Political settlements and the politics of inclusion

Alina Rocha Menocal
October 2015
The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) is an international research initiative based at the University of Birmingham, and working in partnership with University College London (UCL) and La Trobe University in Melbourne.

DLP aims to increase understanding of the political processes that drive or constrain development. Its work focuses on the crucial role of home-grown leaderships and coalitions in forging legitimate institutions that promote developmental outcomes.

DLP’s independent program of research is supported by the Australian aid program.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of DLP, the Australian Government, the UK Government, or DLP’s partner organisations.

The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP)
International Development Department
School of Government and Society
College of Social Sciences
University of Birmingham
Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
+44 (0)121 414 3911
www.dlprog.org
info@dlprog.org
@DLProg
The ‘State of the Art Paper’ series

Our SOTA series aims to lay the groundwork for future DLP research by setting out what existing research evidence and development practice tells us about the politics of development in key areas.

These papers survey the literature, with three aims:

• to clarify what is already known about an issue and the policy implications of that research evidence;
• to suggest areas for further investigation by identifying knowledge gaps;
• to guide future DLP research, ensuring that it is problem-focused, useful and innovative.

To ensure the rigour, validity and utility of these papers, they are peer reviewed internally and externally by both academic and policy or programming experts.

We hope that the SOTA papers will also be useful to other researchers and commissioners of research, and to policymakers and practitioners.

Author and acknowledgements

Alina Rocha Menocal is a DLP Senior Research Fellow, on secondment from ODI. She leads DLP’s workstream on Political Settlements and the Politics of Inclusion.

With thanks to Will Hines (DFID), Heather Marquette (DLP/GSDRC), and Siân Herbert (GSDRC) for guidance and peer review. I am also very grateful to participants at the DFID roundtable where I presented an earlier draft for very useful comments and feedback. Any factual errors remain my own.

This paper builds on a paper that I originally wrote for DFID on “Inclusive political settlements: evidence, gaps and challenges of institutional transformation”. That study was intended to assess whether existing evidence supports DFID’s objective of promoting inclusive political settlements and political processes, as articulated in its “Building Peaceful States and Societies” (PBSB) framework (DFID 2010). The substance and structure of the paper have been updated and revised to make the narrative more accessible to a wider audience, and, with DFID’s agreement, it has been turned into a DLP State of the Art Paper.

This publication supported by:
Executive summary

This paper explores what political settlements are and why they are now at the centre of donor efforts to foster more peaceful and effective states and societies. Analysing available research, the paper finds that, at least in the short to medium term, more inclusive political settlements at the elite level are crucial to avoid the recurrence of violent conflict, and to lay the foundations for more peaceful political processes. The literature also suggests that, over the long term, states and societies underpinned by more open and more broadly inclusive institutions are more resilient and better at promoting sustained and broadly shared prosperity. However, there is a big gap between these two findings: further research and learning are needed on how a political settlement with a narrow focus on elite inclusion can be transformed into a more broadly inclusive political order. The paper highlights insights from the literature that could help develop a more incremental approach to promoting inclusion.

Introduction

There is growing recognition that the challenge of development is not so much what needs to be done, as how – the processes that make change possible, and that stand in the way of change. This has placed the need to understand politics – and underlying ‘political settlements’ – at the centre of current international thinking and practice on how to foster more peaceful, inclusive and effective states.

Political settlements constitute a common understanding or agreement on the balance and distribution of power, resources and wealth (Laws 2012; Jones et al. 2014). This includes both formal and informal institutions. This paper draws on academic and grey literature to examine thinking and research on political settlements and processes of state formation and political, social and economic transformation.

Key findings

The literature suggests that political settlements that are inclusive at the elite level are crucial to avoid a recurrence of violent conflict in the short term.

The literature also suggests that, over the long term, states and societies widely considered to be peaceful, prosperous and resilient also have institutions, and underlying political settlements, that are more broadly inclusive, not just of elites but of the population more generally.

The difficulty lies in the gap between these two findings: We still know relatively little about how a political settlement that starts with a narrow focus on elite inclusion can be transformed into one that supports a more broadly inclusive political order.

Inclusion: who, what, how?

The concept of “inclusion” needs to be unpacked. The analysis in this paper suggests that there are crucial questions about who is included in ‘inclusive’ political settlements, what kind of inclusion one is referring to – inclusive processes versus inclusive outcomes, for example – and how greater inclusion can be fostered. Policy makers, practitioners and donors often focus on the procedural aspects of inclusion. However, it cannot be assumed that promoting greater participation in decision-making, such as through peace negotiations, elections, or processes to revise or rewrite constitutions, will automatically lead to an inclusive outcome.

Political and historical context

Politics and history matter: They determine, for instance, the balance of power, which will often be mediated by historical legacies of state formation and patterns of state-society relations. Historical trajectories and power dynamics also govern a state’s particular insertion into the global political economy, and influence links between domestic and international actors and drivers. These kinds of structural and institutional factors affect the kinds of transformations that are possible.
The transformation of political settlements

The transformation of narrowly based political settlements towards greater inclusion is likely to involve multiple dimensions of change, including transitions:

- from war and/or violent conflict towards peace and a state monopoly over the use of violence;
- from closed political orders towards systems that are more open and representative;
- from clientelism to substantive citizenship and a greater concern for the public good;
- from patronage-based power and institutions towards a more impersonal political system and the rule of law;
- from an economy that is stagnant, narrowly-based or geared towards violence, towards one based on investment, growth and jobs.

Crucially, these changes are not linear, one-directional or always positive. Transitions along these different dimensions may not always reinforce each other – in other words, “all good things” do not necessarily go together, and processes of transformation are likely to generate tensions, dilemmas, and trade-offs.

Critical junctures of many kinds – the end of a war, a national crisis, a natural disaster or a change in government after many years of one-party rule – may offer space for reshaping political settlements along more inclusive lines. However, inclusiveness may develop even through quite limited change; for instance, shifts in key appointments, or negotiations and coalition-building between various actors in society. The role of political leadership both within and outside the state is likely to be a key factor.

We need to know more about which institutions matter most when, where and why in development processes. So far, the literature suggests that the following factors have supported governance transitions and the transformation of political settlements towards greater inclusion:

- security and stability as a foundation for further transformation;
- the rule of law for all, starting with elites, and spreading to the population at large;
- elite commitment and leadership, and strategic coalition-building with well-placed actors and allies;
- political parties that can mobilise around a shared sense of national purpose to encourage collective action;
- bottom-up pressure for change (although this will rarely be sufficient without developmental leadership to support and harness it);
- basic state capacity;
- capacity to foster growth even at low levels of economic development.

Evidence gaps

The evidence suggests that broadly inclusive political settlements do matter and are the right ambition over the long term. However, we still know little about how different countries can get there. Several questions remain to be addressed. For instance:

- What are the key drivers and dynamic processes at play? How do political settlements affect what kinds of reform and transformation are possible?
- How can countries reshape their political settlement(s) so as to break away from patterns of fragility and enhance their resilience and effectiveness over time?
- Can inclusion compensate to any degree for other weaknesses within the state and in the links between state and society?
- Are there any tensions, dilemmas and/or trade-offs between process-based inclusion (such as broad-based citizen participation and inclusion in decision-making processes) and outcome-based inclusion (effectiveness in decision-making processes, promotion of growth)?
- What persuades elites to pursue more or less inclusive settlements? What might be the right balance, if indeed there is one?
- How can bottom-up pressures for change shape political settlements?

Very often in development thinking and practice, it is assumed that (progressive) change in one dimension – for instance, participatory decision-making processes – will prompt further positive change in another – say, a more open political system. But this cannot be treated as a given. The complex linkages and dynamics between these different dimensions remain one of the most important questions to be examined empirically, by research and policy lesson-learning.
Introduction

Since the late 1990s, governance and institutions have emerged as a leading concern in international assistance circles, especially in fragile and conflict-afflicted settings. There is growing recognition that the challenge of development, be it justice and security, or growth, or the effective delivery of basic services, is not so much what needs to be done (be it to build schools or provide vaccinations) but, crucially, how it is done (processes that facilitate or obstruct change). This has placed the need to understand politics — and underlying ‘political settlements’ — at the centre of current international thinking and practice on how to foster more peaceful, inclusive and effective states that are rooted in their respective societies.

This paper starts by defining what political settlements are, drawing on both academic and more policy oriented literature. Section 3 provides a brief overview of how understandings of fragility and statebuilding have evolved within the donor community to locate where the interest in political settlements comes from and why political settlements are important. In Section 4, the analysis shifts to ask whether the current focus of the international development community on supporting more inclusive political settlements and processes is the right one. To do so, the paper looks at available evidence on whether inclusive political settlements do in fact help foster more stable, resilient states that are linked to society through legitimacy rather than coercion. Section 5 seeks to further unpack the who, what, and how of ‘inclusive’ political settlements. It also provides some brief reflections on how donors have sought to foster more inclusive political settlements, and what the analysis in this paper may imply for current international approaches to promote inclusion. Section 6 focuses on key evidence gaps related to the fundamental question of how processes of institutional change happen, and whether and how these may help to make political settlements more inclusive.
Academic thinking and research that engages with the substance of ‘political settlements’

The term ‘political settlements’ has only emerged in international policy-making circles relatively recently, and the concept remains contested. There are concerns that the term is too vague and is subject to multiple interpretations depending on how it is used (Philips 2013; Laws 2012; Laws and Leftwich 2014). Interestingly, in the academic literature, the term ‘political settlements’ has not been commonly used either; except for a few exceptions such as Mushtaq Khan (2010, 2012) (Box 1) and Adrian Leftwich. However, much of the evolving interpretation within the international development community of the dynamics and processes that political settlements embody enjoys a rich tradition in academic thinking and research on processes of state formation and political, social and economic transformation. This tradition is not often acknowledged or cited in the donor literature in particular, but is reflected in frameworks like DFID’s Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic (2013), which seeks to better understand the nature of political settlements and what this implies for the possibility of transformation in different settings.

Box 1: Mushtaq Khan’s conceptualisation of political settlements

Mushtaq Khan’s influential conceptualisation of the term political settlement (Khan 2010) centres around an understanding of:

- the balance of power between different groups and organisations contesting the distribution of resources; and
- the kinds of institutions that emerge from such interactions.

According to Khan, “A [durable] political settlement is a combination of power and institutions that are mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability” (2010: 4). Khan argues that political settlements can be sustained only when equilibrium is reached between the interests of powerful actors and the institutions that govern the behaviour of individual actors (Parks and Cole 2010). An institution’s impact thus depends on the ongoing relationship and distribution of power between the classes and groups with which it engages (Routley 2011).

This helps to explain why very often formal institutions are difficult to enforce in countries across the developing world – namely because powerful groups do not abide by them – and why informal practices like clientelism persist. As Khan (2010: 1) has put it, these “informal adaptations to the ways in which particular formal institutions work play a critical role in bringing the distribution of benefits supported by the institutional structure into line with the distribution of power”.

This academic research includes both structuralist approaches to state (trans)formation, and approaches more focused on agency, leadership and the choices leaders make. A seminal study in the structuralist tradition is Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1967). This book sets out to explain how different agrarian structures, in particular the role of landed upper classes and the peasantry, led to the emergence of democracy in some instances and dictatorship from the left or the right in others from the 1920s onward. The literature on actors and agency focuses on ‘elite pacts’, bargains, and the relationships between elites after periods of turmoil, especially in settings characterised by division and fragmentation. Consociationalism in particular, with the work of Arend Lijphart (1977 and 1999) at the forefront, focuses on the role of elites in preserving unity and stability in otherwise deeply divided societies. There is also an important body of peacebuilding literature that looks at post-conflict transitions and power sharing arrangements in settings as diverse as Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia – Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia – and South Africa (see Noel 2005; Wolff and Yakinthou 2011, among others). The ‘transitology’ school developed a framework

---

1 As the founding Director of Research of the Developmental Leadership Program, Leftwich anchored much of DLP’s work around the notion of the political settlement. See also Hudson and Leftwich 2014.
to understand the transitions to democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s from an agency perspective based on elite divisions, uncertainty and contingent choice (see O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, among others). Higley and Burton (1992; 1998: 98) further emphasise the need for pacts and “deliberate and lasting compromises of core disputes among political elites” to consolidate (democratic) regimes post-transition.

There is also an important body of academic work that seeks to combine these two approaches more purposively. This includes, for example, the sweeping analysis of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) of what made the advent of democracy and development possible in some places and not others; and the work of Deborah Yashar (1997) explaining why state formation processes in Guatemala and Costa Rica took such divergent paths from the 1950s onwards, leading to an oppressive military regime in the former and democracy in the latter. The focus of this latter literature is to better understand what the balance of power is, not only between different elites but also between and among different social groupings (the military, different social classes, etc.). It also seeks to understand what coalitions become feasible between different groups, depending on the different interests driving them, and how these different coalitions shape the prospects for change in both more and less progressive ways. Elites and leaders are instrumental, but they are not free-wheeling agents and they operate within historical, institutional and structural boundaries that are important in shaping the choices they make.

Understanding ‘political settlements’

At their core, political settlements are about taming politics so that they stop being a “deadly, warlike affair” (Higley and Burton 1998). Political settlements constitute a common understanding or agreement on the balance and distribution of power, resources and wealth (Lawes 2012; Jones et al. 2014). This includes both formal institutions, and, crucially, informal ones. It is precisely this interplay between how formal and informal institutions interact that helps explain why settings that share similar formal institutional compositions (as well as endowments) can have different developmental trajectories and outcomes. Political settlements thus define who has power and, crucially, who does not. They outline the parameters of inclusion and exclusion in a given political system, be it in terms of process (such as who is included in decision-making) or outcomes (for instance, how wealth is distributed), or both.

But far from being static, political settlements are ongoing political processes that involve the negotiation, bargaining and contestation of the power relationships between key elite figures and groups, as well as between elites and the wider array of interests in society (Putzel and Di John 2012). As Ed Lawes (2012) has put it, political settlements are “two-level games” that involve both horizontal dynamics and interactions between elites but also vertical linkages between elites and segments of the broader population. Political settlements evolve over time as elites and different groups in state and society continue to redefine the nature of their relationship through a combination of horizontal and vertical interactions. The diverging historical trajectories of Costa Rica and Guatemala offer an interesting, and contrasting, illustration of this (Box 2).

**Box 2: The evolution of the political settlement in Costa Rica and Guatemala**

Up to the middle of the twentieth century, Costa Rica and Guatemala shared many important characteristics and similar periods of political change and development. This included seven decades of authoritarian rule beginning in the 1870s, just under a decade of democratic reforms in the 1940s, and brief but consequential counter-reform movements that overthrew the democratic regimes in the mid-twentieth century. Despite these similarities, however, the two countries followed drastically different trajectories from then onwards. In the end, democracy took root in Costa Rica, while Guatemala experienced decades of authoritarian (and often brutal) rule. According to Deborah Yashar (1997), the key difference is that in Costa Rica, elite divisions combined with organised popular demands led to a progressive pro-reform coalition committed to democracy and broad-based development. In Guatemala, a much more reactionary regime prevailed based on the strategic alliance of the army with landed upper classes.

Thus, what accounts for the pro-development trajectory of Costa Rica, in comparison to Guatemala, is the emergence of a political party that transformed the nature of the political settlement underpinning the state. The Partido Social Democrático (PSD) came to power in Costa Rica in 1951 by gaining political control of the countryside. In addition to weakening the power of land-holding elites, the PSD undermined the oligarchic elite by nationalising the banking system and dismantling the army. By challenging traditional elites in this way, the PSD created the political space in which to press for political and economic reform, including redistributive policies, land reform, and the creation of an inclusive welfare state (financed by drastic increases in tax takes and income tax).

The different experience of Guatemala in this period starts with its military regime stamping down on popular demands for democracy and social reform throughout the 1940s and 50s and introducing a long-term ban on political parties and trade unions. The economic Guatemalan elites were less diversified than in Costa Rica, with power centralised more in large landowners and less in financial and merchant groups. Their interests were also much more closely aligned to those of the military. The ensuing political settlement was not designed for social welfare provision but for maintaining the status quo.

Sources: Yashar 1997; Laws 2012
Critical junctures, defined as events or periods of significant change which produce distinct legacies or trajectories (Berins Collier and Collier 1991), can (re)shape political settlements. These can include, for example, peace processes to end periods of violent conflict; the making of a new constitution (Kenya after the electoral violence of 2007); a particularly formative election (the first post-apartheid election in South Africa, the electoral triumph of the Workers Party in Brazil that brought Luiz Inácio da Silva to power in 2003); or a particularly devastating natural disaster (the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the earthquakes in Mexico in 1985).

The end of apartheid and the transition to multi-racial democracy in South Africa is perhaps one of the most iconic examples of how a political settlement was fundamentally rearticulated. By the 1980s, the ongoing struggle between the apartheid regime, led by the ruling National Party (NP), and the anti-apartheid movement, led by the African National Congress (ANC), had reached stalemate. The ruling coalition in government had control over the state, the police and defence force, while the ANC enjoyed widespread popular support amongst the general populace, the trade unions, civic groups, and international advocates. Escalating civil unrest, violence and mounting international pressure on the NP made governance unmanageable, and negotiations became unavoidable. The ensuing peace process in the early 1990s was highly participatory and inclusive, bringing together a diversity of actors and organisations (including political parties, police, trade unions, business, churches, traditional leaders). South Africa has emerged as a much more open, inclusive and representative political system – even if the country continues to face enormous challenges, and the conditions of its poor (and still mostly black) population have yet to improve substantially.

In Kenya, the violence around the 2007 national elections became a crucial rallying point to redefine the nature of the political system. While the constitutional process it ushered in did not involve the same level of consultation and participation as that in South Africa, the constitution itself represents an opportunity for transformative change – and is perceived as such by many Kenyans (Domingo et al. 2012). The vision of social equity enshrined in the new constitution marks a breaking point with the past. The underlying aspiration of the new Kenyan constitution is that the exercise of power and distribution of resources can be transformed through its new vision of the state, and old grievances which have been at the root of violence, conflict and social exclusion can be addressed. These aspirations, however, have proven much more difficult to materialise in practice, and entrenched institutional dynamics and power structures have endured.

As the examples provided here suggest, however, political settlements should not be reduced to any one single event or process. Such events and processes can be part of an underlying settlement, but the settlement runs deeper (Laws 2012). It is also important to keep in mind that political settlements are not just national in scope. They also often evolve over time at sub-national levels and in relation to broad policy areas or sectors (Laws 2012; Laws and Leftwich 2014; Castillejo 2014; Parks and Cole 2010; Parks et al. 2013; Elgin-Cossart et al. 2012).
2.0 Why ‘political settlements’?

**Evolving thinking on fragility and statebuilding within the international development community**

Over the past fifteen years, donor thinking on fragility and on how to support pathways out of fragility more effectively has evolved considerably. While the concept of fragility remains contested (Grimm et al. 2014; Perera 2015), there is now widespread agreement about some of its key characteristics (Anten et al. 2012). It is now broadly recognised that, at its core, fragility is a deeply political phenomenon. As the OECD/DAC has put it, a “fragile state has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and its territory, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society” (OECD 2011). This understanding of fragility very much reflects the spirit of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

In a fragile setting, the quality of the political settlement establishing the rules of the game is deeply flawed (especially in terms of its exclusionary nature), is not resilient, and/or has become significantly undermined or contested. A “social contract” binding state and society together in mutually reinforcing ways is largely missing.

There is also a growing appreciation that, rather than being binary, fragility is a multi-faceted, complex and dynamic phenomenon. Some countries represent entrenched and systemic state fragility, while others exhibit local and temporary fragile characteristics. Fragility thus has different drivers and finds different expressions and degrees of intensity in different settings (see Rocha Menocal 2013a; Perera 2015, among others).

An emerging body of academic and policy literature has proven useful in understanding fragility along three key dimensions of the state – capacity, authority, and legitimacy (Box 3).

---

**Box 3: Key dimensions of the state**

- **Capacity** refers to the state’s ability to provide its citizens with basic life chances. These include the protection from (relatively easily) avoidable harmful diseases; a basic education that allows for active participation in social and economic activities; social protection; and a basic administration that regulates social and economic activities sufficiently to increase collective gains and avoid massive negative externalities. **Capacity is not just technical – it also involves implementation and it is political, institutional, administrative and economic.**

- **Authority** has two essential components. One is security and relates to the extent to which a state faces an organised challenge to its monopoly of violence. The other refers to the extent to which the state controls its territory and national law is recognised. While **institutional multiplicity exists** to varying extents in all states, the question is the degree to which these are competing and overlapping in ways that undermine rather than complement formal state rules.

- **Legitimacy** refers to the normative belief of key political elites and the public that the rules regulating the exercise of power and the distribution of wealth are proper and binding. Historically, states have relied on a combination of different methods to establish their legitimacy, including legitimacy based on performance; legitimacy based on rules and procedures; legitimacy based on ideas/ideology (for instance, nationalism, religious fundamentalism); and legitimacy based on international recognition.

Sources: Putzel 2010; Stewart and Brown 2009; Rocha Menocal 2013a; McLaughlin 2015.

---

2 See, for example, Grimm et al. (2014), who argue that the ‘fragile states’ concept was framed by policy makers to describe reality in accordance with their development and security priorities, while elites and governments in developing countries have co-opted the term to further their own political agendas. Perera (2015) makes a very similar point.
These different dimensions of the state are conceptually and logically distinct, though they often overlap and interact in different ways (Call 2011; Stewart and Brown 2009). The most fragile of states are those where the state suffers considerable weaknesses or gaps in all three of these dimensions, which reinforce and feed on one another. These states lack the fundamental capacity, authority and legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups, and between citizens and the state, and to channel conflict through peaceful mechanisms (examples include DRC and South Sudan). These cases are qualitatively very different from states that may have a gap only in one or even two dimensions – they may, for instance, be stagnant developmentally or lack fundamental political freedoms/democracy, but remain relatively stable and peaceful. Fragility in a country like Bangladesh is qualitatively very different from fragility in Rwanda, which in turn is qualitatively very different from how fragility manifests itself in North Korea (see Putzel 2010; Stewart and Brown 2009; Call 2011; World Bank 2011, among others). And in all of these different settings, relevant elites and other political actors are likely to have different interests and incentives to address (or not) different dimensions of fragility. The main point to emphasise is that fragility comes in many different shades and varieties. It is essential to understand these multiple dimensions and combinations, as well as unpack issues related to the 'political will' of elites and political actors to promote change, because they present different challenges.

Based on a more dynamic appreciation of fragility and its root causes, donor thinking on statebuilding has also evolved considerably over time. There is now growing recognition within the international assistance community that statebuilding is not purely a technical exercise but rather a long-term, historically rooted process that is inherently political and must be driven from within.

Thus, from a narrow preoccupation with building/strengthening formal institutions and state capacity across various dimensions (for instance, security or public financial management), there has been an important shift towards recognising that the state cannot be treated in isolation. The dynamic capacity of state and society to negotiate mutual demands and obligations and manage expectations without resorting to violence is central to the process of building more peaceful and effective states (see for example Elgin-Cossart et al. 2012; Jones et al. 2012; DFID 2010; OECD 2011; also discussion above on fragility).

This shift has placed the concept of the political settlement, and whether and how political settlements and political processes can become more inclusive, at the centre of the statebuilding agenda. So statebuilding is not simply about ‘top-down’ approaches of formal institution strengthening, but also about ‘bottom-up’ approaches and – crucially – about bringing these together (as captured in OECD DAC Principle 3; OECD 2007). In other words, at the heart of statebuilding efforts lies the challenge to revitalise/reshape the linkages between the state and different groups in society.

Building peaceful states and societies: international frameworks

Building on this, different international organisations and initiatives (such as INCAF, the OECD DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility, the Institute for State Effectiveness, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, and the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report) have developed frameworks outlining the key areas for supporting the building of peaceful and effective states and societies. DFID is at the forefront of much of this (DFID 2010). While each framework varies in some respects, giving different weight to different areas and assigning different characteristics/functions to the state, they all share fundamental similarities.3 (Box 4 overleaf gives examples from the OECD and the World Bank.)

Current international thinking on what is needed to rearticulate the linkages between state and society, strengthen the social contract and foster legitimacy centres around the following:

• making political settlements and political processes more inclusive by including not only the relevant actors to the violent conflict, but also incorporating other groups that have traditionally been excluded or marginalised (women, for instance);
• strengthening key core functions of the state (however narrowly or broadly these core functions are defined);
• helping the state meet public expectations;
• nurturing social cohesion and a society’s capacity to promote reconciliation.

The ultimate objective again is to revitalise state-society relations along more productive and reciprocal lines, which is the basis of the social contract.

3 This is probably not coincidental as frameworks have often been written and/or guided by many of the same people.
Box 4: Examples of international frameworks to support the building of peaceful and effective states

DFID framework for building peaceful states and societies (DFID 2010)

The DFID integrated approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding focuses on three dimensions of state-society relations that influence the resilience or fragility of states:

- support inclusive political settlements and processes;
- develop core state functions;
- respond to public expectations.

A fourth objective is to address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility and build conflict resolution mechanisms. This is intended to be a holistic rather than sequential approach to building peaceful states and societies. Progress in these four areas is intended to form a ‘virtuous circle’ that can help recast state-society relations and improve the quality and nature of the linkages between the two.

At the heart of the interaction between these four dimensions lies the social contract and the matter of legitimacy, which provides the basis for rule by primarily non-coercive means.

OECD statebuilding framework (OECD 2011)

The OECD statebuilding framework shares many of the characteristics of the DFID framework and focuses on the same three closely interlinked objectives:

- the nature of the political settlement and how inclusive it is;
- the capability and responsiveness of the state to effectively fulfil its principal functions and provide key services; and
- beyond these core functions, the ability of the state to address broader social expectations and perceptions about what the state should do, what the terms of the state-society relationship should be and the ability of society to articulate demands that are ‘heard’.

These three dimensions are meant to be understood within a larger regional and global policy environment, and as operating at multiple levels – national and sub-national – within the domestic polity.

The 2011 World Development Report roadmap to move beyond conflict and fragility and secure development (World Bank 2011)

The 2011 WDR argues that institutional transformation sits at the heart of successful transitions out of fragility, and that legitimate institutions, both formal and informal, are a country’s ‘immune system’ against external and internal shocks. The WDR avoids defining legitimacy in terms of narrow normative commitments to democratic principles and acknowledges that states can rely on a combination of different methods to establish their legitimacy.

Critical early steps in breaking the cycle of conflict and fragility and building legitimacy include:

- restoring confidence in crucial institutions through the development of ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ that should include not only state actors but also community leaders, NGOs, the private sector, and informal actors and institutions;
- ‘getting the basics right’ by focusing on the provision of citizen security, justice, and jobs.

Progress on these priorities is essential in order to give everyone a stake in the (new) social order; improve the nature of state-society relations, and foster a sense of collective belonging.
Peacebuilding and statebuilding: a view from within fragile states

While much of the statebuilding agenda has been developed by the international donor community over the past few years, developing countries themselves have begun to play a more active role (Rocha Menocal 2013a). The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was established in 2008. The intention was to bring together donors (including traditional bilateral and multilateral donors, and emerging donors like China and Brazil), recipient countries, and civil society actors to address the root causes of conflict and fragility in a more realistic and effective manner. Led by Timor-Leste and the Democratic Republic of Congo, a group of countries affected by conflict and fragility, known as the g7+, has called for a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. This New Deal sets a series of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) deemed to be essential preconditions for development in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (see OECD 2012 and Wyeth 2012):

- **Legitimate politics**: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
- **Security**: establish and strengthen people's security
- **Justice**: address injustices and increase people's access to justice
- **Economic foundations**: generate employment and improve livelihoods
- **Revenues & services**: manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

These objectives and priorities are very similar to those espoused by the international community and, at least in principle, they reflect a preoccupation with the need to make political settlements more inclusive and rearticulate state-society relations. However, it is also important to highlight that it is not always clear how much of this agenda is actually driven from within g7+ countries. As some observers have noted, a variety of donors and Northern/Western think tanks and academics have been heavily involved in writing background papers, providing technical assistance, and stimulating the agenda and pace. A recent assessment of New Deal implementation finds that there has been insufficient buy-in from various stakeholders within g7+ countries to give the real PSGs traction (Hughes et al. 2014). Others have noted that g7+ leaders are more interested in other aspects of the New Deal, including calls for donors to engage differently with fragile states. Some leaders see PSGs more instrumentally as means towards committing donors to do that.

Nevertheless, even if commitment to PSGs remains superficial within g7+ countries (and beyond), it is also true that in discourse they have been widely embraced in both the developed and the developing world. This is also evident in the report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013), and it features in one of the Sustainable Development Goals that have just been unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly. Goal 16 commits all countries to “[promote] peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development … and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”

---

4 These are the TRUST principles for engagement elaborated in the New Deal: Transparency, Risk sharing, the Use and Strengthening of country systems, and the Timely and predictable delivery of aid (Hughes et al. 2014)

Is the focus on supporting more inclusive political settlements and processes the right one?

A review of the evidence

An analysis of the literature suggests that the current focus of the international community on the need to support more inclusive political settlements and processes is well-placed. Many of the findings and conclusions from existing research, especially up to 2010, are captured in a literature review that DFID carried out to assess whether the assumptions embedded in its peacebuilding and statebuilding framework were backed by evidence (Evans 2012). In particular, that review found that:

- elites in particular play a crucial role in shaping and sustaining or undermining political settlements;
- more inclusive political settlements (at least in terms of incorporating relevant elites) are essential in maintaining peace and stability and they do underpin more resilient and peaceful states and societies over the long term;
- the evidence on whether and how wider society can affect or shape political settlements remains more mixed.

Other research (both from before 2010 and more recently) on inclusion and political settlements — and on whether the inclusive or exclusionary nature of the political settlement is linked to fragility and conflict — reinforces these findings. These are discussed in further detail below.

Inclusion of relevant elites

Analysing the postcolonial trajectories of civil war versus political stability in different states across Sub-Saharan Africa, Lindemann (2008) argues that these are largely determined by the varying ability of ruling political parties to overcome legacies of high social fragmentation and forge/sustain ‘inclusive elite bargains’. While ‘inclusive elite bargains’ foster political stability, ‘exclusive enough violent conflict’ is more likely to lead to civil war because failure to include elites from other groups incentivises them to foment rebellion. In Zambia, for instance, despite high levels of social fragmentation, internal violent conflict has been avoided through an inclusive elite bargain and the inter-group distribution of access to positions of state power. The ability of the ruling party to craft the bargain was instrumental (Lindeman 2010).

The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (Box 4, above) reaches similar conclusions. Analysing all post-Cold War cases of civil war and relapse, it found that the only cases that avoided relapse (with one exception) were cases that had adopted an ‘inclusive enough’ political settlement — either through a negotiated end to war, or, in cases of military victory, through inclusive behaviour by the dominating elites. Cases where no mechanisms were put in place to include former opponents in political governance arrangements tended to fall back into conflict (Elgin-Cossart et al. 2012).

The 2011 WDR also emphasises the need to restore confidence as the first step in institutional transformation through the development of what it refers to as ‘inclusive enough’ coalitions. These coalitions are needed at both the national and the local level, and they include not only state actors but also community leaders, NGOs, the private sector, and informal actors and institutions. This is helpful in moving the debate beyond simple dichotomies of state versus non-state actors and institutions as agents of change; both matter and, in fact, tend to work best when they build on one another. This, however, does not resolve the issue of what ‘inclusive enough’ is, a question that is discussed further below.

In Why Peace Fails (2012), Charles Call also comes to similar conclusions. Examining the factors behind fifteen cases of civil war recurrence in Africa, Asia, the Caucasus and Latin America, Call finds that political exclusion, especially among former opponents, plays a more decisive role in the recurrence of violence conflict than economic or social factors. Conversely, political inclusion of former combatants/potential spoilers, through power-sharing agreements and other mechanisms, is highly correlated with the consolidation of peace. Noting that exclusionary politics and behaviour was the most important causal factor in 11 of the 15 cases of renewed armed conflict, Call concludes that, while other factors help to explain this as well, exclusion is “the most consistently important one” (cited in Jones et al. 2012: 3).
Inclusion of the population more broadly

More sweeping quantitative and qualitative historical research and conceptual analyses find that, over the long term, states that are more inclusive also tend to be more peaceful and resilient and rooted in society on the basis of legitimacy rather than coercion. Inclusion here moves beyond incorporation of relevant elites among competing factions that can otherwise resort to violence to encompass the population more broadly.

In *Why Nations Fail* (2012), Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson find that institutions and the quality of governance form the critical hinge separating prosperous states like South Korea from stagnating ones like its neighbour to the north. In essence, they argue that countries with more inclusive political and economic institutions are less likely to suffer from infighting and civil war and have proven far more successful in promoting long-term growth and broader development than those with ‘extractive’ ones. This has been the case even though creating more stable political systems and more successful economic activity is often a protracted process that takes time and may initially lead to greater stratification in incomes and assets (and therefore increased inequality).

On the whole, then, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) find that over the long term, democratic countries tend to be richer and better performing (see Keefer 2009, among others), and also more peaceful and (eventually) more equal. This is very much in line with Lipset’s finding in 1959 that there is a strong positive correlation between (high levels of) wealth and (established) democracy, which to this day remains one of the strongest and most enduring relationships in the social sciences. It is also in line with the more general observation that, on the whole and over time, democracies in the developed world tend to be better governed, more peaceful, and also more equal (the US in particular is an important outlier) (Fritz 2008). This is also the reasoning that is embedded in UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s ‘Golden Thread’ narrative. However, it is not clear from the Acemoglu and Robinson analysis (or the correlations that have been identified) what leads to what and how one gets to more peaceful, stable, inclusive, representative and wealthier political systems (Rocha Menocal 2012 and 2013b). This question is explored further later in this paper.

North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) argue, for their part, that limited access orders – where institutions and organisations are controlled by a narrow elite and defined by deeply personalised relationships – are more prone to violent conflict than states grounded in the rule of law and impersonal (formal) institutions. They show a ‘virtuous circle’ that discourages violence in open access orders, predicated on citizens’ beliefs in equality and inclusion; the channeling of dissent through political avenues; and the costs imposed on any organisation that attempts to limit access. However, evidence from both their framework (2009) and a set of nine country case studies testing it (North et al. 2013) also suggests that establishing the rule of law is a long-term process. It involves, first, agreement on rules and their application first among elites – and such agreement must be secured if violence is to be overcome. Then the rule of law can be expanded to the broader population at large, in the measure that political systems make a transition from more ‘closed’, to ‘limited’, to ‘open access’.

Exclusion, identity and nation-building

Another crucial issue, both conceptual and empirical, that lies at the core of the nature of political settlements and how inclusive they are is identity and nation-building.

Curiously, this is an issue that, for the most part, donors tend to neglect. As is widely recognised, exclusion is a deeply-rooted challenge in fragile states because at its core it undermines social cohesion. According to the 2011 WDR (World Bank 2011), states and societies function better when ties of trust and reciprocity exist and a rich associational life binds citizens together and links citizens to the state. Importantly, such ties should also be multiple and overlapping/cross-cutting, rather than based on narrow identities (see, for example, Varshney 2001, and critiques of the work of Robert Putnam and others on social capital). The quality and effectiveness of state-society relations are greatly impacted by the degree of cohesion that holds a society together, and by the extent to which elites can develop or already have a collective vision of a shared national project or common destiny with society at large. This is particularly true where relations between citizens have been fractured by conflict and violence, and/or where a sense of social cohesion or common identity – a sense of what brings people together – has been defined in narrow and exclusionary terms.

In this respect, exclusion can be seen as the antithesis of social cohesion. Social exclusion actively militates against the creation of a collective identity or sense of a shared nationwide public (Ghani and Lockhart 2007). Through the different dynamics it generates in fragile states, exclusion undermines trust and hinders collective action in ways that transcend narrow identities of what brings people together (IDB 2008).

Exclusion is especially pernicious when it is based on identity. Group- and identity-based exclusion, or what Frances Stewart refers to as ‘horizontal inequalities’, is a leading driver of fragility and conflict because it undermines the legitimacy of the state (Stewart 2010) in the eyes of those groups that are excluded, if not beyond. As the 2011 WDR emphasises, exclusionary political arrangements/ settlements and the ensuing patterns of state-society relations they generate – based on discrimination, inequality, and the denial of fundamental rights – breed resentment and generate grievances that can provoke or exacerbate violence and insecurity. This is especially true of horizontal inequalities based on political identity, while they become more acute when they overlap with horizontal inequalities based on social or economic identities (Stewart 2010).

Social groups who feel unequal and suffer from multiple disadvantages on the basis of who they are identified as may mobilise against the state and its ruling elites in an effort to challenge existing political understandings and arrangements. In effect, research over several decades has shown that identity-based exclusion and the political, economic and social forms of inequality it helps to generate are crucial factors associated with violence (DFID 2005; Stewart and Brown 2009).

Historically, state elites have played a critical role in shaping the way in which group identity evolves, and whether and how it
becomes salient and politicised. State actions and their consequences, both intended and unintended, frame the contours within which group identities develop and how definitions of belonging and of the nation-state itself are contested (see the work of Anthony Marx (1998) and Deborah Yashar (2007) among others). Nation-building can be defined as the construction of a shared sense of identity and common destiny to bring people together across differences (such as ethnic, religious, territorial) and to counter alternative allegiances (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983). When state elites have used group-based identities as a rallying mechanism for selective incorporation and mobilisation, this has led to biased processes of state formation and nation-building founded on exclusionary political settlements. As these horizontal fault lines in society become salient and politicised, they provide fertile ground for the outbreak of conflict.

Examples of this abound: the struggle against apartheid rule in South Africa, the rise of the indigenous population against the Americo-Liberian elite in Liberia, the north-south conflict in Sudan; exclusion along race lines across Latin America; the conflict between ethnic groups in Burundi, Rwanda and Kosovo; the separatist movement in Aceh, Indonesia; and the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. Research by the US Central Intelligence Agency-funded Political Instability Task Force (PITF) also finds that state-led discrimination is one of four variables that help explain a majority of cases of what it refers to as state failure. The PITF found surprisingly strong results related to factionalism, which generates "extraordinarily high" risks of instability in situations of open competition. The task force also found that political and economic discrimination is strongly linked to instability and the risk of (violent) conflict (cited in Elgin-Cossart et al. 2012; Jones et al. 2012; Castillejo 2014). This speaks of the need to foster the inclusion of groups that have historically been excluded on the basis of their identity in political settlements if such settlements are to prove resilient, viable and stable over time. As Stewart has articulated, addressing the conflict risks of horizontal exclusion is essential to foster stability (based on acceptance of the rules of the game and legitimacy rather than on coercion), which is itself an important (pre)condition to be able to address vertical exclusion.

On the other hand, available evidence seems to suggest that political settlements that are grounded on an inclusive nation-building project – or, as Benedict Anderson (1983) would put it, an "imagined community" that can transcend more narrowly defined identities – tend to be more stable and resilient over time. These kinds of political settlements, which can in fact be quite narrow in terms of actors/elites included at the top, help to promote social cohesion and more productive relations between state and society because they incorporate the population at large in a shared sense of national destiny. The role of elites in shaping these more inclusive identities and nation-building projects has also been crucial.

Mexico under the rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) (from the 1930s until 2000) was a powerful illustration of this. The political settlement that emerged after the devastating revolutionary war that the country experienced at the beginning of the 20th century was based not only on a project of elite/caudillo (warlord) inclusion, but also on the co-option of a wide variety of societal groups that were amalgamated by the party over time. The nation-building project was also based on a unifying discourse of Mexicans as neither Spaniards nor indigenous people, but as mixed-raced mestizos.

Ghana, a multi-ethnic country that has proven remarkably peaceful and stable over time, especially when compared to other countries in West Africa (and beyond), is another good example of this. There, state formation processes and state-society relations based on the promotion of social cohesion and a unified 'Ghanaian identity' emerged early on. Elites have incorporated the notion of a social contract linking state and citizens as an integral part of the state and nation building project from the start (Lenhardt et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2014). Perhaps more controversially, contemporary Rwanda has also been able to develop a strong and widely shared vision for the future that is grounded in part on a reinvented sense of nation that considerably downplays (or even denies) the importance of group-based identities.

More research is needed in this area to substantiate these findings, but it points to an important gap in the conceptualisation of inclusive political settlements and political systems more broadly in current donor thinking and practice. As Rowe (2012) noted in her dissertation applying DFID’s statebuilding and peacebuilding framework to Zimbabwe, statebuilding and nation-building are intricately linked processes. Efforts to support statebuilding without proper attention to nation-building may overlook the fact that issues of identity and how it is constructed are often leading drivers of conflict. They lie at the core of how inclusive or exclusive political settlements and broader political processes are.

6 The other three include regime type, infant mortality (as an indirect measure of the quality of life), and the regional neighbourhood.
4.0

Unpacking the concept of inclusion: who, what, how?

Taken together, the evidence above suggests that, in fact, inclusive political settlements and political processes are essential to foster more peaceful and effective states and societies over the long term. However, many questions remain unanswered and it is important to further unpack the concept of inclusion.

Who is included in ‘inclusive’ political settlements?

The analysis above suggests that there are crucial questions about who is included in ‘inclusive’ political settlements. If political settlements are about taming politics, then clearly including the relevant elites that otherwise can pose a credible, sustained and systemic challenge to peace and stability is an indispensable and essential condition. This is a central message that emerges from much of the existing literature. It also reinforces the finding in the DFID review (Evans 2012) that the DFID framework’s emphasis on the critical role of elites in political settlements is based on a substantial body of persuasive research.

But even at that elite level, how inclusive is ‘inclusive enough’? As discussed earlier, the 2011 WDR emphasises the importance of ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ in identifying pathways out of conflict and towards increased institutional resilience. Drawing on the experiences of a wide variety of countries from different regions and at different levels of development, the report argues that coalitions are inclusive enough when they involve the parties necessary to restore confidence and transform institutions and help create continued momentum for positive change. They are also inclusive enough when there is local legitimacy for excluding some groups – for example because of electoral gains, or because groups or individuals have been involved in abuses. However, it is not clear from the discussion how it is possible to tell in real time what an inclusive enough coalition looks like and when inclusive enough is also good enough. All the cases provided in the 2011 WDR seem to suggest that in hindsight those were examples of inclusive enough coalitions, and further work and thinking is needed to assess the (lack of) inclusivity and its potential implications as events unfold. This is challenging especially because it is imperative to avoid the risk of doing harm.

Also, despite the recognition of politics, the WDR’s discussion of inclusive enough coalitions does not seem to consider the frictions and tensions that may be caused by power imbalances and struggles among different groups. The report seems to avoid dealing with some of the pressing challenges related to this.

How can coalitions bringing together different elements of state and society come together in the first place in settings characterised by a deep sense of mistrust? Under what conditions can excluded actors or groups pose a genuine threat to the stability of the settlement? And what about groups that may be deemed undesirable by large parts of the population but still have enough power and authority to be able to derail statebuilding processes if they are not included?

What kind of inclusion?

Beyond the inclusion of relevant elites, there are also deeper questions about how political settlements can become more inclusive of broader groups in society. As Alan Whaites (2008: 4) has put it: “Elites are prominent within the literature on statebuilding, but elites can rarely take social constituencies for granted; they must maintain an ability to organise, persuade, command or inspire. Wider societies are not bystanders in political settlements or state-building.”

But what does the incorporation of these wider social constituencies mean for ‘inclusive’ political settlements?

One dimension of this is the extent to which the nation-building project underpinning the state is inclusive or exclusionary. As discussed, the political settlement itself might be quite narrow in terms of the actors/elites that are included, but it nevertheless can project a sense of identity and ‘imagined community’ that is more inclusive.

Another dimension is the important distinction between inclusion based on outcomes and inclusion based on processes. As with the issue of identity, political settlements that may be considered narrow in terms of the elites that constitute it can in fact produce distributional outcomes that are more broadly inclusive. The so-called ‘Asian tigers’, including South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, are all good examples of this. These states oversaw a remarkable socio-economic transformation over a period of 50 years that was based on the selective incorporation of some groups (business elites) and not others (labour). However, overall prosperity was
much more widely shared and these developmental states, as they came to be called, became leading examples of performance-based legitimacy (see Evans 1995, and Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007). Contemporary Rwanda and Ethiopia are also examples of this (Booth 2012): in both countries, there are institutional arrangements in place that limit democratic competition, but the regimes have nonetheless fostered other types of outcome-based inclusion that have encouraged significant growth with a degree of poverty reduction, at least for now. The same can be said for China and Taiwan (even if poverty reduction itself has not been sufficient to tackle growing vertical inequality).

In all these examples, state capacity has been essential to securing inclusive developmental outcomes (vom Hau 2012). As Sam Hickey (2013: 3) points out, it has been “a central feature in all successful cases of long-run development witnessed in the post-World War II era, whether in terms of growth … social provisioning … or broader forms of democratic development involving rights and redistribution …”. However, states can be highly capable without necessarily being committed to development, so – as Hickey (2013) also emphasises – the commitment of political elites to promote development, especially in terms of shared prosperity, has also proved critical.

This contrasts sharply with the experience of many other countries across the developing world (including Africa, Asia, Latin America, and most recently even the Middle East) that have undertaken transitions to (formal) democracy from the 1980s onwards. In all these different countries, a variety of reforms intended to promote process-based inclusion, such as new constitutions, elections, and anti-corruption and transparency policies, have been put in place. However, very often such efforts have not proven sufficient on their own to alter existing power relations and redefine underlying political settlements along more inclusive lines. Moreover, many of these countries have not managed to embark on a trajectory of sustained growth and shared prosperity either (Putzel and Di John 2012). These incipient democracies thus face a dual challenge: formal institutions of participation, representation and inclusion have remained hollow and ineffective; at the same time, the regimes have remained unable and/or unwilling to deliver on some of the crucial needs and expectations of their populations. In other words, political settlements have not become more inclusive either in terms of process or in terms of outcomes. This helps to explain why many of the democratic systems that have emerged over the past three decades remain so vulnerable (Rocha Menocal 2013a).

**How can political settlements become more inclusive?**

The policy-oriented literature focuses on three main mechanisms through which more inclusive political settlements may be supported: post-conflict peace processes, democratisation processes, and the increased participation of groups that have traditionally been excluded, especially women (while there is a growing focus on youths as well).

As has been discussed above, much of the literature on how inclusion affects prospects for sustainable peace and stability in post-conflict settings finds that the incorporation of relevant elites (especially former opponents/combatants and potential spoilers) is vital to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. This suggests that, at the very least, peace processes need to include actors that could otherwise credibly opt for violence. Yet this says little about whether peace processes/agreements, however inclusive or ‘inclusive enough’ they might be, can then also make the underlying political settlement more inclusive, especially of the broader population. The empirical case for this remains mixed, and according to Evans (2012) the evidence might even be contradictory. The implications of this raise important challenges for current donor thinking and practice. While international development actors have become more open about the need to recognise that peacebuilding and statebuilding processes often entail difficult trade-offs, dilemmas and tensions, how these ought to be managed remains an area that requires crucial attention (Paris and Sisk 2008; Rocha Menocal 2013a). More empirical research is needed to illustrate how these tensions play out in practice in different countries/settings, whether they have been addressed more or less successfully, and to what effect.

In terms of democracy, or perhaps more accurately, processes of democratisation, the analysis above also suggests that, on their own, these do not necessarily lead to the reshaping of a political settlement in a more inclusive manner. As noted in the DFID literature review (Evans 2012: 14), “The challenges in leveraging democratic processes as a mechanism for peacebuilding and statebuilding are manifest”. However, once again the implications of this – that democratic institutions will not automatically lead to more inclusive political settlements and processes – need to be much further explored in current donor thinking.

Many of the international frameworks for building peaceful states and societies are based on assumptions that legitimacy needs to be bolstered at least partly through democratisation (see Section 3). To be sure, most countries across the developing world today are formal democracies. However imperfect, these emerging democracies are here to stay – and engaging with them more effectively is the new frontier of the developmental challenge. As Evans (2012) also argues, surveys like Afrobarometer suggest that people tend to support/demand democracy. Yet the picture is much more nuanced and complex than that. A closer analysis of global and regional perception surveys covering countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia reveals that the aspect of governance respondents care most about is that their governments ‘deliver the goods’, such as economic management, growth stimulation, job creation, health, and education (Bratton 2010a and 2010b; Leavy and Howard 2013). Survey results show that the percentage of people pointing to economic concerns as the main challenge that their governments should address is much higher than concerns about democracy and rights. Thus, while people may support democracy, what they care about first and foremost is state performance and the ability of governments to deliver on key needs and expectations (Rocha Menocal et al. 2014).

Even then, the relationship between improved performance and service delivery on the one hand, and state legitimacy on the other, is far from linear. A key finding emerging from research in this area is that performance-based legitimacy is not simply based on objective criteria. It needs be understood as socially constructed – with norms, ideas, state-society interactions and power dynamics all playing an important role in shaping it (McLoughlin 2014). This leads to an important legitimacy conundrum: how to build the legitimacy of the state if neither the strategy of doing so procedurally (for instance, through democratic rules of the game) or through performance necessarily works?
While there have been critiques that political settlement frameworks are gender blind (Nazneen and Mahmud 2012; Castillejo 2014), it is also true that the international community has emphasised the inclusion of women (as well as other traditionally marginalised groups) as an absolutely essential component of efforts to foster more peaceful and resilient states and societies. Indeed, post-conflict and transitional settings can offer real opportunities to renegotiate women’s political power, advance gender equality goals, and thereby redefine the nature of the political settlement along more inclusive lines (Domingo et al. 2014). A growing body of evidence on whether and how women’s inclusion and political participation can affect political settlements is emerging, focused in particular on the inclusion of women in peace processes (including peace negotiations and constitution-making processes), and on quotas to increase women’s presence and representation in the political system. This research concludes that there is no straightforward or automatic link between women’s empowerment and more inclusive political settlements, but it offers important lessons about the kinds of factors that are important in shaping women’s influence/impact. The following points are summarised from the work of Domingo et al. 2014; Nazneen and Mahmud 2012; Castillejo and Tilley 2015; and Chambers and Cummins 2014.

• The number of women involved in both peace processes and political systems has increased significantly over the past two decades. However, while this kind of access matters, it is also essential to look beyond numbers to assess what difference the greater incorporation of women in political processes/systems is making. Women need presence and influence to shape the political agenda. Leadership requires the ability to bring a constituency along.

• Women’s presence and influence is often obstructed by clientelist and personalist politics and the nature of political parties and competition, despite formal claims to access. This leads to a substantial gap between the formal empowerment of women and actual changes in power relations and dynamics. Social and political change is incremental and depends on the interests and incentives of domestic actors, and whether they can work collectively to reform institutions. Informal institutions and relationships are as important as formal ones.

• A vibrant women’s movement is critical to get women’s interests on the table and to sustain pressure on governments to implement formal commitments. However, elite support for a gender equity agenda is absolutely essential to give it traction and momentum. So women and gender advocates also need to build policy coalitions to exert pressure for change, and make alliances with key strategic actors and decision-making processes if they are to influence new institutional arrangements. On the other hand, it is also important to note that women themselves do not constitute a homogeneous group and often have different (or even competing) interests, so it should not be assumed that women will always be working towards the same shared agenda.

• Last but not least, transnational discourse, advocacy and actors have created important space and opportunities for women’s empowerment and increased participation in political processes/systems.

The experience of women’s empowerment in Burundi helps to illustrate many of these lessons (Box 5).

Box 5: Women’s opportunities for political influence in post-conflict Burundi

Burundi’s post-conflict constitution (2005) sets a minimum threshold of 30% of women representatives in the Cabinet, National Assembly and Senate and, since 2009, local government. This quota has been met in the two post-conflict elections and has included the appointment of the first women to act as Vice President and Speaker of Parliament, and women holding positions in lead ministries (for instance, justice, commerce, and foreign relations).

This was a hard-won victory for Burundi’s transnational women’s movement and its dogged lobbying for the inclusion of gender concerns and women’s rights, first in the peace agreement and then in the constitution. It was also an important victory given women’s historical exclusion from public life in Burundi before the peace accords, when just 5% of representatives were women. While the visibility of women in public office normalises their political participation, they have found it difficult to influence policy on gender or on other issues.

Burundi’s political system turns on clientelism: all politicians must obey their patrons and party to keep their position. Women also face patriarchal social norms. Party leadership is a male preserve, with women excluded from the real decision-making forums, which are often informal. Women are discouraged from voicing opinions, and particularly controversial ones. Some women are co-opted by party leaders to meet the quota, rather than being elected (so-called ‘flowers’), casting more doubt on their credibility and their primary loyalties. The inability of women MPs to overcome resistance to draft legislation on equal inheritance rights indicates their relative weakness within their parties.

Source: Domingo et al. 2014
Mechanisms for collective organisation and political parties

There is a problematic treatment of elites in the policy-oriented literature on the formation of institutions. Discussions on political settlements and how they can become more inclusive have a tendency to be overly voluntaristic and agency focused, while it is essential to understand agency in interaction with structures and institutions. It is not just elites that matter; but the constellation of power balance between different social groups and, crucially, how these groups are organised. Surprisingly little attention seems to be paid to this issue of collective organisation in donor thinking about political settlements.

Political parties are likely to be central to this. Political parties are prime institutions linking state and society, and they are instrumental vehicles for collective action and organisation (Diamond and Gunther 2001; Burrell 2004; Carothers 2006). They have also played an instrumental role in driving political settlements as well as shaping government incentives to adopt policies that can foster more or less inclusion (including in terms of growth) (see the discussion on Lindemann in Section 4). In a report for the Crisis States Research Centre synthesising findings from a five-year research project, James Putzel and Jonathan Di John (2012) suggest political organisations, and political parties in particular, shape the ways elites relate to each other. They also show how they relate to the state and executive authority at the national and subnational level, and how they relate to their social constituencies.

It is therefore essential to understand the kinds of incentives and interests that drive political parties and the contexts within which they operate, to better appreciate why they function in the way that they do. Their structure, organisation and strategy will be important in determining how effective they are at promoting stability and harnessing collective action towards inclusion or exclusion, and towards more or less developmental aims. In Tanzania and Zambia, for example, well-established political parties were able to mediate the bargaining process and incorporate factions and individuals into security forces in a regulated and institutionalised manner; and this was one of the most important factors behind establishing a more resilient state (Lindemann 2010). Putzel and Di John also find that forms of centralised patronage and the management of rents have been organised by national political parties in almost all cases of state resilience in poor countries. On the other hand, they argue, where the basic parameters of the state remain contested – such as who is a citizen and who is not, or the basic authority to allocate property rights – the establishment of multiple political parties may allow rival elites and their social constituents to challenge the existence of the state itself, thus leading to exacerbated conflict.

Research carried out by Keefer (2009, 2011) suggests that states are more likely to pursue and implement policies that promote more inclusive development over the long term where there are institutionalised political parties in place. As defined by Keefer, institutionalised parties are organisations that can convey a programmatic policy stance, discipline party leaders and members, and can facilitate collective action by citizens. For instance, the Communist Party in Kerala, India, built its strategy on a concerted attack on rural poverty. With its roots in social movements, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil is an extremely coherent, well-organised and institutionalised vehicle for collective action. It has played an instrumental role in shaping government incentives to adopt policies that can foster more inclusive development. The same may be said of ruling political parties in China and Vietnam, as well as Ethiopia. Curiously, as Keefer notes, often non-democratic systems are likely to exhibit more institutionalised ruling parties than democratic ones, especially at higher levels of development, as in East Asia.

Arguably, programmatic or issues-based parties most likely to support collective action are least likely to emerge in patronage states where they may be most needed (Marquette and Peiffer 2014). A quantitative analysis of data by Keefer (2007a and 2007b) on 133 democratic episodes in 113 countries, both developed and developing, examined how a range of economic and social indicators vary with the age of the democratic system. Of the episodes, 102 began after 1975. Keefer concluded that the clientelism present in many newly democratised states leads to inferior provision of public goods, greater corruption, and reduced growth. It is worth noting, however, that the evidence surrounding the assumption that programmatic parties deliver better and more inclusive outcomes remains inconclusive. As has been noted here, some research clearly supports this assertion, but other analysts suggest that the superiority of programmatic parties cannot be taken for granted.

For example, research conducted by Kitschelt and others for International IDEA (2012) (based on seven case studies and quantitative analysis from 88 countries) suggests that while strong clientelism is associated with a slight reduction in economic growth, there is no marked association between programmatic politics and higher growth. Similarly, Kitschelt and others (2012) find that clientelism does not seem to have been associated with a reduction in human development indicators, and it may actually improve some – for instance, life expectancy, literacy and subjective well-being.

Looking at contemporary and recent history in the USA, Galston (2010) argues that strong programmatic parties can be damaging for a polity if this leads to ideological polarisation that reduces the potential for compromise between political actors. This can lead to deadlock over legislation or rapid alterations in government policies, both of which are destabilising for society and the economy. More clientelist appeals may therefore be necessary to defuse social tensions and provide continuity of policies in certain circumstances. Moreover, as Kitschelt and others have argued, the ‘programmatic’ versus ‘clientelistic’ party categories are rarely as mutually exclusive as such labelling might suggest. Parties are likely to combine targeted clientelistic appeals with universal provision pledges and vice versa (Kitschelt 2012).

These different research findings once again point to the fact that the relationship between party form, motivation, inclusion and development remains far from simple or linear; and context, the maturity of the political system, and the nature of political competition all matter. This speaks to the kinds of incentives that electoral competition can engender. The necessity of winning elections for political survival, or what Carothers has characterised as ‘relentless electoralism’ (2006), affects the kinds of development projects elected state officials choose to implement (Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011). Across much of the developing world, and especially in fragile settings, the constant struggle for power and access to state resources means that political parties are preoccupied with winning power and elections, while their concern for the public good is at best secondary. Election cycles and concerns with the immediate visibility of state action, and not the long-term viability of projects, are likely to shape investments in organisational competencies and infrastructural power (vom Hau 2012).
In addition, public financing of political parties across the developing world still remains rare – and with low levels of trust in and performance of parties, public opinion is often not in favour of its introduction. This makes the sustainability of parties quite challenging in the long run. In addition, it may in fact help to strengthen the relationship between economic and political elites even further, as only they can afford to maintain parties and are therefore dominant in the party system.

All of these different factors are likely to impact the developmental or more personalistic approach of political parties and the role they can play in shaping political settlements that are more or less inclusive.

What does this mean for donor approaches to ‘inclusion’?

As different observers have noted (Jones et al. 2012; Castillejo 2014), in donor policy there tends to be a normative bias towards process-based inclusion in efforts to (re)shape the political settlement. Channels and mechanisms have included, for example, supporting representatives of excluded groups to participate in peace negotiations and increase their presence and influence in the political system (for instance, through electoral quotas); supporting constitution drafting; elections; other forms of political participation and representation; and/or supporting broader public consultation mechanisms.

Much of the focus of this kind of support has been on formal rather than informal institutions. From a practical perspective, it is easy to understand why donors choose to focus on the procedural aspects of inclusion and promote, for example, formal mechanisms for participation like peace negotiation processes. This is an area where they have at least some leverage – even if at times there may be limited alignment between what donors and domestic actors understand by inclusion and how/why it matters. From a normative perspective this also holds tremendous power, and it is difficult to quarrel with the notion that open and inclusive political orders are over the long term more stable, resilient, and legitimate (Rocha Menocal 2012 and 2013b).

Yet while such processes might be inclusive not just of parties to the actual conflict, but also of a broader set of stakeholders (for instance, women), the question remains: how might inclusion actually result in more meaningful and substantial transformation of the underlying political settlement and rules of the game? Donors tend to assume too easily that an inclusive process to reshape a political settlement will somehow lead to an inclusive outcome. But such an assumption is deeply problematic and cannot be taken for granted. Laws, regulation and formal institutions on their own may not be sufficient to foster and sustain changes in favour of excluded or marginalised sectors of society, as they may not be thoroughly implemented, so it is also essential to look at how informal institutions work (Andrews 2014).

As has been discussed, while the theoretical case might be persuasive, empirical evidence on whether inclusive peace processes/agreements can make a political settlement more inclusive remains mixed (see also Evans 2012). This remains the case not only for peace processes but also for other mechanisms to promote greater participation in the political system. The discussion on women’s empowerment and inclusion earlier in this section helps to highlight this. The political settlement in Somalia/Somaliland in Box 6 captures very similar challenges related to process- versus outcome-based inclusion.

Box 6: Somaliland’s route to peace

When Somalia’s government collapsed in 1991, violence engulfed much of the country for over two decades. But the leaders of Somaliland – a self-proclaimed republic in Somalia’s north-west – managed, in fits and starts, to negotiate an end to large-scale violence within six years. Drawing on existing institutions and establishing new ones, they created a hybrid political order consisting of locally appropriate (though imperfect) norms and rules of political engagement. The Government of Somaliland’s unrecognised status made it largely ineligible for official international assistance. This meant that Somalilanders were not pressured to accept ‘template’ political institutions from outside and could – at their own pace – negotiate locally devised, and locally legitimate, institutional arrangements. The process involved a series of lengthy peace conferences. It was consultative, inclusive, and time-consuming. Negotiations were supported by networks of trust among (well-educated) elites, mostly forged at secondary school.

The lack of international involvement in Somaliland also motivated strong – though collusive – cooperation between politicians and business elites to secure the funding to disarm militias. In return for loans, President Egal gave a small circle of business leaders generous tax exemptions and opportunities for extraordinary profits through collusive currency trading schemes. This was widely accepted within Somaliland as legitimate, largely because of a powerful idea that continues to permeate society – peace above all else. In Somaliland’s political settlement, protection from violence is exchanged for popular acquiescence to elite capture of the economy. And while there has been significant inclusion in terms of process, outcomes have been considerably less so.

Source: Phillips 2013, summarised in Laws and Leftwich 2014
The contrasting experiences from conflict to peace and from authoritarianism to democracy in Chile and Guatemala are also illustrative.

The pact that ended authoritarian rule in Chile was top-down, heavily controlled by the military, and highly restricted both in terms of the actors involved and the substantive issues it addressed. The military preserved important privileges and areas of autonomy for itself, including immunity from any kind of prosecution for human rights or other crimes, and the designation of General Pinochet as a Senator for life. From a process inclusion perspective, then, the pacted transition process in Chile seemed to offer little promise for transforming the underlying political settlement (Rocha Menocal 2015).

In sharp contrast, the peace process that ended the armed conflict in Guatemala, which was heavily supported by the international community, was exemplary in terms of its participatory and comprehensive nature. The negotiations included a wide variety of stakeholders – not only the rebels who had in fact lost the military battle, but also indigenous groups, women’s organisations and religious leaders (as well as other, less progressive groups such as landed elites). The ensuing Peace Accords are extraordinary in terms of their ambition to redefine the basis of the Guatemalan state and of the social contract binding state and society.

Yet, more than two decades on, of the two countries it is in Chile that a more inclusive political settlement seems to be developing. In Guatemala, underlying power relations have remained broadly intact, and at least until very recently, the political settlement has been underpinned by the agreement (tacit or explicit) to preserve the privileges of the elites (Rocha Menocal 2015). This understanding seems to have been shaken for the very first time as a result of ongoing investigations by the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity (CICIG), which was established to dismantle criminal networks with ties to politicians and the security forces. Accusations of grand corruption at the highest levels of government triggered weeks of unprecedented mass protests that eventually forced President Otto Pérez Molina to step down. Pérez Molina, who has since been arrested, is a former special forces soldier and feared ex-leader of a military intelligence unit accused of numerous abuses of power. His downfall is a sign that those who were once thought of as untouchable may no longer be so. However, it also remains far from clear whether a more inclusive Guatemala will emerge from this crisis.

---

7 For more on the current crisis in Guatemala, see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/09/guatemala-president-otto-perez-molina-cicig-corruption-investigation
Evidence gaps: governance transitions and processes of institutional change

So where does all this leave us? The available literature suggests that, in the short term, more inclusive political settlements at the elite level are crucial to avoid the recurrence of violent conflict and to establish the foundations for more peaceful political orders over time. Available evidence also suggests that, over the long term, states and societies that are underpinned by more open and inclusive institutions are also more resilient and stable, with stability grounded on legitimacy rather than coercion. They are also more effective at promoting sustained and broadly shared prosperity (North et al. 2009; North et al. 2013; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Khan 2012). However, there is a big gap between these two different findings, and this leads to what may be the most fundamental question of all. It is clear that more inclusive political settlements and political processes are essential ingredients to building more peaceful and resilient states and societies. However, this does not say anything about how the boundaries of a political settlement that may have a narrower focus on elite inclusion, at least in the short term, can be expanded to address wider state-society relations and create a more broadly inclusive political order — in terms of both process and outcomes.

This is a fundamental question which, as Evans (2012) points out, requires greater scrutiny. This paper has sought to argue that broadly inclusive political settlements do matter and are the right ambition over the long term. However, how different countries get there is a lot less clear. The path is likely to be complex and far from linear, and all good things may not necessarily align as part of that transformation.

The analysis above points to a variety of potential research questions that have less than straightforward answers:

- How can countries rearticulate the nature of their political settlement(s) so as to break away from patterns of fragility and enhance their resilience and effectiveness over time?
- What are the key drivers and dynamic processes at play in and out of fragility; how do underlying political settlements shape or define the boundaries of the kinds of reform and transformation that might be possible?
- To what degree can various forms of inclusion compensate for other ongoing weaknesses within the state and in the linkages between state and society?
- Are there any tensions, dilemmas and/or trade-offs between process-based inclusion (for instance, broad-based citizen participation and inclusion in decision-making processes) and outcome-based inclusion (for instance, effectiveness in decision-making processes; promotion of growth, and what kind of growth)?
- What persuades elites to pursue more or less inclusive settlements, either in terms of process, or in terms of outcomes, or both? What might be the right balance, if indeed there is one?
- How can bottom-up pressures for change affect or shape political settlements?

In other words, how do formal and informal institutions and underlying political settlements change over time to enable states and societies that are in fact more inclusive to emerge? This question is foundational. It is not possible to give this question proper justice as part of this paper, but some of the key challenges it embodies are addressed in greater detail below.

Multiple processes of change that may not be mutually reinforcing

Sustainable pathways out of fragility toward greater state resilience, effectiveness and inclusion entail complex processes of change. At their core, these changes involve some kind of rearticulation of the rules of the game about the use and distribution of power, and about the nature of the linkages between state and society. In other words, they involve the transformation of the political settlement(s) undergirding a political system (see also Putzel and Di John 2012; Pritchett and Werker 2012; vom Hau 2012). Both politics and history matter. They determine, for instance, the balance of power within different groups inside and outside the state in a given country (North et al. 2009; North et al. 2013; Kahn 2012). This may be mediated by historical legacies of state formation and patterns of state-society relations; the state’s particular insertion into the global system; linkages between domestic and international actors and drivers; and the international political economy (Pritchett and Werker 2012 and others). These kinds of factors play a decisive role in the kinds of transformations that are possible.

This means that governance transitions and the transformation of political settlements are inherently political in nature and they are not likely to be free of conflict. There is nothing unusual about intense social confrontation during the transformation of institutions...
and the complex (and long-term) processes of social and political mediation that this may entail. But it also helps to explain why change and reform in fragile settings has proven so challenging and why efforts to foster political settlements that undergird more inclusive states and societies have so often fallen considerably short (World Bank 2011). Movements toward increasing state capacity and authority, and demands for greater openness and accountability in the political system can lead to instability as power geometries realign. A key issue for states in transition is whether political structures can move the parameters of tolerance and inclusion in such a way as to channel demand-making through peaceful mechanisms.

The transformation of political settlements includes several (long-term) processes of change in the underlying rules of the game, both formal and informal. Similar long-term processes are needed to change the nature of state-society relations to overcome different combinations of weak state capacity, authority and/or legitimacy that characterise fragility as explained above. These dimensions are likely to be iterative and interactive, and they can entail one or more of the following kinds of transition (see Fox 2008; Levy and Fukuyama 2010; Mamdani 1996; North et al. 2009; Putzel and Di John 2012; Pritchett et al. 2010; Rothstein 2011; World Bank 2011, among others):

- from war and/or violent conflict towards peace and the establishment of the monopoly of the state over the use of violence (essential especially for state authority);
- from political orders that are closed and exclusionary towards systems that are more open, representative, and inclusive (essential especially for state legitimacy);
- from clientelism and a narrow concern for particularistic interests to substantive citizenship and a greater concern for the public good (essential especially for state capacity and legitimacy);
- from patronage power to institutions towards greater impersonality of the political system and the rule of law (essential for state authority, capacity, and legitimacy);
- from a stagnating or narrowly-based economy, or an economy geared towards violence, towards investment, growth and jobs (essential especially for state capacity).

Positive transformations along these dimensions are in turn essential in building the legitimacy and credibility of the state (Levy and Fukuyama 2010) and in fostering the emergence of more inclusive political settlements.

States and societies are likely to undergo one or more transition(s) simultaneously, in different arenas (for instance, political competition, the public sector; the market) and levels (national, subnational, or both) and at different paces and scales, depending on the kinds of struggles, contestation and bargaining that play out among different groups to redefine the rules of the game and the nature of the underlying political settlement (or in turn, preserve the status quo). Some of these processes of change may reinforce each other. For instance, efforts to foster the establishment of the rule of law can encourage greater economic investment and also help build state capacity to perform key functions, like administering justice, as well as state legitimacy, because nobody is meant to be above the law.

Crucially, however, governance transitions and changes to underlying political settlements are not linear, one-directional or always positive: the dynamism of social orders does not necessarily imply progress in a neat, straightforward manner, with an obvious pattern and a particular end point in mind (North et al. 2009, Hughes et al. 2014). While change may occur simultaneously in all the dimensions outlined above, it often does not. The political, economic, and social development of most states and societies moves backwards and forwards in uneven processes of evolution across sectors, and with differential impact on different groups and parts of the national territory. They may transition back into violence and conflict after a period of relative stability. An example is Kenya and the electoral violence that convulsed it in 2007, reflecting the contested and conflictual nature of existing institutional arrangements and rules of the game (Branch and Cheeseman 2009).

Processes to reshape political settlements and underlying rules of the game are internally driven processes, but they do not unfold in an international vacuum. External dynamics/influences/incentives and stresses can impact different dimensions of transition processes in both positive and more negative ways (for instance, impact of illegal trafficking and money laundering; organised crime and tax havens) (DFID 2010; World Bank 2011; Elgin-Cossart et al. 2012; Jones et al. 2012; Phillips 2015, among others).

In short, the transformation of political settlements along the dimensions noted above may not always reinforce one another – and they may in fact generate tensions, dilemmas, and potential trade-offs (Call 2011; Paris and Sisk 2008; Rocha Menocal 2011).

Contemporary Rwanda, for instance, is an example of a state that has made remarkable progress in establishing its authority and capacity, especially in terms of generating economic growth, providing basic services, and establishing a monopoly over the use of violence. It has made considerably less progress in making the political system more open, representative, and inclusive. Countries like Malawi, Timor-Leste and Haiti also offer a reminder that transitions can yield periods of greater instability and conflict, and they provide illustrations of the kinds of dilemmas that might be involved (for instance, tensions between what it may take to build state legitimacy versus state capacity; tensions between what is needed to establish state authority versus legitimacy) (Cammack 2011; Call 2011).

**Moments of transition**

What promotes governance transitions out of fragility and assists transformations of the underlying political settlement that prove more sustainable and resistant to backsliding and recurrent violence? The most likely factor is the evolution or transformation of political, economic, and social organisations and institutions so that state and society are better able to cope with internal and external drivers of fragility. This includes being able to manage competing demands and (potential) conflict peacefully and without threatening the viability of the state (World Bank 2011). This is not about establishing perfect institutions but about developing good
greenhouse gas emissions. It is often the case that relatively little is known about how processes of (progressive) change can actually occur and what the tipping points might be (for instance, the Arab Spring) – and there is always the danger of exaggerating the potential for change that a particular window of opportunity may provide (again, the Arab Spring). It is therefore essential to sharpen our understanding of how and why policies are implemented that can lead from violence and fragility to progressive transformation in the underlying rules of the game along multiple dimensions during crucial – if brief – moments of transition. The role of political leadership, both within and outside the state, is likely to be instrumental here.

**Factors that have helped foster governance transitions**

Over the past few years there has been a growing emphasis in the governance and growth/development literature on the need to disaggregate the concept of governance. This would help actors to prioritise what improvements are most crucial at different stages of change/transformation, and in which contexts, to make the promotion of development possible and encourage the eventual emergence of more inclusive states and societies. There is a need to work harder at identifying what it is about governance that matters when, where and why potentially developmental coalitions emerge. We also need to know how and why policies are implemented that can lead from violence and fragility to progressive transformation in the underlying rules of the game along multiple dimensions during crucial – if brief – moments of transition. The role of political leadership, both within but also outside the state, is likely to be instrumental here.

- The need for security and stability is the absolute foundation for any kind of further transformation to take place.
- Rule of law, first among elites and then across the population as a whole, has been a hallmark of all successful transitions, from limited to more open and affluent political orders.
- Basic state capacity has also proven elemental to make other transformations possible (for instance, democracy).
- In countries where such basic state capacity exists, processes to deconcentrate power and create more open and inclusive political systems have borne fruit (for instance, some parts of Latin America).
- There may be cases when bottom-up pressures for change can do much to catalyse governance transitions (for instance, South Africa, Ukraine in the early 2000s, Egypt) – but such changes/transformations will rarely prove sustainable or sufficient on their own, and they will need other facilitating factors.
- A capable state that can foster growth even at low levels of economic development.
- Elite commitment and political leadership.
• Political vision based on a shared sense of a national project/sense of national purpose.
• Political parties that can mobilise around such a project and foster collective action (for instance, Brazil).
• Strategic coalition building with well-placed actors and allies.

Critical here is the balance between choice and constraint. How much scope do policymakers and other actors have to reshape political settlements and promote change along different governance dimensions? How much are the choices before them historically conditioned and path dependent, especially in light of how power structures and relations have evolved over time?

The analysis provided in this paper is intended to invite further dialogue on how more inclusive political settlements might emerge, and how the international community might support such transformations in the underlying rules of the game more effectively and substantively. This will involve recognising that the variety of transition processes involved in reshaping the nature of political settlements may not be mutually reinforcing. There may be multiple paths to development, institutional performance, and, ultimately, inclusion. The relationships among these dimensions of change in political settlements – and the pace of changes within transitions counted as broadly successful – cannot be assumed. Their complex linkages and dynamics remain one of the most important questions to be examined empirically, by research and policy lesson-learning.
References


