HOW DO LEADERS COLLECTIVELY INFLUENCE INSTITUTIONS?

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DLP investigates the crucial role that leaders, networks and coalitions play in achieving development outcomes.

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PREFACE

Over the past 10 years, The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) has explored the vital role of leadership in making change happen. Our key findings are summarised in ‘Inside the Black Box of Political Will: Ten Years of findings from the Developmental Leadership Program’. In it, we argue leadership relies on three interconnected processes:

• First, on motivated and strategic individuals with the incentives, values, interests and opportunity to push for change.

• Second, on these motivated individuals overcoming barriers to cooperation and forming coalitions with power, legitimacy and influence.

• Third, coalitions effectively contest the ideas underpinning the status-quo and legitimise an alternative set that can promote change.

Together, these findings form a working theory of change on developmental leadership, and a set of testable assumptions about how leaders emerge, how they work collectively to create change, and how this process can be supported.

The next phase of research will examine these assumptions. It will focus on four research questions that emerged out of the synthesis of DLP’s earlier work.

As part of the process of planning the next phase, DLP has produced a series of Foundational Papers to provide a conceptual foundation and guide our empirical approach to addressing each of the questions above. DLP’s Foundational Papers aim to interrogate both the theoretical grounding and wider evidentiary basis for DLP’s assumptions about how change happens. They start from what we think we already know, but aim to challenge our thinking and ground future research in interdisciplinary theory and cutting-edge debates.

Each paper aims to situate DLP’s key findings in the wider state of knowledge on this topic, review key themes from the best existing research on our questions of interest, and suggest key theories and bodies of literature that can be harnessed to address them. Together, the papers will form an intellectual road map for our continuing work on developmental leadership, helping us to build a coherent intellectual agenda around our core interests.

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DLP’S RESEARCH QUESTIONS

R01: How is leadership understood in different contexts?

R02: Where do leaders come from?

R03: How do leaders collectively influence institutions?

R04: How can developmental leadership be supported?
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper focuses on the collective process through which leaders work together to gain the power and legitimacy to push through reform.

Insights from this paper are useful for unpacking how leaders and coalitions deal with context and deploy strategies for strengthening their collective power and legitimacy, at each of the following stages of the reform process:

Forming collectives and maintaining cohesion:
Overcoming the collective action problem—the lack of trust and costs associated with collective action—is a key challenge.

Various external and internal conditions influence why coalitions are formed, and the cohesion between members. Once the coalition is formed, a key challenge is to develop cooperation among members. The strategies that work to foster cooperation fall broadly under three categories:

• Strategies that create interdependence through resource exchange among the coalition members;

• Strategies that build consensus among members such as horizontal decision-making structures; and

• Strategies that foster communication between the group members and minimise the insider–outsider dynamic.

Gaining power and legitimacy:
Whether reform coalitions can bring about positive change is influenced by their sources of collective power and how they build legitimacy. Coalitions draw on various sources of power; these fall mainly under one of three categories:

• Material: Ownership of key resource or wealth allows the group to influence elites;

• Organisational: The group can disrupt the status quo or balance of power between elites, which may involve demonstration of numerical and/or collective strength; or the group includes critical actors with capacity that can exert influence;

• Ideational: The group has discursive power and legitimacy to shape ideas.

Securing institutional change:
Influencing institutional change requires coalitions to use both formal strategies such as lobbying, litigation and campaigning; and informal strategies such as soft advocacy and backdoor engagements. In order to deal with sticky norms and informal institutions that are resistant to change, coalitions use the following types of strategies:

• Creation of alternative institutional practices: Changing norms requires the creation of alternatives that slowly displace these norms.

• Institutional activism: This form of activism involves multiple ways of engaging, mainly ensuring the power-brokers and influencers inside the institution targeted for reform are a part of the coalition.

• Leveraging allies within institutional spaces and using social capital: Coalition leaders use social capital and informal networks to access key actors and information, recruit allies and gain traction for their agenda.

• Taking advantage of critical junctures to push for institutional change: Being able to identify windows of opportunity and taking advantage of the changed situation is key to making change happen.

While these broad strategies are useful for understanding how reform coalitions attempt to bring about institutional change, literature on informal institutions has largely explored why reforms fail and how these have adversely affected possibilities of change for marginal groups (including women).
Apart from using personal networks, accessing key allies within the state and using a plethora of bargaining strategies, creating narratives is a key part of influencing the politics of reform. Using discursive strategies, policy coalitions attempt to deploy counter-narratives. In order to do this, coalitions must engage with three levels of ideas:

- Policy ideas that provide potential solutions to predefined social problems;
- Problem definitions that provide ways of framing and understanding particular social issues and possible policy solutions;
- Overarching paradigmatic ideas that provide a coherent set of assumptions about ‘the rules of the game’ or how institutions function.

In engaging with the different levels of ideas, coalition leaders need to consider whether they have 1) identified the opportunities within the industry they are targeting; 2) framed the issue in a compelling way and have a coherent ask; 3) developed a feasible strategy that addresses concerns about costs by firms and governments; and 4) identified which supporting institutions need to be built. While the burgeoning field of discursive institutionalism has started to explore the role played by ideas in change processes, this work is largely theoretical. Case studies on social movements have investigated the role of social media, but there are significant gaps in our understanding of how social media influences mobilisation by collectives. Both areas may benefit from further analysis.

The discussion above on how leaders form collectives, gain power and build legitimacy and secure institutional change draws attention to the fact that the role coalition leaders play in influencing institutions is highly dependent on the stage in the reform process. Who the leaders are at a particular time and the wider contextual factors influence the ability of the reform coalition to push for change.
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

How do leaders collectively influence institutions? This question lies at the heart of understanding how actors influence positive change. Social scientists have attempted to answer it from different perspectives. Broadly, these either emphasise the role of actors (both the individual leader and collective bodies) and how they act and what strategies they use, or focus more on how structures and institutions (i.e. rules of the game) define contextual boundaries and create specific opportunities and incentives for actors to behave in specific ways. These two perspectives reveal important aspects of how and why actors engage in collective processes of change. However, while mobilising, securing and sustaining positive change is not a linear process, these perspectives do not fully capture the changing nature of leadership, the dynamic nature of the relationships between different key actors and how different group-level and larger contextual factors interact at different stages of the reform process.

Developing a fuller picture of how collective change occurs in real life then requires considering both factors and conditions that influence actions within the group/coalitions and actions that are directed towards influencing external context. For example, how do intra-group dynamics influence strategies for building group cohesion and solidarity? Similarly, how do changes in state–civil society relations influence the possibilities for reform and the strategies coalitions use to push for change?

The objective of this paper is to unpack all three stages of collective processes of change by investigating the following questions:

- Collective formation: What factors and conditions influence cooperation between actors to form collectives and for cross-sectional alliances for institutional change? How do the identity and inclusivity of collectives and coalitions influence this process?
- Legitimation of claims: What are the sources of power for developmental coalitions? How do coalitions build legitimacy for their claims? And how does power and legitimacy influence coalitions’ ability to act?
- Securing institutional change: What strategies do developmental coalitions use to push for reform and create counter-narratives? Do these strategies change over time, or the lifecycle of the reform?

What connects these disparate bodies of work is their focus on reform coalitions; collective identity and representation of group interests; and the role played by ideas and framing in legitimation of claims.

1 The focus of this paper is on collective bodies and not individual leaders, although where relevant it discusses the role of champions or insiders. While the paper presents cases of collective action/social movement, it largely explores the role of policy/reform coalitions and cross-sectional alliances when engaging with these cases.
To address these questions, this paper reviews the following bodies of literature:

- The collective action and social movements literature, which explores how groups address ‘collective action problems’, create cohesion, frame demands, take advantage of contextual shifts and gain legitimacy;

- The political settlements literature, which examines how changes in the balance of power distributed between different political and social groups influence the strategies various groups use to collectively promote their interests, and when and why political elites may be amenable to the demands of social groups (women and disadvantaged groups);

- The literature on politics of recognition, feminist institutionalism and the gendered nature of reform processes, to explore how gender influences coalition-building and outcomes of collective negotiation processes; and

- The literature on shrinking civic space, which investigates how civil society actors work to legitimise demands within constrained contexts.

What connects these disparate bodies of work is their focus on reform coalitions; collective identity and representation of group interests; the role played by ideas and framing in legitimization of claims; and how intra and inter-group relations influence policy outcomes—all of which are issues that are critical to understanding how leaders collectively influence institutional change. The empirical cases used in the paper are drawn from across the world. Most are cases of collective struggles for better service delivery, redistribution of resources or inclusion in decision-making processes.

The paper is structured as follows. Section two unpacks the different stages of collective processes of change. This section has five subsections: definitions of collectives and collective action (2.1); collective formation (2.2); sources of power (2.3) and legitimacy (2.4) of the collectives; and the strategies used to promote institutional change (2.5). Section 3 identifies research gaps and new areas that may be explored further.
PART TWO: UNDERSTANDING PROCESSES OF COLLECTIVE CHANGE

2.1. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY COLLECTIVES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION?

There is no single form of collective or mode of collective organising and action. The bodies of literature reviewed for this paper on social movements, collective action, coalitions, citizens’ action and the politics of reform (Olson, 1965; Tarrow, 1998; Gaventa & Goetz, 2001; McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015; DLP, 2018a) cover many different types of groups/collectives and modes of collective organising.

Nevertheless, the literature makes a clear distinction between social movements and collective action and coalitions in the following manner:

• Coalitions may be composed of a diverse set of social, economic or political groups, associations or networks, where actors attempt to align their interests or preferences for promoting or defending specific agenda or goal. They can be formed organically or be engineered.

• Collective action for reform can be undertaken by a single or several coalitions. In the case of the latter, these coalitions may or may not work together. While reform coalitions led by social movements or civil society organisations (CSOs) may attempt to change the status quo, coalitions may also be formed to protect dominant interests, particularly those formed by political elites to maintain the status quo and their interests.

• Social movements are interactive processes of collective action.

The defining characteristics of collectives often discussed in the literature include the following: how members collaborate with each other (i.e. looser/informal forms or more formal structure); the purpose of the collective or the kind of change the group is seeking (i.e. value-based groups asking for broader societal change or specific group interest-driven); and the levels these groups operate at (i.e. village level cooperatives to national and international alliances). Based on this, it is possible to develop a simple typology, or heuristic device, for examining different forms of collective action. This is presented in Table 1. One axis refers to the modes of cooperation between members of a collective; the other refers to the purpose or the kind of change demanded by it.

In terms of modes of cooperation, collectives can be divided into two categories: looser/informal and formal. Collectives in both categories function based on rules. However, differences exist in the way leadership is exercised (which may be more flat or hierarchical) and the way rules are expressed (written or implicit). Informal or looser form of collectives may have a non-hierarchical structure and rely on informal norms and practices when coordinating their actions. Formal groups typically have written rules that spell out the relationship between the members and the mode for cooperation and collective organising. The space for negotiation between members may be greater in looser collectives compared with formal collectives. However, written rules may provide certainty for the members of formal collectives about internal decision-making processes, courses of action and how group members would engage with non-members in seeking collaboration.

The purpose of the collective also divides the groups into different categories. Collectives may come into being to strive for broader societal and value change (i.e. gender equality; democracy) or could be more interest-driven (i.e. securing the specific interests of group members). Although groups can be divided into these categories, to argue that one type is more effective than the other in attaining its goals or that both types resort to using dramatically different strategies (based on their purpose) would be a gross generalisation. Nevertheless, there is a link between the kind of change the collective demands (purpose) and the mode of collective action the group has adopted or the actors it engages. For example, coalitions aiming for legislative change would be more likely to involve technocratic actors, from formal institutions (Aguilar-Støen, 2018). Feminist movement literature (Htun and Weldon, 2010; 2018) also shows that the policy issue under consideration determines who can facilitate or block change, and the kinds of actors likely to become a part of a coalition.

2 Htun and Weldon (2010) use a typology to categorise gender equity policies. One axis refers to whether the policy challenges religious or cultural doctrine and the other to whether the policy is class- or status-based.
### TABLE 1: TYPOLOGY OF COLLECTIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODES OF COOPERATION</th>
<th>TYPE OF CHANGE WANTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broader societal change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal/looser</td>
<td>e.g. Coalition for pro-democracy movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>e.g. Anti-domestic violence reform coalitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.2. COLLECTIVE FORMATION AND MAINTAINING GROUP COHESION

For leaders to collectively influence change, the first step is to form collectives (and then to gather a coalition of actors). How do leaders form collectives and maintain group cohesion? Once they have formed a collective, how do they then cooperate with other groups to form and maintain a coalition? Answering these questions means exploring 1) what conditions facilitate formation of coalitions for reform/change; and 2) what strategies leaders or coalitions use to ensure collaboration between different groups. This will allow us to understand how leaders enable groups to overcome the lack of trust and costs associated with collective action—that is, the collective action problem.

#### 2.2.1. THE ‘COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM’: HOW DO LEADERS ADDRESS ISSUES INTERNAL TO THE GROUP/COALITION?

Collectives often face difficulties when it comes to acting together in a concerted manner. Olson’s classic (1965) study details the difficulties groups face 1) in aligning the interests of individual members; and 2) in that the heterogeneous or homogenous composition of the groups may influence the possibility of collective action (Heyer et al., 2002). Members of a group with shared goals may be unwilling to cooperate given the costs (free-rider problems) and risks (lack of trust) involved. These barriers to cooperation, generally referred to as the ‘collective action problem’, may lead to groups being unable to form a coalition to secure collective benefits (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Peiffer, 2015). For marginal groups, these barriers to collective action—cost and lack of trust—may be higher, and this represents a critical area of concern, as it influences their ability to secure changes in public policy. How, then, do leaders address the collective action problem and form coalitions?

One of the key issues of concern for leaders in forming collectives lies in persuading members to act together in demanding pro-development reforms. The broader literature on collective action and social movements offers insights into the strategies and approaches the leadership takes to build reform coalitions. Forming collectives is a political process that involves trust-building, negotiations and bargaining (DLP, 2018a). Specific contextual factors influence this process by creating opportunities or constraints to leaders/coalitions acting (discussed later in Section 2.5). The paper makes the following general claims about what leaders do to form and maintain cohesion among group members that helps overcome collective action problems.

Leaders can form and maintain group cohesion by 1) balancing the diverse interests of the group members; 2) framing the purpose of the coalition and demands in a manner that ensures room for manoeuvre; 3) engaging continuously in practices throughout the lifecycle of reform that build solidarity among group members and limit counter-movements; and 4) using social capital, especially informal networks, to access powerful actors, so the collective can act. Not all of these strategies will be necessary in specific examples of collective formation, and there may be trade-offs involved in deploying them.
HOW DO LEADERS BALANCE THE DIVERSE INTERESTS OF GROUP MEMBERS?

Leaders need to balance between the diverse interests of the group members to form and maintain a collective/coalition. The leader’s aim is to create functioning alliances between groups. In order to ensure group cohesion and functionality, the leader may decide to accommodate a wide range of divergent interests within the group, or not to accommodate certain group interests. The choice of the leader is influenced by the costs and benefits associated with accommodating a wide range of interests. So, when are leaders likely to accommodate a wide range of divergent interests? Leaders may encompass a wider range of divergent interests and ideas, especially where the claims of these divergent groups add value to the specific change the collective demands. For example, Borgias’ (2018) study of Chilean water governance found the leadership had struggled to balance the collective needs of groups of indigenous people with the more individualist claims of small businesses involved in the coalition. The leadership of the coalition continued to encompass both sets of ideas, accepting an uneasy alliance, as both parties had useful claims against the transnational corporation responsible for water provision.

However, this strategy to accommodate a wide range of divergent interests may not work if there are ideological tensions within the group that create difficulties for members in accepting pragmatic approaches. Research on cases of pro-abortion reform coalitions in Brazil and Uruguay illustrate these points. These coalitions encountered ideological tensions between the different members of the coalition: politicised feminist groups, the more technocratic elements and conservative women’s health advocates (Ruibal, 2015; Pousadela, 2016). The leaders of these coalitions chose to prioritise building a more unified and pragmatic coalition over attempting to include every possible interest group, which meant not all groups that were initially part of the collective remained.

Some feminist groups left the coalition because of what they saw as unacceptable de-politicisation. Some of the more conservative groups also left, as they were unable to accept a more decisive move towards legalising abortion (Ruibal, 2015; Pousadela, 2016).

FRAMING COLLECTIVES’ DEMANDS TO SIGNAL A UNIFIED PURPOSE

As stated earlier, managing the framing of the coalition’s purpose and demands is also vital for leaders to ensure group cohesion. The term ‘framing strategies’ refers to the way an issue is interpreted and represented, and how this can be (re)shaped in order to gain support and agreement, and to facilitate action for particular forms of change (Benford & Snow, 2000). Group cohesion depends on framing the collective’s aims clearly and in a manner that signals a unified purpose, while maintaining some measure of ambiguity to ensure diverse groups can find space within a broad consensus (Giordano et al., 2017). Moreover, the leadership plays an important role in choosing the right degree of politicisation in a given context, which is crucial in maintaining the involvement of disparate groups (della Porta, 2018).

ENGAGING THROUGHOUT THE LIFECYCLE OF REFORM TO MAINTAIN GROUP COHESION

Apart from how leaders frame the purpose of the reform coalition or balance the interests of divergent groups, continuous engagement of the leadership is critical in building solidarity and maintaining cohesion. Mitlin’s (2014) study on urban poor coalitions in India and South Africa found that continuous work was needed to ensure cooperation between groups throughout the lifecycle of reform. This is to facilitate information-sharing, mediate disagreements and problems of collective action, provide peer monitoring and oversight and manage attempts by counter-movements to use factionalism to temper the coalition’s aims.

PROVIDING ACCESS TO SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INFORMAL NETWORKS TO ENSURE GROUP RELEVANCE

For minority and marginalised groups, lack of social capital is a common barrier to collective action. The leadership of these groups plays a critical role in overcoming this problem by informally networking with powerful elites, thereby strengthening the relevance of the group to political elites and policy-makers (Bisung et al., 2015; Gibbs et al., 2015; the role of networks is discussed in Section 2.3. Research from social psychology has also found that pro-social leadership, defined as ‘other-regarding’ as opposed to ‘self-regarding’, is a successful means to overcome collective action problems (Harrell & Simpson, 2015). This is especially relevant for collectives composed of diverse groups where minority interests remain a key concern.

3 Acting to promote the welfare of others based on empathy and alignment of values with action.
The section previous provided insights into what leaders do to form collectives and maintain group cohesion, but they do not act in a vacuum. The following sections focus on how political and social conditions influence group formation and co-operation among coalition members, and the strategies used by coalitions to collaborate with other group/coalition member in order to act in a concerted manner.

2.2.2. WHAT CONDITIONS ENABLE FORMATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN GROUPS/COALITION MEMBERS?

Once collectives or coalitions are formed, they need to be maintained—and for this the members need to collaborate with each other. Whether coalitions are composed of members with divergent or aligned interests, social and political conditions influence how groups come together and collaborate. These conditions can be external to the collective or internal to the group (DLP, 2018a).

EXTERNAL FACTORS/CONDITIONS INFLUENCING FORMATION OF COALITION AND COOPERATION

External conditions usually involve changes in ‘windows of opportunity’ (Tarrow, 1998) created by significant shifts in context: new openings arising from changes in political or social structures or shifts in balance of power between key actors. Shifts in contexts, particularly social and political structures, influence how groups decide to come together and collaborate (Tarrow, 1998; McAdam et al., 2001; Guigni 2009). There are four main dimensions to shifts in political opportunity that signal to social and political actors how to use their resources to mobilise and demand institutional change: 1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system (space for contestation); 2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity (inter-elite relations); 3) the presence or absence of elite allies (networks); and 4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (closing space). Moreover, transitions and post-conflict reconstruction may offer marginal groups a window of opportunity to introduce new narratives and push for progressive reform (Waylen, 2007; Nazneen & Mahmud, 2012).

Apart from changes in space for contestations and in the balance of power among actors, groups may be galvanised to act as a result of temporal conditions. For example, groups may act motivated by a single event (Fletcher et al., 2016). The urgency from a sudden change can be an effective driver of cooperation. For example, the horrific abuses suffered by Maria de Penha galvanized Brazilian feminist groups and their allies to push for domestic violence law reform and monitoring of the implementation of the law (de Aquino, 2013). For coalitions based on a single issue with a time-bound purpose, shifts in external conditions can prompt cooperation. For example, in the case discussed above on water governance in Chile, the need to act quickly to create counter-claims against a transnational corporation led to an alliance between the indigenous population and small businesses (Borgias, 2018).

| TABLE 2: EXTERNAL CONDITIONS THAT INFLUENCE GROUP FORMATION AND INTRA-COALITION COOPERATION |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| CATEGORY                        | TYPE OF CHANGE                        | POSSIBLE IMPACT ON REFORM COALITION                  |
| Social/ political               | Openness in space for contestation | Increases possibility of coming together as a coalition and act |
|                                 | Change in balance of power among elites | If elites that gain power are in favour of change agenda, then it increases the possibility of groups coming together as coalition and for action |
|                                 | Access to elite network               | Increases possibility of groups coming together and for action |
|                                 | State’s capacity to repress increases | Decreases the possibility of coalitions forming to contest state power and for action |
| Temporal                        | Major incidents/sudden change/transitional contexts | Galvanises groups to come together and act |
How do Leaders Collectively Influence Institutions
While changes in external conditions may spur groups to act collectively, factors that are specific to the coalition may contribute to cross-sectional coalitions being formed or lead to cooperation between groups with divergent interests or groups that have intersectional goals.

In coalitions representing the interests of minority or marginalised populations, the presence of members of these groups within the different organisations that form the coalition plays a significant role in fostering cooperation between these members. Deere’s (2017) study of land reforms in Bolivia and Brazil reveals that the successful coalitions combined not only an organisation specifically to represent rural women but also rural women as active members of other key groups, thus promoting meaningful cooperation.

Other studies found that creating a sense of solidarity among people who had experienced discrimination or oppression fostered cooperation between different marginalised groups, even if the form and nature of their experiences varied. Pousadela’s (2016) study on abortion rights in Uruguay found solidarity to be a critical factor where the coalition’s aims were intersectional. In fact, highlighting the disproportionate impact of unsafe, illegal abortion on poor and indigenous women encouraged the involvement of groups campaigning for greater class equality, such as unions, to join pro-abortion coalitions in Latin America.

However, the creation of tight bonds of solidarity and inclusion within a broader coalition may not always mitigate the difficulties facing extremely marginalised groups in forming collectives and being able to take part effectively in cross-sectional coalitions. Research on the identity of group members, particularly of the most marginalised groups, reveals the scale of the challenges posed by intersectional identities in forming effective coalitions. For example, indigenous women in Colombia faced difficulties arising from their intersecting identities as they tried to mobilise and form a coalition (Salamanca et al., 2017; Close, 2018). These women needed to defend their collective indigenous identity and cultural heritage, which can often be at odds with women asserting themselves against harmful gendered norms (Close, 2018; Salamanca et al., 2017).

**TABLE 3: INTERNAL CONDITIONS INFLUENCING COALITION FORMATION AND COOPERATION AMONG MEMBERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNAL FACTOR/CONDITION</th>
<th>HOW DOES IT AFFECT INTERSECTIONAL GOALS</th>
<th>IMPACT ON COOPERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Composition of the coalition</td>
<td>Presence of members from minority/marginalised groups across the different groups in cross-sectional coalition</td>
<td>Builds trust and cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of solidarity</td>
<td>Fosters understanding of how specific group interests are linked along intersectional lines</td>
<td>Helps create cross sectional alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increases capacity of the very marginalised groups through coalitional work</td>
<td>Enables marginal groups to collaborate effectively</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Baniya et al.’s (2017) work on sexual minorities in Nepal highlights that, while creating tight bonds of solidarity within the group and inclusion within a broader coalition for reform achieved some limited progress, this did not mitigate the considerable degree of danger attached to advocating for the rights of sexual minorities by these groups. This study also found that some marginalised groups faced a higher level of difficulty in taking part in coalition-building activities and securing cooperation from other members of the coalition. For example, Dalit (untouchable caste) women groups, facing a form of exclusion more specific to the national and regional context, found fewer transnational advocates who were willing to support their demands. Moreover, Madhesi\(^4\) women were excluded to such a degree that most avenues of effective collective action used by the mainstream women’s coalition were closed to them.

2.2.3. WHAT IS THE REPERTOIRE OF STRATEGIES THAT COALITIONS USE TO DEVELOP COOPERATION AMONG MEMBERS?

Apart from the external and internal conditions that influence group formation and cooperation between group members, different bodies of literature also examine a repertoire of strategies that groups deploy to foster cooperation among coalition actors. Whether these coalitions are composed of groups with divergent interests or whether their interests are aligned, coalitions encounter difficulties in fostering cooperation. Coalitions use a wide range of actions, which can be divided into three broad categories.

### Table 4: Strategies for Developing Cooperation Between Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Strategy</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Examples/Cases Used in the Paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Resource exchange                        | Incentive to rely on the other and cooperate                          | • Divergent groups in post-conflict Croatia sharing resources and information to build their reform coalition (Doerfel & Taylor, 2018)  
  • Coalitions of the urban poor sharing information and expertise in India and South Africa (Mitlin, 2014) |
| Horizontal approach to decision-making  | Avoid hierarchy and build consensus                                   | • Chilean student movements seeking educational equality and radical democratisation (Guzman-Concha, 2012)  
  • Urban collectives fighting for access to housing in Santiago, Chile (Escoffier, 2018) |
| Spaces for communication between groups  | Minimise insider/outside dynamic                                     | • Occupy movements across a range of countries (Kavada 2015)  
  • Diverse groups within women’s movement during the peace process in Colombia (Salamanca et al., 2017) |

\(^4\) A marginalised group from the southern Terai region of Nepal.

The first type of strategy involves an exchange of resources between the key groups or actors in the alliance that creates an impetus to collaborate. For example, Doerfel and Taylor’s (2018) study found resource exchange between key groups to be a significant factor in building cooperation in a coalition advocating developmental reform in post-conflict Croatia.

A second type of strategy involves taking a horizontal approach to decision-making within the coalition, to avoid traditional hierarchies and promote consensus between actors (Guzman-Concha, 2012; Escoffier, 2018).

The third type of strategy aims to ensure inclusivity and minimise the insider/outsider dynamic of collective action by facilitating communication between different groups. In fact, digital platforms and social media are important tools that can minimise this dynamic (Kavada, 2015) and foster cooperation among individuals and groups (Brimacombe et al., 2018).

While these strategies aim to foster cooperation among members through promoting inclusivity and consensus, they may not always be essential for success. There are often limits to inclusivity. In practice, there are examples of reform coalitions that have not emphasised consensus-building as a strategy and have yet managed to be successful in promoting institutional reform. In addition, horizontal decision-making involves trade-offs, and levels of acceptance for this kind of process may be limited.
2.2.4. HOW DOES CONTEXT SHAPE THE SPACE FOR CONTESTATION AND INFLUENCE STRATEGIES USED BY POLICY/REFORM COALITIONS?

The previous section explored how external conditions (including shifts in political and social structures) influenced group formation and cooperation among coalition members. This section focuses on how changes in the balance of power between different groups (or political settlements) shape the space within which coalitions operate and influence the strategies coalitions use to advocate for reforms/change. It also explores how conflict and fragility, particularly the rise of armed non-state actors, may influence the space for contestation. In addition, it highlights an alarming global trend of increased state control over civic space and how this may shape the possibilities for collective action by policy coalitions.

TYPE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT INFLUENCING SPACE FOR CONTESTATION

How power is distributed between different groups is a key factor that determines the space for contestation. Researchers have considered this question extensively, particularly in terms of the nature of the political settlement in which the coalition operates (Rocha Menocal, 2017; Philips & Hunt, 2017). Scholars working with the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre have used the political settlement lens to explore the kinds of strategies policy coalitions use to secure pro-poor reform.

How power is concentrated within the hands of a narrow elite group or not (i.e., elite dominance) determines the openness of the space available to policy coalitions for advocating reform. In dominant party contexts, where power is centralised among a narrow elite in-group, if the pro-poor reform demanded is perceived as a threat to elite control, the space for contestation will be limited. In contrast, in competitive clientelist contexts, the space for contestation is relatively open. However, in these contexts, the existence of multiple competing groups means that, unless the reform demanded aligns with the interests of the political elite, policy coalitions must mobilise longer and harder to promote their interests (Sen & Hickey, forthcoming).

NATURE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT INFLUENCING STRATEGIES USED BY POLICY COALITIONS

The nature of the political settlement also influences the type of strategy policy coalitions adopt for advocating pro-poor reforms. In dominant party settlements with a strong developmental focus, like Rwanda, coalition activities and strategies have been bound by the vision of the ruling party (Burnet & Kanakuze, 2018). In weaker dominant party settlements, such as Uganda, mass mobilisation has been required to demonstrate public support for reforms advancing gender equity (Ahikire & Mwiine, 2015). In a fractured, unstable political settlement such as Bolivia, mass mobilisation was also necessary to establish a regional coalition as a powerful enough actor to demand recognition (Humphreys-Bebbington & Grisi-Holmes, 2017).

The presence of a powerful counter-movement can deter reforms in both types of settlements (dominant or competitive). Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) research on efforts to ratify the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women in Tonga, which saw an eventual defeat, illustrates the power of counter-movements.

The broader political settlements and social movement literature also looks at cases where coalitions were able to use strategies to diffuse opposition from hostile counter-movements. Research on reproductive rights movements reveals that, in many cases, pro-abortion reform coalitions have altered their framing strategies to emphasise the public health angle in response to counter-movements that have made moral arguments (Tamang, 2011; Ruibal, 2015). However, changes in framing strategies may not be enough to counter the presence of large oppositional groups, particularly when reforms advocated for challenge entrenched power relations (i.e., on doctrinal issues such as family law reform; Htun and Weldon, 2018).

There are often limits to inclusivity. In practice, there are examples of reform coalitions that have not emphasised consensus-building as a strategy and have yet managed to be successful in promoting institutional reform.
FRAGILE CONTEXTS: SHIFTS IN THE BALANCE OF POWER AND HOW IT INFLUENCES SPACE FOR CONTESTATION AND STRATEGIES

In fragile contexts, the presence of non-state armed actors and the degree to which they exercise control can be a significant impediment to pro-poor reforms (Molenaar, 2017). Fragmentation of authority means that citizens accommodate different powerful actors for accessing services and negotiating insecurity, and state–citizen relations will be tenuous in these contexts. State accountability for service delivery is weak, and the curtailment of civic and political freedom limits the space for collective action (Tripp, 2010; O’Rourke, 2015).

In these contexts, there are multiple barriers to women’s social and political action. These include restrictions on women’s mobility and access to community and political spaces owing to increased risk of sexual and gender-based violence; deepening of exclusionary social norms within the community and political institutions; and a pushback against gender equality concerns within state agencies as more immediate security and other needs take priority (Domingo et al. 2015; A4EA, 2019). Although the gender and conflict literature focuses on case studies of women mobilising for peace at the local and national level (Tripp, 2010; O’Rourke, 2015), there is little systematic understanding of the pathways through which women’s social and political action strengthens women’s position as a political constituency and accountability outcomes for gender equality.

SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE AND ITS IMPACT ON COLLECTIVE ACTION

There is a burgeoning body of literature that explores the impact of closing civic space on social movements and a coalition’s ability to mobilise and demand state accountability (Howell & Lind, 2010; Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; Hayman et al., 2014; Dupuy et al., 2016). Changing or shifting civic space, with increased repression of some forms of coalitions (human, political or civic rights), has meant there is limited space for more established forms of collective action that challenge the state. Moreover, shrinking space for contestation, particularly for those advocating developmental reform, has been accompanied by an increase in coalitions representing nationalist, nativist or far-right ideologies. This means that, for extreme marginalised groups, unruly forms of collective action may be the only option to draw attention to their issues—rather than directly engaging with the state (Shankland et al., 2011; Hossein et al., 2018).

Hossain et al.’s (2018) review also shows that a policy coalition’s purpose or identity and the political settlement within which it operates are key determinants of how closing or changing civic space affects it. From this perspective, issues of contestation over civic space should be understood as a struggle for normative and political control (Poppe & Wolfe, 2017; Hossain et al., 2018). Therefore, coalitions are more likely to be targeted if 1) their structure, organisation or source of funding is a potential challenge to the state; 2) their purpose is perceived as overtly politicised; or 3) their assertion of identity counteracts normative structures that support the state (Hayman et al., 2015; Hossain et al., 2018).

STRATEGIES COALITIONS USE TO COUNTER THE EFFECTS OF SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE

Some research analyses strategies coalitions employ to overcome these barriers. Coalitions have been shown to rely more on cooperation to mitigate restrictions affecting them (Hossain et al., 2018). An ACT Alliance review (2014) of civil society responses to closing space found increasing reliance on sharing information between groups within a coalition, and between coalitions. This tendency is also expressed in greater reliance on existing networks, and development of new connections, particularly between groups with different interests but similar experiences of exclusion and repression (ibid.; Brysk, 2017).

Coalitions achieving some measure of success despite closing civic space have also leaned more heavily on horizontal linkages and forms of mobilisation, as in the Right to Food movements in India and Brazil (Brysk, 2017). Bornstein and Sharma’s (2016) study on India, where changes to the law deny groups and coalitions with any links to transnational organisations the right to operate freely, shows that, in some cases, organisations have tried to mitigate the risk by excluding certain members of the group who have transnational links. At other times, organisations have contested this rule and redirected their collective action towards re-establishing their right to exist as a CSO.
2.3. SOURCES OF COLLECTIVE POWER

2.3.1. WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF POWER FOR POLICY/REFORM COALITIONS?

Coalitions derive power from three sources (Nazneen et al., 2019; Hickey & Sen, forthcoming):

- Material power: Groups may own a significant share of national wealth or resources of the country, which allows them to exert influence.
- Organisational power: Groups possess numerical strength and can disrupt the power-sharing arrangements or balance of power among the elites.
- Ideations or discursive power: Actors may have the legitimacy to influence framing or ideas around a specific issue.

A policy/reform coalition influences elites to address their concerns by wielding one of these sources of power. Material power allows a policy coalition to use the threat of losing a share of a country’s wealth or the political support of a powerful economic segment to influence elite action. Organisational power allows coalitions to demonstrate wide-scale support for their agenda, and in electoral politics this is an advantage for the policy coalition. Discursive powers enable the policy coalition to shape demands for change and convince elites that, by addressing these concerns, they may gain legitimacy.

In most cases, a policy coalition engages with elites to enlist their support. However, the most marginalised groups lack any of these forms of power. With little elite support, their source of power lies in sheer numbers and large-scale collective mobilisation (Mitlin, 2014). However, there is a careful line to tread between mobilising enough to wield effective power and avoiding being perceived as a threat, particularly for informal population groups normatively considered dangerous or criminal (Mitlin, 2014; King & Hickey, 2015).

2.3.2. HOW DO POLICY COALITIONS GAIN POWER AND INFLUENCE?

Three main factors play an important role in how policy coalitions gain power (DLP, 2018a): 1) how they deploy political strategy; 2) whether they cultivate effective networks; and 3) their ability to navigate existing power structures. This subsection illustrates through examples how each of these factors influences the ability of the policy coalition to push for reform.

DEPLOYING POLITICAL STRATEGY TO EXERCISE POWER

Political strategies include both formal and informal strategies (Rousseau & Kenneth-Watson, 2018; Spark & Lee, 2018).

Formal strategies such as lobbying and use of legal challenges such as public interest litigation have been widely researched. The use of legal challenges to effect pro-poor reforms is particularly effective in contexts where legislation already exists to protect the interests of marginalised groups. Coalitions representing such marginalised groups have been able to draw attention to the discrepancies between legislation and practice, exerting power through legal means (Belda-Miquel et al., 2016; Bornstein & Sharma, 2016).

Informal strategies, such as soft advocacy and backstage politics, can be effective in contexts where the sought-after reform challenges existing, hidden power structures. Fletcher et al.’s (2016) study of women’s coalitions in the Pacific seeking to challenge embedded gender norms reveals how these groups use backstage politics and advocacy to counter hidden power. Piscopo’s (2017) study of women’s informal networks in Mexico—which acted as cohesive group to create pressure on electoral bodies to implement gender quota laws—similarly reveals the importance of informal institutions and backdoor negotiations.
USING FORMAL AND INFORMAL NETWORKS, MAKING ALLIES AND GAINING INFLUENCE

Both formal and informal networks allow policy coalitions to exercise power and influence. Formal networks operating at different levels (local, regional, national, transnational) and the power that can be derived from this (Pettinicchio, 2017; Bisht, 2018), are important for policy coalitions. The Political Settlement Research Program’s (PSRP’s) work, as well as other research on social movements, shows that the effective use of links between diverse networks of actors is crucial for developmental change. Baniya et al. (2017) and Salamanca et al.’s (2017) research on Nepal revealed that the presence of a vibrant, long-established women’s movement with cross-sectional links was particularly effective as a means of creating opportunities for both formal and informal advocacy. However, maintaining the cohesion of a broad cross-sectional coalition requires space for meaningful intra-coalition dialogue (Salamanca et al., 2017).

Formal networks of national and transnational actors can be effective where they generate genuine exchange and dialogue, rather than transplanting narratives at the local level. In fact, established CSOs in Nepal were able to leverage their technical expertise, exploit their links to transnational advocacy networks and act as mediators and brokers for grassroots movements (Baniya et al., 2017). O’Rourke’s (2015) research into transitional justice found that effective, locally appropriate links between human rights organisations and women’s movements were used to facilitate the sharing of information, expertise and strategy.

Social capital and informal networks can also be used by policy coalitions to gain access to closed policy spaces and elite actors (Rocha Menocal, 2017; Nazneen et al., 2019). Feminist institutionalists and those studying women’s movements (Eyben and Turquet, 2013; Waylen, 2017) have researched how women’s movements and gender activists use informal networks, personal relations, soft advocacy and backdoor politics. King and Hickey (2015) found that formal CSOs that elites deemed to possess social capital were able to act as brokers between grassroots social movements and key institutional actors. This process of informal engagement created new channels of communication and spaces for coalitions to exert influence (ibid.).

Informal networking and personal relations can allow policy coalitions to gain influential allies. Research on grassroots women’s organisations and movements reveals that influential elite feminists within key institutions may act as key allies to promote the interests of marginalised groups (O’Rourke, 2015). The presence of influential elite women with sufficient power and social capital to act
as representatives and advocates of marginal groups enhances the reach of these coalitions. For example, ESID research on women’s movements reveals how a policy coalition on anti-domestic violence and women parliamentarians used informal networks to gain the support of strategic male allies to do the institutional work required to introduce reform (Ahikire & Mwiine, 2015; Allah-Mensah & Osei-Afful, 2017; Nazneen & Masud, 2017; Burnet & Kanakuze, 2018).

The literature also shows that this work of cultivating allies is a crucial means to negotiate institutions, particularly in informalised, clientelist settlements where institutions function more through personal relationships than through formal processes (Ahikire & Mwiine, 2015; Allah-Mensah & Osei-Afful, 2017; Nazneen & Masud, 2017). For example, women’s movements in Uganda utilised links with the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development as a key ally in influencing other elite institutions with the power to facilitate or block reform (Ahikire & Mwiine, 2015).

ENGAGING ELITES AND INCREASING POLITICAL CLOUT: RISKS AND TRADE-OFFS

The previous section on formal and informal networks revealed the need to engage the interests of elite actors to secure developmental reform. Policy coalitions that have effected developmental change have cultivated political clout and influence by drawing on elite allies to act as intermediaries, advocates and brokers (Nazneen & Mahmud, 2012; Mitlin, 2014; Chopra, 2015).

While the literature widely acknowledges that the reform coalition’s ability to engage elite actors using social capital or informal networking is a key source of power, there are debates over the associated risks and trade-offs. In situations where the coalition gains momentum through advocating to a group of elites, involving the same elites within the coalition can be a fine line to walk. While coalitions benefit from having close links with the elite, they also run the risk of being co-opted by the same elites for instrumental purposes (Benski et al., 2013; Nogueira, 2018).

Garnering attention from the elite may not always be advantageous. There is some support for Rocha Menocal (2017) finding that a coalition’s potential to wield electoral clout, or the perception that it might, especially in contexts where elites fear the politicisation or radicalisation of poor populations, makes elites more likely to consider their demands (Benjamin, 2008). It is important to note, however, that in some contexts this can make coalitions a target of political actors, as in the case of a coalition in Guatemala demanding more equitable access to public services (Molenaar, 2017). Its emergence as a collective with influence over local populations appeared as a threat to both state and illegal cartels, and coalition members were targeted by armed groups (ibid.). In the same country, however, a coalition striving for more equitable forestry legislation in areas less affected by armed action could utilise its members’ electoral clout more successfully (Borgias, 2018).

Another source of debate is whether coalitions use or circumvent traditional power structures. Case studies from Nepal and Thailand reveal that the ability of coalitions to use traditional power structures to promote significant change played a critical role in creation of an inclusive agenda for development (Molden et al., 2016; Buranajaroenkij et al., 2018).

Formal networks of national and transnational actors can be effective where they generate genuine exchange and dialogue, rather than transplanting narratives at the local level.
2.4. SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY

2.4.1. WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY FOR COALITIONS?

Policy coalitions gain legitimacy from various sources. Generally, research has focused on the following: inclusion and exclusion of different actors; inter-sectionality within the coalition; legitimacy of local leaders; and how links with foreign donors affect the way the public perceives them (Mcloughlin, 2015; Denney & McLaren, 2016; Combaz & Mcloughlin, 2018; DLP, 2018a). Table 5 sums up these sources.

How the effectiveness and legitimacy of the coalition is affected by including or excluding key actors is extensively analysed in the social movement literature. If coalitions fail to include key actors who possess the ability to disrupt or shape an agenda, then the coalition, no matter how broad, becomes ineffective. In addition, the social movement and contentious politics literature also explores the legitimacy coalitions gain from the inclusion of ‘expert’ actors, whether legal, technocratic, academic or medical (McAdam, 2001; Molden et al., 2016; Pousadela, 2016; Aguilar-Steen, 2018). While inclusion of these actors is a means for coalitions to build legitimacy, in some cases these ‘experts’ have also been effective in framing the discourse around demands and ideas into more ‘acceptable’ or recognised norms (Nazneen & Sultan, 2014; Dickin et al., 2017).

LINKS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS AND NETWORKS: CONTEXT-SPECIFIC IMPACT

The social movement literature also analyses extensively how links to a political party may positively affect the legitimacy of a coalition, while other studies highlight that, in highly contentious contexts, coalitions have needed to remain strictly non-partisan to maintain their credibility (McAdam, 2001; della Porta, 2018).

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**TABLE 5: SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY</th>
<th>FACTORS</th>
<th>POSSIBLE IMPACT ON LEGITIMACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Key actors</td>
<td>• Increased ability to act and influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>• Increased credibility as coalition is seen as knowledgeable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affected groups as members of coalition</td>
<td>• Increase ability to represent claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position vis-à-vis national politics</td>
<td>Links with political party</td>
<td>• May increase influence among elites/ability to act in constrained civic spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-partisan stance</td>
<td>• May decrease credibility as seen as partisan in contentious context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links with transnational actors</td>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>• Increased ability to influence the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International/regional movements/CSOs</td>
<td>• May be seen as driving a foreign agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Framing of one’s demand</td>
<td>Public interest framing</td>
<td>• Increased validity of demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Links to pre-existing narratives</td>
<td>• Makes demands recognisable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Culturally appropriate forms of protest/action</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gains moral authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Public service provision</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gains moral authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly, the role of transnational networks and support, and their effect on the legitimacy of coalitions, is much debated (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The involvement of transnational or foreign actors within the coalition is highly context-specific, being a source of legitimacy in some settings and the opposite in others (Bornstein & Sharma, 2016; Baumgarten & Amelung, 2017). Links that national coalitions or movements have with transnational actors, norms and values can be useful in protecting the agency of coalitions, but at times may adversely affect it. Burnet and Kanakuze (2018) found the influence of transnational efforts to introduce gender mainstreaming had a legitimising influence on the demands of the Rwandan women’s movement, in a post-conflict country heavily reliant on aid flows and donor conditionality. Nazneen and Mahmud (2012), on the other hand, found that other southern women’s movements chose rather to emphasise the non-Western roots of their activism to bolster legitimacy in a context where opposition actors interpret transnational influences as ‘western’ interventions. Overall, it seems that coalitions must consider the trade-off between potential support from transnational networks and the risks to their legitimacy as a locally embedded movement (Nazneen et al., 2019).

STRATEGIES FOR FRAMING NARRATIVES

One of the key strategies policy coalitions use to boost their legitimacy relates to how they frame demands for change. Some studies have found that coalitions have been able to derive legitimacy from linking their own aims to a pre-existing narrative, especially those around the public interest. A DLP study on a Chilean coalition found that it had legitimated its demands for more equitable water governance by representing them as part of wider public concerns over government and corporate corruption (Borgias, 2018), while a study on the movement for legal abortion in Uruguay found that the coalition had linked its agenda to that of public dissatisfaction with women’s health care (Pousadela, 2016). Mitlin’s (2014) study of urban poor coalitions also explores how marginal groups may use public interest framing to their advantage to gain legitimacy. As a group with little legitimacy as political actors, urban poor coalitions in this study needed to show their demands for reform were in the public interest, first to their own community and then to a wider network of actors and institutions. As movements often representing informal urban settlements, many of these coalitions also used information gained through mapping and censuses to construct their neighbourhood as a formally recognised physical space, and therefore as a legitimate actor in the political sphere (Mitlin, 2014).

USE OF SPECIFIC FORMS OF MOBILISATION STRATEGIES AND PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION THAT HELP GAIN MORAL AUTHORITY

The legitimacy of coalitions also derives from deploying culturally acceptable forms of collective action and protest that bestow the moral authority to act (Guzman-Concha, 2012; Bornstein & Sharma, 2016). One of the key strategies the urban poor coalition employed was to gain moral authority by providing services to local communities, constructing itself as an effective public agency. This was a tool to demonstrate the coalition’s commitment to the public, as actors able to legitimately negotiate with formal institutions (Mitlin, 2014; King & Kasaija, 2018). Although the social movement literature and other bodies of work explore what factors enhance the legitimacy of a coalition, there is potential to combine the literature on state legitimacy with the coalitions literature to offer further insights into processes of legitimation, exploring McLoughlin’s (2015) ideas on dimensions of legitimacy in the context of collective action. The literature also touches on, but does not fully analyse, the differentiation of the need to appear legitimate within the coalition itself and to outside actors (Ruibal, 2015; Villamayor-Tomas & Garcia-Lopez, 2018). The drivers and mechanisms of legitimacy in each case are likely to be quite different, and systematic analysis of these could form an area for future research.

Coalitions must consider the trade-off between potential support from transnational networks and the risks to their legitimacy as a locally embedded movement.

Nazneen et al, 2019
2.4.2. HOW DOES PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY INFLUENCE A COALITION’S CAPACITY TO ACT?

While research on collective action and social movements (McAdam, 2001; Guigni, 2005; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015) discusses what strengthens the legitimacy of a coalition to act, most of the analysis of how legitimacy influences a coalition’s capacity to act are context- and case-specific. A systematic analysis of and generalisable conclusions are missing partly because establishing causation is difficult when showing the impact of legitimacy on capacity. Table 6 summarises how perceived legitimacy may influence coalitions’ capacity to act.

Rocha Menocal (2017) raises useful questions about considering to whom the coalition needs to appear legitimate, as a starting point to unpack the impact of legitimacy on a coalition’s capacity to act.

Answering this question systematically is key to understanding how legitimacy and the capacity for meaningful collective action may interact. The collective action cases reviewed for this paper offer specific examples where legitimacy, or the lack of it, has been a key factor in determining a coalition’s effectiveness. Aguilar-Støen (2018) found legitimacy to increase the bargaining power of a Chilean coalition in its negotiations with the state, while Belda-Miguel et al. (2016) found that improved legitimacy established a Brazilian coalition working for pro-poor housing reform as a valid party in negotiations with the real estate sector, a group previously powerfully opposed to the coalition’s aims. Research on women’s movements and marginalised groups had similar findings about the link between legitimacy and the capacity to represent demands.

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**TABLE 6: SOURCES OF PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY AND ITS EFFECT ON BARGAINING AND REPRESENTATION BY COALITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE OF PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY</th>
<th>WAYS IN WHICH THE LITERATURE ASSUMES PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY INCREASES CAPACITY TO BARGAIN AND/OR REPRESENT INTERESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viewed as ‘experts’/knowledge-producers</td>
<td>Influences discourse about solutions or framing demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewed as an affected party/legitimate grievance</td>
<td>Capacity to voice demands and represent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived as an actor with an established track record of providing services</td>
<td>Capacity to influence kinds of solution prescribed and also to be included as providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived to have links with international actors</td>
<td>Capacity to influence discourse and enter ‘invited’ policy space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewed as acting in public interest</td>
<td>Capacity to represent as coalition perceived as the moral authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewed as non-partisan</td>
<td>Increased credibility leading to increased capacity to frame and represent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewed as intersectional</td>
<td>Increased capacity to represent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

2.5.1. HOW DO COALITIONS DO THE INSTITUTIONAL WORK TO CHALLENGE INSTITUTIONS WHICH THEMSELVES CHALLENGE DEVELOPMENT?

Coalitions use different strategies to bring about institutional changes. The types deployed vary depending on the kind of change sought, at which level and in which context. Previous DLP research has concentrated on examining the role of people as agents in creating, sustaining and changing institutions, whether through the work of individual actors or groups of actors or through beliefs and norms held by influential groups within society (DLP, 2018a). From this perspective, the DLP literature offers key insights into strategies coalitions employ to enact institutional change through influencing agents.

The strategies discussed below largely explore the ‘agency’ aspect—that is, how do coalitions engage with institutions to bring about change? These broadly involve 1) creating an alternative set of institutional practices to deal with sticky norms; 2) institutional activism; 3) leveraging allies within institutional and using social capital; and 4) taking advantage of critical junctures to push for institutional change.

CREATING AN ALTERNATIVE SET OF INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES TO COUNTER STICKY NORMS

If the change sought aims to alter institutional norms or practices, then empirical cases show that establishing or enacting an alternative set of institutional practices can be an effective challenge to ‘sticky’ or resistant institutional norms (Steinfurt et al., 2017; Bretherton, 2018; Buranajaroenkij et al., 2018). For example, the Nepal case study on water governance revealed that the local coalition advocating for change was able to challenge institutional practices by promoting an alternate set of practices linked to traditional, community-managed solutions (Molden et al., 2016). However, research conducted by feminist institutionalists (Chappell & Waylen, 2013) revealed that creating an alternative set of practices to challenge sticky norms is not easy, given these are ‘hidden’ and difficult to challenge.

INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM

Another strategy used by coalitions for bringing about institutional change is to engage in ‘institutional activism’ (Pettinicchio, 2017). This means including actors, usually people with previous or current experience of working in the institution, within the coalition itself (Aguilar-Steen, 2018). These actors then can act as advocates for change.

Another strategy for institutional activism is for a small number of coalition members to work at gaining access to institutions as a first step and to act as connectors or brokers between the coalition and other groups. Research on improved political participation in Thailand found that a small group of women operating effectively within local politics was able to act both as a bridge to facilitate access for other women and as a powerful example of women’s potential to be effective political actors (Buranajaroenkij et al., 2018).

LEVERAGING ALLIES AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

Discussion on how coalitions gain power and influence reveal the importance of creating allies and use of social capital to influence elites. Both factors are also critical for bringing about institutional change; previous sections have discussed the importance of social capital and informal networks. In addition, studies reveal that securing pro-poor change may mean coalitions leveraging a second institution to influence the culture of the institution they wish to reform. In Uganda, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, a key ally of the women’s movement, was able to gain traction within the Ministry of Justice to facilitate the passing of domestic violence legislation (Ahikire & Mwiine, 2015).

TAKING OPPORTUNITIES OF CRITICAL JUNCTURES

The literature finally highlights the importance of mobilising during periods of transition, or at critical junctures, when institutions may be less fixed in their cultures (Pousadela, 2016; Doerfel & Taylor, 2017). Examples include coalitions in Brazil and Uruguay taking advantage of a time of democratisation to construct judicial institutions as spaces for social change, in this case liberalising abortion laws (Ruibal, 2015; Pousadela, 2016). Feminist scholars have long highlighted the importance of transitional contexts that create windows of opportunity for women to negotiate new social contracts (Molyneux, 1985; Randall & Waylen, 1998; Nazneen & Mahmud, 2012; O’Rourke, 2015).

While DLP (2018a) and other bodies of literature have explored the agential aspect of how policy coalitions use different strategies to bring about institutional change, the evidence presented here has been drawn largely from single case studies. There is a lack of systematic evidence on how these are strategies that aim to change institutional culture, then lead to these change institutions bringing about developmental change.
2.5.2. HOW DO COALITIONS USE NARRATIVES/FRAMING TO CHANGE IDEAS? HOW DO THEY ACTIVELY CONTEST/DELEGITIMISE EXISTING IDEAS AND LEGITIMISE NEW ONES?

Constructing change narratives and framing of demands are important ways through which ideas are transmitted and shaped and legitimised. The power of narratives in effecting developmental change is significant (DLP, 2018a). In fact, Philips and Hunt (2017) argue that a coherent system of meaning is much more significant than the empirical or factual accuracy of claims.

The social movement literature (Tilly, 1998; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015) and more recent literature on political settlements (Lavers & Hickey, 2016; Hickey & Sen, forthcoming) support this DLP conclusion that narratives used by coalitions, and the way they are framed, are of crucial importance in influencing reform processes.

LEITIMATION REQUIRES ENGAGING WITH DIFFERENT TYPES AND LEVELS OF IDEAS

In fact, the way ideas are discursively deployed plays a significant role in shaping the politics of reform during periods of institutional change or when institutions are in flux. Scholars working on discursive institutionalism argue that both the substantive content of ideas and the interaction processes through which ideas are shaped provide insights into the actual preferences, strategies and normative orientation of the actors engaged in institutional change processes (Schmidt, 2010).

There are three main types of ideas that coalitions have to engage with to legitimise their claims, convince policymakers and garner wider public support: 1) policy ideas that provide potential solutions to predefined social problems; 2) problem definitions that provide ways of framing and understanding particular social issues and possible policy solutions; and 3) overarching paradigms that provide a coherent set of assumptions about ‘the rules of the game’ or how institutions function (Schmidt, 2008).

TABLE 6: SOURCES OF PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY AND ITS EFFECT ON BARGAINING AND REPRESENTATION BY COALITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF IDEA</th>
<th>TYPE OF IDEA</th>
<th>IDEAS AROUND A SPECIFIC AGENDA FOR CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm/philosophy</td>
<td>Normative (what should be done)</td>
<td>What are the terms of the social contract with regard to the status and rights of the specific group for whom change is sought?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive (what is)</td>
<td>What kinds of ideas enable these normative philosophies to mesh with the problem definitions and policy ideas that would be used to justify claims? Are these largely instrumental or ideological in nature?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem definition/programmes</td>
<td>Normative (what should be done)</td>
<td>What are seen as the main social problems to be solved/goals to be achieved regarding gender equity (e.g. poverty reduction, inequality, economic development, social harmony)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive (what is)</td>
<td>How are these problems/goals identified? How is consensus on these policy discourses achieved? Who are the winners/losers? What mechanisms/programmatic responses are considered to be effective in addressing these key problems/goals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy ideas/solutions</td>
<td>Normative (what should be done)</td>
<td>What assumptions underpin different policy responses? If adopted, how are policies framed (e.g. group-specific interest or for broader social goals)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive (what is)</td>
<td>Is equity for the specific group seen as a credible solution to the specific problem? What sources of ideas and evidence are relevant here (e.g. policy design, policy evaluations, international ideas and experience)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Schmidt (2010) by Hickey & Nazneen (2019)
Furthermore, in relation to these three levels, policy coalitions have to engage with ideas that are cognitive, which elucidate ‘what is and what should be done’, and those that are normative, which indicate ‘what is good or bad about what is’. Table 7 highlights the different levels and types of ideas.

In terms of legitimising ideas, Table 7 shows how coalitions create framings that clearly link to these different levels of meaning creation; this varies depending on the context and the nature of the issue. The following provides some broad headings on how coalitions use framing strategies for legitimation.

DOWNPLAYING CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES TO MINIMISE CONTENTION

Coalitions use framing strategies that may be used to downplay contention. For example, Nazneen et al.’s (2019) research on domestic violence law-making found that anti-domestic violence policy coalitions framed the problem of domestic violence as a development concern (i.e. reduces capacity, cost to the state) to downplay contentions over gender power relations. In general, coalitions representing the interests of minority or marginalised groups do not use narratives or framing in a directly confrontational way to contest existing ideas (Bornstein & Sharma, 2016; Molden et al., 2016).

ALTERING NARRATIVES AND USING PRAGMATIC FRAMING

While some coalitions downplay controversial issues to minimise contention, others actively change their framing and use a pragmatic approach to bypass direct confrontation with norms supported by invisible power (DLP, 2018a). Examples from abortion reform in Latin America showed coalitions moving away from explicitly feminist or moral narratives about the need to liberalise abortion, relying instead on a pragmatic framing of the issue as a public health crisis and, in the Brazilian context, even avoiding the word abortion itself wherever possible (Ruibal, 2015). This framing allowed limited liberalisation of abortion laws, even in the presence of powerful counter-movements. The use of a deliberately opposing narrative more usually belongs to social movements and anti-establishment or grassroots-driven coalitions (Benski et al., 2013; Escoffier, 2018), or to contexts where marginalised groups feel there is little hope of altering the dominant discourse.

CREATE WIDER PUBLIC APPEAL BY LINKING DEMANDS TO PUBLIC INTEREST OR LARGER NATIONAL CAUSES

In most cases, coalitions seeking to make institutional change insert themselves into or co-opt elements of existing narratives as a means of framing their aims to create wider public appeal (Bornstein & Sharma, 2016; Molden et al., 2016). One of the cases reviewed for this paper illustrates how a Thai coalition seeking to increase women’s political participation drew on the hugely important cultural narrative of respect for the monarchy and patriotism, successfully reframing women’s involvement in politics as evidence of their patriotic commitment to their country (Buranajaroenkij et al., 2018). Research on domestic violence law reform also found that coalitions connected the domestic violence problem to the idea of nation-building (paradigmatic idea), as in Rwanda, where gender-based violence was established as one of the key problems that needed to be eradicated during the post-conflict transition (Nazneen et al., 2019).

2.5.3. HOW ARE DIFFERENT WAYS OF WORKING ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT POINTS IN THE LIFECYCLE OF REFORM?

Collective action strategies and how coalitions operate (ways of working) evolve during the lifecycle of reform. The ability of the coalition leaders to influence institutions is highly dependent on the stage in the reform process, and who the leaders are at that particular time. However, historical and comparative analysis of collective action cases and how strategies change over a period are few. There is space for future research to address this question in a systematic way. DLP research (2018a) and the wider social movement literature tend to be based largely on single case study work. Based on these, the following, general, observations can be made about movements. Movements’ framing strategies are fluid and change over time in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the coalition, with framing needs becoming more acute during the stage when policy is being formulated. However, analysing a broader range of cases in terms of their changing institutional work and shifting use of narratives and framing during the lifecycle of reform would contribute to the current literature.
PART THREE: GAPS IN THE LITERATURE AND NEW AREAS FOR RESEARCH

This paper has addressed the question: how do leaders collectively influence institutions? It has reviewed a diverse set of existing literature—from established bodies of work on social movements and collective action to newer bodies of work that explore intra-elite cooperation, political settlements and closing civic space. It draws on the rich body of work produced by DLP researchers in the past 10 years, in addition to focusing on three stages of the change process: 1) collective formation; 2) legitimation—how claims are made and justified; and 3) how institutional change happens.

The discussion above reveals that, in each of these areas, there are gaps in 1) our understanding of change processes and the role leaders/coalitions play; and 2) our knowledge of new areas emerging as a result of the rapidly changing political context and modes of organising. Based on the review of both empirical case studies and different bodies of literature, the following areas may be considered for the next phase of DLP. The areas identified below offer DLP a wide menu to choose from, depending on which bodies of literature and kinds of area it wants to focus on.

3.1. INTER-SECTIONALITY: ITS ROLE IN GROUP FORMATION AND LEGITIMATION

A key gap in the literature is a systematic and comparative analysis of what role inter-sectionality plays in influencing the ability of marginalised groups to act collectively, and when and how it can be a source for legitimacy. While there are empirical cases of caste-based movements, indigenous movements or minority women in social movements, these are single case studies. The literature also does not examine when intersectional identity may be advantageous for these groups in their negotiations with outside actors and the kinds of trade-offs and choices that the leaders of these groups make. Moreover, the discussion above has revealed that, for extremely marginal identity-based groups or the extreme poor, the ability to take advantage of the general repertoire of movement strategies is limited. Most studies explain why collective action fails or does not occur. It may be interesting to explore empirical cases where these groups have successfully mobilised and the conditions that have led to success. Moreover, a systematic analysis or conducting comparative case studies on how inter-sectionality influences group formation or legitimacy of coalitions will not only generate rigorous evidence but also create possibilities for developing an innovative methodology to study these aspects.
3.2. HOW CONTEXTS SHAPE POSSIBILITIES OF REFORM: SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE

There may be merit in linking up with the burgeoning body of work on shrinking civic space. Many countries of the world are currently witnessing a change in the space available for contestation, particularly a loss of space for certain political and civic rights issues, accompanied by the rise of far-right discourse, which has specific implication for marginal groups. CSOs are responding to these challenges in multiple ways. Development of conceptual framings and tools to analyse how political and social groups mobilise to bring about institutional change in contexts where space for contestation is rapidly shifting may have practical value. It may also be useful to explore whether the style of leadership is different in these contexts than from relatively open ones.

3.3. UNPACKING INFLUENCE OF CONTEXT: POLITICAL REGIMES, SUBNATIONAL LEVELS AND SECTORS

Conceptual work on how collectives operate under different political regimes may be deepened by borrowing from the frameworks developed by political settlements work that unpack the balance of power within a polity in more nuanced manner. Political settlements allow us to unpack underlying power configurations at the national level, but also can be applied to subnational levels and sector-specific areas. The use of these new framings may help in unpacking when, how and which forms of collective strategies work, and how contexts shape the capacity to act.

3.4. MODES OF ORGANISING AND FRAMING DEMANDS: ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

How social media influence the modes and ways of organising, and the framing of demands, is another key area of concern given the rapid growth of social media and its use by different groups to mobilise, in both developed and developing countries. Do social media foster ‘democratic’ principles within movement and groups or do these create further hierarchies? While the social movement and collective action literature discussed here have used different strategies, cases that have used social media are few. This may be a gap to address.

3.5. WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCE LEGITIMACY AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE REFORM CYCLE

While the social movement and collective action literature offers many examples of how legitimacy influences coalitions’ ability to represent and secure pro-poor reform, a systematic analysis of what factors influence perceptions of legitimacy is lacking. It may be useful to unpack the different pathways via which these range of factors influence legitimacy and at what stage of the reform cycle. Moreover, factors that influence internal legitimacy (to members) are different from factors that influence legitimacy of a group to the outsiders. It may also be interesting to unpack the drivers and mechanisms for building internal and external legitimacy, how leaders/coalitions make choices about building legitimacy and the trade-offs they consider in making these choices.

3.6. DEEPENING ENGAGEMENT WITH OTHER THEORETICAL BODIES: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, DISCursive INSTITUTIONALISM AND FEMINIST INSTITUTIONALISTS

There may be benefits to drawing on research from social psychology, particularly focusing on the potential of pro-social leadership to overcome collective action problems, especially those arising from identity-based exclusions. Most of the insights on pro-social leadership are drawn from theoretical work. A productive avenue for future research would therefore be to explore these concepts in applied settings, particularly in low-resource contexts.

Second, there is no doubt that ideas play an important role in legitimization of claims and motivating actors to form collectives and mobilise. Empirical work using frames developed by discursive institutionalists may provide new insights into how collectives link their demands through different levels and types of ideas, and the extent to which these framings play a role in ensuring success.

Lastly, feminist institutionalist literature is developing conceptual frames to unpack how informal institutions are gendered and how this influences gender-positive outcomes. While this body of work largely explores women in politics, there is potential to use these frames for exploring how reform processes are gendered and how policy coalitions operate in a gendered manner and use personal networks (which are also gendered) to promote change.
REFERENCES AND/OR ENDNOTES


How do leaders collectively influence institutions?


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