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Research Paper 40

What Happens to Economic Growth When High-Growth Autocracies Become Democracies?

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DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

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DLP aims to increase understanding of the political processes that drive or constrain development. Its work focuses on the crucial role of home-grown leaderships and coalitions in forging legitimate institutions that promote developmental outcomes.

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Executive summary

International policy makers and domestic activists would often like to promote democracy in authoritarian regimes, but can be deterred by the fact that the instability and uncertainty caused by the transition process itself often harms economic growth. The picture is not uniform, however, and the reasons why in some countries growth falls or collapses under democratic transition, while in others it is sustained, are not well-understood. This paper examines the impact of democratic transition on growth to help policy makers and activists weigh the costs of transition, and if possible act in ways to reduce them.

The study uses post-1960 growth data cross-tabulated with data on political regime change to identify thirteen high-growth autocracies that underwent democratic transition either during or just after a period of high growth. Using the average growth rate eight years following the transition, it divides the countries into 'sustained growers' (South Korea, Chile, Taiwan, Lesotho), 'reduced growers' (Pakistan, Indonesia, Dominican Republic, Spain, Greece, Portgual), and 'collapsed growers' (Bulgaria, Ecuador, Liberia).

It then uses qualitative comparative case study analysis to tease out the causes of these different growth experiences. Three variables seem to be key:

- whether the transition took place while the economy was strong, or during an economic dip;
- whether the transition had strong support from business (which was usually linked to whether the victorious party was pro-business or not);
- whether the transition received strong international support.

If the economy was strong at the time of transition and supported by a strong pro-business coalition and international actors, sustained growth was the result (South Korea, Chile, Taiwan, Lesotho). If the economy was strong but business and international actors were lukewarm about the transition, reduced growth was the outcome (Pakistan). If the economy was weak, meanwhile, but the transition still had either strong business or international support, or both, the result was also reduced growth (Indonesia, Dominican Republic, Spain, Greece, Portgual). If, finally, the economy was weak and business and international actors unsupportive, the economy collapsed (Bulgaria, Ecuador, Liberia).

Taking these lessons on board, policymakers and domestic activists wishing to smooth the process of transition in high-growth autocracies might then try the following:

- nurture business and political support for transition (the paper provides some examples of how);
- broker coalitions between business and political parties; and
- act while growth is still strong.

Some important caveats apply. First, these findings apply only to *high*-growth autocracies. Second, these techniques are only likely to work in countries that have some or all of the underlying conditions for democracy – income per capita above US$2,700, a moderate degree of economic inequality, and comparatively weak ethnic or religious divisions. In other cases, such as Liberia and Lesotho in this study, more drastic forms of international intervention would be required.

Introduction

In a previous paper and blog post for DLP I invited readers to imagine the scenario of a governance advisor in a high-growth autocracy, contemplating whether or not to continue support for the current regime, or to push for a democratic transition (Kelsall 2014). I identified some of the characteristics that were likely to facilitate sustained growth under either regime type, and pointed to some types of country that might be able to sustain growth under both. The latter would be suitable cases, I argued, in which to advise democratic transition, with one caveat: the process of transition itself was something of a problem, since there was evidence to suggest it could be destabilising.[1] Consequently there was a case for further research, I argued, to gain more insight into the conditions in which high-growth autocracies had made relatively painless transitions to becoming high-growth – or at least reasonably high-growth – democracies.

This paper presents the results of that research. It employs a qualitative, comparative case-study approach to examine what happens to growth in strongly growing countries that undergo democratic transitions, and asks why it is that some countries are able to sustain growth, when in others it collapses. It finds that the bulk of the difference can be explained by three factors:

- the extent to which post-transition political settlements are dominated by business interests and pro-business political parties;
- the extent to which this political settlement receives international support;
- the nature of the economic climate, domestic and international, at the time of the transition.

Background and methodology

As detailed in my previous paper for DLP, there is scant consensus in the academic literature on the relative merits of authoritarianism and democracy with respect to promoting economic growth (de Haan and Siermann 1996; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008; Kelsall 2014). However, there is more agreement on the idea that the process of transition itself, from authoritarianism to democracy, can destabilise growth (Masaki and van de Walle 2014: 4). This is because transitions are often a time of political instability and uncertainty, both of which tend to dampen investor confidence (Alesina et al. 1996). As Feng explains, in times of uncertainty investors will decrease investment in fixed capital stocks, preferring to keep their properties and portfolios in liquid and portable forms (Feng 2001: 273; see also Fielding 2003: 159-160). Uncertainty creates a reward for waiting, reducing investment and acting as a brake on growth (Feng 2001, 275). Saving, meanwhile, becomes riskier, leading consumers to decrease savings and increase consumption, while people displaced or deprived of jobs find it difficult to save (see also Alesina et al. 1996: 23). Democratic transitions are also often associated with demands for economic redistribution, and there is some evidence that this deters investors (Clague et al. 1997: 108; Resnick 2001).

This is not always the case, however. Indeed, in a study of 24 countries Rodrik and Wacziarg find that half see growth fall following a transition, while the other half see it rise (Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005). Such heterogeneity provides a rationale for a more case-based approach to the causes of growth-friendly transition.

Methodology

To get a better handle on how some regimes are able to sustain economic growth across transitions – or, to be more accurate, to not let political transitions completely derail growth – I used *The Dynamics of Economic Growth* handbook (Kar et al. 2013) and its accompanying dataset, developed at the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre. According to the authors, the handbook is the first step in a 'third generation' of economic growth research, allowing country growth experiences to be visualised as a series of episodes in which growth is either rising or falling. It is particularly well-suited to this study because it allows country graphs to be easily scanned for 'growth transitions', which can then be cross-tabulated with the 'political transitions' recorded by other datasets.

Using the handbook, I first looked for all those developing countries that had sustained relatively strong growth over an eight-year period or more. To be more specific, I used a combination of the handbook's graphs and supporting data to identify all those countries classified as 'developing' that had, since 1960, experienced a growth episode of at least eight years at the end of which the moving average growth rate was still greater than or equal to 3%.[2]

1 The blog post and accompanying decision tree can be found at: http://www.dlprog.org/opinions/authoritarianism-democracy-and-development.php

2 The choice of a baseline for growth is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. The figure of 6% chosen by the Spence Commission yields a very small dataset, while 2% is too close to the global average to guarantee that we are looking at genuine 'strong growers'. In the end I chose 3% because it is higher than the global average for growth, and sufficient to deliver tangible improvements (80%) in per capita income within the space of a generation. I chose eight years because this is the minimum period the handbook considers necessary for a 'growth phase' to be meaningful; in other words, to not be the result of some short term fluctuation (Kar et al. 2013). Note that this is a less demanding threshold than I have used in previous work on democracy and growth (for example Kelsall 2014).

I then used the Polity IV dataset (Polity IV Project 2014) cross-referenced with Milan Svolik's 'Leadership Change in Dictatorships' dataset (Svolik 2012) to determine whether or not the regimes in question had experienced a democratic transition during, or up to two years after, these episodes. This approach yielded the 13 countries listed in Table 1. This is our universe of cases, and I will draw conclusions from that entire universe, not from a sample of it.

The approach makes it possible to identify:

- all those states that have had at least one significant period of economic growth;
- all those states where political transitions had no apparent negative impact on economic growth;[3]
- a range of states where the transition, or the expectation of a transition, was associated with a fall in growth;
- a range of states where a short-term economic slump precipitated a democratic transition, which was subsequently associated with a rise or fall in growth.[4]

There are many other countries in the world that experienced strong growth but never underwent a democratic transition during or around this episode; and there are many other countries that experienced democratic transition at the end or in the middle of a prolonged economic slump. There may also be states where the effect of a transition on growth or vice versa was temporally more distant. However, this paper is not about those countries.

Next I divided the cases into three types:

- where growth was sustained (eight years after transition, the moving average growth rate was still greater than or equal to 3%);
- where growth collapsed (eight years after the transition, the rate was still negative);
- where growth fell but did not collapse (eight years after transition, the moving average growth rate was below 3%).

This yielded the following dataset.

Table 1: Strong growers and political transitions

Country	Date of democratic transition	Pre-transition growth average	Post-transition growth average
Sustained-growth transitions			
Chile	1990	3.47%	6.59%
Lesotho	1993	2.41%	3.8%
South Korea	1987	5.45%	8.25%
Taiwan	1996	6.46%	3.36%
Reduced-growth transitions			
Dominican Republic	1978	5.6%	0.82%
Greece	1974	8.18%	0.58%
Indonesia	1998	5.54%	0.48%
Pakistan	1971	4.64%	1.53%
Portugal	1974	7.93%	1.55%
Spain	1975	5.7%	0.26%
Collapsed-growth transitions			
Bulgaria	1989	4.45%	-2.43%
Ecuador	1979	6.9%	-0.52%
Liberia	2003	18.69%	-1.37%

3 The method is not pitfall-free. Because economic growth is related to a number of highly variable factors such as the weather and global market conditions, my sampling method runs the risk of under-selecting countries that would have been included as strong growers were it not for particularly unfavourable exogenous factors. Although adopting an eight-year definition of growth phases mitigates this, there remains a slight possibility that some countries with novel institutional arrangements conducive to growth during transitions have been omitted. There may also be problems with some of the growth data, especially in the African cases. (See Jerven 2010). However, even if the data's description of growth levels is not entirely accurate, their description of trend directions is likely to be more so.

4 The choice of a two-year cut-off between the end of a growth episode and a democratic transition is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, although it seems a reasonable period of time in which the growth episode and the transition can be plausibly causally related, in either direction.

To summarise the four-step methodology:

- I identified all those countries that had experienced a growth episode of eight years or more, in which per capita growth was greater than or equal to 3% per year.
- From this set, I identified all those countries that had undergone a democratic transition either during or shortly after the growth episode (see Appendix A).
- I then categorised the countries according to whether growth was on average above 3% (sustained growth) or below 3% (reduced growth) in the eight years after the transition (see Appendix B).
- I then created an additional category for 'collapsed growth' countries where, eight years after the transition, the economy was still smaller than it had been prior to the transition.

Having identified those strongly growing countries that had undergone a democratic transition, I next searched for academic literature on their political economies using JSTOR and Google Scholar. The search terms, 'political transition', 'democratic transition', 'regime transition', and 'economic growth' were used for each country. I then selected readings that, in my judgment, appeared relevant, and read until I had either exhausted the literature available, or until I was satisfied that I had a decent appreciation of the range of causal factors at work.

For each case, I asked the literature several questions.

- What were the main characteristics of the growth experience?
- What were the main political developments?
- What motivated some authoritarian leaders to introduce or acquiesce to more competitive democratic regimes?
- What form did the new political settlements, elite bargains, or coalitions take, and how were they institutionally embodied?
- How was political stability maintained while more inclusive or competitive forms of leadership were emerging/under construction?
- How did the new elite arrangements provide credible commitments to investors?
- How did technocratic agencies maintain their focus on growth throughout the process of change?
- And what was the role of international actors in smoothing transitions?

The aim was to assemble inductively an account of the structural or institutional factors responsible for growth maintenance across political transitions. In the course of this exercise, a number of other variables emerged as potentially important, most of which converged on the timing of the transition, and the nature of the economic context or climate in which it took place.

The method, which is essentially one of tracing causal processes via narrative accounts, allows us to identify the impact of different combinations of variables in different and similar contexts.[5] Proving causality, as opposed to mere association, is of course never a simple matter. There may be confounders and complex reciprocal processes at work, as when a recession precipitates a democratic transition but then the resulting instability continues to inhibit growth. I compensate for this complexity by supplementing process-tracing with the logic of comparison to draw inferences about the relative importance of different variables, acting singly or in combination.[6]

Outline of the discussion

In the following sections I discuss the different types of 'transitioner'. For each type I discuss the key actors included in the political settlement before and after the transition.[7]

We will find that the degree to which the business sector supported the transition, the degree to which the victorious political party was business friendly, and the support of international actors, are all important. As O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) recognised, the prospects for a smooth transition are enhanced where centre-right or pro-business parties win, or at least do well in, founding elections, since victory is likely to reassure business that its interests will not be harmed. Conversely, when business is unhappy with the outcome of a political transition, it will withdraw its support by disinvesting

5 Note that for reasons of length, I am only able to offer descriptively rather thin accounts of the processes at work here. Note also that the published literature on some of the cases, for example Lesotho, is rather meagre.

6 For other examples and a justification of this methodology, see George and Bennett (2005); Gerring (2007); and Ragin (1987).

7 I use the description of political settlements set out by Laws and Leftwich (2014: 1): '[T]he informal and formal processes, agreements, and practices that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power.'

(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).[8] International support is another important factor, exerting a strong influence on the economic fortunes of democratic transitioners – not so much through conventional development aid, as through diplomacy, military intervention and trade policy. The strength of organised labour also appears significant in some of the cases; where organised labour was empowered by the transition, and/or there was a spike in labour militancy, the potential for profit erosion increased uncertainty and hurt investor confidence (Alogoskoufis et al. 1995: 169).

Next I discuss two dimensions of the institutional context. First, the extent to which the country had a tradition of personalised, factional politics (sometimes termed clientelistic politics), as opposed to programmatic politics; and second, the extent to which economic technocrats were insulated from short-term political pressures.

Clientelist politics is common in countries with less developed economies or immature political systems. Here institutionalised links between parties and social groups have not had time to grow and would-be leaders must struggle to build winning coalitions from individual personalities and the followings they command. Because it creates political instability and encourages a short-termist approach to economic management, factionalism of this nature has long been associated with poor economic performance. Indeed, it has sometimes been argued that one of the advantages of authoritarian rule is that it makes it easier to restrain factional and clientelistic politics, although this is by no means guaranteed.

Meanwhile, the degree to which economic decision makers can be insulated from short-term political pressures can also be an important element in a regime's ability to sustain growth (Kar et al. 2013; Kelsall 2013; Khan 2010; McIntyre 2003; Médard 1982).

Finally, I look at the economic climate in the context of the strength of the domestic and external economy at the time of transition. As Haggard and Kaufman (1997) have recognised, the strength of the domestic economy, and in particular whether or not it is in crisis, has important implications for whether the previous pro-business coalition holds together. It affects whether there are enough resources to satisfy different interest group demands, and hence the stability of the transition itself. The domestic economy, needless to say, is affected to varying degrees by relations with the outside world, so that changes in the international economic environment will also influence business confidence and investment. Rather than trying to extract the economic environment from the picture, as other methods might do, this study treats it as a variable whose complex interaction with others needs to be grasped.

Cases of sustained growth

The sustained growers are Chile, South Korea, Taiwan and Lesotho (see Figure 1 below). Chile embarked on a high-growth phase in 1986, towards the end of dictator General Pinochet's tenure, during which growth had for the most part been erratic (Loveman 1988). Just four years later the country underwent a democratic transition, after which growth accelerated further and remains strong to the present day.

South Korea's growth miracle began under authoritarian rule in the 1960s, and remained exceptionally strong throughout democratic transition in the 1980s. In the 1990s growth fell, especially around the time of the East Asian economic crisis, but it soon recovered and has remained comparatively strong.

Taiwan grew extremely rapidly from the early 1960s, embarking on a staged transition to democracy, with free parliamentary elections, in 1986. Initially growth remained strong, but two years prior to free presidential elections in 1996, it halved, although at more than 3%, it was still, by our definition, strong.

Lesotho entered a strong growth episode in 1986 after strongman Chief Leabua Jonathan was overthrown in a military coup. After another coup in 1991, the military restored power to civilians in 1993, with no apparent negative effect on growth.

The dominant coalition

In the cases of sustained growth, we tend to find that the political settlement is dominated by a business-friendly political elite, a supportive business class, a weak or constrained labour movement, and strong international allies. In Chile for example, the centre-right Christian Democrats under Patricio Aylwin Azócar formed a government that provided strong support for capital, to the neglect of labour and the popular classes. Indeed, prior to the transition, the Chilean business sector had secured an institutionalised role in economic policy-making, all the main political parties had moderated their redistributive demands, and property rights were guaranteed by the constitution. This meant that business could be assured that whoever was in power, its interests would be upheld. Regime continuity was ensured by the presence of powerful military oversight, making the transition particularly smooth (Falcoff 1987; Silva 1992). In South Korea, the traditionally pro-business Democratic Justice Party was able to remain in power thanks to a politically divided opposition. Later, opposition leader Kim Young-sam

8 Note that O'Donnell and Schmitter's emphasis of left and right wing parties is of less relevance to today's post-Cold War world, and in particular to contemporary Africa, than it was at the time they were writing. Nevertheless, the support of the business class for a regime transition is still, I contend, a significant variable.

merged his Peaceful Democratic Party with the DJP, securing another four years in power for the 'Grand Conservative Alliance' (Cotton 1989; Shorrock 1986, 1988). In Lesotho, the business sector was dominated by foreign garment manufacturers, lured to Lesotho by cheap labour and preferential access to developed country markets. The secondary literature has little to say about their attitude to democracy; however, it seems reasonable to assume they were in favour, since being a multi-party democracy was part of the qualifying criteria for US trade preferences. Neither of the contending political parties articulated an anti-business agenda, and indeed, the government has made considerable effort to help the industry as its fortunes have fluctuated (Bennet 2006; Maleleka 2009; Matlosa1997; Tangri 1993). In Taiwan, there is little indication business elites were either strongly for or against democratic transition. Rather, it seems, their confidence was maintained thanks to the slow pace of the reforms, and their ability to buy influence in political parties and parliament (Chang 1984; Tien 1996).

Turning to labour, in Chile and South Korea the incumbent regimes were able to control the terms of the transition to a large degree. In Chile, there was very little labour unrest; in South Korea, although there was an upsurge in strikes and labour demonstrations, repressive labour legislation and a strong dominant coalition meant these were ultimately contained (Haggard and Kaufman 1997). In Lesotho, there was a huge upsurge in labour militancy just a couple of years before the transition. However, this was eventually extinguished, with the incumbent regime making reassuring overtures to investors (Tangri 1993).

All the sustained growers experienced international support of varying types in the run up to and during their transitions. In Lesotho, donors played an important role facilitating democratic transition in 1993 (Matlosa 1997); and, in 1998, following disputed elections, violence and rioting, the Southern African Development Community sent troops to support the government and restore order, remaining for eight months (Matlosa 1997). International support for South Korea, though less dramatic, was still influential. In the mid-1980s, American policymakers came to the view that continued political repression was endangering America's economic and strategic interests in the country (Shorrock 1986). A series of high-level delegations conveyed Washington's preference for democracy, contributing to an accord between the ruling party and opposition in 1986, and helping sideline Kim Dae-jung, the more radical of the main opposition leaders (Cotton 1989: 252).[9] In Taiwan, the loss of its UN seat to China in 1978 persuaded its leaders that democratisation was essential to maintain international legitimacy. Thereafter, the Kuomintang began a slow process of transition designed, at least in part, to keep the US onside by neutralising critics in Washington (Tien and Chu 1996: 1170). In Chile, the Americans were also worried that Pinochet's inflexibility would play into the hands of Communists. In the mid-1980s they began to open relations with the moderate opposition, encouraging it to distance itself from the far left. By helping split the opposition, the US arguably made it easier for the military to withdraw, ensuring a smooth, business-friendly transition. This was reinforced by a combination of diplomatic means, including abstentions on multilateral funding votes, contacts with high-level military officers, and promises of military funding (Falcoff 1987; Loveman 1988; Morley and McGillion 2006).

Figure 1: Sustained-growth transitions – Chile, South Korea, Taiwan and Lesotho



9 Media attention prompted by the impending Seoul Olympics provided a further impetus to the opposition and encouraged the military to seek a peaceful solution to mass protest.

The institutional context

In two of the four sustained growers, factional politics was muted. In Chile, post-transition politics quickly coalesced into centre-right and centre-left blocs, with the armed forces exerting considerable influence, and the radical left excluded. The precise reasons are unclear, but it appears that the parties organised naturally around ideological tendencies that predated Pinochet's coup, rather than around personalities. South Korean politics in the 1950s had been highly unstable and factionalised (You 2013), but after liberalisation this tendency, while still visible perhaps in the rivalry between Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, was restrained. The ruling party was able to retain power and govern effectively, winning elections a second time when it merged with Kim Young-sam's Peaceful Democratic Party.

In Taiwan, by contrast, local practices of clientelism continued to flourish into the 1990s, with democratization apparently accelerating this (Tien 1996, Rigger 1999). In Lesotho, politics was beset by factional infighting and successive regimes had difficulty governing effectively, employing emergency measures and withstanding assassination attempts. That this has not derailed economic growth is a curiosity to which we will return.

Technocratic insulation is another potentially important factor. In Chile in the early 1980s, business actually inserted itself into the policy-making process at the expense of some of the Chicago-trained technocrats at the heart of the Pinochet regime. New capabilities for sectoral industrial policy were created (Silva 1992). Since the 1960s South Korea has been a famously technocratic state, with its administration exemplifying the kind of 'embedded autonomy' that Peter Evans identified as crucial to high growth (Evans 1995).[10] Post-transition, some of this semi-autonomy appears to have been eroded as businesses increased their efforts to secure their interests by means of bribery and kickbacks, and this may have contributed to South Korea's slowing growth in the late 1990s (Kang 2002). In the eight years following transition, however, the effects were negligible. A contributing factor here may have been the export-orientation of the South Korean economy. As Thompson has noted, export orientation provided an absolute standard that kept these economies fine-tuned (Thompson 1996).[11]

Economic climate

Another factor linking the sustained growers was a comparative absence of domestic and international economic crises. Lesotho had seen growth surge from the mid-1980s when investors began to flock to the country, first to avoid sanctions in South Africa, and later to take advantage of preferential trade agreements (Tangri 1993). It made its democratic transition in 1993, a period when African growth was just beginning to recover from the long stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s. And in 2001, its external climate changed dramatically for the better when it qualified for preferential treatment under the US's African Growth and Opportunity Act (Bennet 2006). South Korea, meanwhile, made its democratic transition in 1987, when the world economy had begun to recover from the oil crises of the 1970s and the austerity of the early 1980s. Chile made its transition shortly afterwards. Moreover, all of these countries had grown primarily by developing strong export sectors rather than by using industrial policy and planning to protect domestic-market production, much of which, as we will see in some of our 'reduced growth' cases, was suffering from structural imbalance.

Cases of collapsed growth

The collapsers are Bulgaria, Ecuador and Liberia (see Figure 2 below). Bulgaria's planned economy had grown rapidly since 1970, partly thanks to favourable relations with Soviet Bloc trading partners, but it began to slow down in 1988. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and transition to democratic rule in 1989, growth collapsed and was not to recover for several years (Bitzenis 2004; Jackson 1991). Ecuador grew rapidly under military rule in the 1970s, but the economy began to falter in 1978 during a staged transition to democracy. That trend was compounded after the handover to civilian rule in 1979, with strong growth yet to return (Aviles 2009; Conaghan and Espinal 1990; Corkill 1985; Isaacs 1991). In Liberia, a growth surge following the election of strongman Charles Taylor to the presidency in 1997 was undermined in the context of economic sanctions and intensifying civil war in 2002. The slide continued under the country's transitional government (2003-5) and was not effectively reversed until after several years of democratic rule (Johnston 2004; McDonough 2008; Sawyer 2008).

The dominant coalition

In all the collapse cases, we tend to find that victorious politicians are left-leaning or unfriendly towards business in some other way. The business class itself tends to be weak or divided, and the transition is given at best wavering international support. Organised labour may also be strong or exceptionally militant, although there are exceptions.

In Bulgaria, for example, at the time of transition there was no private business class of which to speak. In its stead were a range of vested interests in the state-owned economic sector. As the transition progressed, these interests did their best to sabotage

10 In more recent research, Dasandi (2014) finds that in developmental states, bureaucrats typically work closely with politicians while maintaining high autonomy.

11 For a similar argument about the efficiency-enhancing effects of export orientation, see Pritchett and Werker 2012.

free market reforms, blocking them, delaying them, or converting them into opportunities for asset stripping and rent-seeking (Jackson 1991; Peev 2002).

In Ecuador, a section of the business class had been concerned by the growing statism of the military government's economic policy; another section, however, had found the government receptive to its interests (Aviles 2009; Isaacs 1991). Neither, however, appears to have welcomed the election of a left-of-centre civilian government in 1979, especially given the subsequent escalation of populist economic policies. In the 1980s, a more business-friendly government took power, but found its ability to implement economic reform consistently frustrated by the military (Conaghan and Espinal 1990).

In Liberia, meanwhile, the most powerful members of the business class, timber merchants and diamond dealers, were Charles Taylor's political cronies (Johnston 2004). International bans on timber and diamonds significantly weakened this group, and a more responsible business class was slow to replace it. Given that the transitional government was also characterised by a collection of warlords and politicians with a reputation for pillage, it is little wonder that growth was slow to rebound (Johnston 2004).

In Bulgaria and Ecuador, the problem of business-unfriendly governments and weak or divided business classes was compounded by strong and militant labour movements. In Bulgaria, trade unions played a role in bringing down a number of post-transition governments (Robertson 2004). In Ecuador, labour strikes and demonstrations reached unprecedented levels in the wake of transition (Corkill 1985; Isaacs 1991).

Moreover, these trends were not effectively mitigated by international support. In Bulgaria, for example, the IMF provided a stabilisation package but much of its advice was unrealistic (Dilova-Kirkowa 1999). In Liberia, foreign governments supported and even engineered the transition, but the trade embargoes used crippled the economy. Ecuador, meanwhile, was not considered essential to US strategic interests, and Washington was also decidedly lukewarm both about the military government and the left-wing regime that replaced it (Aviles 2009).

Figure 2: Collapsed-growth transitioners – Bulgaria, Ecuador and Liberia



The institutional context

We saw in a previous section that two out of three of the sustained-growth countries escaped highly factionalised politics. If we look at the collapsed countries, factionalism is prominent in all of them. In Bulgaria, the political opposition was unprepared for the fall of the Berlin Wall and had no tradition of organising; the Union of Democratic Forces, a rainbow coalition of several political parties, was created just before the elections of June 1990 (Gebethner 1997). The elections saw the former communists returned to power, but without a large majority. Numerous ambitious, power-hungry leaders subsequently jockeyed for influence, blocking the economic reforms of their opponents and mobilising unions and the public whenever possible. Over the ensuing seven years there were eight governments, and none was able to establish a credible economic reform programme (Jackson 1991; Robertson

2004; Taras 1999). Only in 1997 was any single party able to win a convincing majority; then credible measures for a return to economic stability, including the creation of a powerful currency board, were at last achieved (Peev 2002).

Prior to 1970, Ecuadorean politics had been dominated by weak, fragmented, personalistic parties, grafted onto a predominantly pre-capitalist economic structure (Corkill 1985; Isaacs 1991). The result was often legislative paralysis, with deadlock broken only by military interventions. Although in the 1970s there was rapid industrial development, it seems to have been insufficient to transform this tradition. Following elections in 1979, President Roldós and Prime Minister Bucaram, both members of the same party, became locked in a struggle for ascendancy, outbidding each other with economically damaging populist policies (Aviles 2009: 1552; Corkill 1985).

For the majority of the 20th century Liberia's True Whig Party was able to put together a relatively stable coalition of local personalities under one Americo-Liberian strongman after another. This ended abruptly in 1980 when Master Sgt Samuel Doe murdered President Tolbert in his bed. There ensued a long period of instability and civil war, which was temporarily brought to an end by the election of Charles Taylor to the presidency in 1997. However, it was not long before Taylor was facing armed rebellion and international arrest warrants, and he fled Liberia in 2003 (Jaye 2003; Johnston 2004; McDonough 2008). The collection of warlords that made up the bulk of the country's transitional government thereafter was highly factionalised, hell bent on looting the economy to the benefit of themselves and their personal followers (Jaye 2003; Sawyer 2008).

Economic climate

The economic climate was also poor in the collapsing countries, characterised by a weak domestic economy and, even more importantly, a weak or constrained external economy. Bulgaria, for example, had grown rapidly but its economic structure was plagued by inefficiencies. Moreover, it was highly dependent on trade with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), which collapsed following the fall of the Berlin wall; its main trade routes were also impeded by the war in neighbouring Yugoslavia (Bitzenis 2004; Jackson 1991). Ecuador had also seen its growth expand in the 1970s on the back of an oil-fuelled industrial investment programme. However, the early 1980s saw prices plummet, plunging the country into economic crisis right around the time of its democratic transition (Corkill 1985; Isaacs 1991). Liberia's ballooning growth, meanwhile, was punctured in the early 2000s following sanctions on its main exports, timber and diamonds (Johnston 2004).

Cases of reduced growth

The reduced-growth transitioners are the Dominican Republic, Greece, Indonesia, Pakistan, Portugal and Spain. There are considerable differences in the constellations of variables characterising the different countries within this group, which are set out in Figures 3-5 below.

The Dominican Republic entered a strong growth phase under strongman Joaquin Balaguer in 1968. However, by 1976 growth had begun to slide, and the trend was compounded during and after democratic transition in 1978. The economy remained in the doldrums, barely achieving positive growth, for more than a decade, before returning to strong growth in the 1990s.

Figure 3: Reduced-growth transitioners – Dominican Republic and Pakistan



Pakistan grew spectacularly in the 1950s and 1960s under General Ayub Khan. Khan was not a popular leader, however, and handed power to General Yahya Khan following mass protests in 1969. Yahya resigned amidst mass protests in 1971, to be replaced by left-wing politician Zulfikar Bhutto. By this stage growth was already falling, and it would not make a significant recovery until the military retook power in the late 1970s.

Figure 4: Reduced-growth transitioners – Greece, Portugal and Spain



Figure 5: Reduced-growth transitioners – Indonesia



In Greece, the economy grew strongly under a combination of both civilian and military rule in the 1960s and 1970s, but slumped during 1973, prior to democratic transition in 1974. Growth remained low for the next nine years, before recovering somewhat in the 1980s.

Portugal made a transition to democracy in 1974 after the authoritarian regime was toppled by junior army officers. Growth had begun to fall prior to the coup and in 1975 the economy shrank by 12%. It soon recovered, however, and the moving average was positive by 1978.

Spain embarked on a transition following the death of long-serving dictator General Franco in 1975. Growth had begun to fall the previous year and struggled to recover in the context of political change; although the economy avoided collapse, it was to be the 1980s before there was a significant rebound.

Indonesia was one of the world's fastest growing countries between 1968 and 1996, when the economy began to cool. In 1997, the country was engulfed by the East Asian financial crisis, the economy plummeted, and, a year later, the Suharto regime was swept away. After a few years, however, growth began to rebound, so that by 2005 the moving average was once again positive, albeit considerably lower than before.

The dominant coalition

The reduced-growth countries show different combinations of support to and from business, but in none of them is the pro-business coalition as unambiguously strong as in the sustained growers. In the Dominican Republic, for example, a section of the business class excluded from Balaguer's personal networks had supported Antonio Guzman's ultimately victorious Revolutionary Dominican Party (PRD) (Guzman himself was a wealthy rancher). After the transition, however, the chamber of commerce opposed much of the government's economic policy (Black 1986a, 1986b; Hartlyn 1998). In Pakistan, the 22 big business families of the Ayub Khan era were also unenthusiastic about Bhutto's left-leaning government, and disinvestment was the result (Monshipouri and Amjad 1995; Zaidi 2005). In Indonesia, big business, much of which enjoyed close personal relations with the Suharto regime, came under fire following the transition and there were some prosecutions. At first, there was massive capital flight; within a few years, however, the old interests had found common ground with the new rulers, and growth returned (Hadiz 2003; Hadiz and Robison 2005). In Spain and Greece, business was in favour of the transitions, not least because they hoped it would ease entry into the European Economic Community, and they were supportive of the political parties that took power. In Portugal, by contrast, the radical character of the revolution initially induced mass capital flight, but once a centre-right government was installed following the hot summer of 1975, restitutions made and private property constitutionally guaranteed, business was reassured (Bermeo 1990).

Even in those countries where business supported the new rulers, however, labour had often emerged as a powerful actor either inside or outside the dominant coalition. In Greece, for example, Prime Minister Karamanlis, though ostensibly a centre-right politician, recognised that the realities of the post-transition situation necessitated a shift to the left. Emboldened, labour became increasingly militant (Alogoskoufis et al. 1995). In Portugal also, the months immediately following the revolution were characterised by generalised labour unrest and demands for factory owners and bosses to be held accountable for their behaviour under the authoritarian regime (Pinto 2008). Even in Spain, where political and economic pacts were employed to reduce it, the number of strikes was significant (Preston 1986). By the early 1980s, centre-left governments were in power in all three countries. In Pakistan also, the labour movement at least initially was close to the regime, in keeping with the redistributive character of Bhutto's government (Zaidi 2005).

International support also varied in the decelerating countries. In Spain, Portugal, and Greece, for example, EU accession was pivotal in consolidating the transitions and reigniting business confidence (Alogoskoufis et al. 1995; Preston 1986). In Indonesia, the US, having long supported Suharto, abandoned him in 1998 (Elson 2001). The IMF subsequently provided a large rescue package. In the Dominican Republic, intensive Latin American and US diplomacy, including a threat to withdraw military aid, were crucial in persuading outgoing dictator Joaquin Balaguer to accept defeat (Kryzanek 1979). In Pakistan, by contrast, the US appears to have been sceptical of the left-leaning Bhutto regime, while comparatively supportive, by contrast, of General Zia, his military successor.

Institutional context

Factionalism is also present to varying degrees. Spain and Portugal appear relatively free from the phenomenon, with the former returning naturally, perhaps, to a pre-civil war ideological tradition. In Greece, Pakistan and Indonesia, it is more pronounced, and in the Dominican Republic it is quite severe (Niaz 2011). It is not possible, however, to draw a strong connection between the degree of factionalism and the severity of the deceleration. Spain is clearly less factionalised than the Dominican Republic, yet growth fell further in the former than the latter. The conclusion we must draw is that factionalism only has explanatory weight when combined with other factors. This is exemplified by Lesotho, which has had extremely factionalised, unstable politics, and yet has sustained growth (Maleleka 2009; Matlosa 1997). The reasons can be traced to the enclavic nature of its economy and the contribution of strong international support, factors we will discuss in due course.[12]

12 A reviewer of this paper has commented that whether or not a democratic transition is growth-destabilising is determined by whether or not it occurs in a patronage-based state. Unfortunately there is no easy way of testing this argument since the degree to which

The evidence available on technocratic insulation is thin. However, we can imagine that the long-established bureaucratic authoritarian states Spain, Greece and Portugal had the most robust, best insulated technocracies. Indonesia was also famous for maintaining some islands of technocratic effectiveness in Suharto's otherwise patrimonial regime (Crouch 1979; MacIntyre 2000; Raquiza 2012). In Pakistan, by contrast, whatever independence the bureaucracy had had prior to transition was rapidly undermined by the Bhutto regime, which used it as a source for patronage (Niaz 2011). In the Dominican Republic also, the Balaguer regime appears to have been highly personalised, and there is no indication that this improved in the immediate post-transition period (Conaghan and Espinal 1990, 555; Hartlyn 1998).

Economic climate

Most of the declining countries also faced difficult external conditions. The first oil shock of December 1973, for example, hurt growth in Spain, Greece, and Portugal, as it did most other European economies. The Dominican Republic suffered a devastating hurricane shortly after Silvestre Antonio Guzman took power. To this were added high prices for oil imports, low prices for sugar, its main export, and the reduction of its sugar quota with the US (Black 1986a). In Indonesia, it was the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 that precipitated Suharto's fall. The main exception is Pakistan, which transitioned in 1971, where external conditions appear not to have been particularly unfavourable (McCartney 2011).

Comparative analysis

As Table C1 in the Appendix summarises, the foregoing analysis has shown that transitions were most likely to be growth-sustaining (Chile, Lesotho, South Korea, Taiwan) when the dominant coalition comprised business-friendly political parties, a supportive or at least not hostile business sector, and strong international support, and where the economic climate was strong. Transitions were most likely to see growth collapse (Bulgaria, Ecuador, Liberia) when the dominant coalition contained business-unfriendly leaders, when the business class was weak or divided, when international support was weak or inconsistent, and when the economic climate was poor. Where these variables took contradictory values – for example, where a country faced an unfavourable global climate but received strong business and international support (as in the Dominican Republic, Greece, Spain, Portugal), or where the global climate was clement, but business was hostile or ambivalent, and diplomatic support and aid were lukewarm (as in Pakistan) – the result was growth deceleration without collapse.

The above observations all relate either to aspects of the dominant coalition and the composition of the actors therein, or to the economic climate. Institutional factors, such as the insulation of the technocracy or the extent to which the political system was factionalised, appear to have been less important. For example, while all the countries in which growth collapsed experienced strongly factionalised politics and two of the sustained-growth countries were relatively immune, the case of Lesotho, where the economy continued to grow despite strong factional tendencies, disturbs any consistent association of one with the other. This does not mean that institutional conditions did not contribute to the growth experience of our cases; it simply means that they appear not to have been decisive in determining in which growth category a country was placed.

Further, while the strength of the labour movement appears as a significant, growth-depressing variable in some of our cases, it is not consistently associated with poor growth outcomes. Hence it also appears to be a contributing rather than a decisive variable.

In most cases, of course, it is not just a matter of how many variables are working in favour of growth and how many against. It is a matter of the magnitude of the positive and negative effects, and these will vary from country to country. For example, had Bulgaria, Ecuador and Liberia not experienced such drastic declines in their external environments, they may well have been in the growth deceleration category instead of the collapse category. Indeed Bulgaria, with the promise of accession to the EU, and Liberia, with massive international assistance and the lifting of sanctions, have since seen growth recover.

The weighting of different variables perhaps allows us to explain the unusual case of Lesotho. Unlike the other sustained-growth countries, it is small and poor with a relatively weak technocracy and intensely factionalised politics. Its ability to overcome these obstacles seems to be a result of the enclavic nature of its small and open economy, and the dramatic effect of favourable US trade preferences in stimulating foreign investment. Indeed, domestic investment collapsed in the wake of the transition.[13] In addition, an immense amount of external diplomatic support was provided to prop up Basotho democracy, and South African troops were stationed in the country for eight months.[14]

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patronage forms the basis for state cohesion is difficult to measure. However, going by reputation alone, we can consider not only Lesotho to be more patronage-based than many of the less successful transitioners, such as Spain or Bulgaria, but also South Korea (Kang 2002). Further, one would imagine that Bulgaria, a centrally planned, industrial economy, was rather less patronage-based than Pakistan and Indonesia, which are quite famous for the phenomenon. Bulgaria, however, fared worse in transition than the two afore-mentioned states. Consequently it seems that patronage, even if it is important, does not deserve to be privileged over other variables.

13 Between 1997 and 2005, gross fixed capital formation fell by 8% a year, while in the same period average FDI inflows almost doubled (source: World Development Indicators, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).

14 Note that the research also considered GDP per capita, political-economic 'pacting' and 'leadership' as potential explanatory variables. However, no consistent relationship with the outcome variable could be established from the data to hand.

Interestingly, if we remove Lesotho from the list of sustained growers on account of its exceptionalism, the remaining sustained growers exhibit very similar characteristics; these include having pro-business parties, pro-democracy business, a weak labour movement, and programmatic politics. In fact, one could say that they have all the ingredients of classic liberal capitalist political settlements already in place: they are pre-cooked for democracy, as it were, and need only international support and a favourable economic climate to be added. Another interesting point to note is that removing Lesotho from the list of sustained growers elevates institutional conditions to the same level of causal significance as the composition of the dominant coalition. As discussed below, this may have policy implications.

Conclusions and policy implications

So what is our governance advisor, anxious about promoting democracy lest it upset economic growth, to make of all this? Well, the phenomenon of fast-growing authoritarian regimes undergoing democratic transitions either during, or shortly after the close of a growth episode, is rather rare. Over the past fifty years it has happened in only thirteen cases (perhaps because the constellation of forces required to end authoritarianism is usually difficult to muster until several years after growth has stalled). Moreover, the cases in which growth has been sustained are even rarer – only four. Insofar as it is possible to extrapolate from these cases, however, the lesson for policy advisors and democratic advocates in fast-growing authoritarian regimes is that the nature of the coalition supporting the transition, together with the timing of the transition, appears to be crucial. More specifically, four findings from these historical transitions can be presented as **hypotheses for future transitions**.

- If democratic transition takes place while the domestic and international economy are strong, and if it is supported by a coalition of pro-business politicians, business itself and international actors, growth will be sustained.
- If democratic transition takes place during a period in which the domestic and international economy have entered a downturn, yet a coalition of pro-business politicians, business itself and/or international actors supports it, growth will fall, but not collapse.
- Growth will also fall but not collapse as long as the transition takes place while the domestic and international economy are strong, even if it is not supported by a coalition of pro-business politicians, business itself, and international actors.
- If the transition takes place during a period in which the domestic and international economy have entered a downturn, and, moreover, the transition fails to gain support from a coalition of pro-business politicians, business itself, and international actors, then growth will collapse.

A fifth, interesting finding, is that the forms of international support that emerge most strongly from the evidence are not conventional development assistance. More common are diplomatic measures – the courting of military softliners with a variety of sticks and carrots; the brokering of deals between moderate political parties; the marginalisation of business-unfriendly parties – and economic measures, such as the granting of trade preferences or membership of trading blocs.

Assuming that these hypotheses are correct, what, then, could democracy advocates who are also interested in promoting economic growth do? There are three logical **implications**:

- First, they could try to nurture coalitions between business actors and pro-business politicians, if these do not already exist.
- Second, they could try to provide incentives for democratic transition, ideally in the form of positive economic conditionalities.
- Third, they should not wait until the economy has already entered a downturn to start doing these things.

In terms of future research, policy advisors would arguably benefit from more fine-grained accounts of the role of international actors in brokering effective coalitions in the more successful transitioning countries. This role is referred to in passing in some of the country case study literature, but further research, probably of a primary nature, could make it even clearer.

These recommendations, however, must be heavily qualified for two reasons. First, in some countries the political forces aligned against transition – for example a business class that feels its interests are best served by authoritarianism – will simply be too strong for such measures to bear fruit, and any attempt to encourage them may provoke strong negative reactions.

Second, in some countries transitions may be possible to engineer, but because the socio-economic underpinnings of democracy are fragile, as in Lesotho, they may require ongoing support, including even international military intervention, to prop them up (see Kelsall 2014). The recent history of the Middle East and North Africa suggests that the international community has little appetite for such adventures. Consequently, advocates of democracy need to proceed with caution, and to be wary of upsetting successful authoritarian growth experiments if they lack the diplomatic, economic, and military means to help sustain a desirable democratic alternative.

A more cautious approach would be to take a long view and wait for the underlying conditions supportive of democracy – for example, a large middle class, urbanisation and programmatic politics – to evolve, while steadily trying to nudge them into being.

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Appendix A: Growth charts and authority trends[1]

Figure A1: Growth breaks for Chile



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A2: Growth breaks for South Korea



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

Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

1 I am grateful to Kunal Sen at the University of Manchester's Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre and to the Center for Systematic Peace's Polity IV Project for supplying these graphs.

Figure A3: Growth breaks for Lesotho



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

Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A4: Growth breaks for Taiwan



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A5: Growth breaks for Dominican Republic



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A6: Growth breaks for Greece



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A7: Growth breaks for Indonesia



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A8: Growth breaks for Pakistan



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A9: Growth breaks for Portugal



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A10: Growth breaks for Spain



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A11: Growth breaks for Ecuador



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A12: Growth breaks for Bulgaria



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

Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Figure A13: Growth breaks for Liberia



Source: Kar et al. (2013)



Source: Polity IV Project (2014)

Appendix B: Moving average growth rates

Key: **GDPPC** = GDP Per Capita; **GDPGPC** = GDP Growth Per Capita; **MovAvGr** = Moving Average Growth Rate.

The year of democratic transition is shown in bold. In the final column, moving average growth rates are calculated for the period before the transition, and after and including the transition.

Table B1: Chile

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1983	4053.05	-5.407333	-5.41
1984	4260.5	5.118366	-0.15
1985	4244.43	-0.3771816	-0.22
1986	4415.08	4.020561	0.83
1987	4647.13	5.255846	1.72
1988	4922.3	5.921288	2.42
1989	5403.52	9.776329	3.47
1990	**5519.53**	**2.14693**	**2.15**
1991	5855.8	6.092367	4.11
1992	6515.03	11.25773	6.6
1993	6892.4	5.792301	6.32
1994	7224.86	4.823573	6.02
1995	7970.51	10.32061	6.74
1996	8496.29	6.59657	6.72
1997	8980.75	5.702018	6.59

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B2: Korea, Republic

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1980	5179.44	-5.496402	-5.5
1981	5387.65	4.019932	-0.73
1982	5704.13	5.874175	1.46
1983	6274.48	9.998898	3.6
1984	6758.31	7.711079	4.42
1985	7190.61	6.396566	4.75
1986	7885.9	9.669416	5.45
1987	**8687.6**	**10.16624**	**10.16**
1988	9656.66	11.15453	10.66
1989	10570.4	9.46228	10.26
1990	11643.2	10.14909	10.23
1991	12713.5	9.192489	10.02
1992	13076.9	2.858382	8.83
1993	13721.6	4.930061	8.27
1994	14825.9	8.047901	8.25

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B3: Lesotho

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1986	681.783	-0.4218085	-0.42
1987	699.537	2.604049	1.09
1988	743.88	6.33891	2.84
1989	785.485	5.592969	3.52
1990	816.169	3.906379	3.6
1991	811.812	-0.5338349	2.91
1992	807.025	-0.589667	2.41
1993	**851.916**	**5.562528**	**5.56**
1994	890.015	4.472154	5.01
1995	894.93	0.5522354	3.52
1996	964.603	7.785306	4.59
1997	1036.17	7.419323	5.15
1998	970.665	-6.321845	3.24
1999	1021.08	5.193866	3.52
2000	1079.91	5.761548	3.8

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B4: Taiwan

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1988	11797.2	4.976907	4.98
1989	12819.2	8.663073	6.82
1990	13637.7	6.384953	6.67
1991	14624.7	7.237291	6.82
1992	15609	6.730393	6.8
1993	16512	5.785124	6.63
1994	17581.2	6.475286	6.61
1995	18542.2	5.466066	6.46
1996	**19361.2**	**4.416952**	**4.42**
1997	20329.8	5.002797	4.7
1998	20876.3	2.688172	4.03
1999	21907.8	4.94101	4.26
2000	23064.6	5.280305	4.47
2001	22261.4	-3.48239	3.14
2002	23312	4.719378	3.37
2003	24090.2	3.338192	3.36

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B5: Dominican Republic

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1971	3149.54	8.759347	8.76
1972	3421.9	8.647608	8.7
1973	3756.26	9.771183	9.05
1974	3700.04	-1.496701	6.42
1975	3841.73	3.829417	5.9
1976	4135.91	7.657492	6.19
1977	4218.73	2.002457	5.6
1978	**4217**	**-0.0410071**	**-0.04**
1979	4218.19	0.0282177	0
1980	4361.81	3.404781	1.1
1981	4527.6	3.800946	1.8
1982	4638.81	2.456267	1.93
1983	4746.64	2.32452	2
1984	4736.63	-0.2108914	1.68
1985	4491.56	-5.173928	0.82

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B6: Greece

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1967	9400.38	4.205632	4.2
1968	10096.8	7.408423	5.8
1969	11282.4	11.74234	7.79
1970	12270.6	8.758767	8.02
1971	13194.1	7.52612	7.92
1972	14479.6	9.742991	8.23
1973	15616.8	7.85381	8.18
1974	**14303.5**	**-8.409533**	**-8.4**
1975	14988.3	4.787638	1.81
1976	15819	5.542325	0.64
1977	15954.6	0.8571945	0.69
1978	16909.7	5.986359	1.75
1979	17156.8	1.461301	1.7
1980	17098.9	-0.3374778	1.41
1981	16551.5	-3.201378	0.84
1982	16306.1	-1.482647	0.58

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B7: Indonesia

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1991	2315.33	7.082145	7.08
1992	2441.37	5.443718	6.26
1993	2568.51	5.207727	5.91
1994	2719.27	5.869551	5.9
1995	2891.47	6.33258	5.99
1996	3059.75	5.819878	5.95
1997	3151.74	3.006454	5.54
1998	**2690.58**	**-14.63192**	**-14.63**
1999	2651.31	-1.459537	-8.04
2000	2749.85	3.716655	-4.12
2001	2814.53	2.352126	-2.5
2002	2874.1	2.116519	-1.58
2003	3028.76	5.38116	-0.42
2004	3078.87	1.654476	-0.12
2005	3224.11	4.717315	0.48

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B8: Pakistan

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1964	741.346	5.264456	5.26
1965	802.435	8.24028	6.75
1966	796.152	-0.7829943	4.24
1967	827.474	3.934176	4.16
1968	864.566	4.482555	4.22
1969	850.162	-1.666037	3.24
1970	961.13	13.05257	4.64
1971	**944.137**	**-1.768021**	**-1.76**
1972	945.065	0.0982885	-0.83
1973	988.655	4.612384	0.98
1974	1003.17	1.468151	1.1
1975	1001.43	-0.1734492	0.84
1976	1025.5	2.403564	1.1
1977	1041.7	1.579712	1.17
1978	1083.96	4.056831	1.53

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B9: Portugal

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1966	5714.12	3.167732	3.17
1967	6090.92	6.594188	4.89
1968	6880.43	12.96209	7.57
1969	7087.16	3.004608	6.43
1970	7745.03	9.282557	7
1971	8332.09	7.57983	7.1
1972	9005.92	8.087168	7.24
1973	10155.8	12.76804	7.93
1974	**10238.1**	**0.8103725**	**0.81**
1975	8972.29	-12.36372	-5.77
1976	9448.89	5.311906	-2.1
1977	10085.9	6.741647	0.13
1978	10200.3	1.134251	0.33
1979	10621.7	4.131255	0.96
1980	11148.6	4.960594	1.53
1981	11336.5	1.685417	1.55

Table B10: Spain

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1968	10873.9	5.060828	5.06
1969	11805.7	8.56914	6.81
1970	12141.8	2.846926	5.49
1971	12503.3	2.977318	4.86
1972	13500.3	7.973895	5.48
1973	14495	7.367986	5.8
1974	15241.2	5.147984	5.7
1975	**15123**	**-0.7755308**	**-0.78**
1976	15462.8	2.246907	0.73
1977	15549.1	0.5581124	0.68
1978	15499.9	-0.316412	0.42
1979	15432.3	-0.4361356	0.25
1980	15666.7	1.518895	0.47
1981	15460.7	-1.314891	0.21
1982	15558.3	0.6312755	0.26

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B11: Bulgaria

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1981	5563.38	4.196606	4.19
1982	5710.73	2.648571	3.42
1983	5905.29	3.406921	3.42
1984	6073.13	2.842195	3.27
1985	6234.25	2.653	3.15
1986	6433.02	3.188355	3.16
1987	6859.99	6.637166	3.65
1988	7545.14	9.987622	4.45
1989	**7306.86**	**-3.158063**	**-3.16**
1990	6820.55	-6.655528	-4.9
1991	7352.38	7.797466	-0.67
1992	6813.01	-7.335994	-2.34
1993	6424.37	-5.704375	-3.01
1994	6446.85	0.3499173	-2.45
1995	6688.9	3.754544	-1.56
1996	6122.38	-8.469555	-2.43

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B12: Ecuador

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1971	3070.43	5.305341	5.3
1972	3227.15	5.10417	5.2
1973	3797.47	17.67256	9.36
1974	4076.67	7.352262	8.85
1975	4276.83	4.909894	8.07
1976	4456.81	4.208257	7.43
1977	4725.03	6.018199	7.22
1978	4943.49	4.623472	6.9
1979	**5001.66**	**1.176697**	**1.18**
1980	5143.77	2.841254	2
1981	5077.01	-1.297886	0.9
1982	5083.54	0.1286244	0.71
1983	4609.67	-9.321656	-1.29
1984	4636.59	0.5839881	-0.98
1985	4708.71	1.555456	-0.62
1986	4718.47	0.2072808	-0.52

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Table B13: Liberia

Year	GDPPC	GDPGPC	MovAvGr
1995	160.931	-3.39812	-3.4
1996	177.454	10.26713	3.43
1997	337.227	90.03629	32.3
1998	390.353	15.75378	28.16
1999	455.493	16.68746	25.87
2000	538.104	18.13661	24.58
2001	542.115	0.7453924	21.18
2002	548.961	1.262833	18.69
2003	**380.809**	**-30.63096**	**-30.63**
2004	380.546	-0.0690636	-15.35
2005	378.104	-0.6417059	-10.45
2006	396.273	4.805293	-6.63
2007	450.297	13.63302	-2.58
2008	441.808	-1.885196	-2.46
2009	441.814	0.0013539	-2.11
2010	458.736	3.830118	-1.37

Source: Kar et al. (2013)

Appendix C: Explanatory variables

Table C1: Presence and absence of potential explanatory variables by country

	Pro-business politicians	Supportive business class	Weak labour movement	Supportive intl. allies/policies	Programmatic politics*	Insulated technocracy	Strong external economy	Strong domestic economy
	Sustained-growth transitions							
Chile	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Korea (South)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Lesotho	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Taiwan	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Reduced-growth transitions							
Dominican Republic	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Greece	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
Indonesia	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Portugal	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
Spain	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
	Collapsed-growth transitions							
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liberia	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

Key
0 = variable is absent
1 = variable is present

* Programmatic politics is regarded as the opposite of personalised-factional politics

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