



DLP

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Leaders, Elites and Coalitions

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Research Paper **26**

Higher Education and Developmental Leadership: The Case of Ghana

Amir Jones, Charlotte Jones and Susy Ndaruhutse, CfBT

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The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) is an international research initiative that aims to increase understanding of the political processes that drive or constrain development. DLP's work focuses on the crucial role of home-grown leaderships and coalitions in forging legitimate institutions that promote developmental outcomes. DLP's independent program of research is supported by the Australian aid program.

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Acronyms

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
ARPB	Association of Recognized Professional Bodies
CDD	Center for Democratic Development
CiviSoc	Civil Society Coordinating Council
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSPIP	Civil Service Performance Improvement Program
CSRPF	Civil Service Reform Program
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
GBA	Ghana Bar Association
GER	Gross enrolment rate
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPAC	Inter-Party Advisory Committee
ISSER	Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
IUC	Inter-University Council
JCR	Junior Common Room
JFM	June Fourth Movement
KNRG	Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards
KNUST	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science
MBA	Masters in Business Administration
MFJ	Movement for Freedom and Justice
MOOCs	Massive Online Open Courses
NAB	National Accreditation Board
NADSU	Nadowli Student Union
NCD	National Commission for Democracy
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDM	New Democratic Movement
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
NUGS	National Union of Ghana Students
PAMSCAD	Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment
PMFJ	People's Movement for Freedom and Justice
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	People's National Party
PPE	Philosophy, Politics and Economics
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SMC	Supreme Military Council (previously the NRC)
SRC	Students' Representative Council
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UCC	University of Cape Coast
UCGC	University College of the Gold Coast

Glossary of key terms

Given the multidisciplinary nature of this research and that terms have different meanings in different disciplines, the DLP definitions of key terms used in this report are outlined here.

Institutions

Institutions should not be confused with organisations. They are best understood as 'the rules of the game', the laws, conventions, traditions and standard procedures, formal and informal, that shape, but do not determine, human behaviour.

Elite

We use the term here in an analytical sense to refer simply to those small groups of people, seldom more than 3% of any given population or unit of analysis, who hold formal or informal positions of authority and power. They take or influence key economic, political, social and administrative decisions. The term covers leaders in all fields: government, political parties, armies, or in the bureaucracy; in business or banking; in social organisations, the media, intelligentsia or in NGOs.

Developmental leadership

"Developmental leadership is the process of organising or mobilising people and resources in pursuit of particular ends or goals, in given institutional contexts of authority, legitimacy and power (often of a hybrid kind). Achieving these ends, and overcoming the collective action problems which commonly obstruct such achievement, normally requires the building of formal or informal coalitions of interests, elites and organisations, both vertical and horizontal." (Lyne de Ver, 2009: 9)

"Successful leadership – in an organisation, movement, society or even a religion – also involves building coalitions with other people and organisations so that together they can achieve objectives that they could not achieve on their own. And successful developmental leadership necessarily involves forging such coalitions within and across the public and private sectors, civil society and NGOs." (Leftwich and Wheeler, 2011: 5)

Developmental coalitions

A coalition is defined here as an association of groups and organisations working to resolve problems or achieve goals that no one member of the coalition could resolve or achieve alone. Many such collective action problems define the central challenge of development: how to achieve cooperation, trust and 'synergy' between different interests, groups and organisations, whether vertically or horizontally, for transformative developmental purposes.

Executive summary

This study highlights the important role that quality education, at both secondary and higher level, has played in the formation of developmental leadership in Ghana. Its findings include the way in which quality education (largely residential in Ghana) has promoted social integration and shared values, and can help form networks and coalitions that have a greater chance of initiating and sustaining reform.

Introduction

This paper reports on the third phase of a research programme that explores the links between higher education and developmental leadership and coalitions. This third phase looked specifically at how higher education has equipped developmental leaders and coalitions in Ghana with the necessary skills, values and networks for leadership and national reform.

Leaders involved in the following three key areas of reform in Ghana were identified:

- restoration of democracy (1987-2000);
- Economic Recovery Program and related public sector reforms (1983-1997);
- liberalisation of the media (1989-2003).

The educational background of a longlist of 117 leaders was analysed and semi-structured interviews with 27 key leaders conducted, covering the quality, content and culture of their education, as well as the key reforms that they had been involved in. They were asked about the relative importance of education in the development of their skills, ideology, attitude and networks, and were asked to compare this to the influence of pre-existing networks such as their political, religious and other social connections.

Where time permitted, a 'relationship survey' asked interviewees to assess the strength of their connections to other members on the 27-strong shortlist of key leaders and to describe the origin of these relationships. This gathered information about the relative importance of higher education for networking and coalition-building.

A model for developmental leadership

The answers of our interviewees identified a set of leadership qualities that cross political divides. We found evidence of a direct link between these qualities and the education of key leaders in the 1960s and 1970s.

Of course, not all interviewees mentioned all of these qualities, but all mentioned at least two, and the majority mentioned six or more. Moreover, grouping individuals in their reform coalitions, we find that both coalitions report possessing all of these qualities. These qualities are:

- **Core values** – moral purpose and commitment to serving Ghana; respect and tolerance; honesty, integrity and fairness. Our analysis shows that these values largely, but not exclusively, originated in secondary school and provided the initial motivation to pursue a developmental career; they are also central to the everyday activities of a developmental leader.
- **Key characteristics of successful reforming leaders** – critical thinking and analytical insight; collaboration and conflict resolution; consultation and teamwork; goal-orientation and a strong sense of responsibility; discipline, focus and determination; courage and agency. These are the essential characteristics or qualities demonstrated by leaders in Ghana who were successful in pursuing reform; some were developed at secondary school, some at university and others at work.
- **Technical skills** – these are the 'hard' skills, expertise and knowledge which leaders need if they are to drive change. They are largely acquired at university and further developed while being applied at work.

Figure 8.1: A model of developmental leadership qualities in Ghana




Table 8.2: Leadership qualities and links to education

Leadership quality	Link to education
Honesty, integrity and fairness	School culture and values; on-campus debate; legal studies
Respect and tolerance	School culture and values; boarding; diversity of student population; overseas study
Moral purpose and commitment to serving Ghana	School culture and values; exposure to poverty through student diversity; sense of privilege created and of debt to society; political debate on-campus; student activism; subject studied (law, politics, journalism, economics)
Courage and agency	Sense of being groomed for leadership; school culture; leadership opportunities; student activism; study of history; belief that role of intellectuals is to provide leadership for change
Discipline, focus and determination	School culture and values; extracurricular activities (e.g. Cadet Corps); subject (e.g. law)
Goal-orientated and strong sense of responsibility	Leadership opportunities; sense of being groomed for leadership
Consultation and teamwork	Extracurricular activities such as sports and debating clubs; boarding school interaction
Collaboration, collective action and conflict resolution	Diversity of student body; extracurricular activities; student activism course content (e.g. African studies course)
Critical thinking and analytical insight	Teaching quality and methodology; debating clubs and on-campus debate; broad curriculum; close interaction with lecturers; subject choice (e.g. law, economics, politics, philosophy)
Technical competency and knowledge	Teaching quality and methodology; on-campus debate; broad curriculum; close interaction with lecturers; extracurricular activities; subject choice (e.g. law, economics, politics, journalism)

Key findings

1. A quality education – at both secondary and higher level – has been an important factor in the formation of developmental leadership in Ghana

All but one of the interviewed leaders on our shortlist attended an elite Ghanaian or UK secondary boarding school or had an elite university education (defined as attending the University of Ghana at Legon or studying overseas); all but three had both. An analysis of the backgrounds of the 117 leaders on our longlist showed similar results: 96% had attended either an elite secondary school or higher education establishment and 74% had attended both.

Quality is important. Analysis of leaders' backgrounds and interview responses suggests that an elite education does more than just screen for existing elites. In Ghana, there was relatively meritocratic access to education, and its quality was the transformative factor in producing developmental leaders. Secondary education was important in the formation of core developmental skills and values. Higher education gave further opportunity to develop those skills and values, and also provided an opportunity to develop technical skills and explore political beliefs and activism.

2. During their education, the leaders gained developmental leadership qualities (including core values, key characteristics and technical skills)

The most common subjects studied (and the technical skills developed) among Ghana's developmental leaders were law, economics, politics and journalism. The foundation of their values was laid in secondary school and further embedded during university. Key characteristics such as critical thinking, teamwork and courage were developed in both secondary and higher education. Technical skills were largely developed during university and then applied in work.

Our model of developmental leadership qualities has strong parallels with the 'capabilities-based professionalism' model developed by Walker and McLean (2013) as their ideal for training professionals willing to work for the 'public good'. The key characteristics of developmental leadership found in Ghana largely overlap with Walker and McLean's eight professional capabilities: vision; affiliation; resilience; struggle; emotions; knowledge, imagination and skills; integrity; confidence.

3. Education has helped create shared values among the leaders, facilitate social integration and increase social mobility

High quality education in Ghana was based on the British model, but also had a strong moral purpose grounded in its Christian missionary roots and fostered social mobility. Our interviewees came from all kinds of family backgrounds and seemingly had only their educational experiences in common. Inclusive access to quality education was a key priority of Kwame Nkrumah's post-colonial government, and most of the leaders studied were directly affected by educational policies that made access to Ghana's elite more meritocratic.

The education of the era also provided a shared residential experience through which key values such as public service and national unity were intentionally formed, leading to greater integration of elites and consensual unification. This ultimately led to sufficient agreement on the 'rules of the game' to allow the emergence and development of democracy.

4. Higher education was critical to both the emergence of reform coalitions in Ghana and to their success in bringing about economic, political and media reforms.

Higher education influenced coalitions in two main ways. Firstly, many of the key reform coalitions in the 1980s and 1990s could trace their roots back to networks first formed on and around campus. Secondly, higher education played a central role in developing the skills and values of these coalitions which would both bring them together and support their success.

Many of the key reform coalitions in this study can trace their roots back to university-based networks and coalitions formed at Legon. Networks formed at and around Legon in the 1970s and early 1980s formed the blueprint for both Rawlings' Economic Recovery Program team and opposition coalitions such as the Movement for Freedom and Justice and the Alliance for Change. More indirectly, most reform coalitions had university alumni, academics and highly qualified professionals at their core.

It is also clear that certain kinds of human and social capital developed during higher education (such as skills, values, ideas, ways of working and, sometimes, the status of networks and alumni) helped bring the leaders who shared them

together in new coalitions. These qualities were also critical for the leaders' success in bringing about reform. Many of these qualities were developed at university through joint action within study groups, or in collective student action and political campaigning. During later coalition-building, these already established norms were integral to the 'culture' of coalitions and their success.

For example, Rawlings selected an Economic Recovery Program team whose members were highly qualified in law and economics, but he had also already seen at Legon their ability to debate these issues as a group, apply critical thinking and make evidence-based decisions. The pro-democracy movement had a shared sense of agency and a joint history of 'underground' collective action that had begun in groups at Legon such as the New Democratic Movement. Academic status was a key motivator for bringing respected academics such as Adu Boahen into the Movement for Freedom and Justice, providing some protection for the cause.

Conclusions

This research demonstrates the important role that both secondary and higher education in Ghana have played in the formation of developmental leaders and coalitions.

It adds to the evidence base on the importance of structure (the key reforms and the political and economic institutions that they created) and agency (the individuals that were central in making and sustaining those reforms).

The skills and values that these agents acquired during their education, coupled with the networks formed, particularly at university, have led to the emergence of coalitions able to instigate and sustain change in Ghana's political and economic structure.

The inclusive nature of Ghanaian secondary boarding schools and the University of Ghana both increased social mobility and helped to foster the integration of elites. We can therefore say that education, and in particular quality secondary and higher education, has played a key role in improving governance in Ghana.

Policy considerations

The Education for All agenda and the education Millennium Development Goals, intended to help reduce poverty, have diverted investment away from higher education over the last twenty years. Since the early 1990s, Ghana has been on a positive trajectory of change from poor governance to improving governance, and this can be partly attributed to the role of an educated group of leaders and developmental coalitions with the necessary skills, values and networks to effect sustained change.

We outline some policy considerations raised by the findings of this research below, but further research is needed in other countries in order to build more specific recommendations.

A wider view of education

Our research from Ghana suggests that education policy needs to incorporate not only important issues such as equity, human rights and poverty reduction, but also more strategic issues such as the development of good governance and developmental leadership.

Residential experience

In Ghana, both boarding schools at secondary level and the shared experience of halls at university helped to bring together students from diverse geographical, ethnic, political and socio-economic backgrounds. They also helped foster common values and mutual respect, building a more integrated elite. Although generally seen as costly and elitist, the evidence from Ghana is that some form of residential education with meritocratic access could work well in countries where trust, integration and shared values are lacking.

Humanities and social sciences versus STEM subjects

Law, economics, politics and journalism were the subjects studied at university by the majority of developmental leaders interviewed in Ghana. Science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) are vital to train the technicians required for development, but they tend not to create transformative leaders. This suggests that investment in STEM should not be at the expense of the humanities and social sciences.

A broad curriculum

Interviewees also stressed the importance of a broad education, both at secondary and higher levels, in developing their

intellect holistically and shaping their values and world-view. While Ashesi University in Ghana is bringing the liberal arts model to Africa, the general trend seems to be towards increased specialisation and segmentation.

School autonomy

Policy makers could consider where the current focus on metrics and accountability might lead. The developmental leadership qualities this research identifies are not easily measurable. Quality education establishments need some flexibility and autonomy to decide what is best for the development of their students.

Scholarships to create networks

At least nine of the developmental leaders we interviewed had studied overseas with the help of scholarships and international fellowships. Their experience offered something different than what was available domestically and can be said to have enhanced developmental leadership in Ghana. Although they gained wider experience, most were isolated from their Ghanaian peers and so missed out on the networking possible for those who studied only at home. Scholarship providers might consider whether scholars could be concentrated at particular overseas universities to maintain some of the advantages of domestic education.

Massive online open courses (MOOCs)

Our findings emphasise the importance of a high-contact, campus education (and all the positive network effects that this brings) in the formation of developmental leaders. However, we also see in Ghana that funding constraints mean that massification is diluting the quality of campus education. One point to consider then is not whether MOOCs will replace campus education, but whether they can be exploited to relieve pressure on publicly funded higher education establishments, thus allowing them to provide the quality, high-contact education they were in the 1960s and 1970s. Ashesi University is also demonstrating how higher education establishments can use MOOCs to increase their course offerings without substantially increasing their costs.

1.0

Introduction

This paper forms part of the third phase of a Developmental Leadership Program (DLP)¹ research programme funded by the Australian Agency for International Development. CfBT Education Trust has implemented all three phases of the work. The overall research programme explores the role of higher education in shaping leaders and leadership. This, the third phase, aimed to look at how higher education has equipped developmental leaders and coalitions² in Ghana with the necessary skills, values and networks for leadership and national reform. This chapter summarises the findings of the research undertaken during the two previous phases and sets the scene for this third phase of research, placing it in the context of wider literature.

1.1 Summary of findings of previous phases of research

Phase 1

The first phase of this research (Brannelly, Lewis and Ndaruhutse, 2011a) undertook global data analysis to map higher education gross enrolment rates (GERs) with a 20-year lag against each of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators to see whether or not there was a link between higher education and improved levels of governance as a proxy for the existence of developmental leadership³. The analysis identified a positive correlation both globally and in the majority of cases in regional sub-groups of countries, and while no definitive causation could be established, a review of the literature illustrated the multiple purposes of higher education and four potential ways in which it could support the emergence of developmental leadership through:

- the creation of a growing middle class that is better positioned to hold governments to account and to shape the institutions⁴ that foster good governance;
- meeting the needs of the labour market;
- a focus on skills as well as increasing access;
- financial support to developing countries wishing to expand their higher education opportunities to enable them to address the previous three purposes.

The first phase concluded that the nature of forming elites⁵ requires a twofold strategy with higher education having a potential role in both of these strategies: firstly, to create the very small elite who will be the strategic players at the top of society; and secondly, to create a wider elite who occupy key positions in the public, private and third sectors, and who constitute a growing middle class with the knowledge, skills and capacity to hold the smaller elite to account.

Phase 2

The second phase of this research sought to explore in greater detail the role that higher education might play in developing the behaviours, skills and values that are essential for developmental leadership, and whether or not it can provide opportunities

1 The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) is a research initiative committed to expanding the evidence base on the political role that leaders, elites and coalitions play in development, focusing on how they shape institutions and influence development outcomes. Further information can be found at www.dlprog.org

2 See glossary for the working definition of coalitions that this research adopts.

3 See glossary for the working definition of developmental leadership that this research adopts

4 See glossary for the working definition of institutions that this research adopts

5 See glossary for the working definition of elites that this research adopts

for developmental coalitions to form. It recognised that “there is a symbiotic relationship between higher education and the broader political, social and economic environment” (Brannelly, Lewis and Ndaruhutse, 2011b: 1) with each influencing the other over time.

The analysis went beyond examining the higher education sector as a whole to look at the processes and factors within higher education institutes that might contribute to the formation of developmental leaders, networks and coalitions. Specifically it drilled down in five areas:

- the subjects studied and the competencies developed;
- the approaches to teaching and learning;
- the governance of higher learning institutes;
- the development of values; and
- opportunities and mechanisms of coalition/network building within higher education institutes.

Key findings were:

- there is a positive correlation between levels of education, civic engagement and social participation;
- government policy and the needs of the economy can have significant influence on the types of skills developed within higher education;
- the ways in which higher education is taught influences the development and consolidation of skills;
- there is debate in the literature over whether or not values can be taught, or if they are acquired during learning via association, habit and example;
- higher education institutes can model effective governance and developmental leadership qualities to students;
- the networks formed during higher education can influence the emergence of developmental coalitions and also help to inform attitudes and behaviours of students;
- historically, student movements have played a critical role in bringing about institutional, economic and political reforms.

1.2 Research questions for this phase of research

Phase 3

The findings of the first and second phases of research provided a theoretical and evidence-based framework for country-level research in Ghana, undertaken during the third phase. This third phase focused on the following key research questions.

- What role did higher education play in providing developmental leaders in Ghana with the necessary skills (technical and otherwise) for leadership and national reform?
 - What specific skills did developmental leaders identify as being important?
- What role did higher education play in shaping the values of developmental leaders in Ghana?
 - What specific values did developmental leaders identify as being important?
- What role has higher education played in the formation of networks and coalitions for leadership and national reform in Ghana?
 - What specific networks and coalitions were formed during or influenced by higher education?
 - What role did higher education play in shaping the skills and values critical to coalition emergence and success?

2.0

Research design and case study selection

2.1 Setting the scene for this research in the context of wider literature

This research is multidisciplinary in nature, investigating the relationships between higher education and developmental leadership. There have been two important strands of development literature that provide context for this research – one strand that focuses on *good institutions* as the building blocks of national development; the other that focuses on *good leaders* as being at the heart of national development. A key rationale of the DLP is to develop understanding about the “critical role played by leaders, elites and coalitions in the politics of development”.⁶ This introduces a third strand of literature that focuses on *coalitions of leaders*. The key premise of each of these strands is outlined below.

Over the past few decades, a body of literature has developed on the problems of state failure, state collapse and fragile and conflict-affected states. A significant proportion of the literature has looked at the problem through the lens of weak institutions (the structural issue). North's (1990) book *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* was a seminal early publication explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change impact upon a country's economic performance through the incentives (or lack of incentives) which these institutions provide. Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) recent publication *Why Nations Fail* provides a compelling argument for state failure from both a political and economic institutional perspective.

“Countries become failed states not because of their geography or their culture, but because of the legacy of extractive institutions, which concentrate power and wealth in the hands of those controlling the state, opening the way for unrest, strife and civil war” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 376).

They underline the link for development and prosperity between economic and political institutions saying that:

“Inclusive economic institutions provide foundations upon which inclusive political institutions can flourish, while inclusive political institutions restrict deviations away from inclusive economic institutions” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 324).

“...inclusive political institutions create constraints against the exercise and usurpation of power. They also tend to create inclusive economic institutions, which in turn make the continuation of inclusive political institutions more likely” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 364).

Using historical and current examples, their approach focuses on the institutions and critical junctures⁷ or key points in history where events and leaders have brought about a significant direction of change in these institutions. However, they place their main emphasis on political and economic institutions and largely ignore the agency of individual or collective leadership.

In contrast, other authors such as Rotberg (2012) in his book *Transformative Political Leadership: Making a Difference in the Developing World* build on the leadership literature, focusing on the role that individual leaders and their choices and decisions have on the development of political cultures and institutions, particularly in newly emerging states. Rotberg emphasises individual leadership (agency) and ‘critical competencies’ – which include emotional intelligence, vision, the ability

⁶ <http://www.dlprog.org/contents/about-us.php>

⁷ Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 106) define a critical juncture as ‘a major event or confluence of factors disrupt[ing] the existing balance of political or economic power in a nation.’

to mobilise followers, integrity, prudence, courage, self-mastery and intellectual honesty – almost to the point of excluding wider institutional factors. His focus on individual leaders from a 'big leader' perspective fails to give sufficient attention to the way in which the four individual leaders he studies in detail formed and used developmental or transformative coalitions to achieve their successes.

Taking a more nuanced angle, the DLP posits that successful leadership is not about the 'big leader', but about "building coalitions with other people and organisations so that together they can achieve objectives that they could not achieve on their own" (Leftwich and Wheeler, 2011: 5). DLP's premise is that developmental leadership requires the building of such coalitions between public, private, non-state and civil society actors.

DLP research from a variety of countries⁸ has demonstrated the critical role of coalitions in overcoming collective action problems and bringing about developmental reform across a range of sectors at national and sub-national levels. Early DLP research on Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa⁹ highlights the importance of existing networks (social, educational, professional and class) in facilitating coalitions around new issues. Other DLP research on women's coalitions in Jordan, Egypt¹⁰ and South Africa¹¹, supported by case study evidence from Yemen¹² and Zimbabwe,¹³ has demonstrated the important role these prior networks can play in constituting change coalitions (Leftwich and Wheeler, 2011).

2.2 Methodology

This research, building both on previous DLP research and on the work of Grebe and Woermann (2011) and Melo, Ng'ethe and Manor (2012), takes an integrated view of structure and agency (or in other words, institutions and leaders), seeing leadership as a political process which can either be developmental or predatory. We seek to explore the role that the education of leaders and networks or coalitions of leaders plays in influencing the shaping and sustaining of developmental reforms through "collective action to change institutions and structures" (Leftwich and Wheeler, 2011: 5). We do this by exploring a number of key economic and political reforms that have taken place in a given country (Ghana) and the institutions they have helped to develop, as well as looking in depth at the leaders and coalitions of leaders involved in these reforms. We then seek to explore the role that higher education has played in both providing these leaders with the skills, values and behaviours required to bring about developmental change in Ghana, and in forming developmental coalitions. A key aspect of this research is to map the evolution and morphing of interactions between agents and different networks (see also Lyne de Ver, 2011). This follows social network theory and analysis in an attempt to explain the role of these coalitions in bringing about developmental reforms in Ghana.

Are leaders born or made?

In analysing the role of higher education in developing the skills, values and networks of leaders that push forward the reform of weak political and economic institutions¹⁴, we have to choose a side on the debate about whether leaders are born or made. There is much debate on this issue, with a large quantity of research on this subject which provides no conclusive evidence. Maltby argues that current consensus implies that there is an element of both aspects in leaders.¹⁵ Anderson (2012) writing in an article in Forbes magazine based on three decades of observing leadership states:

"Some people are, indeed, born leaders. These folks at the top of the leadership bell curve start out very good, and tend to get even better as they go along. Then there are the folks at the bottom of the curve: that bottom 10-15% of people who, no matter how hard they try, simply aren't ever going to be very good leaders. They just don't have the innate wiring. Then there's the big middle of the curve, where the vast majority of us live. And that's where the real potential for "made" leaders lies."¹⁶

8 See <http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/index.php?showcat=researchpapers> for more detail

9 See Subudubudu with Molutsi (2009), Brautigam with Diolle (2009) and Beall with Ngonyama (2009).

10 See Tadros (2011) which discusses women's coalitions in Jordan and Egypt.

11 See Hodes, Thorpe and Stern (2011).

12 See Phillips (2011).

13 See Bratton and Masunungure (2011).

14 DLP's core focus is on the **political processes that drive or constrain development**. Its work is particularly concerned with two things: first, the critical role of leaders, elites and coalitions in forging the locally legitimate institutions that promote sustainable growth, political stability and inclusive social development; and, second, to embed a better understanding of these processes in the thinking, policy and practices of the aid community.

15 <http://www.biola.edu/academics/professional-studies/leadership/resources/leadership/bornormade/>

16 <http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikaandersen/2012/11/21/are-leaders-born-or-made/>

Arvey, Rotundo, Johnson, Zhang, and McGue (2006) and Arvey, Zhang, Avolio and Kreuger (2007) based on studies on identical twins, concluded that leadership is two-thirds made and one-third born. Building on this evidence that some elements of leadership are indeed made or developed over a leader's life, then there are likely to be some key factors that help develop that leadership ability including family experience and upbringing, role models and mentors, education and work experience, amongst other things.

In choosing to examine the role that higher education might play in forming developmental coalitions and bringing sustainable development in more fragile or failed states, this research is focused on the part of leadership that is 'made'.

2.3 Research methods

The objective of this research was to explore the way that higher education has supported the emergence of developmental leaders in Ghana. In order to do this, we set the scene through historical analysis of the key political, economic and democratic reforms in Ghana. We then identified and interviewed key leaders who were involved in these reforms so that it was possible to position their accounts about the role that education has played in their leadership within the historical landscape. We supplemented this with a historical analysis of the education system in Ghana during the time these leaders studied. We chose to focus on historical rather than very recent reforms so that we could have confidence that the reforms were unambiguously developmental and promoted sustained good governance.

Partnership with a national organisation with strong understanding of the Ghanaian political and economic context as well as existing links to Ghanaian coalitions and leaders was a key feature of our approach to doing the empirical element of the research. The Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD) was chosen for this purpose given its track record as a think tank involved in policy research on governance and democracy¹⁷ and its strength in building and working with networks and stakeholder groups.¹⁸ CDD provided researcher and administrative support which enabled us to make contact and set up interviews with leaders. CDD also provided a lot of the context and background material for the historical analysis and peer reviewed early drafts of the whole report, including the analysis, providing input and challenge. A local research assistant was present at all interviews which enabled questioning from a different viewpoint, as well as bridging cultural and linguistic barriers.

The data collection was done through multiple visits in order to allow reflection and adaptation of the methodology based on emerging findings. The core approach used in Ghana was to:

1. **Select a number of key reforms** at national/sub-national level that have contributed in a significant and sustained way to democratic change, the liberalisation and stabilisation of the economy, stronger governance and accountability mechanisms (whether through legal, media, civil society, community or other mechanisms), and the development of strong and accountable state institutions.
2. **Identify the people, coalitions and networks involved** in pushing through these reforms.
3. **Analyse their educational background** to try to draw some inferences about the role of higher education in both forming networks and in forming leadership skills and competences.

The specific steps that were followed in a phased approach are outlined below.

Figure 2.1: Phased approach



¹⁷ See <http://www.cddghana.org/cdd-ghana-people/what-we-do/Policy-Research> for more detail.

¹⁸ See <http://www.cddghana.org/cdd-ghana-people/what-we-do/Networking--Collaborations> for more detail

Step 1: History of Ghana

Research into the history of Ghana, key events since independence and an overview of its education sector was conducted by CfBT, identifying the post-1981 coup period as that which produced the most sustained reforms. This was corroborated by the historical overview provided by CDD.

Step 2: Key reforms

After identifying this period as the one of interest, CDD were asked to select three to four key reforms that have contributed in a significant and sustained way to democratic change, economic stabilisation and growth and good governance, providing a brief description of each reform and a list of the key players and documents related to each reform.

Step 3: Longlist of 100 reformers since 1981 coup

CfBT developed a longlist template which CDD completed with basic personal key career positions and education information on a purposive sample of 115 reformers associated with the main reforms identified. CfBT undertook analysis of this data to try to identify any patterns in education background and potential networks that may have been formed at different higher education institutes (and secondary schools where possible).

Step 4: Short list of 30 key reformers

CDD, in discussion with CfBT, narrowed down the longlist to 38 of the most significant living key reformers from the original list of 115, and gathered further information on career, political background, membership of any societies/groups etc. and identified key allies. This list with some additions (see Section 2.5) formed the basis for the semi-structured interviews in step 6.

Step 5: Research on prominent establishments and courses

A preliminary investigation of prominent education establishments and courses attended by the longlist and shortlist was conducted by CfBT. Initially this was going to focus exclusively on higher education (both in Ghana and if relevant, overseas), but when asked about the formation of their leadership skills and values, all the leaders interviewed in step 6 mentioned the important role secondary education played. Additionally, given the prominent role of two secondary schools in Ghana (Achimota and Mfantsipim), out of one of which the University of Ghana developed, it was decided to include these institutes in the analysis. This step involved an analysis of course structure and content, teaching approaches, governance structures and key extra-curricular groups linked to courses, which was done through a mixture of document and website materials analysis and interviews with staff and former students where possible.

Step 6: Semi-structured interviews with key reformers

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 27 key reformers. In addition, we interviewed 10 young leaders, five organisational leaders, 10 higher education institute leaders and five student leaders using a purposive sampling approach, to triangulate our findings and gain a perspective on more recent educational experiences. Interviews covered the quality, content and culture of their education and the relative importance of the role that higher education has played in the development of their skills, ideology, attitude and networks vis-à-vis other aspects (e.g. pre-existing networks; political, religious or other connections). Interviews also covered key reforms that interviewees (and/or their organisations) had been involved with. For some of the shortlist leaders, where time permitted, we used a 'relationship survey' asking leaders to state the strength of their connections to other members of the shortlist (on a scale of '1' to '5') as well as the origin of these relationships (see Annex 7 for methods used). An outline interview template was used, mainly containing open questions, but each interview followed its own course depending on time available and the emphasis placed on different topics, either by the interviewer or the interviewee. For that reason it is difficult to use the interviews as descriptive data; rather we hope they have some explanatory power.

Step 7: Analysis and report writing

All the data collected through key reformer interviews was analysed qualitatively and quantitatively (through coding) to look for patterns in relation to skills and values as well as exploring the role higher education played in the formation and evolution of networks.

The report starts with a historical narrative that sets the scene (general and education) and outlines the key reforms that took place in Ghana (Chapters 3 and 4); following this is a quantitative analysis of key data on the 100 longlist reformers (Chapter 5). The main findings and discussion are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. These chapters focus on skills and values (Chapter 6) and networks and coalitions (Chapter 7). The discussion in these chapters explores the chronology of skills and values developed in secondary education and then further developed in higher education, and the networks that formed at school and university and then morphed into coalitions post-university. Finally, the last chapter pulls together key research findings and policy issues (Chapter 8).

2.4 Case study selection

A case study approach was chosen to allow for the in-depth interrogation of historical data as well as the position of empirical data within this. A key factor in choosing the country was that it had been on a trajectory of both improving governance and expansion in access to higher education as measured by the gross enrolment rate (GER). This would mean that we would be looking at a country that was in the bottom left quadrant in the figure below at some point in the period 1960s to 1980s and has since been moving into or towards the top right quadrant.

Building on the analysis undertaken in phase 1 of the research, it was decided that an appropriate case study which from a relative (developing country) perspective has a growing higher education GER and good governance is Ghana. Ghana is seen as a success story in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the development of sustainable economic and political institutions after a period of economic decline, military dictatorship and repression. It has been on a trajectory of sustained development and improving governance for the last two decades.¹⁹

2.5 Challenges and limitations of findings

The methodology chosen was deliberately flexible and was adapted several times during the research to allow for incremental changes to ensure the data collected remained central to the research rather than becoming interesting but tangential. Despite this, the methodology used has several shortcomings and limitations.

Selection bias

Given the lack of Ghanaian publications equivalent to “Who’s Who” which provides an outline of key leaders’ education and career profiles, the longlist of 100 reforming leaders was based around those involved in the identified political, economic and/or media reforms and was also influenced by publicly available information on these people.

When it came to drawing up a shortlist of 30 from the original 100, the aim was that these 30 would form the basis for the detailed leader interviews. This therefore excluded anyone who was deceased. Because of the strong possibility of not being able to obtain interviews with some of the more high profile leaders, others were added so that the shortlist grew to 38. Others with credible claims to be included on the original list were added opportunistically, meaning the final shortlist grew to 47. Close to our target of 30 were finally interviewed. Several high profile leaders from each reform area were interviewed, meaning that the final interview list can be said to be broadly representative of the original shortlist.²⁰

This case study focused exclusively on national players – neither the longlist nor shortlist included regional developmental reformers. It could therefore be argued that there is a southern bias to our selection, as national reformers tend to be based along the coastal corridor and in Accra in particular. However, in terms of region of origin, both lists can be said to be broadly representative of the general population.

Developmental leaders and coalitions

It is important to note that the term ‘developmental’ as it applies to leaders and coalitions is an imprecise one. Whether leaders and coalitions have been developmental is open to debate and certainly does not imply that every decision they made and reform they attempted, including the means by which they tried to implement the reform, is by default developmental. In this report, it is assumed that this term refers to a general trajectory and track record rather than perfection. Developmental coalitions or elites are defined as:


“the usually very small group of leaders occupying formal or informal positions of authority or power in public and private organisations or sectors, at national or sub-national levels. They generally take or influence major economic, political, social and administrative decisions in those spheres and often also use their power to influence decisions beyond such spheres” (Developmental Leadership Program, 2010: 1).

¹⁹ Ghana’s rating on the Freedom House Index has improved steadily from 63 in 1994 when it was ‘Not Free’ to 26 in 2005 (becoming ‘Free’ in 2002). Since 2005 it has maintained a score of 26-28. On all six worldwide governance indicators, Ghana has shown an overall trajectory of improvement between 1996 and 2011.

²⁰ However, this is with the notable exception that we did not interview a single Muslim leader. Data on religious affiliation was not gathered on our longlist, so it is hard to say if this is representative of a general underrepresentation of Muslim leaders in Ghana, or if it represents a selection bias – for example, we might expect there to be a bias towards the south (which is predominantly Christian in comparison to the north where there is a higher proportion of Muslims) since all leader interviews were conducted in Accra.

We are aware that there are some controversial figures in our longlist and shortlist of leaders. However, for each of them it can be argued that they have striven to implement reforms which they perceived as being in the public interest.

Figure 2.2: Model depicting criteria for country selection



Key reforms

Similarly, where we have identified key reforms in Ghana (see Section 3.3 for more details), this is not to say that these reforms have been sustained without some setbacks along the way. Rather, we are looking at a general trajectory of improvement from a poor starting place to a better place ten or twenty years later that has been sustained for a number of years. This approach recognises that this does not mean that Ghana has succeeded in overcoming all political, economic, democratic and media obstacles. Nor does it suggest that there is no room for further improvement. It also recognises that not all reforms have been universally welcomed.

Principal sources for secondary school data

Three books provided the basis for the analysis of the two most significant of Ghana's elite²¹ secondary schools of the period leading up to and directly after independence which was the period in which many of the shortlisted leaders completed their secondary schooling (Adu Boahen, 1996; Agbodeka, 1977 and Williams, 1962). The first two were written by old boys of each school. In the case of Mfantispim, the book was specifically commissioned by the school for its centenary. Both of these authors are leading historians and academics in Ghana, but as old boys they are likely to have some element of bias in their perceptions of the schools' achievements.

²¹ The word elite here describes the *type of education* that students had in these schools rather than *who* attended them.

3.0

An overview of Ghana's political and economic history

This chapter provides an overview of Ghana's political and economic history since independence and the three reform areas that this research focused on. It corresponds to step 1 (historical analysis – political and economic) and step 2 (key reforms) in our seven research steps.

3.1 Country overview

Ghana (officially, the Republic of Ghana) is a country in West Africa of approximately 240,000 square km and 24 million inhabitants. It was colonised by Britain from 1844 to 1957, when Ghana became the first African nation to win back independence. Following decades of political instability, Ghana transitioned to party democracy in the 1990s and has since had two peaceful democratic transitions of power.

Of the labour force, 56% works in agriculture (Ghana Statistical Service, 2008: vi), which contributes 22.7% of gross domestic product (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). Considerable foreign exchange has traditionally been earned through gold, timber, cocoa and other natural resources. These were joined in 2010 by oil, the discovery of which off the western coast of Takoradi made Ghana the world's fastest growing economy in 2011.

Box 3.1 (overleaf) provides an overview of key political and economic events in Ghana from 1949 to date, which form the basis of more detailed discussion in this chapter.

3.2 Political and economic history

Pre-Independence

Ghana was inhabited in pre-colonial times by a number of ancient predominantly Akan kingdoms, most notably the Ashanti who, trading their gold wealth with other African states, became one of the largest and most powerful kingdoms in Africa. Trade with Europeans began in the fifteenth century with the arrival of the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch and British. Initially, it focused on gold but soon came to be dominated by the slave trade. Britain established itself as the dominant power on the coast and formed the protectorate of the Gold Coast in 1874. Following continued fighting with the Ashanti, Britain moved to establish a full colony within Ghana's present-day borders in 1896.

Britain's policy of indirect rule and relatively high levels of investment in education led to a political maturity unequalled anywhere in Africa (Whitfield, 2009). The United Gold Coast Convention party was founded by J. B. Danquah on 4 August 1947 as a combination of chiefs, academics and lawyers to campaign for greater self-governance in the face of unfair colonial practices (Whitfield, 2009). Recognising a need for social mobilisation, they invited the young Kwame Nkrumah, a Ghanaian from the Western Region studying at university in the UK, with a reputation for political agitation, to come and spearhead the movement. Nkrumah was to split with the group in 1949 over the timetable for self-governance, forming the Convention People's Party (CPP) with the motto 'Self-government Now'. Following public unrest and political agitation, a new constitution was ratified in 1951 that gave Ghanaians limited self-government, with Nkrumah at its head. Following elections in 1956, the new assembly passed a motion authorising the government to request full independence. Britain accepted and on 6 March 1957 the British colony of the Gold Coast became the independent state of Ghana.

Box 3.1: Political and economic timeline	
1949	Kwame Nkrumah forms Convention People's Party (CPP)
1951	New constitution makes Gold Coast internally self-governing CPP wins two-thirds majority in general elections and Nkrumah becomes 'Leader of government business'
1954	New constitution grants broad powers to Nkrumah's government
1956	CPP wins 68% of seats in legislature and passes an independence motion, which British Parliament approves
1957	British Colony of the Gold Coast becomes independent Ghana on March 6 with Kwame Nkrumah as prime minister
1960	Ghana proclaimed a republic and Nkrumah elected president
1964	Ghana becomes a one-party state
1965-66	Collapse of cocoa market leads to serious macro-economic instability and poor growth for coming two decades
1966	Army stages popular coup while Nkrumah is in China National Liberation Council (NLC), led by General Joseph Ankrah, comes to power
1969	New constitution facilitates transfer of power to civilian government led by Kofi Busia
1972	Busia ousted in military coup led by Colonel Ignatius Acheampong
1978	Acheampong forced to resign and General Frederick Akuffo takes over
1979	Akuffo deposed in a violent coup led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings; Acheampong and Akuffo tried and executed on charges of corruption Ban on party politics is lifted and 16 new parties are subsequently registered
1979	Rawlings hands over power to an elected president, Hilla Limann
1981	Second Rawlings coup removes Limann Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by Rawlings now runs the country
1983	First phase of Economic Recovery Program (ERP), Ghana's World Bank and International Monetary Fund supported Structural Adjustment Program
1985	Establishment of National Commission for Democracy (NCD) to plan democratisation
1990	Various coalitions and organisations call for return to civilian government
1991	PNDC announces acceptance of multi-party politics Creation of Consultative Assembly to discuss new constitution
1992	National referendum approves draft of new constitution Rawlings elected president in national election Parliamentary elections boycotted by major opposition parties resulting in landslide victory for National Democratic Congress (NDC), a political party formed by the PNDC
1993	Swearing in of Rawlings as president
1994-95	Ethnic clashes in Northern Region over land ownership results in one thousand deaths and displacement of 150,000
1996	Rawlings re-elected president for second and last term Ghana gains debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries' program
2000	John Kufuor beats Vice-President John Atta Mills in the presidential election, marking Ghana's first peaceful transfer of power
2007	Major off-shore oil discovery announced. President Kufuor says oil will turn Ghana into an "African tiger"
2008	John Atta Mills elected president; Ghana's second democratic transfer of power
2011	First oil revenues come online, Ghana 'world's fastest growing economy' reference
2012	John Dramani Mahama assumes presidency after sudden death of Atta Mills in July. Mahama wins Presidential election in December.

Box 3.2 Ghana's political traditions

When Kwame Nkrumah formed the Convention People's Party (CPP) in 1949, he created a split within Ghanaian politics that exists to the present day.

The CPP drew its support from the masses – in particular the educated commoners, soldiers and urban youth – and its descendants still claim to represent the poor and working class. In contrast, the Danquah-Busia tradition named after the founder of the United Gold Coast Convention, J. B. Danquah, and Ghana's second civilian ruler, K. A. Busia, has come to represent a pro-western, liberal democratic ideology, drawing its support from the traditional, professional and business elite (and predominantly in Akan regions). Its current incarnation is the New Patriotic Party (NPP).

Whilst the second coming of Rawlings and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (and later the civilian New Democratic Congress (NDC)) arguably created a third tradition in Ghanaian politics, Rawlings claimed to be representing the disenfranchised, in particular the urban and rural poor; and so can be seen in this light as taking on the mantle of the Nkrumahist tradition. Ghanaian politics is now split between the pro-business NPP, largely drawing its support from the Akan regions, and the pro-poor NDC, largely drawing its support from Ghana's other ethnicities, much as it has been for over 60 years.

Ghana's post-Independence political and economic decline (1960s and 1970s)

The First Republic: state-led development, corruption and patronage

Following the establishment of the first Republic in 1960, Ghana's new President Kwame Nkrumah embarked on a plan of 'Accelerated Development', with significant expenditure on social services and state-led industrialisation. This resulted in a large increase in access to primary education as well as substantial growth in the number of secondary schools (Kosack, 2012). This was financed to a large extent by loans, credit and deeply unpopular taxes on cocoa. However, despotic rule, large public debt and a collapse in world cocoa prices made Nkrumah's position untenable and the military coup of 1966 was broadly popular (both domestically and with western powers) (Meredith, 2006).

The Second Republic: further economic decline and another coup

The military rulers handed power to Kofi Busia in 1969 following democratic elections. He continued with the same policies as Nkrumah, transferring resources to politically powerful groups through price controls on agriculture which enabled him to deliver cheap food to urban constituencies and generate resources to fund government expenditure (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). This soon led to foreign exchange shortages and a series of balance-of-payments crises, putting Ghana into a period of steep economic decline (Killick, 2010). As a result, at the end of 1971, Busia agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to devalue the Ghanaian currency, provoking riots in Accra. Consequently, a military coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong toppled Busia from power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

Military rule

Acheampong's National Redemption Council (NRC) renounced what it considered to be the pro-western, laissez-faire economic policies of the Busia administration, and began a policy which essentially sought to recreate the centrally planned, state-dominated economy that had been in place during Nkrumah's tenure (Hutchful, 2002). One of Acheampong's first policy changes was to reverse the currency devaluation that had taken place during the Busia era (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Import and price controls were reinstated. Moribund state-owned enterprises were revived. Emphasis was placed on national self-reliance, especially in the agricultural sector. Commercial agricultural projects were sponsored in Northern Ghana, and the government launched 'Operation Feed Yourself' and 'Operation Feed Your Industries,' which sought to promote agricultural self-sufficiency even at the household level and for manufacturing concerns.

Initially, the economy of Ghana responded well to these reforms. However, by the mid-1970s, the economy began a period of steep decline. Ghana's real GDP growth fell from 9.2% in 1970 to -6.7% in 1982. Inflation rose from 3% in 1970 to 116% in 1977 (Fosu, undated: 1). Exchange rate and import controls soon began to cause shortages in the availability of basic goods (Meredith, 2006). The decline in government revenue led to the breakdown of Ghana's physical infrastructure. Ghana's civil service, once one of the best on the continent, collapsed (Boachie-Danquah and Adei, 2003). Corruption and rent-seeking became rampant. Economic inequality grew. But individuals close to the regime could still make fortunes from being granted import licenses, or from taking advantage of the wide disparity between the official and black market exchange rates of the cedi (Hutchful, 2002). Between 1965 and 1979, Ghana's cocoa production halved (Meredith, 2006: 281).

The collapse of the Ghanaian economy resulted in a sharp decline in the popularity of the regime, and increasingly more strident calls for a return to democratic rule. The initial response was for the regime to become more repressive. However, the continued decline of the economy and the growing unity of the anti-military forces compelled the military to negotiate transition arrangements. A non-partisan, joint military-civilian arrangement known as 'UNIGOV,' to be approved by a referendum in March 1978, was proposed by the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the new name for the NRC. This was widely seen as a cynical attempt to cling to power, especially when the referendum was rigged in a rather heavy-handed manner (Nugent, 2009). The events generated so much domestic and international condemnation that Acheampong was removed in a palace coup four months later.

The new military junta (known as SMC II) was led by General Akuffo, and included many members of the previous SMC regime. They began to release activists who had been jailed by the SMC I regime for opposing UNIGOV, and took steps to return the country to civilian government. The ban on political parties was lifted in January 1979, and an independent committee was established to draft a new constitution. A return to civilian rule was scheduled for July 1979.

Ghana's economic decline continued throughout these events.

"No other country demonstrated the decline of Africa so graphically as Ghana. Once one of the most prosperous tropical countries in the world, it had been reduced by 1980 to a pauper [...] Between 1975 and 1981 some 14,000 trained teachers left the government's education service, many heading abroad. Ghana by 1981 had lost half of all its graduates" (Meredith, 2006: 283-284).

1979 coup

On 15 May 1979, a junior officer in Ghana's air force, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John (or J.J.) Rawlings led an unsuccessful mutiny of junior officers and lower ranks against the SMC II junta. At his court martial, he denounced the prevailing social, political, and economic conditions in the country. He was sentenced to death. Before his execution, a second and ultimately successful mutiny took place, led by Captain Boakye Gyan. Rawlings was released from prison and asked to lead a new military Junta – the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). This military junta differed significantly from previous military juntas led by Colonels and Generals in that there were few people in the inner ruling circle above the rank of major (Agyeman-Duah, Soyinka and Kelly, 2008). The AFRC openly acknowledged that they were a temporary intervention, with the purpose of conducting a 'house cleaning exercise' of the military in particular and the country in general, before overseeing multi-party elections and restoring civilian government to the existing timetable. Military tribunals were established and leading political figures of the last decade of military rule were executed. Other leading political figures of the 1970s were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

The Third Republic and the PNDC Era

The multi-party elections of 1979 were contested by parties from across Ghana's political divide. They were won by Dr Hilla Limann of the People's National Party (PNP) – the party of Ghana's Nkrumahist political tradition. The PNP proved unable to introduce the far-reaching measures that were required to turn the economy around, and it was severely hampered by internal wrangling. Dr Limann was removed in a coup on 31 December 1981 led again by Rawlings. A new military/civilian junta, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was established. Its first cabinet included some members of the Nkrumah and Danquah-Busia traditions, some academics, and technocrats, as well as some of the more radical left wing elements that had supported Rawlings in his AFRC days.

By 1983 Ghana was close to economic collapse and Rawlings moved towards large-scale economic reform which included devaluation and mass public sector redundancies, but also a doubling of Ghana's foreign debt between 1983 and 1988. By 1988, Ghana's gross national product had shrunk significantly and was 16% lower than in 1970 (Meredith, 2006: 373). The economic situation resulted in an exodus of university staff and academics and falling confidence and morale in the university which undermined its effectiveness (Manuh, Gariba, and Budu, 2007). By the mid-1980s, Ghana had gone from having one of the best education systems in Africa at independence to having one in crisis with a significant decline in education expenditure that was skewed towards the secondary and higher sub-sectors (Pedley and Taylor, 2009).

The Economic Reform Program (ERP)

The PNDC's Economic Reform Program (ERP), which began in 1983, was brave and far reaching. It was led in Ghana by a converted left wing radical lawyer, Dr Kwesi Botchwey, the finance minister of the PNDC, and led externally with significant technical and financial support by the World Bank and the IMF. An attempt was made to achieve macroeconomic stability by taking some extremely unpopular decisions, such as the devaluation of the cedi, and progressive movements towards a market-driven exchange rate mechanism (Aryeetey, Osei and Quartey, 2003). Revenue collection was improved. The producer price of cocoa was raised. There was retrenchment in the public service, and the removal of 'ghost' names from the

civil service payroll. The mining sector was reformed – new mining laws and an investor-friendly legal regime for minerals and mining were introduced. State-owned enterprises were privatised (Aryeetey *et al.*, 2003; Hutchful, 2002). Ghana's economy responded positively to these reforms but, as in other countries, the structural adjustment resulted in inflation of around 25% which impacted negatively on the average Ghanaian (Killick, 2010: 442).

Political volatility and repression

Given these harsh economic policies, implemented by an authoritarian government, it is not surprising that Ghana experienced extremely high levels of political volatility in the 1980s, including several coup attempts between 1982 and 1989. The PNDC responded to the discontent and unhappiness arising from the harsh effects of the ERP with repression. It also became less inclusive, shedding both moderates in government who were squeamish about the repression, and leftist radicals who resisted the ERP reforms. A 'culture of silence' prevailed in Ghana for much of the PNDC era, partly the result of the kidnap and murder of three superior court justices and a retired army officer in mid-1983, and the executions of both political and criminal offenders (Handley 2008; Owusu, 2011). The PNDC was also notorious for intimidating political opponents through state media and security outlets.²² It introduced laws to restrict the rights of individuals to *habeas corpus*, and introduced Public Tribunals, courts in which the right to counsel was denied. Press freedom was significantly curtailed resulting in the loss of the role of the media as a government watchdog. Instead, the media was used as a propaganda tool to achieve political and ideological objectives. Journalists who chose to speak out against the regime were subject to repressive laws, intimidation, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment (Whitfield, 2009). During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of prominent journalists and columnists were arrested for falling foul of Ghana's stringent criminal libel laws (Owusu, 2011).

Churches played a significant role as a 'moral conscience' during this period, criticising the military regime for civilian abuses (Yirenkyi, 2000). The Christian Council of Ghana and the Ghana Catholic Bishops' Conference sent two joint memoranda to the government urging them to "exercise justice, fair play, and respect for human rights" and also advised against "arbitrary death sentences" (CCG & GBC Pastoral Letters, 12, 22 June 1979 cited in Yirenkyi, 2000).

The path to democracy (late 1980s to present)

Drivers of change

The level of authoritarianism exhibited by the PNDC makes its consent to restoring democratic government fairly remarkable. The PNDC began a very closely controlled process of democratic transition in the late 1980s. The return to democracy was prompted by a combination of external and domestic factors (Handley, 2008). *External factors* included encouragement by the World Bank and other international donors to democratise. The late 1980s also saw the collapse of the Berlin wall and socialist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, the collapse of apartheid, and the beginnings of the 'Third Wave' of democracy over the African continent. The world was clearly shifting in a more democratic direction. The *domestic drivers* towards democratic transition included dissatisfaction over the handling of the economy and the middle class, which had been cowed by extreme repression in the early and mid-eighties, finally beginning to challenge the 'culture of silence' (Handley, 2008).²³ By August 1990, an opposition movement had appeared in Accra asking for more open politics, an end to press censorship and the release of political prisoners. Students, and urban groups of professionals, businessmen, church leaders, labour unions and civil servants protested, "demanding not just redress of economic grievances but political reforms" (Meredith, 2006: 386).²⁴

Important reform coalitions

As in the 1970s, members of Ghana's two political traditions began to unite in opposition to the regime, most notably in the Movement for Freedom and Justice. Alongside this were organisations like the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the Christian Council of Ghana, the Catholic Bishops' Conference, and the private press who were all vociferous and unyielding in their crusade for constitutional democracy (Handley, 2008).

The legitimacy and continued stay in office of the PNDC, which had after all described itself as a 'Provisional' government, began to be increasingly questioned. The PNDC, having weathered a number of attempted coups and mutinies in the 1980s, began a process of transition by the end of the decade (Handley, 2008). They sought to return the country to civilian rule through a tightly controlled transition process.

22 Especially the Bureau of National Investigations and through the extra-legal activities of quasi-military security operatives who served as PNDC vigilantes and enforcers at large.

23 It is widely believed that the first direct public challenge to the regime was the 'Ghanaian Sphinx' lecture, delivered by noted Ghanaian historian Professor Albert Adu Boahen at a public lecture hosted by the British Council.

24 This supports the argument set out by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that economic and political institutions have to develop side by side for successful nation building.

Opening up of political space and media

Non-partisan local government elections were held in 1988. Media laws were relaxed in 1989, and a number of private newspapers began to emerge. In 1990, the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) chaired by Justice D. F. Annan, Vice Chairman of PNDC, started a series of regional fora throughout the country to debate Ghana's political future. In March 1991, the NCD presented its report to Government. One of the conclusions of the report was the following:

“the general opinion was that the generality of the population is not against political parties as an ideal instrument that may give the fullest expression to the freedom of association” (National Commission for Democracy, undated: 36).

Constitution

This was followed in May by the appointment of a body of experts to formulate constitutional proposals, and the appointment of a Consultative Assembly in August that would debate the proposals and formulate a draft constitution. The Consultative Assembly was chaired by the late traditional ruler, Pe Rowland Ayagyitam II. It originally had 260 members but NUGS and the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) declined to send representatives because the government had allocated the majority of seats to its own supporters and it was not clear how independent the Assembly would be, leaving the final number of it at 258 (Handley, 2008).

The draft constitution had a number of positive features. It guaranteed a wide range of basic rights, including freedom of speech. It created a number of independent constitutional bodies – including an electoral commission, human rights commission, and a media commission. It also included provisions guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary. It was accepted by an overwhelming majority in a referendum in 1991. However, the first elections of 1992 were somewhat controversial. In May 1992, Rawlings lifted an 11-year ban on political parties but this only gave new parties six months in which to rally support (Meredith, 2006). The PNDC formed a political party called the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to contest the elections, with Rawlings as its presidential candidate. The NDC won the 1992 elections fairly comfortably, but the opposition alleged widespread rigging and incumbency abuse (supported by some international observers such as the Carter Center). The opposition consequently chose to boycott the subsequent parliamentary elections, held 30 days later. The first parliament of the 1992 constitution therefore consisted almost entirely of members of the NDC, and individuals from parties affiliated to the NDC. Following the 1992 election and the potentially tumultuous political situation that followed, the Council of Christian Churches and Catholic Bishops Conference played an important mediation role and convened political actors to agree on ratifying the Constitution (Dickson, 1993). The Constitution came into force in January 1993.

Electoral reforms and further media reforms

A Supreme Court decision mandated state broadcasters to provide equal time to all political parties. The electoral commissioner, Dr Afari-Gyan, worked with the political parties to improve the voting process (by the introduction of transparent ballot boxes, for example). The relaxation of media laws continued, and private radio stations such as Joy FM and Radio Gold were licensed for the first time (Handley, 2008). But there continued to be strict enforcement of Ghana's criminal libel laws and a number of prominent journalists were arrested and even incarcerated for violations of these criminal statutes. In 1994, opposition political activist Dr Charles Wereko-Brobby faced criminal charges for making pirate broadcasts (Owusu, 2011).

The 1996 elections were an improvement on the 1992 elections. Though abuse of incumbency continued, and there were again allegations of vote rigging, the main opposition party (which consisted of a “Great Alliance” between non-NDC Nkrumaist parties and the Danquah-Busia New Patriotic Party (NPP)) accepted the election results, and congratulated the NDC's Jerry John Rawlings and his Vice President, John Evans Atta Mills, on their victory.

Transition of power: the 2000 election

The 2000 election is arguably the most important election in the history of Ghana's Fourth Republic. By December 2000, Ghana had been led for 19 years by Rawlings, but presidential term limits introduced by the 1992 Constitution prevented him from running for a third term. His Vice President, John Evans Atta Mills, was selected as the presidential candidate. As in 1996, the NPP chose John Kufuor as its presidential candidate. The NPP benefited from fielding a candidate that was relatively well-known to the Ghanaian populace, and also benefited from further improvements in the media environment and the electoral process which had improved the fairness of the electoral process for opposition parties significantly. In addition, for the first time, there was a well-organised domestic and international observer process, spearheaded by an increasing number of domestic civil society organisations. The election was won by the NPP after a run off. The NPP also obtained a small majority in parliament. To their credit, the NDC chose to concede defeat to the NPP, and congratulate President Kufuor on his victory (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009).

In his first term, President Kufuor began the process of healing and reconciling a country that had been through twenty years of sometimes fairly repressive rule under his predecessor. Institutionalised patronage and corruption, the inevitable effect of having a single party in government for close to two decades, had to be addressed. The economy of Ghana, which had continued to make progress in the 1990s, had suffered from budget-busting election year spending in the months before December 2000. In its first four years, the NPP under Kufuor attempted to restore macro-economic stability, continued the expansion and tolerance for basic human rights that had begun under Rawlings, and greatly improved the media environment by repealing Ghana's criminal libel laws.

Return of NDC

The 2008 elections saw a second democratic transfer of power; this time back to the NDC, with Atta Mills as President. Following Atta Mills' sudden death in July 2012, Dramani Mahama successfully contested the 2012 Presidential elections as the incumbent.

3.3 Key reforms

As outlined in Chapter 2, our aim was to focus on some key reforms that have contributed to sustained democratisation and improved governance in Ghana in order to identify the developmental leaders and coalitions involved in these reforms and then examine the educational background of these individuals. Given Ghana's economic and political transformation over the last 20-30 years as outlined in Section 3.2 above, it was decided to focus on this period and in particular, three key areas of reform were selected as being the most fundamental to Ghana's transformation. These three reforms are summarised in the next few pages.

Key Reform 1: Restoration of democracy (1987-2000)
<p>The restoration of democracy started in the late 1980s. It was begun by the PNDC through a tightly controlled transition process. A series of events contributed to it.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Campaigning for democracy and human rights by organisations like the Ghana Bar Association, the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice and religious organisations. • 1984 – Creation of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) chaired by Justice Daniel Francis Annan who was also Vice-Chair of the PNDC. • 1988– local government elections. • 1989 – relaxation of media laws coupled with the emergence of private newspapers. • 1990 – the NCD undertook regional fora to gather the views of a wide range of representatives from across the country, reporting broad national support for democratisation. • March 1991 – NCD presented its report to Government clearing the way for a return to democracy. • 1992 – drafting of the Constitution by the Consultative Assembly, approved in a referendum by 93% of valid votes. • 1992 – elections conducted by the Interim Electoral Commission. • 1995 – Alliance for Change organise mass protest of what they perceive as Rawlings' continued autocratic rule. • 2000 – first democratic transition of power. <p>Various coalitions also played a key role agitating for change (see Chapter 7 for more detail). The impact of the restoration of democracy was to open up political space to multiple political parties and return to elected leaders rather than military ones.</p>
<p>Key leaders, groups and coalitions: The Movement for Freedom and Justice, the Christian Council of Ghana, the Ghana Bar Association, the National Union of Ghana Students, the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, New Democratic Movement and the Alliance for Change.</p>

Key Reform 2: The Economic Recovery Program (1983-1997) and public sector reforms

After Rawlings' second coup, the Government of Ghana, with guidance and financial support from the World Bank and the IMF, embarked upon the Economic Recovery Program (ERP). The ERP's main focus was to restore economic productivity at minimum cost to the government. Specifically, this meant (Government of Ghana, 1995):

- restructuring economic institutions;
- diversifying the economy;
- balancing the national budget;
- liberalising trade and the currency;
- attracting foreign direct investment.

The ERP sought to improve the economy's capacity to adjust both to external and internal shocks and to generate sustainable economic growth and development. It had three phases:

Phase 1 (1983-1986): the focus was on reducing expenditure and increasing incentives for private production. Expenditure cuts and increased tax collection led to a reduction in the budget deficit from 6.3% of GDP in 1982 to 0.1% by 1986. A series of cedi devaluations boosted export activities.

Phase 2 (1987-1989): the focus was on diversifying state assets. The cedi was devalued through radical foreign exchange reforms (Gayi, 1991). The introduction of foreign exchange bureaux in 1988 nearly led to the purging of the hard currency black market.

Phase 3 (1990-1997): the focus was on boosting the private sector economy by intensifying monetary reforms and reducing private corporate taxes.

The impact of the ERP was to renew Ghana's capability to repay loans regardless of its inability to fully clear all foreign debts. It also to a great extent halted Ghana's economic deterioration and improved its international reputation, ushering it into the international capital market which it had left 20 years previously (Loxley, 1988). The mining sector was transformed from a stagnated state-controlled industry to an economically viable and growing sector providing foreign exchange (World Bank, 2003).

One important objective of the 1983 structural adjustment programme was to reform the public sector. The public sector reform policy framework emphasised the need to develop the public sector and make it more strategic including raising the living standards of Ghana's population.

The PNDC and subsequent governments with support from the World Bank, started a series of public sector institutional renewal programmes, among which were the following.

- The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) – a programme to restructure the civil service so that it could be more effective. This had limited success.
- A more comprehensive National Institutional Renewal Programme which was launched in 1994 with the major objective of encouraging institutions under the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government to discharge their functions transparently and accountably.
- The establishment of the Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP) in 1995 to replace the CSRP. The CSPIP ultimately aimed to promote and enhance civil service performance service delivery systems and good governance with particular emphasis on transparency and accountability.

(Boachie-Danquah and Adei, 2003)

Key leaders, groups and coalitions: PNDC government (Jerry John Rawlings, Kwesi Botchwey, Tsatsu Tsikata, Joe Abbey, Kwame Peprah, P. V. Obeng, all Members of the PNDC Economic Management team), the World Bank, TUC, Overseas Development Agency, Ghana Chamber of Mines and the Public Service Commission.

Key Reform 3: The liberalisation of the media (1989-2003)

The liberalisation of the media started in the late 1980s as part of the first steps towards democracy.

By the early 1990s, Ghana had a vibrant private print media. Newspapers such as the Ghanaian Chronicle, the Free Press and the Ghanaian Voice provided alternative outlets to the pro-government newspapers such as The Graphic and The Ghanaian Times.

The 1992 Constitution significantly improved the independent operating environment of the Ghanaian media, though the criminal libel laws were held to be constitutional. Chapter 12 expressly guarantees the freedom and independence of the media and establishes a National Media Commission to promote and ensure that guaranty. The 15-member National Press Commission (later Ghanaian Media Commission) was created as an independent body tasked with upholding Chapter 12 of the Constitution of Ghana, promoting press freedom, responsibility of both private and state outlets. Other provisions in the Constitution re-enforce the press freedoms enshrined in Chapter 12. The Constitution acknowledges that power ultimately resides in the people in Article 2, which allows litigation for anything inconsistent with the Constitution. Article 21 also guarantees freedom of expression and access to information (Government of Ghana, 1992).

Key coalition groups helped to bring about the reforms in the media sector with groups such as the Ghana Institute of Journalism, the Ghana Journalists' Association, the National Media Commission and some civil society organisations playing a key role in ensuring that these reforms were sustained.

Another important milestone occurred in 1993, when the Supreme Court of Ghana mandated that the state broadcaster, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, should provide equal time for all political parties.

After a prolonged struggle, Parliament, on 27 July 2001, unanimously repealed the Criminal Libel and Seditious Laws, which had hitherto been used to incarcerate a number of journalists. The repeal followed the passage of the Criminal Code (Repeal of the Criminal and Seditious Laws – Amendment Bill) Act 2001 by a unanimous vote in the House. Following the passage of the amendment, all pending prosecutions under the criminal libel laws were ceased immediately and anyone accused of committing an offence under the repealed sections was discharged unconditionally (afrol News, 2001).

The impact of the media liberalisation was to enable the media to become one of the defining features of Ghanaian democracy and freedom, acting as watchdogs and reporting incidents of corruption and misuse of power without fear of repression or imprisonment. The effectiveness of the media is however, hampered by significant gaps in levels of professionalism and integrity amongst media practitioners (Owusu, 2011). The progress towards a more transparent media regime has also been hampered by the failure to pass an access to information law, and by the ineffectiveness of the National Media Commission in regulating media excesses.

Key leaders, groups and coalitions: Ghana Journalists Association, National Media Commission, Audrey Gadzekpo, Kwaku Baako Jnr, Kwesi Pratt Jnr, Alhaji Haruna Atta, Samuel Clegg, Komla Dumor, Nana Kofi Koomson, Elvis Aryeh, Mike Eghan, Ben Ephson, Adwoa Afari Yeboah, Gifty Afenin Dadzie, Kabral Blay Amihere and Elisabeth Ohene.

Rawlings has undoubtedly been the dominant figure in Ghanaian politics in the last three decades, and as such, is associated with all three of the reform areas. It is also possible to argue that both the 1979 and 1981 coups were 'reformist' in nature, one to carry out a 'house-cleaning exercise' on the military, the other to address more endemic, political corruption. This study has therefore also looked at some figures associated with the rise of Rawlings.

4.0

Evolution of education in Ghana

This chapter provides a brief historical review of the evolution of secondary and higher education in Ghana exploring the influence of various colonial education commissions and national reforms on the expansion of secondary and higher education in Ghana from the early to the late 1900s. It corresponds to step 1 (historical analysis – education) in our seven research steps.

4.1 Colonial education and preparations for independence

Primary and secondary schools

Modern education in the Gold Coast began in 1752 led by Rev. Thomas Thompson, a Fellow of Christ's College Cambridge (UK) who came to Cape Coast Castle to work as a chaplain as well as a missionary and educator (Williams, 1962). In the late 1800s and early 1900s, very little formal education existed outside of missionary schools (largely led by the Methodists, the Basel missionaries and the Bremen missionaries) with traditional education being the main education available, focussing on farming and craft. The castles and forts built by European traders led to the establishment of Castle Schools in coastal areas, which gradually spread inland (Agbodeka, 1998). In 1909, the government opened a Teacher Training College to train primary school teachers and a Government Technical School in Accra (Williams, 1962). By 1919, there were 35,000 pupils enrolled in school out of a total school-age population of 300,000. 27,500 were enrolled in 216 elementary, government and assisted missionary schools plus an additional 7,500 in unassisted schools. Most of these were based in Accra or the Cape Coast with only the Basel Mission having some schools in rural areas and running the Akropong Teachers' Seminary. There were only two secondary schools in the whole country (Agbodeka, 1977: 2-3).

A critique of the educational system in the early 1900s made by Governor Guggisberg was that it omitted character training which was seen as an essential trait of a good leader (Agbodeka, 1977). One establishment that did place an emphasis on character training, however, was Mfantsipim. Founded in 1905, Mfantsipim was the leading school of its day. In the 1922 annual report, the Headmaster expressed his hope that Mfantsipim would produce "men who shall be the future leaders in character and thought, in energy, initiative and resourcefulness" (cited in Adu Boahen, 1996: 488).²⁵

The 1920 Phelps-Stoke Commission on African education – widely seen as influential on British colonial education policy in Africa (Berman, 1971) – emphasised the importance of character training and religious development insofar as it reflected an 'adaptation' of the form and content of education to meet the needs of learners in Africa (Agbodeka, 1977).

In Ghana in May 1922, Governor Guggisberg set up a Committee of Ghanaians and Europeans to investigate proposals for a secondary school and training college (Williams, 1962). Achimota School was established as a result. The vision of Achimota's founders was:

"to produce a class of intellectually bi-cultural leaders whose training would enable them to act as interpreters and

²⁵ The Headmaster's hopes can be reasonably said to have been fulfilled: during the pre-independence nationalist struggle, Old Boys played an important supporting role and eleven of the sixteen principal secretaries heading the government ministries in the 1960s were Old Boys, prompting Adu Boahen to dub Mfantsipim 'the father of Ghanaian Nationalism'.

brokers for European and African ideas, fully able to take over their country's government when the time inevitably came for the British to leave."²⁶

Receiving the lion's share of the colonial education budget, Achimota was to become the premier non fee-paying, selective education establishment in Ghana (see Chapter 6, Box 6.1 for more detail). It provided access to the top performing Ghanaian students from all parts of the country (with no emphasis on religion, ethnicity or social background) to a high-quality residential education (Svanikier, 2007). Svanikier (2007: 126) argues that "in this way many commoners were given the opportunity for education on a par with the privileged coastal elites and educated aristocrats."

Preparations for the first university college in Ghana

Mngomezulu (2010) argues that by the 1930s, it was evident that Africa's democratic development would require an educated elite. This placed a greater emphasis and demand for higher education in British colonies in Africa. As a result, in 1943, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, authorised the establishment of the Colonial Higher Education Commission. The Asquith Commission on Higher Education in The Colonies had as its purpose:

"To consider the principles which should guide the promotion of higher education, learning and research and the development of universities in the colonies; and to explore means whereby universities and other appropriate bodies in the UK may be able to co-operate with institutions of higher education in the colonies in order to give effect to these principles."²⁷

The rationale behind this was to facilitate the transition to self-government in the British Colonies, helping to build the necessary social and economic institutions (Nwauwa, 1997). Within the Gold Coast, the Asquith Commission recognised that Achimota College was already providing courses leading to University of London examinations in Intermediate Arts, Intermediate Science, Intermediate Engineering, BSc Engineering and Intermediate Science (Economics) as well as a department for training primary school teachers. In 1943, 98 students (two of whom were women) were studying post-secondary education at Achimota, some coming from Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia (Daniel, 1996). The Asquith Commission aimed to establish universities where they did not exist with the following objective:

"to produce men and women who have the standards of public service and capacity for leadership which the progress of self-government demands, and to assist in satisfying the need for persons with the professional qualification required for the economic and social development of the colonies" (Commission's report of 3 May 1945 cited in Daniel, 1996).

It recommended the establishment of a University College in the Gold Coast which would include faculties of arts and science and an institute of education, thus building on what was already taking place at Achimota through its links with the University of London (Daniel, 1996). A parallel West Africa Commission led by the Rt. Hon. Walter Elliot (and known as the Walter Elliot Commission on Higher Education in West Africa) proposed two options: a Majority Report suggesting also building a university in Nigeria and a Minority Report suggesting only building a university in Nigeria as secondary education was not of high enough quality across West Africa to justify the establishment of two universities (Nwauwa, 1997). Whilst the British government thought about adopting the recommendations of the Minority Report, the educated elite of the Gold Coast led by the politician and scholar Dr J. B. Danquah²⁸ (who had studied at the University of London)²⁹, were clear that they wanted a university and were willing to contribute financially to its development³⁰, leading to a change in the British position. As a result, the prominent secondary schools expanded their sixth forms to help feed students into the planned university (Adu Boahen, 1996).

In 1946, the Bradley Committee, chaired by the Acting Colonial Secretary, Mr Kenneth Bradley, was established to advise the governor on higher education and decided that the Gold Coast should have its own university college. The Bradley Committee proposed that this should grow out of Achimota through a special relationship with the University of London, where the University of London awarded the degrees before the university college proceeded to full university status (Agbodeka, 1998). To do this, Achimota College would need to be separated from the School and the Teacher Training Department; something that it did, enabling it to become the new University College of the Gold Coast (UCGC) in 1948.

26 http://web.archive.org/web/20110724221438/http://www.ac2010.org/about_achimota.html

27 <http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/details?Uri=C5147>

28 <http://www.ug.edu.gh/index1.php?linkid=243&sublinkid=72#est>

29 <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/people/person.php?ID=167>

30 J. B. Danquah lobbied the Cocoa Marketing Board to collect a levy from farmers which raised £897,000 towards the establishment of a university college (Agbodeka, 1998: 13).

Quality assurance of higher education

The Asquith Commission also recommended the establishment of an Inter-University Council (IUC) to advise and support higher education in the British Colonies. The IUC was established in 1946 and provided policy advice to the UCGC. The IUC approved all academic appointments which ensured quality control in line with universities in Britain. It also gave the UCGC a way of sourcing funds from the British government as it provided recommendations to the Colonial University Grants Advisory Committee.³¹

The Scheme of Special Relationship with the University of London which was offered to certain English and foreign universities, continued from 1948 to 1961 with the UCGC offering limited programmes of undergraduate study but virtually nothing at postgraduate level. Over this thirteen year period, the UCGC was supported through both the Special Relationship with the University of London and the IUC helping to maintain high academic standards.³² After 1961, sovereign universities came into being and there were special relationships with local institutes and external programmes too (Daniel, 1996).

4.2 Education in Nkrumah's Ghana

'Accelerated Development Plan'

With the arrival of 'self government' in 1951, education policy was for the first time in the hands of Ghanaians, and 'The Gold Coast Revolution' was as much an educational one as a political one (Foster, 1965). At the time, only 4% of residents had ever attended school (Kosack, 2012: viii), but Ghana had amassed a large sum of money from the Cocoa Marketing Board reserves which it used to expand access through the 1951 Accelerated Development Plan for Education (Agbodeka, 1998). This sought to change the low percentage of the population accessing schools by building almost 5,000 schools, mainly in rural areas, undertaking emergency training of teachers and abolishing tuition fees in all primary schools.³³ In January 1952, more than 110,000 children began primary school, more than double the number that had started the previous year (Kosack, 2012: viii).

The CPP took steps to maintain the quality of education during this significant expansion by increasing the number of teacher training colleges from 22 to 83 and making sure teachers earned more than they could in occupations demanding similar qualifications. Test scores from the era testify to this quality: only in 2002 did Ghanaian Maths scores reach the level they had achieved in 1960; English scores have yet to reach the same level (World Bank, 2004). Nonetheless, there was much criticism of the pace of expansion from Nkrumah's political opponents. Foster (1965: 190) concludes that

"...there is little doubt that the period of rapid expansion did lead to a lowering of academic standards within the primary and middle schools, but it is equally true that the emergency teacher-training schemes could enable the system to 'recover' at a rapid rate once the initial peak of enrolments was past."

Nkrumah expanded access to secondary education with the same zeal, building 13 new secondary schools in 1952, and a total of 92 during his reign. Although access was not free, a large scholarship programme ensured representation from all segments of society. By 1960 the children of farmers and fishermen made up a third of fifth year secondary school students (Foster, 1963 cited in Kosack, 2012: 174).

The Education Act, 1961, which is still the basic law in force today, sought to enshrine the principle of universal free primary education³⁴ and remove all secondary school fees. But despite this revolution in access, there was strong resistance to any move away from a curriculum linked to the English syllabuses and examination system and Ghanaian education continued to seek to emulate the British model (Foster, 1965).

A growing higher education system

The government matched its commitment to general education with a significant expansion of quality higher education that was heavily subsidised and accessible to all within the system (Kosack, 2012).³⁵ Enrolment increased twenty fold during Nkrumah's reign (see Table 4.1). Technical education was also expanded to provide skilled workers for Ghana's rapid industrialisation.

31 <http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/details/C3494-details>

32 <http://www.ug.edu.gh/index1.php?linkid=243&sublinkid=72#est>

33 Secondary schools would follow in 1965 (Botchwey, 2010).

34 Actually primary and middle school; collectively known as elementary.

35 As well as accessing higher education through secondary, graduates of teacher training institutes and technical institutes could also sit the entrance exams.

Table 4.1: Education sector growth under Nkrumah

	1951		1966		% increase	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
Primary	1,083	153,360	8,144	1,137,495	752%	742%
Middle	539	66,175	2,277	267,434	422%	404%
Secondary	13	5,033	105	42,111	808%	837%
Teacher Training	22	1,916	83	15,144	377%	790%
Technical	5	622	11	4,956	220%	797%
University	2	208	3	4,291	150%	2,063%

Source: Hayford (1988) cited in Acheampong (2010: 4).

Post-independence, Ghana had new opportunities for education agreements with others in the international community. The First Republic set up the International Commission on Higher Education in 1960 with a former Minister of Education, Kojo Botsio as its chair (Daniel, 1996). One of its first decisions in 1961 was to rename the UCGC the University of Ghana and at the request of the university, gave it power to award its own degrees. Nana Kobina Nketsia IV, a Mfantisipim alumnus with a PhD from Oxford, became its first (interim) Vice-Chancellor.

The International Commission also created a second university in Kumasi out of the College of Technology established in 1951. This was named the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) in 1961.³⁶ A further decision in 1962 was to create the University College of Cape Coast out of a post-secondary college that trained science teachers.³⁷

The Ghana School of Law was opened in 1958 as an independent institute in order to provide postgraduate professional law education. The Ghana School of Journalism was established the following year with the very political agenda of developing a "patriotic cadre of journalists to play an active role in the emancipation of the African continent."³⁸

Various religious groups (e.g. the Christian Council of Ghana, the Catholic Church of Ghana, the Baptist Christian Seminary and the Christian Service Mission) sponsored smaller colleges who offered religious programmes coupled with humanities to qualify for diplomas and degrees with the University of Ghana (Daniel, 1996).

The 1951 Plan, the 1961 Education Act and the very significant expansion of all levels of education achieved during Nkrumah's time in power reflect his vision of the role of education in poverty reduction and national development. Between 1951 and 1966, primary enrolment increased from just over 150,000 to well over 1 million, secondary enrolment from 5,000 to over 40,000 and university enrolment from just 208 to over 4,000 as outlined in Table 4.1. The result was that in the 1950s and 1960s Ghana was a place of "real economic mobility" with almost 40% of students at the University of Ghana the children of farmers and fishermen (Kosack, 2012: 175).

4.3 Elite capture 1966-1981

Opposition to the rapid expansion of access to education had been building³⁹ and the new military government, led by General Afrifa, began reversing some of the reforms almost immediately after the 1966 coup (Kosack, 2012). The National Liberation Council (NLC) closed hundreds of schools, mainly in rural areas, on the grounds that they were not efficient. By 1971 the NLC had closed over 900 schools and enrolment was down by 15%. At the same time, spending on quality inputs such as textbooks was cut significantly and teachers were encouraged to move into administration. In just a single year

36 The name was changed in 1966 to the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, and changed back in 2000 (Manuh *et al.*, 2007).

37 In 1971, it gained the power to award its own degrees and became the University of Cape Coast (UCC), with a commitment to training teachers (Daniel, 1996).

38 The Ghana Institute of Journalism was granted full degree-awarding powers in 2006.

39 Opposition to increased access was justified on the grounds that it had led to a deterioration of quality, but evidence presented above seems to confirm Kosack's view that it was largely elitist in origin.

(1967-68) real spending on administration increased five-fold to account for 70% of all expenditure on primary education (Kosack, 2012: 188).

Simultaneously, the NLC opened up a new route into secondary.⁴⁰ ‘Special schools’ were mainly private fee-paying schools and offered a much shorter route to the Common Entrance Exam than public schools (6 years instead of 8-10 years). Furthermore, the higher standards in the special schools ensured they dominated entry to the top secondary schools: in 1972 Achimota admitted 182 from these schools and just 26 from public schools (compared to 100% from public schools in 1956) (Kosack, 2012: 191).

Whilst reducing real spending on primary, the post-coup governments poured money into secondary, increasing real spending by 180% between 1966 and 1975. Furthermore, since scholarships were awarded solely on academic performance, they greatly advantaged the private students of the special schools (i.e. the existing elite). From 1966 to 1970, real spending on scholarships increased by 144% (Kosack, 2012: 191).

Real spending on universities also increased 1966-1971 and government scholarships now covered not only fees, but room and board, books, clothing, travel, examination fees, activities fees and a discretionary budget (Kosack, 2012).

Busia’s austerity budgets cut education spending, but the cuts were largely reversed with the coming of a new military ruler, Colonel Acheampong, who largely continued with the policies of Afrifa (Kosack, 2012). The education system was criticised in the report of the Dzobo committee, appointed in 1973 after the 1972 coup, as serving as the training ground of the elite and ruling class (Acheampong, 2007: 4). The Dzobo report also recommended reducing pre-university education from 17 to 13 years and a move away from a grammar school approach to introduce more technical and vocational courses (Little, 2010). Although, his recommendations were only implemented in experimental schools, they formed the basis of the 1980s reforms and therefore of the system present in Ghana today.

Indeed, Acheampong so ignored Dzobo’s recommendations that by 1975 spending per pupil in higher education was 171 times that in primary (Kosack, 2012: 194). The deterioration of the primary education system was so severe that illiteracy levels, which are largely hereditary, were lower in 1981 than in 1966 (Kosack, 2012: 217).

4.4 Education in Rawlings’ Ghana

The education system Rawlings inherited in 1981 was highly dysfunctional. Not only was spending skewed towards secondary and tertiary, the economic crisis meant that by 1983 educational expenditure was just 1.5% of GDP, down from a high of 6.4% in 1976 (World Bank, 2004: 7).

Within the PNDC education enjoyed “the same high level of debate and discussion” that the economy received, and a number of reforms were enacted (Pedley and Taylor, 2009: 10). The most significant of these was to re-structure the system, from the 6-4-5-2 system to 6-3-3, shortening pre-university education from 17 to 12 years, presenting large savings for both parents and the state. Attendance at Senior Secondary School was reduced from seven (five years for O-Levels and two for A-Levels) to three years (World Bank, 2004). There was a reinvestment in the primary sector, which had been neglected since Nkrumah’s overthrow, and by 2000, per student spending had almost quadrupled (Kosack, 2012: 206). Rawlings also sought to significantly increase access to secondary, almost doubling the 241 schools in 1988 to 464 by 2000 (Kosack, 2012: 210).

Massification of higher education

Rawlings sought to increase access to higher education and reverse its elitist nature. Food and board subsidies were removed and per student spending was halved as enrolment increased from just over 8,000 in 1986 to more than 36,000 by 2000 (Kosack, 2012: 210).

It was not until May 1992, that any further public universities were added, with the University for Development Studies established in Tamale, northern Ghana. It combined academic studies and practical training in the fields of agriculture, social sciences, health, environment and culture with the aim of supporting development in northern Ghana (it has four campuses in each of the administrative regions, Brong Ahafo, Northern, Upper East and Upper West). In 1993, the University College of Education at Winneba was created out of an amalgamation of various different teacher training colleges. It was an affiliate of UCC with a specific focus on teacher education until 2005, when it became the University of Education, Winneba (Daniel, 1996; Manuh et al., 2007). The Western University College, established in 2001 became the sixth fully fledged university

⁴⁰ Special schools were actually established by Nkrumah, but their share of enrolment was negligible (Kosack, 2012).

in 2004, renamed as the University of Mines and Technology, Tarkwa. The latest addition is the University of Health and Allied Sciences in Ho, established in 2011. At the same time as the creation of these new universities, the three established universities also expanded rapidly: between 1988 and 2000, the University of Ghana and the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi tripled numbers whilst UCC numbers increased six-fold; their combined enrolment increased from 8,700 to 21,700 (Kosack, 2012: 211).

Box 4.1: Education timeline	
1876	Establishment of the Wesleyan High School by the Methodist Church in the Cape Coast
1905	Formation of Fanti Public Schools Ltd and establishment of Mfantshipim school which was amalgamated with the Wesleyan Collegiate School (formerly High School)
1909	Teacher Training College and Government Technical School opened in Accra
1920	Phelps-Stoke Commission set up in America to look at African education
1922	Governor Guggisberg sets up a committee to draw up proposals for a secondary school and training college in Ghana
1923	Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies set up by British Secretary of State for the Colonies
1924	Creation of the Prince of Wales College and School (later to become Achimota College)
1927	Formal opening of Achimota College (the new name for the Prince of Wales College and School)
1928	Teacher Training College moves to Achimota
1930s	Achimota offers courses covering all pre-university education
	Achimota Teacher Training College moved to Kumasi to form College of Technology
1943	Establishment of the Asquith Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies Establishment of the Walter Elliot Commission on Higher Education in West Africa
1945	Establishment of a Colonial Development and Welfare Fund to support Ten-Year Development Plans in the colonies
1946	Establishment of Bradley Commission to advise the Governor on higher education Establishment of an Inter-University Council to advise and support higher education in the Colonies
1948	Separation of Achimota into the Teacher Training College and the School Creation of the University College of the Gold Coast (UCGC), in a Scheme of Special Relationship with the University of London
1951	Accelerated Development Plan for Education drawn up with a focus on expanding 'free' access to primary and secondary education College of Technology established in Kumasi (later to become University of Science and Technology)
1960	Government of Ghana sets up the International Commission on Higher Education
1961	UGCG becomes the University of Ghana with the power to award its own degrees Kumasi College of Technology becomes Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) Repeal of Achimota School Constitution resulting in loss of Achimota's autonomy and it becoming government-controlled The Education Act (Act 87) makes primary schooling compulsory and free
1962	Establishment of University College of Cape Coast
1966	KNUST renamed as University of Science and Technology, Kumasi
1971	University College of Cape Coast renamed University of Cape Coast (UCC) able to award degrees
1974	Dzobo Educational Reform Committee criticises system for serving the ruling elite (suggests new structure with Junior Secondary Schools and more vocational bent, but does not survive experimental stage)
1986	Education Reform Programme (new structure re-introduces Junior Secondary Schools and shortens pre-tertiary, community secondary schools introduced) University Rationalisation Committee established World Bank start supporting two projects: Education Sector Adjustment Credit and Health and Education Rehabilitation Project
1992	Establishment of University of Development Studies in Tamale

	New constitution enshrines the right to free, universal primary education World Bank funded 'Tertiary Education Program' begins
1993	Establishment of the University College of Education at Winneba Beginning of private sector involvement in higher education University of Mines, Tarkwa
1994	Programme for the Provision of Free, Compulsory and Universal Education (fCUBE) by the Year 2005
1997	Akosombo Accord divides responsibility for university funding between the government (70%) and universities (30% to come from internal revenue-generation, private donations and student tuition fees)
1998	Student academic and residential facility user fees introduced Student loan scheme introduced through the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (replaced by Student Loan Trust in 2005)
2001	Western University College established (previously Tarwa School of Mines)
2002	President's Education Review Committee (the Anamuah-Mensah Committee) Ashesi University, West Africa's first liberal arts college founded
2004	Western University College granted full university status, as University of Mines and Technology, Tarkwa
2005	University College of Education at Winneba becomes University of Education, Winneba

Rawlings also ushered in private sector involvement in higher education in 1993 with the law (PNDCL 317) which established the National Accreditation Board (NAB), an independent government agency for quality assurance in tertiary education with specific responsibility for accreditation of public and private universities (Ng'ethe, Subotzky, and Afeti, 2008). There are now 38 private institutes registered with the NAB, enrolling 18,000 students (Government of Ghana, 2012: 8).

The governance of each university (whether sovereign or affiliate) requires a chancellor; vice-chancellor; a governing council (comprised of academic and lay members) and an academic board or senate. The governing council of each university has 14 members and includes students, alumni, teachers and academic representatives (Daniel, 1996).

Box 4.1 (see above and previous page) provides a timeline of key events in the formal education sector in Ghana, summarising the main developments and providing context for the education data on developmental leaders in Ghana that is presented in the next chapter.

5.0


Basic data on developmental leaders

This chapter provides a summary of the basic biographical information we collected for 115 developmental leaders associated with the key reform areas. Data was collected by our research partners, CDD, from a variety of internet sources in the first instance, and personal contact in the second. It corresponds to step three (longlist of 100 reformers – quantitative analysis) in our seven research steps. The dataset is not complete – i.e. for any specific statistic the sample size may be lower than the total on the list. We therefore either use percentages or give the sample size. For a full summary of biographical data collected, please see Annex 2.

Which reforms?

Of those leaders on the longlist, 54% were associated with democratic reforms, 47% with economic and public sector reforms, 17% with media reforms and 22% with Rawlings' rise to power and the early days of the PNDC.⁴¹ Absolute numbers involved in each reform area are shown in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Longlist leaders – number involved in different reform areas



Note: some leaders are associated with more than one reform.


Age profile⁴²

Taking arithmetic means of the data, we can say that the 'average leader' was 67 years old, was born in 1946, completed 'A-levels' in 1965 and gained a first degree in 1970, at the age of 24. Looking at the leaders in 5-year cohorts (Figure 5.2), we find that two thirds of them were born between 1940 and 1959, graduated from secondary school between 1960 and 1974 and gained their first degrees between 1965 and 1979, respectively. It is these broad time periods and corresponding cohorts of students that much of the following discussion focuses on.

41 Scores of more than 100% show some longlist leaders are associated with more than one reform area, hence a sum of great than 100%.

42 Age data was known for 77 (of 115 leaders); secondary school graduation date for 81 (of at least 108 whom we know attended secondary school, although we imagine almost all leaders did); university graduation date for 62 (of at least 108 of whom we believe attended higher education).

Figure 5.2: Longlist leaders – birth and graduation



Box 5.1 J.J. Rawlings

J. J. Rawlings has been the central figure in Ghanaian history since 1979 and in many ways is central to our analysis. Despite never having attended university, he mirrors the 'average' leader; being born in 1947, attending Achimota School until 1964, graduating from military academy in 1969 and beginning his leadership career in earnest in 4th June 1979, at the tender age of 31, when he was spectacularly sprung from jail to lead a junior officer coup d'état. His ARFC carried out a 'house-cleaning' operation on the military, before overseeing democratic elections and handing power back to an elected civilian President, Hilla Limann. However, dissatisfied that corrupt patronage networks remained in place, Rawlings led a second coup on 31st December 1981. It was this coup that brought many of the developmental leaders in our survey to the fore – either recruited by Rawlings to the new government, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), or in opposition to his autocratic rule.

Gender

Only 10% of the longlist are female. Compared to female representation in tertiary education in 1971 – approximately 15%⁴³ – this can be said to be a slight underrepresentation. This partly reflects methodological issues relating to the identification of longlist individuals (see Section 2.3). However, it can also be said to some extent to reflect the historically marginalised status of women in political life in Ghana: even in the 2012 election women held just 20% of Parliamentary seats, compared to around one third of tertiary students a decade previously.⁴⁴

Ethnicity and geographical background

Although ethnic tensions have sometimes bubbled to the surface, ethnicity in Ghana is not the defining feature it is in some other African states (perhaps the reason ethnicity was known for just 46% of the longlist). Of the data gathered on longlist leaders, 57% were Akan, 15% Ewe, 8% Ga, and 21% others, broadly in line with the population as a whole.⁴⁵ The geographical origin of the longlist leaders was also broadly in line with the general population, with Central region being the most over represented⁴⁶ (16% compared to 8% of general population) and Brong Ahafo the most under-represented (3% compared to 10% of general population). These two findings can be seen as the result of nation building policies pursued since independence, one of which we discuss in Chapter 6 (see Box 6.3).⁴⁷

43 Based on overall and female tertiary GERs from UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Female representation in the final interview list is close to this figure (4/27) – just under 15%.

44 UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

45 CIA World Factfile.


46 Perhaps because of over-representation of quality secondary schools in the region.

47 Foster (1965) provides an analysis of ethnic composition of secondary school students and finds that ethnicities become less well represented as one moves from the southern regions to the north, in line with the pattern of educational expansion and opportunity.

Educational profile


A quarter of the leaders on the longlist studied at Achimota.⁴⁸ This is a remarkable statistic given that there were over 100 secondary schools in Ghana in the 1960s. Fifty seven percent studied at other elite boarding schools,⁴⁹ but with no other school receiving more than a 9% share (Mfantsipim and Adisadel). In total 29 Ghanaian schools were represented. Just three leaders received their schooling outside of Ghana (all in the UK).

Figure 5.3: Longlist leaders – most popular secondary school destinations



At least⁵⁰ 94% of the longlist leaders attended some sort of tertiary education establishment (83% with undergraduate degrees and 11% with other kinds of qualifications);⁵¹ 48% attended Legon at some point and 10% attended the Ghana School of Law. Just 6% and 5% respectively attended KNUST and UCC, the two other public universities (Figure 5.4). Over half (58%⁵²) of the longlist leaders completed at least one degree abroad, with roughly the same number attending UK and US universities (the London School of Economics can claim to be the most popular among these) and a few studying in other countries (Figure 5.5). Well over two-thirds of the longlist leaders have second degrees, and nearly half have third degrees of some sort. At least 50% have postgraduate degrees (20% have Ghanaian postgraduate degrees and 33% have postgraduate degrees from overseas)⁵³ and 19% have PhDs (all of which were obtained overseas) (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.4: Longlist leaders – most popular university destinations



48 Secondary school destination data was collected for 108 leaders. Percentages therefore use this as the base. Where two schools are recorded for one leader, both are used.

49 Classification of elite and non-elite schools was made in consultation with our research partner, CDD.



50 Where no data is recorded, it is not always known whether this is because the leader did not attend university or simply that we were unable to find a record of it.

51 These include vocational, military and religious training.

52 Scores of more than 100% show most longlist leaders have completed more than one degree, hence a sum of greater than 100%

53 Scores do not add up to 50% because some have both Ghanaian and overseas postgraduate degrees.

Figure 5.5: Longlist leaders – university destination country

Figure 5.6: Longlist leaders – highest educational achievement⁵⁴

This is comparable with the educational profile of current Members of Parliament: 90% having completed some sort of tertiary education, 38% having a second degree and 10% having PhDs; 37% have studied abroad, but the UK and US are no longer the dominant destinations they once were (10% have studied in UK and 3.5% in US) (Osei, 2013: 19). Looking at other African leaders from the same period, however, we see that Ghanaian developmental leaders seem to be better educated than their continental counterparts, with only around one third of African heads of state from 1960s and 1970s having an undergraduate degree or higher (Theron, 2011).

Lawyers are often said to dominate Ghanaian politics, and we find that it is the most common subject amongst the longlist, with at least 25% having studied law at some point.⁵⁵ Other popular subjects were economics (19%), politics (12%), journalism (9%), public administration, management, history and English (7% each). The dominance of law and economics graduates is consistent with findings from Theron (2011) on the most common fields of study among African leaders. In relation to law graduates, Theron (2011: 13) suggests that:


“...leaders who have been educated in Law have better understanding of governance, the rule of law, the importance of institutional integrity and application of constitutional principles, which in turn may provide them with enhanced respect for abiding by presidential term limits.”

⁵⁴ For each individual there is an underestimation bias; we simply may not have found evidence of their highest educational achievement.

⁵⁵ Data was collected for 251 degrees, but the subject studied was only known for 213 of these. Figures for numbers studying each subject are therefore our minimum estimate, with the actual number likely to be around one-fifth higher: The base value for percentages is the total number of leaders (115). Where multiple subjects were studied on the same course (such as combined philosophy, politics and economics) we have counted each.

Theron also found that around 50% of leaders who studied economics completed their studies outside Africa and then presided over their countries during a steady or significant period of economic growth. Nearly 70% of these economics graduates had centre-right political leanings, suggesting a more Western approach to economics and support for democracy (Theron, 2011: 13).

Figure 5.7: Longlist leaders – subject choice at university




6.0

Analysis of developmental leadership education in Ghana

This chapter examines the role of secondary and higher education in the formation of developmental leaders in Ghana, drawing on analysis of 27 interviews conducted with some of the most significant developmental leaders associated with the reform areas (see Figure 6.1).⁵⁶ It corresponds to step 6 (interviews with key reformers) and step 7 (analysis of skills and values) in our seven research steps.

Figure 6.1: Interviewee leaders – reform areas



Note: some leaders are associated with more than one reform.

Analysis of the two education sub-sectors is presented separately and in each case examines how and what the sub-sector has contributed to developing the skills and values required for developmental leadership. It naturally follows the narrative of the interviewees⁵⁷ lives (see Figure 6.2), and therefore largely describes the education system in the turbulent post-independence years of 1957-79.

We also interviewed ten younger leaders, ten higher education institute leaders, five organisational leaders and five student leaders in order to triangulate our findings and obtain a perspective on more recent educational experiences. Findings from these interviews are examined in Section 6.3.

56 We have also used information from the autobiography of John Dramani Mahama, the current President of Ghana. The sample size for data therefore varies between 27 and 28.

57 The term 'interviewees' is used here to refer to those shortlisted and interviewed because of their association with our key reform areas. Evidence from other interviews is clearly attributed (for example, interviews with higher education institute leaders).


Table 6.1: List of interviewees and their significance in Ghana's development history

Interviewee	Significance
Joe Abbey	Leading technocrat at Finance ministry during the ERP.
Kwadwo Afari-Gyan	Academic (Political Science), Electoral Commissioner 1992 to present.
Nana Akufo-Addo	Leading pro-democracy advocate in 1970s and 1980s, Attorney-General and Foreign Minister under Kufuor administration, Presidential Candidate for NPP 2008 and 2012.
Paa Kwesi Amissah-Arthur	Current Vice President of Ghana; key member of ERP team; former Governor of the Bank of Ghana; former Consultant to World Bank.
Akoto Ampaw	Human Rights attorney; leading democracy activist as member of New Democratic Movement, Movement For Freedom and Justice and Alliance for Change.
David Ampofo	Leading political broadcaster.
Joyce Aryee	Secretary of Information in the PNDC regime.
Cletus Avoka	Leading figure of NDC, current majority leader in parliament.
Kabral Blay-Amihere	Journalist, founder of one of the first private Newspapers in Ghana, 'The Independent', current Chairperson of the National Media Commission.
Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey	Led PNDC's National Investigations Committee, later leading member of opposition NPP, serving as Minister for Interior and Local Government in Kufuor administration.
Ben Ephson	Journalist and pollster; current Managing Editor of the Daily Dispatch.
Audrey Gadzekpo	Journalist, media and women's rights activist.
Miranda A. Greenstreet	Distinguished academic and advisor on adult education reforms.
Boakye Gyan	Led 1979 coup that first brought Rawlings to prominence.
Samuel O. Gyandoh	Principal co-author of 1979 constitution.
E. Gyimah-Boadi	Leading academic (Political Scientist), founder and director of political think tank, Centre for Democratic Development.
Sam Jonah	Ghanaian industrialist and businessman and advisor on mining reforms.
Kwame Karikari	Democracy activist in 1980s (founding member of New Democratic Movement and Movement for Freedom and Justice), former Director of School of Communication Studies, University of Ghana, current Executive Director of Media Foundation for West Africa.
John Agyekum Kufuor	Veteran politician and President 2001-2009.
Enoch Teye Mensah	Longstanding member of the PNDC /NDC, current Minister for Employment and Social Welfare.
John Ndeugre	Worked in PNDC administration before becoming democracy activist, first for Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards and later Movement for Freedom and Justice, also former MP for NPP.
Jacob Obetsebi-Lamprey	Founding member of NPP, campaign coordinator during transition elections of 2000.
Elisabeth Ohene	Campaigner for press freedom, journalist for the BBC, communications chief for President Kufuor.
Sam Okudzeto	Veteran democracy campaigner; former President of the Ghana Bar Association and Association of Recognized Professional Bodies.
Yaw Osafo-Marfo	A founding Deputy Chairman of the Ghana Stock Exchange, former past Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the West African Bankers Association, Finance Minister in Kufuor administration.
Akilagpa Sawyerr	Former lecturer, Dean of Faculty of Law and Vice Chancellor, University of Ghana.
Ekwow Spio-Gabrah	Leading figure under both the PNDC and NDC Governments, prominent businessman.
John Dramani Mahama ⁵⁸	Current President of Ghana.

More detailed profiles for selected key leaders are provided in Chapter 7 in relation to their role in reform coalitions.

58 Not interviewed, but his autobiography (Dramani Mahama, 2012) provides information on how his educational experience influenced him as a developmental leader:

Figure 6.2: Interviewee leaders - birth and graduation



Note: dataset not complete.

See Annex 4 for key biographical and education data on the interviewees.

6.1 Secondary schooling

“The boarding system almost guaranteed leaders – it helped develop relationships, aspirations, networks [...] I can’t understand why others did not become leaders” (Ekwow Spio Gbrah, Achimota School, class of 1970).

When asked about the formation of their leadership skills and values, all of the interviewees described secondary education as a crucial part of this.⁵⁹ Further, operating a largely boarding school system, secondary schooling in Ghana pre-empted the role that higher education does in many other countries by providing the student’s first experience away from home in an academic environment.⁶⁰ We therefore first consider the role of secondary schools, especially elite boarding schools, in the formation of the skills and values of developmental leaders, before turning our attention to higher education.

When talking about secondary schooling, there is a consensus among the leaders that there was an elite band of publicly-funded secondary boarding schools, all of which were training young people for eventual entry into the government, law courts and private business. It is also generally acknowledged that one of these, Achimota School, was more prolific than the others, churning out 25% of the leaders. (Adisadel and Mfantsipim, which also hold a significant place in Ghanaian history, were the next most prolific schools, each educating 9% of the leaders). This aim of creating leaders was achieved through a number of different approaches including high quality teaching, strong Christian values and significant government funding, as outlined in more detail below.

Elite boarding schools – training for leadership

An integral part of this leadership formation model was the boarding school system. All the interviewed leaders attended a secondary boarding school of some sort, and many were boarders from primary school. With constant activity, the feeling of living in a ‘bubble’, and a focus on achievement at the expense of family relationships, life at school for many mirrored their later leadership career.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Interviews were conducted with 26 Ghanaian leaders, and some data was also collected from the autobiography of the current President, John Mahama Dramani. A rough interview template was followed, but each interview followed its own course depending on time available and the emphasis placed on different topics, either by the interviewer or the interviewee. For that reason it is difficult to use the interviews as descriptive data, but we hope they have some explanatory power.

⁶⁰ Most secondary school students in Ghana are now day students, though the elite boarding secondary school system is still very much in place.

⁶¹ Whereas in many countries (such as the UK) it is still a bone of contention that so many leaders are from elite boarding schools, in Ghana it was seen as inevitable. The educational model is similar but since many elite schools are publicly funded (almost all were in the 1960/70s) access to them in Ghana is on merit, while in the UK and many other developed countries, access to elite schools is determined largely by wealth.

Box 6.1 Achimota School - a model school for developmental leaders?

Achimota school was founded in 1924 by Brigadier-General Sir Frederick Gordon Guggisberg (the British Governor of the Gold Coast), Dr James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey (a Ghanaian intellectual, missionary and teacher) and Rev. Alexander Garden Fraser (a Scottish missionary and educationalist). Achimota was always envisaged as the premier training ground for Ghana's future leaders, drawing students from the entire colony and beyond. It had strong Christian roots, with values such as public service, equality and respect for different cultures all reflected in its founding ideals:⁶¹

- The best use of the minds and bodies which God has given us.
- An equal opportunity for girls and boys in education.
- Respect for all that is true and of lasting value in the old African culture, beliefs and ways of life
- Willing, humble service of the educated for the uneducated.
- Mutual understanding and cooperation between Christians of all denominations and the growth of that spirit in which the churches shall one day be united again.
- Friendship, respect and cooperation between all races on equal terms.
- The belief, on which all else rest, in Jesus Christ as the revelation for all time and all peoples of the love of God, and as the guide and pattern of our lives (Agbodeka, 1977).

Whilst many schools may also have similarly impressive mission statements, the evidence from the interviews is that Achimota was successful at transmitting these values to its students. One factor in its success is undoubtedly the generous funding Achimota received from the Gold Coast authorities, both for its capital investment needs and its recurrent expenditure. One estimate put its funding as 60% of the Governor's Ten-Year Education Development Plan, whilst another put it at 85% of the 1920-1930 education expenditure – in either case, the lion's share of the country's education budget (Setse, 1974 and Ekuban, 1973 cited in Agbodeka, 1977: 47). This enabled Achimota to be generously staffed and equipped in beautiful surroundings with the aim of inspiring pupils to have a visionary outlook in terms of nation-building and development (Agbodeka, 1977).

"Boarding school taught me how to live with other people who are not family [...] and I learnt emotional and social skills. It also taught me about community – the idea of leadership without community is a joke" (David Ampofo, St John's School, 1977).

"My entire educational experience, from kindergarten to college, was spent as a residential student. Those pain-filled years at Achimota provided me with the foundation, the support, and the motivation that saw me through the remainder of my education. And in time, I learned to thank my father for insisting upon it" (John Dramani Mahama, Achimota and Ghana Secondary School, 1977 from Dramani Mahama (2012: 36).

One of the purposes of boarding school was to allow enough time and space for thorough character formation and it was one of Governor Guggisberg's 16 founding principles to guide future education in the Gold Coast (Agbodeka, 1977).

"Character training is much the most important thing. It must come in the religious teaching, it is true, but still more in the spirit of the daily round, the thoroughness in work, the team play, the training in love of country and in practical service of the people of the country. It must come above all from the unity of the staff, and the common life of staff and boys living in close relationship in field, dormitory and classroom. It will be forwarded greatly by responsibility in self-government given to the boys in increasing measure, till captains and prefects have a large share in the ruling of the school and college. It will best be done when we have a strong body of African colleagues on the staff" (Fraser's first annual report on Achimota, cited in Williams, 1962).

Similarly, at Mfantsipim:

"It was as a result of strict discipline, religious training, insistence on excellence, his own principled and courageous stand on issues, that he [Lockhart] was able to infuse into his students and staff what became known as the Lockhart character or spirit – the spirit of service, courage, standing up for one's convictions, loyalty, honesty, integrity..." (Adu Boahen, 1996: 318)

Students were taught how to be independent and were given positions of responsibility, such as dormitory prefect, student monitor, captain of a sports team or editor of the school newspaper.

“When entrusted to monitorship and prefectship, you are given responsibility that you account for [...] you give direction to your peers and juniors. You learn all this at that time of your life. By the time you are through, you become self-aware” (Interview with John Kufuor, Prempeh College, 1959).

All of this, of course, was to train the student for leadership. A quarter of the interviewees describe learning basic leadership skills at school.

“In boarding school, a student is exposed to the necessity of leadership” (Interview with John Kufuor, Prempeh College, 1959).

“The sixth form offered leadership. All sixth formers were in one leadership position or the other, whether you were a prefect or not” (Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, Achimota and Ola School, 1978).

At Achimota in particular, these positions were made accountable through student elections.

“We were made to practice democracy in Achimota [...] by voting for tribal heads and school prefects [...] I was elected head of the Twis [the dominant language group in Ghana] twice – this was the beginning of my political career” (Interview with Yaw Osafo Maafo, Achimota School, 1963).⁶³

Core development area: 'Character formation' and leadership qualities	
Examples of this development area as paraphrased in interviews	'Independence', 'discipline', 'responsibility', 'relationships', 'community', 'democracy', 'confidence' and 'aspirations'
How these characteristics were developed as described in interviews	Boarding, leadership positions, student elections and extra-curricular activities
Interviewees mentioning this development area	Ekwoy Spio Gbrah, David Ampofo, John Kufuor, John Dramani Mahama, Audrey Gadzekpo, Yaw Osafo Maafo, Joyce Aryee, Ben Ephson, Elizabeth Ohene, Joe Abbey, Boakye Gyan, Nana Akufo-Addo and Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey (13/28)
Transmission mechanisms described in literature	'Servant leadership' through social and community services, leadership positions of extra-curricular clubs, religious teaching and school culture

Values and culture

Values around **discipline**, **public service** and **tolerance and respect for others** were those most cited when talking about secondary school experience, being mentioned in around a quarter of interviews each. The first two of these are summed up in the words to the Achimota School song (directly quoted in two interviews):

“So to subjugate ourselves so that we may rule.”

The emphasis on these two values is probably a result of Ghanaian education's Christian roots. Schools such as Mfantsipim, Accra High School, St. Augustine's and the SPG Grammar School (now known as Adisadel College) were established as missionary schools of Methodist, Anglican and Catholic churches. Their Christian values translated to strong school cultures, this being the main transfer mechanism of values described by the interviewees. Although the new schools established as part of Nkrumah's Accelerated Development Plan for Education were essentially secular, they were modelled on these schools and retained much of their culture and values. This strong moral code can therefore be said to have affected all Ghanaian leaders who passed through the boarding school system.

⁶³ It is worth pointing out that the voting of tribal heads was purely a celebration of national culture (their main responsibility was to lead the 'School Yell') and not a divisive issue. Indeed, Osafo Maafo says that at school, 'ethnicity was irrelevant' and that he 'never felt tribal until recently'. See Box 6.3 for more on attitudes towards ethnicity and national identity.

Other values developed at school were **national identity** (see Box 6.3), **competitiveness** (through sports and other extra-curricular activities), **integrity** (again, through the Christian ethos of the majority of schools) and **democracy** (through student elections, particularly at Achimota).

Core development area: Developmental leadership values	
Examples of this development area as paraphrased in interviews	'Service', 'discipline', 'tolerance', 'respect', 'integrity', 'cohesion', 'democracy', 'morals' and 'Christian values'
How these characteristics were developed as described in interviews	School culture, integration of students from whole country, recognising traditional leadership institutions, celebrating traditional culture, sense of privilege, extra-curricular activities and leadership positions
Interviewees mentioning this development area	Ben Ephson, Elizabeth Ohene, Joe Abbey, Boakye Gyan, Nana Akufo-Addo, Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey, Miranda Greenstreet, Sam Jonah, Akilagpa Sawyerr, John Ndebugre, Akoto Ampaw, Yaw Osafo Maafo, Cletus Avoka, Jacob Obetsebi-Lampsey and E. Gyimah-Boadi (15/28)
Transmission mechanisms described in literature	Strong social service focus from the Red Cross Link and Social Services Societies at Achimota and Mfantispim with active involvement from large majority of students going out to serve their local community in a variety of health and community development activities; the approach to leisure time in Achimota was to use it for the "profitable enjoyment of their neighbours and themselves" (Agbodeka, 1977: 82)

Box 6.2 The nature of elites in Ghana

Of 22 shortlist leaders asked, there was a roughly even split between those coming from poor agricultural, basic skills, lower middle class, professional middle class, and elite backgrounds.⁶⁴ A more reliable predictor of becoming part of the Ghanaian developmental elite would seem to be secondary school attendance:⁶⁵ all but three of the shortlist leaders attended an elite Ghanaian or British public school. From the longlist only 18% attended non-elite schools.⁶⁶

During Nkrumah's time in power, access to secondary schooling was relatively meritocratic: access to primary schooling expanded so that by 1966 the GER was around 70% (Kosack, 2012: 171); there was significant spending on scholarships so that the "vast majority" of students were receiving free education and there were positive discrimination policies for those from poorer backgrounds and regions (Kosack, 2012: 174).⁶⁷ The Cocoa Marketing Board scholarship is the most important scholarship fund from this period (with four of the interviewees benefitting). In addition, all children from the northern regions received entirely free education (applicable to three of the interviewees). There was also automatic admission to Achimota if you were amongst the top performers in any northern primary school (with one of the interviewees benefitting from this policy). Even at Achimota and Mfantispim, the two most exclusive schools, around one fifth of students had totally uneducated, rural parents (Foster; 1965: 246). In 1965, tuition fees for all levels of education were abolished.

Successive elitist governments from 1966 to 1981 sought to restrict access to higher levels of education (Kosack, 2012), but we can say that when the majority of the leaders were progressing through general education, access to the Ghanaian educated elite was relatively inclusive and meritocratic.⁶⁸ This inclusion had obvious benefits for those receiving scholarships and free education; it also had positive governance implications as elites were drawn from a greater pool of talent; and it also had an impact on the values and outlook of more privileged students who were brought into contact with poverty for the first time:

"It was my first exposure to people who were really poor – a defining thing for me." (Interview with Elizabeth Ohene, Achimota School, 1964)

64 Based on parents' profession. The figures were 4, 3, 4, 7 and 4, respectively.

65 Since non-developmental leaders were not studied, we cannot say whether the same would be true for them. This is an important area for future research.

66 The majority of these would nonetheless go on to an elite higher education (defined as Legon or an overseas higher learning institute). Just 4% of our sample did not attend any elite higher education institute.

67 Inevitably some slipped through the cracks – without a scholarship, Kwame Karikari for example, could not afford the fees and therefore opted for fully-funded Teacher Training College.

Box 6.2 continued

Since its introduction in the colonial period, education has always been valued as the vehicle of social and economic mobility, and this was particularly the case in the Ghana of the 1950s and 1960s.

“...there can be no doubt that the schools [in Ghana] operate as extraordinarily effective channels for occupational and social mobility.” (Foster, 1965: 258)

It was not until the disastrous regime of Acheampong in the 1970s, when corruption became the only secure route to prosperity and status, that Ghanaians began to question the value of education (Svanikier, 2007). The funding crisis and emphasis on cost recovery in secondary and higher education since the 1980s have particularly hit the poor. Palmer (2005: 9) reported that the poorest 10% of the population are unlikely to benefit from government spending on either secondary or higher education, and the poorest 45% of Ghana's population do not have access to any form of higher education.

Box 6.3 Boarding schools and national integration

The national network of boarding secondary schools was inherited from the British and expanded after independence, at least partly as a means of promoting a national identity and integration.⁶⁹ Schools admitted students based on a common entrance exam sat by all students in the final year of primary school. Students were asked to name first, second and third school choices (Foster, 1965). Since all schools were boarding, students could select any, leading to a diverse student body at the top schools, drawing on all ethnic, faith and geographical backgrounds (Dramani Mahama, 2012).

Over a third of the leaders who went to public boarding school in Ghana reported that this exposure to people of different backgrounds helped them form a national identity. Sam Jonah, an Adisadel old boy, says: “there was a sense of togetherness and respect for others, an appreciation of others' talents, a tolerance for other religions, spirit of teamwork and a need to work with different sorts of people.”

Akilagpa Sawyerr states that his Achimota experience made him “more Ghanaian” than he otherwise would have been. As well as the simple exposure to different cultures and backgrounds, the schools actively encouraged celebration of traditional culture, but within the context of a modern nation state. At Achimota:

- students had to wear their own traditional dress to Sunday church services; and
- students ate from a menu that contained foods from all the different ethnic groups (Agbodeka, 1977).

A quality education – academic excellence and a broad curriculum

“Quality education thrust you to leadership” (Joyce Aryee, Achimota School, class of 1963).

Ghana's secondary school system seems to have been of a very high quality when the leaders were attending. In 1976, whilst GERs were still very low,⁷⁰ education's share of GDP was 6.4%, with two-thirds of expenditure going to secondary and tertiary sub-sectors (World Bank, 2004). With Ghana's economy in increasingly dire straits, however, this figure had fallen to just 1.5% by 1983. In addition, a shift in focus to basic education with the 1987 reforms and continued enrolment expansion meant that expenditure per secondary (and tertiary) pupil never recovered.⁷¹

68 We found social diversity even among the five leaders who started their secondary education after Nkrumah's fall, with one coming from a poor agricultural background, one from a basic skills background, one from the lower middle class and two from the professional middle class.

69 Francis L. Bartels, one of Ghana's foremost educators as Headmaster of Mfantshipim School states: “[Nkrumah] managed to rise impressively above tribalism. He downgraded it in cooperation with the Christian churches and their boarding schools.” (Bartels, 2003: 214). This aim of ‘reducing ethnic loyalties’ was inherited from British colonial policy (Foster, 1965: 212).

70 GER data for secondary education alone was not available. For middle and secondary combined, it was between 35-40% through the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

71 Expenditure per pupil for both levels has been in decline since 1966 and by 2000, it was around one-tenth of 1966 levels in real terms. Expenditure per head for secondary students dropped from 15 times that for primary pupils in 1966 to 2.5 by 2000; the primary-university expenditure ratio dropped from 1:193 to 1:24 (Kosack, 2012: 189-211).

In the 1950s and 1960s, there were many teachers from overseas⁷² and there were low pupil-teacher ratios.⁷³ **A broad curriculum** gave an “all-rounded education”⁷⁴ and developed **critical thinking skills**.⁷⁵

“Exposure to diverse subjects really ignited my consciousness of society [...] how things come together to shape society” (Interview with John Kufuor, Prempeh College, 1959).

“I was top of my class in [at a top UK university] – I believe because of the quality of my A-level education at Achimota” (Interview with former Legon lecturer).

As alluded to above, within this elite band of secondary schools, there was one that was first amongst equals and received the lion’s share of the education budget from its creation to independence: Achimota School. Where other schools had foreign teachers, Achimota had Oxbridge graduates; where other schools had elementary buildings (or, in the case of many mission schools, teachers’ own homes), Achimota had an expansive campus and a generous capital works budget (Agbodeka, 1977; Adu Boahen, 1996). Those at Achimota felt privileged to be there, and they talk about the confidence that gave them:

“The moment you enter Achimota School, everybody had the feeling that you are going to do something in the system [...] the type of history you learn, the type of visitors you get [...] Going to Achimota got you a lot of respect” (Yaw Osafo Maafo, Achimota School, 1963).

Indeed, Achimota was so special that they received prestigious visitors “every couple of weeks”⁷⁶ – Nikita Khrushchev, Jawaharlal Nehru and Harold Macmillan, to name but a few. All this only enhanced the students’ feeling that they were in a unique position to serve society.

“Achimota gave us an all rounded education, a sense of privilege and a sense to give back” (Audrey Gadzekpo, Achimota and Ola School, 1978).

Core development area: Intellectual development	
Examples of this development area as paraphrased in interviews	‘Critical thinking’, ‘intellectual development’ and ‘subject interest’
How these characteristics were developed as described in interviews	Quality teaching and broad curriculum
Interviewees mentioning this development area	Audrey Gadzekpo, Joyce Aryee, Ekwow Spio Gbrah, John Dramani Mahama, Nana Akufo-Addo, Akilagpa Sawyerr, Cletus Avoka, Jacob Obetsebi-Lamptey, Kabral Blay-Amihere and Sam Okudzeto (10/28)
Transmission mechanisms described in literature	Focus on strong academic but liberal education with teachers at Achimota and Mfantsipim encouraged to continue with further study; strong investment in and focus on use of school libraries for research and learning at Achimota and Mfantsipim;

Constant activity – extra-curricular activities

Another reason Achimota was seen as so special, and where considerable resources were spent, was students’ extra-curricular activities. Involvement in debating clubs, cadet corps, student newspapers and sport gave students the opportunity to develop important leadership skills such as debating, discipline, strategy and teamwork. Other clubs and activities mentioned in interviews are Young Pioneers, Boy Scouts, Current Affairs clubs, school bands, drama clubs, press clubs, farming, weaving, pottery, book-binding, even United Nations Associations and a students’ movement for African unity. This “mixture of

⁷² John Ndebugre claims that 90% of teachers at Navrongo were Scottish. Malcolm Redding, a teacher at Achimota in the 1960s describes ‘a fair number of European teachers’.

⁷³ Interview with Akilagpa Sawyerr.

⁷⁴ Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo.

⁷⁵ Interview with Cletus Avoka.

⁷⁶ Interview with Yaw Osafo Maafo.

academic and non-academic activities helped develop a spirit of competition”,⁷⁷ provided “exposure to different kinds of relationships, forced us to face the world, and taught that knowledge was to be practiced.”⁷⁸

At Mfantipim, drama played an important role, with its founder viewing it as “one way of helping pupils to discover for themselves that there is always a better way of doing and saying things as well as to enjoy the human story in word and action” (Adu Boahen, 1996: 421). At Achimota, there was a tradition of performance of vernacular plays on Saturday nights and then house performances of longer plays and productions (also known as the Curtain Club) (Agbodeka, 1977).

The emphasis on extra-curricular activities was present at most schools, but it was Achimota in particular where this model was pursued to the full (13/28 shortlist interviewees mentioned extra-curricular activities, but 6/8 Achimotans). Indeed students were encouraged to be busy the whole day, with a timetable that started at 5am and finished at 9pm,⁷⁹ a philosophy credited by one interviewee to the longstanding Headmaster of the day, Alan Rudwick.⁸⁰

“After staying in Achimota for seven years these activities become a part of me” (Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey, Achimota School, 1974).

“I established the Current Affairs Club, edited the school newspaper, was a Young Pioneer and in the school band [...] It was the start of my leadership career [...] really prepared me for the future” (Kabral Blay-Amihere, St. Augustine’s School, 1972).

Study abroad

Three of the interviewees studied at elite boarding schools in the UK (two at Lancing College, one at Camden Girls School). As the Ghanaian system was modelled to a large extent on the British one, their experience was quite similar, with the obvious differences that living in a strange country brings.

“I experienced different societies [...] I was able to mix with [...] people of other cultures” (Interview with Miranda Greenstreet, Camden Girls School, UK, 1949).

Box 6.4 The exceptions that prove the rule?

Of 27 leaders interviewed, just three of them had not had an ‘elite’ secondary schooling (i.e. had not attended one of Ghana’s elite schools or a British boarding school). Sam Okudzeto studied at Zion College, E.T. Mensah at Accountancy College and Kwame Karikari went to teacher training college as it was fully funded.⁸¹ Two of these – Okudzeto and Karikari – went on to higher education abroad, which leads us to hypothesise that entry into Ghana’s developmental elite was determined partly by educational background, either an elite secondary education or an elite higher education.

Of the interviewees, E.T. Mensah is the only one who could be said to have never received an elite education. However, elite education did play an important role in his leadership career: whilst working as an accountant for the University of Ghana, he met many of Ghana’s future leaders (many of whom would become his colleagues) and took part in campus study groups which he cites as an important influence on his politics, leadership ambitions and networks (see Box 6.8 for more on these study groups).

6.2 Higher education

“The key of higher education is intellectual exposure – knowledge of the past, issues of the present [...] The fundamentals come from secondary – beliefs, core values; higher education is a maturation of this development” (Interview with Nana Akufo Addo, Lancing College, UK and University of Ghana, Ghana School of Law).

77 Interview with Cletus Avoka.

78 Interview with Joyce Aryee.

79 Interview with Nkrabeah Effah Dartey. He credits this philosophy to the headmaster of the day, Alan Rudwick.

80 ‘Nana’ Alan Rudwick spent twenty five years teaching at Achimota, and was Principal from 1965 to 1977.

81 Teacher training colleges covered all expenses for all students and paid a stipend to students, whereas secondary school students had to win a scholarship to receive payment to cover board and accommodation.

Elite formation stage of educational development⁸²

Ghana's plan for universities has always been as a means for promoting development: the University of Ghana, Legon, was formed largely to train managers and leaders for developing administration and business; the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, to develop engineers to drive Ghana's infrastructural development; and the University of Cape Coast (UCC) was initially formed to train teachers for Ghana's rapidly expanding education system. (Although the remit of all these institutions has widened somewhat, they still have the same broad goals) (Agbodeka, 1998). This model continues to the present day, with four new specialist universities for Rural Development, Education, Mining and Health added in the last twenty years. Given this plan of specialisation, it is not surprising that Legon dominates our survey as the main national producer of developmental leaders – after all, it was the only university producing law,⁸³ history, politics and economics graduates – degrees highlighted in our previous reports as more likely to be studied by developmental leaders.⁸⁴ What perhaps is surprising is the extent of its dominance: of the 68% of longlist leaders that did at least one degree in Ghana, 71% of them studied at Legon, with just nine and eight percent studying at Kumasi and Cape Coast, respectively (15% did postgraduate studies at Ghana School of Law). Explanations for this dominance were sought from interviewees, and their responses are presented in Box 6.5.

Another key finding from the data is that the majority (58%) studied abroad at some point.⁸⁵ This is split half and half between the UK and US,⁸⁶ with a small minority studying in other countries (two in Germany and one each in Belgium, Canada, Cuba, France, Israel and Uganda).

This chapter largely focuses on Legon, and what it was about it that made it such a prolific producer of developmental leaders, before turning our attention to the experiences of those who studied elsewhere.

Extension of Achimota in the Oxbridge mould: a culture of high academic expectations

From the Legon of the 1960s and 1970s described by the leaders, it is easy to spot the influences of its dual heritage: Legon was formed as an extension of Achimota College, with a supervisory role played by the University of London. The inheritance from Achimota is clear: a privileged and high quality education was afforded the elite few, although on the basis of ability, with a view to creating Ghana's future leaders.

“University was similar to secondary school therefore also very important [...] it bred leadership” (Interview with Ekwow Spio Gbrah, University of Ghana, 1973).

“Legon was like an extension of Achimota – big campus, lots of activities [...] you felt like you were somewhere special, part of an elite” (Interview with Nkrabeah Effah Dartey, University of Ghana, 1977).

It was also similar to Achimota in that it took the best students from all over the country and put them on one expansive campus.

“Legon was a big crucible – it took the boarding school idea, which in Ghana had been positive because it brought people from all ethnicities and social strata [...] Legon demonstrated that principle even more” (Interview with Nana Akufo Addo, University of Ghana, 1967).

“At university there were different people from different backgrounds. You learnt that you weren't the only bright person around – a new dynamic! This shapes you as you have to adapt to these changes” (Interview with Elizabeth Ohene, University of Ghana, 1967).

“There was a 'levelling up' – we all inspired each other. Volta Hall was a diverse society – different faiths and skills [...] we recognised that each was there on merit” (Interview with Joyce Aryee, University of Ghana, 1966).

From the University of London, or the British university model more generally, the influence is also clear: Legon was built

82 See previous paper in the series for a discussion of different stages of educational development (Brannelly, Lewis and Ndaruhutse, 2011a).

83 The Ghana School of Law only offers postgraduate studies.

84 Theron (2011), examining key characteristics of heads of state and government in Sub-Saharan Africa since independence, found that law, economics, social sciences and education were the most popular subjects studied by leaders at university. Over the past two decades, law has remained consistently popular and a growing number of leaders have studied economics. Since the 1990s, several leaders have been university lecturers before coming to power, indicating that universities may be important in developing leaders and coalitions of leaders.

85 This compares to data from the DLP database of African leaders which tells us that 48% of first degrees, 76% of postgraduate degrees and 92% of PhDs were obtained overseas. Of the 71 leaders with a higher education, 50 (70%) had studied abroad at some point.

86 32% have studied in the UK and 30% in the US.

upon a Hall structure – students lived in Hall dormitories, received tutorials from Hall tutors and the majority of the extra-curricular and social activities were based in the Hall. Each Hall had a Junior Common Room (JCR) which had its own democratically elected administrations. Each Hall also had its own character, but Commonwealth Hall in particular can claim to have had a lasting impact on those that passed through its doors.

“Commonwealth was the vanguard hall; the most radical [...] it gave confidence, a feel-good factor to be in the best hall [...] Seniors gave inspiration and mentorship” (Interview with Nkrabeah Effah Dartey, former JCR President).

John Dramani Mahama, the current President of Ghana, describes how humbled and “filled with purpose” he was the first time he saw its coat of arms with the Hall motto, “Truth Stands”. He also describes the lasting impact the Hall culture was to have on him.

“[Commonwealth] coaxed the natural activist in me to come out [...] It encouraged the formation of opinions and the expression of individuality [...] I'd never really been expressive. I had strong opinions, but mostly I kept my inner thoughts to myself. Living in Commonwealth Hall helped me to start speaking out because I felt relaxed enough to be myself” (Dramani Mahama, 2012: 205).

The key place of **strong, personal staff-student relationships** that was a core part of the Oxbridge teaching and mentoring model was further developed at Legon. Around half the interviewees talked either about the quality of individual faculty or teaching more generally. Nine named particularly influential individuals and two stated how important it was to them that their professors took an interest in their work and in their opinions.

“Tutorials were important. Your tutors became your mentors, as part of the hall system” (Interview with Joyce Ayree, University of Ghana, 1966).

“We had small class sizes (seven people) and [...] lots of interaction – debate, discussion. We had regular access to professors, both academic and social” (Interview with Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, University of California, 1974).

“Classroom teaching was radical: it was about challenging the establishment” (Interview with former Legon lecturer).

Similarly, John Kufuor, a philosophy, politics and economics (PPE) student at Oxford, spent considerable time when interviewed describing influential faculty in law, economics, politics and philosophy, and how they challenged him intellectually and strengthened his character.

“All these people were big in their own way and you couldn't pass through their hands, come out after three years and not be influenced” (Interview with John Kufuor, Oxford University, 1964).

Box 6.5: Higher education in Ghana: a tool for social mobility or elite reproduction?

The establishment of the University of Ghana at Legon in 1948 owed a lot to the lobbying and fundraising of the existing educated elite (Agbodeka, 1998), who were already beginning to challenge the hegemony of the traditional aristocracy (Svanikier, 2007). From 1951 to 1966, Nkrumah significantly expanded access to higher education for the poor so that Ghana in the 1950s and 1960s was a place of real social and economic mobility (Kosack, 2012). The subsequent elitist governments restricted access for the poor (see Chapter 4) and increased spending relative to primary. University students became so privileged that in 1978, when the country was in economic ruin, Legon students went to the streets to protest that they were having too much chicken in their (free) meals (Kosack, 2012). Rawlings sought to re-open access to the poor and significantly expanded student numbers, but at the same time as reducing spending on higher education relative to primary education. Despite these attempts at a pro-poor education policy, the poorest 45% have no access to higher education (Palmer, 2005).⁸⁷

⁸⁷ All of our leaders benefitted from Nkrumah's inclusive policies, at least in access to primary education (as well as subsequently benefitting from elitist policies). Of the five interviewees who began secondary education after 1966, one comes from a poor agricultural background and four from the lower and professional middle classes.

Leadership skills and values

Just as at boarding school, many of the interviewees also describe how they developed their values of public service at university. Although a secular institute, it still had a strong **moral purpose**.

“People at Legon had a strong commitment to contributing to social change and the development of our country” (Interview with Akoto Ampaw, University of Ghana, 1979).

“Leftist lecturers stimulated our minds to think and to be of service” (Interview with Kabral Blay-Amihere, University of Ghana, 1975).

Leadership skills and values were developed through three distinct mechanisms: **course content**, **extra-curricular activities** and **student activism**.

Box 6.6 A model university for developmental leadership formation?

As already stated, nearly half of the longlist passed through Legon as a student (even more if you include those who worked there). Of the 27 interviewees, 15 studied there, two taught there after studying overseas and one worked on campus as an accountant. To try to understand why Legon of the 1960s and 1970s produced so many developmental leaders, we asked interviewees what it was (if anything) about Legon that made it so special.

It was inevitable

Five of the leaders felt that it was inevitable that Legon produced so many leaders – after all, that was what it was set up to do. The higher education GER was 0.68% in 1971,⁸⁸ meaning that university graduates were almost guaranteed leadership careers. Legon was the only institute offering law, politics and economics and student politics provided a training ground for future leaders.⁸⁹

Exciting times

The post-independence generation “felt they could achieve anything [...] We were brought up in the atmosphere of ‘get out there and get things done’”;⁹⁰ indeed the compulsory African studies “put you in the liberation mood.”⁹¹ The 1966 coup led to “Legon being alive”⁹² – partly because Nkrumah’s removal led to a “reawakening of dissent, discussion and activism”⁹³ and partly because it was so divisive, with camps forming on both sides at Legon, doing battle through the 1960s and 1970s.⁹⁴ “Amazing lecturers” like Kwesi Botchwey and Akilagpa Sawyerr⁹⁵ also helped create a “vibrant atmosphere.”⁹⁶

Set-up/structure/quality/critical mass

“Legon was founded on the on the traditions and best practises from England”;⁹⁷ from where almost all of its Vice-Chancellors have been educated (the only exception being one from the University of Dublin) (Adu Boahen, 1996). Its philosophy was always to “nurture the youth”, bringing together a “storehouse of the first batch of highly trained Ghanaians”, including youth from the traditional leadership ranks.⁹⁸ Boakye Gyan also puts the particular impact of the class of ’67 down to critical mass: entrance was suspended in 1963 meaning that two cohorts entered together in 1964.⁹⁹

88 Interview with John Kufuor.

89 *Ibid.*

90 The class of 1967 includes 1979 coup leader Boakye Gyan, former President John Atta-Mills, NPP flag-bearer Nana Akufo-Addo and Election Commissioner Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, to name but a few.

91 Interview with Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey.

92 Interviews with E.T. Mensah, Paa Amissah-Arthur and Akilagpa Sawyerr.

93 UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

94 It would seem that trainee educators and engineers were much less political – Yaw Osafo Maafo describes how the Kumasi Vice Chancellor took a shine to him as he was the only engineer involved in student politics – indeed he credits the Vice Chancellor with getting him out of jail on numerous occasions.

95 Interview with Boakye Gyan.

96 *Ibid.*

97 Interview with Joe Abbey.

98 *Ibid.*

99 Interview with Akilagpa Sawyerr.

Box 6.6 Continued

PNDC factor

A large part of why so many of the shortlist leaders had been at Legon in the 1960s and 1970s is that Rawlings recruited many of his team directly from campus (see Section 7.1). Although he never studied at Legon, he would hang around campus and involve himself in the political discussions of the day.¹⁰⁰ Of the PNDC top leadership, at least seven were alumni of the Legon study groups,¹⁰¹ socialist discussion groups set up by Botchwey and Sawyerr (see Box 6.8 for more detail).

Course content

“Studying politics will make you more socially- and developmentally-minded than medicine [...] that’s why I switched from engineering to law” (Interview with John Ndebugre, University of Science and Technology, University of Ghana).

As mentioned earlier, Legon was the only university in Ghana that offered courses in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences. Eight percent of our longlist and five of the interviewees studied English at undergraduate level, though none mentioned this as influential on their leadership development, other than giving them practical skills (for journalism) and in that it involved historical study – indeed four of the interviewees talked about how history inspires.

“The broader the educational system, the more it is suited to produce leaders” (Interview with Kabral Blay-Amihere, History Bachelor, University of Ghana, 1975).

“I eventually grew to consider my assignment to history as a blessing in disguise and recognise that the knowledge I would gain from its study would carry me far beyond the classroom and workaday existence” (Dramani Mahama, 2012: 199).

Almost a fifth of the interviewees talked about developing **critical thinking skills** at university, all of them saying that this was achieved through discussion and interaction with their professors (see below for more discussion on teaching styles).

“Higher education gives you the capacity to think” (Interview with Kabral Blay-Amihere, History Bachelor, University of Ghana, 1975).

Core development area: Intellectual development	
Examples of this development area as paraphrased in interviews	‘Critical thinking’, ‘analysis’, ‘intellectual rigour’ and ‘problem solving’
How these characteristics were developed as described in interviews	Broad curriculum, interaction with tutors (see below), subjects such as English, History, Political Economy and Economics
Interviewees mentioning this development area	John Dramani Mahama, Kabral Blay-Amihere, Akilagpa Sawyerr, John Kufuor, E. Gyimah-Boadi, Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, Paa Amisah-Arthur, John Dramani Mahama, Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey, Joyce Aryee, David Ampofo, Akoto Ampaw, Ekwow Spio Gbrah, Miranda Greenstreet, E.T. Mensah ¹⁰² (15/28)
Transmission mechanisms described in literature	Significant investment in and critical role of library in supporting learning; active debating societies

100 Interview with Kabral Blay-Amihere. See also Box 6.6 and Box 6.7 for more discussion on their impact.

101 Interview with Joyce Aryee.

102 Although E.T. Mensah never attended university (his qualifications were gained through distance learning) he did work at Legon as an accountant and interacted with lecturers and students in political debate and study.

All of the interviewees who attended university had done some kind of 'technical' degree at some point and nearly half of them talked about the importance of learning **technical skills** at university.¹⁰³

The longlist data confirms the often-stated dominance of lawyers in Ghanaian leadership, with a quarter having studied law at some point. Other popular 'technical' subjects were economics (19%), politics (12%), journalism (9%), public administration and management (both 7%). These reflect the kinds of skills and sectors required for national development – e.g. entrepreneurs, administrators and politicians to run the country, and lawyers and journalists to hold them to account. Noticeable in their absence are the technicians (doctors, engineers, agriculturists, etc.) that are the backbone of development but, in general, are not transformational leaders.

Law: Of those interviewed, ten studied law at some point (seven from first degree, three more switching at postgraduate level). Studying law makes one more aware of constitutional issues, and can make you “appreciate what democracy is meant to be.”¹⁰⁴ According to the interviewees, it also brings one into contact with “more people and more problems”,¹⁰⁵ “accentuating activism and concern about rights.”¹⁰⁶ Cletus Avoka claims to be the first person from Boko region to qualify to practice law – this made him feel “lots of responsibility” to work hard and represent his region with pride.¹⁰⁷

“We [the lawyers] are the voice of the voices. When you talk about education; that is what you are talking about” (Interview with Sam Okudzeto, Bachelor of Law, Kings College, London, 1963).

Box 6.7 International trade and investment course

“It opened up my mind more than any other course.” (Interview with Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey, University of Ghana, 1977)

Of all the lecturers at Legon during the 1970s, by far the most often cited by interviewees as influential and inspirational are Kwesi Botchwey and Akilagpa Sawyerr. Their ‘International Trade and Investment’ course, offered as part of the law degree, provided a (Marxist) political economy analysis of western domination of international business and drew crowds from across campus.

Economics: Of the shortlist, two are specialist economists, and a further four studied either economics or philosophy, politics and economics (PPE) at university. In addition to these, numerous others studied political economy through the International Trade and Investment course and study groups at Legon (see Box 6.7 and Box 6.8).

“A good grounding in economics is important for anyone wanting to do serious politics” (Interview with Nana Akufo-Addo, Economics Bachelor, University of Ghana, 1967).

Politics: Although by no means a prerequisite for becoming a politician, a politics degree would seem to be a reasonable indicator of later career choice, being the third most common subject chosen by the longlist leaders. Of the interviewees, two did courses in PPE and two specialised in politics to doctoral level. For E. Gyimah-Boadi, studying politics opened his eyes to just what it could achieve, positive and negative, and taught him “what needed to be done to block people doing the bad things”. At the University of California, he learnt **technical skills** and **intellectual discipline** – they were “very hard on empiricism”. He went on to found one of Ghana’s leading political think-tanks, the Centre for Democratic Development.

Journalism: Like politics, studying journalism is not a requirement for a career in journalism: none of the five journalists included on the shortlist had studied journalism before they started their careers, but four did so later in their careers. (The only interviewee to study journalism before his career went on to academia; he describes his experience at Columbia, as “like being in a real newsroom” with each class giving reporting assignments.) For the journalists, it was rather the student newspapers and magazines that provided their training ground (three of the journalists mentioned working on student papers, plus three of the others; more still did so at secondary school).

“Journalists are between the people and the government – expected to inform the people of government policies

¹⁰³ Those talked about are administrative, political, economic, law, journalism and engineering; our interviewees had also studied accountancy, international relations and population studies; ‘non-technical’ courses studied included English, history, philosophy and theology.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Sam Okudzeto.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with John Ndebugre.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Nana Akufo-Addo.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Cletus Avoka.

and programmes but also expected to carry the feelings of the people back to government” (Interview with David Newton, Rector of Ghana Institute of Journalism).

Engineering: Just three of the interviewees studied engineering,¹⁰⁸ one of these switching to law for postgraduate studies and another becoming a banker upon graduation (with both being on the list as politicians). Just one went into industry as an engineer: after studying at the Camborne School of Mines in the UK, Sam Jonah went on to a career in mining, becoming the Chief Executive of Ashanti Goldfields at 36 years of age. He was also a founding member of the Mining Commission, where his MSc in Mine Management had “immediate relevance”.

Managerial: Sam Jonah, one of Ghana’s leading businessmen, studied mine management at Imperial College, London. Through organisational case studies and studying business analysis and strategy, he gained the necessary leadership skills to manage an organisation. Ekwow Spio-Gabrah says “higher education is not important for leadership *per se* but it is essential for institutional and corporate leadership.” He did not study administration, but is rather referring to the leadership skills fostered at university by the “opportunity to serve your community through societies and organisations”.

Core development area: Technical skills	
Examples of this development area as paraphrased in interviews	Political skills, economics, law and advocacy, journalism, engineering and management
How these characteristics were developed as described in interviews	Course content and extra-curricular activities
Interviewees mentioning this development area	Ekwow Spio Gabrah, John Kufuor, Kabral Blay-Amihere, Ben Ephson, Joe Abbey, Boakye Gyan, Nana Akufo-Addo, Sam Jonah, Akilagpa Sawyerr, John Ndebugre, Akoto Ampaw, Yaw Osafo Maafo, Sam Okudzeto, Cletus Avoka, Jacob Obetsebi-Lampsey, E. Gyimah-Boadi, Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey, Kwame Karikari and Paa Amissah-Arthur (19/28)
Transmission mechanisms described in literature	Course content and extra-curricular activities; important societies included the Political Discussion Society, The Plato Club which organised debates and lectures on political and economic matters ¹⁰⁹ , and the Rover Crew (scouts for young men focussing on personal development with public service) (Agbodeka, 1998)

Extra-curricular activities

As at Achimota, at Legon there was an abundance of extra-curricular activities for students to get involved with. Student newspapers and magazines, opportunities to run for Hall President and NUGS representatives, and to serve the Hall as legal advisors, gave many of the interviewees important practice and skills in areas such as political mobilisation and campaigning. Examples of leaders within our short and longlist who took on student leadership positions include: John Ndebugre (President of NUGS), Joyce Ayree (President of Volta Hall, Legon), Nkrabeah Effah Dartey (President of Commonwealth Hall, Legon), Paa Amissah-Arthur (President of Legon Hall, Legon), Kabral Blay-Amihere (President of NUGS and General Secretary of Student Movement for African Unity), Yaw Osafo Marfo (Acting President of NUGS), Ibn Chambas (Secretary NUGS) and Chris Atim (NUGS Vice President).¹¹⁰

“All our current leaders belonged to JCR executive or NUGS on campus.” (Interview with Yaw Osafo Maafo, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, 1967)

“[As legal advisor to JCR] I developed practical legal skills [...] As member of the Law Students' Union I learnt values of service to community - humility, honesty and protection of vulnerable.” (Interview with Cletus Avoka, University of Ghana, 1976)

¹⁰⁸ There is an obvious selection bias created by our working definition of ‘Developmental Leadership’ – the reform areas we have chosen leads to an emphasis on politicians, economists, journalists and lawyers. Sam Jonah was included because mining reforms were a vital component of the ERP.

¹⁰⁹ <http://aqsackeywordpress.com/2010/01/28/chapter-3-two-years-at-achimota/>

¹¹⁰ Sourced from shortlist interviews and longlist profiles.

"I decided to run for JCR vice president [...] The mode of campaigning was basic grassroots, going from room to room meeting people, telling them who you were and what you intended to do if elected [...] I lost the election, but it was a great learning experience. I had been focused squarely on my own goals and visions as a candidate. After the loss, I came away with an understanding that in these types of contest what is most important is a candidate's knowledge of the electorate and its expectations in the selection of a leader. I carried that knowledge the next time I decided to run for office [as Secretary of the Student Representative Council]. And that time I won." (Dramani Mahama, 2012: 207)

Officer training, sports and debating clubs gave students the opportunity to develop other important leadership skills such as teamwork and argument development.

Officers Training Corps at Leeds taught me about warfare [...] a good foundation for leadership; it gave discipline and critical observation." (Interview with Sam Okudzeto, Leeds College of Commerce, 1959)

"Being a member of the Amalgamated Sports Club helped me develop disciplinary skills and confidence." (Interview with Cletus Avoka, University of Ghana, 1976)

"The debating club helped to develop listening and communication skills." (Interview with Elizabeth Ohene, University of Ghana, 1967)

Other clubs gave students the opportunity to explore political theories and ideology. The interviewees were members of such groups as Student Movement for African Unity, African Affairs Club, Pan African Youth Movement, National Socialist Students and Economics Society.

Box 6.8 Legon study groups

Kwesi Botchwey and Akigalpa Sawyerr also organised study groups, "socialist cells" where lecturers and students were given reading assignments, mainly on political economy, to "discuss as equals".¹¹¹ The idea was to teach "different methods of analysing reality"¹¹² and was an "incredible eye opener."¹¹³ One member explains that this had a profound impact on students' confidence and ability to challenge the status quo in the real world:

"Lecturers opening themselves to criticism had a big impact on the students – it liberated them to believe that *if you read you can take them on*, created individuals with the confidence to argue their case (but not before they had done their research first) [...] It is perhaps the reason why Rawlings and his generation had the confidence to challenge their leaders and assume the mantle." (Interview with study group member)

Similarly, Dramani Mahama explains how these groups helped members to analyse Ghana's situation and debate solutions to bring about change:

"We would meet once a week for a couple of hours to better familiarise ourselves with the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. We would juxtapose the conditions that led to the Great October Revolution with Ghana's current society and position, debate the direction in which we felt the country needed to go, and figure out what part we could play to help it get there." (Dramani Mahama, 2012: 202)

These skills were particularly important in the development of the PNDC and later NDC – not so much in its ideology (as the PNDC quickly rejected leftist ideology on commencement of the ERP/SAP) but in the intellectual development of so many of its leaders. As well as Kwesi Botchwey (Finance Minister implementing the ERP), Paa Amisah-Arthur, Tsatu Tsikata, Kwamina Ahwoi, E.T. Mensah (all leading figures in PNDC/NDC from the time of ERP to the present day) and John Dramani Mahama (current President of Ghana) are all alumni of the Legon study groups. Chapter 7 provides a more in-depth analysis of this coalition and its skillset.

111 Interview with Akigalpa Sawyerr.

112 Interview with Paa Amisah-Arthur.

113 *Ibid.*

Core development area: Practical skills	
Examples of this development area as paraphrased in interviews	'Electioneering', social mobilisation', 'debating', 'advocacy' and 'performing under pressure'
How these characteristics were developed as described in interviews	Extra-curricular activities and student politics
Interviewees mentioning this development area	Ekwow Spio Gbrah, John Dramani Mahama, Audrey Gadzekpo, Joyce Aryee, Kabral Blay-Amihere, Ben Ephson, Boakye Gyan, Nana Akufo-Addo, Miranda Greenstreet, Akilagpa Sawyerr, John Ndebugre, Akoto Ampaw, Cletus Avoka, Jacob Obetsebi-Lampsey, Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey, Kwame Karikari and Samuel O. Gyandoh (17/28)
Transmission mechanisms described in literature	Strong skills in intellectual discussion stemming from a cultural background of legalistic debates; Important societies included the Political Discussion Society, The Plato Club, the Study Circle and the Rover Crew (Agbodeka, 1998)

Student activism and political development

"University provides the opportunity for idealistic students to engage in political activism; those in politics now were involved in politics then" (Interview with Ekwow Spio-Gabra, University of Ghana, 1973).

Research suggests that students are often amongst the most political of all segments of society (see Brannelly, Lewis and Ndaruhutse, 2011b). The interviewees were at university during the struggle for independence, during times of coups, new constitutions and referenda on the nature of government which creates greater motivation for politicisation. They were keen to point out its significance on their politics and concept of agency.

"[We were] at university at a time of struggles against the dictatorship [...] There was a healthy and lively climate of debate regarding development issues and a clash of ideologies [...] People at Legon had a strong commitment to contributing to social change and the development of our country. We pursued that trajectory. We were student leaders out of commitments to these causes" (Interview with Akoto Ampaw, University of Ghana, 1979).

As well as being involved in formal student politics through JCRs and NUGS, the leaders were also activists in a very real sense, getting involved in the big political battles of the day. Indeed, NUGS was one of the more important political organisations of the day, either supporting the government, for example by mobilising thousands of students to help with cocoa harvests in the 1980s, or in opposing it (see Box 6.9 for more on NUGS).

"Student politics was a high mark because now one had moved from theory to practice - real social mobilisation" (Interview with John Ndebugre, former National Secretary of NUGS).

The success of some of the student movements, as well as the political and social changes that were sweeping Africa and the world, gave the leaders a sense of agency.

"We had a feeling that *we are going somewhere, Ghana is free, we need to develop*" (Interview with Boakye Gyan, University of Ghana, 1967).

"More than anything else, we took out of this period the concept of agency [...] you'd better get out there to change the circumstances of your life" (Interview with Nana Akufo Addo, University of Ghana, 1967).

Through this involvement in the politics of the day, as well as more general intellectual discourse on campus, many of the interviewees describe how this led to a maturation of their politics and core beliefs.

"Legon was a significant period of my life, not in terms of fundamentals but in the development. I was a socialist and Marxist-Trotskyite [...] it was part of the national debate at that time but did not stick

with me for too long because it did not address political liberty”¹¹⁴ (Interview with Nana Akufo-Addo, University of Ghana, 1967).

“Education...[made me realise]...that the status quo was not the only option, that the function of intellectuals was to challenge and provide leadership for change” (Interview with Akoto Ampaw, University of Ghana, 1979).

“Higher education shaped my key beliefs: thinking out of the box [...] believing that we can't all think the same way”¹¹⁵[...] Reading books was critical to this belief – I was always surrounded by books.” (Interview with Elizabeth Ohene, University of Ghana, 1967)

Core development area: Political development	
Examples of this development area as paraphrased in interviews	'Activism', 'commitment to and leadership for social change', 'political liberty', 'agency' and 'liberation'
How these characteristics were developed as described in interviews	Student activism, debate with students and lecturers, course content, broader political events and international students
Interviewees mentioning this development area	Ekwov Spio Gbrah, David Ampofo, John Kufuor, John Dramani Mahama, Kabral Blay-Amihere, Elizabeth Ohene, Joe Abbey, Boakye Gyan, Nana Akufo-Addo, Akilagpa Sawyer, John Ndebugre, Akoto Ampaw, Yaw Osafo Maafo, Sam Okudzeto, Cletus Avoka, Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey, Paa Amisah-Arthur, Kwame Karikari and E. T. Mensah ¹¹⁶ (19/28)
Transmission mechanisms described in literature	Strong skills in intellectual discussion stemming from a cultural background of legalistic debates (Agbodeka, 1998)

Box 6.9 National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS)

The NUGS emerged as the representative organisation of all students in Ghana in 1950 as part of the World Assembly of Youth. In the 1960s, NUGS started to assert its power and authority more readily, its independence of the authorities seen as leading to a breakdown of the former trust between students and tutors and thus challenging the hall-based tutorial system (Agbodeka, 1998: 133). Although its then socialist leanings led it to initially support the 1981 revolution, NUGS' pro-democracy stance eventually led it to become a consistent opponent of the PNDC regime, agitating for the rule of law and respect for human rights (Sapong, 2000). Tensions between students and the government increased to such an extent that in 1986, Kakraba Cromwell, a NUGS official, was arrested and jailed. The government also temporarily shut down Legon and dismissed eight students (Agbodeka, 1998). See Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 for more information on NUGS' role as part of a coalition which forced the toppling of the Acheampong regime.

114 Nana Akufo-Addo describes two key moments in his personal development; the death of his grandfather; J. B. Danquah, and seeing TV coverage of detainees leaving Nkrumah's prisons following the 1966 coups. Both events occurred while he was at Legon.

115 This is a reference to the lack of press freedom, for which she was to campaign and eventually go into exile.

116 Although E.T. Mensah never attended university he did work at Legon as an accountant and interacted with lecturers and students in political debate and study.

Box 6.10 Legon's direct institutional impact

As well as being the foremost training ground for the developmental leaders, Legon's influence has often been more direct, with students and lecturers taking part in the political struggles of the day.

Opposition to the Acheampong regime: against the backdrop of the UNIGOV referendum,¹¹⁷ major student demonstrations against the regime took place across all three university campuses in Ghana in 1977 (Shillington, 1992). Student demonstrations continued after the vote, contributing to the steady erosion of Acheampong's power that led to the coup of 1978 and a timetable for democracy. Around this time, Kwesi Botchwey and other Legon academics formed the National Affairs Discussion Group, to debate the issues of the day. This eventually morphed into the New Democratic Movement, which would go on to be one of the staunchest opponents of Rawlings' rule.

Advocacy and guidance for a transition to democracy: exploiting their "protected status",¹¹⁸ Legon academics were amongst the leading voices calling for a return to democracy in the 1980s. History Professor Adu Boahen's Ghanaian Sphinx lecture in 1988 is largely credited with breaking the culture of silence that had grown during the Rawlings regime, opening the floodgates for pro-democracy campaigners.¹¹⁹ Not to be outdone, Legon's Political Science Department ran a series of conferences facilitating public discourse around democracy and the nature of the constitution of the Fourth Republic (see Section 7.3 for more detail).

Individual lecturers have also used Legon as a base from which to conduct other activities. As well as providing intellectual mentorship to much of the PNDC regime, Akilagpa Sawyerr also influenced Ghanaian and African development in much more direct ways. He was the Founding Chairman of the Mining Commission, chair of the Tripartite Committee of the Economic Reform Programme, a member of the Council of State (a Council of Elders which advises the President on national issues), Chairman of the Volta River Authority (Ghana's biggest energy company), Secretary General for the African Association of Universities, and a board member on countless International and regional organisations.

Kumasi and University of Cape Coast (UCC)

With Ghana's model of specialised higher education establishments, it is perhaps not surprising that so few of the leaders studied at the other two public universities – just six and five percent, respectively, studied at Kumasi and UCC.

Of the interviewees, just two studied engineering at Kumasi – John Ndebugre and Yaw Osafo Maafo – and none studied at Cape Coast (Ndebugre started at UCC before moving to KNUST). Both describe being the odd ones out because of their interest in politics: Osafo Maafo was "the only engineer involved in student politics", and Ndebugre's interest in social development meant his "teachers never saw me as an engineer".

"There were influential intellectuals at UCC and Tech [KNUST], but they were just science and teaching institutions [...] Legon had the humanities and politics, and also a better pedigree." (Interview with John Ndebugre, University of Science and Technology and University of Ghana)

University abroad

"Studying abroad gave me a supreme confidence." (Interview with former Legon lecturer)

From the longlist, 57% of the leaders studied overseas, with roughly equal shares for the UK (30%) and US (31%).¹²¹ In the UK, the London School of Economics and Political Science has been the most popular (seven following in Nkrumah's

117 In 1977, Acheampong proposed the concept of Union Government (UNIGOV) to make Ghana a no-party state. It was put to referendum in 1978 and approved by a 60% majority.

118 Interview with Kwame Karikari.

119 Boahen's authority and broad appeal as an academic led him to be the spokesman for the Movement for Freedom and Justice and later presidential candidate for the NPP in the 1992 elections (interviews with Kwame Karikari and John Ndebugre).

120 Although E.T. Mensah never attended university he did work at Legon as an accountant and interacted with lecturers and students in political debate and study.

121 Some studied in both countries, hence the total is higher than 57%.

footsteps), with Yale the most popular destination in the US (five). Other destination countries for the longlist were Germany (two), France, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Israel and Uganda (one each). These leaders tended to pick the same subjects as those who remained in Ghana.

Of the interviewees, 16 studied overseas (a roughly equal proportion to the longlist). Financing mechanisms described in interviews include government sponsorship (both colonial and independent) and company sponsorship, as well as international sponsorship programmes such as the Ford Foundation Fellowship, Woodrow Wilson Fellowship and the Chevening Scholarship. At least ten interviewees accessed overseas education through these routes; the others are assumed to be self-financing.

These leaders tended to talk about two broad channels through which their international experience affected their later leadership career:

1. Academic excellence

An obvious motivation for studying overseas is to access the best education, and it would seem the interviewees chased both institutional reputation and access to the best professors in their field. The interviewees studied at Cambridge, Oxford, London School of Economics, Imperial College, Columbia and California, amongst others. They cite inspirational faculty and talk about the quality of the teaching.

“Oxford gets you to think, you get to shun dogmatism – this is critical to leadership.” (Interview with John Kufuor, Oxford University, 1964)

Kwame Karikari believes: “American campus newspapers are one of the best training grounds for journalists” and says his MA in Journalism at Columbia “was like being in a real newsroom [...] very practical, each class gave reporting assignments.”

2. Exposure to different national struggles

Essentially studying at an international political leadership training centre, David Ampofo recalls celebrating different national days and holidays, a mechanism through which students would be taught about leftist struggles around the world.

“I was educated to care, to work beyond me; that for me is an education.” (Interview with David Ampofo, Escuela Superior de la Partida Populista de Cuba, 1986)

Although Ampofo’s was a unique experience amongst the interviewees (and indeed amongst the longlist), others cite a similar impact upon their politics.

Elizabeth Ohene was particularly affected by contact with Ethiopian students. At the time they were excited about the socialist revolution that was sweeping their country, but years later, when she met them again, she was shocked to discover they had been detained and tortured for their political activity. This transformed her politics and she became firmly opposed to oppression and deeply committed to reform in Ghana, a stance that forced her into exile for much of the 1980s.

John Kufuor describes events organised by Oxford Student Union and others as giving him proximity to leaders, with a 1962 meeting with Tom Mboya of Kenya cited as being the most important of these experiences.

Four of the leaders studied law in the UK.¹²² Both Samuel Gyandoh and Sam Okudzeto describe meeting British Lords and Judges, but this exposure had a particular impact on the young Okudzeto:

“Realising they are just ordinary people made me realise I could also become a leader.” (Interview with Sam Okudzeto, Kings College, 1963)

The first-hand experience of democracy also had a big impact on Okudzeto, and is perhaps a factor in him becoming one of its staunchest defenders in Ghana.¹²³

It is perhaps two of the interviewees that Akuffo-Addo is referring to when he talks about the impact on Ghanaian politics of the ‘radicalisation’ of those that studied in the US. Kwame Karikari was “very politically active” on campus, getting involved in Black American struggles and later concentrating on African political organisation, before returning to Ghana and founding the New Democratic Movement. Akilagpa Sawyerr was also active in the Black Power movement, but describes his radicalisation

¹²² Samuel Gyandoh, John Kufuor, Sam Okudzeto and Akilagpa Sawyerr.

¹²³ Interview with Sam Okudzeto. Alone among our interviewees, Okudzeto has had the unique experience of being detained by two different regimes.

as a cumulative experience from his exposure to both intellectual and social radicalism whilst studying in Durham, London and Berkeley. Through the radicalisation of his students, Sawyerr can be said to be one intellectual father of the PNDC and NDC movements.

These experiences can be said to have given those who studied abroad a broader understanding of the potential of politics and leadership to shape a society, and changed their views towards reform and development in their own country.¹²⁴

6.3 Changing landscape

Since the surveyed leaders completed their education, the educational landscape has changed considerably in Ghana. The number of senior secondary schools has increased from 105 in 1966 to 757 in 2011, with enrolment up from 42,000 to 438,000 (Hayford (1988) cited in Acheampong (2010: 4), Ministry of Education, 2012).¹²⁵ There are now seven public universities, with the University for Development Studies, the University of Education, the University of Mines and Technology and the University of Health and Allied Sciences all being added in the last two decades. In addition, public institutes have been added and expanded, the most notable being the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration and the Ghana Institute for Journalism. Perhaps the biggest change, however, has been in the emergence of private universities in 1992, with 38 private institutes now accredited with the NAB and enrolling 18,000 students (Government of Ghana, 2012). In total, there are over 150,000 (Government of Ghana, 2012) higher education students in Ghana, meaning a GER of 12%.¹²⁶

Secondary school – rise of private prestige

The big change in secondary education since these leaders were at school is the rising prestige of private education, accompanied by a drop in prestige of public schools. The likes of Achimota and Mfantsipim are still considered elite schools, but there is now a view that private schools such as Ghana International School provide a better education.¹²⁷ Since these schools charge substantial fees, we can say that despite a broadening of access generally, there may have been a narrowing of access to the best schooling.

Quality and access in higher education – the impact of massification

This 'massification' of the higher education system has led to some inevitable changes. In the six years to 2008 there was a virtual doubling of fulltime tertiary students in public institutions (Ministry of Education, 2012: 9) and at Legon alone, there are now nearly 30,000 students. Interviewees (many of whom have links to the university) rue the distance this creates between staff and students and the impact it has on the halls system.

At Legon only 30% of the student population has access to accommodation on campus, despite the fact that five students share rooms originally meant only for single or double occupancy (Mohamedbhai, 2008). This has inevitably led to a breaking down of the hall system, with the 'privilege' that the leaders describe being an important part of the university experience now a distant memory.

"Legon is still the best public school but it doesn't have what it takes to create the same quality of leaders as before." (Interview with Bernard Avle, University of Ghana, 2004)

"We have lost that intimacy with professors. We need to improve the quality of higher education; the remuneration of the uni (sic) teachers is poor." (Interview with Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, former lecturer at Legon)

Bernard Mornah (University of Cape Coast, 2003) describes the impact massification has had on his education:

"I was sat outside the lecture hall because it was so full. The quality has gone down. You only read your notes and then regurgitate because the questions in the exams are short. Yesteryear the accommodation was

124 This can be seen as building on findings from comparative education (such as Schweisfurth, 2012) which show that international students have a greater understanding of both host and home country culture.

125 GER for senior secondary is still relatively low at 32%. Historic data for GER for senior secondary alone was unavailable, but by including middle/junior secondary school we can see that secondary GER remained stagnant through the 1970s, 80s and 90s at under 40%, only rising recently to 57% in 2009.

126 UNESCO Institute for Statistics

127 After insisting on educating his son at Achimota, Akilagpa Sawyerr later had him removed, appalled at the decline of his former school, and placed him in Ghana International School. He believes that this school provides a quality education, but without the breadth of Achimota in the 1950s and 1960s.

not overcrowded, you had laundry, food etc. so you could concentrate on academia. The curriculum hasn't changed for a long time."

Both shortlist leaders and young leaders expressed concern at the impact this was having on intellectual development, critical thinking skills and agency:

"Education should be about forming arguments to develop thinking. The levels of teaching now are going to hold us back." (Interview with Jacob Obetsebi-Lampsey)¹²⁸

"People are not able to create their own thought processes – that handicap comes to the fore when in the workplace – people don't have initiative, people are waiting to be told what to do." (Interview with Patrick Sogbodjor, Ghana Law School, 2004)

Funding shortfalls have inevitably impacted on the research budgets of the public universities. Although the University of Ghana spends about one fifth of budget on research, the other two established universities, KNUST and UCC spend just 6 and 3%, respectively (Effah, 2003 cited in Akyeampong, 2010). Using this money effectively to target problems of development in health, science and technology to alleviate poverty and increase productivity presents another challenge for the universities (Akyeampong, 2010).

Despite the beginning of 'massification' of the system, equality of access to tertiary education still represents a major challenge. Participation in tertiary education is still dominated by relatively few urban secondary schools. In the University of Ghana, for example, a study revealed that between 60 and 90% of students accepted onto various degree programmes came from the top 50 senior secondary schools, which constitute less than 10% of senior secondary schools (Addae-Mensah, 2000). Palmer (2005: 52-53) presents even more alarming statistics:

- the poorest 10% of the population are unlikely to benefit from public expenditure on either secondary or tertiary levels;
- the poorest 45% of Ghana's population have no access to tertiary education; and
- the richest 1.5% of the population command 55% of public spending on tertiary education.

In fact, the problem is deteriorating (Manuh *et al.*, 2007). Increasing demand has led to more competitive entry requirements that further disadvantage students from poorer backgrounds.

Some continuity

Despite the increased numbers, Legon and the other public universities operate in many ways as before. Current education leaders and students talk of similar leadership skills and values being developed in their institutes. Critical thinking, communication skills and ethical values are the most cited in interviews with young leaders and current students.

Student activism continues to be a force in Ghanaian politics, with NUGS still at the fore. It has been a key player in the development of education policy over the last twenty years and is now a leading advocate in the Freedom of Information campaign. Its current president believes that as the chief spokesman for Ghanaian students, he is developing exceptional communication skills.

Institutional extra-curricular activities and student representation are also still providing opportunities to practice leadership and technical skills in both schools and universities.¹²⁹ Of the young leaders interviewed, all but one had taken part in extra-curricular activities.

"Working on the student radio [...] gave me four years of free training." (Interview with Bernard Avle, University of Ghana, 2004, now radio presenter at Citi FM)

Bernard Mornah (University of Cape Coast 2003) was the first UCC President of Nadowli Student Union (NADSU). Having decided to nationalise NADSU he had to draft a constitution and national agenda. This gave him the opportunity to interact with members of government and be exposed to different styles of leadership and governance.

¹²⁸ Jacob Obetsebi-Lampsey was unique in our shortlist in having no higher education whatsoever.

¹²⁹ One slight change is a shift in emphasis from hall representation to Student Representative Councils. While both have existed side by side since the early days of higher education in Ghana, shortlisted leaders spoke more of hall-based politics while current students and younger leaders spoke more of SRC-based politics.

“I learnt the ability to manage people’s expectations; to communicate, engage, deal with people [...] I learnt to account for people, to take their mandates [...] learnt to lobby for NADSU, to alert government to issues and [...] projects.” (Interview with Bernard Mornah, University of Cape Coast, 2003)

Bernard later founded the Tertiary Institutions Functionary, which he credits with leading to his current job as The General Secretary of the People’s National Convention.¹³⁰

Richard Quashigah was the local NUGS President then worked for them one year full-time as an International Relations officer; he was also working as reporter for GBC during this time and volunteering for NDC. He is now the NDC Propaganda Secretary.

Through societies and leadership roles at university, Sammy Awuku, learnt:

“Courage [...] to take decisive decisions [...] to ensure people are at the centre of your policies so that the electorate believe what you stand for; [...] interest in the welfare of people [...] I’m the product of TESCON [Tertiary Education Students’ Confederation of the NPP]” (Interview with Sammy Awuku, University of Ghana, 2005).

The head of Ashesi’s student judicial council is putting “ideas of ethical leadership into practice”,¹³¹ for example as the body responsible for exam monitoring, and the Ghana School of Law Students’ Representative Council (SRC) President is creating links between students and lawyers working on pro bono cases.¹³²

Rising importance of international study?

Of ten young leaders interviewed, eight had completed at least part of their university education overseas (three not studying in Ghana at all). With the perceived decline of Ghanaian university education, it is perhaps inevitable that more and more will seek out an international education. This could have implications for the emergence of developmental leadership as network effects and opportunities to become involved in national politics would be reduced.

Rise of private universities

Private sector involvement in higher education was first sanctioned in 1993. There are now 38 private institutes registered with the NAB, enrolling 18,000 students (Government of Ghana, 2012) – at 15% of total enrolments they provide significant relief to the national budget, but institutes are seen to be highly variable in quality:

“The evidence is that while some of the private institutions have succeeded in introducing innovations in course design and delivery in response to challenges in the labour market, others have given cause for worry about the quality of education they provide” (Betty Mould Idrisu, former Minister for Education cited in Kokutse, 2011).

One of these private institutes, Ashesi, has been attracting a lot of attention, partly because of its perceived quality and partly because it is putting a deliberate focus on helping to create a new generation of developmental leaders (see Box 6.11 overleaf).

¹³⁰ This is a party in the Nkrumahist tradition, registering 0.22% of the Presidential vote in 2012, placing it in fifth place.

¹³¹ Interview with Nii Okai Nunoo, Judicial Council Student Representative, Ashesi University.

¹³² Interview with Samuel Bartels, President of Student Representative Council, Ghana School of Law.

Box 6.11 Ashesi University – A new model university for developmental leadership formation?

“The most important question that we confront is: ‘what is the good society and how do we create it in Africa?’ That question cannot be answered in just an engineering class; that question needs to be discussed in the context of the humanities courses, such as philosophy or literature.” (Interview with Patrick Awuah, founder of Ashesi University)

One school that is deliberately setting out to train developmental leaders is Ashesi University, just north of Accra. In 2002, Patrick Awuah set out to establish a university that would provide a model for training “a new generation of ethical, entrepreneurial leaders.”¹³³

Having studied in the US, Awuah decided he wanted to bring the liberal arts model to Africa. He arranged focus groups with corporate and civic leaders to determine needs. The courses most called for were engineering, medicine, law, economics, business and IT, but they also talked a lot about soft skills:

“[entrepreneurs] really care about their employees’ ability to deal with ambiguity, [...] they want to find problem-solvers [...] They are looking for people who are able to communicate effectively [...] who are ethical [...] lifelong learners [...] trustworthy.” (Interview with Patrick Awuah)

They then had internal discussions on “what kind of leaders we wanted to create [...] what are the attributes that we want Ashesi students to have”¹³⁴ and came up with seven key learning areas:

- Ethics and civic engagement
- Critical thinking and quantitative skills
- Communication skills
- Leadership and teamwork
- Innovation and action
- Curiosity and skill
- Technological competence.

These are broad themes that are not connected to particular subjects; they create “a holistic picture of what constitutes a good leader [...] It turns out that these attributes can be built throughout the curriculum.”¹³⁵ Every instructor is required to state how their course enables the broader learning goals.

One of the core courses at Ashesi, the ‘Leadership seminars’, addresses the question posed above directly. Through readings on different leaders, the challenges of leadership and on political economy, and through talks from guest lecturers and community service projects, students are made to ponder such questions as: what is good leadership, the good society and the good economy?; what kind of leader do they want to be as students on the campus and what kind of leaders they want to be in the future?

Students follow a four-year programme, following the same core curriculum of maths, social sciences and humanities for the first two years. They then choose to specialise in one of only three majors: business administration, computer science or management information systems (the most economical of the high-demand subjects identified by the feasibility study). The next stage for Ashesi is to expand its course offerings, with the immediate priority to add three engineering courses (electrical, mechanical and computer), followed by economics and law. Medicine is also a high priority but currently unaffordable.

Students are encouraged to form their own clubs as Awuah believes that through organisation, interrelating around a common theme and learning to work in a team, they will address a lot of the learning aims. All students are also required to complete a community service project as part of the leadership course.

¹³³ Patrick Awuah, interview with CNN African Voices.

¹³⁴ Interview with Patrick Awuah.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*

Box 6.11 Continued

The university funds operating costs with tuition fees and growth and scholarships through charitable donations. Tuition fees are around US\$6,000/year (with accommodation and board adding a further US\$3,000/year to costs), making Ashesi University comparable in costs to US and European schools. Currently around half of students are on full fees, a quarter on subsidised fees and a quarter on full scholarships.

Whilst students study a broad liberal arts curriculum, there is very much a private sector focus at Ashesi, and it is not clear if it can produce the kind of transformational national leaders that came out of the Legon of the 1960s and 1970s.

Distance learning and technological advances

With the advent of Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs), there is now potential to greatly increase access to higher education. Evidence from the interviews suggests that distance learning would not provide the all-round education required for developmental leadership (such as residential experience and the relationships that form through it, networking, taking part in extra-curricular activities and having access to and direct interaction with the brightest professors). But it also suggests that by presenting a cheap, scalable alternative to campus education, MOOCs could alleviate pressure on the public universities and allow them to once again concentrate on educating the minds of an elite band of future leaders. However, the fact that many MOOCs are not accredited may not provide the right incentives for them to do this.

Patrick Awuah of Ashesi University believes strongly in the importance of 'high contact' campus education in the formation of developmental leaders. Echoing the other leaders' statements on their own education, he strongly believes in the importance of getting different ethnicities, nationalities and religions together on the same campus, in the same dorms. The opportunity Ashesi University sees MOOCs as presenting, therefore, is in opening up more electives to students in subjects not available on campus.¹³⁶

Ashesi is contributing content for open courses for the Open University of West Africa. It is also experimenting with synchronised courses with US and Canadian universities which Awuah believes is useful in creating a "diversity of conversation" and in demonstrating to students that they are on a par with their American counterparts.

Changing values and the role of higher education in developmental leadership and public good

A major theme arising from leader interviews is the call for higher education to continue to cultivate values of public service and create developmental leaders as it did in the 1970s and 1980s. There was a sense that university education today is increasingly perceived as a route to personal political and economic gain rather than national development.

"We need development agents and critical minds for development" (Interview with Audrey Gadezkpo, journalist and media activist).

"We need to have an educational system that encourages people to reflect on issues and challenges them to use their knowledge to serve society [...] From the beginning we were encouraged to open our minds to knowledge, to read as widely as possible, and by reading the stories of achievers you are bound to be influenced [...] to follow their path" (Interview with Kabral Blay-Amihere, journalist and media activist).

"A lot of Ghana's problems come from people who don't understand the value of leadership, the social contract. We need students to come out [of university] ready to solve problems in a creative and bold way. They need honesty and integrity – higher education should shape those values – the thinking and the mindset. You are privileged to attend university therefore you should help solve societal problems" (Interview with Bernard Avle, journalist).

"Today, activists have their eye on political rewards. It is not producing enquiring and critical minds, we need a commitment to the development of public goods. Our institutions are producing people who are interested in what they can get out of it for themselves. We need better quality, we need to rethink and reshape higher

¹³⁶ Interview with Director, Patrick Awuah.

education institutes to play this role and provide education grounded in the Ghanaian and African condition with a passion to contribute to change and national development” (Interview with Akoto Ampaw, lawyer and democracy campaigner).

“We need to retain a portion of higher education which focuses not on vocational work but on the primary university function of developing the mind and rounding it to think a range of things – education in the broader sense. We should just get the best minds trained optimally – what they do with it is up to them. The problem now is it is too vocational – it is cheapening and diluting the key function of higher education” (Interview with former Legon lecturer).

This raises questions about the quality of higher education today in Ghana and its ability to create developmental leaders with the kinds of skills and values, including a drive to serve society, we saw emerging from alumni of the 1960s and 1970s.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown the importance of educational experience to our interviewed leaders. Starting from secondary school, they received an education that was deliberately preparing them for a career in leadership, and one which gave them the skills and values to pursue developmental reform. The chapter has also documented some of the changes to the education system since the shortlisted leaders attended, raising concerns about its ability to continue producing developmental elites.

In the next chapter, we will see exactly how our shortlist utilised this education in their careers, building on networks that they formed at school and at university. In particular we will analyse the emergence of three key coalitions that have brought lasting change to Ghana.

7.0

Higher education and developmental reform coalitions

This chapter explores the impact of higher education on the formation of developmental leadership coalitions and leadership networks in Ghana. It corresponds to step 6 (interviews with key reformers) and step 7 (analysis of networks) of the seven-step research process. Our research looked at developmental coalitions associated with the three key reforms outlined in Section 3.3, as well as the critical preceding period which brought Rawlings to power:

- Rawlings' rise to power from 1979-1983;
- Economic reforms in the 1980s; and
- Democratic and media reforms in the 1980s and 1990s.

A more detailed historical narrative for each of these reforms is outlined in Section 3.3.¹³⁷ This chapter examines three ways in which higher education influenced these developmental leadership coalitions. Firstly, we analyse how early coalitions and political groupings centred around the University of Ghana, Legon, became the blueprint for later developmental reform coalitions. Secondly, we look at the significance of higher education for individual networks and connections between the developmental leaders in our study shortlist. Thirdly, we analyse the skills and values critical to coalition success and review the role of higher education in developing these. The findings in this chapter are based on the following evidence: the longlist data on reform coalition membership, interview data from shortlist leaders (including relationship data analysis), and wider literature on coalition membership and qualities.

Box 7.1 Coalitions, organisations and networks

In this section we use the following definitions, based on those in use by the DLP:

“A **coalition** is best thought of as an association of groups and organisations working to resolve specific problems or to achieve specific goals that are beyond the capacity of any individual member of the coalition to resolve or achieve on their own.” (Leftwich and Hogg, 2007: 5)

What differentiates coalitions from **organisations** is that their constituent parts retain their separate identity (unless they later merge to become one organisation). They are different from networks because they have a goal destination. Coalitions take many forms. Some may be formal and regard themselves as a constituted coalition (perhaps even with a name). Others may be less formal (and nameless) but nonetheless conscious of themselves as groups of players with a common objective. And yet others may simply be loose networks groups with similar interests and ideas.


7.1 The emergence of reform coalitions: Legon's central role

Overview

There is strong evidence that Legon in the 1970s and early 1980s played a central role in the formation of Ghana's developmental reform coalitions throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 7.1 draws together evidence from our interviews (including relationship data analysis), longlist data and wider literature to analyse how some of the key developmental

¹³⁷ Although Rawlings' rise to power and the early PNDC days are not strictly 'reforms' they are important critical junctures leading to the economic, democratic and media reforms of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. There are also strong continuities between this early PNDC period and the reforms post-1983. The role of higher education in shaping these events is therefore included in our analysis.

Figure 7.1: Selected reform coalitions in Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s, and their link to University of Ghana, Legon, in the 1970s and early 1980s



Source: Interviews, relationship data, longlist data and wider literature.

coalitions formed over time. The analysis shows three main coalition groupings: Legon-based coalitions closely associated with Rawlings' rise to power; the PNDC government which led economic reforms; and the 'opposition' which led democratic and media reforms. Key individuals within each coalition are listed to demonstrate the linkages between coalitions over time and the striking continuities in membership. The diagram focuses on the development of more 'formal' coalitions i.e. those with a publicised name and stated purpose, rather than detailing connections between individuals. Further insights into connections between individuals are given below in Section 7.2.

Box 7.2 Leader profiles – Rawlings, Botchwey and Sawyerr

Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings

Rawlings attended Achimota before joining Ghana Military Academy to train as a fighter pilot. Whilst studying for his officer exams in the 1970s, Rawlings began to spend time on Legon campus, where his friend Boakye Gyan was studying part time. During this time, Rawlings became increasingly interested in politics; he was impressed by the radical stand taken by NUGS against Acheampong's UNIGOV campaign and began receiving tuition in Marxism and dependencia. When Rawlings was being tried for treason in 1979, it was Legon law lecturer (and study group member), Tsatsu Tsikata who served as his counsel (who himself was to become a prominent figure in both the PNDC and the NDC).

Following his 'Second Coming' in 1981, Rawlings sought to effect an 'elite renewal' and recruited much of his government from the Legon study groups and others he first met on campus, including his Finance Minister Kwesi Botchwey, Kwamina Ahwoi (acting Foreign secretary) and young economist Paa Amissah Arthur (current Vice President of Ghana).

Sources: Data gathered on longlist leaders; interviews with Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey and Boakye Gyan; Ahiakpor (1991); Osei (2013); and Shillington (1992).

Kwesi Botchwey

After studying law at Legon, Yale and the University of Michigan, Kwesi Botchwey became an academic and led a Marxist revival at the University of Ghana with Akilagpa Sawyerr. Their 'International Trade and Investment' course, offered as part of the law degree – providing a Marxist political economy analysis of western domination of international business – drew crowds from far beyond the law school, including many of our interviewees. They also organised study groups to discuss key Marxist political economy texts through which they mentored many of the subsequent leading figures of the PNDC and NDC. Of 15 leaders who were asked to rate their relationships to others in the relationship survey (see Annex 7 for description), 10 responded that they had a strong relationship with him.

Following the 1979 elections, Botchwey became interested in party politics and formed the New Democratic Movement (NDM) on campus with other left-leaning academics and students such as Kwame Karikari and Tsatsu Tsikata. The 'Marxist Revolution' of 1981 put paid to these democratic ambitions and Botchwey was recruited by Rawlings to become his Finance Minister. As Ghana's economic position worsened, Botchwey broke with his Marxist past and led Ghana's Structural Adjustment Program of the 1980s, the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) (working closely with Information Minister Joyce Aryee and economists Joe Abbey and Paa Amissah Arthur). Botchwey remained a central figure through the PNDC era, leaving office in 1995 as the longest serving Finance Minister in Ghana's history.

Sources: Data gathered on longlist leaders; shortlist interviews with Joe Abbey, Joyce Aryee, Kwame Karikari; personal website.

Akilagpa Sawyerr

Akilagpa Sawyerr was born in 1941 and also attended Achimota School, graduating from his A-levels in 1960. He studied law at Durham, London and Berkeley, where he became involved in civil rights movements. He returned to Ghana in 1970 to teach in the law faculty at Legon. As mentioned above, with Kwesi Botchwey he led a Marxist revival on campus and became an idol and a mentor to many of Ghana's future leaders. Of 15 leaders who were asked to rate their relationships to others in the relationship survey (see Annex 7 for description), 10 responded that they had a strong relationship with him.

Despite being heavily influential to many within the PNDC regime, he remained an academic, becoming Vice Chancellor from 1985-1992. However, he has served on many government committees and is currently a Presidential appointee to the Council of State.

Sources: Data gathered on longlist leaders; shortlist interviews, including with Akilagpa Sawyerr.

The legacy of Legon is clear: many of the key reform coalitions were spin-offs or developments of prior networks centred around Legon in the late 1970s and early 1980s:

- Legon-based study groups (described earlier in Box 6.8 and led by Akilagpa Sawyerr – see Box 7.2 above) provided key members of the ERP coalition such as Kwesi Botchwey, E.T. Mensah and Paa Amisah-Arthur.
- The New Democratic Movement (NDM), a Marxist leaning group leading the opposition to the PDNC in the 1980s, was originally formed on campus at Legon in 1981. It included students and academics from the study groups and a prior network called the National Affairs Discussion Group. It worked very closely with the PNDC government in its early days, but transformed into an opposition group at a critical juncture in Ghana's development in 1983 when the PNDC decided to pursue a liberal economic agenda. The individuals expelled by the NDM became leaders within the PNDC government, and the remaining NDM figures began a new trajectory as leaders of various underground opposition movements throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
- As well as providing a breeding ground for the formation of early coalitions, the more general influence of higher education on coalitions can be seen from the highly educated backgrounds of coalition leaders (see Table 7.1 and Annex 6). They were overwhelmingly university graduates, including notable professionals such as Sam Okudzeto and high profile academics such as Adu Boahen.

The following sections take each reform area in turn and explore in more detail how Legon influenced the development of reform political coalitions. This includes the key coalitions introduced in Figure 7.1 above as well as other key players.

Rawlings' rise to power: Legon's influence on early coalitions

Box 7.3 Rawlings' rise to power and the early PNDC era – key coalitions

The key coalitions associated with Rawlings' rise to power (both in support and in opposition) were:

- The People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ)
- The junior officers of the military
- June Fourth Movement (JFM)
- New Democratic Movement (NDM)
- National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS)
- Trades Union Congress (TUC)
- Professional bodies such as Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB)

Membership lists for these groups are given in the tables in Annex 6 and we recommend that these are read in conjunction with the analysis which follows.

Legon-based networks and campus life were intimately associated with Rawlings' ascendancy to power from 1979 and they had a major influence on the early days (1981-83) of the PNDC. The key coalitions associated with Rawlings' rise to power are described in Box 7.3.

Higher education was at the very heart of these coalitions: all were either formed on campus or through university connections, or worked closely with university based coalitions. This dated back to the mid-1970s when resistance against the Acheampong regime (1972-78) had at its locus the left-leaning student activism at the University of Ghana, Legon.

“In those days, the student body was one of the most active unofficial political organisations.” (Dramani Mahama, 2012: 204)

For example, the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ), a key opposition movement against the Acheampong regime, drew heavily on academics and the educated elites for its membership e.g. academics Professor Adu Boahen and Obed Asamoah, and lawyers Sam Okudzeto and William Ofori-Atta.¹³⁸ The PMFJ campaigned for a return to civilian democracy. NUGS, the national student union, was a further coalition with university roots playing a key role in toppling the Acheampong regime (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). It was a vociferous critic of the regime's corruption and led Ghana's mobilisation against Acheampong from around 1974. By 1976 NUGS was increasingly aligning itself with socialist principles and forming alliances with the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and the Association of Professional Bodies' (later Association of

138 Interview with Sam Okudzeto.

Recognized Professional Bodies) in light of their shared anti-corruption stance (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). In 1977 major student demonstrations against the regime took place in all three of Ghana's universities (Shillington, 1992).

Coalitions critical to Ghana's future were formed when, in the run up to their 1979 coup, Rawlings and his military networks (e.g. Major Boake Gyan and Sgt Akata-Pore) began to associate and align themselves with Legon's student body and its strong socialist ideologies. As described in Section 6.2 Legon was a hotbed of socialist debate in the 1970s and early 1980s, both in terms of student activism and its cadre of radical Marxist lecturers based in the Faculty of Law. Rawlings spent time on campus and was influenced by the political debate (Nugent, 2009).¹³⁹ He also met key individuals with whom he was soon to form political alliances: for example, he met E.T. Mensah at Legon (later to become a key PNDC figure) through Tsatsu Tsikata.¹⁴⁰ Rawlings chose to highlight issues of corruption in the Akuffo regime at his trial in 1979, again aligning himself again with NUGS' stance. On 4 June 1979 Rawlings' was sprung him from jail during a junior officer-led coup and made leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

Box 7.4 Leader profiles – E. T. Mensah

E.T. Mensah

Despite never studying at tertiary level, E.T. Mensah exemplifies the importance of Legon in shaping Ghana's national leadership. Whilst working as an accountant at Legon, Mensah joined the **socialist study groups** organised by Botchwey and Sawyerr (whom he describes as his mentor) where he met so many of those he would later work with in the PNDC/NDP.

At Legon, he was also a founding member of the **National Democratic Movement**, alongside Botchwey, Akoto Ampaw, Tsatsu Tsikata and Kwame Karikari. Following the 1981 coup, Mensah became the Chief Executive of the Accra Metropolitan Authority, before joining the national government in 1992. He is a key ally of former President John Atta Mills and current President John Dramani Mahama.

Sources: Data gathered on longlist leaders; Interview with E.T. Mensah.

Following general elections, Rawlings handed power to Limann's People's National Party government in September 1979 and Legon continued to play an important role for his coalition building during Limann's tenure (September 1979 – January 1981). The socialist opposition movements New Democratic Movement (NDM) and June Fourth Movement (JFM) were both born directly out of Legon as a result of dissatisfaction with the Limann regime. JFM was a group of student leaders and ex-student leaders (such as Chris Atim and Kwesi Adu) who wanted to uphold the revolutionary objectives of Rawlings' 1979 coup and who invited Rawlings to become their Chair. The NDM was formed on campus in 1980 by academics, including Kwesi Botchwey, the influential Legon law lecturer:

"Sawyerr, Botchwey and Tsikata had formed National Affairs Discussion Group on Legon campus in 1979. I was in contact with these Legon activists because of my activism in US and when I arrived at Legon in 1979 this group morphed into NDM based on common shared views and values – we were all democratic socialists." (Interview with Kwame Karikari, founding member of NDM)

Together with NUGS, NDM and JFM formed a broad based socialist coalition and during Limann's tenure Rawlings strengthened his associations with these radical left wing groups, becoming a "magnet" for them and their discontents (Hutchful, 2002: 32).

Rawlings seized power on 31 December 1981 on a platform of revolutionary socialism, formally announcing his alignment with NUGS and the NDM. Some within these socialist groups and the Left saw Rawlings as the vehicle to bring about their revolutionary ideas (Hutchful, 2002)¹⁴¹ and, in the early days of the PNDC, these groups of Legon heritage were highly influential and closely associated with Rawlings' new regime. Indeed, Shillington (1991: 87) argues that "the PNDC was strongly influenced by the model of revolutionary socialism espoused by the former student leaders and radical intellectuals of the JFM." Furthermore, Rawlings put key JFM players Chris Atim and Sergeant Akata-Pore into leading roles in the Workers' Defence Committees and People's Defence Committees, an early PNDC development. Rawlings also met John Ndebugre in September 1981 through the JFM leader Chris Atim¹⁴² and appointed both Ndebugre and Johnny Hansen as early PNDC Secretaries (Haynes, 1995).

¹³⁹ Interviews with Nkrabeah Effah Dartey and Akilagpa Sawyerr.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with E.T. Mensah.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Kwame Karikari.

¹⁴² Interview with John Ndebugre.

In the early PNDC days, the socialist ideology adopted by PNDC leaders whilst students or lecturers at Legon affected the direction of economic policy as the PNDC debated more structuralist approaches and worked with the support of the TUC (Hutchful, 2002). However, this coalition of JFM, NDM, NUGS and the early PNDC began to dissolve due to a number of cleavages, including ideological and personal tensions. The ideological issue at the heart of this was that Rawlings never specifically defined his own politics as socialist, distinguishing only between 'officialdom' and 'the people' rather than any kind of class struggle (Hutchful, 2002).

"While attracted to the rhetoric and intellectual power of the Left, Rawlings had little interest in ideological questions. His basic interest was in constructing a strong and efficient national team that would achieve results, without regard to ideological leaning." (Hutchful, 2002: 51)

As Rawlings distanced himself from socialist leanings, the alliances which had been forged at Legon quickly broke apart. The JFM, still intent on progressing a true socialist 'revolution', started to pose a real threat to Rawlings' authority and, after a failed coup attempt, its members fled in exile. Similarly, NDM members, with their academic analysis and aspirations, soon clashed with Rawlings, an important juncture described below by Kwame Karkari:

"The NDM was started by academics. We liked to analyse things thoroughly. They were always taunting us that we were armchair revolutionaries. After the coup, on about 2nd January 1982, there was a big meeting, assembly of all the left wing groups, all small groups. As the NDM we raised so many questions: 'this is a coup d'état, not a revolution as Rawlings says', so that people said 'oh you guys, revolution is here and instead of going to the people to mobilise them you are raising questions like scholars.' That was their attitude. And some of them paid dearly for not being academic enough, for just going in without thinking. They were the first casualties. All the people who were leading, who were Rawlings' close associates from the JFM – Chris Atim – they were run out of town before the end of one year because they thought it was a revolution and the revolution wasn't going fast enough." (Interview with Kwame Karikari, founding member of NDM)

The NDM finally split into two opposing camps after the announcement of the IMF budget in 1983: some of its members, such as Kwesi Botchwey and E.T. Mensah joined the PNDC's Economic Reform Program team (see below for details) and others (such as Akoto Ampaw and Kwesi Pratt) transformed the coalition into an underground opposition movement agitating for democracy (see below for details).¹⁴³ Similarly, this budget prompted NUGS to completely distance itself from the regime from 1983, when it called for Rawlings' resignation (Hutchful, 2002).

Economic reforms (1980s): Legon's role in the formation of coalitions

This section looks at the impact of higher education on the formation of leadership coalitions which drove Ghana's Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in the 1980s. The ERP was a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with three phases between 1983 and 1997, the key elements of which are outlined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.

Box 7.5: Economic Recovery Program – key players in the PNDC coalition

- **Kwesi Botchwey** – Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning
- **Paa-Kwesi Ammissah-Arthur** – Deputy Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning
- **Dr Joe Abbey** – civil servant and main technical input to the ERP
- **P.V. Obeng** – Chairman of the Committee of Secretaries (effectively Prime Minister)
- **Tsatsu Tsikata** – close involvement with macroeconomic policy, at times chairman or deputy chairman of the Economic Management Team; leading figure behind the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD)
- **Joyce Aryee** – Secretary of Information
- **Kwamina Ahwoi** – Director Office of Revenue Commissioners, Investigations and Tribunals, and Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs; later Secretary for Local Government and Rural Development

Sources: Interviews with shortlist leaders; Hutchful (2002).

Table 7.1: Academic background of ERP team and members in PNDC

ERP team members in PNDC	Secondary Education	Higher Education	Subject first degree	Comment
J. J. Rawlings	Achimota	Ghana Military Academy and Training School		
Dr Kwesi Botchwey	St Augustine's College; Presbyterian Boys	Legon; Yale (USA); Michigan (USA)	Law	Joined PNDC from lecturer position at Legon's Faculty of Law
Paa-Kwesi Ammissah-Arthur	Mfantispim	Legon	Economics	Joined PNDC from lecturer position at Legon's Department of Economics
Dr Joe Abbey	Mfantispim	London School of Economics and Political Science (UK)	Economics	Long-serving civil servant
P. V. Obeng	Opoku Ware	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology		
Tsatsu Tskikata	Mfantispim	Legon, Oxford (UK)	Law	Joined PNDC from lecturer position at Legon's Faculty of Law
Kwamina Ahwoi	Opoku Ware	Legon; Oxford (UK)	Law	Joined PNDC from lecturer position at Legon's Faculty of Law
Kwesi Ahwoi	Prempeh College, St Augustine's	University of Cape Coast	Economics, Geography, Education	
Joyce Aryee	Achimota	Legon	English	
Key members of wider PNDC coalition	Secondary Education	Higher Education	Subject first degree	Comment
Dr Emmanuel Hansen		Legon; Kakerere (Uganda); Indiana (USA)	Political Science	
Mohammed Ibn Chambers	Mfantispim; Tamale	Legon; Cornell (USA)	Political Science	Deputy Foreign Secretary of Ghana from 1987
Dr. Obed Asamoah	Achimota	King's College, London (UK); Columbia Law School (USA)	Law	Academic; PNDC secretary
Justice D. F. Annan	Accra Academy; Achimota	Hull (UK)	Law	Deputy Chairman of PNDC
E. T. Mensah	SNAPS College of Accounting	Various distance (UK, USA)		Worked at Legon in the accounts office; attended Legon study groups

Sources: Longlist leader data; interviews with shortlist leaders; Kotey (2012); and Hutchful (2002).

Although the PNDC's earlier and more structuralist economic policy direction was influenced by a broad coalition of regime supporters (including NUGS, the TUC and leftists groups), it is recognised (e.g. Hutchful, 2002: 98) that from about 1983 the key movers and shakers in economic reform operated in a tightly drawn team within the PNDC government, working closely with the World Bank and the IMF, with relatively little influential input from Ghanaian civil society, business or other actors.

"While the revolution started off with a broad participatory base, it ended up with extremely narrow-based and personalised decision-making structures [...] This centralisation of power around the person of Rawlings

(and an extremely small economic management team) was to be seen as one of the strong points in Ghana's adjustment." (Hutchful, 2002: 50)

"The management of adjustment in Ghana was notable for both its dirigiste approach and for its narrow institutional and social base. Programme management centered around a small macroeconomic team based in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the Bank of Ghana, several key ministries and the Committee of Secretaries [...] The regime concentrated on enlarging its autonomy from rather than links to social groups and institutional forces." (Hutchful, 1992: 198)

This section therefore concentrates on the influence of higher education on the formation of this PNDC coalition (see Box 7.5), before turning briefly to the influence of higher education on other players in the economic reform process.

Higher education influenced the formation of the new ERP coalition in two ways. Firstly, it would seem Rawlings selected his tightly knit group heavily on the basis of their academic background and skills: almost all were alumni of prestigious universities and many were career academics. Table 7.1 details the academic background and technical specialisms of these key figures, showing the dominance of law and economics within the team. Section 7.3 provides further analysis of this coalition's skillset, its provenance and its significance for reform.

Secondly, there were strong existing relationships and prior networks between individuals in this new PNDC coalition which had originated at Legon. Hutchful (2002: 141) remarks that:

"Apart from the small group of Civil Service technocrats they originated (in all but two cases) from the universities; all were strangers to the bureaucracy and to politics [...] they were people joined by the fact that they were political and academic colleagues."

The 'political colleagues' which Rawlings recruited into the ERP team included the Marxist political group called the New Democratic Movement (NDM), which formed on campus at Legon and with whom Rawlings had formed a close coalition on rising to power in 1981. Those joining from the NDM included Kwesi Botchwey, Tsatsu Tsikata, E. T. Mensah, Kwesi Ahwoi and Kwamena Ahwoi.¹⁴⁴ These figures continued to be members of the NDM coalition while it was still in close alliance with the PNDC, but they were expelled from the NDM in 1983 when it formally split from PNDC association upon commencement of the ERP. This marked a critical juncture in Ghana's political scene: elites groups which had met together at Legon and been closely associated had now split into two opposing coalitions, the PNDC and its political opponents (Hutchful, 2002).¹⁴⁵

The 'academic colleagues' to which Hutchful refers on the ERP team included Botchwey, Tsikata, Ammissah-Arthur and Kwamena Ahwoi, who joined directly from their positions as lecturers at the Faculty of Law at Legon and the Department of Economics. These four academic colleagues were also part of a tightly knit academic group which had met regularly together for the Legon-based study groups, along with E. T. Mensah (who was an Accounts Officer at Legon). Finally, Dr Joe Abbey was a former university lecturer although his tenancy in the ERP team derived from his days as a technocrat for the previous Acheampong regime.

"Study groups were important for network formation and radicalisation." (Interview with E. T. Mensah, accountant at Legon 1970s and leading PNDC member 1980s)

"Those were times of unconstitutional rule. Some opposed it, some shaped it. There was a power vacuum that needed to be filled and some academics jumped into it." (Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, journalist and media activist, 1980s to present)

In summary, the importance of higher education in the creation of the ERP coalition is clear: almost all of the key ERP members were drawn from prior Legon-based academic and political networks. Legon was therefore very important, not simply as a recruitment ground for the PNDC, but also as a place where long-standing relationships and trust were forged. An interesting observation on this new highly educated elite is made by Osei (2013) who suggests that Rawlings initiated 'elite renewal' in part by choosing well educated technocrats for this PNDC team:

"The PNDC [...] built its own power base, thus becoming an 'amalgam of large segments of the CPP and entirely new political groups' (Amponsah 2006: 290). Among these new groups were the cadres of the revolutionary institutions, the securocrats (including Kojo Tsikata, Arnold Quainoo, and Brigadier Mensah-Wood), and **finally the young, mostly university-educated technocrats (Nugent 1995: 126f). This last group,**

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Akoto Ampaw; Interview with Akilagpa Sawyerr:

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

among them well-known figures such as Kwesi Botchwey, the Ahwoi brothers, and Obed Asamoah, would 'not have carried political weight if political circumstances had been different' (ibid.: 127). This indicates that elite renewal took place under the PNDC to some degree, even if it was under the guise of an anti-elite revolution." (Osei, 2013: 14; our emphasis)

Beyond the PNDC and the IMF, there was some attempt to engage the private sector and other public interests which would be affected as part of the change management process, mainly through the Tripartite Committee (from the mid-1980s), the **Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD)** (from 1987), the **Private Sector Advisory Group (PSAG)** from 1991 and, much later from 1997, **civil society** representation in the umbrella organisations **CiviSoc** and **SAPRIN**.¹⁴⁶ Key opposition players, including those involved in these initiatives, were the **TUC** who initially supported the ERP in 1983, but from around 1986 emerged as key opponent to the process, precipitating the creation of PAMSCAD in 1987 to mitigate the social costs of adjustment. The TUC were also heavily involved in the Tripartite Committee and chaired CiviSoc. Other opposition groups included the **NDM**, **NUGS** (since students were adversely affected by the reforms) and **GBA**, although their opposition became largely political and these coalitions are therefore discussed in the later sections of this report on democratic and media reforms.

There are a number of ways in which higher education could be said to have made a contribution to the economic reform process and the coalitions described above. Firstly, when the PNDC finally opened up broader consultation to the ERP from social groups and NGOs (in large part led by TUC campaigns), the Tripartite Committee which managed the political process was chaired by **Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr from Legon**. Secondly, individual academics from the **University of Ghana Business School** contributed to the PAMSCAD programme, looking at how to mitigate the social cost of the ERP, for example, recommending microfinance activity to cushion the blow to small and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, universities and academics provided a range of advice and research in relation to reforms: for example evaluating the impact of the banking reforms under the Financial Sector Adjustment Program.¹⁴⁷

Democratic reforms (1980s and 1990s): Legon's role in the formation of coalitions

This section looks at the impact of higher education on the leadership coalitions involved in Ghana's democratic and media reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis covers influential coalitions which agitated for reform throughout these decades. The details of the reforms are discussed in detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.

Box 7.6 Democratic and media reforms – key coalitions

The key leadership coalitions involved in these reforms included:

- Informal opposition movements and groups agitating for democratic reform e.g. **New Democratic Movement, Movement for Freedom and Justice, Alliance for Change** and the **Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards**.
- Formal bodies which protested against the military regime on the basis of their undemocratic policies and media restrictions e.g. **Ghana Bar Association, Association of Recognized Professional Bodies, National Union of Ghana Students, University Teachers Association of Ghana**, several religious organisations such as the **Catholic Bishops Conference, Christian Council and Ghana Journalists' Association**.
- Thought leaders from established institutes such as the **University of Ghana (Legon)**, and from think tanks such as the **Institute of Economic Affairs** and the **Center for Democratic Development**, who made academic and technical contributions to democratic reforms.
- Formal coalitions or organisations appointed by the PNDC to take forward democratic reforms such as the **Committee of Experts, the Consultative Assembly, the Electoral Commission** and the **National Media Commission**.
- Independent journalists and newspapers emerging underground in the late 1980s e.g. **The Ghanaian Chronicle, the Free Press**.
- Formal political parties such as the **PNDC, NDC, NPP, CPP**.

A full membership list of coalitions is provided for reference in Annex 6.

¹⁴⁶ <http://www.saprin.org/ghana/ghana.htm>

¹⁴⁷ Interview with current Dean, Professor K. Ameyaw Domfeh.

Higher education had a profound impact on the formation of the pro-democracy movement in terms of the way networks and coalitions formed; the academic backgrounds of their members; and the leading roles played by influential academics at various critical junctures in the democratic reform process. Central to all of this were the ideologies, skills and values of the key democracy movements which we argue were legacies of individuals' educational experience (see Section 7.3).

Box 7.7 Leader profiles – Akoto Ampaw

Akoto Ampaw

Akoto Ampaw studied law at Legon and subsequently at Ghana School of Law. He became a founding member of the Marxist learning **New Democratic Movement** at Legon in 1980 during the Limann administration, along with Kwesi Botchwey, Kwame Karikari, Tsatsu Tsikata and E.T. Mensah. He maintained opposition to the PNDC regime and was imprisoned in the mid-1980s. Upon release, he became a founding member of the **Movement for Freedom and Justice**, bringing the left and right together to form an effective opposition to the PNDC regime. In the 1990s he was a part of the **Alliance for Change**, a popular opposition movement again led by intellectuals from both the left and the right, most notably Nana Akuffo Addo. He continues to work as a high profile lawyer, contributing to national reforms.

Sources: Data gathered on longlist leaders; interview with Akoto Ampaw.

1. Legon's influence in the formation of early pro-democracy coalitions

Firstly the NDM, the socialist coalition born at Legon in the early 1980s, played a key role in early agitation for liberal democracy. Once they formally announced their ideological separation from the PNDC in 1983, the NDM joined others such as the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) in vocal criticism of the PNDC. Later on the NDM and KNRG were to effectively merge in the creation of the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ). Again, the prior connections formed at Legon between the two groups were vital in bringing the two groups together, since they had "known each other since student days".¹⁴⁸ Several of the NDM and KNRG's members were jailed for their criticisms of the regime, including Kwame Karikari, Akoto Ampaw and John Ndebugre. In Karikari's case, networks formed at university abroad had a significant impact on his incarceration period: his colleagues at the New York universities where he had studied lobbied the US Congress who issued a statement calling for his release.

Box 7.8 The role of faith-based organisations in the pro-democracy movement

Faith-based organisations and religious leaders played a notable role in Ghana's movement towards democracy. For example the **Christian Council of Ghana** and the **Catholic Bishops' Conference** were major pro-democracy players during the Rawlings era. They opposed human rights abuses from early in the regime and continued to call for a return to constitutional rule throughout the 1980s. They openly spoke out against the murders of the judges in 1982, working in a loose alliance with the NDM, GBA and others. They also played a pivotal role, along with the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, in calling for a peaceful transition to democracy (Dickson, 1993). These coalitions used collaborative approaches to influence change:

"While the NUGS and GBA leadership used methods that frequently provoked confrontation with the PNDC, the CBC and the national and regional houses of chiefs preferred a more conciliatory method of political change, emphasising national unity." (FRDLC, 1988)

They used these collaborative skills to lead discussions between political parties after the 1992 elections and in the drafting of the 1992 constitution, having organised domestic electoral observers to ensure electoral activities proceeded peacefully (Dickson, 1993).

Pro-democracy youth movements often had a religious basis. The Catholic Youth Movement was popular amongst university students in the 1980s and early 1990s, attracting gifted individuals who went on to found successful NGOs with a strong concern for governance and peace-building, such as the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC).

Secondly, NUGS and the student base, although an initial ally of Rawlings and his 'revolution' in 1981, moved sharply away from the PNDC in response to the newly published SAP budget in 1983, demanding the resignation of the regime (Hutchful, 2002).

¹⁴⁸ Interview with John Ndebugre.

Thirdly, from the earliest days of the PNDC regime until its last in 1992, the GBA and ARPB, comprising the highly-educated elite and middle class, had a key role to play in criticising the regime (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). They both opposed the murders of the three judges and a retired army officer in 1982, calling for a transition to constitutional rule and opposing extra-legal tribunals. This included trial and detention of various members following a plot to destabilise the government in 1989.

“Rawlings and his colleagues never recovered from the fall out of the killing of the judges [...] they were part of the law elite, their influence is huge.” (Interview with Kwame Karikari, opposition activist, 1980s)

Both the GBA and ARPB had a history of assertiveness and maintaining their independence from government (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). Although both groups played a very consistent role in opposing the regime and calling for a return to constitutional democracy, Gyimah-Boadi (1994) argues that they had been relegated to the sidelines by the 1990s, compounded by their diminished role in the Consultative Assembly (the GBA declining to participate). However, the influence of higher education can be seen in the professional status of their members and also in their leadership which included the academic Harry Sawyerr in the ARPB.

2. Academics and critical junctures – late 1980s

The pro-democracy movement gained more traction in the late 1980s once some key figures were released from jail and following several critical junctures in Ghana’s political history. Criticism and momentum had been growing from a very broad based coalition which extended well beyond the NDM and professional groups discussed above. This included the churches who publicly called for a return to constitutional rule and the TUC who began to take a more oppositional stance to the ERP, particularly from about 1988 onwards (Akonor, 2006). In addition, a number of independent newspapers (e.g. The Ghanaian Chronicle, the Free Press) critical of the PNDC emerged around 1989.¹⁴⁹

However, the clear influence of higher education can be seen in the ‘democratic surge’ precipitated by the well-respected academic, Professor Adu Boahen when he made a famously outspoken speech – known as the Ghanaian Sphinx lecture – in the British Council Halls in 1988, heavily criticising the ‘culture of silence’ that had developed in Ghana (Agyeman-Duah, 2006). Aside from the more general influence of Boahen’s academic career, it was the protective status afforded by his international academic networks which really demonstrated the power of higher education at this juncture:

“Some members of the PNDC government had publicly denounced him but nobody touched him because, you see, when you are a professor, there is some protection internationally.” (Interview with Kwame Karikari, founding member of MFJ)

Box 7.9 Leader profiles – Kwame Karikari

Kwame Karikari

After studying journalism in the US, Karikari returned to Ghana to teach at Legon. He had been in touch with activists in Legon whilst in the US, and as soon as he was back he became involved in campus activism and, with Kwesi Botchwey, Akoto Ampaw, Tsatsu Tsikata and E. T. Mensah, formed the leftist **New Democratic Movement** in 1980. Following the 1981 coup, the NDM was torn between those who supported the ‘Marxist revolution’ and those who opposed its undemocratic nature, with Botchwey, Tsikata and Mensah joining the PNDC and Karikari becoming one of its key opponents. Karikari was arrested and detained but credits his release to his international academic network, who lobbied the US Congress to call for his release.

Imprisonment of the various opposition activists only served to help them forget their differences and, upon release, Karikari sought to unite the NDM with other groups from the left and the right to form the **Movement for Freedom and Justice**. Following Adu Boahen’s Ghanaian Sphinx lecture, the new group approached the distinguished Legon academic to become their front man and began campaigning for a return to democracy.

Sources: Data gathered on longlist leaders; interviews with Kwame Karikari and John Ndebugre.

This was a turning point and “was the spark that led to pressure to open up; there was latent pressure there brought to the surface.”¹⁵⁰ For example, the speech was followed by bold activism from the TUC as it formally adopted a pro-democracy and pro-human rights resolution in March 1988 after years of opposition to the PNDC mainly on economic rather than political grounds (Hutchful, 2002).¹⁵¹ The TUC began to work with the NDM and other organisations ‘underground’.¹⁵² The TUC’s involvement widened the opposition movement beyond the elite to provide a mass popular base (Darkwa, Amponsah and Gyampoh, 2006).

A renewed sense of purpose following their release from jail emboldened members of the NDM and KNRG to form a new underground movement, the MFJ:

“Prison is not as frightening as it sounds [...] prison does not deter criminals, how can it deter people with commitments? We said we should continue to agitate for the return of democratic rule in this country. Let’s form a new organisation that will embrace a wider reach of people rather than just us, the small leftists. In any case the leftists have been associated with Rawlings in some ways: people said, ‘if he has arrested you, he has arrested his own friends’. Let’s start something that tries to be broader. We wanted to bring together old disbanded political parties.” (Interview with Kwame Karikari, member of opposition groups NDM and MFJ)

Again, there was a clear continuity from the Legon-derived coalitions of 1981: the MFJ was formed by four NDM and KNRG members (including Akoto Ampaw, Kwame Karikari, Kwesi Pratt and John Ndebugre) in 1990, one of whom (Karikari) was actually still teaching at Legon.

Box 7.10 Leader profiles – Nana Akufo-Addo

Nana Akufo-Addo

Nana Akufo-Addo was born in 1944, into the most important political family in Ghana (his father, Edward Akufo-Addo, uncle, William Ofori Atta, and grand uncle, J. B. Danquah, are all counted as part of the ‘Big Six’ of Ghana’s independence struggle) and his home became the headquarters of Ghana’s first political party, the United Gold Coast Convention. He was educated at a British boarding school but returned to Ghana to study economics and law at Legon and the Ghana School of Law. He was formally introduced to politics in 1977 by former head of state Akwasi Afrifa, who asked him to become the General Secretary of the **People’s Movement for Freedom and Justice**, a broad-based coalition that brought the political elite, intelligentsia and students together in opposition to military rule.

In the 1980s he opposed the PNDC regime through legal challenges to their rule, advocating the independence of the judiciary and the right of the citizen to demonstrate without police permit. In 1992 he became the first national organiser of the **New Patriotic Party (NPP)** and the campaign manager of the party’s first presidential candidate, Professor Albert Adu Boahen. In 1995, taking advantage of the massive unpopularity of the new Value Added Tax, he formed another broad-based coalition, the **Alliance for Change**, with such diverse figures as Akoto Ampaw, Kwaku Baako and Kwesi Pratt all meeting at Charles Brobbey’s house to organise the movement that would lead to the biggest demonstrations in Ghana’s history.

Following the first democratic transition of power in 2000, Akufo-Addo served as Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, repealing the draconian criminal libel law, making Ghana’s media one of the freest and most vibrant in Africa. He also served as Foreign Minister and took the NPP mantle from John Kufuor, running (unsuccessfully) for President in 2008 and 2012.

Sources: Data gathered on longlist leaders; interview with Nana Akufo-Addo; campaign website.

As with the ERP coalitions, a strong feature of the pro-democracy movements was therefore continuity in coalition membership over time, and strong roots in Legon. In order to soften the hard leftist image of the nascent MFJ’s members and appeal to a wider audience, they purposefully formed a broader-based coalition, again drawing on Legon graduates and academics. The final piece of the jigsaw was engaging Adu Boahen to lead the MFJ:

“It was academics and professionals who led the resistance. We had to get a middle class respectable academic to be front man.” (Interview with John Ndebugre, founding member of MFJ)

¹⁵⁰ Interview with John Kufuor.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Kofi Asamoah.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

Karikari describes the day Ndebudgre, Pratt, Akoto Ampaw and Karikari approached Adu Boahen:

“He was protected as an academic. So we said ‘let’s go to this man’. We approached him, he said ‘What?! This is what I have been waiting for all this time. I am waiting for a group of Ghanaians who are bold enough to say “let’s go”. I am with you.’” (Interview with Kwame Karikari, founding member of MFJ)

3. Higher education and the formation of democratic and media reform groups from 1990

The MFJ was a broad coalition, encompassing various political parties (both Nkrumahists and Danquahists¹⁵³) and interest groups, alongside organisations such as NUGS, the TUC, the Christian Council of Ghana, the Catholic Bishops' Conference and the private press (such as representatives from the Free Press and Ghanaian Chronicle newspapers). It campaigned, holding press conferences and making formal statements, and together with ongoing calls from this broad-based coalition, Ghana seemed to reach a tipping point:

“In the churches, people were preaching for democracy. Because of what we were doing and so many people were doing (churches), the PNDC members prevailed on Rawlings to set up something, a review. They set up a body [National Commission for Democracy] headed up by Justice Annan to go around, soliciting ideas for what Ghanaians want. Of course, they knew it was just a formality. They reported to Rawlings that what people wanted was a return to democracy. What the MFJ was doing, by bringing all these people together is help them to now start crawling back into their old political formations e.g. NPP, CPP. By 1989, in flagrant violation of the newspaper licensing law, some individuals started publishing newspapers and the government wouldn’t stop it. People were buying them and it was too late to stop it. All of these things got the PNDC to consider that we have to change tack” (Interview with Kwame Karikari, founding member of MFJ).

The PNDC responded to this growing momentum (as well as external pressures) by announcing a transition programme on 1 January 1991. The key reform groups and institutions which then came into play were:

- The **National Commission for Democracy**, headed by Justice Annan.
- The **Committee of Experts** (1991) which made recommendations for the constitution and whose members were appointed by the PNDC. This was heavily influenced by higher education since almost all of its members were esteemed academics (see Annex 6 showing membership for details).
- The **Consultative Assembly** (1992) which was charged with drafting the constitution to establish the Fourth Republic, whose members were also appointed by the PNDC. This was a much broader based coalition, comprising 258 members, with representation across all geographic districts, civic organisations and professional groups. It included strong academic and elite representation, such as Professor Ninsin from Legon’s Department of Political Science. Significantly, the GBA and NUGS both boycotted their seats in the Consultative Assembly.
- The formation of the **Electoral Commission** in 1992 to oversee the first elections. Again, Legon’s influence can be seen here as the PNDC appointed Dr Afari-Gyan as the chairman, a Political Science lecturer from Legon (see Box 7.11).

Box 7.11 Leader profiles – Dr Kwadwo Afari-Gyan

Dr Kwadwo Afari-Gyan

Kwadwo Afari-Gyan attended Achimota School and Adisadel College and also graduated from the University of Ghana, Legon, in 1967 with a BA in philosophy, where his roommate was Akuffo-Addo. He went on to attain an MA degree in African politics in 1969 from the same university and a PhD in Political Science from the University of California.

Afari-Gyan worked as a lecturer and professor in Political Science at the University of Ghana. He was a member of the Committee of Experts in 1991 that drafted proposals for the Fourth Republican Constitution. In 1992, he took leave from lecturing to become Deputy Chairman of the Interim National Electoral Commission, the predecessor to the Electoral Commission. After one year he was asked to become Chairman of the new Electoral Commission.

Afari-Gyan has played a significant role in maintaining democracy in Ghana, successfully overseeing the conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008, and leading significant reform to the electoral process since 1992 including the establishment of an Inter-Party Advisory Committee.

Sources: Data gathered on longlist leaders; interviews with Kwadwo Afari-Gyan and Nana Akuffo-Addo.

153 See Box 3.2 for a description of Ghana’s political traditions.

The constitution launched the 1992 elections and finally granted press freedoms. However, the elections were somewhat controversial (with Rawlings' party, the NDC, winning comfortably) and the Criminal Libel Law meant that journalists continued to be arrested. Between 1992 and 2000 further reform coalitions emerged intent on seeing things change. A major new coalition was the Alliance for Change, formed in 1996, ostensibly to resist the introduction of VAT but built on a wider platform for true democracy and further media freedoms (Agyeman-Duah *et al.*, 2008).

"This created a platform that was popular so opposition parties rallied around this. They rallied people for demonstrations, mass protest; it came at a time when the population was yearning for this leadership. Without too much effort we built the biggest mass movement since colonial struggles [...] this broke the appearance of invincibility of the Rawlings regime and prepared the ground for the NPP victory in 2000; it emboldened the population. It was beyond our wildest imaginations" (Interview with Akoto Ampaw, founding member of Alliance for Change).

The importance of prior networks can be seen again in the composition of the Alliance for Change: there was a strong continuity in personnel from the PMFJ, NDM and MFJ, with some key players being Akufo-Addo, Akoto Ampaw and Kwesi Pratt.

Finally, in the period 1992-1996 significant reforms were led by Dr Afari-Gyan, Chairman of Ghana's Electoral Commission. He worked hard to secure high level cross party support for the election process by establishing the IPAC (Inter-Party Advisory Committee), a forum for debating electoral issues and reform (Handley, 2013).¹⁵⁴ This has been dubbed 'a stroke of genius' by Handley (2013: 226) as the process "secured not only their input on how to improve those processes [implementation of the electoral program, electoral reform and electoral regulations] but also their consent to the outcomes".

4. Think tanks, civil society and thought leadership: higher education's broader contribution to reforms

A further important way in which higher education influenced the pro-democracy coalition was through its role in academic thought leadership. For example, the University of Ghana (Department of Political Science) ran three important conferences on democratic transition and constitutional reform: first on *Constitutional Rule in Ghana*, the papers being sent to members of the Consultative Assembly; the second on *Political Parties and Democratic Rule* and the third on *Conflict Resolution and Democracy*.¹⁵⁵ The conferences included published research, seminars and workshops and supported the creation of a public discourse on democracy, which connected to the work of developmental coalitions. Again, academia's protected status was important here as even when the media was controlled the university provided input into documentaries.¹⁵⁶

Think tanks, and their highly educated personnel, also had a role to play in creating a broader public discourse around democracy and helping to mediate between different players, coalitions and developmental leaders to secure democracy. The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) (whose founder Dr Charles Mensah had received his undergraduate and graduate degrees in the US) was the main political governance think tank in Ghana until the late 1990s. IEA did much of the inter-elite, cross-party mediation in the 1990s, drawing from a pool of intellectuals, technocrats and politicians. For example, Legon Professor E. Gyimah-Boadi directed IEA governance programs between 1994 and 1997.

5. Higher education and reforms post 2000

The work of the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) in 2000 provides another example of the key role played by think tanks in supporting collaboration for reforms across different political coalitions and groups. CDD and IEA are seen as important in securing the first peaceful democratic transition of power in Ghana in 2000: both collaborated closely with the Electoral Commission to enhance election transparency and peacefulness (see above and Box 7.11). For example, CDD's work in this area included: democratising civil-military relations; getting the military coalition to be comfortable with the post-Rawlings phase of Ghanaian democratisation; enhancing the transparency and credibility of the 2000 polls to ensure military and broad public acceptance of poll outcomes.¹⁵⁷

The final key reform during our period of research focus which supported democratic development was the repeal of the Criminal Libel Law in 2001. This was the result of agitation by a loose coalition of media, professional and academic actors such as: Ghana Journalists' Association; Ghana Institute of Journalism; individuals such as the lawyer Akoto Ampaw, the journalists Kwame Karikari and Kabral Blay-Amihere, and the lawyer Kwesi Prempeh whose legal and constitutional arguments were canvassed on the platforms of IEA and opposition media; and the support of the then Attorney-General Nana Akufo-Addo. Again, the key actors were highly educated and the coalitions were closely linked to prior pro-democracy and media coalitions from the 1990s, such as the Movement for Freedom and Justice and the Alliance for Change, through Akoto Ampaw, Kwame Karikari and Akufo-Addo (see also Figure 7.1 for lineage of coalitions).

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Afari Gyan.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Professor Ninsin, Head of Political Science, University of Ghana at the time of the conferences.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Professor Gyimah-Boadi.

In summary, we can see the very influential role of higher education in the formation of democratic and media reform coalitions in Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s through: the role of prior higher education networks in bringing people together, the role of key academics in agitating for change, and the highly educated backgrounds of those leading the opposition.

7.2 Higher education and the formation of networks between developmental leaders

This section looks in more detail at the significance of individual networks and connections between Legon alumni. It presents analysis from the 'relationship' dataset (see Annex 7 for methodology) and is intended to **offer further insights into the role higher education played in forming connections and networks between Ghana's developmental leaders**. We then discuss the significance of these connections for the emergence of coalitions and the characteristics of developmental leadership in Ghana.

How important was higher education to developmental leaders' networks?

In Section 7.1 we discussed a number of ways in which political and academic networks at university brought developmental leaders together e.g. through the New Democratic Movement, extra curricular activities (e.g. study groups) and through roles within student organisations such as NUGS. Here we broaden the analysis to look more generally at the importance of higher education in developing connections between individual developmental leaders. Table 7.2 shows the origin of relationships amongst the shortlist leaders, based on data collected during the shortlist leader interviews (see Annex 7 for methodology).

Origin of relationship	Number of connections	Percentage of all connections
University	55	33.5%
Work	53	32.3%
Family/friends	25	15.2%
Political activist networks	19	11.6%
School	8	4.9%
Church	4	2.4%
Total Education (school + university)	63	38.4%
Total	164	100%

Source: Shortlist leader interviews; is based on only those relationships between shortlist leaders self-reported as 'strong' since origin data exists for these only.

It demonstrates that, within this shortlist leader group, higher education has been more influential than any other factor in forming leadership networks,¹⁵⁸ accounting for almost 34% of all connections. As Akufo-Addo says:


"Legon opened my eyes radically to Ghana. Meeting Ghanaians from all over the country was one of the major positives I took out of it – it was very positive. The people that I know within the system, [they are] all from Legon" (Interview with Nana Akufo-Addo, University of Ghana 1967).

The data suggests that higher education was a more significant factor in the formation of leadership networks than school. It is also striking that education overall (i.e. school plus university) was the origin of more than 38% of all connections amongst this elite group. Since our shortlist leaders came from a wide range of social, ethnic and geographical backgrounds (see Chapter 6), this data suggests that education has played a key role in creating lasting connections between future leaders from different backgrounds.

¹⁵⁸ This analysis looks only at how the connection between two people is formed and may underrepresent the importance of higher education where, for example, two people might have met through a mutual university friend who introduced them both to a political network.

Figure 7.2 shows these connections visually, highlighting in red those connections formed through higher education and in grey all other origins.


Figure 7.2: Network graph of shortlist leader connections, highlighting connections formed through higher education



Source: Shortlist leader interviews; based on only those relationships between shortlist leaders self reported as 'strong' since origin data exists for these only

Figure 7.3 breaks this data down further to look at the relative importance of higher education in developing each leader's network within the shortlist leader group:

Figure 7.3: Network graph of shortlist leader connections, showing importance of higher education to each leader's network / percentage of shortlist leader relationships originating at university



Source: Shortlist leader interviews; based on only those relationships between shortlist leaders self-reported as 'strong' since origin data exists for these only.

This shows that some of the key players in Ghana's reforms, such as Kwesi Botchwey (70%), Kwame Karikari (58%), Kwadwo Afari-Gyan (57%), Kabral Blay-Amihere (56%) and E. T. Mensah (50%) met a large proportion of their elite contacts at university, again demonstrating the importance of higher education in the formation of developmental leader networks. Table 7.3 below provides some examples of key coalition relationships first formed through higher education (all rated as 'strong' relationships).

Table 7.3: Examples of relationships within the shortlist leader group that were initially formed at Legon	
ERP/PNDC	Pro-democracy
Kwesi Botchwey and E. T. Mensah	Kwame Karikari and John Ndebugre
Joyce Aryee and Obed Asamoah	Nana Akufo-Addo and Elisabeth Ohene
Kwesi Botchwey and Joyce Aryee	Akoto Ampaw and John Ndebugre
Joyce Aryee and Joe Abbey	Fred Degbe and Kabral Blay-Amihere
Kwamina Ahwoi and E. T. Mensah	Kabral Blay-Amihere and Akoto Ampaw
Paa Kwesi Amissah-Arthur and E. T. Mensah	Kabral Blay-Amihere and John Ndebugre
Obed Asamoah and E. T. Mensah	Kwame Karikari and Kabral Blay-Amihere
J. J. Rawlings and E. T. Mensah	
Kojo Yankah and E. T. Mensah	


Source: Relationship survey data collected during shortlist interviews, as confirmed by one or both of the leaders.

Note: This data is based solely on information collected from interviews and therefore provides examples of relationships formed at Legon rather than a comprehensive list of all origins.

Strength of relationships across the political divide

A further observation we can make from this data is on higher education's role in creating strong relationships **across the political divide**. Figure 7.4 below shows connections between leaders from the two main political groups (P/NDC, shown as purple nodes versus opposition groups, shown as green nodes). Connections in red are those originating through higher education.

Figure 7.4: Network graph of shortlist leader connections, showing connections across the political divide (highlighting in red connections formed through higher education)



Source: Shortlist leader interviews; based on only those relationships between shortlist leaders self reported as 'strong' since origin data exists for these only

What is striking is the number of relationships reported as 'strong' across the political divide. This is nicely captured in a quote from a Member of Parliament.

"We disagree on politics but eat together." (Member of Parliament quoted in Osei, 2013: 20)

Also striking is the role which higher education seems to have played in this: despite operating in different coalitions throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the shortlist leaders clearly retained strong connections with peers they had formed at university. This is a further example of education's role in forming lasting connections amongst the elite in Ghana.

Box 7.12 Education and elites

Education played a central role in Ghana in enhancing social mobility and creating new kinds of political elites (Svanikier, 2007; Pedley and Taylor, 2009). The colonial system and creation of a more modern society created the need and demand for western-style education that gave access to an alternative status system. Largely accessed by traditional elites and merchants during the colonial period, the significant expansion of education during the transition to independence led to a new generation of educated and semi-educated classes and it was conflict between these two blocs that characterised the early days of independence and contributed to Ghana's four decades of political instability (Svanikier, 2007).¹⁵⁹ Indeed, Austin (1970) cited in Svanikier (2007) describes Nkrumah's social mobilisation as a class struggle with educational status replacing economic status as the basis of differentiation. But this elite differentiation also made the political elite more representative which meant that when the consensus described below finally arrived, it had a much greater chance of being sustained (Svanikier, 2007).

Higley and Burton (2006: 9) argue that the evolution of liberal democracy requires a 'consensually united elite' which is horizontally integrated and shares broad values. This integration consists of "dense and interlocked networks of communication and influence, along with basic value agreements and a shared code of political behavior", characteristic of the elite relationship described in this section. Furthermore, we have shown that not only was education the location where almost 40% of relationships within the elite surveyed were first formed, but that it also formed the basis of relationships across the political and social divide.

In addition to this structural aspect, consensually united elites share basic values and norms of political behaviour and recognise bargaining as an acceptable way to operate (Higley and Burton, 2006). Furthermore, Svanikier (2007) argues explicitly that the value consensus which emerged in the 1990s played a major role in the success of Ghana's transition to democracy. Whilst we do not hypothesise on where this willingness to bargain came from, we show in the following (Section 7.3) that Ghana's education system inculcated the kind of shared values and qualities in our leaders that might have led to such a consensus.

To summarise, we can say that education has contributed to social mobility, political representation, elite renewal and, in the long term, political stability in Ghana (though it has also contributed to political instability in the short-term).

7.3 How did higher education affect the skills and values of reform coalitions?

Sections 7.1 and 7.2 reviewed how higher education shaped the emergence of reform coalitions, and the relationships within them. This section examines how higher education influenced the collective skills and values critical to the success of these coalitions. We discuss how these competencies might have brought these actors together to form coalitions in the first place, as well as how they equipped the coalition with the tools to bring about successful reform.

ERP coalition: how did higher education influence the skills and values of this coalition?

After 1983 when the PNDC finally accepted the idea of negotiations with the IMF out of economic necessity (Hutchful, 2002), the ideologies so passionately debated at Legon had no further place within the PNDC: it underwent an "ideological realignment" (Hutchful, 2002: 41) politically as well as economically to support its new direction. Section 7.1 outlines the importance of prior networks in the formation of the ERP team which Rawlings drew together to lead these economic

¹⁵⁹ From independence until the end of the 1970s, political conflict was mainly confined to existing political elites. Rawlings' second coming in 1981 and his appeal to the masses brought the non-elite back into the political game (Nugent 2007; Kosack 2012).

reforms. But if his choice of personnel was no longer about ideology, what precisely was it that motivated Rawlings to select this team of academics and Legon alumni? It was not necessarily an inevitable choice:

“In the early 1960s, nobody would pick a graduate for a political position, but AFRC and PNDC deliberately recruited graduates.” (Interview with Yaw Osafo-Marfo)

It is recognised that the decision to go to the IMF was purposeful leadership decision rather than inevitably determined by economic conditions (e.g. Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000: 44; Herbst, 1993: 30ff) and that the ERP’s successful implementation was “largely, no doubt, because of the unusual degree of political skill and determination with which the Rawlings-PNDC regime managed the reform process” (Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000: 45). So, once launched as a team, what were the leadership characteristics of this coalition? How did they make decisions and work together to deliver a successful ERP? And how had higher education influenced these success factors?

Our analysis is based on interviews with four ERP and PNDC members (Paa Amissah-Arthur; E. T. Mensah, Joe Abbey, Joyce Aryee) and their narrative about the skills and values central to the ERP’s success as they experienced it. It also draws on interview data from other developmental leaders outside of the ERP and PNDC who commented on the ERP culture and skills, as well as supporting evidence and analysis from the literature.

1. Technical expertise, critical thinking

Most obviously, Rawlings recruited the ERP and related PNDC team members for their technical skills: he was intent on recruiting competent technocrats. These largely centred on legal, economic and political science backgrounds (see Table 7.1 in Section 7.1 above) with several qualified to PhD level.

An important feature of the team was the ability to combine these different technical skills areas when debating policy areas.

Core skill area: Technical expertise in economics, law	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the ERP literature	'Intellectual skills', 'competency' and 'knowledge'
Interviewees mentioning this skill area	Paa Amissah-Arthur and Joe Abbey
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	Very strong match as these were subjects studied at university

Joe Abbey provides an interesting insight into the ERP policy decision-making process, showing how the range of different technical skill areas made for more successful policy decision-making.

“[Justice D. F. Annan] was critical in bridging the gap between economic analysis and what I like to call political economy. That is where I saw the likes of Captain Tsikata, Kojo Tsikata, Annan at the bridges of the hard headed economic analysis – and saw the fact that policy belongs in the realm of political economy [...] You must make sure that you are aware of the political support and the political position of some of the hard reforms. When you have people who have the savvy to make sure that the hard edges of economics can be honed in to make for greater support and acceptability, you feel comfortable. You knew you also needed those dimensions [...] of course it wasn’t a democracy so it wasn’t like we were always being tested for the support of the population, but when you had people who also could supply that type of assurance, warning you, bringing to your attention some of the ramifications for social stability and so on, it made you have to think and answer to these questions” (Interview with Joe Abbey, senior economist for ERP).

Interestingly, Hutchful (2002: 141) comments that Botchwey was not selected for his legal expertise but rather for his knowledge and analysis of institutions.

“Though not professional economists, both Botchwey and Tsatsu had sophisticated knowledge of the multilateral institutions. Botchwey has taught an international trade course at the law faculty known for its acerbic critique of the IMF and World Bank and the international trade and financial system; ironically, it was on the basis of this reputation that the Left proposed him as Secretary for Finance.”

These competencies in sharp analysis, critical thinking – and the ability to contribute to rigorous debate drawn from a variety of academic and political positions – were a cornerstone of the ERP team. Hutchful references this “diversity” and the “the ability to “brainstorm” as sources of great strength (Hutchful, 2002: 144).

Core skill area: Critical thinking	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the ERP literature	'Rigorous debate' and 'commitment to evidence-based decisions'
Interviewees mentioning this skill area	Ammissah-Arthur, Joe Abbey and Cletus Avoka
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	Very strong match as these were the skills practised at Legon where a culture of rigorous and challenging debate was a cultural norm, and academic standards were high

2. Collaboration, listening and teamwork

Facilitating these debates was an atmosphere of strong collaboration, teamwork, listening to and respect for others, mentioned by several interviews and referenced in the literature.

Core skill area: Team work and collaboration	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the pro-democracy literature	'Collegiality', 'trust', 'team work', 'listening to others' and 'respecting others'
Interviewees mentioning this skill area	Paa Ammissah-Arthur, E. T. Mensah, Joyce Aryee, Joe Abbey, Ekwow Spio-Garbah and Cletus Avoka
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rawlings' leadership in creating a sense of team was most likely critical here • The values of listening to others and respecting others' opinions were strongly cultivated at Ghana's boarding schools and in Legon's extra-curricular activities such as debating clubs and study groups

“Kwesi Botchwey: he brought people together; asked questions, related to people [...] was the champion who put everything together [from all the different contributors]...he was able to make a presentation that captured everything, it was so great the way he did it” (Interview with Paa Ammissah-Arthur, senior economist for ERP).

“We debated through the night on various issues together. We were bringing different backgrounds, the people were strict economists, political scientists; there were lawyers. Economy was a major sector but the influences on the economy were varied and people had to see what the implications of the things they were doing would be on various sectors of the economy” (Interview with Paa Ammissah-Arthur, senior economist for ERP).

“Obeng and Tsikata had strikingly different styles, temperaments, and backgrounds [...] Nevertheless, through the close collaboration of Obeng and Tsikata, issues of policy and security were closely articulated or overlapped within the regime. The Economic Management Team (EMT) in turn functioned under the umbrella of this policy-security axis” (Hutchful, 2002: 144).

We argue that this team, however, was more than a team of technocrats. As well as the intellectual force and dynamism internal to the team, the ERP coalition held a key set of skills in broader **change leadership**. A number of authors (e.g. Hutchful (2002) and Herbst (1993)) remark on their striking ability to successfully implement challenging economic reforms from a very narrow initial base of support. Much of this is attributed to the team's mastery of political leadership.

“Rawlings and those who became his close associates once the economic reform programme started had well developed political skills [...] technocratic input [...] is important, but to some degree, especially in Africa, it can be supplied by others (notably, the World Bank). Political strategy, however, must come from the leadership itself and is therefore arguably more important than the beliefs and cohesiveness of the senior civil service” (Herbst, 1993: 32-33).

This next section explores the political change leadership skills and values possessed by the wider ERP team, and their links to higher education, before moving onto Rawlings’ contribution in particular.

3. A meaningful higher vision related to public sector service

A key change leadership skill was the **strong vision** of Rawlings and the ERP team. Critical to this vision was a **commitment to public sector service** and reform for public benefit.

Core skill area: Commitment to a strong vision driven by public sector service	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the ERP literature	‘Strong vision’, ‘commitment to serving Ghana and contributing to public good’, ‘moral and ethical purpose’, ‘integrity’ and ‘sense of responsibility and accountability’
Interviewees mentioning this skill area	Joe Abbey, Ekwow Spio-Gabrah, Joyce Aryee, Paa Amisah-Arthur and Cletus Avoka
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong link with school ethos around serving others, preparation for public leadership • Strong link to school focus on moral/ ethical purpose

“[There was] a lot of debate, these were people who wanted the best for Ghana” (Interview with Paa Amisah-Arthur, ERP team member).

“I took the words of the Achimota school song seriously: ‘So to subjugate ourselves so that we may rule’” (Interview with Ekwow Spio-Gabrah, leading member of NDC).

“It was clear, as a public servant, I was aware that the situation was bad [...] I felt it was national service; my country could use my experience” (Interview with Joe Abbey, ERP team member).

“No nation has been able to progress without solid foundation in education [...] to understand society’s needs, basic rights of citizenry: that power is meant to be used for the interest of the people. All this is not something that you can conjure in your head unless foundation is laid for it in education. [...] It is not [about] the contribution of what government has made for you but what you have made for Government” (Interview with Sam Okudzeto, lawyer and democracy activist).

“[It is] out of necessity that sometimes you impose things that look tough. You can sit outside and think that the reason they have imposed something is because somebody has taken more than their fair share [but it was because of a higher need]” (Interview with Joe Abbey, quoting Kwesi Botchwey in a Radio 4 interview).

“...a concern with the wider development of their community or their nation, [...] a sense of what is ‘just’ [...] there is an abundance of evidence, in fact, that the political behaviour of most Ghanaians is very significantly influenced and qualified by such concerns” (Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000: 48).

“[The decision to go to the IMF] seems to have been motivated by a genuine concern to engineer economic recovery” (Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000: 44).

We recognise that this is a contested area, especially since the ERP’s impact on ‘public good’ is, to this day, hotly debated (e.g. Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Kraus, 1991).

4. Drive and focus in implementing the vision

As important as the vision itself is tenacity and a commitment to implementing it. This drive and focus was widely referenced in the leadership interviews and in the literature around the ERP.

Core skill area: Drive and focus in achieving vision	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the ERP literature	Drive, commitment, hard work, discipline and focus
Interviewees mentioning this skill area	Cletus Avoka, Joyce Aryee and Paa Amissah-Arthur
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	A very strong value at Ghana's key schools was discipline and hard work

"Remarkable resourcefulness, commitment and sheer hard work of the small macroeconomic management team..." (Hutchful, 2002: 149)

"Kwesi Botchwey and Joe Abbey were influential [...] I worked very closely with them; respected their vibrancy, tirelessness, determination and their willingness to debate issues." (Interview with Joyce Aryee, Information Minister during time of ERP)

Of course, the extent to which Rawlings and Botchwey had true choice in their decision to approach the IMF, and to pursue these economic reforms, is debatable. But there is a general consensus that they had a choice; it was not inevitable, given the track record of other African leaders' economic decisions:

"In general there is no clear relationship between an African country's economic condition and its willingness to undertake reform measures [...] The economy could have become worse in Ghana and the government could have limped by [as opposed to taking action]." (Herbst, 1993: 30)

For this reason, we argue that this is a **clear example of developmental leadership, where the driver of behaviour was the 'good of the country' rather than short-term political interests. It particularly differentiates the Ghanaian leadership from other African nations** in similar circumstances in the 1980s. In this vein, Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries (2000) argue that this example of Ghanaian leadership decision making challenges Bates' urban-bias theory of African leadership behaviour; since this argues that African leaders take economic policy decisions on the basis of short-term political expediency rather than any kind of ideology or longer term vision.

This 'vision for public good first, manage the stakeholders later' approach is also the opposite of the behaviour predicted by the historical neo-patrimonial structures of Ghana since:

"A patrimonial state is one in which there is no sense of the public good or of public service, but the resources of the state are quite simply the patrimony of the ruler and his court." (Booth, Crook, Gyimah-Boadi, Killick, Luckham and Boateng, 2004: 7)

The technocrats in the ERP team pursued the economic policies which they thought best for broader public good. In fact, Hutchful (2002) observes that these leadership qualities were unfortunately lost after 1992 once a multi-party democracy was restored.

"...the process of remaking the regime into a political machine capable of electoral competition shifted power from technocrats to political brokers more concerned with patronage and less with market rationality [...] Rawlings [...] failed to demonstrate the same leadership." (Hutchful, 2002: 2)

However, the strong ERP vision, divorced from the ideology of the PNDC's early Leftist supporters, meant that the PNDC were left with the very difficult job of managing their political stakeholders towards this vision.

5. Political leadership and stakeholder management

Core skill area: Stakeholder management and political leadership	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the ERP literature	'Political leadership' and 'stakeholder management'
Interviewees mentioning this skill area	N/A but widely referenced in the literature
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	Experience in student leadership and political activism during university

The PNDC team was able to implement economic policies which resulted in little unrest and opposition. There is a consensus in the literature that in theory, the ERP should have been “politically ruinous” (Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000: 45) and that “The PNDC regime was able to initiate [economic] stabilisation on the basis of a particular coalition and to consolidate it on the basis of yet another” (Hutchful, 2002: 44). The skills employed in making this happen are a central tenet of the change leadership literature (including Rotberg’s (2012: 6) skill termed “ability to mobilise followers”).

In order to manage these coalitions, the PNDC placed great emphasis on ‘marketing’ (i.e. controlled messages through the government controlled media outlets) and the Information Minister at the time, Joyce Aryee was described in interviews as a key member of the ERP team.¹⁶⁰

“A whole team was created and quite often [Rawlings] sat in those meetings and discussions were thrashed out so that the marketing could be done [to the public].” (Interview with Joe Abbey, senior economist on ERP)

“Around that PNDC office it was an interesting collection, people who’d ask questions about the common person: ‘What does that mean for the minimum wage?’. We didn’t just talk theory, very practical points. The messengers would come into high-level meetings to be consulted on what they ate today.” (Interview with Paa Amissah-Arthur, senior economist on ERP)

“Tsikata would ask ‘How would that impact on my messenger in my office?’ forcing you to think through things.” (Interview with Joe Abbey, senior economist on ERP)

6. The Rawlings factor

Rawlings himself played a large part in making the ERP and PNDC coalition a success, and drawing out the key skills needed to drive through reforms. Our interviews¹⁶¹ confirmed the existing literature on the ERP (e.g. Hutchful, 2002; Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000) that two of these key leadership traits were:

- A major concern with pragmatism rather than any particular ideology.
- An attraction to, and trust in technocrats. This was demonstrated through a leadership style which put trust in his team, giving them the space to make decisions, as long as they aligned with the broader vision.

“I was given the space to call myself the key architect of Ghana’s economic programme [...] As long as you were clear in your thinking and could explain what the options are then I could get on with my work.” (Interview with Joe Abbey, senior economist on ERP)

“When the coup d’état came it took a long time before [Botchwey] joined [the PNDC]. He joined under a lot of pressure [...] after quite some reluctance. I suspect that’s why, throughout his career with the PNDC, Rawlings never liked his guts, never liked him at ALL. Rawlings picked him because he’s a pragmatist; he is the one of the most sophisticated politicians this country has ever produced because many of his opponents don’t credit him with his craftiness [...] his Machiavellian sense of politics, because he has a lower education than most of the elite they take him for granted. Many of the people he has worked with he didn’t give a damn about them but they could give him results. Look at the people he put together for the PNDC, very diverse, later he cleared all of them. The guy is a clever politician so you underestimate him at your peril. So he didn’t like Botchwey, but he delivered. He had a very funny relationship with people like Tsikata but because he

¹⁶⁰ Interviews with Joe Abbey and Joyce Aryee.

¹⁶¹ In particular with ERP team members: Joe Abbey, Joyce Aryee and Paa Amissah-Arthur.

delivered in terms of intelligence [...] so why not" (Interview with Kwame Karikari, founding member of NDM and opposition activist).

"Rawlings' own style firmly discouraged ideological disputation and emphasised competence, collaboration and commonsensical approaches. Not just in the macroeconomic team but in the regime at large, this attitude fostered the construction of long lasting working relationships by people drawn from a variety of political and ideological backgrounds, the only apparent condition being the acceptance of the rules as defined by Rawlings. Hence within the structural adjustment team [...], certain common objectives had been agreed upon and these individuals brought disparate perspectives to the table to learn from each other [...] the greatest strength was the ability to brainstorm" (Hutchful, 2002: 144).

Pro-democracy and media coalitions: how did higher education affect the skills and values of these coalitions?

Although the pro-democracy coalitions are a broad base – including for example the TUC and religious organisations – in a large part they were driven by the intellectual elite, including the PNDC appointments to the Committee of Experts and the Electoral Commission (see Annex 6 for details of academic background). This section sets out the shared skills and values held by these coalitions, which we argue were significant motivations in bringing them together as new coalition groups, as well as factors critical to their success in bringing about reform. We draw on evidence from across our developmental leader interviews, from both members and non-members of the pro-democracy coalitions.

1. Intellectual and analytical skills

Core skill area: Technical skills and expertise	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the pro-democracy literature	'Analysis', 'competency' and 'insight'
Interviewees from pro-democracy coalitions mentioning this skill area	Kwame Karikari, Akoto Ampaw, Yaw Osafo-Marfo, Kwadwo Afari -Gyan
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	Very strong match as these were skills developed during university classes and debating/study groups

"The Consultative Assembly was made up of well-educated and skilled people." (Interview with Yaw Osafo-Marfo, Engineers' Representative on the 1992 constitution Consultative Assembly)

"It's the same old story of intellectuals playing leading roles in social movements." (Interview with Kwame Karikari, leading opposition activist 1980s)

Like the ERP coalition, sheer intellectual and analytical power had its place as a key characteristic of pro-democracy coalitions.

2. Courage and agency

Core skill area: Courage	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the pro-democracy literature	'Courage', 'boldness', 'express opinion', 'outspoken', 'agency', 'challenge', 'agent of change'
Interviewees from pro-democracy coalitions mentioning this skill area	Kwame Karikari, Akoto Ampaw, Audrey Gadzekpo, Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey, Sam Okudzeto, John Ndebugre, John Kufuor, Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, Kabral Blay-Amihere and Elisabeth Ohene
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	Strong match with school values and university values and focus on agency

An interesting skill and value not mentioned by the ERP and PNDC interviewees, but widely referenced by those in opposition or in pro-democracy movements was 'courage', which was critical in standing up to the military regime. This most often was a simple statement of 'courage' or 'boldness' but also included references to a sense of agency and need to challenge the status quo. This shared sense of agency was clearly a key motivator in bringing different groups together and in their success in challenging the regime:

"[Through the Alliance for Change] we wanted an assault on the hegemony of the PNDC/NDC. We had the commitment, determination and courage that you couldn't find in parties." (Interview with Akoto Ampaw, leading opposition activist 1980s-1990s)

"The status quo was not the only option, the function of intellectuals was to challenge and provide leadership for change." (Interview with Akoto Ampaw)

"Nana Akufo Addo [I admire him] for his determination and courage." (Interview with Joyce Aryee, Information Minister at time of ERP)

"More than anything else we took out of this period the concept of agency [...] you'd better get out there to change the circumstances of your life." (Interview with Nana Akuffo-Addo, leading opposition activist 1970s to 1990s)

"The education system didn't turn out wishy-washy leaders" (Interview with Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, Electoral Commissioner, 1992 to present)

3. Tolerance, open-mindedness

Core skill area: Tolerance	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the pro-democracy literature	'Tolerance', 'open-mindedness', 'respect for others' and 'listening'
Interviewees from pro-democracy coalitions mentioning this skill area	Kwame Karikari, Akoto Ampaw, Sam Okudzeto, Bright Blewoo and Elisabeth Ohene
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	Strong link due to mixed social backgrounds of Ghana's boarding schools and the clear values emerging from this; links to respect for others fostered at debating clubs in Legon and culture of listening to others' arguments

Similarly, this is a skill area specifically mentioned in relation to the pro-democracy coalitions but not featuring within the ERP and PNDC coalitions. Our analysis of school and higher education (see Chapter 6) suggests that this idea of tolerance was a shared value, or way of working, which dated back to both school and university culture in Ghana. We suggest that this shared value would have been critical in establishing trust and allowing ideas to flourish between opposition groups operating underground:

"A key belief of mine: thinking out of the box, believing that we can't all think the same way (free press wasn't a popular concept at the time). Reading books was critical to this belief – I have always been surrounded by books" (Interview with Elisabeth Ohene, journalist 1970s-1980s)

"The New Democratic Movement had a culture of open debate, every member had this [...] we presented lots of ideas to determine policy direction and lots of debate of policy options" (Interview with Akoto Ampaw, opposition activist 1980s to 1990s)

4. Collaboration and collective action – shared objectives

Core skill area: Collaboration	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the pro-democracy literature	'Social mobilisation', 'consultation', 'compromise'
Interviewees from pro-democracy coalitions mentioning this skill area	Kwame Karikari, Nana Akufo-Addo, Kabral Blay-Amihere, John Ndebudgre
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	Opportunity through student leadership positions and student activism to practice collective action

This is strongly related to the ability to create a shared vision (see below), and to tolerate others' perspectives. It was very important in enabling the pro-democracy movement (especially broad-based coalitions such as the MFJ and Alliance for Change) to work together in pursuit of shared goals, despite differences.

"NUGS gave me the opportunity to practise social mobilisation. At KNUST [Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology] I got involved in student politics – I was the National Secretary of NUGS. They were tumultuous times with a struggle against military rule over four years. [...] All these things impact on somebody trying to have an impact on social development" (Interview with John Ndebudgre, opposition activist, 1980s)
 "The capacity to compromise and identifying what is the most important issue of the time and building a coalition around it." (Interview with Nana Akufo-Addo, opposition activist, 1970s-1980s)

"All my working life has been [about bringing] the right people at the right place at the right time." (Interview with Bright Blewoo, head of Ghana Journalists Association)

"We made synergies and enabled collaboration." (Interview with Kabral Blay-Amihere, journalist and media activist, 1980s-present)

The joint history of groups such as the NDM and the KNRG working together in 'underground' movements for a collective goal in the early 1980s clearly set a precedent for further work together in the late 1980s and 1990s. The fragile nature of this collaborative work is highlighted by the speed with which these broad based coalitions re-set into old camps in 1992.

"The [pro-democracy] opposition made some effort to overcome old cleavages. This was most notable in the civil society groups such as the MFJ, where elements from the Busia-Danquahists and the Nkrumahists worked together to protest against the regime. However, this did not lead to the formation of a united opposition platform. When the ban on political parties was lifted in 1992, the 'old' camps formed new parties: the NPP in the Busia-Danquah tradition and several small Nkrumahist parties. This time, the Busia-Danquah tradition possessed enough social cohesion to form a single party, the NPP." (Osei, 2013: 19)

5. Vision/public service

Core skill area: Vision for higher purpose/public service	
Examples of this skill area as paraphrased in interviews and the pro-democracy literature	'Serving Ghana', 'selflessness', 'vision' and 'doing the right thing'
Interviewees from pro-democracy coalitions mentioning this skill area	John Ndebudgre, Elisabeth Ohene, Kabral Blay-Amihere, Sam Okudzeto and Akoto Ampaw
Influence of higher education and school on the formation of these skills/values	Strong link due to mixed social backgrounds of Ghana's boarding schools and the clear values emerging from this

This was mentioned by many leaders in both the ERP and the pro-democracy coalitions and was clearly a driving force in bringing coalitions together to work for what they saw as a higher purpose.

In summary we can see a clear set of shared skills and values which were critical to coalition formation and success. Our analysis, when mapped against the findings in Chapter 6, shows that higher education played a central role in cultivating these skills and values. Importantly, many of these were developed at university as *shared* capabilities rather than solely individual ones e.g. within study groups, within collective student action and political campaigning, which had significant implications for later coalition building as these norms were integral to the 'culture' of coalitions and their success. For example, it can safely be assumed that Rawlings clearly understood the legal and economic skillset of the ERP team he selected, but it has been suggested that he also saw value in what he knew (from previous interaction with them at Legon) would be their ability to debate these technical areas as a group, in a strong culture of challenge and critical thinking to make evidence-based decisions. In terms of the pro-democracy movement, it was a shared sense of agency, a culture of tolerance and open discussion, and a joint history of 'underground' collective action, all experienced together in prior groups at Legon (e.g. during student activism), which helped to bring coalitions together.

8.0

Key research findings and conclusion

This research aimed to explore how higher education has equipped developmental leaders and coalitions in Ghana with the necessary skills, values and networks for leadership and national reform. This chapter summarises the analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7 presenting four key research findings and associated policy issues. Based on this analysis, we outline a model of developmental leadership qualities in Ghana that may have application in other contexts. We also demonstrate the role higher education has played in forming coalitions as well as exploring the institutional effect of higher education establishments. We conclude this section by looking at the future of higher education in Ghana and the challenges that are facing the higher education sector in continuing to produce developmental leaders as it moves towards massification.

8.1 Skills and values

All of our interviewees were keen to explain the importance of their educational experience in the development of key skills and values that enabled them to go on to their respective leadership careers. We also find that they describe a similar set of skills and values. A summary of our findings on the secondary and higher sub-sectors is presented below. We then summarise findings in relation to the skills and values needed for reform and, based on this, develop a model for developmental leadership in Ghana.

Secondary education

Core skills and values were developed at secondary school, and the leadership ambitions of most of our interviewees can be traced back at least this far (some talked about the importance of their earlier upbringing, but in general, their time at secondary school seems to be the crucial period).

The characteristics of their secondary schooling are remarkably similar; all of them having been educated in elite UK boarding schools or at elite Ghanaian boarding schools (that were, to a large degree, modelled on their UK counterparts).¹⁶² There was a deliberate focus on training young minds for leadership and a particular set of skills and values were developed (for example, public service, independence, discipline, critical thinking, respect and tolerance). This was achieved through the following characteristics:

- **Boarding schools** – with twin aims of mimicking future leadership lifestyle and encouraging national integration and identity, Ghanaian education policy has always placed great importance on boarding at secondary school.
- **Strong school culture** – Ghanaian education's missionary roots translated to very strong school cultures, effective in inculcating values of public service, social justice and tolerance in students.
- **Broad curriculum** – students received a broad education that developed their critical thinking skills and interest in the world.
- **Extra-curricular activities** – students were involved with debating clubs, drama productions, cadet corps, student newspapers and sport which gave them the opportunity to practice at future careers and develop important leadership skills such as creativity, debating, discipline, strategy and teamwork.
- **Well resourced** – secondary schools in general were well-resourced compared to primary¹⁶³ and Achimota, in particular, received very generous funding.

¹⁶² Foster (1965).

¹⁶³ See Kosack (2012) for details on sub-sector financing.

Higher education

The core skills and values that originate from secondary education were further developed at university. The key role of higher education, however, seems to be as a place to develop intellectually, technically and politically. This was achieved through the processes described in the Table 8.1.

Table 8.1: Quality educational processes and characteristics for developmental leadership

Educational processes or characteristics	How these cultivated developmental leadership skills, values and networks
<p>Institutional culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Students from all ethnicities and social backgrounds • Hall system which created sense of belonging • Hall system with democratically elected administrations • High academic expectations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed tolerance of other social and ethnic backgrounds • Developed values around public good for Ghana and national integration • Developed new 'horizontal' connections between students from different social backgrounds • Raised expectations for leadership • Developed values around democracy
<p>Curriculum and course content</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanities and Social Science subjects such as law, economics, politics, journalism, English and history • Access to broad range of courses • Compulsory African Studies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed awareness of key social, political, and economic issues • Developed technical skills in subject areas central to governance and accountability • Developed sense of agency (through both the study of historical leaders and current political developments) • Broad intellectual development
<p>Significant contact with quality teachers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant interaction with tutors and lecturers • Small group sizes • Lecturers open to critique and debate • Challenging and inspiring teaching 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main mechanism for developing critical thinking skills • Public-minded and politically-engaged lecturers inspired students to developmental leadership
<p>Extracurricular activities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Debating clubs, student newspapers, etc. • Opportunities for leadership positions in Halls, SRCs and other clubs • Study groups with reading assignments and debates with lecturers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed discipline and work ethic • Developed confidence and provided opportunity to develop practical skills • Study groups, debating clubs and certain other societies encouraged critical thinking, intellectual rigour and analytical skills • Enabled students to practise leadership and teamworking • Encouraged community service and developed values around public good
<p>Student politics and activism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protest and activism • Formal politics in Halls JCRs, SRCs, NUGS and other groups • Formation of early political groups e.g. New Democratic Movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed values and political views • Developed sense of agency through collective action and leadership • Enabled students to practise leadership skills (e.g. social mobilisation and campaigning) • Prior networks were a blueprint for later coalitions

We found that there were two distinct higher educational contexts that were important for developmental leadership in Ghana: a Legon education and a foreign education.¹⁶⁴ Whilst both gave access to the educational features and processes described above, there were certain differences in the experience they offered.

¹⁶⁴ There is a roughly even split, in both longlist and interviewee data, between those who studied only at Legon but not overseas (38%), those who studied only overseas (34%), and those who studied both at Legon and overseas (23%). A small minority (5%) studied neither at Legon nor overseas.

Legon

The University of Ghana, Legon developed out of Achimota and borrowed strongly from the Oxbridge tradition to provide a broad liberal arts/humanities education for the future leaders of Ghana. Indeed, it is still the only publicly-funded university to do this (although UCC has been broadening its offerings). In being the “crucible”¹⁶⁵ in this way it provided a unique experience for our interviewees:

- **Environment** – Legon was an “extension of Achimota”¹⁶⁶ with a large campus and privileged halls, giving students the sense that they were being groomed for great things.
- **Broad curriculum** – as well as their chosen subject, our interviewees also describe accessing lectures in other subjects, leading to an all-round intellectual development.
- **Network effect** – as the only university until recently to offer subjects such as politics, economics, law, English and history, it brought most of Ghana’s budding developmental leaders to one campus where they were able to interact and inspire each other.

International study

Interviewees who studied abroad tended to talk about two broad channels through which their international experience affected their later leadership career:

- **Academic excellence** – although a Legon education was of a high quality, studying at elite schools in the UK and US gave our interviewees access to inspirational academics at the forefront of their fields.
- **Exposure to different national struggles** – by meeting students from all over the world and being involved in their host country’s politics, our interviewees cite their political development overseas as fundamental in their transformation into developmental leaders once back home.

Key Research Finding 1: A quality education – at both secondary and higher level – has been an important factor in the formation of developmental leadership in Ghana during the period studied. The research suggests that a number of key educational processes or characteristics were integral to this quality education (see Table 8.1).

With just one quite particular exception,¹⁶⁷ all of the interviewed leaders had an elite secondary education (defined as attending an elite Ghanaian or UK boarding school) or an elite university education (defined as attending Legon or studying overseas); the vast majority (25/28 interviewed shortlist leaders) having both. We find a similar story amongst longlist leaders, with 96% having attended either an elite secondary school or higher education establishment and 74% having attended both. Further, interview responses and our analysis of the skills developed (see Table 8.1 above and Figure 8.1 below) suggest that it is the quality of the education that they received which made an elite education so vital, not simply that it was elite (i.e. that it served as a screening device for existing elites). In other words, the quality of the education was a transformative factor in producing developmental leaders.

Our interviewees talked about the skills, values and networks they formed at secondary and higher education as critical in their development as reform-minded leaders. For the generation of leaders we interviewed, we also rule out the ‘reproductive’ function of education, as the education system in the immediate pre- and post-independence years was highly inclusive and provided opportunities for all segments of society.

We find that secondary education is important in the formation of core developmental skills and values, whilst higher education gives further opportunity to develop those skills and values, as well as providing an opportunity to develop technical skills and explore political beliefs and activism.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Nana Akuffo-Addo.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey.

¹⁶⁷ E.T. Mensah did not have an elite education but while working as an accountant at Legon in the 1970s, he attended the socialist study groups which so many of our leaders cited as important in their intellectual and moral development. He has worked with the same network in the three decades since, first in the PNDC and now in the NDC. Half of the strong relationships he described with other shortlisted leaders were made at Legon.

Skills and values needed for reform

1. Economic reforms

Rawlings was said to be intent on recruiting the best minds to his PNDC project, filling it with academics, technocrats and promising young graduates. His team was filled with **technical expertise**, particularly in law and economics, engaged in rigorous debate and was committed to evidence-based decision making. Not surprisingly, therefore, **critical thinking skills and collaboration** were key themes throughout these interviews.

The core value of this coalition was a **commitment to public service**. Rawlings and the ERP team had a **strong vision** of reform, which was seemingly pursued for public benefit rather than any kind of ideology. As important as this vision itself, was the **determination and commitment** to implement it. In executing their plan, they also needed deft **stakeholder management** and **political leadership**.

2. Democratic and media reforms

Technical expertise was also a key skill required for democratic reforms, with journalists, lawyers and politicians required to challenge the PNDC regime in the papers and in the courts, guide the constitution drafting process and effect political reform.

Given the nature of the military regime, it is unsurprising that **courage and agency** were two other characteristics that kept appearing during the course of interviews. **Tolerance, open-mindedness** and **collaboration** were also necessary to enable coalitions to form across the political divide (e.g. People's Movement for Freedom and Justice, Movement for Freedom and Justice and Alliance for Change). A **commitment to public service, social justice** and the **vision** and **determination** to achieve reforms were also necessary characteristics of democracy campaigners.

3. Link to education


From our interviews, we can see that many of these characteristics and qualities come directly from education. For example, **commitment to public service** was described in many interviews as being a core component of school culture, particularly at Achimota but also at other elite secondary schools such as Mfantshipim and Navrongo. These schools brought together students from all over the country, with the deliberate aim of nurturing **tolerance, open-mindedness** and national integration. As elite schools, they also encouraged a **sense of agency**, which was further developed during student activism in turbulent political times (along with **courage**). At university, our leaders further developed their **critical thinking skills** and developed the **technical skills** they would need to effect reform. These links are outlined in more detail in Annex 8.

Knowing that these key characteristics come from education, and knowing that our leaders tended to have similar educational experiences, it is not surprising that we find commonality in the characteristics described by different coalitions working across the political divide.

A model for developmental leadership

Our interviews give a clear picture of what developmental leadership looked like in Ghana. Through questions about reform coalitions, leader core characteristics and educational experiences, we have come up with a set of leadership qualities that define developmental leadership across political divides, and found evidence of a direct link to their education in the 1960s and 1970s as outlined in Figure 8.1 and Table 8.2 (further detail of the key characteristics can be found in Annex 8).

Figure 8.1: A model of developmental leadership qualities in Ghana



168 This model aims to provide a generic template for developmental leadership qualities, and so technical skills have not been specified. The most common subjects of study we encountered were law, economics, politics and journalism (in that order), but any technical skills that could be applied to developmental reform or give legitimacy to developmental leadership are relevant. For example, Yaw Osafo-Maafo originally trained as an engineer, but entered politics after representing the engineering community in the 1992 constitution's Consultative Assembly.

Table 8.2: Leadership qualities and links to education

Leadership quality	Link to education
Honesty, integrity and fairness	School culture and values; on-campus debate; legal studies
Respect and tolerance	School culture and values; boarding; diversity of student population; overseas study
Moral purpose and commitment to serving Ghana	School culture and values; exposure to poverty through student diversity; sense of privilege created and of debt to society; political debate on-campus; student activism; subject studied (law, politics, journalism, economics)
Courage and agency	Sense of being groomed for leadership; school culture; leadership opportunities; student activism; study of history; belief that role of intellectuals is to provide leadership for change
Discipline, focus and determination	School culture and values; extracurricular activities (e.g. Cadet Corps); subject (e.g. law)
Goal-orientated and strong sense of responsibility	Leadership opportunities; sense of being groomed for leadership
Consultation and teamwork	Extracurricular activities such as sports and debating clubs; boarding school interaction
Collaboration, collective action and conflict resolution	Diversity of student body; extracurricular activities; student activism course content (e.g. African studies course)
Critical thinking and analytical insight	Teaching quality and methodology; debating clubs and on-campus debate; broad curriculum; close interaction with lecturers; subject choice (e.g. law, economics, politics, philosophy)
Technical competency and knowledge	Teaching quality and methodology; on-campus debate; broad curriculum; close interaction with lecturers; extracurricular activities; subject choice (e.g. law, economics, politics, journalism)

Of course, not all interviewees mentioned each of these qualities, but they all mentioned at least two, and the majority mentioned six or more. Moreover, grouping individuals in their reform coalitions, we find that both coalitions report possessing all of these qualities.

We can group these qualities as follows:

- **Core values** – our analysis shows that these values largely, but not exclusively, originated in secondary school and they are what gives the initial motivation to pursue a developmental career; they are also central to everyday activities as a developmental leader.
- **Key characteristics** – these are the essential characteristics or qualities that leaders must demonstrate if they are to be successful in pursuing reform; some developed at secondary, some at university and others during career.
- **Technical skills** – these are the 'hard' skills, expertise and knowledge which leaders require to drive change; these are largely developed at university and applied and further developed in work.

These leadership qualities provide a shorthand for Ghanaian elite leadership culture and 'norms' in the 1980s and 1990s; a culture largely shared across both the PNDC and opposition coalitions.

Our model has much resonance with the findings of a detailed study in South Africa on public good professionals. This found that "a high level of specialised knowledge and technical skills are a *sine qua non* of public-good professionalism" but that "technical competence alone, while necessary, is not sufficient [...] we envision graduates who not only acquire the capabilities to function as public-good professionals, but also acquire the values which dispose them to choose to function this way" (Walker and McLean, 2013: 81-82).

Key Research Finding 2: There is a clear set of developmental leadership qualities that were developed during our leaders' education which include core values, key characteristics and technical skills. In Ghana, the most common subjects studied (i.e. technical skills developed) amongst developmental leaders were law, economics, Politics and journalism and these were the areas in which sustained national reform was brought about.

Our research shows that these leadership qualities characterised the developmental leaders in Ghana operating in the 1980s and 1990s. The foundation in values was laid in secondary school and further embedded during university. Key characteristics such as critical thinking, teamwork and courage were developed in both secondary and higher education. By contrast, the technical skills were largely developed during university and then applied in work.

Our model of developmental leadership qualities has strong parallels with the 'capabilities-based professionalism' model developed by Walker and McLean (2013) as their ideal for training public-good minded professionals. The key characteristics of developmental leadership that we found in Ghana have a large area of overlap with the eight professional capabilities (vision; affiliation; resilience; struggle; emotions; knowledge, imagination and skills; integrity; and confidence) that Walker and McLean (2013) identified in South Africa.

8.2 Networks

Nature of developmental elites in Ghana

We have found that access to the Ghanaian elite was quite open, even to those from the poorest backgrounds, with scholarships and positive discrimination policies enabling wide access to quality education. The developmental leaders in this study came from a range of social, ethnic and geographical backgrounds, with as many coming from the agricultural poor as came from the established elites. The only thing they had in common was a quality education, almost all having either studied at an elite boarding school or an elite university. This is in strong contrast with theories of schools as centres for elite reproduction (e.g. Bourdieu, 1977) and suggests that education contributed to processes of elite renewal and differentiation in Ghana.

A deliberate aim of Ghana's boarding school system during the period of study was to encourage national integration and foster values of tolerance between these different groups. We found strong evidence of this in the values expressed by developmental leaders (e.g. a sense of national pride, Ghanaian public good, tolerance and open-mindedness towards other social and ethnic groups). Further, our relationship data shows us that education, and university in particular, was where almost 40% of connections between our developmental leaders were first made – higher even than the workplace, and far higher than origins which might suggest less integration between different social groups (such as family, friends and church). In addition, we found evidence that education was responsible for strong connections between individuals across the political divide i.e. between PNDC and opposition leaders.

Higley and Burton (2006) argue that this 'horizontal integration', alongside the shared values outlined above are necessary conditions for the emergence of a 'consensually-united elite', which in itself, they argue, is a necessary condition for liberal democracy. We can therefore speculate that education has played an important role in the emergence and development of Ghana's Fourth Republic democracy.

The role of higher education in the formation of the ERP/PNDC coalition

Higher education influenced the formation of the new ERP coalition in two ways. Firstly, we find that Rawlings selected his tightly-knit group heavily on the basis of their academic background and skills: almost all were alumni of prestigious universities and many were lecturing at Legon at the time of their appointment. Secondly, as a result of this policy and of the political allies Rawlings had made, there were strong existing relationships and prior networks between individuals in this new PNDC coalition which had originated at Legon. Although this group was initially united by the leftist ideology dominant in Legon political debate, they were to go on to pursue conservative economic policies supported by the IMF and World Bank.

Key Research Finding 3: Education has helped create shared values amongst the elite, facilitated horizontal integration and increased access to the elite.

The establishment of high quality education in Ghana based on the elite British model but with strong moral purpose grounded in its Christian missionary roots, created new routes into the elite. Our interviewees came from all kinds of family backgrounds, with seemingly just their educational experiences in common. Inclusive access to quality education was a feature of the education system that Nkrumah's government strived towards, and we can say that the educational policies of the era, which directly affected most of our leaders, made access to Ghana's elite more meritocratic.

By providing a shared residential experience through which key values such as public service and national unity were intentionally formed, education led to greater integration of elites and consensual unification. This ultimately led to sufficient agreement on the 'rules of the game' to allow the emergence and development of democracy in Ghana.

Our findings add to the literature on elite formation, circulation and consensus (e.g. Higley and Burton (2006), Svanikier (2007) and Osei (2013)) by showing the educational processes through which our leaders acquired the skills necessary to join the political elite and develop the shared values that may have contributed to the elite consensus around democracy arrived at in the 1990s.

The role of higher education in the formation of the democracy and media coalitions

Legon, and higher education more generally, was also crucial to the formation of coalitions within the pro-democracy movement. Again, many of these coalitions formed from prior networks based or formed on campus (e.g. the New Democratic Movement formed by Legon academics). Other key players were professional groupings such as the Ghana Bar Association, the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies and the Ghana Journalists Association. Broad-based movements such as the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice, Movement for Freedom and Justice and the Alliance for Change united these groups at different points in time.

Key Research Finding 4: Higher education was critical to both the emergence of reform coalitions in Ghana and to their success in bringing about economic, political and media reforms. Higher education influenced coalitions in two main ways. Firstly, many of the key reform coalitions in the 1980s and 1990s could trace their roots back to prior networks first formed on and around campus. Secondly, higher education played a central role in developing the skills and values of these coalitions which would both bring them together and support their success.

Firstly, **prior networks** formed at and around Legon in the 1970s and early 1980s formed the blueprint for both Rawlings' ERP team and opposition coalitions such as the Movement for Freedom and Justice and the Alliance for Change. Our research shows that many of the key reform coalitions in this study can trace their roots back to previous networks and coalitions at Legon. More indirectly, the majority of reform coalitions had university alumni, academics (such as Adu Boahen and Karikari) and highly qualified professionals (especially lawyers such as Sam Okudzeto and Akuffo-Addo) at their core.

Secondly, it is clear that certain kinds of human and social capital and capabilities (skills, values, ideas, ways of working and, sometimes, status held by these prior networks and alumni) which had been developed within the higher education setting, were significant motivations in bringing them together in new coalition groups. These were also critical to their success in bringing about reform. These include the qualities outlined in the leadership model in Figure 8.1; importantly, many of these were developed at university as *shared* capabilities rather than solely individual ones: for example, within study groups, collective student action and political campaigning. This had significant implications for later coalition building as these norms were integral to the 'culture' of coalitions and their success.

These were valued as a collective asset: for example, Rawlings selected an Economic Recovery Program team that was highly qualified in law and economics, but moreover he had seen from previous interaction at Legon their ability to debate these technical areas as a group, applying critical thinking to make evidence-based decisions. In terms of the pro-democracy movement, it was a shared sense of agency and a joint history of 'underground' collective action, experienced together in prior groups at Legon (e.g. in the New Democratic Movement), which helped to bring coalitions together. In addition, academic status was a key motivator for bringing academics such as Adu Boahen into the fold in the Movement for Freedom and Justice, providing some protection of the cause.

The importance of higher education can also be seen in the 'democratic surge' that followed the Ghanaian Sphinx lecture by academic Professor Adu Boahen. Adu Boahen heavily criticised the culture of silence that had developed in Ghana in a speech that would have landed most others in jail. His ability to do so can be seen as a result of the protected status of academics as a result of international academic networks. Higher education can therefore be seen to have played a crucial role at this critical juncture in Ghanaian history.

The Rawlings Factor

Rawlings' rise to power from 1979 to 1981 affected an entire generation, and certainly led to the developmental leadership careers of many of our interviewees. Rawlings sought to break with patrimonial structures of the past and, whilst some key actors and networks from the old establishment acquired enhanced status with time, we can say that Rawlings 'anti-elite revolution' was relatively successful, at least in the early years of the revolution. Having been influenced by the political debate at Legon in the 1970s and clearly having a high respect for education, it was to Legon that he turned, recruiting young lecturers and graduates with strong technical skills – "strangers to the bureaucracy and to politics" (Hutchful, 2002: 141) – into his government. In addition, it was the peers of Rawlings and his recruits who formed the main opposition to his rule.

Further, this generation of leaders has been in power ever since. For example, the current Vice President, Paa Amisshah-Arthur, was one of the architects of the ERP; and the current leader of the opposition, Nana Akufo-Addo, was one of the leading democracy campaigners in the 1980s and 1990s. The passing of the presidency from Atta Mills (the year below Rawlings at Achimota) to Dramani Mahama in July 2012¹⁶⁹ can be seen as the first sign of a handover to a younger generation,¹⁷⁰ but even he was an alumnus of Botchwey and Sawyerr's study groups at Legon.

We can therefore consider this an exceptional generation of leaders. Although the central figure amongst these did not study at University, he was present on campus and was influenced by the quality and spirit of its debate.

8.3 Institutional effect

As well as through the development of skills, values and networks, universities also have a direct institutional effect on developmental reform and, in Ghana, Legon has always been at the centre of political discourse. This can partly be seen as a result of Ghana's pursuit of a specialised, development-oriented higher education policy, with just one public liberal arts/humanities university. With a concentration of academic authority on Politics, economics and law,¹⁷¹ it is perhaps inevitable that Legon has been the leading organisational voice in many national debates.

As the number of higher education establishments has increased, Legon's individual impact may have lessened, but it remains the only establishment of its type and an important influence. Furthermore, Ghana continues with a policy of specialisation of universities, meaning that within their own fields, the other public universities also have strong voice.

Other establishments, however, have come to the fore and are rivalling Legon for academic and intellectual influence. The Institute for Economic Affairs (established 1989), Centre for Democratic Development (1998) and Institute for Democratic Governance (2000) all play a high-profile role in economic and political debate through their research and advocacy, furthering the cause of developmental leadership in Ghana.

Student activism also continues to be a force in Ghanaian politics, with NUGS still at the fore. It has been a key player in the development of education policy over the last twenty years and is now a leading advocate in the Freedom of Information campaign.

8.4 Changing landscape

Since our leaders were at university, Ghana's higher education system has started a process of 'massification', with the established universities enrolling far more students; the upgrading and establishment of other public higher education establishments; and the introduction of private higher education meaning that Ghana has moved from a GER of 0.7% in the early 1970s to 12% today.

¹⁶⁹ This was consolidated with an election win in December 2012.

¹⁷⁰ At 55, Mahama is the first Ghanaian Head of State to be born after independence.

¹⁷¹ Not strictly true for law because the Ghana School of Law is another established centre of legal expertise. Legon's Law department, however, has been highly influential. In the fields of public administration, development management, governance and leadership, the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration is also now a key player.

This has led to a highly differentiated and unequal higher educational system. At some of the public universities, there is overcrowding with too many students to fit into the lecture halls; at some private universities, the quality of education is highly questionable. At the other end of the spectrum, Ashesi has emerged providing a quality education with a 'high-touch' campus experience.

Despite the increased numbers, Legon and the other public universities operate in many ways as before and current education leaders and students talk of similar leadership skills and values being developed in their establishments, with critical thinking, communication skills and ethical values being the most cited. The halls system is still technically in place; student politics is alive and well; and there are plenty of extra-curricular activities for students to get involved in.

Massification can be said to have had a conflicting impact on equity – there is more access in general but overcrowding means that entry requirements are constantly increasing. With access to quality secondary education now less meritocratic (see Palmer (2005)), this can be seen as restricting access for the poorest students. The increasing need for students to study abroad (or at private Ashesi) in order to distinguish themselves can also be seen as a restriction of access to quality higher education establishments.

Ashesi University is putting education for developmental leadership back on the agenda, with the fledgling university providing an international standard higher education with the explicit goal of creating a "a new generation of ethical, entrepreneurial leaders"¹⁷² in Africa. With just 650 students, it will not achieve this alone (rather it hopes to set an example for others to follow) and its private sector focus suggests it may not be the breeding ground of national leaders in the same way Legon has been.

We can also see that technology and distance learning is playing an increasing role in expanding access to higher education, but it is not clear how and when this will become a major factor in the education of developmental leaders.

8.5 Policy considerations

The Education for All agenda and the education Millennium Development Goals have placed a strong focus on basic education from a poverty reduction perspective. As argued in our first research report (see Brannelly, Lewis and Ndaruhutse, 2011a), this has been to the detriment of investment in higher education over the last twenty years. Our research on Ghana has demonstrated that there is a clear link between secondary and higher education and the formation of developmental leaders and coalitions. The positive trajectory of change from poor governance to improving governance that Ghana has been on since the early 1990s, can be partly attributed to the role of an educated group of developmental coalitions which had acquired the necessary skills, values and networks to effect sustained change in their country. This would not have been possible if they had not attended such quality secondary and higher education establishments.

The findings in this report are based on the secondary and higher education system as it was in the 1960s and 1970s and how the skills, values and networks that this education provided enabled graduates of this system to act as developmental leaders and coalitions in the 1980s and 1990s at a critical juncture in Ghana's history. Since then the education system in Ghana has changed significantly, not least in growing substantially in size, impacting on the quality of and depth of student-staff relationships in education establishments.

We recognise that each country context is different, and the need for developmental leaders thus may look different from country to country. We also recognise that our research focus has been on education alone and did not intend to take a comparative approach looking at the relative importance of higher education compared to other influencing factors. However, we believe that these findings raise some important policy considerations both for Ghana and for national and international support to secondary and higher education in other countries. These are outlined below but also require further research in other countries in order to build more specific recommendations. Suggestions for further research can be found in Annex 9.

1. The need for a sector-wide view of education

Whilst the international focus on primary education over the last two decades appears to make sense from a poverty reduction and equity perspective, the rigour of the rates of return analysis that were used as evidence to justify this focus has since been questioned (see The Task Force on Higher Education and Society, 2000: 10). Our research from Ghana highlights the need to look at investment in education from a holistic and sector-wide perspective that incorporates not only important

¹⁷² <http://www.ashesi.org/>

issues like equity, human rights and poverty reduction, but also looks at more strategic issues such as education's potential to effect wider change through good governance and developmental leadership. Higher and secondary education are key to this process and policymakers need to consider a more balanced investment across all the sub-sectors of education to have maximum impact. It could be argued that this is in line with the argument put forward by Rawls (2001) that inequality is to be permitted if it is to the benefit of the disadvantaged.

2. The importance of residential experience

Boarding schools at secondary level and the shared experience of halls at university, helped to bring together students from diverse geographical, ethnic, political and socio-economic backgrounds in Ghana. They also helped to foster common values and mutual respect. This all helped to build a more horizontally integrated elite in Ghana. Boarding schools have generally been seen as costly and elitist and have thus been discouraged by policymakers. However, the evidence from Ghana suggests that in countries that need to build trust and foster horizontal integration and shared values across different social, ethnic and religious backgrounds, different models of meritocratic residential education (such as boarding schools, campus living around a hall structure at university and residential summer camps for secondary schools) might be advantageous.

3. Humanities and Social Sciences versus Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths (STEM)

Law, economics, politics and journalism were the top subjects studied at university by the developmental leaders we interviewed in Ghana, and provide the most relevant subjects for political and economic reform, governance and accountability. Whilst STEM subjects are vital for training the technicians required for development, they do not tend to provide nationally transformative leaders in such quantities.¹⁷³ Investment in STEM should therefore not come at the expense of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

4. A broad curriculum versus specialisation

Interviewees also stressed the importance of a broad education, both at secondary and higher, that shaped their values and views about the world and allowed them to develop their intellect holistically. Whilst Ashesi University in Ghana is notably bringing the liberal arts model to Africa, the trend sadly seems to be towards increased specialisation and segmentation.

5. School autonomy versus metrics and accountability

This last point raises the question of where the current focus on metrics and accountability might lead. The developmental leadership qualities described in our interviews (and synthesised in Figure 8.1) are not easily measurable. For quality education establishments to exist they must have some flexibility and autonomy to decide what is best for the development of their students.

6. Scholarships for higher education study

At least nine of the developmental leaders we interviewed (out of 16 who studied overseas) had accessed quality overseas education through scholarships and international fellowships. Their experience offered something different than what was available domestically and can be said to have enhanced developmental leadership in Ghana. However, they tended to be widely dispersed across different higher education establishments and so missed out on the network effects present for those studying domestically. One consideration therefore for scholarship providers is whether scholars might be concentrated at particular universities in order to maintain some of the advantages of domestic education.

7. Campus education versus MOOCs

Our findings emphasise the importance of a high-contact, campus education (and all the positive network effects that this brings) in the formation of developmental leaders. However, we can also see in Ghana that funding constraints mean that massification is diluting the quality of campus education. One point to consider then is not whether MOOCs will replace campus education, but whether they can be exploited to relieve pressure on publicly funded higher education establishments, thus allowing them to provide the quality, high-touch education they were in the 1960s and 1970s. Ashesi University is also demonstrating how higher education establishments can use MOOCs to increase their course offerings without substantially increasing their costs.

¹⁷³ China is a notable exception: until recently, all nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee were engineers by training. But Li (2007) argues that the current generation of leaders largely come from Humanities and Social Science backgrounds.

8.6 Final remarks

To conclude, this research has demonstrated the important role that both secondary and higher education in Ghana have played in the formation of developmental leaders and coalitions. The research also adds to the evidence base on the importance of **structure** (the key reforms that took place and the political and economic institutions that they created) and **agency** (the individuals that were central in making those reforms happen and sustaining them). The **skills and values** that these agents have acquired through their educational experience, coupled with the **networks** that have been formed, particularly at university, have enabled the emergence of **coalitions** to bring about sustained change in the political and economic structure of Ghana. Furthermore, the inclusive nature of Ghanaian secondary boarding schools and the University of Ghana both deepened access to the elite as well as help foster horizontal integration of elites. Through these two lenses, we can therefore say that education, and in particular quality secondary and higher education, has played a key role in improving governance in Ghana.

The last twenty years has seen a focus of education investment to the primary level in many countries, including Ghana. With enrolment rates still at very low levels, this focus had legitimate reasoning, particularly for donors concerned about the equity implications of investing in higher levels. But earlier generations of leaders in Ghana recognised that certain inequality is necessary during the development process and invested in all levels of education, even if it was not accessible to all.

Education is acknowledged to be an important engine of all areas of development, and each sub-sector adds another layer to domestic capabilities. At the individual level, primary education is perhaps the most powerful engine of extreme poverty reduction, but secondary education has always been a requirement to enter the modern labour force and without quality higher education there cannot be the local expertise required to develop nationally relevant solutions to complex development problems. Furthermore, we have seen in Ghana that, for an elite few, a quality secondary and higher education provided the skills, values and networks necessary for developmental leadership.

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Annex 1: Longlist of 115 key leaders

Joe Abbey
 Kow Nkensen Ackaah
 Paul Amoako Acquah
 Ibrahim Adam
 John Saka Addo
 Albert Adu Boahen
 Mathew Jacob Kwaku Adusei Poku
 (Otumfuo Opoku Ware II)
 Kwadwo Afari-Gyan
 G. K. Agama
 Dan Kwasi Agbodakpi
 Kwamina Ahwoi
 Kwesi Ahwoi
 Tony Aidoo
 Nana Akufo Addo
 Peter Ala Adjetey
 Christopher Ameyaw-Akumfi
 Martin A. B. K. Amidu
 Kabral Blay Amihere
 Paa Kwesi Amissah Arthur
 Kingsley Y. Amoako
 Akoto Ampaw
 David Ampofo
 Justice Daniel Francis Annan
 Akenten Appiah Menkah
 Phillip Archer
 Joyce Aryee
 Obed Asamoah
 Gladys Asmah
 Chris Bukari Atim
 John Atta Mills
 Ato Austin
 Cletus Avoka
 Kwadwo Baah-Wiredu
 Abdul-Malik Kweku Baako
 Alban Kingsford Sumana Bagbin
 Asoma Banda
 Kwamina Bartels
 Mohammed Ben Abdallah
 Anna Bossman
 Kwesi Botchwey
 Hermann Chinery-Hesse
 Churcher Christine
 Sam Clegg
 Nana Kofi Coomson
 Bernard Joao Da Rocha
 Kwabena Darko
 Christian Deklu Aggrey
 Ambrose Patrick Dery
 John Dramani Mahama
 Kwabena Duffour
 Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey
 Ben Ephson
 Sena Gabianu
 Audrey Gadzekpo
 James Victor Gbeho
 Yaw Graham
 Professor Miranda A. Greenstreet
 Boakye Gyan
 Samuel O. Gyandoh
 Professor Gyimah-Boadi
 Emmanuel Hansen
 Mohammed Ibn Chambas
 Mahama Iddrisu
 Sam Jonah
 Kwame Karikari
 John Agyekum Kufuor
 Alan John Kwadwo Kyeremateng
 Hilla Limann
 Aliu Mahama
 Charles Mensa
 Enoch Teye Mensah
 John Henry Mensah
 Peter Nanfuri
 John Ndebugre
 Paa Kwesi Nduom
 Nana Oduro Numapau
 Paul Victor Obeng
 Jacob Otanka Obetsebi-Lamptey
 Steve Obimpeh
 Michael Aaron Ocquaye
 Josiah Ofori Boateng
 Ken Ofori-Atta
 Elisabeth Akua Ohene
 Sam Okudzeto
 Yaw Osafo-Marfo
 Anthony Oteng-Gyasi
 Victor Owusu
 Richard Kwame Peprah
 Andrews Kwame Pianim
 Kofi Portuphy
 Kwesi Pratt
 Arnold Quainoo
 Kofi Bentum Quantson
 Courage Quashigah
 Jeremiah John Rawlings
 Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings
 John Kobina Richardson
 Boniface Abu-Bakar Saddique
 Kwame Safo Adu
 Akuoku Sarpong
 Akilagpa Sawyerr
 Emile Short
 Ekow Spio-Gabrah
 Esi Sutherland-Addy
 Goosie Augustus Obuadum Tanoh
 Kofi Totobi Kwaakye
 Kojo Tsikata
 Tsatsu Tsikata
 Peter Turkson
 Charles Wwereko-Brobby
 Georginal Theodora Wood
 Huudu Yahaya
 Hawa Yakubu
 Ishmae Yamson
 Kojo Yankah

Annex 2: Longlist data

Basic statistics	No.	% ¹⁷⁴	Sample size	Comments
Total on list			115	
Which reform?			115	Can be involved in more than one reform
Involved in Democracy Reforms	62	54%		
Involved in Economic and Public Sector Reforms	54	47%		
Connected to 1981 Coup	25	22%		
Involved in Media Reforms	20	17%		
Basic info				
Alive	92	81%	114	
Female	11	10%	115	
Average year of birth	1946		77	
Average age	67			
Ethnicity			53	
Akan (Ashanti/Fante)	30	57%		
Ewe	8	15%		
Ga	4	8%		
Others	11	21%		
Geographical background			62	
Ashanti	10	16%		
Greater Accra	8	13%		
Eastern	3	5%		
Western	5	8%		
Northern	4	6%		
Brong Ahafo	2	3%		
Volta	6	10%		
Central	10	16%		
Upper East	4	6%		
Upper West	3	5%		
Secondary School			107	
Achimota	27	25%		
Mfantipim	10	9%		
Adisadel	10	9%		
St. Augustine's	8	7%		
Tamale	6	6%		
Accra Academy	5	5%		
Navrongo	5	5%		

¹⁷⁴ Percentages describe the sample size for each dataset, not necessarily the total number of longlist leaders.

Opoku Ware	5	5%		
Prempeh	4	4%		
St. John's	2	2%		
Apam	3	3%		
UK	3	3%		
Higher Education			115	True sample size not known; where no information was found, we have assumed that they did not attend higher education
Highest educational achievement				
Bachelor's degree	95	83%		
Postgraduate studies	58	50%		
PhD	22	19%		
Other tertiary education courses	13	11%		
Subjects studied				
Law	29	25%		Subject totals are minimum estimates as data missing for around 20%
Economics	22	19%		
Politics	14	12%		
Public Administration	8	7%		
Management	8	7%		
Journalism	10	9%		
Finance	3	3%		
History	8	7%		
Military	6	5%		
Engineering	3	3%		
Accountancy	3	3%		
Teaching	3	3%		
English	8	7%		
Philosophy	5	4%		
Higher education establishment destinations				
Ghana	76	66%		
University of Ghana	55	48%		
Ghana School of law	12	10%		
Kumasi	7	6%		
Cape Coast	6	5%		
Ghana Military Academy	3	3%		
Abroad	67	58%		
UK	37	32%		

LSE	7	6%		
SOAS	3	3%		
Nottingham	3	3%		
Oxford	3	3%		
Cambridge	1	1%		
Imperial	1	1%		
Sussex	1	1%		
USA	35	30%		
Yale	5	4%		
Harvard	3	3%		
California	4	3%		
Texas	2	2%		
Columbia	3	3%		
Georgia	1	1%		
Indiana	2	2%		
Cornell	2	2%		
Michigan	2	2%		
Syracuse	2	2%		
Wisconsin	1	1%		
Other foreign	8	7%		
Germany	2	2%		
France	1	1%		
Belgium	1	1%		
Canada	1	1%		
Israel	1	1%		
Uganda	1	1%		

Annex 3: Shortlisted leaders

Shortlisted leaders from our key reform areas

Joe Abbey	Joyce Aryee
Samuel O. Gyandoh	Jacob Otanka
Kwadwo Afari-Gyan	Obetsebi-Lampsey
E. Gyimah-Boadi	Cletus Avoka
Nana Akufo-Addo	Elisabeth Akua Ohene
Sam Jonah	Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey
Kabral Blay-Amihere	Sam Okudzeto
Kwame Karikari	Ben Ephson
Paa Amissah-Arthur	Yaw Osafo-Marfo
John Agyekum Kufuor	Audrey Gadzekpo
Akoto Ampaw	Akilagpa Sawyerr
Enoch Teye Mensah	Miranda A. Greenstreet
David Ampofo	Ekow Spio-Gabrah
John Ndebugre	Boakye Gyan

Young leaders

Anis Haffar	Richard Quashigah
Patrick Awuah	Bernard Mornah
Sammy Awuku	Patrick Sogbodjor
Bernard Avle	Felix Boakye
Aquinas Quansah	Ivor Greenstreet

Organisational leaders

National Union of Ghana Students	President	Peter Kodje
Ghana Bar Association	Former President	Nii Osah Mills
Trade Union Congress	General-Secretary	Kofi Asamoah
Association of Ghana Industries	President	Nana Owusu Afari

Student leaders

University of Cape Coast	SRC President	Enoch Boateng
National Union of Ghana Students	President	Peter Kodje
Ghana law School	SRC President	Samuel Bartels
University of Ghana law School	SRC President	Richard Badombie
Ashesi University College	Judicial Council Student Representative	Nii Okai Nunoo

Higher education institute leaders

Ghana Institute of journalism	Rector	David Newton
Ashesi University College	Founder and Director	Patrick Awuah
Achimota School	Former Teacher (1960s)	Malcolm Redding
University of Ghana Business School	Dean	Professor K. Ameyaw Domfeh (Dean)
University of Cape Coast	Vice-Chancellor	Professor Domwini Dabire Kuupole (VC)
Mfantsipim	Asst HM Academic Asst HM Domestic Asst HM Admin	John Aitpillah Akpoh Phyllis Arthur-Simpson Manfred Oduru
University of Ghana	Head of Political Science in 1980s	Professor Ninsin
University of Education, Winneba	Vice-Chancellor	Professor Akwasi Asabere-Ameyaw

Annex 4: Interviewee leader information

Name	Significance	Secondary School	University
Joe Abbey	Leading technocrat at Finance Ministry during the ERP.	Mfantsipim School	London School of Economics, UK, BSc Political Science Iowa State University, USA, MSc Mathematics Iowa State University, USA, Phd Economics
Kwadwo Afari-Gyan	Academic (political science); Electoral Commissioner 1992 to present.	Achimota School and Adisadel College (1964)	University of Ghana, BA Philosophy (1967) University of Ghana, MA Political Science (1969) University of California, USA, PhD Political Science (1974)
Nana Akufo-Addo	Leading pro-democracy advocate in 1970s and 1980s; Attorney-General and Foreign Minister under Kufuor Administration; presidential candidate for NPP 2008 and 2012.	Lancing College, UK (1964)	University of Ghana, BSc Economics (1967) University of Ghana, LLB Ghana School of Law, LLM
Paa Kwesi Amisah-Arthur	Current Vice President of Ghana; key member of ERP team; former Governor of the Bank of Ghana; former consultant to World Bank.	Mfantsipim School (1971)	University of Ghana, BSc Economics (1974) University of Ghana, MSc Economics (1976)
Akoto Ampaw	Human rights attorney; leading democracy activist as member of New Democratic Movement, Movement For Freedom and Justice and Alliance for Change.	St. Augustine's College	University of Ghana, LLB Ghana School of Law, LLM
David Ampofo	Leading political broadcaster.	St John's Grammar School (1977)	Escuela Superior de la Partida Populista de Cuba, BA Politics and Philosophy (1986) Cardiff University, UK, MA Journalism (1991)
Joyce Aryee	Secretary of Information in the PNDC regime.	Achimota School (1963)	University of Ghana, BA English (1966) University of Ghana, MA Public Administration
Cletus Avoka	Leading figure of NDC; current majority leader in parliament.	Navrongo Secondary School (1972)	University of Ghana, LLB (1976) Ghana School of Law, LLM (1978)
Kabral Blay-Amihere	Journalist; founder of one of the first independent newspapers in Ghana, 'The Independent'; current Chair of the National Media Commission.	St. Augustine's College (1972)	University of Ghana, BA History (1975) London School of Economics, UK Harvard University, USA, Nieman Fellow, Journalism (1991)
Nkrabeah Effah-Dartey	Led PNDC's National Investigations Committee; later leading member of opposition NPP, serving as Minister for Interior and Local Government in Kufuor Administration.	Achimota School (1974)	University of Ghana, LLB (1977) Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK (1979)
Ben Ephson	Journalist and pollster; current Managing Editor of the Daily Dispatch.	Accra Academy (1975)	University of Ghana, LLB (1981) University of Maryland, USA, US Foreign Policy (1994)
Audrey Gadzekpo	Journalist; media and women's rights activist.	Achimota School (1978)	University of Ghana, BA English (1984) Brigham Young University, USA, MA journalism (1987) Birmingham University, UK, PhD journalism
Miranda A. Greenstreet	Distinguished academic and advisor on adult education reforms.	Camden Girls' School, UK (1949)	London School of Economics, UK, BSc Economics (1954) London School of economics, UK, MSc International Relations (1957) Open University, UK, MSc Population Studies
Boakye Gyan	Led 1979 coup that first brought Rawlings to prominence.	Opoku Ware Secondary School and Achimota School (1965)	University of Ghana, BA English (1967) Thompson Foundation, UK, Teaching International Journalism (1969) Ghana Military Academy
Samuel O. Gyandoh	Principal co-author of 1979 constitution.		University of Southampton, UK, LLB (1960) Yale University School of Law, USA, LLM

			(1964)
E. Gyimah-Boadi	Leading academic (political scientist); founder and director of political think tank, Centre for Democratic Development.	Oda Secondary School (1974)	University of Ghana, BA Political Science (1977) University of California, USA, MA Politics University of California, USA, PhD Politics
Sam Jonah	Ghanaian industrialist and businessman and advisor on mining reforms.	Adisadel College (1969)	Camborne School of Mines, UK, BSc Mining Imperial College, UK, MSc Mine Management
Kwame Karikari	Democracy activist in 1980s (founding member of New Democratic Movement and Movement for Freedom and Justice); former Director of School of Communication Studies, University of Ghana; current Executive Director of Media Foundation for West Africa.	Komenda Teacher Training College	Advanced Teacher Training College, Education, specialism in history (1968) City College, USA, BA PPE (1975) Columbia University, USA, MA Journalism (1977)
John Agyekum Kufuor	Veteran politician and President 2001-2009.	Prempeh College (1959)	Lincoln's Inn, UK, LLB (1961) Oxford University, PPE (1964)
Enoch Teye Mensah	Longstanding member of the PNDC/NDC; current Minister for Employment and Social Welfare.	SNAPS College of Accounting (1968)	(all distance learning courses): London School of Accountancy, UK, Accountancy Vision International University, USA, MA Theology (2004) Vision International University, USA, PhD Theology (current)
John Ndebugre	Worked in PNDC administration before becoming democracy activist, first for Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards and later for Movement for Freedom and Justice; also former MP for NPP.	Navrongo Secondary School	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana, BSc Engineering, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana, LLB
Jacob Otanka Obetsebi-Lampsey	Founding member of NPP, campaign coordinator during transition elections of 2000.	Lancing College, UK (didn't graduate, left 1964)	No university education
Elisabeth Akua Ohene	Campaigner for press freedom; BBC journalist; Minister of State with responsibility for media and communications for the President's office during the Kufuor Administration; currently Minister of State without portfolio.	Mawuli School, (1964)	University of Ghana, BA English (1967) University of Indiana, USA, Certificate in Mass Communication (1971) University of Cambridge, UK, Press Fellow (journalism) (1983)
Sam Okudzeto	Veteran democracy campaigner; former President of the Ghana Bar Association and Association of Recognized Professional Bodies.	Zion College	Leeds College of Commerce, UK, Accounting King's College London, UK, law (1963)
Yaw Osafo-Marfo	A founding Deputy Chairman of the Ghana Stock Exchange; former past Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the West African Bankers Association; Finance Minister in Kufuor Administration.	Achimota School (1963)	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, BSc Mechanical Engineering (1967) Metal Engineering Institute, USA, Diploma in Mechanical Engineering
Akilagpa Sawyer	Former lecturer; Dean of Faculty of Law and Vice Chancellor, University of Ghana.	Achimota School (1960)	University of Durham, UK, LLB University of London, UK, LLM (1969) University of California, USA, LLM, JSD
Ekow Spio-Gabrah	Leading figure under both the PNDC and NDC Governments, prominent businessman.	Achimota School (1970)	University of Ghana, BA English (1973) Ohio University, USA, MA International Affairs (1979)

Annex 5: Interview template for shortlist interviews

Leadership development

1. Do you think your secondary education was an important factor in your leadership development? If so, which particular aspects?

E.g. school culture, pedagogy, peers, parental/community involvement/extra-curricular activities
2. Do you think your higher/military/vocational education was an important factor in your leadership development? If so, which particular aspects do you feel were important and why?

E.g. values of institute where you studied, course content, delivery of course, influential faculty/department/staff, networking opportunities
3. a) Did you belong to any university societies/organisations? Please state. (If at Legon, ask which Halls of Residence.)

b) How important were these in your leadership development?

E.g. Developing skills, Forming values, Creating networks etc
4. a) What do you think are the three key things about you that make you a good leader? (Values, characteristics, beliefs)

b) Where do you think you developed these? (Family, Education, Career/work, Religion, Other)
5. Is there anything else that you think has been a significant influence on your leadership development?

Reforms and coalitions

6. a) What key reforms have you been involved in?

b) About your reform coalition/network:

 - i) Who were the other members of your coalitions involved in these events?
 - ii) How did this coalition form? How did you get involved?

c) Please reflect on the role of higher education in the formation and work of this coalition.

E.g. skills, networks, values.

d) What was key to achieving this reform? What was the key moment/critical juncture?

Relationships

7. How would you rate your strength of relationship with the following people?

Q7								
			Low				High	How did you meet them? (If 4 & 5 only)
1	A Smith		1	2	3	4	5	
2			1	2	3	4	5	
3			1	2	3	4	5	
.			1	2	3	4	5	
.			1	2	3	4	5	
.			1	2	3	4	5	
36			1	2	3	4	5	
37			1	2	3	4	5	
38			1	2	3	4	5	

8. Have any of these people influenced you as a leader? Please specify how for the top three.

9. Lots of these people were at Legon in the early 1970s. Why do you think that so many of them went on to become prominent leaders?

(Political climate of the day, education system, lecturers, all influenced each other?)

10. Are you affiliated with any of the following organisations?

- Political party (specify NDC, NPP, other)
- Trade unions (please specify)
- Professional bodies (please specify)

11. Some other quick questions

- What were your parents' occupations?
- Have you ever had a scholarship? If so, please provide details
- Would it be possible for you to share a recent bio or CV?

Wrap up questions

Ask one of the following, if time permits:

12. What would your vision of a higher education sector that prepares the next generation of developmental leaders look like?

13. Briefly, what factors do you think have influenced developmental leadership in Ghana?

(Developmental leadership is defined as leaders/coalitions working for the public good.)

14. What would your advice be for countries wishing to learn lessons from Ghana's successes and failures?

Any other comments

Annex 6: Key coalitions and members

This annex details key leaders' membership of the main coalitions referred to in the report. The tables are not intended to be exhaustive lists of all associated individuals. For ease of reference, the acronyms used most often in these tables are listed here. They also appear in the full list of acronyms that precedes the main body of the report.

GBA	Ghana Bar Association
JFM	June Fourth Movement
KNRG	Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards
KNUST	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology
LSE	London School of economics and Political Science
MBA	Masters in Business Administration
MFJ	Movement for Freedom and Justice
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDM	New Democratic Movement
NUGS	National Union of Ghana Students
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PPE	Philosophy, politics and economics
TUC	Trades Union Congress

Name	People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ)	
Date of formation	1978	
Purpose / beliefs	Led 'no' campaign in UNIGOV referendum 1978	
Members and educational background	Member	Comments on Background
	Sam Okudzeto (Secretary)	Lawyer and former MP Later to serve as President of GBA and Association of Recognized Professional Bodies King's College, London (Law)
	K. S.P. Jantuah	
	Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa	Involved in 1966 coup and Head of State of Ghana in 1969
	Komla Agbeli Gbedemah (Chairman)	Founder of National Alliance of Liberals and former Minister of Finance during Nkrumah's regime
	William Ofori Atta (Chairman)	Columbia, USA (economics); Yale, USA (MBA)
	A. K. Daku	Former Police Commissioner
	Professor Adu Boahen	University of Ghana, Legon (history); London University, School of Oriental and African Studies, UK (imperial history)
	Nana Akuffo Addo (General Secretary)	University of Ghana, Legon (law, economics)
	Professor Quartey	
	Obed Asamoah	Former law lecturer at University of Ghana, Legon and former General Secretary of All People's Party
Key relationships	GBA, NUGS	
Comments		

Sources: Interviews with Sam Okudzeto and Akufo Addo; longlist of leaders; Agyeman-Duah (2006).

Name	June 4 Movement (JFM)	
Date of formation	1979	
Purpose / beliefs	To uphold revolutionary principles of 4 June 1979 movement; Marxist ideology	
Members and educational background	Member	Comments on Background
	Chris Atim (Chairman)	Ex-student leader
	Kwesi Adu	Ex-student leader
	Sergeant Aolga Akata-Pore	
	Nyeya Yen	Ex-student leader
	Sakua Agambilla	Ex-student leader
	Zaya Yeebo	Ex-student leader
	Amartey Kwei	Trade unionist
	Nicholas Atampugre	
Key relationships	With Rawlings, NDM, NUGS	
Comments	Formed on campus at University of Ghana, Legon	

Sources: Shillingdon (1992); Chavagneux (1997: 106); Kandeh (2004: 81); Dijkstra and White (2003).

Name	New Democratic Movement (NDM)	
Date of formation	1980	
Purpose / beliefs	Opposed to military dictatorship Calling for return to multi-party liberal democracy Socialist ideology	
Members and educational background	Member	Comments on Background
	Kwami Karikari (Chairman)	City College, USA (PPE); Columbia University, USA (journalism); lecturer at University of Ghana School of Journalism and Mass Communications
	Kwasi Adu-Amankwah	Head of TUC Political Department
	Akoto Ampaw (General Secretary)	University Ghana, Legon (law)
	Tsatu Tsikata*	University Ghana, Legon (law); University of Oxford (law)
	Ato Ahwoi*	University of Cape Coast
	Kwamena Awoi*	University Ghana, Legon (law); University of Oxford (law)
	Kwesi Botchwey*	University Ghana, Legon (law); Yale, USA (law); University of Michigan, USA (law)
Key relationships	With Rawlings/PNDC until 1983, June 4 Movement, NUGS, KNRG	
Comments	Formed on campus at University of Ghana, Legon *(later split from NDM, aligned with PNDC)	

Sources: Interviews with Akoto Ampaw and Kwamw Karikari; Kraus (2007: 110); Degenhardt (1988: 136); Hutchful (2002: 143); longlist of leaders.

Name	Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG)	
Date of formation	During Limann regime (1979-1981)	
Purpose / beliefs	Revolutionary/uphold Nkrumist beliefs	
Members and educational background	Member	Comments on Background
	Soni Provencale, Chairman	
	Johnny Hansen, Vice Chairman*	Leading Marxist academic Former member of PNDC
	Kwesi Pratt, Secretary	Journalist, trained at Ghana Institute of Journalism
	Kweku Baako	Journalist Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration
	John Ndebugre*	KNUST, Engineering; Ghana School of Law
Key relationships	With Rawlings, JFM, NDM, NUGS	
Comments	Essentially merged with NDM to form Movement for Freedom and Justice in 1988. *Joined PNDC during 'radical' phase 1982-83	

Sources: Interview with John Ndebugre; Oquaye (2004); West Africa (1989: 82).

Name	Alliance for Change	
Date of formation	1996	
Purpose / beliefs	Ostensibly to resist the introduction of VAT, but built on a wider platform campaigning for true democracy and further media freedoms	
Members and educational background	Member	Comments on Background
	Nana Akufo Addo	University of Ghana, Legon (law, economics) Leading human rights lawyer
	Akoto Ampaw	University Ghana, Legon (law) Former member of NDM and MFJ
	Kwaku Baako	Journalist
	John Kufuor	Lincoln's Inn, London UK (law); Oxford, UK (PPE)
	Dr Charles Wereko Brobbey	Leeds, UK (engineering); University of Middlesex, UK (MBA)
	Argiri Blankson	
	Kwesi Pratt	Journalist, trained at Ghana Institute of Journalism
	Hawa Yakubu Ogede	Catering course
	Victor Newman	
Key relationships		
Comments		

Sources: Interviews with Akoto Ampaw and Nana Akufo Addo; leader longlist; Agyeman-Duah (2003: 80); longlist of leaders.

Name	Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ)	
Date of formation	1990	
Purpose / beliefs	To restore multiparty democracy	
Members and educational background	Member	Comments on Background
	Kwame Karikari (Chairman)	City College, USA (PPE); Columbia University, USA (journalism); lecturer at University of Ghana School of Journalism and Mass Communications; Member of NDM
	Prof Adu Boahen (Chairman)	University of Ghana, Legon (history); London University, School of Oriental and African Studies, UK (imperial history); Lecturer at Legon
	Kwakraba Kwashi (2 nd Vice Chairman)	
	Johnny Hansen (1 st Vice Chairman)	Member of KNRG
	Akoto Ampaw (General Secretary)	University of Ghana, Legon (law) Member of NDM
	Obeng Manu (Secretary)	
	John Kufuor	Veteran politician in the Danquah-Busia tradition
	Kwesi Pratt	Journalist, trained at Ghana Institute of Journalism
	John Ndebugre	KNUST, Engineering; Ghana School of Law Former member of PNDC; member of KNRG
	Ray Kakraba Quarshie	
	Lieutenant Owusu Gyimah	
	Dan Lartey	Veteran politician in the Nkrumah-ist tradition
Sam Okudzeto	President of Ghana Bar Association King's College, London (law)	
Key relationships	GBA, NUGS, TUC, Catholic Bishops' Conference, Christian Council of Ghana. ¹⁷⁵	
Comments	Umbrella for groups in opposition to PNDC	

Sources: Interviews with Akoto Ampaw, Kwame Karikari and John Ndebugre; Haynes (1995: 96); Agyeman-Duah (2003: 50); longlist of leaders.

Name	Media Reforms	
Date of formation	Active late 1980s through early 2000s	
Purpose / beliefs	Free press	
Members and educational background	Member	Comments on Background
	Akoto Ampaw	University of Ghana, Legon (law)
	Kwame Karikan	City College, USA (PPE); Columbia University, USA (journalism); lecturer at School of Journalism and Mass Communications, University of Ghana
	Audrey Gadzekpo	Journalist
	Gift Dadzie	Ghana Journalists Association Journalist
	Kabral Blay-Amihere	University of Ghana, Legon; LSE, UK; Harvard (Nieman Fellow in Journalism) Founder of first independent newspaper in PNDC regime
	Ben Ephson	University of Ghana, Legon (law); University of Maryland, USA (foreign policy) Journalist
	Bright Blewoo	Ghana Journalists Association
	Elizabeth Ohene	University of Ghana, Legon (English); Editor of Daily Graphic in late 1970s
	Nana Akufo Addo	Attorney General who repealed the Criminal Libel Law
Key relationships	Ghana Journalists Association, Ghana Institute of Journalism, independent press, National Media Commission; International Federation of Journalism	
Comments		

Sources: Interviews with Bright Blewoo, Kabral Blay-Amihere, Audrey Gadzekpo, Ben Ephson and Akoto Ampaw; longlist of leaders.

Name	Committee of Experts (1992 Constitution)	
Date of formation	1991	
Purpose / beliefs		
Members and educational background	Member	Comments on Background
	Dr. S. K. B. Asante (Chairman)	Law (retired academic)
	Osagyefo Oseadeeyo Dr. Agyeman-Badu	Traditional leader
	Mrs Justice Annie Jaggie	Retired judge
	Mr L. J. Chinery-Hesse	Lawyer/legislative drafter
	Dr. K. Afari-Gyan	Lecturer at Legon in political science
	Mr Ebo Bentsi-Enchill	Lawyer
	Dr. Charles Jebuni	Economist
	Dr. E. V. O. Dankwa	Lawyer/academic
	Mrs S. Ofon-Boateng (Member/Secretary)	Lawyer/legislative drafter
Professor Maxwell Owusu	Social Scientist	
Key relationships		
Comments		

Sources: Interviews with Professor Gyimah-Boadi and CDD experts.

Annex 7: Relationship survey

The survey

The relationship survey (see Q7 of interview questionnaire) asked shortlist leaders to self-report the following:

- the strength of their connections to other shortlist leaders (on a scale of '1' to '5', with 5 being the strongest);
- the origin of their connection with leaders rated as a '4' or '5'.

Relationship data was collected only for leaders' connections within the shortlist leader group; the data therefore does not reflect the size and strength of each leader's wider network beyond the shortlist.

Cleaning and coding protocols

The data was cleaned by transferring the raw data to a two-by-two matrix of the shortlist leaders. Given the limited dataset, we decided to create non-directional data, populating only 50% of the matrix. Where both leaders in a cited connection were interviewed and there was conflicting raw data on the strength of a connection, it was coded using the highest rating. There were fewer than five conflicts). There were no conflicts on 'origin'.

Six codes were created from the origin data: school, university, work, family/friends, activism and church.

Data analysis

This yielded three immediate types of data for analysis:

- Frequency data – the number of relationship connections which exist for each leader;
- Strength data – the self-reported strength of the relationship between two shortlist leaders;
- Origin data – the self-reported origin of those relationships.

Frequency data (total number of connections) for each individual is not meaningful in this analysis because not all interviewees completed the relationship survey.

Annex 8: Developmental leadership qualities

This annex provides a summary analysis of interviewee responses about leadership qualities.

Leadership quality	Developed during secondary education	Developed during higher education	Key characteristic	Described as important to work of reform	Number of interviews that mention this area	Number of interviews that mention this area	Link to education	Other transmission mechanisms
Honesty, integrity and fairness	2	2	9	2	11	3	School culture and values, on-campus debate, law studies	Family/community, religion
Respect and tolerance	9	3	2	1	13	10	School culture and values, boarding, diversity of student population, overseas study	Family/community, religion, career
Strong sense of public service and social justice	8	10	5	12	18	14	School culture and values, exposure to poverty through student diversity, privilege created sense of debt to society, political debate on-campus, student activism, subject study (law, politics, journalism, economics)	Family/community, religion, career
Courage and agency	8	12	8	8	19	15	Sense of being groomed for leadership, school culture, leadership opportunities, student activism, history study, belief that role of intellectuals was to provide leadership for change	Political climate of the day, family/community, career, religion
Discipline, focus and determination	6	1	6	2	12	7	School culture and values, extra-curricular activities (such as Cadet Corps), subject (for instance, law)	Career, family/community, religion
Goal-orientated and strong sense of responsibility	6	0	7	1	11	6	Leadership opportunities, sense of being groomed for leadership	Career
Consultation and teamwork	3	1	11	10	14	4	Extra-curricular activities such as sports and debating clubs, boarding school interaction	Career, family/community
Collaboration, collective action and conflict resolution	2	8	4	17	22	10	Diversity of student body, extra-curricular activities, student activism	Career
Critical thinking and analytical insight	8	12	3	6	19	16	Teaching quality and methodology, debating clubs and on-campus debate, broad curriculum, close interaction with lecturers, subject choice (such as law, economics, politics, philosophy)	Career
Technical competency and knowledge	6	17	4	7	24	21	Teaching quality and methodology, on-campus debate, broad curriculum, close interaction with lecturers, extra-curricular activities, subject choice (such as law, economics, politics, journalism)	Career

Annex 9: Suggestions for further research

Questions for Ghana

The place of quality secondary and higher education

- Is Ghanaian education still of sufficient quality to produce the developmental leaders of the future?
- Is overseas study becoming more important as the quality of Ghanaian education establishments declines and private schools replace the elite public schools?
- What is the role of individual academics, processes and local context in providing quality education in Ghana?
- Given that not all Ghanaians with a similar educational background became developmental leaders or formed developmental coalitions, what other factors are important?

Institutional impact

- How has Legon's institutional impact been affected by the increase in higher education establishments and the emergence of think tanks in Ghana?

Access to the elite

- Has access to higher education among the poor narrowed as access to the middle classes has broadened?
- Is the Ashesi model appropriate for public universities? Given finite public financial resources and the resulting trade-off between expanding access and maintaining quality, how can Ghana improve the quality of its education and simultaneously increase inclusivity?

Skills and values

- Are the elite public schools and universities still developing the leadership skills and values outlined in this report?
 - If so, is access to these elite establishments broad enough?
 - If not, where will developmental leaders come from? (Perhaps elite private schools and foreign universities?)
- Do the leadership qualities outlined in Annex 8 still hold true for Ghana now? If so, are they being developed in the education system; if not, what are the qualities required for developmental leadership today.

Values

- Why has the Fourth Republic been so successful compared to Ghana's previous experiments in democracy? Why did this consensual unification not arise/breakdown so readily in the past?

Networks

- How has massification and increased competition for key subject areas affected network formation in Ghana? Is Legon still the dominant location of network formation or has this changed?
- How special or unique was the generation of Ghanaian developmental leaders that we studied? Have other generations effected change at such an early age and for so long, or was the 'Rawlings factor' critical in bringing them to the fore?

Questions for other countries or further case studies

The place of quality secondary and higher education

- Why do some people with similar education backgrounds not pursue developmental leadership?
- Are non-developmental leaders less likely to have received a quality education and/or more likely to be from a particular social background?
- By providing an alternative to campus education, can MOOCs (mass open online courses) alleviate pressure on national higher education establishments and allow public universities to provide a privileged campus education to an educational elite once again? If so, is it desirable to create a two-tier system in this way? What are the precise pedagogical processes through which developmental leadership skills and values are created?

Institutional impact

- How important are higher education establishments in the national development debate in countries where there is less dominance by a single higher education institution?

Access to the elite

- How relevant and applicable is the Nkrumah model of educational development to other countries?
- Would we find that non-developmental leaders are less likely to have a quality education and/or more likely to be from a particular social background?
- Which factors affect whether elite education supports developmental leadership or whether it plays more of a screening¹⁷⁶ and/or elite reproduction function?

Skills and values

- What are the processes, personnel and environments needed for effective transmission of the skills we found most common among developmental leaders in Ghana?
- Does the set of leadership qualities outlined in Annex 8 hold true for other countries in other time periods?
- How common are these leadership qualities for any kind of leadership as opposed to specifically for developmental leaders?

Networks

- Are developmental leadership connections formed through higher education stronger or weaker on average than those formed through other influences such as work, religion or family?
- Which of the critical skills within developmental coalitions can be traced back directly to higher education, and which are practised and developed over time, or developed through other influences?
- In a qualitative study in a higher education setting: what are the detailed social and psychological processes through which skills and values in collective action are developed? What can higher education institutions do to promote these?
- In a longitudinal study comparing different educational institutions: what is the impact of different pedagogical practices and educational arrangements on leaders' skills, values, networks and involvement in reforms over time?
- How unusual is it to find such strong relationships across the political divide as this research found in Ghana?
- Do we find the same generational effect that we found in Ghana in other countries? Is it more likely where revolutions promising elite renewal have taken place?



The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) addresses an important gap in international thinking and policy about the critical role played by leaders, elites and coalitions in the politics of development. This growing program brings together government, academic and civil society partners from around the world to explore the role of human agency in the processes of development. DLP will address the policy, strategic and operational implications of 'thinking and working politically' - for example, about how to help key players solve collective action problems, forge developmental coalitions, negotiate effective institutions and build stable states.

The Developmental Leadership Program

E: info@dlprog.org

W: www.dlprog.org