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SUGGESTION IN EDUCATION

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTIES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOLS OF ARTS,
LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE, IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(DEPARTMENT OF PEDAGOGY)

BY

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CHICAGO

1900

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"To know how to suggest is the great art of teaching."
—*Amiel's Journal*.

PREFATORY NOTE.

THE publication of this thesis has been delayed in the hope that opportunity would be found for a fuller statement of the application of the fundamental principle of *guidance through suggestion* to practical school work; but no time has been found for such revision, and the dissertation is now given to the printer in the form in which it was originally accepted by the Faculties.

W. A. CLARK.

NEBRASKA STATE NORMAL SCHOOL,
January, 1903.



ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS.

I. PROBLEM STATED.

PAGE

- | | | |
|----|---|----|
| 1. | Nature and method of the discussion - - - - - | 9 |
| a) | Constructive and expository, rather than research. | |
| b) | Formulation and discussion of a single law of pedagogy. | |
| c) | A view of the whole field from a definite standpoint. | |
| 2. | Pedagogy and its laws - - - - - | 10 |
| a) | The science of education. | |
| b) | What a science is. | |
| c) | Education as the subject-matter of pedagogy. | |
| d) | Accumulation of material for a science of education. | |
| e) | Pedagogy a normative science. | |

II. MENTAL GROWTH.

- | | | |
|----|---|----|
| 1. | Nature of growth in general - - - - - | 12 |
| a) | Definition of growth. | |
| b) | "Enlargement" and "organization" as factors in growth. | |
| c) | All growth through functioning of the organism. | |
| 2. | How mind grows - - - - - | 13 |
| a) | Analogy to the growth of the plant. | |
| b) | Increase in "mental volume" and reorganization of "mental structure." | |
| c) | Source of the materials. | |
| d) | Rubbed into conscious life by the friction of the environment. | |
| e) | Saturation of the life by the content of common consciousness. | |
| f) | Making the race knowledge individual knowledge. | |

III. GUIDING THE MENTAL LIFE OF ANOTHER.

- | | | |
|----|--|----|
| 1. | A common assumption in all education - - - - - | 15 |
| a) | Each person builds his own life out of the available materials and under the limitations of his environment. | |
| b) | But one person may intentionally influence the life of another, determining in a large measure its general trend and character, without destroying its autonomy. | |
| 2. | Means of guidance - - - - - | 15 |
| a) | By ordering the materials. | |
| b) | By determining the functioning in expression. | |

IV. NATURE OF SUGGESTION AND REACTION.

- | | | |
|----|---|----|
| 1. | Two uses of the word "suggest" - - - - - | 16 |
| a) | One idea <i>suggests</i> another. | |
| | (1) Use in the "association of psychology." | |
| | (2) Continuity of the life current. | |

(3) Professor James's criticism.	
b) One person <i>suggests</i> an idea to another.	
(1) The introduction of an "image."	
(2) Nature of "reaction."	
(3) Suggestion and reaction not successive stages.	
2. The two schools of hypnotic theory - - - - -	18
a) The "neurosis theory."	
b) The "suggestion theory."	
c) Views of Bernheim, Wundt, Titchener, and James.	
3. Two important facts in the suggestion theory of hypnotism - - -	19
a) The consciousness of the hypnotized person.	
b) Self-determination in hypnotic action.	
4. Suggestion in normal life - - - - -	20
a) Inoculating with an idea.	
b) Compared with hypnotic suggestion.	
c) Illustration: nature of a "conversation."	
5. "Imitation" is through suggestion - - - - -	21
a) Vagueness of the term.	
b) Aristotle's use of it.	
c) Baldwin, Harris, and Preyer.	
d) Guyau's view of the process.	
e) "Imitation" <i>vs.</i> "originality."	
V. SUGGESTION IN EDUCATIVE GUIDANCE.	
1. Nature of education - - - - -	24
a) Formal definition.	
b) Explication of the definition.	
(1) Demands two parties: teacher and pupil.	
(2) Limited to "formal education."	
(3) Psychological and sociological conceptions.	
(4) Product and process conceptions.	
(5) From the standpoint of the teacher or from that of the pupil.	
(6) Critical summary.	
2. Teaching - - - - -	28
a) Definition.	
b) No teaching without learning.	
c) Nature of "instruction."	
d) Nature of "discipline."	
3. Affirmative character of all education - - - - -	30
a) Encouraging and aiding growth.	
b) Leading to life through life.	
4. The law of educative guidance - - - - -	31
a) No education apart from <i>suggestion</i> .	
b) The teacher guides from within.	
c) Pedagogical suggestion a normal life process.	
d) Humanity essentially good.	
e) Examples of particular teaching acts.	

	PAGE
5. Unintentional influencing - - - - -	34
a) Huntington's "unconscious tuition."	
b) Educative guidance essentially <i>intentional</i> .	
c) Employing life <i>consciously</i> to guide life.	
6. Study - - - - -	36
a) What study is.	
b) Teaching is inciting to study.	
7. The "recitation" - - - - -	37
a) Function of the recitation.	
b) Importance in school work.	
8. The "school" - - - - -	38
a) What a school is.	
b) The teacher's place in the school.	
c) The "curriculum."	
9. Punishment - - - - -	39
a) Definition and explication.	
b) The three ends of punishment.	
c) Character of school punishment.	
d) Examples of educative punishment.	
e) Punishment for neglect to do the right.	
f) Punishment to be avoided.	
g) Example in the Elmira Reformatory.	
VI. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW.	
1. No education apart from suggestion - - - - -	46
a) Life cannot be controlled from without.	
b) Teacher can only <i>modify</i> life.	
2. No guidance without reaction - - - - -	47
a) Only active things can be guided.	
b) No "suggestion" without reaction.	
VII. PEDAGOGICAL CONCLUSIONS.	
1. Education is an affirmative process - - - - -	49
a) Its aim is affirmative.	
b) Its means are affirmative.	
c) Its methods are affirmative.	
2. Education is a personal matter - - - - -	50
a) Attitude of the teacher toward his pupil.	
b) Pedagogy an ethical science.	
c) Individual character of teaching.	
d) The teacher a fellow student.	
3. Education seeks to form character - - - - -	52
a) There is one unified aim.	
b) The aim is an ideal one.	
c) Education aims at present character.	
BIBLIOGRAPHY - - - - -	54



SUGGESTION IN EDUCATION.

THE PROBLEM STATED.

THE following study deals with a perfectly definite problem. It is the purpose to state explicitly a single law of pedagogy, to discuss its validity as a scientific proposition, and to show its significance in the whole of educational theory. It is a work of formulating and expounding rather than of establishing through scientific research. The facts employed as data in the discussion are, in the main, common property—an inheritance from centuries of thought upon educational aims and practices. While no attempt has been made to verify them by extended observation and experiment, the writer feels that his experience of more than a score of years in the class-room gives some warrant for their acceptance. Until experimental psychology advances beyond its present stage of a too exclusive investigation of sense-phenomena and deals with the facts of rational life in general, and until the future pedagogical laboratory makes possible a like critical study of educational phenomena, we must content ourselves to deal tentatively with the facts found in common consciousness in such a manner as seems most productive for the ends sought. Such a study as is here presented, will not, however, prove unproductive for the purposes of practical pedagogy, and it is certainly not without its more strictly scientific value. It presents and explains a clearly defined working hypothesis for guidance in subsequent research, thus pre-empting a field for future exploration. To gather and evaluate by true scientific method the data necessary to establish or confute this law would be a decisive step toward giving pedagogy a right to a place among the modern sciences. But such a consecrated work demands an equipment of resources and an opportunity for study which the writer cannot at present command; consequently he contents himself with merely delimiting the field.

While dealing with but a single law of the science of education, there is a degree of completeness in the discussion, in that it views the whole field of educational thought from a definite standpoint. It is, in fact, a study of educational aims, means, and processes in their relation to one dominating principle. All the materials of edu-

cational science are thus organized about a central conception, and all educational theory is developed from one germinant idea. There are evidently other laws of co-ordinate rank which could be made the centers of similar studies, but with these we are not at present concerned. The cosmic process of formulating such laws and organizing them into a consistent whole is truly the first stage of differentiating and defining *the science of education*. But while we may not at present undertake the organization of such a framework for our science, we must preface our discussion of the chosen law by a general characterization of the nature of pedagogy, its subject-matter and its methods.

Pedagogy is the science of education.—The common denial that there is a science of education, either *in esse* or *in posse*, is due chiefly to three facts: a vagueness of conception regarding what constitutes a science, a lack of precise definition of education, and ignorance of what has already been accomplished in the formulation of fundamental educational principles. Our present purpose will not permit the examination in detail of these three sources of error; but the lines along which such a vindication of the claims of pedagogy should proceed may be indicated here.

A science is an organically related body of thought originating in a specialization of interests. In the earlier stages of life, both of the race and of the individual, experiences come and go in their complexity without being evaluated from definite view-points, each experience being for the time the whole of life viewed in its unbroken entirety. Later certain experiences are objectified, correlated, and unified into a class, viewed as having a common origin in a particular mode of contact with the environment; and thus centers of special interest are established, and particular points of view become habitual. Through analysis and classification experiences are broken up and the elements segregated into groups, and by constructive thinking these groups are organized into phases of life. These phases of life through elaboration and systematization of their characteristic features become *sciences*. Thus any mode or "way of looking at things" may become a science, if the facts are so differentiated and organized as to constitute a distinct phase of experience. Sciences are styles of thought, fashions in experiencing that are born, run their courses, and die, giving place to new sciences. The facts in common consciousness are seen in endless variety of kaleidoscopic combinations as age succeeds age, and the sciences of one generation become old-fashioned and "false" to the succeeding generations. Nevertheless each science has

during its reign its own field, within which it is exclusive and beyond which it cannot be extended. The mutability of the organic form of a science does not necessarily render its knowledge-basis vague or its boundaries indefinite. It is essentially one way of looking at the facts, and such singleness of conception will not admit of uncertainty as to subject-matter. Many of the facts and principles of one science may by slight conversion be turned to useful account in building up another science. It is merely a question of reconstructing the elementary materials about a new center of interest; the view-point is changed, and the truths are seen in new relations and altered perspective. One science in this way may become a propædæutic to another, contributing its facts as data for new generalizations. Its principles are transplanted into the new field and subordinated to a new cosmical view. It is in this way that the facts of psychology and ethics become facts of pedagogy. Education, properly defined, presents a characteristic body of phenomena, which are the subject-matter of a true science.

Education is the conscious direction which the more mature person gives to the growth of the less mature, that he may lead him into a larger enjoyment of the blessings of the physical environment, and a fuller participation in the pleasures and duties of the social life. The fundamental idea here is the *conscious guidance* of a life-process. It is the bringing up of the young to such a stage of life-functioning as enables them to participate in the blessings and responsibilities of life, through a constructive guidance of their development. Both the social and the individual aspects of education are recognized; it is the process of socializing the individual through maturing him. The individual is to be "elevated into the race" through integrating into his life experiences originating in the social environment. This restriction of the term to what is commonly called "formal education," as opposed to the vague conception of the whole process of development of the individual during the period of youth under whatever influences, is essential to any clear discussion of pedagogical principles and laws. *There is no education apart from teaching*, that is, apart from "conscious guidance" of life toward a more or less clearly determined end.

It is neither possible nor desirable to exhibit here what has already been accomplished by educators in accumulating materials for their science. One who reads with discrimination our rapidly increasing pedagogical literature cannot fail to find much of a truly scientific

character. To segregate these discovered principles and to give them organic form as the laws of a science is a work of the highest value, which awaits the masterhand of some educational leader.

As to matter and method sciences may be separated into two groups: *descriptive and normative*. The descriptive sciences are explanatory, dealing with that which *is*, without concern for what *ought to be*. They are the "fact sciences" of the physical and psychical worlds, in which man simply sees and interprets the objects about him unmoved by a desire to modify them with reference to subjective relations. The normative sciences, on the other hand, are concerned with subjective attitudes springing out of a sense of moral obligation. They deal with what *ought to be* and are fundamentally concerned with questions of duty. They are the "law sciences" of the social world. The descriptive sciences are analytic and explanatory in their methods, while the normative are constructive and directive; the former deal with *facts*, and the latter with *norms*. Psychology is a descriptive science; pedagogy, a normative science. The laws of pedagogy are formal enunciations of principles of conduct of one moral personality toward another in aiding him to his highest development. They should not be confounded, on the one hand, with the mere laws of mental development which belong to psychology, nor, on the other, with the general laws of conduct in social life which belong to ethics. Their characteristic element is the recognition of the ethical attitude of the teacher toward his pupil.

MENTAL GROWTH.

Growth is the process by which a living organism builds its own structure through the functioning of its organs. It involves both the acquisition of material and the organization of structure. While growth, at least in the earlier stages of the life of the organism, includes enlargement, mere enlargement without a simultaneous organic development is not growth. The rolling snowball increases in volume, but it does not "grow;" nor can the forming crystal be said to grow in the biological sense in which we are here using the word. The living tree grows by appropriating material from its environment and assimilating it into its own organized substance, employing in the process its organs—roots, leaves, etc.—in their normal functioning. In the lowest forms of animal and plant life the vital movement is merely a simplification of this process, and in the most perfect form of the human organism the growth is still through the normal action of the living mechanism;

hence it may be broadly stated that all growth, in the biological sense, is through the functioning of the organism.

The growth of the human mind is analogous to the growth of the tree, making due allowance for the non-spatial character of the mind. It is not necessary to raise here the question of the existence of a substantial mental entity, hypostatized as a substratum for the mental phenomena; it is enough to know that *man's mental life is a self-directed growth*. The individual human personality develops naturally to perfection of structure and functioning through self-directed experiencing. This does not mean that the mind grows apart from the body in which it manifests itself; it is the *man* that grows, body and soul in their vital union. We are, however, concerned at present with the mental aspect of the man in his life-movement, *i. e.*, with the growth of the mind. This *growth*, like that of the vegetable organism, is not a mere enlargement through accretion and molding by environment; it is a vital process, consciously directed by the man himself. Whatever life the man has—all that he *lives* is thus a matter of self-directed development. Each day's life is built upon that which is past, and is in turn the foundation and the condition of that which is to come. Nothing belongs to the life except that which it grows into itself, and all that it does grow into itself is permanently a part of it.

In this mental growth it is important to distinguish with precision the two phases, of increase in "mental volume" and reorganization of "mental structure." They are not two successive stages, but two aspects of the same process; the acquisition of material and the constructive employment of it are but the life movement seen from different standpoints. When we speak of "increase in mental volume," we need to guard ourselves against the implication of the space conception involved in the term "volume," which we borrow from the physicists. A "larger life" does not, of course, mean one of greater magnitude, but merely one of greater experience content. To "increase the mental volume" is to add to the knowledge-possessions, to swell the current of the life-movement by wider and fuller experiences. Similarly by the "organization of mental structure" is not meant the distribution of the "mental substance" into particular organs, or "faculties," but the securing of such integrity of the mental life as will give effectiveness and facility to functioning. Clearly determined *expression* is both the means and the result of this organization of life. It is only the effort to produce that can give the ability to produce; and one learns to live artistically by living artisti-

cally. In the effort *to know* one lives *more*; in the effort *to do* he lives *better*. But these cannot be separated; one knows truly only in doing, and does only in knowing.

The materials for man's growth are found in his physical and social environment. All growth is by incorporating into the structure of the organism materials taken from the environment. Plants feed upon that which they find in the soil and air; and man nourishes his life from his environment. Man has two environments, or rather his environment is double in its character. From the physical universe about him he appropriates the materials of his bodily structure; and this same physical universe impinging upon his nervous mechanism stimulates him into conscious life-activities—"rubs him into conscious life." But his experiencing of the environment, his interpretation of its irritating contact, is mediated by his social environment. He sees the "greenness" of the grass through the eyes of his race-fellows. His life is saturated with the content of common consciousness, the accumulated race-experiences, so that he cannot reach the physical world except through the medium of the social atmosphere in which he lives. In addition to mediating the physical environment for man, this social atmosphere is itself a true environment. Man acknowledges his fellows as subjects with whom he agrees or disagrees, to whom he takes attitudes. His relations to them nourish and condition his individual life. Just as in his experiences with his physical environment he builds up certain concepts, or "types" of existence, that are to him in their recurrence in thought a sort of sense-impression stimulating to life, so in the recognized "characters" of his fellows and in the social institutions as they exist in common consciousness, he finds stimulation and materials for his own development. Thus in his experiences with nature and in his intercourse with his fellow men the individual man finds the materials of his normal growth. We designate as "environment" the general storehouse of life's supplies; but *environment* is only so much of "circumstances" as is related actively to the life of the individual; it is circumstances as they are grasped by the individual and made a part of his own structure. What we call "knowledge," the accumulated race-experiences that we embody in books, becomes material for the growth of the individual only as he appropriates it. He must psychologize it into his very soul-substance through true apperception. The "arithmetic" of the school text-book becomes *John's arithmetic* by being incorporated into John's life in normal growth.

GUIDING THE MENTAL LIFE OF ANOTHER.

That one person may intentionally guide and stimulate the growth of another is a fundamental postulate in all educational science. It is a common assumption in all teaching, and is not likely to be called in question by the practical teacher or the more philosophical expounder of pedagogical principles. It is, however, important to know its relations to the principle set forth in the preceding section, namely, that each person's life is a *self-directed* growth. It is an essential condition of rational life that it builds itself out of the available materials and under the limitations of its environment. To take from a person, even for the most benevolent motives, this right of self-making would, were it possible to do so, be destructive of all moral responsibility, would degrade the *person* into the thing. Fortunately it is psychologically impossible to rob man wholly of this power, though the supply of life-materials may be so limited and the opportunities for constructive expression may be so controlled as to make the life a poor, dwarfed, sickly shadow of what it would be under normal conditions. On the other hand, it is possible to so enrich the environment and to so accelerate the movement as to make the life of another much more than it would be unguided. Upon this possibility of aiding the life-movement of another depends the whole theory of education. The teacher claims the power and the right to co-operate in determining the development of his pupil toward some ideal end, which he as a more mature student of life's purposes and processes more or less clearly perceives; and pedagogy has for its province the principles and laws of this intentional influencing of one person by another.

The teacher has chiefly two means of influencing the life-movement of his pupil: he may so order the environment as to secure a larger appropriation of such materials as contribute to development in a certain direction; or he may suggest images about which the successive experiences may be developed, thus shaping by gentlest touch the progressive building. These two are not so easily distinguished as might appear at the first glance; they are really fundamentally the same, differing only as to whether our attention is directed to the material used or the use that is made of it. We may for the present drop from view the first aspect, returning to it in a later part of the discussion. The nature of the second means is comprehensively presented in the following statement: *Images may be suggested about which the life-experiences may be organized, and even the larger ideals of the whole life-movement may be biased by the intentional influence of*

the more mature mind. We must now devote ourselves to a somewhat exhaustive study of this proposition, seeking to determine first its psychological validity and then its pedagogical significance.

NATURE OF SUGGESTION AND REACTION.

The word "suggest" has, in both philosophy and in common speech, two pretty clearly distinguished meanings: one idea may suggest another, and one person may suggest an idea to another person. The first is the common use in the "association psychology;" it denotes the operation by which one idea calls up another through some form of association with it. Doubtless there is much justification for the claim that "all mental life falls under the principle of suggestion," and that "the existence of an idea in consciousness at a particular time is due to the fact that such another idea has preceded it in consciousness;" but we need not on this account look upon life as a mere chain of linked ideas. It is the whole life-current that moves on; or, as Ladd states it in his *Descriptive and Explanatory Psychology*, p. 264, "It is our total states or fields of consciousness which follow each other in the succession of time." It is enough for our present purposes to recognize that there is a continuity of experience without attempting to trace the connections between its successive phases. We must leave to the psychologist the formulation and defense of his "laws of association," with the humble petition that we may be spared from any attempt to deal in pedagogy with discrete "psychic atoms" joined by some form of hypothetical linkages "in the mind" or "in the brain." We cannot forbear, however, to quote Professor James against his brethren: "Association, so far as the word stands for an effect, is between *things thought of*—it is *things*, not ideas, which are associated in the mind. We ought to talk of the association of *objects*, not of the association of *ideas*. And so far as association stands for a cause, it is between *processes in the brain*—it is these which, by being associated in certain ways, determine what successive objects shall be thought."¹

To suggest, in the second meaning of the term, is to impart an idea unobtrusively to another. It is to excite an idea in the mind of another, to start an experience by indirect prompting, to introduce an image into the mind in such a manner as to cause a reconstruction of the life-materials about it as a determining center. Baldwin characterizes it as "the abrupt entrance from without into

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 554.

consciousness of an idea or image which becomes a part of the stream of thought and tends to produce the muscular and volitional effects which ordinarily follow upon its presence."¹ The word "abrupt" in this statement is liable to be misunderstood. The idea does not, even in the hypnotic state, *break into* the mind; there is always a welcoming, however coy and resisting the receiving mind may be. It is a *life-movement* that is influenced, and it cannot passively suffer the introduction into it of something wholly foreign to it. "Suggestion is an operation producing a given effect on a subject by acting on his intelligence. Every suggestion essentially consists in acting on a person by means of an idea; every effect suggested is the result of a phenomenon of ideation."² This "ideation" is the essential fact of the suggestion as seen from the side of the influenced life. It is the *reaction* of the receiving mind. When we speak of the "reaction to a suggestion" we do not, however, mean adverse action, as we do in physics, but the active reception of the suggestion as a factor in the life-movement. To react in this sense is to accept and to utilize constructively in a normal process of experiencing that which is placed before the mind. In his *Outlines of Psychology* Professor Titchener, speaking of the experimental process of applying sensory stimuli to another person and noting his response to them, says: "A reaction is an artificial action." The term "artificial" used here must be carefully guarded. The action is a perfectly natural one so far as its procedure is concerned; it is only artificial in that it originates in the conscious purpose of another, that is another furnishes the stimulus to an experience that otherwise would not have come naturally into the life-current. The suggestion comes as a *hint* or *insinuation* to a self-determining movement, which may accept it or reject it with more or less vigor according to the integrity of the whole movement. This is as true for the hypnotic subject as it is for the person in the normal state. Further, "suggestion" and "reaction" are not successive stages in the progress of the influencing of one life by another; they are two aspects of the same movement. There can be no suggestion without reaction. The two minds participate in a common process, the one as suggester and the other as reactor. The one mind *communicates* to the other from its own life-movement, and the other actively *receives* the communication into its own vital current. It is merely the impinging of one life upon another, gently yet effectively modifying its course. For the purposes of the present discussion emphasis

¹ *Handbook of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 297.

² BINET AND FÉRÉ, *Animal Magnetism*, p. 173.

must be laid upon the *unobtrusiveness* of this influencing. The idea is not thrust before the mind as something wholly foreign to it, interrupting forcibly its current of experiencing with the demand for the taking up of a new element. The "communicated image" finds its place in the life because of a feeling of kinship of the present content for the factor. The new idea is created in the mind of the receiver under the most gentle touch of the influencing mind, and the experience is determined in volume and form by the "mere suggestion" of what it may become.

There are two clearly distinguished schools of hypnotic theory, commonly known as the "Paris School" and the "Nancy School." According to the first, hypnotism is a peculiar pathological state into which certain predisposed people may be brought, and in which their actions may be automatically controlled by another person without their own consciousness or volition. In the *cataleptic trance* the body becomes merely an ingenious machine to be played upon by the hypnotizer. According to the second theory, hypnotism is an abnormal condition of the mental life in which images work themselves out more readily into expression, and in which the hypnotized person controls his own life under the *suggestions* of the hypnotizer. The first has been called the "neurosis theory," and the second the "suggestion theory." In the one, personal life is for the time wholly destroyed; in the other, it is only warped and distorted. Without attempting to enter into this controversy, it need only be said, as is probably sufficiently evident from the context, that the claims of the Nancy people, led by Bernheim, are accepted in the present essay. Bernheim characterizes the process of hypnotism as "the induction of a peculiar psychical condition which increases the susceptibility to suggestion;" also he says: "It is suggestion that rules hypnotism." Wundt¹ says: "Die hauptsächliche Entstehungsursache der Hypnose ist die *Suggestion*, d. h. die Mittheilung einer gefühlsstarken Vorstellung." Professor Titchener tersely says: "All the phenomena of hypnosis can be summed up in the single word *suggestion*. The operator suggests to the subject what he is to see and do; the subject suggests to himself that he shall enter the hypnotic state."² Hypnotic suggestion is only a simplified and intensified form of the influence which one person exerts over another in the normal state. In this view the trance-state itself is the effect of *suggestion*. Bernheim, in *Suggestive Therapeutics*, p. 179, says: "Hypnotism does not really create a new condition;

¹ *Grundriss der Psychologie*, p. 321.

² *Primer of Psychology*, p. 275.

there is nothing in induced sleep which may not occur in the waking condition, in a rudimentary degree in many cases, but in some to an equal extent." Again on page 190 he says: "The induced sleep does not depend upon the hypnotizer, but upon the subject; it is his own faith which puts him to sleep. No one can be hypnotized against his will, if he resists the command. Baldwin in the *Nation*, August 11, 1892, writes: "According to the Nancy view, there is nothing abnormal about hypnotic sleep. It is normal sleep artificially produced, and the method of producing sleep artificially—suggestion—is nothing more than a skilful and professional use of the hitherto unrecognized fact that our normal life is full of responses suggested to us by our surroundings. Of our usual surroundings, persons are the most important elements; in other words, our social environment, our living *milieu*, gives constant tone and support to our lives and aids our development." Professor James judiciously sums up the argument for this position in his *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 601, as follows: "*The suggestion theory may therefore be approved as correct, provided we grant the trance-state as its prerequisite.* The three states of Charcot, the strange reflexes of Heidenhain, and all other bodily phenomena which have been called direct consequences of the trance-state itself, are not such. They are products of suggestion, the trance-state having no particular outward symptoms of its own; but without the trance-state there, those particular suggestions could never have been successfully made."

The two important facts in this view of hypnotism are the *consciousness* of the hypnotized person and the *self-determination* of his actions. Upon the first point Bernheim¹ says: "The impressions produced by artificial or induced sleep are always conscious at the time they are produced." With even greater definiteness Moll² says: "There is no suggestion without consciousness. . . . A suggestion without consciousness is to me inconceivable." The same conception is also implied in the definition of suggestion in hypnotism by Sidis:³ "Suggestion is the intrusion into the mind of an idea; met with more or less opposition by the person; accepted uncritically at last; and realized unreflectively, almost automatically." Of similar tenor is Fouillée's statement⁴ that "What is called hypnotic suggestion is nothing but the artificial selection of one idea to the exclusion of all others, so that it passes into action." To ascribe to the hypnotic

¹ *Suggestive Therapeutics*, p. 157. ² *Hypnotism*, p. 267. ³ *Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 15.

⁴ *Education from a National Standpoint*, Greenstreet's translation, p. 12.

subject personality, however modified and distorted, is to grant that all his mental processes are conscious to that personality. Consciousness, as the mind's awareness of its own states, is the one abiding characteristic of all mental life. It is not necessary here to deal with the theory of "unconscious mind," or of varying "degrees of consciousness." *The mind that reacts upon a suggestion, whether in a normal or an abnormal state, is necessarily conscious of its own processes.*

The hypnotized subject reacts upon the suggestions of his hypnotizer, that is, all of his acts are *self-determined*, however much his normal mental life may be abridged and constrained. His life shorn of its full normal play of ideas is none the less *his* life, concerning itself with its own materials and developing its own experiences. The suggestion and reaction are essentially the same as in the normal state, differing only in the unbalanced state of the subject. "Physiological and neuropathic suggestion is nothing but the exaggeration of facts which occur in the normal state."¹ Self-directed personal life still exists, though narrowed in its field and biased in its movement. In this fragment of normal personality there are still reflection, judgment, volition—operating in the whole field of the abridged and distorted life. This is clearly seen in the refusal of a hypnotic subject, who has readily yielded himself to suggestive guidance in numberless minor acts, to perform under the most strenuous demand an immoral or criminal act *at total variance with the integrity of his character*. The man is still there, and "pulls himself together" for a successful struggle against a wrong to himself. May we not conclude that action under hypnotic suggestion is as truly *conscious and voluntary* as that of normal life?

Much that has been said of suggestion in abnormal life—in the hypnotic state—applies equally to suggestion in normal life. Here, as in the former case, to suggest an idea to another is to excite in him a notion upon which he proceeds to build up an experience. The chief difference, probably the only one, is that in the normal life the suggested image comes into the midst of an active play of a multitude of mental systems, each ready to claim the field of consciousness and to determine an experience. It must win its way to the life-center, establish its right to rule as the dominant factor in the life-movement in open, free competition with numberless other possible images. Stout finds the "suggestibility" of the hypnotic subject, or of the mentally weak in general, to consist essentially in the absence of the

¹ GUYAU, *Éducation et hérédité*, p. 8.

normal conflict of apperceptive systems for dominance. The possible mental field is narrowed by inhibition to one system, which is the whole of life, even to monomania. "A healthy condition of mind is characterized by a general excitability of all the mental systems composing the empirical Ego, which enables them to co-operate, compete, and conflict, with a comparative strength simultaneously determined by conditions both external and internal to the particular systems."¹ Coming into such a complex of psychic life, the suggested image must so touch that life as to be welcomed as its organic center in a true psychosis. It must by its intrinsic interest focus the whole movement in itself. "The first condition of normal suggestion is fixation of attention."² Starting with the centering of the life about the suggested image in "attention," the experience moves on to a motor discharge in some form of expression. Touched from without by a fact which the life recognizes as belonging to itself, it reacts by welcoming that fact as a temporary sovereign to whose feet it brings all its treasures.

No better examples of the nature and process of mental suggestion can be found than in a social conversation between two friends upon the ordinary concerns of life. In such a conversation each remark is in its turn the completion of an experience of the speaker and the occasion of an experience for the hearer. The two lines of life are approximately parallel, bending now this way, now that under the influence of their reciprocal interaction. Since their apperceptive systems are different, no two experiences can be identical; yet as each life impinges upon the other, it modifies its course by *suggesting* to it an image center. While the thoughts of the two persons have in general a common trend, each life moves forward in a continuous reconstructing of its own experience about constantly changing images. Each by expressing his own experience contributes to the life of the other in the only way in which one life can affect another, *i. e.*, by *suggestion*.

Imitation has become a word to conjure with in dealing with the early development of the child under the influence of his associates. Psychologists and sociologists have in the past decade written much about "imitation in the child and in the race," the "imitative function," the "laws of imitation," the "imitative faculty," the "imitative impulse," etc.; and much that has been written is very vague, lacking in true psychological definition. The term is used with all shades of

¹ *Analytical Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 156.

² SIDIS, *Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 45.

meaning, from "mechanical repetition of the actions of another person" up to the great creative work of the true artist. It will doubtless help to clear up some of this indefiniteness if we return, as we so often do in our wanderings in philosophic thinking, to Aristotle. In the well-known definition of tragedy the *major genus* is "imitation," used in a sense that is clearly defined in the context. Imitation for Aristotle is not a mere reflection of a product; it is a genuine *creative act*, not the mirroring of the product of the creative act of another. As an artist his poet is employed in "imitating things as they ought to be." In spite of all that has been said of late about "organic imitation" apart from consciousness, it is by no means established that there is any such thing as mere reflex action in the psychic world. One reads Professor Baldwin's very interesting and instructive discussion of "circular activity" with a constantly growing query as to whether he might not have said without qualification, on page 266 of the first volume of *Mental Development*, that "imitation is an instance of *suggestive reaction*," implying in his predicate term a conscious response to an external stimulus. Is it not a rather forced classification of mental phenomena that assigns "volition to the man," "suggestion to the infant," "reflex action to the mocking-bird," and "instinct to the beaver?" Is it not mind that acts in each case, *in essentially the same manner*? Dr. Harris has stated the whole case so far as the "infant" is concerned in *Psychologic Foundations of Education*, p. 301:

To see the significance of imitation in the child-mind, we must look upon it not as a comparatively feeble and mechanical effort, as something determined by outside influences, but as a phase of self-activity which is engaged in emancipating the self from heredity and natural impulse. We must not lose sight of this essential fact, that shows itself even in the most rudimentary of the phenomena of imitation. There can be no imitation whatever except on the part of self-active beings—in other words, only souls can imitate. "Imitation," says M. Compayré, "is the reproduction of what one has seen another do." It is therefore always to some extent an act of assimilation. Even if we extend the meaning of imitation so as to include unconscious mimicry and all phenomena akin to hypnotic suggestion, still it is self-activity that does the imitating. What is beheld as an act of another is converted by adoption into an act of self. The pride and pleasure that the infant exhibits on the occasion of his first conscious imitation has its root in this, that he has made something his own—has proved himself equal to imitating in himself a movement by his will—he has revealed his selfhood to some extent. This is the significance of play, which is chiefly imitation, that the undeveloped human being is learning to know himself by seeing

what he can do. He is revealing himself to others and to himself, and getting strength in his individuality. Thus we see that there is an element of originality in the most mechanical phase of imitation. The self is active and assimilative. It sees an external deed which it proceeds to make its own deed by imitation. The child proves itself to possess a human nature identical with the one whom it imitates.

To these very significant words of Dr. Harris should be added Preyer's statement in *Mind of the Child: The Senses and the Will*:¹

In order to imitate one must first perceive through the senses; secondly, have an idea what has been perceived; thirdly, execute a movement corresponding to this idea. . . . However often imitation has the appearance of an involuntary movement, yet when it was executed the first time, it must have been executed with intention—*i. e.*, voluntarily. When a child imitates, it has already a will.

These quotations express with such clearness and fulness my own conception of the nature of imitation that little more needs to be said here. Imitation is essentially, in all its phases, a matter of *reaction to suggestion*. It is the common process of all manifestation of life. All organic development proceeds in this way: the outer world impinges upon the nervous mechanism, and the sensuous life moves out to meet it in a more or less rationally ordered reaction. The effort to determine when the infant "begins to imitate" the life of those about him must in the end prove as fruitless as the speculations of the theologians as to the origin of the individual human soul. The child begins to imitate when it begins to *perceive* the world about it.

Toute perception se ramène plus ou moins à une imitation, à la création en nous d'un état correspondant à celui que nous percevons chez autrui; toute perception est une sorte de suggestion qui commence et qui, chez certains individus, n'étant pas neutralisée par d'autres, s'achève en actions.²

To the artificial opposition between "imitation" and "originality"—between "copying" and "creating"—are to be traced numberless evils of educational procedure. The assumption is that certain experiences may be had mediately or vicariously, that one may receive into his life the result of the experiencing of another done up in the "original package," without any true creative movement on his own part. On the other hand, it is assumed that in some experiences one creates *ab initio*, even *ex nihilo*, wholly "original products." The error here consists in the idea that there are two distinct modes of experiencing, rather than varying degrees of activity and self-direction. It is the same misconception that lies at the bottom of the neurotic theory

¹ Brown's translation, p. 282.

² GUYAU, *Éducation et hérédité*, p. 10.



of hypnosis. All life is self-directed life, and all acts of organic being originate in self-activity.

SUGGESTION IN EDUCATIVE GUIDANCE.

In the preceding pages we have discussed at some length the nature of "suggestion" in both abnormal and normal life, seeking to free the term from its common limitation to certain manifestations in the hypnotic state and to show that it is a factor in all psychic movements. Before treating of its use in the processes of education, it is necessary to perform a somewhat similar service for the term "education," supplementing the brief discussion given on page 11.

The term "education" is often used loosely to designate the whole process of development of the individual during the period of youth. Properly, however, it denotes the development which takes place under the intentional guidance of more mature persons. While immediate contact with the physical environment furnishes materials for enlarged life and stimulates to self-directed growth, there is no education in such self-ordered development. Environment cannot educate a man, nor can he "educate himself." He may systematically guide his own life in its constructive movement so as to reach a high degree of development, by availing himself fully of the materials in his physical and social environment; but such unaided maturing of oneself lacks the characteristic element of education, namely, *directive guidance by another*. The teacher intentionally guides his pupil in the appropriation of life-materials and in the organization of the life-content so as to make the development more rapid, consistent and permanent. The term "teacher," as used here, designates anyone who gives conscious guidance to the life of another. It may be the parent, the minister, the school-teacher, the editor, the author—whoever intentionally directs the experiences of another. Education belongs peculiarly to the period of youth, though it is properly continued in varying degrees throughout life. It aims by the right ordering of the environment to secure a more healthy and more complete life. It is to the human infant what the gardener's cultivation is to the plant; and just as the apple developed by the horticulturalists' art differs from the fruit of the wild tree, so the educated man differs from "nature's product."

This limiting of the term "education" to what is often called "formal education" is not at all arbitrary. The narrower meaning is that of common speech. When we speak of a man's "education," we

mean that development that he has received through the instruction and discipline of some form of school life; and of a man who has made himself a place among his fellows unaided, as far as that is possible, by such sympathetic guidance, we say "he has accomplished much for a man lacking education." But we need not confine our claim for justification of our use of the term to common speech; those who attempt a scientific discussion of the aims and processes of education—even those who formally define the term in the broader sense—treat the whole matter from the standpoint of the *teacher* and constantly limit the meaning of the word to the guided maturing of the individual. It would certainly be an interesting study to consider critically the formal definitions of "education" in the more scientific treatises on that subject against the backgrounds of the respective treatises themselves; but such an investigation is apart from our present purpose, and we must content ourselves with a somewhat dogmatic statement of what is believed to be, not only the true, but also the common, use of the term. It will, however, contribute to clearness in our discussion to notice briefly the various forms under which this definition may occur—forms determined by the different standpoints from which the definition is formulated, but all embodying substantially the same fundamental conception.

Education may be defined as to its aim from two distinct points of view: the psychological and the sociological. Psychologically education is "the harmonious development of all the human powers" through their proper exercise; sociologically, it is the "adaptation of the individual to the civilization into which he is born." These definitions are complementary, emphasizing different aspects of the same general conception. The psychological looks to the means; the sociological to the end. It is in the latter sense that Dr. Harris has defined education as "the elevation of the individual into the race." It is the preparing of the individual for future social functioning, for sharing in the duties and privileges of social life, through participation in a simplified form of that life. Most of the classical definitions in educational literature can be arranged under the one or the other of these two classes; and much that is unsatisfactory in educational theory and practice is due to such partial one-sided conceptions. Any adequate statement of the aim of education must recognize both the individual and the social factors. The "harmonious development of powers" requires as material means the facts of social life found in the common consciousness; and the process of "socializing the individual"

is by giving greater individual efficiency in the enjoyment and productive use of the facts of his social environment. The "individual man" and the "social man" are not two beings capable of separate development; the highest individual life involves the widest social life, and the richest social life demands the most perfect individual life.

Education may also be defined as a product or as a process. As a product, education is a state of mental development and equipment fitting for mature life-functioning; as a process, it is self-making through the progressive reconstruction of experiences under the stimulation of the physical and social environment. There is truth in each of these conceptions, though the latter is far more productive than the former. To emphasize the product-conception, to regard education as an equipment that can be quantitatively measured, encourages procrastination of real life-functioning and makes school life artificial. Thus to make the final cause in educational procedure *future having* instead of *present being* is to make much of life barren and meaningless. To be "educated" is not to have acquired a certain knowledge-content and to have developed a certain skill and grace in self-direction; all this is a valuable accompaniment and result of education, but education itself is a matter of present growth for its own sake. It is a normal life-process, finding its meaning and value within the process itself. It is ordered and directed present life in its relation to the whole of life.

Nevertheless the product-conception has value in educational theory. Each stage of life is preparation for the next stage, and the whole is a progressive development. All educational endeavor should recognize this continuity of life, and there should always be the forward look of anticipation of the fuller life to come. Thus the teacher at every stage of his guiding work should keep in mind the possibilities of future functioning; but he should not degrade the "school" into an artificial mechanism designed to prepare for a hypothetical future social state. Just as in the theological world man has suffered untold miseries from regarding the present life as a mere "probationary state," preparation for a "heaven" after death, so in the educational world the school life is vitiated by "preparing to live" in the "real life" of the business and social world.

Again education may be defined from the standpoint of the teacher or from that of the pupil. From the side of the teacher, education is "the conscious direction which the more mature mind gives to the

less mature in its efforts to develop, elevate, and inform itself;" from that of the pupil, it is self-directed activity in progressive self-development under the guidance and stimulation of more mature leaders. These two definitions express but two aspects of the same process; and one or the other is to be preferred in view of the particular purpose of the definer. The central idea in both is that there can be no education without conscious guidance of one person by another. While it is conceivable that an individual could develop in direct contact with his physical environment, without the mediation and assistance of social life and institutions, such "rubbing into conscious life" by the friction of the physical world is not *education*, though the term is often used uncritically to include this so-called "informal education."

We may now summarize critically the ideas involved in these various phases of our definition and gather the results into a formal enunciation of an explicit and comprehensive definition. *First*, as to its content, education is both social and individual. It is the process of socializing the individual through maturing him. The aim, as "a rationalized endeavor," is both social and psychological — social as it looks to functioning in society, and psychological as it looks to self-realization through normal life-processes. The materials of education are social; the process is psychological. Individuals are "elevated into the race" by integrating into their lives experiences originating in the social environment. *Second*, as to its form, education is a process rather than a product — more, it is a process that is not merely a means to some external end, but a process that finds its end within itself. Present character, not future, is the end of the reconstruction of self in education. It deals with what the child now is as seen in relation to the whole of his life. It is a directing of his growth by intensifying, emphasizing, and classifying his passing experiences so as to enrich and strengthen his life. Education views life in its present phase as a continuous process building constructively toward an ideal end. *Third*, as to its scope, education must be restricted rigorously to what has been called "formal education," that is, to the intentional guidance of the maturing mind by the more mature mind. The source of the present confusion regarding the relation of psychology to pedagogy is due, so far as the pedagogists are to be blamed for it, to not restricting the field of pedagogy to what is strictly educational. The development of the human being considered apart from the rational guidance of his more mature associates is a proper subject of

psychology, but not of pedagogy. Thus our discussion leads us to regard education as a psychological process to be viewed from the standpoint of the teacher. This conception is embodied in the definition given on page 11. More briefly it may be said that *education is the guidance of the life of another toward the complete realization of its possibilities.*

Teaching is the process of educating as seen from the standpoint of the educator. To teach another is to determine his development by controlling the circumstances, ordering the materials, and stimulating the activity of his growth. Teaching is the art of education, as pedagogy is the science. As an art its product is fullness and vigor of life in the individual taught. The teacher forms the character of his pupil by determining his experiences. Probably no better definition of teaching has been formulated than that of Arnold Tompkins: "Teaching is the process by which one mind, from set purpose, produces the life-unfolding process in another;" or as he also states it: "Teaching is the conscious process of producing mental experiences [in another] for the purpose of life-development." In its extent the term "teaching" is identical with the term "education," though an effort is often made to limit it to a narrower field. A good example of this error in restricting the meaning of the term is to be found in a late teacher's manual:¹ "The teacher's work is of a threefold character: he has in the first place *to organize his school*; secondly, *to govern his children*; and thirdly, *to teach*." Since to teach is to present the best conditions for complete living and to incite to such living, it includes the organization of the school and the government of the children as well as the "teaching of knowledge." As a helper toward complete living, toward the realization of a rich, full life, the teacher's art embraces all that contributes directly to this end.

There is no teaching without *learning*. The two processes are complementary; or, rather, they are the two aspects of the same educative process. The educator *teaches*; his pupil *learns*. If the pupil does not learn simultaneously with the teaching effort of the educator, then there is no true teaching. Learning is the effect of which teaching is the cause; and since no cause can exist, as a cause, apart from its effect, there can be no teaching without learning. Jacotot's definition of "teaching" is significant here: "Teaching is causing another to learn."

Teaching has two factors, *instruction* and *discipline* — the first as the

¹ LONDON, *Principles and Practices of Teaching and Class Management*, p. 4.

adding of knowledge-material to the soul-substance, and the second as the organization of the soul-content through its functional expression. In instruction the teacher is employed in so ordering the available life-materials as to secure on the part of his pupil such an appropriation, both as to kind and quantity, as will contribute to the most healthful and vigorous growth. He seeks to enlarge the life through chosen experiences. From his wider view of life's possibilities and more definite conception of the highest good, he is enabled to select from the residue of race-experiencing the most nourishing materials and so to prepare and serve them as to secure their incorporation into the individual life which he seeks to influence. Thus he needs to combine the qualifications of a good marketer, a good cook, and a good server of mental viands. He aims at mental growth by *building into (in-struo)* the life of his pupil materials taken from common consciousness. Just as the gardener carefully places about the roots of the plant chosen food-materials and seeks to stimulate it to their appropriation and assimilation by controlling the circumstances of heat, light, and moisture, so the teacher, as instructor, controls the physical and social environment of his pupil with a definite view to the determining of the volume and form of the soul-content.

In discipline the teacher is concerned with *expression*. All completed experiencing eventuates in some form of expression. Every psychosis tends to an outgoing motor discharge. No life-movement is complete until it has expressed itself in and through the bodily structure. Expression is an element in all thinking. Language is more than "a means of expressing thought;" it is a means of *thinking*. We do not think thoughts completely and then select verbal clothing for them; we think in words. All constructive thought is in language. The volitional movement to express gives definite form to the thought; and all life culminates in expression. The soul expresses itself in the body which it builds about it, expression being merely the culmination of the organizing psychic movements. This disciplinary side of education has not been recognized as a vital part of the acquisitive process itself. Expression is commonly treated as a means of exhibiting results already acquired, the teacher demanding formal expression of his pupils merely as a means of determining the existence of a completed mental state. It is not commonly regarded as an essential fact in the psychosis itself, but as a separable evidence that the psychosis *has been*. Thus the common "recitation" in the elementary school is a barren performance upon dead forms of verbal

utterance, instead of a constructive thinking exercise culminating in normal expression of a present life-movement. In it the teacher, instead of guiding actual life, endeavors to discover what a past movement has been, thus attempting a psychological impossibility. What is true in the elementary school is true in slightly varied form in secondary and higher education. Nowhere have teachers grasped the idea of the psychological nature of expression, and consequently we have the unnatural divorcing of instruction and discipline.

The fallacy of "discipline" apart from knowledge-content is even more destructive of true education than that of securing the mechanical acquisition of knowledge through "instruction" that does not involve expression. One cannot be trained to live by any sort of intellectual gymnastics. Living is a growth, involving both the acquisition of materials and the organization of the structure. There is no training apart from the content on which we train; and no work of the teacher can have any possible educational value that does not enrich the content of life through true growth. All education involves both instruction and discipline; there must be both increase in the volume of life and more perfect organization of its structure.

It follows from our definition of "education" and the subsequent explication that all educative guidance must be affirmative in its character. Education is a constructive guidance of life, conserving, organizing, and directing its good elements toward perfection of development and functioning. It consists essentially in encouraging and aiding the process of self-making along the natural line of normal growth. The educator must believe in humanity, must incorporate into his pedagogical creed the proposition that "man naturally grows right." He must recognize his powerlessness to originate in his pupil's life a movement or a state wholly foreign to the character of that life. If man were "born faced hellward," no human power could "convert him," whatever may be the possibilities on the divine side. Just as the plant builds up its plant life, under circumstances more or less favorable to a perfect realization of its planthood, so the human being builds up his humanity, more or less dwarfed and distorted by his environment, but still his *humanity* in its struggle toward perfect realization. It is not the teacher's business to change the "nature" with which he deals, but only to recognize it, foster it, and strengthen it. In so doing he can deal with the present life only, finding preparation for the future in enriching the present. All life prepares for life, and there is no preparation for life but life itself. He who would

live tomorrow must live today — not today as today merely, but today as a stage of the whole development. The teacher's work is necessarily limited to the directing of actually existent forces, that their resultant shall have a desired character; and he must see the resultant in the actual present play of the forces. It is present character, not future character, that is the true object of education. Not *to become* a good man, but *to be* a good boy, is the highest ideal for the pupil. If the teacher is able to see that his pupil lives today as he ought to live for today's needs and opportunities, the life of tomorrow will be easy and natural, and a progressive development will be secured.

One does not become essentially better by "quitting his meanness." Negative goodness is at best "good-for-nothingness." The secret of all goodness is in *being good*. One does not develop strength by dealing with his weakness; but all genuine curative treatment is by directing and strengthening "nature's powers." It is the teacher's business, like that of the true physician, to discover, guide, and encourage the life which the pupil actually has, treating all defects and weaknesses negatively only. His work is constructive, using nature's materials, in nature's way, and for nature's end. A full comprehension of this great truth would eliminate from our schools by far the greater part of all punishment, drill-work, and barren tasks that are now so destructive of normal child-life.

ALL EDUCATIVE GUIDANCE IS THROUGH SUGGESTION AND REACTION.

This fundamental law of pedagogy has been foreshadowed in all the preceding discussion on the nature of education; and it now only remains to show as definitely and as concretely as possible its application in the teaching process. It is not a question of *when* to employ suggestion in teaching, but of *how* to employ it. The law is not a statement of what ought to be or what is best in educational practice, but rather of what everywhere is and has always been in all true educational procedure. Teachers have always accomplished their work by *suggestion*, even when most unconscious of the real nature of their actions. The word "all" in the statement of the law above indicates the writer's answer as to when to employ suggestion. The claim is that there can be no education apart from suggestion. This will be established by answering the practical question: How does the teacher quicken and enlarge the mental life of his pupil by suggestion? Of course, to prescribe definite rules for the practice of pedagogical suggestion is absurd quackery; the procedure here, as in all true art, is by

the rational use of materials in reaching an ideal end under the actual concrete conditions. In the article on "Suggestion" in the sixth volume of Rein's *Encyclopädisches Handbuch der Pädagogik*, Wendt says: "Die Anwendung der pädagogischen Suggestion kann nicht durch Regeln erläutert und geordnet werden. Diese Anwendung erfordert Takt." Still it is possible to indicate in a general way and to illustrate by examples the place of suggestion in teaching.

"Education, in my opinion, is nothing else than a totality of co-ordinated and reasoned-out suggestions."¹ In education the teacher brings into the life of his pupil through suggestion a succession of images, which, operating as germinant centers of experiencing, determine progressively the line of his life-development. He seeks to guide the life *from within*, that is, to influence the development by the communication of a factor that is spontaneously wrought out in the activity of the life itself. In all true teaching no effort is made to constrain the life of the pupil from without, to force its current by external pressure. The pupil's life is modified by presenting to him a conception of what he may be or do and an incentive for its realization. In this consists the whole art of teaching. The teacher initiates the experience and provides for its motor discharge.

Pedagogical suggestion, it must be insisted, is a normal life-process; it is not hypnotic influence. In Wendt's article, quoted above, he says:

Mit dieser [Suggestion im Zustand der Hypnose] hat die pädagogische Suggestion nur ausnahmsweise etwas gemein, denn nur in wenigen speziellen Fällen darf die Hypnose in der Erziehung Anwendung finden und kann von einer Verbindung der pädagogischen Suggestion mit der Hypnose die Rede sein.

In an earlier part of this discussion an effort was made to show that suggestion in hypnosis is essentially the same as suggestion in the normal state; but this does not signify that the conditions are the same. In the hypnotic state the life-current is narrowed to a mere rill, easily deflected in any desired direction. Doubtless hypnotic suggestion could be employed for educational purposes—in fact, that is just what is done in the curative treatment of various diseased states. But a *Heilmittel* is not a true type of a *Lehrmittel*. The teacher's work is not essentially curative or corrective, but constructive and directive. The "health-pedagogy" of the teacher is affirmative in character, substituting health for disease. Drastic counteractive treatment has no place in education. Though a child might be "cured" of an evil

¹ GUYAU, *Éducation et hérédité*, p. xv.

habit through post-hypnotic suggestion, the possible evil consequences are too great to be risked. Whatever may be the final verdict of the medical world upon degrading free personality to a neurotic state for even the most benevolent ends, it may be safely asserted that this is not the field for the teacher. He must deal with life as he finds it, with the most reverent attitude toward the personalities of his pupils.

Since all normal growth is right growth, it is only necessary for the teacher to show the child how he can experience the best, how he can live the most completely. A healthy life inspired by good moral instincts is easily guided toward the "highest good," not only as an ultimate aim, but in each separate act of experiencing. We lead people to better life by suggesting the conception that they are *in reality* better than they appear; to assign to them right motives is to induce them to justify the assumption, on the other hand, to consider them base is to strongly urge them to be so. One makes himself moral by believing that he is moral in his true inner manhood. To make one conscious of his goodness is the true secret of all moral education. It is a fundamental postulate of all pedagogy that *humanity is essentially good*; and this is applied to the individual case by presupposing in the individual the germs of the life we would have him live. Goodness is more than the mere negation of badness; it is life itself in its true development; "it is the natural way of living."

Guyau¹ says:

All education should be directed to this end, namely, to convince the child that he is *capable of good* and *incapable of evil*, in order to give him this ability and this inability; to persuade him that he has a strong will, in order to communicate to him force of will; to make him believe that he is morally free, master of himself, in order that "the idea of moral freedom," may tend to realize itself progressively.

To clearly conceive the *possible* in normal life-functioning is to proceed at once to make it *actual*. The ideal is thus the formative real.

In the particular teaching act the teacher directs attention by suggestion to a phase of life and provides for the culmination of the experience in a definite expressive movement. For example, suppose the teacher desires to secure from his pupils more strenuous effort in their study. He says, on the proper occasion: "How well we have done our work today! We really have understood it all, and have discussed it clearly. The lesson for tomorrow will lead us a little farther

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

into the same subject, but there is also a new discovery which I know we shall all enjoy." The suggestion of the *ability* to do good work made here, carrying with it the less definite suggestion of the *obligation*, will in the natural course of things work out the desired result. Again, suppose the teacher wishes to teach the value of the accurate measurement of space dimensions, or more immediately to teach the use of the graduated measuring scale, having supplied his pupils with such rulers, he will in their presence use one of the rulers in determining the length and width of his desk or of a book, and then leave them free to measure such objects as present themselves to their convenience or fancy. A suggestive question as to the use that a carpenter can make of such a ruler will start a variety of exploring expeditions about the room. The composition by the pupils in the University Elementary School of simple songs, both words and music, is accomplished wholly through suggestion. The season of the year or the lesson in history furnishes the theme, and the tactful teacher guides by stimulating touch the creative work. The song is the expression of the life of the pupils themselves, felt by them to be so both in matter and form. It is the expression of genuine experiencing under the most unobtrusive guidance. In teaching various forms of intentional drawing, such as industrial designing, the *motif* presented by the teacher suggests a figure to be elaborated by the pupil. In elaborating the design the pupil feels the pleasure of creating and is scarcely conscious that he does not originate the entire work. The proper "assigning of a lesson" in any subject is a suggestion of possible ordered experiencing by the pupil. The judicious teacher starts a movement which the pupil completes in the natural functioning of his own powers. The life is touched suggestively, and interests are aroused which lead on to active endeavor in the subsequent private study. By a suitable "preliminary drill" the way is opened for earnest living in a new and wider field. In all true teaching the impetus to master the task set is found in the spontaneous life of the pupil, who simply *lives out* the suggestion given by the teacher.

What is known as "the power of example" is a mighty force in determining the life of the child. In the very simplicity of his life he is more open to suggestion than the adult person; and the circumstances of his life readily influence his actions. Some years ago Bishop Huntington, of New York, emphasized in a forcible manner the value of "unconscious tuition" in school work. In the opening sentences of the address he says:

By unconscious tuition I mean that part of a teacher's work which he does when he seems not to be doing anything at his work at all. It has appeared to me that some of the most nutritive and effective functions of an instructor are really performed while he seems least to be instructing. To apprehend these fugitive, subtle forces, playing through the business of education with such fine energy, and if possible to bring them within the range of practical dealing, is the scope of my present design.¹

Again on page 5 he says :

My main propositions are these three: first, that there is an educating power issuing from the teacher, not by voice or by immediate design, but silent and involuntary, as indispensable to his true function as any element in it; second, that this unconscious tuition is yet no product of caprice or of accident, but takes its quality from the undermost substance of the teacher's character; and, third, that, as it is an emanation flowing from the very spirit of his own life, so it is also an influence acting insensibly to form the life of the scholar.

To the fundamental conception of this address we can give most hearty assent. The teacher's work is most effective when he obtrudes himself least upon the personality of his pupil. It is what he gently suggests that is most fruitful in the lives of those whom he would guide. It is also true that the pupil *learns* much from suggestions originating in the example of his teacher, in which there is *no intentional guidance* at all. Thus strong belief and active life in the teacher beget like states in his pupils. The pupils imitate the tones, the gestures—all mannerisms—of the teacher, reproducing in their own lives, without conscious intention, the good and the bad alike of the teacher's life. It is not the external expression alone that they "copy;" the moral qualities of the teacher's life affect in a silent way their lives. As truly as masses of matter act upon each other by unseen forces, moral beings influence each other constantly through equally intangible means. The teacher who lives in the presence of the child *lives into* his life powerful factors for good or evil.

But the title chosen by Dr. Huntington seems a most unfortunate one for any strictly pedagogical interpretation of his thoughts. He designates the unintentional influence as "unconscious tuition," thus saying that a teacher can *teach* without "teaching." His expression is a contradiction. There cannot be *unconscious* "tuition." The word "tuition" is a word of essentially active signification, meaning to "care for," to "watch over" as a protector, hence actively to instruct in that which is most beneficial for the guarded life. All tuition must

¹ *Unconscious Tuition*, p. 3.

be *conscious* and *intentional*, however vague the aim be. It is the teacher's duty so to order his own life that all his actions may speak to his pupils for their good. Conscious that "like begets like," he must live as he would have his pupils live. He must participate sympathetically in their lives, so that his own stronger life may incite in them the impulses to higher living. We demand of the pastor not only that he shall teach his people by formal utterance how they ought to live, but also that his own life shall be a daily example of good living. Equally we demand of the teacher in our schools that his "walk and conversation" be consciously included in his means of teaching. Froebel's, "Come let us live with the children," has a deeper meaning than is usually found in it. It is in *living* with his pupils that the teacher teaches them to live. He takes them into partnership with him in this business of directing life's affairs. The true teacher is a senior partner in a firm whose business is *living*; and he shares equitably with his fellows the responsibilities and the profits. With Rousseau, though in a far higher sense than he ever conceived of, he can say, "To live is the trade I wish to teach my pupil;" and he can realize his desires by securing participation in the duties and pleasures of the life he wishes pupils to lead, thus leading them into life through life.

Study is consciously intensified mental activity directed toward a definite cognitive end. In its etymology, the word "study" means "to pursue eagerly." In study one pursues with more or less eagerness an experience which he seeks to realize. For example, the student of the declension of *penna* endeavors to intensify his mental life and to direct it toward the realization in his own consciousness of the formal succession of case forms. One may study without guidance, determining by reflection a phase of life upon which to fix persistently the attention and about which to concentrate his constructive abilities; but in childhood study is usually under the guidance of a teacher. Without study there can be no vigorous growth. It is only intense life that is healthy and that leads to strong character. To teach well is to incite to study, to intensify attention, and to secure the formation of habits of strenuous life. It is not enough merely to direct by suggestive touch a lazy current; true teaching accelerates the movement, converting the passive suffering of experiences into active seeking for them. The suggestive touch must be made so as not only to determine the direction of the life, but also to lead it to greater effort for self-realization.

The chief means of guiding study is the *recitation*. There is probably no word in the pedagogical terminology more abused than the word "recitation;" certainly there is no word whose current use is more at variance with the central conception of this thesis. The so-called "recitation" is too often artificially divorced from the vital movement of the acquisition of knowledge. It is conducted as a *testing* for the results of experiences already completed. Pupils are "examined" upon what they are supposed to have "learned" in previous "study." This inquisition degenerates into a barren performance upon the husks of knowledge, which is utterly devoid of any educational value. The "recitation period," instead of being a time of true experiencing under the stimulation and guidance of the teacher, is a *post mortem* examination into the facts of past life. In the true recitation, however, the teacher guides the life of his pupil to a more vigorous growth through suggesting materials and demanding expression. Such a recitation is related both to the previous "private study" and to that which is to follow. As a true life-epoch it supplements and corrects that which has taken place under the less immediate direction of the teacher; and, looking forward, it suggests image centers and starts processes of experiencing which may be carried on to completion by the pupil in his subsequent study alone. The recitation is thus, on the one side, a sort of intellectual clearing-house, and, on the other, a general "office hour" for the more immediate supervision of the study. In guiding his pupils in their study, which is the chief business of the teacher, the assigning of tasks and the examining of results are only incidental. The teacher is the guider of this eager endeavoring after complete living; and the recitation is the time when he can most effectually direct the zealous seeking for that which gives most life. The recitation is essentially *the study period* of the particular subject discussed, the time to be especially devoted to directing the study in that subject. Thus in the "geography recitation" geography should be *studied* under the immediate guidance and stimulation of the teacher, and all private study should be held subsidiary to the work of this more intense period. The preliminary questioning on the results of the preceding private study should be merely preparatory to the new advance now to be made; and by far more attention should be given to indicating fields to explore, *i. e.*, to "assigning the lesson," than to examining for results of the previous exploration. The expression of the recitation should always be the natural completion of *present* experiences; and even in "review" the experiences must be *new*. There is

no more serious error in all educational procedure than the attempt to warm into life the corpse of a past experience — to bring back again an experience that we have had. There should never be expression for expression's sake, but always as a manifestation of growth in its normal movement. So conducted the recitation becomes the true center of all school work, a real means of suggestive guidance.

Just as in the case of the word "recitation," the word "*school*" needs to be freed from a false connotation to reconcile it to the universality of our *law of suggestion*. A school, as the chief educational instrumentality, is commonly regarded as a place where immature persons are equipped for later life-functioning by gathering a certain fund of useful knowledge and acquiring a certain power of self-direction—in short, *a place where persons prepare to live*. No value is assigned to the school life as such ; it finds its significance solely in the preparation which it affords for a future hypothetical stage of existence. In such a view, one does not live in the school, but simply gets ready to live.

A school, defined with reference to the ideal of this essay, is a simplified form of social life—simplified by eliminating all that is negative and destructive, and by conserving and organizing all that is affirmative and constructive. In the school specially equipped and trained guides determine minds toward such normal growth as gives the fullest and most symmetrically organized life. The teacher, dealing with the actual present phase of the life, directs it in accordance with the continuous whole. Beginning in the possible present, he builds toward an ideal future, without, however, losing sight of the fact that this present is real life of value for itself. Whatever of life he desires for his pupils in the future he leads them to participate in under the simplified conditions of the present. Considering life as a continuous growth, he sees that the only preparation for any stage of it is to be found in the activities of the preceding stages. One stage prepares for another by furnishing the material basis and the motive for it ; and each stage is a cross-section of the whole life-current, concerned solely with its own experiences. In it the acquisition of materials and the organization of structure is for its own purposes, nothing being gathered that does not belong to the immediate present. The school is then a social organization for mutual assistance in the prosecution of studies under the leadership of a more mature member of the organization. It affords the best possible means of effective guidance through suggestion of desirable modes of functioning. In the true school the children *live* under the unobtrusive direction and stimulation of the teacher.

The *curricula* of the school, the organized body of available educative material, constitute a current in which the pupil's life is persistently confined by his teacher. The "branches of study" are so many phases of possible experiencing to be employed by the teacher in broadening and intensifying the life that he guides. Arithmetic, if employed rationally at all, is thought to afford definitely selected materials for suggesting certain desirable forms of experience. In the residua of race-experiencing preserved in the text-books the teacher has a mine of wealth for his educative needs. He selects the matter and presents it to his pupil with a view to influencing his life both in the immediate present and throughout its continued development. He does not attempt to "store up" *unlived* life-materials, but only to guide in the appropriation from the content of common consciousness of that which contributes to the individual life. The curriculum is thus a mediation of the environment designed for use in educative guidance.

It is in "*punishment*" that we find that function of the teacher, if indeed it be a function of the teacher, most at variance, both in theoretical conception and in current practice, with true educational guidance. In order to reconcile this negative element of educational procedure to our conception of guidance by suggestion, it will be necessary to discuss briefly three points: first, the general nature and function of punishment in the bettering of humanity; second, the common aims and methods of school punishments; and, third, the sense in which punishment may be made to contribute affirmatively to education.

Punishment is the intentional infliction of pain on a wrongdoer in recognition of his wrong acts. The essential element in punishment is *pain*, physical or mental. It must come as an opposing or disturbing element into the pleasure of life, temporarily interrupting and modifying its normal movement. It must also be intentionally applied. Pain unintentionally given to another is not punishment, however much it may appear to be retribution for wrong done. "Nature" does not punish, though we often speak of the suffering which one undergoes in consequence of an improper use of his physical environment as "nature's punishment." In such an expression there is doubtless always a more or less clearly defined personification of "nature," in which we regard *her* as *intentionally* inflicting a penalty for a wrong done. One person may, however, employ "natural consequences" as means of inflicting punishment on another, that is he may control natural reactions rationally for his own ends. Also a person may pun-

ish himself, by bringing about intentionally states of pain in himself in recognition of his own wrong acts and as a self-inflicted retribution. In all cases the sufferer of punishment must be recognized as a wrongdoer. Pain inflicted upon another is not punishment unless in recognition of wrong done. The sufferer may not actually be a wrongdoer, but he must be recognized as such by the inflictor of the punishment. Further, the pain must be considered to be in some sense a suitable reward for the wrong acts, a just return for specific evil deeds. The penalty is proportioned by the punisher to the extent of the wrong as seen by him—so much wrong, so much pain.

Writers upon ethics generally recognize three distinguishable ends of punishment: first, to prevent others from committing like offenses; second, to vindicate the law; and third, to educate or reform the offender. Sometimes the emphasis is laid upon one, sometimes upon another of these ends; but usually the first and second receive the stress, though the third is probably never wholly wanting in the doctrine of any modern writer. Paulsen states the prevalent view:¹ "The reform of the convict by *education* is not included in the purpose of punishment as such." On the other hand, Seth says:² "The end of punishment is to bring home to the man such a sense of guilt as shall work in him a deep repentance for the evil past, and a new obedience for the time to come." Also Plato, in *Protagoras*, Jowett's translation, 324 B, forcibly presents the educative end:

No one punishes an evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong—only the unreasonable fury of the beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished may be deterred from wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught.

This conception of Plato's is becoming more and more that of the best *modern* political and ethical thought. Vindictiveness and brutal revenge are giving place to a desire to make men better, both in the social body and in the individual man upon whom the punishment falls. It is no longer literally "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," though it still lacks much of "turning the other cheek to the smiter." The dominant ideas in punishment are still the "protection of society" and the "maintaining of the majesty of the law," with but little regard to reformation of the individual offender.

¹ *System of Ethics*, THILLV'S translation, p. 611.

² *A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 337.

In school punishments we have the same diversity of conception regarding the ends to be attained. For one teacher all his punishments are concerned primarily with "vindicating the majesty of the law;" for another, with securing the best conditions for his teaching through an arbitrarily superimposed government; and for still another, with correcting the wrong life through repentance following upon a realization of the evil done. One teacher is always watchful for infractions of "rules" for school behavior, either explicit formulations or implicit conventionalities; and on the discovery of such wrongs against authority he visits upon the offender punishment sufficient to heal the wounded dignity. Another, impressed with the idea that a certain degree of "order" is necessary for efficient work in "instructing in knowledge," employs punishment as a means of securing such an orderly state of his school, with little concern about its effect upon the lives of the individuals punished; the individual is, in fact, punished for the good of the community, as "an example." A third conceives punishment to be a sort of "counter-irritant," valuable as a means of relieving an internal congestion of "badness," a means of purging the moral life of its impurities. In schoolroom practice the punishment is too often a "squaring of the account." Offenses accumulate until, the patience of the teacher being exhausted, he endeavors at one fell swoop to deal out retribution "on general principles." In zealously "guarding the law" and in anxiously "keeping order" the teacher makes unnecessary issues with his pupils, in which the mastery is often won by brute force alone. This same artificial "governing" of the pupils gives rise to *threats of punishment* to be inflicted for anticipated wrong acts.

It should not be inferred that this is a true picture, either in theory or practice, of the punishment inflicted by *all* teachers; there is one here and there who in the spirit of true teaching has apprehended the real nature of this negative force in teaching and has learned to employ it in the building of character.

Whatever may be the theory of punishment in the state, or of divine punishment of disobedient man, "school punishment" is, by the very circumstances of its use, essentially *educational*. Every act of punishment in the school must be an educational act; its only excuse for being is that it may serve as a means of guiding the growing life of the child. Just as the nurseryman in the pruning of a tree cuts off a branch, not merely that he may remove it from the tree, but that he may thereby foster and accelerate the growth of the tree as a whole, so

the teacher uses punishment, a negative means, for an affirmative result in the life of his pupil. This can be accomplished only by making the state of pain in some way the starting-point for a healthy, pleasurable experience, that is, the punishment must be made to suggest an image for a constructive life-movement. This cannot be done by dwelling upon the wrong and its consequent painful results. Prolonged "sorrow for sin" is not a fruitful source of right living. Wood, in his *Studies in the Thought World*, page 168, puts this matter very clearly:

One cannot afford to think much about evil, even for the well-intentioned purpose of its suppression. The true remedy is its displacement. Thought-space given to it confers realism, familiarity, and finally dominion. To silence discordant strings in ourselves or others we must vibrate their opposites. To truly sympathize with a friend who is quivering with trouble or sorrow is not to drop into his rhythm and intensify it—as is usual—but to lift his consciousness by striking a higher chord in unison. The road to mental and physical invigoration lies through a dynamics of formative thought. Our way to elevate other lives is also through their creative mental energies.

It is difficult to formulate in definite statement the conception of punishment as a means of *suggestive guidance* to right living, not because of the uncertainty of the principle, but because the common thought of the race is thoroughly saturated by a totally different conception of the nature and use of punishment. What is contended for is that all school punishment shall lead over directly to the affirmative side, that the very pain itself shall blossom into the happiness attendant upon right living. No act of punishment can have a place in the school that is not definitely designed to lead to an experience of normal life-functioning. It is the teacher's business to *form* life, not to *reform* it, and every corrective measure must be essentially that of displacing the evil by the good. A simple example will help us see how this can be done.

A mother who was much distressed by a growing caprice and petulance in her little daughter watched for an opportunity to strengthen in her a habit of rational choice and patient consideration of possible lines of conduct. One day in the early spring, when some little friends were going for a short walk, the little girl was eager to join them. Her mother gave her consent, with the provision that she should put on a light jacket as protection against the cool air. The little maiden promptly said: "Then I will not go!" At which her mother stepped to the open window and said to the little friends waiting outside: "Jennie says she will not go today." The little girls went off

without Jennie, who pleaded in vain with her mother to be permitted to reconsider her hasty decision. The mother, though firm, was very gentle and carefully avoided any crimination or intensifying of the sense of loss. Her whole attitude indicated confidence in her little daughter's ability to order her life more rationally; and she carefully watched for an immediate opportunity to direct this aroused sense of a better nature to a constructive expression. This she found in a simple act of service. A magazine was to be carried to the grandmother in another room; the opportunity to do this for her was presented by the mother to her child; and an encouraging smile caused the awakened sense of ability and obligation to express itself in a definite act of rational self-determination. Thus the disappointment in itself was the image center out of which under gentle guidance a genuine experience of right living was built. The conception of wrong to self was the suggestion of a right line of future action. The mother so applied the punishment that its pain was chiefly in the feeling of self-inflicted injury to the true nature, to the better self, the selfish regret for the pleasure lost being a mere incident. The punishment was made simply the *occasion* of the beginning of a more vigorous life-movement. The wrong act was seen in contrast to the fulness of the true normal life, a discordant note in its harmony; and a right experience was suggested, which the mother wisely led to its completion in rationally determined expression.

In the example just given the punishment belongs to the class known as "natural consequences," as distinguished from "arbitrary punishments" in which the penalty has no causal connection with the wrong act. But even in this latter class it is possible to get affirmative results, though certainly it is more difficult to do. Suppose a little boy has persisted in disobedience until his father says: "Joe, you have not tried to do what I asked you to do. Now, tomorrow afternoon when we all go to the lake you cannot go with us. You must stay at home." Here the punishment has no immediate connection with the offense; and in order that it be educational in its effect, the child must have loving confidence in his father's benevolent attitude toward him and in his knowledge of what is just in penalty for wrong acts. With these conditions this wholly artificial penalty may be made to contribute to right living. It is here, as in the former example, merely a question of promptly leading the thought to the *ability* and the *obligation* to act in accordance with a newly recognized better nature. All punishment, to have any educational value, must be made to suggest indirectly

images for the affirmative reconstruction of experiences; and in the infliction of punishment the teacher must guide the pupil's thought immediately into normal channels. Punishment, like all true educational procedure, looks *forward*, not *backward*, and deals with present life with a view to its complete realization.

Should punishment be inflicted for the mere *neglect to do right*, where there is no overt act of "wrong"? In some cases it certainly should, being employed as a means of quickening the life-movement. The greater part of what is called "wrong" is only the negative of right life, due chiefly to *ignorance* of how one ought to live. The fundamental error in our attempts at "moral education" is demanding of children that they know on authority and accept without question our standards of right conduct, canons that we have realized in our own consciousness only through years of progressive experiencing. All educative punishment is *instructive*, giving clearer knowledge of the nature of right life. In punishment the teacher is to *teach* his pupil, in the dual sense of that word; that is, he is both to enlarge and to organize his pupil's life.

A still deeper question is: Is punishment a necessary means of education? Doubtless there are cases in which we must answer this in the affirmative; *but in the great majority of cases in which punishment is inflicted in the school and in the home it is not necessary*, and leads to destructive experiences. Its pain too often but further disturbs the life-current, which might otherwise be easily directed into a normal flow by immediate constructive guidance. Often the child's apparent stubbornness is only the lack of a proper center for right action. Dr. Carpenter¹ says:

A *suggestion* kindly and skilfully adapted to its [the child's] automatic nature, by directing the turbid current of thought and feeling into a smoother channel, and *guiding* the activity which it does not attempt to *oppose*, shall bring about the desired result, to the surprise alike of the baffled teacher, the passionate pupil and the perplexed bystanders.

Here we have the secret of all guidance, to lead from the evil by *leading toward the good*. What does it matter whether we leave unrequited the wrong acts, if we can secure the right life? It is not the wrong corrected, but the right done, that is the measure of the moral life. The physician does not labor to destroy the disease, but to make the man well. His motto, like that of the true teacher, is: Seize upon life wherever it may be found, and strengthen and develop it, thus leaving

¹ *Mental Physiology*, p. 135.

the weakness and the wrong to drop away under the accelerated movement of the healthy life.

A good example of this mode of treating wrong life is given in a story told by a matron of the reformatory at Elmira, N. Y. A woman who became an inmate of the institution appeared to be so indurated in her evil nature and malevolence as to care for no one and to have no healthy interest in anything about her. She seemed to be a veritable Ishmaelite in the loving atmosphere of that home, and no sympathetic advance met with any other response than the growl of an animal at bay. Her life had been so poisoned by man's inhumanity that she saw good in no one, and neither recognized nor expressed sympathy. For many days she lived—rather existed—in the midst of her physical and social environment without manifesting any normal life-interest that could be made a starting-point for a healthy growth. Without chiding or attempting to intrude into this barricaded, barren field, the matron waited patiently, watching for a sign of the real life which she had learned to expect somewhere in even the most warped and stunted characters. At last the door was found. The matron placed trays, in which some silkworms were at work in various stages of development, where the woman must pass them in the meaningless round of her daily life. For two or three days she passed indifferently by the active little workers and their loving friend. Then she stopped and contemptuously watched the matron tending to the wants of her little pets. At last curiosity forced her to ask what they were. To which the wise teacher, carefully concealing the hope which was aroused by this question, replied: "Oh they are only silkworms." Each day the woman came to watch the worms fed and cared for, with a growing interest that broke out from time to time in half-suppressed questions. The watchful teacher, biding her time, at last seizing the right opportunity, said one morning suddenly to her watcher: "Mary, I must go on an errand for a moment, to speak to a man about some work. Will you please take care of the worms while I am gone?" The ready assent and the sympathetic flash of light in Mary's eyes told the teacher that the victory had been won. *Life was found, and it only remained to guide it.* From this slender beginning Mary grew under loving guidance to true womanhood, a marked example of what affirmative teaching will accomplish where punishment in any form would only have intensified the existing evils. The first *suggestion* to better living came doubtless in seeing the earnest industry of the little worms. In them at least life appeared to be real and to have some meaning in its activi-

ties. Then the loving care of the matron for her helpless little charges *suggested* that one life is in some sense responsible for happiness in another and that all is not selfishness. Then there came, in the request for the slight service, a *suggestion* of personal worth recognized by another. Thus unobtrusively did one life kindle to a glow the dying embers of another. This is what may take place—what must take place; there is no other way—in the moral guidance of the schoolroom. The “bad boy” is made *good* by leading out to self-realization the germinant goodness of his normal humanity. Human beings are born to *live right*, and the guiding touch of the teacher may aid in *living*.

NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW.

The law of educative guidance, as formulated on page 31, carries with it two important negative implications: first, that there can be no education apart from suggestion; second, that there can be no education where there is no conscious reaction on the part of the pupil to the stimulation applied by the teacher. While the discussion of these two implied propositions is in effect a restatement from the negative side of the thought already presented in explanation and vindication of the law itself, such further defining and explication seems to be demanded in view of the muddy thought in vogue regarding educational principles.

One person cannot exert educative influence upon the life of another mechanically; that is, he cannot manipulate the factors of the life as he handles things in his material environment. He cannot dissolve a state of consciousness by the introduction of a reaction agent with the definiteness and certainty of a chemist. He cannot force into the life of another an element wholly foreign to it, and hence he cannot control that life *from without*. All his control must be exercised through elements found within the life itself and by means of the life's own normal activities. One may knock at the door, but he cannot force an entrance; it is only as the life itself gives him welcome that he can participate in it. The teacher cannot give his “knowledge” to his pupil; he can only express what he knows, *i. e., what he is*, in the hope that his pupil may be induced to know, *i. e., to be*, something similar in general content and form. A man's knowledge is himself, and it cannot be transferred, either *en masse* or in its elements, to another; also the pupil's knowledge is his own creation, the manifestation of his own life, and cannot be appropriated mechanically from the experiences of another. Each person's character is unique

in its individuality. It *grows* naturally through simple life-functioning and cannot be *made* by external manipulation. Our law, then, on the negative side means this: *There can be no change wrought in the life of another by any other means than the suggestion of image centers to be realized in complete experiencing by the self-determined action of the life itself.*

Even by suggestion we cannot make of the life of another anything we will to make. We can at most only *modify* the life in an indirect and partial manner. The teacher does not deal with the life of his pupil as a potter with his clay, but more as a machinist with the force of gravity. He accepts and utilizes forces that he cannot create or destroy. He is powerless to do more than to direct in a general way the character-forming process. Into the contending multitude of experience centers he brings by suggestion his mite of life-value, and can only watch hopefully that it may not be wholly smothered in the surging mass. He does not begin his work with a *tabula rasa* of an absolutely unformed life-structure, to educate *ab initio* in the life-process. Hereditary bias has already determined, in large measure, what the life shall be, and his work as an educator is merely to modify as rationally as he can that which he cannot successfully oppose or re-create. The tendencies and habitual states which the pupil has inherited from his ancestors constitute already at birth a certain character which stubbornly resists the teacher's interference. He must reckon with this, and content himself with *improving* it by gentle guidance. The environment of the pupil's life is also a powerful force to which the teacher must adapt his educational ideals and methods. The child's physical and social environment touches his life at a thousand points, starting myriads of experiences that are wholly beyond the teacher's knowledge and ability to control for educational ends. It is, besides, from this same environment that he is to take the educative materials which he employs in his intentional enriching and directing of his pupil's life. He is limited to the use of the materials at hand, and cannot at will import from other fields of life that which his ideal would indicate to be the most desirable. Hence we see again that the teacher's function, while noble in its conception, is in its realization narrowed to a comparatively small field. *He can only guide the existing life by unobtrusive suggestive touch.*

There can be no educative guidance without *reaction by the pupil*. This idea is involved in the very term "educative guidance." Only that which has independent motion can be "guided." To guide is to

point out the way to a moving body, to direct in a determined course; and that which is so piloted and directed must have motion, given to it by some power which can be distinguished from the directing power. A shuttle can be guided through the warp; a horse may be guided along the highway; or a bicycle may be guided by a force clearly distinguishable from the propelling force. A merely inert thing, in a state of rest, cannot be guided; there is nothing to guide. The perfectly passive object may be propelled, but it cannot while passive be guided. That which is guided must not only be in action, but it must also be possible to modify that action by the new force applied. In the case of the self-active mind, this modifiability must of necessity consist in the conscious adaptation of the mind itself to the new circumstance. To direct the development of the life of another person is to determine an internal state by external touch; it is to cause the conscious propelling force to manifest itself in a new direction. Hence the educative guidance is accomplished through the conscious response which the pupil's life makes to the suggestive touch. The teacher brings to the self-active and self-determined life an interesting fact; and the life reacts upon it by modifying its own movement so as to incorporate the new element. Life in all its forms progresses chiefly by responding to stimulation from without. In education the stimulus is rationally applied by another for the purpose of securing the response. It is the response, not the stimulus, that contributes to the development. To guide educationally is to secure such reactions to the chosen stimuli as will lead to fuller and more vigorous life.

There can be no "suggestion" without a "reaction," that is, a fact becomes a suggestion only through the reaction which it stimulates. To suggest to another is to so touch his life with the chosen materials as to cause him to accept it *actively* as something desired in his life, *to cause him to react upon it*. It is not the food selected in the market, or prepared in the kitchen, that *nourishes* the man; it is what he appropriates at the table. While good "service" has much to do with feeding the body, it is, after all, the appetite and digestion of the eater that gives the desired growth. Though this idea of active appropriation is implicit in all educational theory, it has seldom received the emphasis which its importance demands, and in practice it is often wholly forgotten. Even in this day in which "apperception" has become a familiar term in our pedagogical literature, we are still far from recognizing its real significance in the teaching process. The great majority of teachers in all grades of instruction—elementary,

secondary, and higher—act as if to teach were to dispose of certain educational materials by a systematic and forceful presentation to the pupils. The current conception, however vaguely held, appears to be that to know clearly the “knowledge” to be imparted and have certain acquaintance with devices of “method” is to be fully equipped for success in teaching. So qualified, the teacher needs but to present the knowledge according to the recognized rules of his art; the desired result is sure to follow. Teaching is thus viewed solely from the side of the teacher, who is thought to be able to introduce into the life of a tractable pupil elements at will. But our law negatively implies that this cannot be the case; in it the words “and reaction” were added to emphasize the pupil’s part in the act of suggestion. In teaching the teacher’s eye should be upon the life-movement of his pupil, watching for the *reaction*. To teach is to instruct through the normal reactions of the pupil.

PEDAGOGICAL CONCLUSIONS.

There are three important pedagogical truths that may be deduced directly from this law of education through suggestion: first, education is strictly an affirmative process; second, it is purely a personal matter; and, third, its goal is character, not mere “knowledge” or “ability.” These three formal propositions are basal articles of an educational creed, a warp of fundamental truths into which one may weave his whole pedagogical theory. To accept them as “a living faith” is to establish rational character as a teacher, and to transform spasmodic action into systematic procedure. Each proposition has its own distinctive value and importance, which we must now briefly set forth.

Education is affirmative in its *aim*, in its *means*, and in its *methods*. The teacher seeks to secure a positive result in the life of his pupil. It is his wish to guide the child to the realization of the possibilities of his humanity. “To prepare us for complete living is the function which education has to discharge.”¹ While the child would naturally attain to a degree of life unaided, it is possible by right guidance to lead him into a fuller life. The aim of education is to give more life. The world’s greatest Teacher spoke of his work thus: “I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly” (John 10:10).

The means of education are positive life-factors. It is the function of the teacher to stimulate the child to more vigorous and more

¹ SPENCER, *Education*, p. 31, first edition.

rationally ordered living. This he does by employing the materials of life itself, materials found in the child's contact with the physical and social environment. The accumulated results of race-experiences found in the social consciousness are a ready fund for the teacher's use. What man has lived through in constructive growth is available material for enhancing the growth of this "heir of all the ages." The various "branches of study," the differentiated sciences, are food for human life. Their preserved and logically organized truths are to be *experienced* anew by the pupil under the stimulative guidance of his teacher. Thus from the actual experiences of man, from his normal life-movements, are to be selected the educative materials for the teacher's use. He uses life to form life.

All true educative method is affirmative. It consists essentially in guiding existing life, seeking to reach fulness of life by developing the life that already is in germ at least. Just as it is no part of the teacher's work to create life, so it is not at all his business to check life or to destroy it. To "convert" one, intellectually at least, is not to reverse the current of his life, but to guide it in a more rational flow. The teacher is to *aid* his pupil in living. He is to make life easier for him, to assist him in appropriating life-materials and in building his life-structure. It is not enough that the teacher shall point out where the materials lie and later "test" to see whether they have been appropriated. Such general supervision lacks an essential element of true teaching; it furnishes no immediate aid to the builder. There is an unreasonable opposition among teachers, in their theoretical utterances at least, to "aiding pupils in their work," evidently born of a fear that "the teacher may do the pupil's work for him." There is underneath this the absurd assumption that the teacher may experience for his pupil and present to him in some form the results. This is manifestly false from any rational psychological conception of the cognitive process. All the "results" of life that anyone can have are simply what he himself has *lived through*. *It is the teacher's sole function to aid the pupil in living*; that is all that he can do. This aiding is always in the last analysis positive direction of the life-forces through *affirmative suggestion*. The true teacher gives freely to the life, struggling for self-realization, the ideals and the material for a noble structure and sympathetically aids the architect.

Education is purely a personal matter. It is the influence of one person upon another with a view to improving his life. The teacher acknowledges his pupil's personality; that is, he treats him as a peer

in the realm of self-determined living. His attitude toward him is that toward a subject to be acknowledged and reckoned with, not toward a thing to be manipulated ; consequently his work is that of sympathetic co-operation, not of external control.

Pedagogy is essentially an ethical science, dealing with right conduct of the teacher in his relation to his pupil. It is normative, treating of how the teacher as such ought to act toward his pupil in order to secure for him the most complete life. The teacher, with a high ideal of what his pupil's life ought to be and a clear conception of the possibility of guiding that life toward such ideal end, seeks ethically to order his own life for educational purposes. The fundamental question is one of *ideal conduct* by the teacher with specific reference to its influence on his pupil. It is with the rightness or wrongness of the teacher's life *as a teacher* that the norms of educational science have to do. Also the pupil's conduct *as a pupil* must be ethically *right*. The two parties are to live right with each other under the peculiar relations of teacher and taught, each recognizing the personality of the other and accommodating his own life to it. Pedagogy is a "practical science" in the sense which Mackenzie¹ gives to that term: "A science, it is said, teaches us *to know*, and an art *to do*; but a practical science teaches us *to know how to do*." Pedagogy is the practical science of the teacher's conduct as a teacher.

Teaching is necessarily individual in its character. The teacher cannot teach a "class" *en masse*; the class as such has no personal life to guide. While it must be admitted that the best teaching is done with pupils associated in classes, the true teacher does not on that account overlook the characteristic feature of his own function, namely, to guide the life of the individual pupil to its highest realization ; he simply individualizes his teaching ; that is, he guides individual life in the social class relation. In all teaching there are but two parties immediately concerned ; a teacher and a pupil. The *social atmosphere* of the class and the *educative material* employed are alike incidents of the work of the guiding of one life by the sympathetic participation of another.

The teacher is *ipso facto* a fellow-student. He guides his pupil in living by living himself. He cannot direct his pupil's experience except through his own *immediate* experience. It is his life-current that touches the life-current of his pupil, flowing into it and modifying it by its very vital force itself. He "lives with his pupil," participating

¹ *Manual of Ethics*, p. 11.

in his life and contributing to it from his own fuller life. The pupil returns life for life, entering in a very important way into the daily experiences of his teacher, so that it may be truly said that not only does the teacher live on an ever-widening life in the lives of his pupils, but also the pupils live in the life of the teacher. The contact of the two lives in the schoolroom is characterized by a reciprocal interaction that should contribute to the bettering of both lives. The teacher as the stronger force, however, may intentionally determine the general character of the resultant—not only the character of his influence upon his pupil, but also indirectly the influence of his pupil upon himself. He may so order his own experiences and so control his pupil's experiences as to enrich and strengthen both lives; but he cannot direct his pupil's life educationally without participating in that life. *He cannot show another how to live without living himself.*

Not mere "knowledge" or "ability," but *character* is the final goal of *all* true educational effort. Education has a definite unified aim, which is the same for all children. If the aim were knowledge as such, it would be diversified; for there are *many knowledges*, many forms of knowing arising in the various circumstances of human life. One would seek one knowledge as essential for a mercantile life; another, for a military life; another, for a professional life; and so on, each avocation demanding its peculiar "knowledge," and hence giving a separate educational aim. Similarly, if the aim were "ability," granting that it can be distinguished from knowledge, there would still be as many separate aims as there are abilities to do particular works, each skill furnishing for its craftsman a definite educational aim. In the naïve view this would seem to be the natural and desirable function of education; each man should be prepared by special development for the particular part which he is to perform in the social body. In this way not only the best social service would be secured, but also the greatest enjoyment of life for the individual. But this is only a superficial view of the matter; education is essentially one in its aim. It may be directed to a definitely conceived common end for all men, and yet be applicable to all forms of human activity, and even to all shades of individual personality. In fact, it is only such a unified aim that can give to *all* education serious purpose and make the teacher's work most fruitful in his pupil's life. It is the high ideal that lifts the imperfect and commonplace into perfect realization.

Laurie has said that: "The aim of education is always an ideal aim, for it contemplates the completion of a man—the realization in

each man of what each has in him to become." Herbart defined such an aim more definitely as "the development of moral character." "Good character" in the Herbartian sense may be defined as *such an integrity of life as enables the person wisely to direct all his experiences for his own good and the blessing of his fellow-man*—a life fitted for "every good word and work." With such an aim the teacher would endeavor, not only to develop each pupil in accordance with his life-needs and capacities, but—what is far higher—would strive to secure in him a realization of true manhood. "*Let him first be a man,*" should be the watchword of the teacher. The aim of education is thus *organic*, not acquisitive; it seeks to help one *to be*, not *to have*. Its end is not only integrity, but fulness of life—not only a well-organized and definitely centered life, but "a many-sided life." Such an education produces what President Thwing has characterized as "not narrow specialists, but broad men sharpened to a point."

The immediate aim of education is *present* character for present life. It seeks to actualize the potentialities of the present stage of life as a means of realizing the whole possibilities of the life. *Complete living* in the whole life is to be attained to by daily approximations in the actual present of that life. By guiding *suggestively* the growth of the present the perfect stature of the whole is secured.



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Explanatory Note.—In selecting from the mass of "references" accumulated during the preparatory reading for this thesis such bibliography as will be helpful to another who cares to investigate the subject, it has not been the aim to restrict the list rigorously to books and articles that support the position taken by the writer. The publications in the first division show the current views of the function of suggestion in the development of human life, though by no means all of those enumerated definitely treat of normal suggestion. The presence of so many titles concerning suggestion in abnormal life shows how little the real field of the thesis has been worked. The conception of *affirmative guidance* in education characterizes the writings of the second division, though in general they contain little explicit reference to *suggestion* as the means of such guidance. The list could be much extended, but the books and articles named are fairly typical. In the third list are cited the few sources in which there is some definite statement regarding education through suggestion. There are doubtless more, but only these were accessible to the writer. The order of the titles has no significance.

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