

IMPEDIMENT OF TASK OF NATION BUILDING IN ALGERIA: A LESSON FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT**BY****YAKUBU ADAMU****DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY****JIGAWA STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, GUMEL****TEL: 0802 423 2550, 08186247065****EMAIL ADDRESS: yakubuadamu227@gmail.com****Abstract**

Nation-building is a critical process in the establishment of stable, unified states, yet it is often hindered by a variety of challenges. This paper provides a critical analysis of the key impediments to effective nation-building, emphasizing the complex interplay of political, social, economic, and cultural factors. It explores internal obstacles such as ethnic and sectarian conflicts, political fragmentation, weak institutions, corruption, and social inequality, all of which undermine efforts to create cohesive national identities and sustainable governance. The paper also examines the role of external influences, including international interventions, foreign aid, and globalization, which can either support or obstruct the nation-building process in Algeria which can serve as a lesson for African development. By drawing on case studies from diverse geopolitical contexts, this analysis seeks to identify strategies for overcoming these barriers, ultimately contributing to a more nuanced understanding of the nation-building process and the creation of resilient, inclusive states in Africa at large.

Keyword: Nation-Building, Impediments, ethnic conflicts, corruption, war governors, inequality, external interference

Introduction

Nation-building can involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and economic growth. According to Columbia University sociologist Andreas Wimmer, three factors tend to determine the success of nation-building over the long-run: "the early development of civil-society organizations, the rise of a state capable of providing public goods evenly across a territory, and the emergence of a shared medium of communication."

Overview

In the modern era, nation-building referred to the efforts of newly independent nations, to establish trusted institutions of national government, education, military defiance, elections, land registry, import customs, foreign trade, foreign diplomacy, banking, finance, taxation, company registration, police, law, courts, healthcare, citizenship, citizen rights and liberties, marriage registry, birth registry, immigration, transport infrastructure and/or municipal governance

charters. Nation-building can also include attempts to redefine the populace of territories that had been carved out by colonial powers or empires without regard to ethnic, religious, or other boundaries, as in Africa and the Balkans. These reformed states could then become viable and coherent national entities.

Nation-building also includes the creation of national paraphernalia such as flags, coats of arms, anthems, national days, national stadiums, national airlines, national languages, and national myths. At a deeper level, national identity may be deliberately constructed by molding different ethnic groups into a nation, especially since in many newly established states colonial practices of divide and rule had resulted in ethnically heterogeneous populations.

In a functional understanding of nation-building, both economic and social factors are seen as influential. The development of nation-states in different times and places is influenced by differing conditions. It has been suggested that elites and masses in Great Britain, France, and the United States slowly grew to identify with each other as those states were established and that nationalism developed as more people were able to participate politically and to receive public goods in exchange for taxes. The more recent development of nation-states in geographically diverse, postcolonial areas may not be comparable due to differences in underlying conditions.

Definitions of Nation Building

Stephenson, has observed, “Nation – building is a normative concept that means different things to different people.”¹ For example, some see it as the historical evolutionary act of ‘forming a nation’. Others perceive it as a process of creating a common national identity where none existed previously, as in the case of after war and conquest, or as in the efforts of “nationalists” to turn post-colonial countries at independence into cohesive “nation-states” with citizenship of the colonially created, but now “independent” country as the over-riding national identity. Yet another meaning, of more recent origin, assumes that “Nation-building programs are those in which dysfunctional or unstable or ‘failed states or economies are given assistance in the development of governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as economic assistance, in order to increase stability”.² Alesina and Reich³ have defined nation building “as a process which leads to the formation of countries in which the citizens feel a sufficient amount of commonality of interests, goals and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from each other.

The concept of nation building signifies efforts to construct a national identity tied to citizenship of a sovereign state/country; it is an identity, which is then viewed as the superior and most important of all the multiple identities that people in a country may have. Thus, nation building is about turning people within a sovereign state as conscious citizens, proud of their country, obedient to a body of national laws often codified in a constitution and other forms of

¹ Stephenson, C., Nation Building, https://www.beyondinteractivity.org/essay/nation_building/%3B, January, 2005.

² Ibid.

³ Gambari, I.A. “The challenges of the Nation Building: The case of Nigeria”. First Year Anniversary Lecture, Mustapha Akanbe Foundation. Abuja. Nigeria, 2008.

legislation, committed to their country's progress as well as its protection and defense, and ready to recognize others as citizens of equal stature, regardless of other differences, such as of ethnic, linguistic background, race or religion.

Nation building is a process that evolves over time and is consolidated by effective leadership that is passionately national in orientation, rather than subservient to primordial affiliations. As Gambari has observed, "nations are built by exemplary men and women and sustained by institutions that promote good governance and socio-economic development". It can be added that nations are built by courageous, selfless and visionary leaders or nationalists who have a vision of a one, united, integrated community as citizens of a given country with a common purpose.

Nation building is a slow process, which evolves with incremental positive changes in the construction of a single national identity. It requires resilience, persistence and consistency. As the experience of the USA clearly shows, it is a process that can begin to yield dividends only in about 100 years of determined effort, in spite of threats of, and attempts at, disintegration. Now, in the African context, nation building is used to refer to efforts of leaders of newly independent nation-states to redefine the populace with a single identity, of citizenship, regardless of ethnic, religious and other identities, so that they assume a coherent national identity.⁴ Thus, nation building can be defined as the striving for constructing or defining a national identity using the machinery and power of the state. It is said to be aimed at "unification of people with the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run". Also, it is about developing a cohesive national community through governmental programs and policies for "national unity" or "national integration" amidst complex diversity and multiplicity of contending identities.

Challenges of Nation Building

The processes of "national integration" espoused and pursued by many African nationalist leaders in the post-colonial period were basically impositions from above, in their haste to quickly turn their countries in to "nations" essentially in the image of their former colonial masters. Tribalism and ethnicity are seen as negative things, which have to be abolished or suppressed. Given this, many strategies for forging "national unity" were essentially suppressive of freedom of association, etc. Having not been inclusive and not making haste slowly, many "nationalists" in government mostly failed in their "national integration" projects. They failed to either merge, or bridge the "two publics" created under colonialism⁵. Indeed, many, pursued governmental policies and project, which essentially favored their communities, or ethnic or religious groups, to the exclusion of those defined as "others". Politics, and governance, essentially became an "us" versus "them" phenomenon.

Algeria

At first glance, Algeria gives the impression of a country that has succeeded in bypassing the turmoil of the Arab Awakening that has rocked the Middle East over the last two years. Social unrest appears to be largely under control. The country is enjoying a large current account surplus, a limited budget deficit, and very low external debt. Recent

⁴ Theoretical Statement, Comparative Studies in Society in History, Vol 17, No1, January, 2016, PP. 91-112.

⁵ A. Alesina, and B. Reich., "Nation-Building" Colonialism and the Politics in Africa. Unpublished. 2015.pp19-75.

parliamentary elections were conducted without interruption and were officially open to participation by all political parties. But despite this reassuring veneer, many of the social, economic, and political challenges that triggered uprisings in neighboring North African countries fester just beneath the surface in Algeria. The government in Algiers staves off unrest by relying on its large hydrocarbon revenues to finance a redistribution system that buys the regime quiescence and loyalty from key constituencies while leaving the bulk of the population in misery. But this system cannot be sustained indefinitely. If left untreated, latent grievances threaten to rapidly escalate into political demands and jeopardize the regime's stability. Although it adheres to the formal procedures of a multiparty system, Algeria has been run since its independence in 1962 by a single party—the National Liberation Front (FLN). From the beginning of the country's struggle for liberation, the FLN nurtured intimate connections to the Algerian intelligence services and armed forces. This proximity underpinned the military's dominance over political institutions, which was exercised through protection and control of the country's political leadership. Indeed, rather than allow an Islamist opposition party to win Algeria's first multiparty vote in 1991, which it was poised to do, the military canceled the election altogether and imposed a state of emergency, sparking a decade of bloodletting.⁶

Political discontent is reinforced by deep economic, social, and regional imbalances in the country. Most Algerians have experienced a decline in the quality of basic social services, including education and healthcare. Unemployment is high as much as 21.5 percent among young people aged fifteen to twenty-four. Most jobs created during the past decade are precarious, poorly paid, and offer no benefits. But people are not just upset about their economic misfortune. There is also simmering, palpable resentment for a social pact that rewards a small network of insiders and enables them to act with impunity to divert public resources to their own private gain. Growing numbers of Algerians object to what they perceive as the acutely inequitable way the hydrocarbon revenues are distributed. Despite paying lip service to reform and diversification, consecutive governments have failed to break the economy's excessive dependence on the global market for oil and gas. They have also neglected to create a policy and regulatory environment that encourages entrepreneurship, private investment, and economic diversification—all of which are necessary for Algeria's long-term economic growth and stability. As a result, the energy sector continues to account for more than one-third of Algeria's gross domestic product (GDP), two-thirds of government revenues, and nearly 98 percent of exports. Yet, medium- and long-term trajectories of hydrocarbon production and consumption in Algeria indicate that this revenue stream is diminishing quickly in proportion to GDP, and no new sources of economic opportunity are being created to fill the gap. And if domestic hydrocarbon consumption continues to grow at its current rate, Algeria will be exporting only gas by 2023 and importing oil. It could become a net hydrocarbon importer by 2026, exposing the country to real risks of economic and political dislocation.⁷

In order to avert serious domestic instability, Algeria's authorities need to conduct a managed but real political and economic transition before the country's energy resources run out.

⁶ M. Harris, *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, P.17

⁷ Ibid. P.30

Conditions Fueling Discontent

Algerians harbor many of the grievances that triggered turmoil among populations in neighboring states. Foremost among these are complaints about the corrupt and opaque regime and a growing, disgruntled and disproportionately unemployed youth population.

Widespread Corruption and Lack of Transparency

Endemic corruption and nepotism have been at the root of the Arab uprisings. In every demonstration across the region, protesters have chanted anticorruption slogans and denounced the privileges unfairly captured by a small clique of high-ranking officials and their connections in the business sector at the expense of ordinary citizens. Corruption is no less a factor in Algeria. On Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perception Index, which ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be, Algeria ranks 105 out of 176 countries worldwide and twelve out of seventeen countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

The country ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2004—albeit with reservations—and adopted a corruption prevention law in 2006. In the same year, it established the National Commission for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption. Yet, the president did not appoint the commission's seven members until 2010, and it has yet to achieve any results. Indeed, most of these anticorruption commitments have been substantively empty.

Algeria suffers from “grand corruption,” in which leaders at high levels of government, such as high-ranking public officials and top management of state-owned enterprises, abuse their power to benefit themselves at the public's expense. It also faces “petty corruption,” or everyday abuse of power, by low- and mid-level bureaucrats among both the central administration and local authorities. Grand corruption manifests itself through crony awards of public-works contracts. Accusations are rife in the Algerian media that foreign companies have been paying massive bribes to political figures and highly ranked bureaucrats to secure contracts. This has been the case with building the East-West Highway, a \$12 billion project to construct a six-lane highway spanning over 755 miles across the country. It is one of the biggest infrastructure projects Algeria has ever undertaken, and investigators have uncovered a system of kickbacks and illegal commissions involving the country's security services and senior officials in the Ministry of Public Works.⁸

This corruption has not gone unnoticed, and many state officials and public company directors have been prosecuted for their transgressions. In 2007, Algeria Telecom, the national telecommunications company, was prosecuted for squandering public funds. In 2009, the leaders of the Department of Fish and Fisheries came under fire for influence peddling and illegal fishing, the National Bank was accused of granting sweetheart loans without sufficient collateral, and the investigation of the Ministry of Public Works for procurement fraud during construction of the East-West Highway began. But these sorts of prosecutions are rarely conducted in good faith. Often orchestrated from inside the

⁸ A. Wimmer., *Nation Building*, Princeton University Press. 2008.

regime, they usually reflect the struggle for power among different ruling elites or between individual members of the same elite. Algeria also receives poor marks when it comes to budget transparency. In the Open Budget Initiative's 2010 survey, which evaluates whether governments give their publics access to budget information, Algeria received a score of one out of 100. The average score for the Middle Eastern and North African region was 2.3⁹

The constitution stipulates that the parliament controls the government's budget. In the last three decades, however, budget laws have been enacted without parliamentary scrutiny. Whenever the parliament fails to adopt the budget within the seventy-five days mandated by the constitution, the president can issue it by decree. The Algerian Court of Audit is, in principle, in charge of auditing the government's budget and the financial accounts of state-owned enterprises and submitting a yearly report to the president. In practice, however, auditing is rarely completed and audit reports are rarely made public. The court does not inspect hydrocarbon taxes, and Sonatrach does not publish audited financial reports. The Revenue Watch Index, which assesses revenue transparency of 41 resource-rich countries, ranked Algeria 38 in its 2011 edition, placing it behind all other oil-rich countries in the region.

Youth Unemployment and Marginalization

The total population of Algeria was estimated at 37 million inhabitants in 2012, compared to 18.8 million in 1980. Given its rapid average growth rate— 1.5 percent per year compared to 1.2 percent in Morocco and 1.08 percent in Tunisia—Algeria's population is expected to exceed 40 million by 2020, with those less than thirty-four years of age representing 68 percent of the total population. Algeria's population has also grown more educated, with an average of seven years of schooling now up from less than two years in 1980, and become more urbanized, with 72 percent of Algerians living in cities compared to 44 percent in the early 1980s. These factors increase expectations for jobs and decent housing and could trigger widespread dissatisfaction that may contribute to social unrest.¹⁰

Many Algerian youth compare themselves to the young people in neighboring countries who have been the vanguards of change. Globalization and exposure to worldwide media have increased their expectations regarding individual liberties, dignity, and social justice. As in the rest of the region, Algerian youth suffer more than adults from high unemployment rates and the absence of economic opportunities. Unemployment in 2010 among recent university graduates was as high as 30 percent, and youth account for three-quarters of unemployed Algerians. There has been a decline in unemployment in the last decade, but it has gone hand in hand with a growing preponderance of underemployment, temporary jobs, and informal-sector activities. As the official unemployment rate dropped from 30 to roughly 10 percent over the last decade, the share of temporary jobs increased. Fifty percent of jobs created during the period 2005–2010 were temporary, compared to 30 percent of the jobs created during the 1990s and 20 percent before the 1990s. Two factors help explain this development. The first is the emergence of a large number of micro- and small enterprises (with fewer than ten employees). The second is the declining government role in job creation.

⁹ A. Jega and H. Wakili, et.al, *Democracy and Democratization in Nigeria*", Mumbayya House, Centre for Democratic Research and Training, 2002.

¹⁰ Ibid

But employment alone is no guarantee of satisfaction. A recent survey by Algeria's National Office of Statistics revealed that one-third of employed people are looking for another job either because their current job is unstable (six out of ten cases) or poorly paid (three out of ten cases). Unemployment and poor job quality represent just one facet of the marginalization and hopelessness felt by a wide swath of Algerian youth.

Algerians often experience political exclusion, and the country lacks an open political system or effective civil society organizations that would channel people's grievances.

Self-immolation is widely understood in Algeria as a reaction to humiliation, *hogra* in the Algerian dialect, and the exclusion of the nation's population from political and economic life by a privileged few.¹¹ There are no accurate figures on Algerian cases of self-immolation. Scattered reports, however, point to more than a dozen instances since the beginning of 2011.

The number of illegal migrants trying to flee to France or other countries on the north Mediterranean coast has also been rising since the late 1990s. As part of the country's talks with European countries on border control and visa facilitation, the Algerian parliament issued a law in 2009 that punishes any national or foreign resident leaving the country in a fraudulent or clandestine manner. The punishment ranges from two to six months of imprisonment and a fine of between \$250 and \$750.¹² Despite these measures and the dangers illegal migration involves, many continue to take the chance rather than remain in the country. In 2010 alone, the Spanish authorities expelled more than 1,400 Algerians who had entered the country illegally.

Bubbling Tensions

Algeria has all of the factors that have combined to fuel dramatic revolts in neighboring countries, many of which continue in parts of the Arab world to this day. And yet, no sustained Algerian uprising took place. Protests did erupt in Algeria in January 2011, almost at the same time as they did in Tunisia and Egypt. But the government responded quickly and, in the near term at least, far more effectively than governments in neighboring countries. The government's on February 2011 took a decision to repeal the state of emergency was designed to restore calm and show its willingness to reform. But police presence on the streets remained substantially unchanged, and a ban on protest marches in the capital continued. A national commission on political reform was launched in May, 11 but the impact was similarly negligible. The commission met with more than 200 statesmen, political party members, and leaders from civil society associations. Participation, however, was limited to regime insiders with little credibility.¹³ Some prominent former officials and political leaders from Islamist, secular, and leftist opposition parties boycotted the consultation process, and protesters and opposition figures criticized it for not being inclusive. Indeed, despite early hopes that the regime might be serious in its approach to political reform, most opposition activists soon concluded

¹¹ H. Wills. *An introduction to the History of Central Africa, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe*, 4th Edition, Oxford University Press, 1987.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ S. K. Kula, *From Colonialism to Independent*, Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau.

that, the process was designed to buy time and implement only cosmetic reforms while the main elements of authoritarian government persisted. And still, despite widespread disappointment, there has been no uprising.

ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1954-1962

Algeria is a North African country that was colonized by the French in 1830 up to 1962 when she obtained her independence. During the 132 years of French colonialism, a number of French settlers poured into Algeria and greatly infringed on the political, social and religious rights of the indigenous Algerians-the Berbers and Arabs. They introduced a policy of assimilation by which the educated Algerians or “evolutes” were proud to behave like French men and promote French culture. Even Ferhat Abbas, one of the most outspoken Algerian nationalists originally loved and promoted French rule, culture and progress.

However, the oppressive, exploitative, monopolistic and discriminative colonial policies of the French soon stirred feelings of discontent amongst the Algerians. Accordingly, between 1954-1962 Algerians Nationalism expressed its self in form of a militant war of Liberation.¹⁴ Negotiations had failed, the patience of Algerians had run out and soldiers no longer had time for the battle of words.

CAUSES OF THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (ALGERIAN REVOLUTION)

1. The desire for independence provoked the Algerians into war against the French. The French conquest of Algeria had been so violent and was accompanied by a suppression of the authority of traditional Moslem rulers in Algeria. All the top posts in administration, in the army and police were occupied by French settlers/colons, The traditional Muslim leaders who had lost powers of decision making mobilized the Algerians to fight against French political domination.

2. Land alienation. French colonialism was immediately resisted by Abdel Kader and others. To contain the rebellions of the Algerian Moslems at the time, the French government encouraged the immigration of a number of French settlers into Algeria. These settlers grabbed Algerian land especially along the coast and pushed the natives into less productive reserves desert lands. Other Algerians were turned into mere squatters on their land. The Algerian war of liberation became inevitable.

3. The French intentions of retaining Algeria as a white man's country fanned Algerian nationalism. After the Second World War, France started preparing her colonies such as Indo-China, Morocco and Tunisia for independence. However, no plans were made for Algeria. Popular opinion in France was that Algeria had to be turned into a white man's country.

“November 1954, the French Prime Minister Pierre- Mende S- France told the parliamentarians: “The departments of Algeria have been French for so long and the situation cannot be altered. Algeria is France.”¹⁵

¹⁴ G. B. Nsamba, “Modern African Nationalism 1935 to Present. Kampala Lubiri Press, 2008, pp.235-245.

¹⁵ Ibid. p237.

On 9h February 1956, his successor Guy Mollet said in a broad cast “France will remain present in Algeria...”

Earlier in January 1955 the governor general of Algeria- Jacques Soustelle said “**whatever happens, the destiny of Algeria is French**” such French intentions of turning Algeria into part of France annoyed the Algerian nationalists and drove them into a war of independence.

4. Forced labor. The settlers from France, Alsace, Lorraine, Malta established large commercial plantations and forced the native Algerians pain them without pay. This was exploitation of both Algerian land and labor. While exploiting Algerian labor, the French became very brutal, abusing and canning the lazy Algerians. By November 1954, this Was no longer tolerable. Hence the militant war of independence.

5. Heavy taxation. Taxes were high and methods of tax collection very harsh. Most of the money from the high taxes didn't benefit the Algerian taxpayers, rather, the corrupt French officials swindled it. This too annoyed the Algerians.

6. French racism stirred discontent all spheres of life in Algerian were very discriminative. They lived apart from the Algerians, had separate health and education facilities from those of the native etc. they monopolized city life and forced a number of Algerians into rural areas. This gave them opportunity to mobilize themselves into fighting groups against the French.

7. Religious differences led to war. The Algerians were Moslems while the French colonialists were Roman Catholics. Their ways of life differed e.g. The French didn't allow polygamy while Islamic religion allowed it; the French took wine and pork and moved along with dogs which were acts against Islamic teachings. When the French attempted to force Algerians into Christianity, turned Mosques into churches and promote only those Algerians with Christian names, the ground was prepared for the Algerian war of liberation.

8. The erosion of Algerian culture. Through their assimilation policy, the French intended to create white Africans in black skins. Africans were trained to think, dress, speak, build as French men. Accordingly, French replaced Arabic as the official language of Algeria. It was used in schools, offices, businesses and all diplomatic connections. This angered the vibrant Algeria nationalists and hence the war of independence. The unveiling of Algerian women was also an abuse of Algerian culture.

9. The influence of the 2 World War. The Algerian ex-service men such as Ahmed Ben Bella and Belkacem Krim developed militant nationalistic ideas and determination to oust the French. They had been exposed to new weapons, tactics and liberal ideas. In particular, the American troops which served in North Africa during the 2nd World War had spread ideas of equality, democracy and self-government. Everywhere in Africa, there was a wind of change after the 2nd world war and the Algerians took full advantage of this.

10. The defeat of the French in Vietnam led to the Algerian war of independence. The Vietnamese defeated the French colonialists in the battle of Dien Bien Phurr (1946-1954). This battle humiliated the French and shattered both

their pride and invincibility. It forced the French to withdraw from the whole of Indo-China.¹⁶ The Algerian nationalists such as Ben Bella who served in the Vietnamese war returned

Algeria and spread the propaganda that just as the French were defeated in the jungles of Asia, they could easily be defeated in the desert of Algeria.

EFFECTS OF THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

1. Algeria became independent in 1962. This ended the 132 years of French colonialism in Algeria and shattered the French intentions of turning Algeria into a white man's country. The politics of Algeria was placed in the hands of Indigenous Algerians with Ben Bella as the first president.

2. Democratic governance. Under Ben Bella and Successor Houari Boumedienne, a democratic form of governance was introduced to replace French dictatorship. Democracy started with the free and fair elections of 1962 which were held on the UN basis of universal adult suffrage (one man one vote). Hence Ben Bella was democratically elected. Constitutional governance, freedom of association, public debates, religious and cultural freedoms followed. A new member was created to represent national interests and replace the FLN.

3. Agrarian /Land reforms were carried out. As a number of French from Algeria, large pieces of land were let open for Algerians to occupy. The Algerians who had been turned into landless squatters became land owners once again. However, some French settlers who had obtained their land genuinely were allowed to repossess them or sell them to Algerians.

4. Working conditions were improved. Forced labor was abolished, employment opportunities were created for all and wages increased. Great emphasis was placed on rural development which solved the problems of rural-urban migration placed and unemployment. Rural development even attracted Some Algerians from towns back to villages. Go back to land policy. Hence a revolution.

5. Agricultural modernization. The government set up a green dam to provide water for irrigation, to reclaim arid areas and improve on pastoralism. It also extended credit facilities, fertilizers, quality seeds and Radio programs to farmers. It under took to market farmers crops abroad, created 190 socialist villages and funded about 6,000 co-operative unions.

6. It created harmony between Algeria and France. government did not cut off the diplomatic relations with France. Rather, it opened up a new phase of co-operation between the two states. For instance, Algeria remained a Franco-phone country and continued receiving assistance from France. About 1000 French teachers were employed in Algerian schools. All sorts of color discrimination ended.

¹⁶ Ibid p.239.

7. There was a cultural revival. The French cultural imperialism was ended and Islamic culture was revived. The Arabic language, Islamic names, Masques, dressing styles, morals and schools were all revived. Islamic leaders regained their roles and condemned drinking, prostitution, theft and cheating as acts against Koranic teachings

8. Creation of law and order. The revolutionaries created a new coherent disciplined police force to keep law and order in urban centers. It also created national army which comprised of soldiers from all the ex-guerilla war fighting groups e.g the ALN and OS. This army was used to defend the borders and national integrity of Algeria and to flush out government rebels.

9. Algeria adopted a socialist ideology. Ben Bella nationalized all the major means of production and assets left behind by foreigners. He invited a number foreign socialist advisers and intellectuals who advised him on industrialization. Subsequently, gas, textile, cement and food processing industries were called for economic and social equality of all Algerians.

10. The War aroused national consciousness amongst the Algeria's. FLN leaders called for unity amongst Algerian Moslems of different social and economic backgrounds. E.g the Kabylia and Arabic speakers were sensitized to come together, fight for independence and later build the new nation.

Negative Impact

It led to loss of life and destruction of property. Right from the 8th May 1945 riots up to 1962, the French reaction to Algerian nationalists was horrifying brutal. Nearly 1 million Algerians died in the struggle while many were wounded. About 8,000 villages were ransacked (burnt) using napalm bombs and heavy gun fire. A number of Europeans were also killed.

It created refugee problems. A number of Algerians (about 300,000) fled to neighboring Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Libya to seek for asylum. About 2 million Algerian especially women and children became internally displaced. They were herded into regroupment villages so as to separate them from guerrillas. In these villages/concentration camps, they suffered from overcrowding, hunger and disease. At the end of the war, about 1 million colons fled back to France.¹⁷

It paved way for dictatorship. Ben Bella became increasingly dictatorial by limiting the people's freedom of association, freedom of the press and assembly. This was a return to the pre-revolutionary days. Even his successor Boumedienne became a dictator. A sad case of dictatorship was the nullification of the 1992 election results.

The rise of the army factor in Algeria's politics. Owing to the great role they had played during the independence war, soldiers continued influencing post-independence politics in Algeria e.g. In 1965, the army under colonel Boumedienne ousted the elected president-Ben Bella, from power in an almost bloodless coup and power was fixed in the hands of soldiers.

¹⁷ Ibid. P140.

It failed to end neo-colonialism in Algeria. Owing to financial constraints, the post-independence Algerian governments found themselves begging for economic and technical aid from their former colonial masters. Soon, Algeria became a strong member of the French Community and the E.E.C. this undermined the independence of Algeria to the extent that 1992, the French manipulated the democratic elections.

Others are:

It paved way for Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria

It led to economic ruin and stagnation

Power struggle

It destabilized traditional family life in Algeria

It sourced relations between Morocco and Algeria

It divided pan-Africanist whereby the radical Casablanca group supported the FLN's military activities while the Monrovia group called for negotiations between the FLN and the French.

Algeria's Future Prospects

Over the years, the Algerian regime has allowed just enough sociopolitical change to absorb and defuse popular discontent, so as to safeguard political stability and ensure that much remains the same. The resulting system has elements of authoritarianism and democracy. Major decisionmakers in Algeria have crafted, renewed, and refined strategies to sustain the system and their roles in it. The country's next presidential election, scheduled for 2019, is not likely to constitute a turning point. Whoever is elected—whether Bouteflika secures a fifth term or someone else takes office—will be chosen by the military political elite and will be purely a product of this system.¹⁸ But while the regime has shown considerable resilience and adaptability, the system it has created is not invulnerable and will continuously be tested by social change in Algeria. Another drop in oil prices, similar to the one in mid-2014, or a lasting economic crisis might hinder the capacity of the regime to pacify contesting groups. In the wake of the plunge in energy prices that took place in mid-2014, the finances of Algeria's highly oil-reliant economy have been significantly strained.¹⁹ In 2015, energy earnings dropped 41 percent and despite a subsequent rise of 16 percent in 2017, the country's 2017 budget deficit amounted to 9 percent of GDP. . Despite incessant talk of economic diversification to decrease reliance on hydrocarbons, the government has taken few measures to move in that direction. As a result, it is likely that the Algerian authorities will struggle more with further unrest as spending cuts put a substantial burden on the population. Amid these financial difficulties, the regime may feel compelled to make more political concessions to mitigate further popular frustration. Such concessions may involve allowing greater political participation, recognizing ethnic and cultural minorities, inviting opposition parties and civil society organizations to

¹⁸ H. Robin, *Africa since 1875: A Modern History*, Vol., 2, East African Educational publishers, 1974.

¹⁹ M. Crowther and Abdullahi, *A History of West Africa AD 1000 to the Present*, London, Longman. 1979.

join consultations with the government, and adopting a national youth policy. The country's leadership should keep in mind that Algerian young people have the numbers on their side, with 55 percent of the population under thirty years old.⁸⁹ Given Algeria's young population, the formulation of a national youth policy and the establishment of a national youth organization would appear to be priorities for the country's leadership. Established in 2016, the High Council for Youth is a good first step, provided that it starts offering tangible recommendations to better engage youth politically.

Conclusion

Over the years, the Algerian regime's ability to fragment, co-opt, manipulate, or silence its opponents has helped to ensure the continuity of the country's political system. While this requires the government to display a constant ability to adapt, the system is likely to survive for now. The real locus of power remains in the military, whose influence remains intact regardless of the façade of constitutionalism and pluralism. The military rules, even if it does not govern. It does so from atop a pyramid of power in which the interests of the military, the FLN leadership, and members of the political and economic elite are intertwined.

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