gaps remain in peri-urban rice areas (Vietnam News, 2023). The  
40 city has also run a long-standing program to relocate polluting factories away from central

1 districts; by 2021 it had listed around 90 establishments for removal and reported partial  
2 progress, with the program continuing as sites and financing line up (VietNamNet News,  
3 2021).

4 For new policy architecture, Hanoi's 2017 People's Council resolution laid out a phased  
5 restriction on motorbike circulation through 2030, explicitly linking traffic control to air-  
6 quality gains and public-transport expansion (Nguyen Thuy, 2017). The 2024 Capital Law then  
7 empowered Hanoi to set low-emission zones (LEZs) and adopt stricter local emissions  
8 measures; pilots are slated in central districts from January 1, 2025, prioritizing cleaner  
9 vehicles and public transport access (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025). Translating framework  
10 into timelines, the city has announced a staged ban on fossil-fuel motorbikes: a first cordon  
11 within Ring Road 1 from July 1, 2026, expanding to tighter two-wheel and car restrictions  
12 between Rings 1-2 from January 1, 2028 (Vu Tuan, 2025).

13 In parallel, Hanoi is preparing periodic emissions testing for in-use motorbikes, with a  
14 national roadmap pointing to a Hanoi/HCMC start in 2027 and phased coverage by model  
15 year thereafter (Vietnam News, 2025). Hanoi's LEZs pilots operationalize zone-based access  
16 management, restricting high-emitting fossil-fuel vehicles in core districts, pairing the rule  
17 with investment in public transport and charging (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025). The  
18 Capital Law text and city briefings emphasize LEZs authority, phased expansion after 2030,  
19 and the use of fees/charges to reinforce behavior change (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025).  
20 These zone-based controls complement the 2017 resolution's longer-run intent to  
21 progressively limit motorbike circulation citywide as transit supply improves.

22 In terms of public transport, to align access rules with cleaner fleets,  
23 Hanoi has adopted a green-bus roadmap: targets announced in 2025 aim for a  
24 full switch to electric/green-energy buses by 2030, with interim milestones  
25 (~10% in 2025; 20-23% in 2026) and supporting infrastructure/finance measures  
26 (Vietnam News, 2024). Several statements and press briefings also reference  
27 taxi electrification by 2030 (some sources cite "all taxis," others "at least  
28 50% buses and all taxis"), reflecting evolving targets as plans are finalized  
29 (Vietnam News, 2024). Earlier than these transport measures, Hanoi set a  
30 foundation for monitoring and dust control. Decision 355/QĐ-UBND (January 13,  
31 2012) approved a fixed air-quality monitoring network to 2020, establishing the city's long-  
32 term infrastructure for air-pollution observation (Hanoi People's Committee, 2012).  
33 Meanwhile, Decision 02/2005/QĐ-UB and Decision 55/2009/QĐ-UBND required  
34 construction sites to control dust and maintain sanitation (Hanoi People's Committee, 2005;  
35 2009). These actions were important for PM reductions alongside later traffic-related  
36 measures.

1

2 **6. Comparison of Beijing and Hanoi’s air pollution approaches**

3 Overall, Beijing and Hanoi are working towards the same objective, cleaner air, but with  
4 different approaches. Beijing started early by addressing what enters the tank. It pushed  
5 cleaner fuels (down to 10 ppm sulfur and no lead) and required gas stations to capture  
6 gasoline vapors, which allows modern emissions equipment to work better. Meanwhile,  
7 Hanoi can’t set its own fuel rules (those are nationally determined), so its new powers focus  
8 on access: starting in 2025, the city uses low-emission zones (LEZs) and road “cordons” to  
9 favor cleaner vehicles in key areas.

10

11 For new and in-use vehicles, Beijing moved faster in implementing standards and enforced  
12 them more rigorously. It introduced strict limits for new cars and trucks; used a color-label  
13 system, roadside remote sensing; and ran an inspection/maintenance program to identify  
14 and retire the most polluting vehicles. Hanoi follows national standards for new vehicles and  
15 is now developing its enforcement tools: periodic emissions testing for motorbikes slated for  
16 2027 (which are piloted in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City before expansion).

17

18 Traffic management also reflects different strategies. Beijing limits car ownership with a  
19 license-plate lottery (since 2011), lays down weekday “last-digit” driving rules, bans  
20 motorcycles inside the 4th Ring Road, and keeps high-emitting yellow-label vehicles out  
21 entirely. Hanoi, by contrast, doesn’t use lotteries or last-digit rules; instead, it’s restricting  
22 in phases where higher-emitting vehicles can go: a 2017 decision sets up a phase-out of  
23 gasoline motorbikes in the urban core by 2030, with a firm cordon inside Ring Road 1 on July  
24 1, 2026, and a wider zone in 2028. LEZs will then scale up thereafter.

25

26 Beyond traffic, while Beijing’s headline moves were mostly on-road, Hanoi prioritized major  
27 non-traffic contributors inside the city: it eliminated honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021  
28 and banned open burning of crop waste and trash from 2020. Both cities are also pushing  
29 cleaner fleets, but in different ways: Beijing built large CNG/LNG and NEV programs  
30 whereas Hanoi is linking bus and taxi electrification to its LEZs and cordon timelines toward  
31 2030.

32

33 On monitoring and enforcement, Beijing already has a mature system: an extensive air-  
34 quality network, roadside testing, and large scrappage programs. Hanoi has a city AQ (air  
35 quality) network and district enforcement teams for stove and burning bans, and upcoming  
36 testing centers to police motorbike emissions.

37

38 Beijing’s model is largely based on technological upgrade and strict enforcement with  
39 controls on when and how many cars can drive. Hanoi’s model is based on zones and access

1 rules, paired with household-fuel crackdowns and a staged build-out of emissions testing,  
 2 reflecting its more limited regulatory authority and later policy start.

3  
 4 Based on these comparisons, a comprehensive table was created (Table 1).

5

Air Pollution Policy/Strategy	Beijing	Hanoi
Fuel quality & vapor recovery	Led the nation on cleaner fuels (to 10 ppm sulfur) and gas-station Stage I/II vapor recovery with retrofits before the 2008 Olympics.	No city-specific fuel-quality mandates; fuel is set nationally. LEZs authority (2025) can indirectly tighten via access rules.
New-vehicle emission standards	Applied Euro-pathway early (Beijing 1 in 1999 and China 5 by 2013), often ahead of the national timeline.	Follows national standards; new local authority (Capital Law 2025) to set tighter access by emission tier within LEZs.
In-use vehicle controls (I/M, remote sensing)	Robust I/M and roadside remote sensing; color label system (green/yellow) enabled targeted scrappage.	Periodic emissions testing for motorbikes slated to begin in 2027 (Hanoi/HCMC first), phasing nationwide by 2030.
Traffic control and usage restrictions	Odd-even/last-digit weekday restrictions started during the 2008 Olympics and continued (modified).	Not citywide last-digit rules; instead, phased access limits for high-emitting/fossil-fuel vehicles via LEZs and cordons.
Vehicle population control	License-plate lottery since 2011; annual caps tightened (240k to 150k).	No lottery; strategy is to restrict where/when certain vehicles can circulate (zone-based).
Low-emission zones (LEZs)	Piloted YLV bans and zone-based controls; studied broader LEZs in the mid-2010s.	Legal authority from 2025; pilots in central districts from 2025 with expansion after 2030.
Motorbike restrictions	Motorcycles restricted within 4th Ring Road; focus on YLV ban (2014).	2017 resolution to phase out gasoline motorbikes in urban core by 2030; firm cordon inside Ring

		Road 1 on 1 Jul 2026, expand in 2028.
Alternative-fuel fleets	CNG/LNG bus rollout; NEV promotion, including separate license caps for NEVs.	EV transition targets for public transport/taxis toward 2030 aligned with LEZs/cordon rollout.
Monitoring & enforcement tools	Expanded AQ network; empowered BEPB for roadside testing; strong scrappage programs for YLVs.	City AQ monitoring network; district-level enforcement for stove/open-burning bans; building out motorbike testing centers.
Household fuels & Open burning	Controls exist but less emphasis citywide; focus remained on transport and industry (coal-to-gas campaign was mostly regional/national).	Directive to eliminate honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021 (support in 2020; fines from 2021). Instruction 15/CT-UBND (Sep 2020) bans open burning of agricultural waste and trash; ongoing enforcement.

**Table 1.** Beijing and Hanoi’s transport-related policies targeted at air pollution

**7. Discussion:**

Ultimately, the review of policies and recent data show that Beijing has experienced a steady decline in PM2.5 per capita. This trend reflects the relative success of Beijing’s efforts to tackle air pollution. On the contrary, Hanoi’s PM2.5 per capita values fluctuated more dramatically throughout the recorded period, displaying a stable or slightly upward trend over the last 4 years. This suggests that air pollution in the city remains insufficiently addressed or is worsening. Furthermore, among the 100 months illustrated in the chart, Hanoi’s PM2.5 per Capita exceeded Beijing’s in 70% of the cases. This pattern indicates that air pollution remains a major concern for Hanoi, underscoring the importance of timely government regulations to protect public health and the environment.

Hanoi can improve its air quality, but this means introducing its new measures in a logical sequence and reinforcing them with steady enforcement. Beijing’s success in tackling vehicular air pollution highlights that progress comes from a set of actions maintained over the years. They include tight vehicle regulations, clear restrictions on where high-emitting vehicles can operate, and rigorous follow-through. While Hanoi has already addressed several non-traffic sources, such as charcoal “honeycomb” stoves and open burning, a

1 recommended next step is to implement low-emission zones (LEZs) and inner-city cordons  
2 in a systematic, equitable, and persistent manner. To ensure this transition is socially just,  
3 especially for low-income motorbike users, phased implementation must be paired with  
4 financial support mechanisms, such as hardship exemptions, vouchers, or micro-loans, to  
5 facilitate the switch to cleaner motorbikes.

6  
7 However, to be more impactful, some policies could be transferred or adapted from Beijing  
8 to Hanoi—for instance, zone access with clear rules. Hanoi’s phased implementation could  
9 start from within Ring Road 1, followed by a scheduled expansion, and employ cameras to  
10 reduce the dependence on manual spot checks for enforcement. Additionally, Hanoi could  
11 prioritize the highest polluters for targeting and use emissions testing (and quick roadside  
12 checks where possible) to find vehicles with disproportionately high emissions, then offer  
13 trade-in or scrappage bonuses tied to cleaner replacements—ideally electric motorbikes.  
14 Hanoi could also foster compliance by standardizing inspection procedures then linking test  
15 results to LEZs access, and storing everything digitally for better organization.

16  
17 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a difference in cultural contexts between Beijing and  
18 Hanoi does exist. Thus, there are some policies that were successful in Beijing, but would be  
19 less feasible in Hanoi’s context. For example, Beijing’s license-plate lottery and weekday last-  
20 digit bans worked there, but they’re not as suitable for Hanoi. Hanoi is a motorbike city, and  
21 many people use their bikes to earn a living. Limiting vehicle operation through lottery or  
22 alternating-day license plate permits could adversely affect lower-income riders, many of  
23 whom rely on motorcycles for livelihood, while yielding more limited environmental benefits  
24 than spatial restrictions. Also, Beijing could order cleaner fuel and early vapor recovery  
25 systems at gas stations; however, Hanoi can’t set fuel specs on its own. Instead, it should  
26 push nationally for those changes while using city purchasing (e-buses, e-taxis, municipal  
27 fleets) to promote cleaner technologies into the market.

28  
29 It is also crucial that local context be considered. To ensure an equitable transition, LEZs  
30 should be accompanied with subsidies like hardship exemptions, vouchers or micro-loans to  
31 help riders switch to cleaner motorbikes. In addition, practically sufficient charging or  
32 battery-swap options should be offered in dense neighborhoods. Hanoi’s budgets and  
33 staffing are more limited than Beijing’s, so it is advisable for Hanoi to roll out cameras, test  
34 centers, scrappage funding in phases and clearly signal what’s coming ahead a sufficient  
35 amount of time (e.g., 2026 inner cordon, 2028 expansion). It should keep working on non-  
36 traffic sources too: facilitate the open-burning ban by funding straw collection and  
37 alternative uses (compost, biochar), and continue moving heavy industry out of residential  
38 districts.

39  
40 **8. Limitations:**

1 Several limitations should be noted when interpreting these findings. First, PM2.5 per capita  
2 was used as the sole indicator of air quality in this paper, potentially overlooking other air  
3 pollutants that also affect public health, such as NO<sub>2</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub>, and VOCs. Second, the study only  
4 focuses on Beijing and Hanoi, making the results less appropriate for generalization and  
5 transferral to urban contexts with different population densities, infrastructures, or  
6 governance systems. Third, while PM2.5 trends are analysed alongside policy timelines,  
7 proving a direct causality is impossible given other external influences on air quality,  
8 including industrial relocation, regional pollution transport, weather, and temporary events.  
9 Finally, not all policies are transferable across cities due to socioeconomic, cultural, and  
10 regulatory variations. Hence, future research could expand to multiple pollutants, additional  
11 cities, and cross-sector policy influences for a more comprehensive assessment of urban air  
12 quality management.

13

#### 14 **9. Conclusion**

15 This paper examined the current status of air pollution in Hanoi and Beijing from mid-2016  
16 to mid-2024, using PM2.5 as the core metric. The findings suggested that: while Beijing has  
17 successfully mitigated the impacts of air pollution through rigorous regulatory measures,  
18 Hanoi has shown modest progress. Policies aimed at improving air quality were then  
19 reviewed for both cities, focusing on transport-related measures for Beijing and a broader  
20 range of fields for Hanoi. A thorough table was compiled, categorizing and contrasting  
21 policies in both cities. Main differences in each category were then identified and briefly  
22 discussed. Subsequently, Beijing's policies were assessed if they are suitable for Hanoi's local  
23 application, proposing recommendations for air pollution abatement to the municipal  
24 government. The review also took into account cultural and socioeconomic factors to outline  
25 potential adjustments for effective policy adoption.

26

27 This comparative survey aims to help Vietnam and other countries streamline existing  
28 policies to accelerate progress towards better air quality through transport measures.  
29 Nevertheless, there are certain shortcomings in this study, which can be resolved in future  
30 research. As the analysis is limited to two cities and only focuses on PM2.5, future studies  
31 should expand to cover multiple pollutants (such as NO<sub>2</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub>, and VOCs) and include  
32 additional urban contexts with varying population densities or governance systems to  
33 improve generalizability. Furthermore, research should also explore cross-sector policy  
34 influences, as improvements in Beijing's air quality resulted from multiple factors, not  
35 transport alone, while accounting for the non-transferability of some policies due to  
36 socioeconomic and cultural differences. Still, this paper serves as an introduction to

1 comparative air pollution and related policies in Hanoi and Beijing, laying the foundation for  
2 further studies into this topic and supporting Hanoi's efforts in mitigating air pollution.

3

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- 7 [3.1%20Total%20GHG%20emissions%20per%20capita.pdf](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/B-3.1%20Total%20GHG%20emissions%20per%20capita.pdf)

The unconventional yet interesting PM2.5 per capita metric could perplex reviewers, even though it makes sense when trying to connect environmental concerns with sociopolitical ones. The author should clarify or justify this metric before review.

- a. Where else has this been used in the literature? Could you discuss this a bit more. Since PM2.5 alone is a bit more common, it might be good to actually feature both values.**

I have included the IPCC report and the UNECE guideline as examples where per capita metrics are used (especially the UNECE case, which aligns with my intended purpose when using PM2.5 per capita in this study). I searched but found no prior study employing this approach for PM2.5, so I believe this application in my paper could be a methodological innovation. I have also elaborated further on what PM2.5 per capita means and why it is advantageous in this context.

Regarding the recommendation to feature both values, this paper deliberately centers on the per-capita normalization of PM2.5 to allow an equitable, population-adjusted comparison between Hanoi and Beijing, ensuring that the analysis remains focused on how policy differences relate to pollutant exposure trends. Including absolute values, in my view, would add little interpretive value while complicating the paper's methodological clarity and focus.

- b. (Optional) maybe you can include at least one additional pollutant, such as NO<sub>2</sub> or O<sub>3</sub>, in your analyses/discussion to avoid over-reliance on PM2.5 alone**

Collecting and analysing data for additional pollutants would significantly expand the paper's scope and complexity. Indeed, I believe that the primary aim of this paper is to examine policies and evaluate their adequacy and effectiveness rather than to conduct an extensive analysis of multiple air pollutants. The use of PM2.5 concentration here serves mainly as the contextual background for the hypothesis and regulatory analysis.

## **Recommendation: Revise and Resubmit**

This is an ambitious and relevant comparative policy review that tackles a significant environmental challenge. The author demonstrates a strong capacity for synthesizing information from diverse sources and has chosen a timely topic with clear practical implications for policymakers in Hanoi. The compilation of policies into Table 1 is particularly useful and represents a solid foundation. However, the manuscript in its current form reads more like a comprehensive literature review and data summary than a cohesive analytical paper. To meet the journal's standards for rigor and clarity, significant revisions are needed to strengthen the methodological justification, deepen the analytical discussion, and refine the core argument. I am happy to review a revised version that addresses these points.

### **1. Refine the Methodological Approach and Justification:**

**Critique:** The paper identifies its approach as a "scoping review" but does not detail the search strategy, inclusion/exclusion criteria, or the number of sources identified and screened. This lack of transparency makes the methodology difficult to assess or replicate. Furthermore, the use of "PM2.5 per capita" is a highly unusual and problematic metric. While the rationale (normalizing for population) is understandable, it is not a standard measure in air quality science. PM2.5 concentration is a measure of ambient exposure in the air, not a direct output of individual activity. Using it per capita can be misleading, as it implies that a city's air pollution is divided equally among its residents, which distorts the actual environmental conditions.

You need to greatly expand the Methodological Approach section. Specify the exact search terms, databases, and the time frame of the search. Describe how you selected the final sources for analysis. Regarding PM2.5, I strongly recommend re-plotting Figure 1 using standard, absolute PM2.5 concentrations ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ). You can still discuss population differences as a contextual factor in the text, but the primary metric must align with established scientific practice. This change will make your analysis more credible and interpretable.

### **2. Deepen the Analysis from Description to Argument:**

The paper excels at describing "what" policies were implemented but spends less time analyzing "why" they were successful in Beijing or "how" their core principles can be abstracted for Hanoi. The discussion of "transferability" is a good start but remains somewhat surface-level. For instance, the conclusion that low-emission zones (LEZs) are suitable while license-plate lotteries are not is sensible, but the underlying reasons (e.g., governance structure, primary vehicle type, social equity) could be explored in much greater depth to build a more powerful argument.

Re-structure the **\*\*Discussion\*\*** section to be more argument-driven. After presenting the comparative data, create a framework for analysis. For example, you could analyze the policies based on criteria like: 1) Technical Efficacy: How much does this policy reduce emissions? 2) Institutional Feasibility: Does Hanoi have the legal and bureaucratic capacity to implement it? 3)

Social & Political Acceptability: How will this policy be received by the public, especially considering Hanoi's reliance on motorbikes for livelihoods?

Use this framework to systematically evaluate each recommended policy transfer, moving beyond a simple list to a reasoned justification.

### 3. Strengthen the Link Between Data and Policy Conclusions:

The connection between the PM2.5 trends in Figure 1 and the subsequent policy analysis is currently weak. The text states it's difficult to establish causality, but then the data is used to make broad claims about Beijing's "success" and Hanoi's "delayed responses." A more nuanced interpretation is needed.

When discussing the PM2.5 trends, be more precise. Instead of saying Beijing's policies were successful, specify which clusters of policies (e.g., the pre-2010 fuel and new vehicle standards) appear to correlate with the beginning of its downward trend. For Hanoi, discuss how the observed volatility might reflect its current reliance on banning specific activities (stoves, burning) rather than a continuous, systemic regulatory framework for mobile sources. This will create a more logical and evidence-based flow from your data to your policy recommendations.

### 4. Enhance Precision in Language and Claims:

There are instances of overly broad or imprecise language. For example, the introduction mentions "Vietnam has been subject to heavy Chinese influences" but doesn't clearly link this historical fact to modern environmental policy capacity. The abstract states the paper "reviews previous academic studies and news articles," which undersells the original work of policy comparison.

Scrutinize the manuscript for sweeping statements and replace them with specific, focused claims. In the abstract and introduction, more accurately describe your contribution—e.g., "This paper provides a systematic comparative analysis of transport-related air pollution policies in Beijing and Hanoi..." This sounds more scholarly and confident.

## Reviewer Report

**Paper title: Hanoi's potential to learn from Beijing's past experience in addressing air pollution caused by vehicle emissions.**

Recommendations: **Major changes recommended**

### Suggestions for improvement

The manuscript requires a thorough revision to address pervasive issues in sentence structure, grammar, and syntax. Insert a continuous line number or in case of page-based line numbers, please provide the page numbers. Although a better way is a continuous line number so that referencing can be easy.

### Title suggestion:

The current title lacks academic strength. Please follow any of the below to be more effective manuscript:

- A Tale of Two Capitals: Policy Transfer for Sustainable Urban Mobility and Air Quality in Beijing and Hanoi.
- Decarbonizing the Urban Fleet: Analysing Beijing's Past as a Policy Blueprint for Hanoi's Vehicle Emissions Challenge.
- A Comparative Analysis of Vehicle Emissions Control Policies in Beijing and Hanoi.
- Mitigation Lessons for Rapid Urbanization: Hanoi's Potential to Learn from Beijing's Air Quality Management Experience.

### Abstract

- **Lines 7 to 9:** Please revise this as follows. In an abstract, references cannot be cited, and mentioning specific years without citation is not appropriate. Suggested revision: *"Despite significant economic progress, Vietnam faces a critical environmental sustainability challenge rooted in severe urban air pollution, common to many developing nations. The capital, Hanoi, a vital political and economic hub, is a focal point of this crisis, facing persistent air quality degradation."*
- **Lines 13 to 14:** Kindly provide a clearer methodology. I am sharing some steps in the methodology section that should be followed in detail and then

briefly summarized in the abstract. It is important to specify how the authors conducted the literature search.

- Also, please remove the phrase “comprehensive table.” Any results or findings can be presented in tabular form, but this should not be explicitly mentioned in the abstract.

### **Main Text**

- **Lines 29 and 30:** Please remove the dash (—) for consistency and clarity.
- **Lines 32 to 33:** The data cited from 2011 is outdated. Kindly provide more recent figures and appropriate references. It is important to reflect the current number of registered vehicles in Hanoi in relation to the city’s size and population.
- **Line 35:** Replace the phrase “thanks to” with “due to” to maintain academic tone.
- **Page 2, Line 4:** This statement is incorrect. Vietnam is an independent country and is not under China’s rule. Please revise this to reflect historical context, such as periods of Chinese rule or war-related influence.
- Please also review the manuscript for grammatical errors throughout.
- **Line 12:** A reference is needed to support the claim. If unavailable, please locate relevant research papers that substantiate the statement.
- **Line 13:** The reference mentioned is missing from the reference list. Additionally, the claim that UNICEF is working directly on air pollution appears questionable. Please verify the reliability of this reference and consider replacing it with a more appropriate source.
- **Lines 13 to 27:** This section repeats the same concept multiple times. It would be more effective to consolidate the content into a single paragraph. Suggested structure:
  - Identify the limitations observed in the existing literature.
  - Highlight the novelty of your work.
  - Clearly state the objectives of your study.
- It is also recommended to include statistics on air pollution in Hanoi to illustrate the severity of the issue and its impact on human health.

**Study Area:** It is recommended to add a dedicated heading titled “*Study Area*” immediately following the introduction. This section should present a comparative

overview of both cities, covering trends in demographics, transportation infrastructure, and air pollution levels. Providing this context will help readers better understand the scope and relevance of the analysis. If possible, please include maps of the study areas to visually support the comparison and enhance geographic clarity.

## **Methodology**

Please write this section following these steps:

Define the Scope and Objectives of your work

- Clearly state the research question or problem.
- Set boundaries: time period, geographic focus, type of studies (e.g., empirical, theoretical).

Develop a Search Strategy and write how you search data

- Choose relevant databases: Scopus, Web of Science, Google Scholar, PubMed, JSTOR, etc.
- Use Boolean operators and keyword combinations (e.g., “air pollution AND Hanoi/ Beijing” “transportation OR air pollution’ etc).
- Document your search terms, filters, and inclusion/exclusion criteria.
- Apply inclusion/exclusion criteria (e.g., peer-reviewed only, published after 2015).
- Prioritize high-quality, relevant, and recent studies.

**Sample Size and Data Transparency:** Please clarify how many studies were included in the literature review that informed the results. Additionally, specify how the empirical PM2.5 data was collected — for example, which monitoring stations were selected, and what criteria were used for their inclusion. It is also important to indicate the time frame your study covers (i.e., which years are included in the analysis) to ensure transparency and reproducibility.

Critically analyse the literature

- Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of each study.
- Discuss methodological limitations, sample sizes, biases, and relevance.

- Compare findings across studies to identify trends or gaps.

Line 37 onwards, the methods described should come under methodology section.

## Results

The data presented under the heading *“What does recent data show?”* should be relocated to the **Results** section, as it reflects findings rather than introductory context. Additionally, if any methodological details are embedded within that section, they should be moved to the **Methodology** section to maintain structural consistency and ensure proper categorization of content.

**Figure 1:** The y-axis is labelled with months, yet the figure title refers to dates — please ensure consistency between the axis label and the figure description. Additionally, the data presented focuses on PM2.5 concentrations, which appear relatively similar between the two cities during 2017 and 2018. It would be helpful to explain the underlying reasons for the elevated values in both cities during that period, as well as the subsequent decline. **This trend suggests that it may be more insightful to examine other primary pollutants to better understand the broader dynamics of urban air pollution.**

Page 8 line 22 to 30, recheck for the consistency in font style used here.

It is also suggested to remove Headings 5 and 6, as the content under these sections largely overlaps with the information already presented in the table. Instead, consider integrating the relevant details directly into the table itself. For example, adding a reference column and including further contextual information would enhance the table’s value and reduce redundancy. At present, the table and accompanying text are repetitive; consolidating them will improve clarity and streamline the presentation of findings.

**Discussion:** To strengthen the discussion section, it would be helpful to include examples of global cities that have successfully implemented effective air pollution control measures and urban health mitigation strategies. This comparative perspective can offer valuable insights and practical relevance. Additionally, the current comparison between Hanoi and Beijing appears weak, as the two cities differ significantly in terms of size, economic capacity, and governance structures. A more balanced or contextually aligned comparison would enhance the credibility and depth of the analysis.

**Limitations and Conclusion:** These sections are well-written and clearly presented. However, the **Methodology** section requires significant improvement. At present, there is no clear explanation of how the work was conducted. The authors should provide a detailed account of the research process, including how data was collected, analyzed, and interpreted. Strengthening this section is essential for ensuring transparency and academic rigor. The remaining suggestions relate to enhancing the presentation and reinforcing the logical flow of the study.

## **Reference**

This section needs to be reconsidered. Several references are inconsistently formatted in the reference list. Also, check that all references cited in text are present in the list and vice versa. Please ensure that all references follow a single, consistent citation style throughout the manuscript. Additionally, the formatting of the reference list should be uniform — currently, some entries are in hanging indent format while others are not. Align all entries to the same style to maintain professional and academic presentation standards.

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~~Hanoi's potential to learn from Beijing's past experience in addressing air pollution caused by vehicle emissions.~~

~~Decarbonizing the Urban Fleet: Analysing Beijing's Past as a Policy Blueprint for Hanoi's Vehicle Emissions Challenge.~~

### Abstract

~~Despite significant economic progress, Vietnam faces a critical environmental challenge rooted in severe urban air pollution, common to many developing nations. The capital, Hanoi, a vital political and economic hub, is a focal point of this crisis, facing persistent air quality degradation. Air pollution is a major environmental problem across the world, especially in developing countries, and Vietnam is no exception. A national political and economic hub, Hanoi is facing severe pollution, even ranked among the world's most polluted cities in early 2025. Current levels of air pollution in Hanoi are exceptionally high, with research indicating vehicles are the primary factor. This situation mirrors the past experience of Beijing, a famous success-story case study, in addressing air pollution through constant regulatory adjustments. This paper reviews previous academic studies and news articles to produce a comprehensive table that compares policies implemented in each city. It also gathers PM2.5 levels in both cities to show that Hanoi's values exceeded those of Beijing in recent years, suggesting a policy gap and delayed responses. The analyses conclude that some of Beijing's policies may be suitable for Hanoi to apply locally, such as low-emission zones (LEZs) establishment, scrappage programs and camera-based law enforcement. Other strategies like the license-plate lottery or last-digit bans, by contrast, appear impractical for adoption. Ultimately, these findings are intended to provide Vietnamese policymakers with regulatory insights to tackle air pollution more effectively. This study provides a systematic comparative analysis of the evolution of transport-related air pollution policies in Beijing and Hanoi, employing a targeted review of scholarly and official sources. CAMS NRT PM2.5 data during 2016-2024 are collected, then processed through unit conversion, spatial averaging, and monthly aggregation. To present an equitable cross-city comparison, both absolute and per capita concentrations are evaluated. Observed trends show a decline in Beijing's PM2.5 levels recently but stagnation in Hanoi, suggesting relatively delayed policy responses. Some of Beijing's policies are concluded to be suitable for Hanoi's adoption, such as low-emission zones (LEZs) establishment, scrappage programs, and camera-based law enforcement. Other strategies like the license-plate lottery or last-digit bans, by contrast, appear impractical. Ultimately, these findings are intended to offer actionable insights for Hanoi's policymakers to tackle air pollution more effectively.~~

**Keywords:** air pollution, PM2.5, transportation, policy, Hanoi, Beijing.

### 1. Introduction

~~Despite its current relatively low urban population, Southeast Asia has been experiencing rapid urban growth (Das & Paul, 2021). This trend is reflected by in the case of Vietnam: in 1986, Vietnam's urban population was under 12 million, but by 2019, it reached nearly 37 million (World Bank, 2024). Given that Vietnam's national transport structure—characterized by space constraints and inadequate~~

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43 infrastructure is strongly conducive to personal vehicle use, a growth in population likely increases  
44 private vehicle ownerships, specifically cars and motorbikes. In 2011, the numbers of registered cars and  
45 motorbikes in Hanoi were estimated at 235,000 and 4 million, respectively. Vietnam's national transport  
46 structure, which is characterized by space constraints and inadequate infrastructure, is conducive to  
47 personal vehicle use (Nicolaisen, 2023). Consequently, a growth in population likely increases private  
48 vehicle ownership, specifically cars and motorbikes (World Bank, 2008). In 2024, the numbers of  
49 registered cars and motorbikes in Hanoi were estimated at 1.1 million and over 6.7 million, respectively  
50 (Vo Hai, 2024). Considering the city's geographical area of over 3,359.8 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 8.7  
51 million in 2024, this translates to around 2,322 vehicles per km<sup>2</sup> and 897 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants  
52 (National Statistics Office, 2025).

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54 Thanks Due to Hanoi's rapid growth rates of vehicle ownership (22.8% for cars and 13.1% for motorbikes,  
55 annually) (Bray & Holyoak, 2015), local traffic emissions of CO, NO<sub>x</sub>, Particulate Matter (PM), and Volatile  
56 Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the city have increased such that they became the primary factor behind  
57 the deterioration in Hanoi's air quality (Sakamoto et al., 2018). Therefore, it is important that the  
58 municipal government address air pollution with a focus on transportation, particularly through policy  
59 implementation. Otherwise, public health as well as the sustainability of urban environments may be put  
60 at risk. This growing concern raises the question of how comparable cities have addressed similar  
61 challenges.

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63 Having been under China's rule for over a millennium, Vietnam has been subject to heavy Chinese  
64 influences in culture, customs, and religions; politically, both countries are socialist states led by their  
65 respective Communist party. Nevertheless, a divergence emerges when it comes to present air quality.  
66 On one hand, China has made substantial progress in tackling air pollution through enforcement since its  
67 2014 declaration of a "war against air pollution". Statistics have shown sharp declines in PM<sub>2.5</sub>  
68 (particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5µm or less), NO<sub>2</sub> (Nitrogen Dioxide), SO<sub>2</sub> (Sulfur Dioxide) and  
69 CO (Carbon Monoxide) nationwide (Silver et al., 2025). On the other hand, Vietnam was listed as the  
70 second most polluted country in Southeast Asia by IQAir, a world leader in air quality apps. Its capital,  
71 Hanoi, was named the eighth most polluted city in the world (UNICEF, 2024). As a result, an essential  
72 question arises: Can air pollution control policies from China be applied to Vietnam, and if so, to what  
73 degree? Considering the status of this issue in both countries, Vietnam may benefit from investigating  
74 the key drivers of China's success so far in combating air pollution and see whether they are applicable  
75 in the Vietnamese context. Vietnam and China share a number of historical and cultural connections, as  
76 well as broadly similar socialist governance led by their respective Communist parties. Despite these  
77 similarities, a divergence emerges when it comes to present air quality. On one hand, China has made  
78 substantial progress in tackling air pollution through enforcement since its 2014 declaration of a "war  
79 against air pollution". Statistics have shown sharp declines in PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matter with a diameter  
80 of 2.5µm or less), NO<sub>2</sub> (Nitrogen Dioxide), SO<sub>2</sub> (Sulfur Dioxide) and CO (Carbon Monoxide) nationwide  
81 (Silver et al., 2025). On the other hand, Vietnam was listed as the second most polluted country in  
82 Southeast Asia in 2023 by IQAir (IQAir, 2024). Its capital, Hanoi, was named the eighth most polluted city  
83 in the world (IQAir, 2024).

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85 While on this topic covering both nations has been conducted. Hence, this paper aims to offer an overview of  
86 the recent battle against air pollution in both countries, thereby drawing lessons for application to the  
87 Vietnamese context. By reviewing the scholarly literature, this paper, with a focus on Beijing (China) and  
88 Hanoi (Vietnam), examines the current state of air pollution in both cities. It also compares their  
89 transport-related anti-air pollution policies and identifies Hanoi's areas for improvement based on  
90 Beijing's past experience while accounting for certain limitations in policy transfer between the two  
91 cities. Despite the urgency of this issue, existing literature primarily examines air quality issues in China  
92 and Vietnam separately, with no comprehensive research covering both nations for direct policy lessons.  
93 Hence, this paper addresses that gap by providing the first comparative analysis of transport-related air  
94 pollution policies in Beijing and Hanoi. The objective is to identify which of Beijing's successful policies  
95 are adaptable to Hanoi's context, therefore offering potential regulatory insights while accounting for  
96 certain limitations in policy transfer between cities.  
97

## 98 2. Methodological Approach Study Area

99 In order to understand air pollution policies of Hanoi and Beijing, a scoping review was conducted using  
100 Google Scholar and Google News to search for previous studies in the field, as well as recent regulatory  
101 updates of the government. In this paper, major policy changes were introduced, briefly summarized,  
102 and then compared in light of municipal differences in socioeconomic and political contexts.

103 Table 1 below presents a brief comparative overview of the two study areas: Beijing (the capital of China)  
104 and Hanoi (the capital of Vietnam) in terms of key socioeconomic aspects.  
105

Feature	Beijing	Hanoi
Population (in 2024)	~21.8 million <sup>(1)</sup>	~8.7 million <sup>(2)</sup>
Land area	16,140 km <sup>2</sup> <sup>(3)</sup>	3,360 km <sup>2</sup> <sup>(2)</sup>
GRDP (2024)	4.9 trillion CNY (~693 billion USD) <sup>(4)</sup>	1.43 quadrillion VND (~56 billion USD) <sup>(5)</sup>
Public transport infrastructure	Extensive Metro Network (>800 km) and long-established Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) since 2004. <sup>(6) (7)</sup>	Nascent Metro Network (2 operational lines with limited coverage) and young BRT systems (since December 2016). <sup>(8) (9)</sup>
Governance structure	Provincial-level municipality with great autonomy in policymaking and management <sup>(10) (11)</sup>	Special provincial-level administrative unit with autonomy recently enhanced by the 2024 Capital Law <sup>(12) (13)</sup>

106 **Table 1.** An overview of Beijing's and Hanoi's socioeconomic circumstances

107 *Sources:* <sup>(1)</sup>: (Beijing Municipal Government, n.d.); <sup>(2)</sup>: (National Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2025); <sup>(3)</sup>:  
108 (Beijing Municipal Government, n.d.); <sup>(4)</sup>: (Beijing Municipal Government, 2025); <sup>(5)</sup>: (Vietnam News,  
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111 2025); <sup>(6)</sup>: (Beijing Municipal Government, 2025); <sup>(7)</sup>: (BRTData.net, 2021); <sup>(8)</sup>: (Hanoi Metro, n.d.); <sup>(9)</sup>:  
112 (Hoang-Tung et al., 2021); <sup>(10)</sup>: (Wong & Karplus, 2017); <sup>(11)</sup>: (Chun et al., 2019); <sup>(12)</sup>: (Lao Động, 2023); <sup>(13)</sup>:  
113 (Vietnam News, 2024)

114  
115 Overall, Hanoi is smaller, rapidly developing, and more economically constrained, relying heavily on a  
116 major fleet of motorbikes without fully developed public transport systems (Kieu et al., 2024). This  
117 contrasts with Beijing's vast economic capacity and extensive public transport networks (Metro and BRT),  
118 which provide robust alternatives when implementing vehicle restrictions. Hanoi, by comparison, only  
119 introduced its BRT system in late 2016 and opened its first Metro line in 2021.

120  
121 Both cities are provincial-level municipalities. However, Beijing has substantial autonomy in policymaking  
122 and urban management, whereas Hanoi has only recently gained more decision-making authority  
123 following the 2024 Capital Law. These differences in scale, transport infrastructure, and governance  
124 structure are crucial to assessing policy transfer feasibility between the two cities.

### 125 126 3. Literature Review

127 A critical review of the existing literature reveals a significant disparity in the quality and depth of  
128 research focused on air pollution control in Beijing compared to Hanoi.

#### 129 130 3.1 Literature related to Beijing's policies

131 The policy evolution of Beijing has been documented through detailed, quantitative research, providing  
132 a strong basis for policy comparison. Studies focusing on Beijing, such as Wu et al. (2011) and Zhang et  
133 al. (2014), offer robust analyses and link policy implementation to measurable air quality improvements.  
134 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2019) further synthesizes these findings, providing  
135 a comprehensive timeline of control measures. Likewise, the work by Yang et al. (2015) provides  
136 exhaustive and specific documentation on the motives, mechanisms, and tangible outcomes of Beijing's  
137 key policies (e.g. the vehicle registration lottery and last-digit driving restrictions), which is crucial for  
138 thorough efficacy assessments. However, the primary limitation of this Beijing-focused literature, for the  
139 purpose of this comparative study, is the transferability of findings. They do not explicitly explain how  
140 the socioeconomic circumstances of Beijing influenced regulatory decisions and the recorded outcomes,  
141 which makes analyses less certain and adaptation to Hanoi's context more challenging.

#### 142 143 3.2 Literature related to Hanoi's policies

144 Literature on Hanoi, while crucial for contextual understanding, is less cohesive and more limited in scope  
145 compared to that of Beijing. Foundational research like Bray and Holyoak (2015) provides essential  
146 insights into Hanoi's unique transportation structure, especially the dominance and societal role of  
147 motorcycles, for designing effective vehicle control measures. Studies such as Sakamoto et al. (2018)  
148 confirm the considerable contribution of vehicle emissions to criteria pollutants like VOCs, CO, O<sub>3</sub> in  
149 Hanoi, underlining transportation's role in the city's worsened air quality. Das and Paul (2021) offer a  
150 valuable regional perspective, analyzing the influence of economic growth and urbanization trends  
151 across South, East, and Southeast Asian countries. However, these studies suffer from temporal and  
152 scope limitations. The Bray and Holyoak (2015) data is now a decade old, failing to account for the recent

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153 explosive growth in private vehicle ownership and the emergence of new public transport systems like  
154 the metro. Similarly, the Sakamoto et al. (2018) study's time frame is limited to 2015-2016, which does  
155 not capture changes in emission sources and policy impacts years later. The regional scope of Das and  
156 Paul (2021), while informative for macro trends, lacks the city-specific policy granularity required for  
157 direct regulatory recommendations. More broadly, the literature on Hanoi's air policy relies heavily on  
158 official government announcements and news reports (e.g., Hanoitimes, Vietnamnews), which may  
159 introduce a policy bias and lack the independent, peer-reviewed evaluation of effectiveness available in  
160 the Beijing case.

### 162 3.3 Research Gap and Justification

163 Existing studies largely examine these two cities in isolation. While Yang et al. (2015) provide a deep dive  
164 into Beijing, there is a notable absence of comparative literature that directly juxtaposes these findings  
165 with Hanoi's context. Additionally, previous research often focuses exclusively on absolute concentration  
166 levels, which can be misleading given the demographic disparities between the two capitals. This study  
167 addresses these gaps by conducting a direct policy comparison and considering PM2.5 per capita besides  
168 absolute values to assess the urgency and transferability of transport interventions.

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## 170 4. Methodology

### 171 4.1 Scope and Objectives

172 The question guiding this research is: "What elements of Beijing's transport-related policy framework  
173 are adaptable to Hanoi's local context?"

174 Accordingly, this study aims to:

- 175 • Synthesize existing literature on transport-related policies in both cities
- 176 • Compare the evolution of their policy trajectories
- 177 • Evaluate the transferability of Beijing's measures to Hanoi

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179 The scope of this study is limited to:

- 180 • Geographical area: Beijing (China) and Hanoi (Vietnam)
- 181 • Time period: 1997-2025 for policy review; 2016-2024 for PM2.5 trend analysis
- 182 • Source types: peer-reviewed studies, government documents, organizational reports, and  
183 reputable news sources reporting policy updates.
- 184 • Regulatory focus: transport-related air pollution policies regarding fuel quality, emission  
185 standards, driving restrictions, LEZs, enforcement tools; non-transport policies regarding bans on  
186 charcoal stove and open burning.

### 188 4.2 Search Strategy

189 A scoping search was conducted using Google Scholar and Google News between July and September  
190 2025. Boolean keyword combinations included:

- 191 • "Air quality" AND ("Beijing" OR "Hanoi")
- 192 • "Beijing air pollution" AND "transport policy"
- 193 • "Hanoi air pollution" AND "transport policy"
- 194 • "Hanoi air pollution" AND ("honeycomb charcoal stove" OR "open burning")

- 195       • “Air pollutants”  
196       • “PM2.5” AND “health”

197  
198 Filters applied:

- 199       • Publication year:  
200       • 2000 onward for foundational literature on air pollutants  
201       • 2010 onward for papers about policy implementation.  
202       • Language: English

203  
204 Rather than compiling an exhaustive dataset, the search adopted a targeted and iterative approach.  
205 Sources were progressively added and screened until additional materials no longer offered  
206 substantially new insights to the research question.

207  
208 4.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

209 The following criteria guided purposive selection of literature:

210 Included:

- 211       • Studies and reports detailing transport-related policies, including their temporal and spatial  
212 scopes, regulatory mechanisms, and observed or expected impacts.  
213       • News articles reporting regulatory announcements, implementation timelines, and official  
214 directives related to air quality management and transport emissions.

215 Excluded:

- 216       • Studies focusing solely on indoor air pollution, road dust, or a single type of air pollutant instead  
217 of vehicle emissions  
218       • Studies examining short-term or regional air pollution outside Beijing or Hanoi  
219       • Studies centred solely on modeling, prediction, a single aspect of transport, or providing  
220 mitigation suggestions without discussing existing or officially planned policies.

221  
222 The final analytic sample consists of 17 peer-reviewed academic studies, 13 government documents from  
223 central and municipal authorities, 14 verified news articles, and 10 institutional and organizational  
224 reports. These figures represent the materials used for this paper’s synthesis rather than a  
225 comprehensive corpus of available literature.

226  
227 4.4 Analytical Framework and Data Processing

228 4.4.1 Variable Selection and Justification

229 To analyze the most recent trends in air pollution for Hanoi and Beijing, this paper used PM2.5  
230 concentrations, a widely adopted metric for air quality assessments, as the key indicator. The selection  
231 of PM2.5 is justified by its strong health relevance and international recognition:

- 232       • Public health and regulatory relevance: In the United States, PM2.5 is classified as one of the  
233 criteria air pollutants under the Clean Air Act (1971), which helped establish safe levels in the  
234 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Suh et al., 2000). These fine particles are also considered  
235 a major cause of premature death and illness, and no absolute safety threshold against adverse  
236 health effects has been determined (Yu et al., 2023).

237 • International recognition: The World Health Organization (WHO), in its updated Air Quality  
238 Guidelines (2021), recognised PM2.5 as a classical air pollutant and recommended a threshold of  
239 5 µg/m<sup>3</sup> for annual PM2.5 levels exposure. Additionally, concentrations of PM2.5, alongside  
240 PM10, are made Indicator 11.6.2 under Target 11.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),  
241 which aims to reduce cities' negative environmental impact.

#### 242 4.4.2 Data Collection and Spatial Averaging

243 The analysis utilized the CAMS Near-Real-Time (NRT) ImageCollection (ECMWF/CAMS/NRT) for the  
244 period 2016–2024. From each image, the variable particulate matter d less than 25 µm surface was  
245 selected, representing the total surface-level mass concentration of PM2.5, expressed in kilograms per  
246 cubic meter (kg/m<sup>3</sup>). To align with standard air quality reporting practices, values were converted to  
247 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m<sup>3</sup>) by multiplying by 1 × 10<sup>9</sup>.

248 Spatial processing focused on bounding boxes encompassing Beijing (115.9°E–116.8°E, 39.4°N–40.3°N)  
249 and Hanoi. Each image was clipped to the respective region, and zonal mean PM2.5 values were  
250 calculated using a mean reducer, providing a representative daily surface concentration for each city.

#### 251 4.4.3 Temporal Aggregation and Normalization

252 Daily mean PM2.5 values were aggregated into monthly averages. This was achieved by grouping the  
253 data based on a formatted 'month' field and computing the mean for each group. The final dataset thus  
254 consists of monthly averaged PM2.5 values for both cities during 2016–2024, providing a basis for  
255 subsequent comparative and trend analyses.

256 To account for the huge difference between Beijing's and Hanoi's urban population sizes, the quarterly  
257 average PM2.5 concentrations are evaluated per capita (µg/m<sup>3</sup>/person) for a fairer assessment and  
258 comparison (Figure 2). Per capita PM2.5, referring to the concentration of PM2.5 normalized by  
259 population, does not represent individual exposure but an indicator that allows fairer cross-city  
260 comparison by accounting for population size.

261 While this specific approach has not been applied directly to PM2.5, it has established precedents in  
262 climate policy. For example, the IPCC's Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report (2023) adopts GHG  
263 (greenhouse gas) emissions per capita as a key metric. Likewise, the UNECE Guidelines (2025)  
264 recommend GHG emissions per capita with a view to "harmonising the absolute value of GHG emissions  
265 for international comparisons." Extending this precedent to PM2.5, this study employs PM2.5 per capita  
266 alongside absolute values to provide a more balanced and academically rigorous comparison of air  
267 quality impacts.

### 272 3-5. What does recent data show? Results

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


Figure 1

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


Figure 2 PM2.5 concentrations per capita in Beijing and Hanoi, June 2016 to April 2024

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### 5.1 Absolute PM2.5 concentrations ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )

Data shown in Figure 1 reveal that Beijing consistently experienced higher PM2.5 levels than Hanoi throughout the 2016-2024 period. Beijing's maximum values exceeded  $200 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  in late 2017-early 2018, whereas Hanoi's stayed considerably lower. Although both cities exhibit strong seasonality, Beijing's amplitude is much greater, which indicates more intense pollution episodes. These differences are understandable given Beijing's larger scale of land area, population, as well as economic and industrial activities. Hanoi, by contrast, has a smaller industrial footprint and lower absolute emissions despite recently recorded expansion in vehicle use and urban activities. However, it is notable that since 2021, Beijing's PM2.5 concentrations have gradually declined, even reaching parity with those of Hanoi in April 2024. Hanoi's levels remained steady over the years since mid 2018 (seasonal peaks and dips not considered). In short, Beijing's absolute PM2.5 levels remain consistently higher than Hanoi's, although the gap has gradually narrowed since 2021.


### 5.2 PM2.5 concentrations per capita ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3/\text{person}$ )

Per capita PM2.5, although not a standard air quality metric, is presented for contextual illustration as absolute PM2.5 values measure ambient concentration rather than individual allocation. Figure 2 highlights relative exposure: Hanoi's smaller population means that even moderate absolute concentrations translate into a higher exposure burden per resident. Hanoi's per capita values exhibit pronounced spikes in late 2017-early 2018, winter peaks in 2018-2019 and 2020-2021, dips around mid-2020 and mid-2021 (which temporally align with Vietnam's COVID-19 lockdown periods (Prime Minister of the Government, 2020; Hanoi People's Committee, 2021 July 23; Hanoi People's Committee, 2021 August 6). While this overlap does not establish causation, it suggests that mobility restrictions may have played a role), followed by rebounds in late 2021. Beijing's per capita values are generally lower, especially after mid 2021, reflecting both its larger population and long-run regulatory interventions.

### 5.3 Patterns Analysis

Beijing's early implementation of fuel and vehicle controls, scrappage of high-emitting vehicles, and long-running traffic restrictions since early-mid 2010s appear to be associated with lower baselines and reduced seasonal peaks in recent years as the policies' effects became stabilized and more tangible (Yang et al., 2015). Conversely, Hanoi's rather stagnant PM2.5 trends align with the city's current reliance on activity-specific bans such as restrictions on household solid-fuel use and open burning between 2019 and 2021 (Vietnam News, 2019; 2023). They seem to limit extreme spikes yet do not have continuous dampening effects on emissions, most of which come from vehicles. Direct interventions targeted at transport like periodic motorbike inspection programs, low-emission zones, or traffic-based cordons are planned for 2025-2028, meaning their influence is absent from the time period examined here (Vietnam News, 2019; 2023; 2024; Vu Tuan, 2025). When normalized by population, Hanoi exhibits higher per capita PM2.5 levels despite its lower absolute concentrations, highlighting a relatively greater exposure burden per resident.

Nevertheless, these observations suggest not a definitive causal chain but an empirical correspondence between regulatory trajectories and PM2.5 patterns: Beijing with earlier systematic controls on fuel and



322 vehicle emissions tends to show smoother and more sustained reductions, while Hanoi, which relies on  
323 episodic bans, exhibits less visible progress in air quality mitigation. Importantly, causality cannot be  
324 established from this dataset alone, as meteorological variability, regional transport, and biomass burning  
325 also affect year-to-year fluctuations. Therefore, the purpose of this analysis is to situate PM2.5 patterns  
326 within their policy contexts for an overview of both cities' current status rather than a claim of policy-  
327 specific effectiveness, which requires a broader body of evidence.

328  
329 To analyze the most recent trends in air pollution for Hanoi and Beijing, this paper used PM2.5  
330 concentrations—a widely adopted metric for air quality assessments—as the key indicator. In the United  
331 States, PM2.5 is classified as one of the criteria air pollutants under the Clean Air Act (1971), which helped  
332 establish safe levels of pollutants in the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Suh et al., 2000). These  
333 fine particles are also considered a major cause of premature death and illness, and no PM2.5 threshold  
334 for absolute safety against adverse health effects has been determined (Yu et al., 2023). Moreover, in its  
335 updated Air Quality Guidelines (2021), the World Health Organization (WHO) recognised PM2.5 as a  
336 classical air pollutant and recommended a threshold of 5 µg/m<sup>3</sup> for annual PM2.5 levels exposure.  
337 Additionally, concentrations of PM2.5, alongside PM10, are made Indicator 11.6.2 under Target 11.6 of  
338 the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aims to reduce cities' negative environmental impact.  
339 These statistics serve as background information, providing context for the analysis of air pollution trends  
340 in Hanoi and Beijing that form the core focus of this paper.

341  
342 This review compares the quarterly average of PM2.5 from 2016 to 2024 in Beijing and in Hanoi to  
343 understand how and to what extent the policies reviewed in each city may have impacted air quality. In  
344 order to account for the huge difference between Beijing's and Hanoi's sizes of urban population, the  
345 quarterly average PM2.5 concentrations are evaluated per capita (µg/m<sup>3</sup>/person) for a fairer assessment  
346 and comparison (Figure 1). PM2.5 per capita refers to the concentration of PM2.5 normalised by  
347 population, which offers a measure of individual exposure and allows equitable comparisons across cities  
348 with different population sizes. While this approach has not been applied directly to PM2.5, it has been  
349 used in other contexts. For example, IPCC's Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report (Intergovernmental  
350 Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023) adopts GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions per capita as a key metric.  
351 Likewise, Indicator B.3.1 in the UNECE Guidelines for the Application of Environmental Indicators  
352 recommends GHG emissions per capita as a statistical recommendation with a view to "harmonising the  
353 absolute value of GHG emissions for international comparisons" (United Nations Economic Commission  
354 for Europe [UNECE], 2025). Extending this precedent to PM2.5, this study employs PM2.5 per capita to  
355 provide a more balanced comparison of air quality impacts in Hanoi and Beijing by accounting for their  
356 demographic variations (Figure 1).

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
(Optional) maybe you can include at least one additional pollutant, such as NO2 or O3, in your analyses/discussion to avoid over-reliance on PM2.5 alone

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Figure 1 PM2.5 concentrations per capita in Beijing and Hanoi, June 2016 to September 2024

Both cities exhibit strong seasonality, but Hanoi's is generally higher and more volatile. The most pronounced spikes occur in late 2017–early 2018, with winter peaks in 2018–2019 and 2020–2021. Dips occurred around mid-2020 and mid-2021, which likely reflected pandemic-era slowdowns, were followed by a rebound in late-2021. From 2022 onwards, most of Beijing's values were between ~2–4 µg/m³ with smaller seasonal swings, whereas those of Hanoi were higher, roughly ~4–6 µg/m³ with occasional winter bumps. Overall, while Beijing's amplitude seems to have dampened over time, Hanoi's remains high with less evidence of a structural step-down. These patterns suggest the effectiveness of Beijing's measures and imply that Hanoi still has substantial challenges to resolve.

Taken against policy timing, the contrast is consistent with each city's strategy. Beijing's earlier fuel and vehicle controls, scrapping of high emitters, and long-running traffic restrictions align with a lower baseline and smaller seasonal peaks in recent years (Yang et al., 2015). Hanoi's 2019–2021 actions targeted household fuels and open burning, which likely helped curb the most extreme spikes seen in 2017–2018; however, its transport levers (motorbike testing, LEZs/cordons) only begin in 2025–2028, thus, an extensive, sustained transport-driven reduction has not yet been observed in the series (Vietnam News, 2023; Vietnam News, 2019; Vietnam News, 2024; Vu Tuan, 2025). In short, Beijing resembles a mature, policy-stabilized regime, whereas Hanoi remains in transition with time needed for transport measures to prove their efficiency.

388 Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish a direct causality between PM2.5 fluctuations and specific policy  
389 outcomes, as other factors—such as meteorological conditions, regional pollution transport, and biomass  
390 burning—may also influence air quality. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to produce a high level  
391 overview of PM2.5 patterns in both cities, framing them within policy contexts to demonstrate how  
392 regulatory trajectories may correspond with observed changes while acknowledging that policy-specific  
393 efficacy must be concluded from a wider body of literature and not solely from this high-level PM2.5 time  
394 series.

395 ~~▲ Health-wise, the World Health Organization's annual guideline on PM2.5 is 5 µg/m<sup>3</sup>. Recent months'~~  
396 ~~PM2.5 levels in Beijing often fall near or below that threshold; meanwhile, Hanoi still records many~~  
397 ~~months above it. That said, month-to-month variation can result from temporary events or region-wide~~  
398 ~~influences, so regulatory effects are better analyzed from sustained trends than single spikes.~~

400  
401 **4.6. A brief review of Beijing's major transport-related air pollution policies**  
402 Beijing's set of actions against vehicular air pollution has developed over more than two decades,  
403 characterized by a structured framework across five key fronts: fuel quality and vapor recovery, vehicle  
404 emission controls, traffic management, compliance, and alternative-fuel fleets (UNEP, 2019; Wu et al.,  
405 2011; Yang et al., 2015). The city's effort marked its beginning with the 1997 *Strategies and*  
406 *Implementation Plan for Controlling Motor Vehicle Emissions in Beijing*, which served as the cornerstone  
407 for applying Euro-equivalent standards to all newly registered vehicles starting in 1999 (Yang et al., 2015).  
408 From 1999 to 2015, Beijing took complementary measures targeted at both new and in-use vehicle  
409 emissions while controlling how, when, and which vehicles could access the urban centre (UNEP, 2019;  
410 Yang et al., 2015).

411  
412 ~~Existing literature consistently shows that on fuels, Beijing acted earlier and more aggressively than~~  
413 ~~stipulated by national requirements. On fuels, Beijing acted earlier and more aggressively than stipulated~~  
414 ~~by national requirements.~~ It first banned lead and then limited sulfur content in fuel, enabling modern  
415 after-treatment technologies (Yang et al., 2015). Within less than two decades, the city replaced poorly  
416 quality-controlled fuel with lead-free gasoline and diesel capped at 10 ppm sulfur, facilitating sizable  
417 tailpipe reductions. Beijing also addressed evaporative losses by mandating Stage I and Stage II gasoline  
418 vapor recovery at filling stations beginning in 2000, three years ahead of national rules (Yang et al., 2015).  
419 In 2007, Beijing funded a large-scale retrofit program that equipped over 1,000 stations and tanker trucks  
420 with the required vapor recovery systems for the 2008 Olympics, cutting VOC emissions by an estimated  
421 20,000 metric tons annually (Fung & Maxwell, 2011; Z-Yang et al., 2015).

422  
423 Emission standards for both light-duty gasoline and heavy-duty diesel vehicles (China I-V and China 1-5,  
424 respectively) were adopted by Beijing in an accelerated manner, helping to close its gap with the EU and  
425 U.S. as well as reduce new-vehicle emissions (UNEP, 2019). To manage the in-use fleet, the city  
426 successfully utilized a color-labeling system that laid the groundwork for subsequent scrappage and  
427 retrofitting programs. Scrappage programs were carried out in phases, restricting certain types of vehicle  
428 from entering central areas and providing subsidies that encouraged the retirement of high emitters  
429 (UNEP, 2019; Wu et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015). Meanwhile, despite several preliminary pilot programs,

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431 retrofits  
432 due to their transient benefits but high operation-maintenance costs and limited lifespan (Yang et al.,  
433 2015).

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434 Traffic control policies implemented by the Beijing government have significantly decreased demand for  
435 and access to new vehicles. In 2011 the city initiated its license-plate lottery to cap new registrations, and  
436 the average 26-month queue time to be given an official plate reduced winners' likelihood of actually  
437 switching to driving by 16% (H-Yang et al., 2014). The city also enacted several restrictions: spatially,  
438 motorcycles are prohibited within the Fourth Ring Road, and yellow-label vehicles have been fully  
439 forbidden from-in the metropolitan area since late 2014 (Z-Yang et al., 2015; The State Council of the  
440 People's Republic of China, 2015); temporally, weekday "last-digit" driving restrictions—which ban  
441 vehicles from entering the Fifth Ring Road on designated days according to their license-plate numbers—  
442 were first piloted for the 2008 Olympics. Afterwards, they were extended due to their effectiveness, and  
443 have continued to help manage peak-hour traffic ever since. For non-local vehicles (excluding already-  
444 banned yellow-label vehicles), a provisional City Pass is required to access the Sixth Ring Road; otherwise,  
445 they can only travel beyond the Sixth Ring Road from midnight to 6 a.m. (Beijing Municipal Government,  
446 2025; Z-Yang et al., 2015).

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448 Compliance measures were implemented to augment these aforementioned controls. Beijing's  
449 inspection-and-maintenance (I/M) program mandates periodic safety and emissions testing. National and  
450 local guidelines were introduced to standardize procedures and verification of type-approval criteria;  
451 testing intervals vary depending on vehicle type and age (Z-Yang et al., 2015). Concurrently, roadside  
452 remote sensing contributes to enhanced enforcement by spotting high-emitting vehicles, tracking fleet  
453 trends, and checking I/M program performance despite its inaccuracies in monitoring vehicles individually  
454 (Z-Yang et al., 2015). However, loopholes exist: old, unqualified vehicles may slip in ring-road boundaries;  
455 some Beijing-registered vehicles may refuel outside the city, where sulfur levels are higher because of  
456 inadequate regulation. Both of these scenarios can increase real-world emissions and risk catalyst failure,  
457 thus calling for regionally coordinated policies on fuel standards and enforcement to ensure enhanced  
458 regulatory efficacy (Zhang et al., 2014).

459  
460 Finally, Beijing coupled restrictions with cleaner, more sustainable vehicle technologies. The city has  
461 strongly promoted new energy vehicles (NEVs) and built one of the world's largest fleets of natural-gas  
462 buses, employing both CNG and LNG, technologies that cut life-cycle CO2 emissions by 18-25% compared  
463 to gasoline buses (Hao et al., 2016). In an attempt to foster NEV adoption among its citizens, the  
464 government released a separate license plate cap for this type of vehicle (Z-Yang et al., 2015). Together,  
465 these complementary measures—including cleaner fuels, tighter standards, targeted scrappage, access  
466 controls, rigorous compliance tools, and alternative-fuel deployment—create the backbone of Beijing's  
467 transport-focused anti-air pollution strategy.

468  
469 **5.7. A brief review of Hanoi's major air pollution policies**

470 This section reviews Hanoi's city-level efforts to curb transport-related air pollution from mid-2000s to  
471 2025. Due to the recent nature of Hanoi's policies targeted at vehicular air pollution, it also briefly

472 examines related measures, such as the charcoal stoves ban and control on open burning, as key drivers  
473 of observed air-quality trends in Hanoi.

474  
475 The backbone of Hanoi's approach has been a 2017 People's Council resolution to rein in private  
476 motorbikes (Nguyen Thuy, 2017), followed by legal authority in the revised Capital Law (effective from  
477 2025) that lets the city create low-emission zones and apply more stringent rules on local vehicles (Ngoc  
478 Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025). In parallel, Hanoi banned honeycomb charcoal stoves, curbed open burning,  
479 and began relocating polluting factories out of the urban core, while upgrading its monitoring and  
480 enforcement toolkit (Vietnam News, 2019; Vietnam News, 2023; VietNamNet News, 2021).

481  
482 Unlike Beijing's early fuel-quality push, Hanoi's most impactful fuel actions have targeted household  
483 sources. In late 2019 the Chairman of the People's Committee ordered the elimination of honeycomb  
484 (beehive) charcoal stoves, which the city had identified as a major PM contributor in dense districts  
485 (Vietnam News, 2019). In September 2020, a law under Instruction 15/CT-UBND formally banned the open  
486 burning of agricultural residues (notably rice straw) and trash; subsequent reporting highlights both the  
487 rule and the continuing enforcement challenge in suburban districts (Vietnam News, 2023). To ensure  
488 household-fuel compliance, Hanoi's 2019 stove directive shifted from education and support in 2020 to  
489 penalties from 2021, with enforcement handled by the city's environmental protection units (Vietnam  
490 News, 2019). For open burning, Instruction 15/CT-UBND tasks the Department of Natural Resources and  
491 Environment (DONRE) and district authorities with inspections and sanctions, though coverage gaps  
492 remain in peri-urban rice areas (Vietnam News, 2023). The city has also run a long-standing program to  
493 relocate polluting factories away from central districts; by 2021 it had listed around 90 establishments for  
494 removal and reported partial progress, with the program continuing as sites and financing line up  
495 (VietNamNet News, 2021).

496 For new policy architecture, Hanoi's 2017 People's Council resolution laid out a phased restriction on  
497 motorbike circulation through 2030, explicitly linking traffic control to air-quality gains and public-  
498 transport expansion (Nguyen Thuy, 2017). The 2024 Capital Law then empowered Hanoi to set low-  
499 emission zones (LEZs) and adopt stricter local emissions measures; pilots are slated in central districts  
500 from January 1, 2025, prioritizing cleaner vehicles and public transport access (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy,  
501 2025). Translating framework into timelines, the city has announced a staged ban on fossil-fuel  
502 motorbikes: a first cordon within Ring Road 1 from July 1, 2026, expanding to tighter two-wheel and car  
503 restrictions between Rings 1–2 from January 1, 2028 (Vu Tuan, 2025).

504 In parallel, Hanoi is preparing periodic emissions testing for in-use motorbikes, with a national roadmap  
505 pointing to a Hanoi/HCMC start in 2027 and phased coverage by model year thereafter (Vietnam News,  
506 2025). Hanoi's LEZs pilots operationalize zone-based access management, restricting high-emitting fossil-  
507 fuel vehicles in core districts, pairing the rule with investment in public transport and charging (Ngoc Mai  
508 & Nguyen Quy, 2025). The Capital Law text and city briefings emphasize LEZs authority, phased expansion  
509 after 2030, and the use of fees/charges to reinforce behavior change (Ngoc Mai & Nguyen Quy, 2025).  
510 These zone-based controls complement the 2017 resolution's longer-run intent to progressively limit  
511 motorbike circulation citywide as transit supply improves.

512 In terms of public transport, to align access rules with cleaner fleets, Hanoi has adopted a green-bus  
513 roadmap: targets announced in 2025 aim for a full switch to electric/green-energy buses by 2030, with  
514 interim milestones (≈10% in 2025; 20–23% in 2026) and supporting infrastructure/finance measures  
515 (Vietnam News, 2024). Several statements and press briefings also reference taxi electrification by 2030  
516 (some sources cite “all taxis,” others “at least 50% buses and all taxis”), reflecting evolving targets as plans  
517 are finalized (Vietnam News, 2024). Earlier than these transport measures, Hanoi set a foundation for  
518 monitoring and dust control. *Decision 355/QĐ-UBND* (January 13, 2012) approved a fixed air-quality  
519 monitoring network to 2020, establishing the city’s long-term infrastructure for air-pollution observation  
520 (Hanoi People’s Committee, 2012). Meanwhile, *Decision 02/2005/QĐ-UB* and *Decision 55/2009/QĐ-*  
521 *UBND* required construction sites to control dust and maintain sanitation (Hanoi People’s Committee,  
522 2005; 2009). These actions were important for PM reductions alongside later traffic-related measures.

523

#### 524 **6.8. Comparison of Beijing and Hanoi’s air pollution approaches**

525 ~~Overall, Beijing and Hanoi are working towards the same objective, cleaner air, but with different~~  
526 ~~approaches. Beijing started early by addressing what enters the tank. It pushed cleaner fuels (down to 10~~  
527 ~~ppm sulfur and no lead) and required gas stations to capture gasoline vapors, which allows modern~~  
528 ~~emissions equipment to work better. Meanwhile, Hanoi can’t set its own fuel rules (those are nationally~~  
529 ~~determined), so its new powers focus on access: starting in 2025, the city uses low-emission zones (LEZs)~~  
530 ~~and road “cordons” to favor cleaner vehicles in key areas.~~

531

532 ~~For new and in-use vehicles, Beijing moved faster in implementing standards and enforced them more~~  
533 ~~rigorously. It introduced strict limits for new cars and trucks; used a color-label system, roadside remote~~  
534 ~~sensing; and ran an inspection/maintenance program to identify and retire the most polluting vehicles.~~  
535 ~~Hanoi follows national standards for new vehicles and is now developing its enforcement tools: periodic~~  
536 ~~emissions testing for motorbikes slated for 2027 (which are piloted in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City before~~  
537 ~~expansion).~~

538

539 ~~Traffic management also reflects different strategies. Beijing limits car ownership with a license-plate~~  
540 ~~lottery (since 2011), lays down weekday “last digit” driving rules, bans motorcycles inside the 4th Ring~~  
541 ~~Road, and keeps high-emitting yellow-label vehicles out entirely. Hanoi, by contrast, doesn’t use lotteries~~  
542 ~~or last-digit rules; instead, it’s restricting in phases where higher-emitting vehicles can go: a 2017 decision~~  
543 ~~sets up a phase-out of gasoline motorbikes in the urban core by 2030, with a firm cordon inside Ring Road~~  
544 ~~1 on July 1, 2026, and a wider zone in 2028. LEZs will then scale up thereafter.~~

545

546 ~~Beyond traffic, while Beijing’s headline moves were mostly on road, Hanoi prioritized major non-traffic~~  
547 ~~contributors inside the city: it eliminated honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021 and banned open burning~~  
548 ~~of crop waste and trash from 2020. Both cities are also pushing cleaner fleets, but in different ways: Beijing~~  
549 ~~built large CNG/LNG and NEV programs whereas Hanoi is linking bus and taxi electrification to its LEZs and~~  
550 ~~cordon timelines toward 2030.~~

551

552 On monitoring and enforcement, Beijing already has a mature system: an extensive air quality network,  
 553 roadside testing, and large scrappage programs. Hanoi has a city AQ (air quality) network and district  
 554 enforcement teams for stove and burning bans, and upcoming testing centers to police motorbike  
 555 emissions.

557 Overall, Beijing's model is largely based on technological upgrade and strict enforcement with controls on  
 558 when and how many cars can drive. Hanoi's model is based on zones and access rules, paired with  
 559 household-fuel crackdowns and a staged build-out of emissions testing, reflecting its previously more  
 560 limited regulatory authority and later policy start.

562 Based on the policies discussed for each city, a comparative table covering different regulatory aspects  
 563 was compiled (Table 2).

564 Based on these comparisons, a comprehensive table was created (Table 1).

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Air Pollution Policy/Strategy	Beijing	Hanoi
Fuel quality & vapor recovery	Began early by controlling what goes in the tank: pushed cleaner fuels (down to 10 ppm sulfur, no lead), which enabled modern after-treatment technologies to work effectively. Required Stage I/II vapor recovery at gas stations with major retrofit programs completed before the 2008 Olympics. Led the nation on cleaner fuels (to 10 ppm sulfur) and gas station Stage I/II vapor recovery with retrofits before the 2008 Olympics.	No city-specific fuel-quality mandates because fuel standards are set nationally. However, the new LEZs authority (from 2025) allows Hanoi to indirectly tighten fuel-quality control by regulating zone access based on vehicles' pollution levels (particularly favoring cleaner ones). No city-specific fuel-quality mandates; fuel is set nationally. LEZs authority (2025) can indirectly tighten via access rules.
New-vehicle emission standards	Adopted Euro-pathway standards early (Beijing 1 in 1999 and China 5 by 2013), often ahead of the national timeline, pushing cleaner new vehicles sooner. Applied Euro-pathway early (Beijing 1 in 1999 and China 5 by 2013), often ahead of the national timeline.	Follows national standards for new vehicles. Under the 2024 Capital Law, the local authority can set stricter access rules by emission tier within LEZs. Follows national standards; new local authority (Capital Law 2025) to set tighter access by emission tier within LEZs.

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In-use vehicle controls (I/M, remote sensing)	<del>Robust I/M and roadside remote sensing; color label system (green/yellow) enabled targeted scrappage. Operates a robust I/M system and widespread roadside remote sensing. A green/yellow label system enabled targeted retirement of high-emitting vehicles through scrappage programs.</del>	<del>Developing enforcement tools: periodic emissions testing for motorbikes slated to begin in 2027 (piloted in Hanoi and HCMC first), phasing nationwide by 2030. Periodic emissions testing for motorbikes slated to begin in 2027 (Hanoi/HCMC first), phasing nationwide by 2030.</del>
Traffic control and usage restrictions	<del>Uses usage controls: odd-even/last-digit weekday driving restrictions (started during the 2008 Olympics and continued with modifications); a ban on motorcycles inside the 4th Ring Road; and complete bans on yellow-label vehicles. Odd-even/last-digit weekday restrictions started during the 2008 Olympics and continued (modified).</del>	<del>Does not adopt last-digit rules. Instead phased geographic restrictions: the 2017 plan mandates phasing out gasoline motorbikes in the urban core by 2030, with a strict cordon inside Ring Road 1 on 1 July 2026 and expansion in 2028. Not citywide last-digit rules; instead, phased access limits for high-emitting/fossil-fuel vehicles via LEZs and cordons.</del>
Vehicle population control	<del>License-plate lottery since 2011; annual caps tightened-reduced over time (240k from 240,000 to 150,000 to 150k).</del>	<del>No population-control strategy. Relies on restricting where and when each vehicle type can enter through zone-based measures. No lottery; strategy is to restrict where/when certain vehicles can circulate (zone-based).</del>
Low-emission zones (LEZs)	<del>Piloted bans on yellow-label vehicles. Studied broader LEZ models from the mid-2010s onward. Piloted YLV bans and zone-based controls; studied broader LEZs in the mid-2010s.</del>	<del>Legal LEZ authority from 2025. Pilots in central districts begin from 2025 with expansion after 2030. Legal authority from 2025; pilots in central districts from 2025 with expansion after 2030.</del>
Motorbike restrictions	<del>Motorcycles restricted inside the 4th Ring Road. Placed priority on eliminating yellow-label vehicles (2014).</del>	<del>2017 resolution targets full phase-out of gasoline motorbikes in the urban core by 2030, firm cordon inside Ring Road 1 from 1 July 2026, and expansion in 2028.</del>

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	<u>Ring Road; focus on YLV ban (2014).</u>	<u>2017 resolution to phase out gasoline motorbikes in urban core by 2030; firm cordon inside Ring Road 1 on 1 Jul 2026, expand in 2028.</u>
<u>Alternative-fuel fleets</u>	<u>Extensive use of CNG/LNG buses and strong promotion of NEVs, including separate license quotas for NEVs. CNG/LNG bus rollout; NEV promotion, including separate license caps for NEVs.</u>	<u>Ties bus and taxi electrification to LEZ and cordon timelines, targeting major transitions by 2030. EV transition targets for public transport/taxis toward 2030 aligned with LEZs/cordon rollout.</u>
<u>Monitoring &amp; enforcement tools</u>	<u>Mature systems including: an expanded AQ network, empowered BEPB for roadside testing, and strong scrappage programs for YLVs. Expanded AQ network; empowered BEPB for roadside testing; strong scrappage programs for YLVs.</u>	<u>Operates a citywide AQ monitoring network, district-level enforcement for bans on honeycomb stoves and open-burning. Building motorbike emissions-testing centers. City AQ monitoring network; district-level enforcement for stove/open-burning bans; building out motorbike testing centers.</u>
<u>Household fuels &amp; Open burning</u>	<u>Has controls but historically emphasized transport and industry more than household fuels. Major coal-to-gas campaigns were mostly regional/national. Controls exist but less emphasis citywide; focus remained on transport and industry (coal-to-gas campaign was mostly regional/national).</u>	<u>Eliminated honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021 (support in 2020; fines from 2021). Instruction 15/CT-UBND (Sep 2020) bans open burning of agricultural waste and trash, with ongoing enforcement. Directive to eliminate honeycomb charcoal stoves by 2021 (support in 2020; fines from 2021). Instruction 15/CT-UBND (Sep 2020) bans open burning of agricultural waste and trash; ongoing enforcement.</u>

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**Table 21.** Beijing and Hanoi's transport-related policies targeted at air pollution

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**7.9. Discussion:**

The data and literature generally confirm that Beijing's aggressive policy interventions have effectively reduced air pollution to some extent. However, it is essential to acknowledge that Beijing and Hanoi are not directly comparable: they differ significantly in terms of urban population size, economic capacity,

572 and governance structure. This study does not propose direct replication, but rather uses Beijing's policies  
573 as a reference to isolate mechanisms that successfully targeted vehicle emissions. The goal is to identify  
574 potentially transferable, not identical, policies. Therefore, to move beyond a theoretical list of measures  
575 and provide a contextually relevant evaluation, this section analyzes the adaptability of Beijing's measures  
576 to Hanoi using a tripartite framework:

- 577 1. Technical Efficacy: The potential for significant emission reductions.
- 578 2. Institutional Feasibility: The legal and bureaucratic capacity of Hanoi to implement the measure.
- 579 3. Social & Political Acceptability: The likelihood of public approval and compliance, particularly  
580 given Hanoi's heavy reliance on motorbikes.

#### 581 9.1 Transferable policies with adaptation

582 The analysis concludes that three policies utilized by Beijing, including low-emission zones (LEZs),  
583 scrappage programs, and camera-based enforcement, have high potential for transfer, provided they are  
584 strategically adapted.

##### 585 9.1.1 Low-emission zones (LEZs)

- 586 • Technical Efficiency: High

587 This is the most direct emission reduction measure. Given Hanoi's 6.7 million motorbikes, restricting the  
588 oldest, most polluting vehicles from entering the urban core (e.g., Ring Road 1) yields immediate,  
589 concentrated benefits to air quality, especially in central areas where air pollution is typically the most  
590 severe due to intense traffic activities.

- 591 • Institutional Feasibility: High

592 This criterion is now met due to the revised Capital Law (effective from 2025), which grants Hanoi the  
593 legal authority to establish LEZs and enforce stricter vehicle emission standards. This forms a strong  
594 institutional backbone for the planned gas-powered motorbike ban starting in 2026.

- 595 • Social & Political Acceptability: Low to Medium

596 This is the main source of friction. Hanoi lacks Beijing's extensive subway system, so LEZs risk being  
597 inequitable because motorbikes are crucial to the working class' livelihoods. Hence, implementation  
598 should be gradual and closely linked to the accelerated development of public transportation modes,  
599 especially bus and metro.

##### 600 9.1.2 Scrappage programs

- 601 • Technical Efficiency: High

602 Scrappage targets the worst-polluting vehicles in the fleet. This strategy specifically addresses the largest  
603 contributors to pollutants like PM, NOx, and VOCs, thereby leading to a rapid reduction in tailpipe  
604 emissions.

- 605 • Institutional Feasibility: Medium

606 While legally feasible, managing, verifying millions of motorbikes and securing substantial funding  
607 required for subsidies present a significant bureaucratic and fiscal challenge to Hanoi, in contrast to  
608 greater resources available in Beijing.

- 609 • Social & Political Acceptability: Medium to High
- 610
- 611

612 This is socially and politically more easily acceptable than outright bans as it offers financial incentives and  
613 a fairer transition mechanism. If subsidies are fair, particularly sufficient to cover the cost difference for  
614 more technologically modern vehicles, then the programs are likely to gain public support.

#### 616 9.1.3 Camera-based enforcement

- 617 • Technical Efficiency: High

618 This tool provides consistent and systematic compliance with LEZ and emission regulations, thereby  
619 boosting their effectiveness. It enables reliable enforcement over large areas without dependence on  
620 manual policing.

- 621 • Institutional Feasibility: High

622 Hanoi is already investing in 'smart city' infrastructure, including cameras on select roads (VNA, 2025).  
623 The technology for plate recognition technology is widely available and scalable as it is already used to  
624 detect traffic violations (Nguyen & Pojani, 2018)

- 625 • Social & Political Acceptability: High

626 Automated enforcement is generally perceived as more transparent, stringent and less prone to  
627 corruption than human police interaction. This shift towards system integrity is likely to promote higher  
628 compliance rates among the citizens.

629

#### 630 9.2 Impractical policies

631 In contrast, two key policies employed by Beijing are assessed as likely impractical for Hanoi's current  
632 context, which consist of license-plate lotteries (vehicle quotas) and weekday last-digit rotation bans.

633

##### 634 9.2.1 License-plate lotteries

- 635 • Technical Efficiency: Low to Medium

636 This only curtails new vehicles, while Hanoi's air pollution mainly stems from existing, aging motorbikes.  
637 Therefore, the policy would only provide a delayed, marginal benefit to current emissions levels. However,  
638 once air pollution is generally mitigated, it could help sustain long-term control over pollution.

- 639 • Institutional Feasibility: Medium

640 Implementing an equitable and secure lottery system for millions of motorbikes would be an  
641 administrative burden for the government disproportionate to immediate gains in terms of air quality.

- 642 • Social & Political Acceptability: Low

643 Motorbikes serve not only as the primary means of transportation but also a source of income for many  
644 (Pojani et al., 2024). Implementing a quota system to limit the number of motorbike registrations could  
645 be perceived as restricting a basic right to mobility, and could negatively impact the city's economy. This  
646 would likely result in massive public backlash.

647

##### 648 9.2.2 Weekday last-digit rotation bans

- 649 • Technical Efficiency: Medium

650 Although this ban could indirectly reduce emissions by limiting days a vehicle could be on the road, its  
651 main benefit lies in alleviating traffic congestion, which can easily be outweighed by the significant  
652 institutional and social costs. Instead of specifically retiring high-emitting vehicles, it merely rotates them.

- 653 • Institutional Feasibility: Medium

654 This policy requires only the deployment of automated camera systems (as discussed in 9.1.3) and clear  
655 signage, making it highly feasible from the administrative standpoint.

656 • Social & Political Acceptability: Low

657 This policy relies on users having an alternative on their banned days, which Hanoi has not provided yet.  
658 Forcing a motorbike rider off the road without a thorough, functional network of Metro or bus will lead  
659 to economic disruption or incentivize purchasing a second vehicle, which counteracts the policy's intent.  
660 This strategy is only viable once major public transit infrastructure is complete.

661 ▲  
662 Ultimately, the review of policies and recent data show that Beijing has experienced a steady decline in  
663 PM2.5 per capita. This trend reflects the relative success of Beijing's efforts to tackle air pollution. On the  
664 contrary, Hanoi's PM2.5 per capita values fluctuated more dramatically throughout the recorded period,  
665 displaying a stable or slightly upward trend over the last 4 years. This suggests that air pollution in the city  
666 remains insufficiently addressed or is worsening. Furthermore, among the 100 months illustrated in the  
667 chart, Hanoi's PM2.5 per Capita exceeded Beijing's in 70% of the cases. This pattern indicates that air  
668 pollution remains a major concern for Hanoi, underscoring the importance of timely government  
669 regulations to protect public health and the environment.

670  
671 Hanoi can improve its air quality, but this means introducing its new measures in a logical sequence and  
672 reinforcing them with steady enforcement. Beijing's success in tackling vehicular air pollution highlights  
673 that progress comes from a set of actions maintained over the years. They include tight vehicle  
674 regulations, clear restrictions on where high-emitting vehicles can operate, and rigorous follow-through.  
675 While Hanoi has already addressed several non-traffic sources, such as charcoal "honeycomb" stoves and  
676 open burning, a recommended next step is to implement low-emission zones (LEZs) and inner-city cordons  
677 in a systematic, equitable, and persistent manner. To ensure this transition is socially just, especially for  
678 low-income motorbike users, phased implementation must be paired with financial support mechanisms,  
679 such as hardship exemptions, vouchers, or micro-loans, to facilitate the switch to cleaner motorbikes.

680  
681 However, to be more impactful, some policies could be transferred or adapted from Beijing to Hanoi—for  
682 instance, zone access with clear rules. Hanoi's phased implementation could start from within Ring Road  
683 1, followed by a scheduled expansion, and employ cameras to reduce the dependence on manual spot  
684 checks for enforcement. Additionally, Hanoi could prioritize the highest polluters for targeting and use  
685 emissions testing (and quick roadside checks where possible) to find vehicles with disproportionately high  
686 emissions, then offer trade-in or scrappage bonuses tied to cleaner replacements—ideally electric  
687 motorbikes. Hanoi could also foster compliance by standardizing inspection procedures then linking test  
688 results to LEZs access, and storing everything digitally for better organization.

689  
690 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a difference in cultural contexts between Beijing and Hanoi does exist.  
691 Thus, there are some policies that were successful in Beijing, but would be less feasible in Hanoi's context.  
692 For example, Beijing's license-plate lottery and weekday last-digit bans worked there, but they're not as  
693 suitable for Hanoi. Hanoi is a motorbike city, and many people use their bikes to earn a living. Limiting  
694 vehicle operation through lottery or alternating day license-plate permits could adversely affect lower-  
695 income riders, many of whom rely on motorcycles for livelihood, while yielding more limited

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696 environmental benefits than spatial restrictions. Also, Beijing could order cleaner fuel and early vapor  
697 recovery systems at gas stations; however, Hanoi can't set fuel specs on its own. Instead, it should push  
698 nationally for those changes while using city purchasing (e-buses, e-taxis, municipal fleets) to promote  
699 cleaner technologies into the market.

700  
701 It is also crucial that local context be considered. To ensure an equitable transition, LEZs should be  
702 accompanied with subsidies like hardship exemptions, vouchers or micro-loans to help riders switch to  
703 cleaner motorbikes. In addition, practically sufficient charging or battery swap options should be offered  
704 in dense neighborhoods. Hanoi's budgets and staffing are more limited than Beijing's, so it is advisable for  
705 Hanoi to roll out cameras, test centers, scrappage funding in phases and clearly signal what's coming  
706 ahead a sufficient amount of time (e.g., 2026 inner cordon, 2028 expansion). It should keep working on  
707 non-traffic sources too: facilitate the open burning ban by funding straw collection and alternative uses  
708 (compost, biochar), and continue moving heavy industry out of residential districts.

#### 709 710 **8.10. Limitations:**

711 Several limitations should be noted when interpreting these findings. First, PM2.5 ~~per capita~~ was used as  
712 the sole indicator of air quality in this paper, potentially overlooking other air pollutants that also affect  
713 public health, such as NO<sub>2</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub>, and VOCs. Second, the study only focuses on Beijing and Hanoi, making  
714 the results less appropriate for generalization and transferral to urban contexts with different population  
715 densities, infrastructures, or governance systems. Third, while PM2.5 trends are analysed alongside policy  
716 timelines, proving a direct causality is impossible given other external influences on air quality, including  
717 industrial relocation, regional pollution transport, weather, and temporary events. Finally, not all policies  
718 are transferable across cities due to socioeconomic, cultural, and regulatory variations. Hence, future  
719 research could expand to multiple pollutants, additional cities, and cross-sector policy influences for a  
720 more comprehensive assessment of urban air quality management.

#### 721 722 **9.11. Conclusion**

723 This paper examined the current status of air pollution in Hanoi and Beijing from mid-2016 to mid-2024,  
724 using PM2.5 as the core metric. The findings suggested that: while Beijing has successfully mitigated the  
725 impacts of air pollution through rigorous regulatory measures, Hanoi has shown modest progress. Policies  
726 aimed at improving air quality were then reviewed for both cities, focusing on transport-related measures  
727 for Beijing and a broader range of fields for Hanoi. A thorough table was compiled, categorizing and  
728 contrasting policies in both cities. Main differences in each category were then identified and briefly  
729 discussed. Subsequently, Beijing's policies were assessed if they are suitable for Hanoi's local application,  
730 proposing recommendations for air pollution abatement to the municipal government. The review also  
731 took into account cultural and socioeconomic factors to outline potential adjustments for effective policy  
732 adoption.

733  
734 This comparative survey aims to help Vietnam and other countries streamline existing policies to  
735 accelerate progress towards better air quality through transport measures. Nevertheless, there are  
736 certain shortcomings in this study, which can be resolved in future research. As the analysis is limited to  
737 two cities and only focuses on PM2.5, future studies should expand to cover multiple pollutants (such as

738 NO<sub>2</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub>, and VOCs) and include additional urban contexts with varying population densities or  
739 governance systems to improve generalizability. Furthermore, research should also explore cross-sector  
740 policy influences, as improvements in Beijing's air quality resulted from multiple factors, not transport  
741 alone, while accounting for the non-transferability of some policies due to socioeconomic and cultural  
742 differences. Still, this paper serves as an introduction to comparative air pollution and related policies in  
743 Hanoi and Beijing, ~~laying the foundation for further studies into this topic and supporting Hanoi's efforts~~  
744 ~~in mitigating air pollution supporting Hanoi's efforts in mitigating air pollution, and informing future~~  
745 ~~comparative research on urban transport policies.~~

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## **Recommendation: Revise and Resubmit**

This is an ambitious and relevant comparative policy review that tackles a significant environmental challenge. The author demonstrates a strong capacity for synthesizing information from diverse sources and has chosen a timely topic with clear practical implications for policymakers in Hanoi. The compilation of policies into Table 1 is particularly useful and represents a solid foundation. However, the manuscript in its current form reads more like a comprehensive literature review and data summary than a cohesive analytical paper. To meet the journal's standards for rigor and clarity, significant revisions are needed to strengthen the methodological justification, deepen the analytical discussion, and refine the core argument. I am happy to review a revised version that addresses these points.

### **1. Refine the Methodological Approach and Justification:**

Critique: The paper identifies its approach as a "scoping review" but does not detail the search strategy, inclusion/exclusion criteria, or the number of sources identified and screened. This lack of transparency makes the methodology difficult to assess or replicate. Furthermore, the use of "PM2.5 per capita" is a highly unusual and problematic metric. While the rationale (normalizing for population) is understandable, it is not a standard measure in air quality science. PM2.5 concentration is a measure of ambient exposure in the air, not a direct output of individual activity. Using it per capita can be misleading, as it implies that a city's air pollution is divided equally among its residents, which distorts the actual environmental conditions.

You need to greatly expand the Methodological Approach section. Specify the exact search terms, databases, and the time frame of the search. Describe how you selected the final sources for analysis. Regarding PM2.5, I strongly recommend re-plotting Figure 1 using standard, absolute PM2.5 concentrations ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ). You can still discuss population differences as a contextual factor in the text, but the primary metric must align with established scientific practice. This change will make your analysis more credible and interpretable.

I have significantly expanded the Methodology section to address concerns about transparency and replicability. This now includes specific details regarding the search terms, databases utilized, the time frame, and the inclusion/exclusion criteria for selecting the final sources.

Regarding the PM2.5 metric, I acknowledge that absolute PM2.5 concentration is the established scientific measure of ambient air quality. Therefore, I have revised Figure 1 and added a paragraph of analysis dedicated to it. Nevertheless, I have decided to keep the original table that features the PM2.5 per capita metric, but explicitly presented it in the paper for contextualization only. This figure allows readers to grasp the PM2.5 levels relative to the population of each city, but is not used to draw conclusions on policy efficacy or individual exposure.

### **2. Deepen the Analysis from Description to Argument:**

The paper excels at describing “what” policies were implemented but spends less time analyzing “why” they were successful in Beijing or “how” their core principles can be abstracted for Hanoi. The discussion of “transferability” is a good start but remains somewhat surface-level. For instance, the conclusion that low-emission zones (LEZs) are suitable while license-plate lotteries are not is sensible, but the underlying reasons (e.g., governance structure, primary vehicle type, social equity) could be explored in much greater depth to build a more powerful argument.

Re-structure the **Discussion** section to be more argument-driven. After presenting the comparative data, create a framework for analysis. For example, you could analyze the policies based on criteria like: 1) Technical Efficacy: How much does this policy reduce emissions? 2) Institutional Feasibility: Does Hanoi have the legal and bureaucratic capacity to implement it? 3) Social & Political Acceptability: How will this policy be received by the public, especially considering Hanoi’s reliance on motorbikes for livelihoods? Use this framework to systematically evaluate each recommended policy transfer, moving beyond a simple list to a reasoned justification.

The Discussion section has been restructured to be more argument-driven rather than descriptive. I grouped Beijing's policies into five clusters and developed the suggested analytical framework based on three key criteria:

1. Technical Efficacy: The potential for significant emission reductions.
2. Institutional Feasibility: The legal and bureaucratic capacity of Hanoi to implement the measure.
3. Social & Political Acceptability: The likelihood of public approval and compliance, particularly given Hanoi’s heavy reliance on motorbikes.

I systematically evaluated each of the five policy groups against these three criteria, assigning a qualitative assessment (Low, Medium, or High) and providing detailed justification for each rating.

### **3. Strengthen the Link Between Data and Policy Conclusions:**

The connection between the PM2.5 trends in Figure 1 and the subsequent policy analysis is currently weak. The text states it's difficult to establish causality, but then the data is used to make broad claims about Beijing's "success" and Hanoi's "delayed responses." A more nuanced interpretation is needed.

I have adjusted portions of the language that appeared inappropriate for this context; however, some phrasing may still be misleading or unintentionally suggest causal relationships. I would therefore appreciate further feedback on my language to help me improve it.

When discussing the PM2.5 trends, be more precise. Instead of saying Beijing's policies were successful, specify which clusters of policies (e.g., the pre-2010 fuel and new vehicle standards) appear to correlate with the beginning of its downward trend. For Hanoi, discuss how the

observed volatility might reflect its current reliance on banning specific activities (stoves, burning) rather than a continuous, systemic regulatory framework for mobile sources. This will create a more logical and evidence-based flow from your data to your policy recommendations.

I have attempted to link certain policy groups to the periods shown in the charts. However, because the policies' timeframes do not exactly align with those of the charts, I am uncertain whether these linkages are entirely accurate or satisfactory enough.

#### **4. Enhance Precision in Language and Claims:**

There are instances of overly broad or imprecise language. For example, the introduction mentions "Vietnam has been subject to heavy Chinese influences" but doesn't clearly link this historical fact to modern environmental policy capacity. The abstract states the paper "reviews previous academic studies and news articles," which undersells the original work of policy comparison.

Scrutinize the manuscript for sweeping statements and replace them with specific, focused claims. In the abstract and introduction, more accurately describe your contribution—e.g., "This paper provides a systematic comparative analysis of transport-related air pollution policies in Beijing and Hanoi..." This sounds more scholarly and confident.

I have addressed the points you highlighted and reviewed the text for other potentially sweeping statements. However, I recognize that I may be biased toward my own work, making it difficult to identify all instances that might read as overly general to readers. I would therefore greatly appreciate any further feedback on this aspect for improvements.

## Reviewer Report

**Paper title: Hanoi's potential to learn from Beijing's past experience in addressing air pollution caused by vehicle emissions.**

Recommendations: **Major changes recommended**

### Suggestions for improvement

The manuscript requires a thorough revision to address pervasive issues in sentence structure, grammar, and syntax. Insert a continuous line number or in case of page-based line numbers, please provide the page numbers. Although a better way is a continuous line number so that referencing can be easy.

I have adjusted the line numbering to a continuous format.

### Title suggestion:

The current title lacks academic strength. Please follow any of the below to be more effective manuscript:

- A Tale of Two Capitals: Policy Transfer for Sustainable Urban Mobility and Air Quality in Beijing and Hanoi.
- Decarbonizing the Urban Fleet: Analysing Beijing's Past as a Policy Blueprint for Hanoi's Vehicle Emissions Challenge.
- A Comparative Analysis of Vehicle Emissions Control Policies in Beijing and Hanoi.
- Mitigation Lessons for Rapid Urbanization: Hanoi's Potential to Learn from Beijing's Air Quality Management Experience.

I have decided to adopt the title *Decarbonizing the Urban Fleet: Analysing Beijing's Past as a Policy Blueprint for Hanoi's Vehicle Emissions Challenge*.

### Abstract

- **Lines 7 to 9:** Please revise this as follows. In an abstract, references cannot be cited, and mentioning specific years without citation is not appropriate. Suggested revision: *“Despite significant economic progress, Vietnam faces a critical environmental sustainability challenge rooted in severe urban air pollution, common to many developing nations. The capital, Hanoi, a vital*

*political and economic hub, is a focal point of this crisis, facing persistent air quality degradation.”*

- **Lines 13 to 14:** Kindly provide a clearer methodology. I am sharing some steps in the methodology section that should be followed in detail and then briefly summarized in the abstract. It is important to specify how the authors conducted the literature search.
- Also, please remove the phrase “comprehensive table.” Any results or findings can be presented in tabular form, but this should not be explicitly mentioned in the abstract.

I have significantly revised the abstract according to all your feedback regarding this section.

### **Main Text**

- **Lines 29 and 30:** Please remove the dash (—) for consistency and clarity.

I have removed the emdash.

- **Lines 32 to 33:** The data cited from 2011 is outdated. Kindly provide more recent figures and appropriate references. It is important to reflect the current number of registered vehicles in Hanoi in relation to the city’s size and population.

I have replaced the 2011 reference with more recent ones and also provided some data about Hanoi’s size and population.

- **Line 35:** Replace the phrase “thanks to” with “due to” to maintain academic tone.

I have replaced it as suggested.

- **Page 2, Line 4:** This statement is incorrect. Vietnam is an independent country and is not under China’s rule. Please revise this to reflect historical context, such as periods of Chinese rule or war-related influence.

I have rephrased the statement for accuracy and clarity.

- Please also review the manuscript for grammatical errors throughout.

- **Line 12:** A reference is needed to support the claim. If unavailable, please locate relevant research papers that substantiate the statement.

I have deleted the claim about IQAir's credibility, just keeping the data that it reported.

- **Line 13:** The reference mentioned is missing from the reference list. Additionally, the claim that UNICEF is working directly on air pollution appears questionable. Please verify the reliability of this reference and consider replacing it with a more appropriate source.

I have rechecked and found that the UNICEF article cites the results of an IQAir report rather than producing them itself. Therefore, I have replaced the UNICEF reference with the original IQAir report.

- **Lines 13 to 27:** This section repeats the same concept multiple times. It would be more effective to consolidate the content into a single paragraph. Suggested structure:
  - Identify the limitations observed in the existing literature.
  - Highlight the novelty of your work.
  - Clearly state the objectives of your study.

I have rewritten this part according to your recommendations.

- It is also recommended to include statistics on air pollution in Hanoi to illustrate the severity of the issue and its impact on human health.

While detailed air pollution statistics could provide further context, Hanoi's ranking in international reports has already been mentioned earlier in the manuscript. Including additional statistics would require substantial work and is unlikely to add significant new insight.

**Study Area:** It is recommended to add a dedicated heading titled "*Study Area*" immediately following the introduction. This section should present a comparative overview of both cities, covering trends in demographics, transportation infrastructure, and air pollution levels. Providing this context will help readers better understand the scope and relevance of the analysis. If possible, please include maps of the study areas to visually support the comparison and enhance geographic clarity.

I have added a section to the paper that includes a table comparing Beijing and Hanoi on selected socioeconomic aspects, providing readers with an overview before discussing each city's policies in subsequent sections. Regarding air pollution levels, it is difficult to draw direct comparisons between the two cities without referencing the dataset presented later in the paper. Additionally, the existing literature on air pollution in each city employs varied methodologies, criteria, and scales, which further complicates direct comparison.

I did not include maps of the study areas due to uncertainty about the specific type of maps being requested as well as time constraints.

## **Methodology**

Please write this section following these steps:

Define the Scope and Objectives of your work

- Clearly state the research question or problem.
- Set boundaries: time period, geographic focus, type of studies (e.g., empirical, theoretical).

Develop a Search Strategy and write how you search data

- Choose relevant databases: Scopus, Web of Science, Google Scholar, PubMed, JSTOR, etc.
- Use Boolean operators and keyword combinations (e.g., “air pollution AND Hanoi/ Beijing” ‘transportation OR air pollution’ etc).
- Document your search terms, filters, and inclusion/exclusion criteria.
- Apply inclusion/exclusion criteria (e.g., peer-reviewed only, published after 2015).
- Prioritize high-quality, relevant, and recent studies.

I have revised the Methodology section based on your suggestions, with some minor adjustments to accurately reflect the research process I followed.

**Sample Size and Data Transparency:** Please clarify how many studies were included in the literature review that informed the results. Additionally, specify how the empirical PM<sub>2.5</sub> data was collected — for example, which monitoring stations were selected, and what criteria were used for their inclusion. It is also important to indicate the time frame your study covers (i.e., which years are included in the analysis) to ensure transparency and reproducibility.

Critically analyse the literature

- Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of each study.
- Discuss methodological limitations, sample sizes, biases, and relevance.
- Compare findings across studies to identify trends or gaps.

Line 37 onwards, the methods described should come under methodology section.

I have clarified how many studies were included in the literature review and elaborated on how PM2.5 data was collected. Regarding the critical analysis of literature, I have added a *Literature Review* section to go through the literature as a whole.

Additionally, I have relocated the methods starting from line 37 onwards as suggested.

## Results

The data presented under the heading *“What does recent data show?”* should be relocated to the **Results** section, as it reflects findings rather than introductory context. Additionally, if any methodological details are embedded within that section, they should be moved to the **Methodology** section to maintain structural consistency and ensure proper categorization of content.

**Figure 1:** The y-axis is labelled with months, yet the figure title refers to dates — please ensure consistency between the axis label and the figure description. Additionally, the data presented focuses on PM2.5 concentrations, which appear relatively similar between the two cities during 2017 and 2018. It would be helpful to explain the underlying reasons for the elevated values in both cities during that period, as well as the subsequent decline. **This trend suggests that it may be more insightful to examine other primary pollutants to better understand the broader dynamics of urban air pollution.**

I have refined the table based on your feedback. Regarding the suggestion to include additional primary pollutants, I considered two options: either further revise the existing data and analyses, or omit the data and charts entirely, as including other pollutants would require substantial additional work although not the study’s main focus.

Page 8 line 22 to 30, recheck for the consistency in font style used here.

I have double-checked and made sure that there is no font inconsistency.

It is also suggested to remove Headings 5 and 6, as the content under these sections largely overlaps with the information already presented in the table. Instead, consider integrating the relevant details directly into the table itself. For example, adding a reference column and including further contextual information would enhance the table's value and reduce redundancy. At present, the table and accompanying text are repetitive; consolidating them will improve clarity and streamline the presentation of findings.

I was not entirely sure what was meant by removing Headings 5 and 6, which in my original manuscript correspond to 'A Brief Review of Hanoi's Major Air Pollution Policies' and 'Comparison of Beijing and Hanoi's Air Pollution Approaches.' Still, I have incorporated the accompanying text in the original 'Comparison of Beijing and Hanoi's Air Pollution Approaches' section into Table 2 for enhanced clarity and conciseness.

**Discussion:** To strengthen the discussion section, it would be helpful to include examples of global cities that have successfully implemented effective air pollution control measures and urban health mitigation strategies. This comparative perspective can offer valuable insights and practical relevance. Additionally, the current comparison between Hanoi and Beijing appears weak, as the two cities differ significantly in terms of size, economic capacity, and governance structures. A more balanced or contextually aligned comparison would enhance the credibility and depth of the analysis.

I did not have an opportunity to include examples of global cities in this section. Furthermore, since other cities have implemented different policies in different socioeconomic contexts, including them would require substantial additional work to ensure fair and thorough analysis, while potentially shifting the focus away from Beijing and Hanoi. Nevertheless, I have restructured the Discussion section based on the other referee's feedback to make it more argument-driven and less like a theoretical listing of policies.

**Limitations and Conclusion:** These sections are well-written and clearly presented. However, the **Methodology** section requires significant improvement. At present, there is no clear explanation of how the work was conducted. The authors should provide a detailed account of the research process, including how data was collected, analyzed, and interpreted. Strengthening this section is essential for ensuring transparency and academic rigor. The remaining suggestions relate to enhancing the presentation and reinforcing the logical flow of the study.

## **Reference**

This section needs to be reconsidered. Several references are inconsistently formatted in the reference list. Also, check that all references cited in text are present in the list and vice versa. Please ensure that all references follow a single, consistent citation style throughout the manuscript. Additionally, the formatting of the reference list should be uniform — currently, some entries are in hanging indent format while others are not. Align all entries to the same style to maintain professional and academic presentation standards.

I have double-checked the References section and ensured that all of your feedback has been addressed.

## **Accept with Minor Revisions**

This is a good revision. The author has engaged thoughtfully with the previous critiques, resulting in a manuscript that is vastly improved in structure, rigor, and tone. The new title is excellent, and the addition of a structured Methodology, a dedicated Study Area/Literature Review, and a sophisticated analytical framework for the Discussion elevates this from a descriptive report to a genuine comparative policy analysis. My remaining feedback is focused on final polishing, clarity, and ensuring the data narrative is perfectly aligned with the paper's core argument.

### **Critical and Actionable Feedback for Final Polishing:**

#### **1. Resolve the Tension Between the Two PM2.5 Narratives:**

**Comment:** There is a critical inconsistency between the data presented in Section 5 and the narrative in the paper's introduction and abstract. Section 5.1 clearly states that Beijing's absolute PM2.5 levels are and have consistently been higher than Hanoi's (see lines 281-293: "Beijing consistently experienced higher PM2.5 levels than Hanoi..."). However, the abstract and introduction frame the problem as Hanoi facing "severe" pollution while Beijing is a "success story," which is slightly misleading based on your own absolute data.

**Suggestion:** This is a crucial point to clarify. You must reconcile these statements in the Abstract, Introduction, and Discussion. The accurate story your data tells is more nuanced and powerful: Beijing started with catastrophically higher pollution, implemented aggressive policies, and has seen a dramatic decline, nearly catching up to (or in per capita terms, falling below) Hanoi's levels. Meanwhile, Hanoi started at a lower baseline but has shown stagnation, with less pronounced improvement. Revise the framing to emphasize rate of improvement and trajectory, not just a snapshot of "severity." For example: "While Beijing's absolute PM2.5 concentrations remain higher, its aggressive policy framework has driven a steep, sustained decline. In contrast, Hanoi's lower baseline levels have shown stagnation, indicating its more recent and less comprehensive policy approach has yet to alter its pollution trajectory significantly." This turns a potential contradiction into a sophisticated analytical point.

#### **2. Clarify and Justify the "PM2.5 per Capita" Metric in the Narrative:**

**Comment:** You've done a good job in the Methodology explaining the rationale for PM2.5 per capita (Section 4.4.3). However, in the Results (Section 5.2), the explanation is still a bit muddled. The sentence "Per capita PM2.5... is presented for contextual illustration as absolute PM2.5 values measure ambient concentration rather than individual allocation" could confuse readers about what the metric actually represents.

**Suggestion:** Strengthen the language in Section 5.2. Be explicit: "To contextualize the population-level burden and enable a more equitable comparison between cities of vastly different sizes, we also calculate PM2.5 per capita. This metric does not represent individual exposure but serves as a proxy for the aggregate pollution burden shared by each city's population, revealing that Hanoi's residents bear a proportionally higher burden from its

ambient pollution than Beijing's residents do." This precise language will prevent reviewer confusion and strengthen your argument about the urgency for Hanoi.

### 3. Final Synthesis: Tighten the Link Between Data and Policy Recommendations:

Comment: The Discussion is excellent but could more directly use the data trends from Section 5 to justify the urgency of your recommended policies (LEZs, scrappage).

Suggestion: In the opening paragraph of the Discussion (Section 9), add a sentence that bridges your findings. For example: "The observed stagnation in Hanoi's PM2.5 trends, coupled with a higher per capita burden, underscores the insufficiency of its past, targeted bans and highlights the urgent need for the systemic, transport-focused interventions now being planned." This creates a seamless "Results -> Therefore -> Discussion" logic flow.

### 4. Minor Formatting and Proofreading:

Action Required: The document still contains formatting artifacts (e.g., "Formatted" tags, comments like `[Commented [3]]`). These must be removed for final submission. Conduct a meticulous line-by-line proofread to:

- Delete all tracked changes and review comments.
- Ensure consistent font (Lora) and spacing (1.15) throughout.
- Verify that all in-text citations have corresponding references and vice-versa.
- Confirm that Figure 1 (and any other figures) are correctly numbered, referenced in the text, and have clear captions that can stand alone.

### **Conclusion:**

You have executed an impressive revision. The core analytical work is now complete and of high quality. The final steps are about precision in communication—ensuring your data narrative is crystal clear, consistent, and powerfully connected to your conclusions. Addressing these points will perfect an already good manuscript.

## **Decarbonizing the Urban Fleet: Analysing Beijing's Past as a Policy Blueprint for Hanoi's Vehicle Emissions Challenge**

### **General Comments:**

The manuscript has improved significantly compared to the previous version. While some major changes suggested earlier could not be fully implemented due to the author's workload, I am satisfied with the article in its current form. The study is relevant and well-structured, but a few presentation and formatting issues need attention before publication.

### **Specific Comments**

1. **Abstract (Line 26):**

Avoid abbreviations such as *CAMS NRT PM2.5 data* without prior explanation. Always provide the full term first, followed by the abbreviation in parentheses.

2. **Tables:**

Place table captions **above the tables**, as per publication standards.

3. **Study Area Description (Lines 115–124):**

This section should appear before the table as a descriptive introduction before providing table.

4. **Results Section:**

The results should not begin with figures directly. Include a descriptive paragraph summarizing key findings before presenting figures.

5. **Section 4 (Lines 170–220):**

Rewrite this section in **proper paragraphs**, not bullet points. The headings are logical, but the content should follow a journal-style presentation.

6. **Discussion Section:**

- o Remove excessive headings and subheadings.
- o Replace minor subheadings with transitional sentences to ensure smooth flow.
- o Retain only essential headings for clarity.
- o Present the discussion in a narrative style rather than fragmented sections.