

novel a

stef meul

artistic research

'16 - '18

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introduction

There is the desire to know what comes ahead, but this can be written in revision.

This artistic research called *novel a* is in a way an entry in the past seven hundred days or so before completion - not that it has ceased to change since then. Nevertheless, the insisting activity of reflecting on an individual's minds perception and its sensible world wherein it finds itself embedded, has embroiled a multiplicity of resources which found a need for a reasonable form.

Transitions between the subjects can be difficult at first glance, therefore please bear with the recurrence of the transmissive thread quilting the text into the reader and allowing any personal interpretation to remain open for remittance.

Wherein the fragments and passages from disparate sources might cause a sceptic backlash when read with academic goggles, the intent is not to write a logic into a content, but also not to remain inside of solipsist narcissistic regurgitation. I would prefer not too endeavour to far along this path with recourse to what I still consider artistic integrity, while giving a real relation to subjectivity to emerge within an artistic research practice that aims at learning to refrain what stops not being written.

From start to end the text can be read in any order, when possible at least per chapter or per series. The division between chapters and series is maintained throughout *novel a*, with purpose for reading in both forms. Chapter sequentiality endeavours a reading which focuses on attribution of meaning through: *at first/then after - but just not yet*. Series sequentiality deals with the context wherein the text comes about: *arriving here again*.

Intersections are added to repack the dual sequentiality into the current form, and also to open some metaphorical rescaling of the sometimes dense passages along the metonymies of desiring self-knowledge.

Inspirations and influences are - among many and more - material by: Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Zizec, Alenka Zupancic, Georg Hegel, Gilles Deleuze, Christopher Wallis, Jodi Dean, Cadell Last, and readers like you...

Novel a
logic of sense - tale & novella
lacan object cause of desire objet petit a
story of an impossible love
blues
"you know that it is so hard to love somebody that don't love you"
lacanian phantasm "she appears like a ghost of herself"
biopolitics <https://youtu.be/vCm3UCIXkgE>

Mercury (13 per century)
rare may transit
Venus transits (13 per millenia) June 8y later
then in december 109 y 121,5 y
late n19th c
no in 20th C 2004- 2012 june

Communism, A New Beginning? Jodi Dean: "Communist Desire"

<https://youtu.be/g4xC9LEU4Fw>
38:36 anti communists as a dog

youtube auto transcript:

notion at the desired the analyst. such a desire is collective sustaining a community 32:11 even as it has moved past the need for some kind of Fantasmic support 34:41this space between and within worlds 34:44 departed no part doesn't does not exist designate a subset a person's 36:43 and communism shares with capitalism a revolutionary mobilization of negation 36:48 hints communism is the negation at the negation the difference is the ways the 36:52 subjective eyes the gap 46:21 in a close engagement with Catherine mountains discussion of severe brain 46:24 injuries 46:25 scheck discusses the logic dialectical transitions 46:29 after negation in the nation lost the subject returned to itself 46:33 but the subject is not the same as the substance that underwent the alienation 46:37 it is constituted in the very movement returning to itself 46:41 she concludes the subject is as such the survivor but some death 46:45 a shell which remains after is deprived of its substance 48:36 Aristotle politics criticize communism as utopian 48:40 an impossible because it just seems another word for perfect 48:44 but the impossible communist desire is not the same as its cause 48:49 the object cause a communist desire is the people and again 48:52 the people not as a name for the social hall but as a name for the exploited 48:57 producing majority 49:02 the people remain elusive incompatible with 49:06 and disruptive to what attempts to reduce cont in reducing and 49:09 and disrupted do whatever it is that it tends to reduce 49:13 constrain represent authoritarianism 49:16 oligarchy aristocracy representative democracy 49:19 parliamentary democracy none of these forms worries too much 49:23 about the disconnect between government and people 49:26 but the disconnect the gap matters for communism 49:30 and actually i'm for fascism as well which deals with the gap by is 49:33 centralizing the people give blood so it be applied 49:36 soil and the leader attempting to externalizing eliminate the remaining in 49:40 unavoidable antagonism 49:42 the communism does worried out this gap particularly because communism is not 49:46 only a form a government 49:48 but also an organization production the people are lucid 52:04 thank you up could you play a little bit more 52:07 around and emphasize more the distinctions between 52:11 these forms a solidarity and possibility in the communist desire 52:14 and the fascist desire which recognizing these are over some publications and 52:19 kinda architect at this point but 52:21 that was a very quick can one-liner around blood and soil and so forth their 52:25 other kinds of fascism zine 52:27 um I mean I might be in favor them so I i'm not 52:30 I'm not saying that I want you to critiquing show white fascism is bad 52:34 or anything like that I i'm just I want you to play with 52:37 you exactly why on why this kind of solitary 52:42 and desire the collective differs and how it differs from 52:45 from fascism and and see what more we can dry out for that distinction 52:49 the different the difference has to do with substantial Ising in filling in the 52:53 gaps saying that one can 52:55 I'm designate the people in some sort of clothes or determined way 53:00 verses recognizing the openness and 53:03 in the necessary openness up the people so I would call ashes desire that one 53:08 that thinks to identify 53:09 and substantiate the people and communist desire one that holds at open 53:13 necessarily so to prevent fascism because I don't think there's a defense 53:17 fashions so so is that it's a matter the universality in a way but you will talk 53:22 about 53:22 didn't nests the necessity of universality so as to not being evil 53:27 it is that the is there another way to talk about it I'm 53:30 I wanna I a so I want to insist on openness 53:33 and non substantial non substantiate holiday break 53:37 the fact that it can't it can't be closed 53:40 and it can't be filled in as these I'm 53:43 as this exact group right there can be a division 53:47 make the division I'm talking about is one that has to do with ownership in 53:50 property 53:50 okay maybe it was fun wanna again addendums want to intervene 55:41 to speak I'm I think that's a good question no: I'm 55:45 think I can a anything more about that 55:48 I'm what I would say

right now 55:52 is I would wanna say that first the problems with populism 55:56 are twofold the first is the tendency towards kind 56:00 have substantial is a shin and I'm not racist 56:04 and religious and exclusion exclusive practices and 56:07 so identification said be my first basically try to 56:10 into that would bind squishing it back into fascism and then the 56:14 other way I would answer it is to try to squish it back in 56:18 switch switching over to capitalism in not 56:21 its the that the that populism remains set 56:25 individually did folks moving rather than 56:29 trying to have the kind of self conscious collectivity 56:32 moving so that's that they would be my first initial pass 56:40 energies in the news but the gap is is closing 56:44 at least its shrinking the the gap the store 56:48 to the clothes a clothing store I 56:53 up I but that was announced this week 56:58 it so I think maybe that some kinda symbolic yeah 57:02 I'm the 57:05 I would like to I wonder if it's a structuring absence this for little 57:09 word I'm with the L word love 57:12 surprise surprise I'm 57:16 at you know chica said that its love is evil 58:01 I am I'm also thinking of but eyes notion of eroticism that 58:06 it it allows us to experience the gap the Vertigo of the gap together 58:12 so all these terms overlap 58:15 I think you know desired eroticism love 58:19 drive and I think you did a great job it 58:23 distinguishing different types of desire and all those 58:26 I'm important distinctions but wife and if 58:30 is there anyway at 58:33 one more reference hi david says the technology is in unreasonable demand 58:37 nature 58:39 could love be since I've argued that love is technology could love being 58:42 unreasonable demand 58:44 that dovetails with the communist 58:47 to me answer her question I'm 58:51 with the short one would be why do you object to the 58:54 the deployment the term love 58:57 in in specifically I'm because it sounds like 59:00 Oprah to me mean when I hear people talk about love in politics 59:05 if this is it it seems too much to a firearm 59:09 a kind of hyper emotionalism in 59:13 I mean sensitive it's very particular in contention answer that I have about let 59:17 me think that 59:18 the burger being together I really like and I me too me you can find a way to 59:22 engage that that's a 59:23 I really like that a lot but its it's the love language 59:26 in American society now 59:29 debt I'm that makes me not want to mobilize that term 59:33 trait that's the so it's not that it is not good theoretical reason to cover the 59:36 tactical reason 59:38 but it but I like the brink of being at a time when I use 59:41 thanks season 59:58 well I can tell you the end question 60:01 I'm gonna ask which is what is the purpose of theory 60:06 that's going to be the end question but to get the hand just gonna desk 60:10 say two things one is if I look 60:15 I mean the 99 percent unfortunately includes me if it was 60:19 the lower 48 would not nervous probably in this room I 60:23 the students would be included but people who have 60:27 10 your jobs in universities make more 60:30 and that fortunately ninety nine percent will include us who we can 60:33 say okay we're still okay right 60:37 but is so I but but what i'm talking about. but say between let's say even 60:42 twenty or thirty percent 60:44 in that in the at wealth pic pyramid 60:48 and 21 percent you have this huge class 60:52 I mean middle class doesn't mean anything a theoretically 60:56 analytically in no way well actor but I'd like to 61:00 reintroduce is not the petty bourgeois because that's two French excuse me 61:05 you can but the the penny 61:09 capitalist were all petty capitalists 61:12 rallied I played one K plans 61:15 I mortgages the price to buy homes so many ways my pedi capitalist even when 61:20 we quote invest in our children 61:23 to send them to college you know that's the kind of thinking well I don't have 61:28 to have such a big pension fund because 61:30 I got kids who went to medical school or something like this: this is a kind of 61:34 our 61:34 week we are stuck in this system in a way 61:37 bet I it seems to me is is bad faith but 61:42 is not has nothing to do with my desire 62:14 I have empathy with this because I think are not I've what 62:17 political life is Stanley by 62:21 is this damned if you do damned if you don't reality of people's lives okay 62:26 so that's one side is kind of like that employer chrome 62:31 objectives sociological side and 62:34 the other side is the psychological and I know that for you the feeling the 62:39 sociological psychological 62:40 go together but I'm trying to pull them apart I'm 62:43 big times that's why I have trouble 62:47 right and when it comes to you 62:51 when it comes to desire 62:54 hide this man authenticity in my life 62:58 not but we need me not between me in my nearest 63:02 deal once not between my you know I mean in the sense 63:05 I have we do I have authentic desire 63:08 even to desire at be yet 63:11 the be kinda I am 63:16 I'm Homs this is all just the kind of 63:21 I don't wanna say make you a good idea but kinda you know 63:24 a kind of metaphor for how we can talk to each other 63:29 about what really counts and then 63:32 I'm saying you know for me welke is theory 63:35 this kind have theoretical intervention 63:39 I'm a kind of metaphor for talking about what really counts 63:44 I but you know I don't is at what makes me 63:48 what to end this system 63:52 I have capitalist exploitation can't be 63:56 am described by 64:00 my psychoanalytic makeup but that's just me 64:04 right so I just have to wait because for me there's so many mediations 64:09 between my psychological makeup 64:12 you know which I tried it could have been ordered not to you know the correct 64:16 not to ito be awful to the people who came here I care about 64:21 right how can I then say but in its really authentic form it's going to 64:26 you know stop the problems the world and give me a solidarity 64:30 with ninety-nine percent of human beings 64:33 you know when I can't nor do I think I should 64:38 do it 121 cell 64:42 okay should int does but the question is the question is 64:46 the question is what kind of work does this theory do 64:50 I'm on the road F 64:57 your remarks I'm first I think there's a answer to 65:00 I'm dollop I'm to a chance question am 65:03 regarding the difference between fascism the we are all pretty capitalist that 65:07 would be the populism 65:08 into the populism so that would be the populist slogan 65:11 I'm rather than the communists like that would be the difference we're all pretty 65:14 capitalists 65:15 am I also think that I'm on the 65:19 are standpoint up the empirical 65:22 sociological dimensions class I'm 65:26 the fact that we have in the united states now 65:29 10 percent roughly 10 percent structure on unemployment 65:33 arm ok him duck increases to nearly 20 percent when you think 65:37 underemployment and temporary work 65:51 the unbelievable change in the night last thirty years 65:55 in the class composition in the United States so 65:58 I'm you know I so impure Ackley it's simply not to eat there's a scan 66:02 wonderful rich body night 66:04 nice secure am middle class people who can bank on 66:08 lasting for a1k something to cry about capital since broken 66:12 break so that side so I don't think that it's a matter of conflict will looking 66:16 around in everybody's 66:17 im for the most part doing alright additionally I wanna say that 66:21 what is the purpose of theory think the purpose a theory is to provide weapons 66:30 thanks on I was learning how 67:10 am but you know his yes of course historically national question has been 67:14 a problem 67:15 it's also been the case that historically communism was 67:18 the I'm antithesis of nationalism 67:22 I and II I can't get urban

Flow mix when folks only think about it in terms of 67:27 one son 67:28 rate particularly now may particularly 67:31 like last night particularly yesterday when the global dimension 67:37 was and is so strong so I think that 67:40 part I love mill basically part understanding our moment in pushing in 67:45 is not getting bogged down in the national question that recognizing the 67:48 International 67:49 basically you recognize the international communist movement right 67:52 now 68:24 rancher tirade down individualism is kinda like mine 68:29 yeah associating love with Oprah I think that right now in the united states the 68:33 problem is not 68:34 insufficient attachment to individualism but in fact the opposite 68:38 but most frustrating things at I'm Washington Square Park 68:42 last night is this guy gives us yep intact your fantastic 68:45 rousing speech up you and we will you occupy washington reporters I guess 68:49 then one the next one comes in with in this is of course 68:52 our individual choice each individual has to make their own individual call to 68:57 do this 68:58 and this conflict while node upgrade I mean yeah and you're not trapped 69:02 right you could go but to keep emphasizing on in 69:05 01 break why is that serving I don't think that is serving 69:10 building collectively solidarity 69:13 and mutual responsibility and the since like okay yeah 69:17 we are gonna be this together and there will be folks we're gonna your hold the 69:20 line when the police come in 69:21 but to keep emphasizing individuality over and over particularly in the 69:25 settings 69:26 actually broaden its that it makes it much harder to have confidence that 69:29 folks are gonna be there when you need them to be there 69:31 so I'm trying so I am trying to you 69:35 push against that strand because I think that 69:38 it too much affirms the essentially firms affirms the capitalist 69:43 media ties participation ist culture that were already in 72:02 so I'm just wondering what you have to say but I I think two things 72:06 first I'm wanna keep calling it communist desire 72:10 because I don't because I'd I don't want 72:13 to think that we achieve it and have achieved 72:16 or like even after this could in point I think that the in point thinking is the 72:20 wrong way to think about it 72:22 and not instead the way of thinking that no matter what 72:25 hines I love I am so 72:28 eliminations a property and common 72:32 relations and common organizations 72:35 I have your water and health and 72:38 the sustainability of the planet and 72:42 the I'm development love better food ways of producing 72:46 in distributing food that no matter what happens there 72:50 a designer has to keep alive break 72:53 it has to we have to continue to desire 72:56 to desire collectively and that's good will be fragile 73:01 make that's not something that's a permanent feature of people 73:05 and that's not something that should be understood in such a 73:08 substantial eyes way but more in this openly so that's the first part 73:13 the second part is am I'm I'm I think about is particularly communist 73:17 am design your own the designer said no and this is influenced primarily am 73:23 from mines reading in conversations with I'm Bruno has persuaded me 73:27 to think more about the subject and I think that wanted the mistakes in 73:32 thinking about communism has been 73:33 a focused on the object which then not spritely makes people really quite 73:37 worried about like what exactly is that objective look like in hand then you 73:41 start to get look 73:42 the objects always gonna be fielding %um then you get really then you start to 73:45 see the dynamic desire not 73:47 like over some really the way to think about is in 73:50 what is it to desire like a communist shift the discussion 73:54 towards the side the subject rather than the object so that's the 73:58 that's the reason for that up thank you very much a 74:09 one question that came to my mind when you im 74:12 explicitly attack to renounce ment of the party model 74:16 within but you as a framework of organization 74:19 because I mean to pose as Jack in question what happens the day after the 74:24 Revolution the emergence of that is I 74:26 hard to organize it and I saw different options and I think for example the 74:31 questions 74:32 I with regard sir to populism also are linked to that 74:35 because the openness that's you let's say the unrepresented ability of the 74:40 people as such 74:42 I'm offers California Way the place of powers always Mt 74:46 but offers like low in way this is where the populism calms 74:50 comes in but also you seemed to indicated by the 74:54 reference to Los year one needs a dialect is sized 74:59 relation of politics and police so then there is a model of integration always a 75:03 bit of police 75:04 organization about the people we merge is a 75:08 politics and their integrated but you also 75:12 with your definition of communist desire abs 75:15 the common relation to the common ground of division 75:20 imply its some sort of logic of purification among ourselves 75:25 because where r to put it in with reference to mile 75:29 where are the 99 that one percent 75:32 after the revolution there in the nineteen ninety there would be 75:35 demolished answer 75:36 so what to do then purified the 99 percent more and more to keep the 75:40 openness 75:41 so I mean I saw these different strands and I would like to know for which one 75:46 you would not 75:55 I think I I don't know if I can answer that question I think it's a really good 75:58 question and I i need to think about it more 76:00 I'm mean 76:06 mean breakthrough 76:09 the one percent camp remain the one percent 76:13 3 they have to be a.m. there 76:17 the conditions that make the one person have to change in so there's we take 76:20 their stuff 76:22 right or we here the 76:25 the I mean honestly if you really think that who 76:28 are you think a bit more tactically wreck know what action me with I think 76:32 about it on the incident the second day 76:34 what happens the financial networks have collapsed and in fact 76:37 the stuff just vanishes because it's all up to RAL anyway so to that extent they 76:41 become not the 99 percent mean they become 76:43 not the one percent me more and then we'll need to learn not to treat 76:47 everybody else is a certain 78:41 something like that people years last night at the moment falsely then the 78:46 I was cruising around trying to see what's going on and how I can 78:50 sensitize with atmosphere there and then I was looking at different 78:55 the sayings there on the walls and people had 78:58 something written on the paper and so on so it is a wonder they want special a 79:02 broom not to comment on it 79:04 and is saying telander to buy go support 79:07 Wall Street protest if you can comment on that or appreciate it very much 79:12 Trinidad and Tobago support the wall street protests that's the sign 79:19 what's the problem 79:24 Saudi good 79:29 weeklies 79:33 one what's they're not entitled 79:37 ordered 79:42 US finance capital ruins the world 79:45 of course the rest of the world would want it to fall

Published on 13 Jun 2012 • Category

○ Non-profits & Activism

Fatboy Slim - Eat Sleep Rave Repeat (Official Video) [Dimitri Vegas, Like Mike & Ummet Ozcan Remix]
<https://youtu.be/sVrUXYEXU40>

Pink Floyd - The Wall Movie - In The Flesh
https://youtu.be/v_leY_LgOuQ

Donald Trump's Newest Campaign Ad
<https://youtu.be/-ep53vIAV9c>

Martin Garrix - Animals (Official Video) <https://youtu.be/gCYcHz2k5x0>

The President's Speech
https://youtu.be/sb_jquEvqO8

President's speech - Armageddon (1998) (1080p) <https://youtu.be/pBEtmUdQRWE>

The Prodigy - Poison (Official Video)
https://youtu.be/_mej5wS7viw

Madeleine Albright justifies the deaths of 500000 iraqi children worth it <https://youtu.be/2fwF6PjTkQ> (repeat nine times)

Cyndi Lauper - True Colors
<https://youtu.be/LPn0KF1bqX8>

True Blood Theme Song (Jace Everett - Bad Things) <https://youtu.be/MiBhZlaJsQ4>

Propaganda - p: Machinery
<https://youtu.be/660ZCEhvbnw>

Shakespears Sister - Stay
<https://youtu.be/AX-MyKQlndo>

Highlights: President Obama's Berlin Speech <https://youtu.be/pClq5Wc8AN8>

Miley Cyrus - Wrecking Ball
<https://youtu.be/My2FRPA3Gf8>

SKRILLEX - FUCK THAT
<https://youtu.be/Ka7wBGFSuSE>

Charlie Chaplin - Final Speech from The Great Dictator <https://youtu.be/J7GY1Xg6X20>

Marianne Faithfull -- The Ballad Of Lucy Jordan <https://youtu.be/d0NxhFn0szc>

Coolio- Gangster's Paradise
<https://youtu.be/N6voHeEa3ig>

Shirley Bassey - Where Do I Begin (LOVE STORY) (1973 TV Special) <https://youtu.be/2kBiVLmDZoc>

One Direction - One Way Or Another (Teenage Kicks)
<https://youtu.be/36mCEZzzQ3o>

Craziest moments at U.N. General Assembly
<https://youtu.be/thihXcZXOsU>

Nina Simone - Isn't It A Pity
<https://youtu.be/ZcP7odvmMok>

Healing, heartache one month after Boston bombings
<https://youtu.be/DrVixHXJ9aw>

ADAM FREELAND - WE WANT YOUR SOUL
https://youtu.be/_WTBkj8gFfl

Jupiler – #ALLINRED (FR)
<https://youtu.be/aPtRXxN6O-k> (play twice)

Alanis Morissette - Ironic
<https://youtu.be/Jne9t8sHpUc>

siri siri siri pi pi pee pee siri
speech mac voice "...these big catastrophes, spectacular destruction that we see is basically a lure. it is here to deceive us. What, the truly fascinating thing is what happens as it's by-product: the sudden upsurge of solidarity, dedication, communal love, and so on and so on.

And the message is basically again a sad one:
It is that the only way in our societies to imagine this kind of solidary activity is against the background of a catastrophe."

Slavoj Zizek | Why Only An Atheist Can Believe

AZEALIA BANKS - 212 FT. LAZY JAY
<https://youtu.be/i3Jv9fNPjgk>

Manichaeism
<https://youtu.be/NCoBD6J7eqk>

Kate Miller-Heidke - Are You Fucking Kidding Me? (The Facebook Song) [Live at the Hi-Fi] <https://youtu.be/kPIWi3H2Y1A>

Icona Pop - I Love It
<https://youtu.be/8VWH13hJQWY>

The Jimi Hendrix Experience - I Don't Live Today 1969-01-10 Copenhagen <https://youtu.be/tk28Nx9wX00>

Volley 360 | Pepsi Max | #MAXFOOTBALL
<https://youtu.be/XiU1GzDpM-I>

Expected future for the Deaf
<https://youtu.be/CVr8W-tDQ-A>

FUCK YOU RIGHT BACK
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Htyq3BP2nOM>

Finley Quaye - Even after all
<https://youtu.be/214cQIpcClc>
Yellowman Zungguzungguguzungguzeng
<https://youtu.be/HV46OGU7ksE>
Jacques Brel - Rosa
<https://youtu.be/TjTSpowKJSM>
Word of the Day: Herd Mentality
<https://youtu.be/xU0cq3UvLaM>
Official Documentary of the Loveparade 2010 Desaster (ENGLISH!) <https://youtu.be/8y73-7IFBNE>
Panic! At The Disco: Hallelujah
<https://youtu.be/DxYyHHR0Q1c>
Nirvana - All Apologies (MTV Unplugged)
<https://youtu.be/aWmkH1k7uA>
Toni Braxton - Un-Break My Heart
<https://youtu.be/p2Rch6WvPJE>
Rethinking Airport Security After the Brussels Attacks
<https://youtu.be/vefK5nVK1gU>
Where Do I begin with lyrics - Andy Williams
<https://youtu.be/1DNj2VnaAgw>
UniversityNow: Quantitative vs. Qualitative Research
<https://youtu.be/bCuwX35MHyE>
Day of the Triffids Trailer (1962)
<https://youtu.be/FqrLqg3w6AU>
Is China Engineering Smarter Babies?
<https://youtu.be/Tlas4vQTP8E>
Moonman - Eugenics
<https://youtu.be/43f78HB8Q8k>
The Third Pill-Slavoj Zizek
<https://youtu.be/d3bBreSgaik>
Laibach - Mi kujemo bodočnost 1983! (We are Forging the Future!) <https://youtu.be/2P2oF9qYo4U>
Kundalini Mantras
<https://youtu.be/njGnVWnU5Ws>
Mariah Carey - Emotions
<https://youtu.be/NrJEFrth27Q>
Frankie Goes To Hollywood - Two Tribes (ZTIS 119)
<https://youtu.be/SXWVpcypf0w>
Destiny's Child - Survivor (Official Video) ft. Da Brat
<https://youtu.be/Wmc8bQoL-J0>
Lionel Richie - All Night Long (All Night)
<https://youtu.be/nqAvFx3NxUM>

Slavoj Zizek | Why Only An Atheist Can Believe https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1X_hwUEPeIQ&feature=youtu.be&t=18m28s Don't Tell Me Words Don't Matter--Obama's BEST speech YET! <https://youtu.be/t6NS9unm-OQ>
TOTAL RECALL TRAILER 1990
<https://youtu.be/WFMLGEHdljE>
Snakes On A Plane - Official Studio Trailer #1
<https://youtu.be/vkckhcqiwM8>
Donnie Darko Theatrical Trailer
<https://youtu.be/vijy4Oiawa8>
Radiohead - Paranoid Android
<https://youtu.be/fHiGbolFFGw>
RMS Carpathia Wreck Diving Expedition 2007
<https://youtu.be/C6-pSYdPraM>
Titanic's sister ship to become underwater tourist site
<https://youtu.be/GS1gQt4QFQU>
Titanic Contacts the Carpathia (The Last Signals)
<https://youtu.be/FMHBPm7a0nQ>
Rode Duivels - Go West
<https://youtu.be/N2pWzTofeRQ>
The Bangles - Walk Like an Egyptian
<https://youtu.be/Cv6tuzHUUuk>
South Park- Butters - What What In The Butt!
<https://youtu.be/jC1s3c-sFF8>
Jefferson Airplane - White Rabbit (Grace Slick, Woodstock, aug 17 1969) https://youtu.be/R_raXzIRgsA

Tracking Orion & Sirius In Ancient Civilizations #1: Hopi & Chaco Canyon https://youtu.be/0MfpWDP_xyM
Human Sacrifice
<https://youtu.be/buBvBmNCGog>
Zizek The King's Speech and Black Swan
<https://youtu.be/th8eAw8AqGw>
Saudi Arabia Execution Horror Video Shows 'Innocent' Woman Being BEHEADED for 'Killing Six
<https://youtu.be/TJ96NbM0tyM>
Beheading in Saudi Arabia
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=b89_1421360015
---- ALLMENAREPIGS {FULLMEP
<https://youtu.be/qDkS8hQuJcA>
The Chemical Brothers - Music: Response (Osaka '97) <https://youtu.be/wbZtFJwwWcl>
The Doors- Break On Through
<https://youtu.be/7BYNDpFIBPw>
Kanye West feat Jay-Z- Got To Have It <https://youtu.be/QhvgHS2qCnY>
Britney Spears - Toxic (Official Video) <https://youtu.be/LOZuxwVk7TU>
How Much Oil Is Left On Earth? <https://youtu.be/ynaOH7OmMcM>
Leonard Cohen ~ Dance Me To The End Of Love <https://youtu.be/IEVow6kr5nl>
Flume - Never Be Like You feat. Kai <https://youtu.be/-KPnyf8vwXI>
Peggy Lee -- Is That All There Is? 1969 <https://youtu.be/LCRZZC-DH7M>
Wyclef Jean, Canibus - Gone Till November <https://youtu.be/kl6MWZrl8v8>
Performance Studies: An Introduction - Make Believe/Make Belief <https://youtu.be/YG6fMnH17GU>
Phil Collins - Another Day In Paradise (Official Music Video) <https://youtu.be/Qt2mbGP6vFI>
The Boomtown Rats - I Don't Like Mondays <https://youtu.be/-Kobdb37Cwc>
Mel & Tim - Starting All Over Again <https://youtu.be/LDtPrJlxB68>
The Persuaders - Thin Line between Love & Hate <https://youtu.be/ULuHJgCos7A>
A MILLION TO ONE ~ Jimmy Charles & The Revellettes <https://youtu.be/EmyOXqGFOqs>

Fascism and Mussolini | The 20th century | World history | Khan Academy
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AoRpWU6hHJ8>

FP017 Corporatism: A marriage of left and right
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIHaulRE9Ww>

Play it again, Pam!

on va lui faire un cauchemar. nightmare.
the corps brides horse runs at night.
ideal love always remains a mortifying love.
interview with the vampire.
dream what makes it psychoanalytical? As if.
fantasy memory - all for sirius - in a threesome: taking my two lovers from behind.

First the one i was in relation with, then the one i was starting a relation with. Both had an orgasm and me, I could enjoy the pleasure of making them come while not even needing a preservative, mdma had made it practically impossible for me to ejaculate. This really made me feel like the man at that time, because previous to that moment i felt completely redundant when the lover i was in relation with was licking and sucking the vagina of the lover i was starting a relation with, but she wouldn't let me join in on the action. Rejection is hard to deal with, unless you believe in acting with a vengeance. That does keep the drama going, for the better and the worse. A dream of love making on a tree besides a lake.

Working title: Not for me!

owb < shover / shower > vampyrotheutis

to know how to end. and to keep seeing through your own eyes. <https://soundcloud.com/stef-meul/people-in-the-house>

twenty minutes past the hour

Pi-piru-piru-piru-pi-piru-pi

<https://youtu.be/kL3remBDiy0>

vacuum cleaning

eight, great, ... alors, c est un mason.

disillusion of the numerologists.

entropy and patience

Destiny's Child - Survivor (Official Video) ft. Da Brat

<https://youtu.be/Wmc8bQoL-J0>

Turn Your Lights Down Low by Bob Marley & Lauryn Hill Lyrics <https://youtu.be/35O6H0aWF3Q>

"The Harder They Come" Jimmy Cliff

<https://youtu.be/xGE4dnPPZQ>

Chuck Berry - Johnny B. Goode live

<https://youtu.be/AEq62iQo0eU>

Michael Jackson - Remember The Time

<https://youtu.be/LeiFF0gvqcc>

--

Communism, A New Beginning? Slavoj Žižek

<https://youtu.be/utmZmKzwqyQ>

55:26

of the ideologies of power it's generally the one of some type of direct 55:31

democracy

55:32

outcome of the emphasis on domination for democratic program 55:37

while outcome of the end british on exploitation

55:40

be set comtex program Darien excites

Slavoj Žižek + Paul Holdengräber "Voyeurism and digital identity" - International Authors' Stage

<https://youtu.be/HAZiFWZpYds>

31:30

52:10

Phyllis Dillon - In The Ghetto <https://youtu.be/2SyNqCDZ2Yc>

Dionne Warwick - Walk On By <https://youtu.be/ijhL9Y7skQs>

Screamin' Jay Hawkins, I Put a Spell on You <https://youtu.be/PwXai-sgM-s>

FAT BOYS - all you can eat (krush groove 1985)

<https://youtu.be/inPGlpHBhBM>

Shakira - La Tortura ft. Alejandro Sanz

https://youtu.be/Dsp_8Lm1eSk

"ai perito nueve"

Slavoj Žižek + Paul Holdengräber "Surveillance and whistleblowers"

https://youtu.be/PIPjmmmh_os

11:00 indeterminacy in itself. world is ontologically incomplete

Jodi Dean - The Limits of the Web in an Age of Communicative Capitalism https://youtu.be/Ly_uN3zbQSU

25:26 the content the repetitive intensities doesn't matter 25:30 it's a massive virtually indistinguishable

25:33 yet rapidly circulating differences and modulations 25:37 that ensure that nothing changes

25:40 democracy follows this circuit drive 25:44 we circle around and around missing our goals 25:47 but still getting a little satisfaction some 25:50 enjoys sharing outrage over a setback 25:53 others enjoy rehashing all the steps that would into our failure 25:57 arguing over where we were wrong even if it was a constant 26:01 others want us to delve into the particulars a process for its 26:05 own sake with little regard for the outcome 26:08 democratic drive then names the reflexivity 26:12 in which we are stuck which we can't avoid 26:15 but which can't be understood as giving is what we want 26:19 even as it gives us this little ticket enjoyment 26:22 so we protest we talk we complain we signed petitions and forward them to our 26:27 friends 26:28 in the reflexive circuit communicative capitalism 26:32 democratic dried is the capture about political engagements in networked media 26:36 so that we feel active 26:38 we feel in gold even as our actions and engagements reinforce 26:44 rather than undermine capitalism so 28:19 what we produce in common in I'm communicated capitalism 28:23 on five these are dead a get data meta-data 28:27 networks attention in capacity so those are the 28:30 the 510 the fibers words can't so first

Cannibal Holocaust Uncut

<https://youtu.be/rf1832sLfeM?t=1h15m33s>

"Move in thight, thight."

Aah, move in for close up"

"Watch it Alan, I'm shooting"

"Ohh good Lord! It's unbelievable, it's horrible! I can't understand the reason for such cruelty. It must have something to do with some obscure sexual rite or with the almost profound respect these primitives have for virginity."

"You're rolling Marc?"

till 1h24m37s

Shivoholocast <https://youtu.be/jubIRO1nnJA>

As Walter Benjamin writes: 'all efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war.' The becoming aesthetic of life is one aspect of this mobilization of social energies. The aestheticization of war is functional to the subjugation of everyday life to the rule of history. War forces the global masses to partake in the process of self-realization of the Hegelian Spirit, or, perhaps more realistically, to become part of capitalist global accumulation. Captured in the dynamics of war, everyday life is ready to be subjected to the unlimited rule of the commodity. From this standpoint, there is no difference between fascism, communism and democracy: art functions as the element of aestheticization and mobilization of everyday life. Total mobilization is terror, and terror is the ideal condition for a full realization of the capitalist plan to mobilize psychic energy. The close relation between Futurism and advertising is an integral part of this process."

pg129 scribd.com/doc/45814645/Precarious-Rhapsody-Semiocapitalism-and-the-pathologies-of- post-alpha-generation- by-Franco-Bifo-Berardi

songs:

soundcloud.com/stef-meul/no-idea-pussy-talk soundcloud.com/stef-meul/welcome-to-the-army-boy

video sources:
youtu.be/rf1832sLfeM
youtu.be/AkhkBb4aVvw
youtu.be/7aMLiGO2eqA

Slavoj Žižek in Conversation with Jonathan Derbyshire at Central Saint Martins

<https://youtu.be/hvWkWYHmMxg>

36:45 notion of future-avenir
"For Hegel there is no future because there is a-venir."
Son House - Death Letter (live) <https://youtu.be/QwjGytOVVQA>
"You know, it's hard to love someone that don't love you
Ain't no satisfaction, don't care what in the world you do
Yeah, it's hard to love someone that don't love you
You know it don't look like satisfaction, don't care what in the world you do You know, love's a hard ol' fall, make you do things you don't wanna do Love sometimes leaves you feeling sad and blue"

--

Alenka Zupancic. The Culture of Lying

https://youtu.be/mY9rmi_YvNc

20:21 anything when is they often 20:24 when he insisted to local he still scooped 20:29 the truth which has of sizes 20:32 whose the ames said

Marx Reloaded Extra: An Interview With Slavoj Žižek
<https://youtu.be/7s9kgUPFuCw>

11:20 This will sound sound as an irony, but for me a communist society would be a society where everyone would be allowed to dwell in his or her own stupidity. You know who gave me this idea? Like in some Brueghel painting. There is a man who thinks is a chicken chicken and a a a walks like this.

What is the right way to earn a living?
<https://youtu.be/iIqVJaF4Gig>

33:56 as we should be on a date we are 33:59 this is it hideous toll here he is 34:04 get it not care 34:07 were busy tonight casual curiosity 34:12 care who produces good 34:19 but one must criticize one must down 34:24 not what these people be saying but beginning to dawn 34:29 all that due to our ping me and then 34:33 don't want to speak to you don't began to go back what is because 34:37 plays what he sees point you know pure said 34:40 so 34:44 when the rain 34:48 the freedom in relationship which doesn't mean 34:53 to do what you like that's obviously what 34:58 everybody's doing it if I don't like 35:02 the present woman I chain go walk with a runnable 35:06 and the agony up give also enormous 35:11 business in 35:16 well as I really understood the nature of pollution 35:19 which can only exist when there is no record 35:24 when there is no you make about each other invis 35:32 %um communion with each other unknown 35:40 to what is

right back well that's what she sees 35:46 would be light he's relationship Sunday 35:50 you carded keep from these what is right back 35:57 which must be

36:03 right and all looked Marion D 36:09 West comptroller the smoker in the communist world 36:15 that more difficult because you can't speak 36:19 you don't 36:23 act who act according to the edicts of the 36:27 dictate and his group 36:30 so there is no sent to plead so we ask what do you make 36:36 find that out 36:41 almost in Palm into what these 36:44 a lot action now I 36:47 what he did own action based on 36:51 I 36:55 all an ideal okay 37:02 own and principal 37:05 all on certain banks 37:09 all 37:14 I do what I want to do 37:17 these 37:22 inquired into old I that's it 37:26

projected are you human 37:30 com 37:34 ship experiences all venues 37:40 all 37:44 doing what to please 37:48 moment you want to do something duty which is the latest 37:53 cry abyss high-quality don't have been maybe 37:59 do what more that's what is at actually going on in the world 38:08 and if that project

38:13 what does 38:16 action me deep do we 38:21 like did you mean: 38:25 now that his neck 38:30 eat that action 38:33 bait own your post 38:36 it beauty it ricky's 38:42 wanna acting accordingly part memory

38:46 open Xperia to the party's dictating 38:51 you an action in the pit made 38:54 12 on are you interested no 39:00 the 39:04 were I mean to me are you interested in a week you really want to find ok which 39:10 protection 39:17 you made temporary affected 39:21 month mean birth inquiry into old 39:25 not accept some 39:31 at 110 billion 39:34 a SoC 39:40 so with see action so based 39:43 home memories politics beauty all 39:48 a projected hunt I have poured into mocks

39:53 or two 39:57 the church or 40:01 somewhat idealistic remand pic business 40:05 drop affirming which meet you at all 40:13 always acting upholding

40:16 to the palms all bien 40:19 coaching future rate

40:26 your back nd 40:30 that X 40:47 we have accepted day 40:49 as Eq that's on all 40:52 that all packed probably need 40:57 condition never mind and soul no according to their 41:01 we 41:05 up questioning we r 41:08 don't big day we r saying that's not back 41:12 action 41:16 can only be when Billy complete 41:20 freedom from the past and the future mom 41:33 and when you use the word right mean push tax 41:36 ek action which is not based on mood

41:44 action which is not connected 41:48 committee

41:56 all the understanding upon what is right here 41:59 right action right relationship 42:04 the understanding that the dreams about being technique 42:08 you instead not the intention to be Inc 42:14

but that per 42:17 I'm Inc couldn't switch not you so much and their contentions 42:25 would dictate what you would do 20 min 42:29 lead cervical you understood 42:35 we hope that the incursions your

42:39 label you put in will be dictated 42:42 both sercan 42:46 if you have acting when they did that Inc and 42:49 maybe gotten their good some it doesn't mention 42:54 did she know our minds in 42:58 all in trading to look sick 43:01 take in 43:05 position 43:13

and mainland in I men were designed to roll back 43:17

in the video and the spending of all that you 43:20 in Pickens which will head which with who 43:23 working as like like make 43:28 now bill third base but in our and 43:33 no reported but managed one question will you do something about the 43:39 in 43:43 them 43:44 E 43:47 all 43:48 carry on with your usual we in

43:55 that's why moms agree do you look 43:58 in quality 44:05 denying anybody for more pics billions in that been quoted 44:11 in 44:15 to the visa real living in

44:18 in which there is no con good 44:22 and because there is no conflict the symptoms 44:25 which will show the wheel right maybe

Can one live in a timeless state?

<https://youtu.be/JWeKz6a4PaU>

7:06 how to understand 7:12 this tenable inquiry 7:22 if we don't understand day not bow billion not 7:27 intellectually but unique painting up what it means 7:32

to lead because we have to host 7:36 living that as we all had many 7:40 whether you are disciple with all the jobs you know the rest 7:45 you out because meaty going to the office

7:49 from take to date for the best Nick fifty years 7:53 maybe you know we 22 7:58 doing una all the what what 8:02 demeaning you may give 8:05 meeting today as people do 8:09 did like fees

8:13 this like must be day 8:17 but withhold all these 8:21 romantic uses a 8:25 idealistic nuns like the vid I like big 8:30 really heaven competition despair 8:34 did ed made 8:38 with cheddar soup occasional should 8:42 beauty left its own neck 8:52 can face day understand

8:56 so completely that we have no 9:01 conflicted that needs to be done 9:10 28 would in Latin port has bid 9:14 would 9:17 pool 9:21 has built my any pork has 9:27 said you must be portis 9:33 it you much cleverer than the other port 9:38 said achieve become come back have 9:43 compete in like the Olympics 9:55 that's what phone together well geez 9:59 my exist United 10:09

God solid churches %uh looms between 10:13 changing names into Union the 10:16 all moved back to sleep activity up hope 10:27 and photos we say he's

10:30 in moving up memory 10:35 experience 10:38 don't giao 10:41 experience bring certain longer 10:44 stored up in the brain as memory 10:48 and responding it that memories the movement before 10:53 you so 10:56 Europe so whole economic period 11:00 proxy they 11:05 to 11:08 hoped has me my life feat day 11:12 have different from you 11:16 and must achieve people 11:19 and 11:24 when whole predominate selling like 11:28 has it does then 11:33 won't B-nine 11:37 luck 11:43 me 11:45 full love is not implemented 11:52 love is not inexperience 12:05 levees not dissolve pleasure no 12:10

you see you don't believe it is but to that lol 12:18 like and 12:21 living that me we have 12:25 separated think all date would easily 12:28 and with Peyton Eve 12:38 win we deny 12:44 a written being in one will the won't 12:47 is created aid Houston 12:52 was mended Greek 12:57 not a woman-owned and 13:00 to Canberra Mac York tech 13:06 your who your vanity 13:09 your sense of importance 13:14 all it is the to become 13:18 in that becoming 13:21 com he creates what have you 13:25 you are you are with big time to 13:30 to living room 13:37 ease hate 13:40 until the new 13:43 who you don't do it can you find 13:49 back 13:54 we are trained to be individual me and you 14:02 my own your day 14:06 is that effect all 14:16 we are at the end are you human 14:19 because we go to war 14:24 everybody human being goes through sexual Epica 14:32 in dungeons so I will 14:36 great who feel 14:40 and and the main 14:43 and mildred let what each one of us 14:48 and the toddler to 14:53 We Are The In all humanity 14:56 not individual like to think we 15:01 we are no you may be clever 15:04 writing a book would like to make you need to beat you 15:08 you have a good 15:14 but you have to give tonight on 15:17 single don't want to repeat that BP's 15:21 translated as my give and in New York tip 15:28 effect as you'll give vanity no 15:32 all this hookers begins 15:43 whom they raise life in which 15:45 there is no and to raise me and have 40 15:53 he walking hand in hand with day 15:59 and evolve 16:03 that and the in 16:07 big totally time has come to any 16:11 nature 16:15 that time he's moon 16:18 movement means hope wat used 16:22 time and 16:28 in OC does do I delivering that eternity 16:33 then you don't understand Yukon you 16:36 you are no you so you see what we have done 16:40 hi want to live in a good I won't want to spend the more 16:47 had which means I must be part of that 16:51 but won't tell you 16:55 in a minute 16:59 form and all that things 17:02 that Horton put to pee 17:05 we actually all 17:11 and weak link to me 17:16 and gift comes 17:21 to ease accidentally 17:24 host area 17:33 and is wall with the priest from the corn 17:37 tell you have what we gonna do what you can to 17:46 go to hell you're going to decrease in the cold 17:54 but didn't go to room the call they're all the sea 18:01 too candid 18:05 like a you be 18:09 plea you tell percent 18:17 and therefore no Quinn 18:21 and then only that stayed 18:24 Maureen which is time this comes in to be 14:04

We are trained to be individuals. me and you.my ego and your ego. is that a fact or we are the entire humanity, because we go through what every human being goes through: sexual appetites, indulgence, sorrow, great hope, fear, anxiety, an immense sense of loneliness. That is what each one of us has, that is our life. So we are the entire humanity. We are not individuals. We like to think we are, we are not. You may be clever or writing a book, but that doesn't make you an individual. You may have a gift, but when you have a gift to write, or sing or dance or whatever it is. That gift is translated as my gift and when you accept that as your gift: vanity, you know all this circus around it begins.

So, there is a life in which there is no center as me and therefore life is walking hand in hand with death; and therefore out of that sense of ending totally, time has come to an end, naturally. But time is movement. Movement means thought. Thought is time and when you see that as: do I live in that eternity? Then you don't understand, you can't. You, you are no, you see, sir what we have done? I want to live in that eternity. I want to understand immortality. Which means : I want to be part of that. But what are you? A name, a form and all the thing that thought and... put together: that is what we actually are. and we cling to that. And when death comes through disease, accident, old age: how scared we are. And there is always the priest around the corner telling you: you to go to heaven or if you don't do what he tells you, you go to hell. It is not only the priest around the corner but the guru around the corner, they are all the same.

So can one live a life so completely without a center, and therefore without a conflict? and then only that state of mind which is timeless comes into being.

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Robert Pfaller: What To Do When Progress Seems to Melt Away Emancipation?

(29. April 2016)

https://youtu.be/_cCwbB6qq0w
47:44 enjoyment obsession

Rebecca Comay. Hypocondria and its Discontents.

2015

https://youtu.be/FA_4Rx4Nk9c

9:48 has set out to reverse the prevailing academic hierarchy he announces the 9:52 conceptual privilege of philosophy over the vocational disciplines disadvantage

9:58 is grounded on the distinction between autonomous and instrumental rationality 10:02 between a self after rising mode of thinking and one tethered to the techno 10:07 bureaucratic constraints of church state and market and there's an immediate 10:13 institutional agenda can't has been somewhat unsuccessfully campaigning for 10:18 some years to secure philosophy an exemption from state censorship and from 10:23 the exigencies utility expediency or profit even if the price of this freedom 10:29 might be a concession to marginalization or even trivialization a retreat into 10:36 irrelevance and intelligibility and even 10:40 tedium as kind himself as the first to point out and the question perhaps 10:45 resonates no one really reads or bothers with philosophy anyway so what's the 10:51 problem

16:38 between quality and quantity it confounds the difference between 16:41 longevity and vitality between living long and living well the condition at

16:47 once exaggerated suffering and enact inexplicably cease to prolong this 16:52 misery by turning life itself into an endlessly mortifying ritual of

16:57 self-management can't hypochondriac presents the conundrum posed by Motown 17:03 continued the worst the life the more we cling to it we caress the serpent that 17:09 devours us or as Woody Allen puts it in any hole the food is terrible at this 17:16 restaurant and small portions and 17:21 we keep going back for more is hypochondria a mental fast phantasm or

17:27 physical MLS is a propensity to imaginary illness which produces 17:33 delivery bodily sensations or is it abdominal compression which stimulates 17:39 ideational distortions the affliction as the curious character of being at once 17:45 both localized and diffuse both digestive construction hypochondriac 17:50 with the name of the place 17:53 innards and they're both digestive construction and vaporous expansion both 18:01 somewhere very specific and nowhere in particular the unstable locus of this 18:07 illness strangely parallels the uncertain location of philosophy as a 18:12 discipline it slightly eccentric or ectopic position within the university 18:17 and recalls shellings challenge to the very idea of disciplinary containment 18:23 how can something like philosophy which like God for the soul is everything and 18:30 everywhere 18:32 anything or anywhere in particular for example confined to a department or 18:37 relegated to a faculty where could either serve or suit or some 18:42 jurisdiction over the other faculties or disciplines

40:16 supernatural ministration is suffering the body is scant preparation for the 40:22 spiritual agonies awaiting the beleaguered penitent the torments of 40:26 such scrutiny forced confession 40:29 and a repentant repentance that keeps energizing itself by feeding on its own 40:35 insufficiency and can't just described the circle beautifully my penitence 40:40 provoked the anguishing second-degree reflection that I'm not adequate the 40:45 grief I suffer or that this grief itself is somehow an authentic or insufficient 40:51 I suffer over the fact that I'm not suffering enough or in the right way at 40:57 the right time with the right words and this reflexive anguish in turn provokes 41:03 the suspicion that I'm distracting myself with all this anguish and circle 41:09 of self punishment but eventually drives me to the point that I need to call in 41:13 an outsider a big other will be able to guide my spiritual practice to intercede 41:19 on my behalf and eventually to do my suffering for me a delegation of 41:24 responsibility that only compound's my kills and further tightened the 41:29 addictive my role and subjection to pilot is embodied in a nutshell was 41:35 subjected to of course anticipates Higgins objection to count himself was 41:43 so easy to write in other words the Reformation remains an unfinished 41:50 project can't describe the continuous prayer practice of the murrah viens as a 41:57 kind of artificial life support without which faith itself would die he's 42:02 referring to the practice of 24 7 worship institutionalized in the 18th 42:10 century by a man called Nickolaus since and off and you can still see vestiges 42:16 of the Arabian Brotherhood all around the world including fundamentalist 42:20 churches in in in the us- which advertised 24 7 worship like a 42:27 flickering flame as like life itself any break in the continuity of worship any 42:34 interruption of the flow of prayer severs the spiritual bond between human 42:39 and divine 42:40 and extinguishes the fragile spiritual life line from which alone redemption 42:44 issues i mean this is kind of cancer script is kind of anticipating for a 42:51 description of rap man's obsessional ritual of this constant prayer invented 42:55 as a kind of protective sheath 22 roundup 22 to ward off stuff and behind 43:04 the unending struggle with religion 43:07 lurks philosophies own battle with itself that is morality zone struggle 43:12 with its own lingering scrupulous city to fight that battle to purge suffering 43:19 of the last most stubborn bested a field logical investment

might require not 43:26 only borrowing the arsenal of medical science but administering to philosophy 43:31 a dose of unapologetic but now add a drop of utilitarianism a spoonful of 43:38 behaviorism a tincture of positivism or something even stupider can't fix this 43:46 is the stupidest thing I've a diet with respect to thinking comes at the wrong 43:55 time 44:21 that philosophy which is of course the very formal at the end of the first 44:24 boutique but he does not fly surprising without philosophers without being a 44:29 philosopher you can somehow if you're really out of it classifies the formula 44:36 echoes the sickness without sickness which is of course the very definition 44:41 of hypochondria and mirrors the

circularity of disease and cure non 44:47 philosophy is both the way of prolonging life so that you reach 44:53 age or very old age and something to do when you eventually get there a 44:58 suspension of conceptual labor which philosophy itself is point is brought to 45:03 the point of thinking but the formula is too reminiscent of all those other 45:09 without its not to make us sit up most notably purpose of Ennis without purpose 45:15 that had characterized the object of aesthetic judgment in the third critique

Algorithmic Cultures and Security - presentation by Luciana Parisi

- <https://vimeo.com/140173695>
8m11 critical theory antipathy
pragmatic : reason and logic
1
2 rejection transcendental reason and logic
abductive, inductive, deductive
extension of Kantian reasoning
meaning constructed through use of things
16:28 critical theory of automation needs to explain how use of data becomes part of social practices
37m40 incomputable
39:30 divorce capitalism from techno signs
44:00 making explicit what is implicit in non inferential materialities. - collective ability of extrapolating the meaning of its use of data. 45:50 conclusion: intelligibility -> reasoning
51m topology vs mathematic modeling
54m50 thinking about thinking
third level of abstraction where rules establish a relation between distinct levels of doing
56:30 abductive reasoning standard model of computation
cannot account for some key features of reason
know how skills: capacity to know the rules by which the patterning functions

Davos 2016 - A World Without Work?
<https://youtu.be/UnNs2MYVQoE> 26m detach work & income
29:10 Onet
7dimensions
30m complex unstructured problem solving 50:40 inclusive innovation competition shared prosperity
51:50 consumption tax
Pulp - Common people + Lyrics - Full version <https://youtu.be/NcBH4C5RtR8>
4:36 what common people do (an exhaustive list)

Jodi Dean: Communicative capitalism and the challenge for the left <https://youtu.be/mBYbURWYUrM>
1h10m
1h28m16s automation as a response to strength

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The Symptom 11

Spring 2010 – “Universalism versus globalization. This at least will be our US chapter – to be read as United Symptoms,”
Jacques-Alain Miller
EDITORIAL by J. A.

Deleuze and the Lacanian Real

Slavoj Žižek

http://www.lacan.com/symptom11/?p=346#_ftnref5

This purely virtual self-referential creating moves at infinite speed, since it needs no externality in/through which to mediate its self-positing movement: "Infinite speed thus describes a movement that no longer has anything to do with actual movement, a purely virtual 'movement' that has already reached its destination, whose moving is itself its own destination." [5]

] Peter Hallward, Out of This World, London: Verso, 2006, p. 142.

Encirclement -- Neo-Liberalism Ensnares Democracy (Part 1 of 2) <https://youtu.be/l8nrdLIMWvM?t=1h19m23s>

Rally of the Impossible Professions: J-A Miller (part 3) https://youtu.be/0vCTVk69S_A?t=3m5s

silencing unconscious, exacerbating death drive

-

Aldous Huxley And The Brave New World (1958) https://youtu.be/68OT54_ZvZ4?t=16m20s

-

Slavoj Žižek: Pervert's Guide to Europe¹

I claim intellectual property is the same. It will be the death of capitalism. <https://youtu.be/OLNU3wqG12M?t=1h56s>

I am tempted to say:

I am a communist out of pessimism.

The true utopia is not: another society is possible.

The true utopia is: to think that with a little compromises here and there we can none the less survive in a society in which we live.

My real fear is: what will become of our societies spontaneously if we don't introduce some economic, and so on, changes. So I am a moderate, not even a moderate pessimist. But maybe this is the only position of hope today. I hate optimists, you know why: because they are always disappointed. You know, if you are an optimist it is never like this. I prefer to be a pessimist, because then you have Syriza, this there, and it is always a little bit better than you expected, you know. So don't lose hope, precisely in situations which are like ours, miracles do happen. From time to time like Egypt, Tahrir Square, Syriza and so on and so on.

Don't lose nerves, miracles do happen.

<https://youtu.be/OLNU3wqG12M?t=1h5m1s>

if we say europe today then who is our bull?

1 American Liberalism

2 Capitalism with asian values authentication (justification of a lie)

1600 AD Mexico

virgin de gaudelope, the black virgin

<https://youtu.be/OLNU3wqG12M?t=1h8m3s>

What I like about European Union, and I know that it is practically a lost cause: is that we have a trans-national network, which in some way, with all illusions behind and so on. None the less isn't this some kind of a silent pre-supposition: that it stands for a civilisation which should look

neither like pure anglo saxon american liberalism, neither that nor that famous capitalism with asian values. Maybe the case is lost, what do I know? So there are two thieves, I agree. And I am not saying: we are returning to some original core of Europe or whatever. Although I am tempted to say maybe we do, you know because with all the limitations: only men, not slaves. But you know what was the miracle of limited as it was: Greek democracy. It is not only that those who were poor or whatever, also had the right to vote. But it was that they, like or. Let me jump from Greece to French revolution. When did the revolution really begin? Not when the third estate said simply: the first two estates have too much power, we also want our voice to be heard. No, when they said:

the first two estates just stand for themselves: we are the people, we, the third estate. This moment of universality, which you find even in Christianity. That what I

like in Christianity. Christianity is for me a religious form of atheism. In Christianity the message is: god dies, what survives is Heiliger Geist, which means emancipatory egalitarian community. That's what even, I had debates in Munchen, with bishops and so on, and I confused them, by asking them, the most elementary simple questions like for example: when christ says: if you don't hate your father mother, sister, you are not my follower, what exactly did christ mean there. My god it was incredible, how yeah we have to think about it, blabla and the.. Fuck you, you know this for two thousand years, I didn't bring some new thing you know. And then it is incredible what stupid answer I got: one of their answers was: we shouldn't absolutize christ. I thought my God in medieval times I would burn you for this statement.

Hegel was right when he said on the cross, ...

He just insists on one simple fact:

don't accept that my suffering has deeper meaning. what dies on the cross is god beyond itself <https://youtu.be/OLNU3wqG12M?t=1h16m7s>

<https://youtu.be/OLNU3wqG12M?t=1h16m7s>

pagan justic. harmonious society - fascist corporatism
against this

heiliger geist

we are not part of this totality

everyone of us has the right to direct contact with universality by bypassing particularity. buddhism equality in death - nirvana

christianity is this crazy hope equality can be materialized in an actual social organization

Aldous Huxley - Grey Eminence

- <https://youtu.be/OLNU3wqG12M?t=1h20m39s>

Militarization

<https://youtu.be/OLNU3wqG12M?t=1h22m50s>

My enemy is not the state, my enemy is big capital

deadly serious problem

How to prevent the right wing radicalization of europe. that is the true problem not through leftist sentimentality
the right winger will silently win and then there will be a leftist explanation.

Slavoj Žižek "Parsifal - A Piece of Didactic Brechtian Theater

sublime demand rossini - wagner <https://youtu.be/iABa3wCNyEc?t=5m52s>

Phenomenology of Spirit

GWF Hegel

In another sphere, revenge on an enemy is, according to the immediate law, the supreme satisfaction of the injured individuality. This law, however, which bids me confront him as himself a person who does not treat me as such, and in fact bids me destroy him as an individuality - this law is turned round by the principle of the other world into its opposite : the reinstatement of myself as a person through the destruction of the alien individuality is turned into self-destruction. If, now, this inversion, which finds expression in the punishment of crime, is made into a law, it, too, again is only the law of one world which is confronted by an inverted supersensible world where what is despised in the former is honoured, and what in the former is honoured, meets with contempt. The punishment which under the law of the first world disgraces and destroys a man, is transformed in its inverted world into the pardon which preserves his essential being and brings him to honour. pg97

The actual crime, however, has its inversion and its in-itself as possibility, in the intention as such, but not in a good intention ; for the truth of intention is only the act itself. But the crime, as regards its content, has its reflection- into-self, or its inversion, in the actual punishment ; this is the reconciliation of the law with the actuality opposed to it in the crime.

Finally, the actual punishment has its inverted actuality present in it in such a way that the punishment is an actualization of the law, whereby the activity exercised by the law as punishment suspends itself, and, from being active, the law becomes again quiescent and is vindicated, and the conflict of individuality with it, and of it with individuality, is extinguished.

pg 98

Anti communists are dogs <https://youtu.be/utmZmKzwqyQ?t=2m37s>

Ratman

after years of the og, years of the rat

unprecedented uniformization (bourgeois individualism)

RoboRat <https://youtu.be/-EvOIJp5KIY>

BMI

<https://youtu.be/utmZmKzwqyQ?t=1h51m8s>

I don't agree totally but ok

Let me make the most important point for which we don't have time, i think this reversal..

Phenomenology of Spirit GWF Hegel

183. Thus the action has a double significance not only

because it is directed against itself as well as against the other, but also because it is indivisibly the action of one as well as of the other.

pg 112

204. Dialectic as a negative movement, just as it immediately is, at first appears to consciousness as something which has it at its mercy, and which does not have its source in consciousness itself. As Scepticism, on the other hand, it is a moment of self-consciousness, to which it does not happen that its truth and reality vanish without its knowing how, but which, in the certainty of its freedom, makes this 'other' which claims

to be real, vanish. What Scepticism causes to vanish is not only objective reality as such, but its own relationship to it, in which the 'other' is held to be objective and is established as such, and hence, too, its perceiving, along with firmly securing what it is in danger of losing, viz. sophistry, and the truth it has itself determined and established. Through this self-conscious negation it procures for its own self the certainty of its freedom, generates the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises

it to truth. What vanishes is the determinate element, or the moment of difference, which, whatever its mode of being and whatever its source, sets itself up as something fixed and immutable. It contains no permanent element, and must vanish before thought, because the 'different' is just this, not to be in possession of itself, but to have its essential being only in an other. Thinking, however, is the insight into this nature of the 'different', it is the negative essence, as simple.

205. The sceptical self-consciousness thus experiences in the flux of all that would stand secure before it its own freedom as given and preserved by itself. It is aware of this stoical indifference of a thinking which thinks itself, the unchanging and genuine certainty of itself. This self-certainty does not issue from something alien, whose complex development was deposited within it, a result which would leave behind it the process of its coming to be. On the contrary, consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest, this medley of sensuous and intellectual representations whose differences coincide, and whose identity

is equally again dissolved, for it is itself determinateness as contrasted with the non-identical. But it is just in this process that this consciousness, instead of being self-identical, is in fact not-

FREEDOM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 125

ing but a purely casual, confused medley, the dizziness of a perpetually self-engendered disorder. It is itself aware of this ; for itself maintains and creates this restless confusion. Hence it also admits to it, it owns to being a wholly contingent, single, and separate consciousness-a consciousness which is empirical, which takes its guidance from what has no reality for it, which obeys what is for it not an essential being, which does those things and brings to realization what it knows has no truth for it. But equally, while it takes itself in this way to be a single and separate, contingent and, in fact, animal life, and a lost self-consciousness, it also, on the contrary, converts itself again into a consciousness that is universal and self-identical; for it is the negativity of all singularity and all difference. From this self identity, or within its own self, it falls back again into the former contingency and confusion, for this same spontaneous negativity has to do solely with what is single and separate, and occupies itself with what is contingent. This consciousness is therefore the unconscious, thoughtless rambling which passes back and forth from the one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness to the other extreme of the contingent consciousness that is both bewildered and bewildering. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together. At one time it recognizes that its freedom lies in rising above all the confusion and contingency of existence, and at another time equally admits to a relapse into occupying itself with what is unessential. It lets the unessential content in its thinking vanish ; but just in doing so it is the consciousness of something unessential. It pronounces an absolute vanishing, but the pronouncement is, and this consciousness is the vanishing that is pronounced. It affirms the nullity of seeing, hearing, etc., yet it is itself seeing, hearing, etc. It affirms the nullity of ethical principles, and lets its conduct be governed by these very principles. Its deeds and its words always belie one another and equally it has itself the doubly contradictory consciousness of unchangeableness and sameness, and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself. But it keeps the poles of this its self-contradiction apart, and adopts the same attitude to it as it does in its purely negative activity in general. Point out likeness or identity to it, and it will point out unlikeness or non-identity ; and when it is now confronted with what it has just asserted, it turns round and

B. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

points out likeness or identity. Its talk is in fact like the squabbling of self-willed children, one of whom says A if the other says B, and in turn says B if the other says A, and who by contradicting themselves buy for themselves the pleasure of continually contradicting one another.

pg 124- 126

Hagia Sophia - Istanbul's Ancient Mystery (Documentary) <https://youtu.be/ZKR6KRbYcL0?t=8m37s>

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Slavoj Zizek "On Jacques Lacan"

(Full Lecture) <https://youtu.be/7HpuDmTqWal?t=34m08s> sexual difference
Lacan formula's of sexuation, relating to aristotle
Logical square Hertovic
Un a

uni n <https://youtu.be/7HpuDmTqWal?t=35m59s>
all swans are white
some swans are white
all swans are none white some swans are none white
aristotle all I some I
lacan
all x are y
one x is not y I none x are not all y <https://youtu.be/LpZXRaZtL-g?t=43m8s>
<https://youtu.be/7HpuDmTqWal?t=1h44m30s> Kant science
Fichte politics
Schelling art
art as higher level of knowledge Hegel love

What do you want?

- 1) to always have enough money to do what i want.
- 2) to be in true love and to have good health.
- 3) to share life with peace loving friends.
- 4) to make art.
- 5) to have the power to make infinite wishes and have those wishes come true.

Great Minds: Slavoj Žižek

<https://youtu.be/cW1zUh94uMY?t=33m40s>

A true intellectual doesn't resolve problems posed by others.

The first step of intellectual work is to precisely to reflect on the problem itself. What if the way we perceive a problem is already part of the problem? What if the way we spontaneously formulate a problem, mystifies the problem? I think that this is the task of it.

all non some non

I no x is non y

For the life of k'bl'a

Slavoj Zizek - The Abyss Of Spirituality

steven weinberg <https://youtu.be/TyaXdZRysGM?t=6m34s>

Without religion bad people would be doing bad things and good people good things. You need something like religion to make good people do bad things.

Phenomenology of Spirit

40 1 . First of all, then, the originally determinate nature [or natural predisposition] of individuality, its immediate essence, is not as yet posited as active, and as such is called special capacity, talent, character, and so on. This peculiar tinge of Spirit is to be looked on as the sole content of the End itself and as the sole reality. If we thought of consciousness as going beyond that, and as wanting to give reality to a different content; then we should be thinking of it as a Nothing working towards Nothing. Further, this original essence is not merely the content of the End, but is in itself the reality as well, which otherwise has the appearance of being a given material of the action, of being a reality found to begin with, which is to be shaped by the action. That is to say, action simply translates an initially implicit being into a being that is made explicit ; the being-in-itself of the reality opposed to consciousness is reduced to a mere empty show. This consciousness, then, when

bringing itself to act, does not let itself be led astray by what is merely the show of a given reality, and equally it has to avoid floundering about in empty thoughts and Ends, and has to hold on to the original content of its essence. True, this original content is only explicit for consciousness when the latter has made it into a reality; but the distinction between a content, which is explicit for consciousness only within consciousness itself, and an intrinsic reality outside it,

C. (AA.) REASON

no longer exists. Consciousness must act merely in order that what it is in itself may become explicit for it ; in other words, action is simply the coming-to-be of Spirit as consciousness. What the latter is in itself, it knows therefore from what it actually is. Accordingly, an individual cannot know what he [really] is until he has made himself a reality through action. However, this seems to imply that he cannot determine the End of his action

until he has carried it out; but at the same time, since he is a conscious individual, he must have the action in front of him beforehand as entirely his own, i.e. as an End. The individual who is going to act seems, therefore, to find himself in a circle in which each moment already presupposes the other, and thus he seems unable to find a beginning, because he only gets to know his original nature, which must be his End, from the deed, while, in order to act, he must have that End beforehand. But for that very reason he has to start immediately, and, whatever the circumstances, without further scruples about beginning, means, or End, proceed to action ; for his essence and intrinsic nature is beginning, means, and End, all in one. As beginning, this nature is present in the circumstances of the action ; and

the interest which the individual finds in something is the answer already given to the question, 'whether he should act, and what should be done in a given case'. For what seems to be a given reality is in itself his own original nature, which has merely the illusory appearance of an [objective] being-an appearance implied in the Notion of action with its twofold aspect, but which shows itself to be his own original nature by the interest he takes in it. Similarly, the 'how' or the means is determined in and for itself. Talent is likewise nothing else but the determinate, original individuality considered as an inner means, or as a transition from End to an achieved reality. But the actual means and the real transition are the unity of talent with the nature of the matter in hand, present in that interest : talent represents in the means the side of action, interest the side of content ; both are individuality itself, as an interfusion of being and action. What we have, therefore, is a set of given circumstances which are in themselves the individual's own original nature ; next, the interest which treats them as its own or as its End ; and finally,

the union [of these] and the abolition of the antithesis in the means. This union itself still falls within consciousness and the INDIVIDUALITY REAL IN AND FOR ITSELF 241

whole just considered is one side of an antithesis. This illusory appearance of an antithesis which still remains, is removed by the transition or the means ; for the means is a unity of inner and outer, the antithesis of the specific character it has as an inner means. It therefore rids itself of that character and posits itself-this unity of action and being-equally as an outer, as an individuality that has itself become a reality, i.e. an individuality which is posited for individuality itself as [objectively] existent. In this way, the entire action does not go outside itself, either as circumstances, or as End, or means, or as a work done.

pg 239-241

Slavoj Zizek The Idea of Communism and its Actuality Hegelian notion of idea

<https://youtu.be/gNlpJBGskdw?t=51m31s>

<https://youtu.be/gNlpJBGskdw?t=1h52m30s> Capra (pro mussolini) "You can take it with you"

Slavoj Žižek "The Freedom of a Forced Choice" [NEW!] <https://youtu.be/BWllczVOIU8?t=54m14s>

perversion not subversive

hysteria sub versive

--

a la fin de ta colère on trouvera ton âme amoureuse;
ou quelque chose différent et difficile à définir en mots, sons, images ni sensibilité.

--

Phenomenology of Spirit

416. Just as the 'matter in hand' itself and its moments appear here as content, they are equally necessary, too, as forms in consciousness. They appear as content only to vanish, each

making room for the other. They must therefore be present in the character of superseded forms ; but as such they are aspects of consciousness itself. The 'matter in hand' is present as the in itself or the reflection into itself of consciousness ; the supplanting of the moments by one another finds expression there, how ever, in their being established in consciousness, not as they are in themselves but only as existing for another consciousness. One of the moments of the content is exposed by it to the light

of day and made manifest to others ; but consciousness is at the same time reflected back from it into itself and the opposite is equally present within consciousness which retains it for itself as its own. At the same time what occurs is not that one or other of the moments is merely exposed, and another merely retained ; on the contrary, consciousness operates alternately with them, for it must make one as well as another essential for itself and for the others. The whole is the spontaneous interfusion of individuality and the universal ; but because this whole is present for consciousness only as the simple essence, and thus as the abstraction, of the 'matter in hand' its separate moments fall apart outside of that 'matter in hand' and of one another. As a whole,

249

C. (AA.) REASON

it is only exhaustively exhibited by alternately exposing its moments and retaining them for itself. Since in this alternation consciousness keeps, in its reflection, one moment for itself and as essential, while another is only externally present in it, or is for others, there thus enters a play of individualities with one another in which each and all find themselves both deceiving and deceived.

423. What is thus given immediately must likewise be accepted and considered immediately. Just as in the case of 253

C. (AA.) REASON

sense-certainty, we had to examine the nature of what it immediately expressed as being, so here, too, we have to see how the being expressed by this immediate ethical certainty, or by the immediately existing 'masses' of the ethical substance, is constituted. Examples of some such laws will show us this ; and since we take them in the form of declarations of the sound Reason which knows them, we do not have first to introduce the moment which has to be made valid in them, considered as immediate ethical laws.

425. Another celebrated commandment is: 'Love thy neighbour as thyself.' It is directed to the individual in his relationship with other individuals and asserts the commandment as a relationship between two individuals, or as a relationship of feeling. Active love-for love that does not act has no existence and is therefore hardly intended here-aims at removing an evil from someone and being good to him. For this purpose I have to distinguish what is bad for him, what is the appropriate good to counter this evil, and what in general is good for perhaps do him more harm than hatred. Intelligent, substantial beneficence is, however, in its richest and most important form the intelligent universal action of the state-an action compared with which the action of a single individual, as an individual, is so insignificant that it is hardly worth talking about. him; i.e. I must love him intelligently. Unintelligent love will. The action of the state is, moreover, of so great a power that, if the action of the individual were to oppose it, and either were intended to be a downright, explicitly criminal act, or the individual out of love for someone else wanted to cheat the state, would be altogether useless and inevitably frustrated. The only way out of its right, and its share in the action, such an action significance left for beneficence, which is a sentiment, is that of an action which is quite single and isolated, of help in (a situation of) need, which is as contingent as it is transitory. Chance determines not only the occasion of the action but also whether it

C. (AA.) REASON

is a 'work' at all, whether it is not immediately undone and even perverted into something bad. Thus this acting for the good of others which is said to be necessary, is of such kind that it may, or may not, exist ; is such that, if by chance the occasion offers, the action is perhaps a 'work' and is good, but also perhaps not. This law, therefore, as little has a universal content as the one we first considered, and does not express, as an absolute ethical law should, something that is valid in and for itself. In other words, such laws stop short at Ought, they have no actuality; they are not laws, but merely commandments.

430. But that is the reason why this testing does not get very far. Just because the criterion is a tautology, and indifferent to the content, one content is just as acceptable to it as its opposite. Suppose the question is: Ought it to be an absolute law that there should be property? Absolute, and not on grounds of utility for other ends : the essence of ethics consists just in law being identical with itself and through this self-identity, i.e. through having its ground in itself, it is unconditioned.

C. (AA.) REASON

Property, simply as such, does not contradict itself; it is an isolated determinateness, or is posited as merely self-identical. Non property, the non-ownership of things, or a common ownership of goods, is just as little self-contradictory. That something belongs to nobody, or to the first-comer who takes possession of it, or to all together, to each according to his need or in equal portions - that is a simple determinateness, a formal thought, like its opposite, property. Admittedly, if a thing that belongs to no one is considered as a necessary object of a need, then it is necessary that it become the property of some particular individual ; and the contradiction would stem rather from the freedom of the thing being made into a law.

But by non-ownership of the thing is not meant absolute non-ownership, but that it shall come into someone's possession according to the individual's need, and, moreover, not in order to be kept, but to be used immediately. But to provide for the need in such a completely arbitrary way is contradictory to the nature of the conscious individual who alone is under discussion. For such an individual must think of his need in the form of universality, must provide for the whole of his existence, and acquire a lasting possession. This being so, the idea of a thing being arbitrarily allotted to the first self-conscious individual who comes along and needs it, does not accord with itself. In a society based on a common ownership of goods, in which provision would be made in accordance with a universal fixed rule, either each receives as much as he needs-in which case there is a contradiction between this inequality and the essential nature of that consciousness whose principle is the equality of individuals--or, in accordance with that principle, goods will be equally distributed, and in this case the share is not related to the need, although such a relationship alone constitutes the very notion of 'sharing'.

pg 249-258

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What is Repression

Samo Tomsic <https://youtu.be/PgaczIzuqXs?t=47m15s> superego
drive demand enjoy-work

--
Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 3/30 <https://youtu.be/EuO7CJfjFFY?t=14m37s>
evolving
psychoanalyst - authorization only from himself

-
play until <https://youtu.be/RBVH37kwGPk?t=2m57s> mix with <https://youtu.be/Cil62q96oRA?t=16m24s>

-
Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 6/30 <https://youtu.be/1G7JdOWIS5w>
Me, object-image
I, subject

share with solo of poet dancer -

Egypt - Karnak - A Hidden History. 1/3 until <https://youtu.be/33JGzwmo0t4?t=4m4s> mix with Anna Graceman - Living in Denial (EigenARTig Remix) <https://youtu.be/r8Q0r1v6ntA> Egypt - Karnak - A Hidden History <https://youtu.be/33JGzwmo0t4?t=5m43s> then Prof.

Bruno Latour - The Anthropocene and the Destruction of the Image of the Globe <https://youtu.be/4-l6FQN4P1c?t=18m36s>

Encirclement -- Neo-Liberalism Ensnared Democracy (Part 2 of 2) https://youtu.be/Vdz3MP_V3cM?t=30m49s mesures de washington consensus

Brexit panic wipes \$2 trillion off world markets - as it happened <https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2016/jun/24/global-markets-ftse-pound-uk-leave-eu-brexit-live-updates>

Yuri Bezmenov: Deception Was My Job (Complete) <https://youtu.be/y3qkf3bajd4?t=1h8m57s> four stages

Donald Trump political campaign ad <https://youtu.be/OVHfuCzFc-0>

then <https://youtu.be/33JGzwmo0t4?t=6m51s> till temple city, three - mix to <https://youtu.be/4-l6FQN4P1c?t=22m2s>
<https://youtu.be/4-l6FQN4P1c?t=48m23s> sensitivity - loops

devil faust - i am the spirit of always saying no.

loops, critique spaceship earth, houston base <https://youtu.be/4-l6FQN4P1c?t=54m19s>

-

a la fin de ta colere on trouvera ton âme amoureuse; ou quelque chose different et difficile a definir en mots, sons, images ni sensibilité. Les substances font parler les gens de l'état. La détente paresse de sa parraine de détention.

-
Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 8/30
<https://youtu.be/dcDydQUmWug?t=9m7s> development of discourse - semantics similarity - metaphoric contiguity - metonymy

6. Classical Conditioning II: Temporal Contiguity is not Enough https://youtu.be/xGt4Aa_NAy8

7.

Rescorla-Wagner Model and Dopamine Jackpot

<https://youtu.be/UC4V8dJxGRw?t=3m35s> –

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-KKiqpGFM6U> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8b-cfIPpec>

Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 8/30 <https://youtu.be/dcDydQUmWug?t=12m31s> a star is born

Chicks On Speed - Little Star <https://youtu.be/otl8KeZ7Auk> <http://southpark.cc.com/full-episodes/s16e09-raising-the-bar> 18m30s

psychotic patients..

Isis, Seth and Osiris <https://youtu.be/GqoxpMd8nt8>

Flume - Never Be Like You feat. Kai <https://youtu.be/Ly7uj0JwgKg>

"Glitch" forgotten thought - subject to substitution

Nabiha - Mind The Gap (Official Video) <https://youtu.be/avY-XIFNas0>

Alfons - Glitch 2015 https://youtu.be/2_qAheeGbbg

Synectics <https://youtu.be/X-AfXP3lyiE>

Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 10/30 Castration - psychotic structure https://youtu.be/vF_dlolWWE0?t=19m09s

Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 11/30 <https://youtu.be/qHN-yPrv0UI?t=10m50s>

Lil' Kim How Many Licks ft Sisqo <https://youtu.be/dy468aoZADo>

Tommy Lee feat Lil' Kim, Fred Durst Get Naked https://youtu.be/1me5rHk_Rc4?t=2m17s Bounce That Dick https://youtu.be/YwLMM_QBkMc

Uncle Sam - I Don't Ever Want TO See You Again <https://youtu.be/OWasrUYMHgo>

Britney Spears - Work Bitch (The Jane Doze Official Remix) https://youtu.be/ib_St1oxC-c The Prodigy - Breathe (official video + lyrics) <https://youtu.be/OfdCJ50dqW4> Psychosomatic addict, insane.

Phenomenology of Spirit

469. Ethical self-consciousness now learns from its deed the developed nature of what it actually did, as much when it obeyed divine law as when it followed human law. The law that is manifest to it is linked in the essence with its opposite ; the essence is the unity of both; but the deed has only carried out one law in contrast to the other. But the two laws being linked in the essence, the fulfilment of the one evokes the other and the deed having made it so-calls it forth as a violated and now hostile entity demanding revenge. In the action, only one aspect

of the resolve as such is clearly manifest. The resolve, however, is in itself the negative aspect which confronts the resolve with an 'other', with something alien to the resolve which knows what it does. Actuality therefore holds concealed within it the other aspect which is alien to this knowledge, and does not reveal the whole truth about itself to consciousness: the son does not recognize his father in the man who has wronged him and whom he slays, nor his mother in the queen whom he makes his wife. In this way, a power which shuns the light of day ensnares the ethical self-consciousness, a power which breaks forth only after the deed is done, and seizes the doer in the act. For the accomplished deed is the removal of the antithesis between the knowing self and the actuality confronting it. The doer cannot deny the crime or his guilt: the significance of the deed is that what was unmoved has been set in motion, and that what was locked up in mere possibility has been brought out into the open, hence to link together the unconscious and the conscious, non-being with being. In this truth, therefore, the deed is brought out into the light of day, as something in which the conscious is bound up with the unconscious, what is one's own with what is alien to it, as an entity

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divided within itself, whose other aspect consciousness experiences and also finds to be its own, but as the power it has violated and roused to hostility.

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475 · In this representation, the movement of human and divine law finds its necessity expressed in individuals in whom the universal appears as a 'pathos', and the activity of the movement appears as the action of individuals, which gives the appearance of contingency to the necessity of the activity. But individuality and action constitute the principle of individuality as such, a principle which in its pure universality was called inner divine law. As a moment of the visible community its activity is not confined merely to the underworld, or to its outer existence, but it has an equally visible existence and movement in the actual nation. Taken in this form, what was represented as a simple movement of the individualized 'pathos' acquires a different look, and the crime and consequent destruction of the community acquire the proper and characteristic form of their existence. Human law in its universal existence is the community, in its activity in general is the manhood of the community, in its real and effective activity is the

government. It is, moves, and maintains itself by consuming and absorbing into itself the separatism of the Penates, or the separation into

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independent families presided over by womankind, and by keeping them dissolved in the fluid continuity of its own nature. But the Family is, at the same time, in general its element, the individual consciousness the basis of its general activity. Since the community only gets an existence through its interference with the happiness of the Family, and by dissolving [individual] self consciousness into the universal, it creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it an internal

enemy-womankind in general. Womankind-the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community--changes by intrigue the universal end of the government into a private end, transforms its universal activity into a work of some particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament for the Family. Woman in this way turns to ridicule the earnest wisdom of mature age which, indifferent to purely private pleasures and enjoyments, as well as to playing an active part, only thinks of and cares for the

universal. She makes this wisdom an object of derision for raw and irresponsible youth and unworthy of their enthusiasm. In general, she maintains that it is the power of youth that really counts : the worth of the son lies in his being the lord and master of the mother who bore him, that of the brother as being one in whom the sister finds man on a level of equality, that of the youth as being one through whom the daughter, freed from her dependence [on the family] obtains the enjoyment and dignity of wifehood. The community, however, can only maintain itself by suppressing this spirit of individualism, and, because it is an essential moment, all the same creates it and, moreover, creates it by its repressive attitude towards it as a hostile principle.

However, this principle, being merely evil and futile in its separation from the universal end, would be quite ineffectual if the community itself did not recognize the power of youth (the manhood which, while immature, still stands within the sphere of individuality) , as the power of the whole. For the community is a nation, is itself an individuality, and essentially is only such for itself by other individualities being for it, by excluding them from itself and knowing itself to be independent of them. The negative side of the community, suppressing the isolation of individuals within it, but spontaneously active in an outward direction, finds its weapons in individuality. War is the

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Spirit and the form in which the essential moment of the ethical substance, the absolute freedom of the ethical self from every existential form, is present in its actual and authentic existence. While, on the one hand, war makes the individual systems of property and personal independence, as well as the personality of the individual himself, feel the power of the negative, on the other hand, this negativity is prominent in war as that which preserves the whole. The brave youth in whom woman finds her pleasure, the suppressed principle of corruption, now has his day and his worth is openly acknowledged. Now, it is physical strength and what appears as a matter of luck, that decides on the existence of ethical life and spiritual necessity. Because the existence of ethical life rests on strength and luck, the decision is already made that its downfall has come. Just as previously only the Penates succumbed to the national Spirit, so now the living Spirits of the nation succumb through their own individuality and perish in a universal community, whose simple universality is soulless and dead, and is alive only in the single individual, qua single. The ethical shape of Spirit has vanished and another takes its place.

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Spoiler Alert - Fan Fest <https://youtu.be/nkOrZ0NRzLA>

B.o.B - EARTHQUAKE - Official Video <https://youtu.be/lIAJOAb3fSs> -

Fatboy Slim - Right Here, Right Now <https://youtu.be/l7ZISHGFfdc>

Phenomenology of Spirit

489. It is therefore through culture that the individual acquires standing and actuality. His true original nature and substance is the alienation of himself as Spirit from his natural being. This externalization is, therefore, both the purpose and the existence of the individual ; it is at once the means, or the transition, both of the [mere] thought-form of substance into actuality, and, conversely, of the specific individuality into essentiality. This individuality

moulds itself by culture into what it intrinsically is, and only by so doing is it an intrinsic being that has an actual existence ; the measure of its culture is the measure of its actuality and power. Although here the self knows itself as this self, yet its actuality consists solely in the setting-aside of its natural self.

Consequently, the originally specific nature is reduced to the unessential difference of quantity, to a greater or lesser energy of will. But the purpose and content of the will belong solely to the universal substance itself and can only be a universal. The particularity of a nature which becomes purpose and content is something powerless and unreal ; it is a 'kind' of being which vainly and ridiculously strains every nerve to get going ; it is the contradiction of giving to what is particular an actuality which is immediately a universal. If, therefore, individuality is erroneously supposed to be rooted in the particularity of nature and character, then in the actual world there are no individualities and no characters, but everyone is like everyone else ; but this presumed individuality really only exists in someone's mind, an imaginary existence which has no abiding place in this world, where only that which externalizes itself, and, therefore, only the universal, obtains an actual existence. That is why such

an imagined existence is esteemed for what it is, for a kind of being. 'Kind' is not quite the same as *espece*, 'the most horrid of all nicknames ; for it denotes mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt'.¹ 'Kind' and 'good of its kind' are, however, German expressions which add an air of honesty to this meaning, as if it were not really meant so badly ; or, again, consciousness is, in fact, not yet aware what 'kind', and what 'culture' and 'reality' are.

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491 . The self knows itself as actual only as a transcended self. Therefore, it is not constituted by the unity of consciousness of itself and the object ; on the contrary, the object is, for the self, its negative. Thus, by means of the self as soul of the process, substance is so moulded and developed in its moments that one opposite stirs the other into life, each by its alienation from the other gives it an existence and equally receives from it an existence of its own. At the same time, each moment possesses its own specific nature as something unchallengeably valid and as a firm reality vis-a-vis the other. Thinking fixes this difference in the most general way by the absolute antithesis of good and bad which, shunning each other, cannot in any way become one and the same . The soul of this fixed being, however, is the immediate transition into its opposite ; existence is really the perversion of every determinateness into its opposite, and it is only this alienation that is the essential nature and support of

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the whole. We have now to consider this process in which the moments are stirred into life and given an existence of their own; the alienation will alienate itself, and the whole will, through this alienation, return into its Notion.

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502. Now, these relations express, in the first instance, the judgement, the determination, of what these two essential realities are as objects for consciousness, not as yet what they are in and for themselves. The reflection which is presented in the judgement is partly an affirmation of the one as of the other only for us, and is therefore an equal annulling of both ; it is not yet the reflection of them for consciousness itself. Partly,

at first, they simply are essences, they have not become such, nor do they possess self-

consciousness : that for which they are is not that which animates them, they are predicates which are not yet themselves subject. On account of this separation, the whole of the spiritual judgement falls apart into two consciousnesses,

C. (88.) SPIRIT

each of which is subject to a one-sided determination. Now, just as at first the indifference of the two sides of the alienation one of which was the in-itself of pure consciousness, viz. the specific thoughts of Good and Bad, the other their existence as state power and wealth-was raised into a relation between them, into a judgement, so must this external relation be raised to an inner unity, or to a relation of thought to actuality, and the Spirit of both forms of the judgement must make its appearance. This happens when the judgement becomes a syllogism, i.e. becomes the mediating process in which the necessity and the

middle term of both sides of the judgement come to view.

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521 . It is this absolute and universal inversion and alienation of the actual world and of thought ; it is pure culture. What is learnt in this world is that neither the actuality of power and wealth, nor their specific Notions, 'good' and 'bad', or the consciousness of 'good' and 'bad' (the noble and the ignoble consciousness) , possess truth ; on the contrary, all these moments become inverted, one changing into the other, and each is the opposite of itself. The universal power, which is the Substance, when it acquires a spiritual nature of its own through the principle of individuality, receives its own self merely as a name, and though it is the actuality of power, is really the powerless being that sacrifices its own self. But this expendable, self-less being, or the self that has become a Thing, is rather the return of that being into itself; it is being-for-self that is explicitly for itself, the concrete existence of Spirit. The thoughts of these two essences, of 'good' and 'bad', are similarly inverted in this move-

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3'7

ment ; what is characterized as good is bad, and vice versa. The consciousness of each of these moments, the consciousnesses judged as noble and ignoble, are rather in their truth just as much the reverse of what these characterizations are supposed to be ; the noble consciousness is ignoble and repudiated, just as the repudiated consciousness changes round into the nobility which characterizes the most highly developed freedom of self consciousness. From a formal standpoint, everything is outwardly the reverse of what it is for itself; and, again, it is not in truth what it is for itself, but something else than it wants to be ; being-for-self is rather the loss of itself, and its self-alienation rather the preservation of itself. What we have here, then, is that all the moments execute a universal justice on one another, each just as much alienates its own self, as it forms itself into its opposite and in this way inverts it. The Spirit, however, is just this unity of the absolutely separate moments, and, indeed, it is just through the free actuality of these self less extremes that, as their middle term, it achieves a concrete existence. It exists in the universal talk and destructive judgement which strips of their significance all those moments which are supposed to count as the true being and as actual members of the whole, and is equally this nihilistic game which it plays with itself. This judging and talking is, therefore, what is true and invincible, while it overpowers everything ; it is solely with this alone that one has truly to do with in this actual world. In this world, the Spirit of each part finds expression, or is wittily talked about, and

finds said about it what it is. The honest individual takes each moment to be an abiding essentiality, and is the uneducated thoughtlessness of not knowing that it is equally doing the reverse. The disrupted consciousness, how ever, is consciousness of the perversion, and, moreover, of the absolute perversion. What prevails in it is the Notion, which brings together in a unity the thoughts which, in the honest individual, lie far apart, and its language is therefore clever and witty.

522. The content of what Spirit says about itself is thus the perversion of every Notion and reality, the universal deception of itself and others ; and the shamelessness which gives utterance to this deception is just for that reason the greatest truth. This kind of talk is the madness of the musician 'who heaped up and

C. (BB.) SPIRIT

mixed together thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every sort ; now with a deep bass he descended into hell, then, contracting his throat, he rent the vaults of heaven with a fal setto tone, frantic and soothed, imperious and mocking, by turns'.! To the tranquil consciousness which, in its honest way, takes the melody of the Good and the True to consist in the evenness of the notes, i.e. in unison, this talk appears as a 'rig marole of wisdom and folly, as a medley of as much skill as baseness, of as many correct as false ideas, a mixture com

pounded of a complete perversion of sentiment, of absolute shamefulness, and of perfect frankness and truth. It will be unable to refrain from entering into all these tones and running up and down the entire scale of feelings from the profoundest contempt and dejection to the highest pitch of admiration and emotion ; but blended with the latter will be a tinge of ridicule which spoils them.'2 The former, however, will find in their very frankness a strain of reconciliation, will find in their subversive depths the all-powerful note which restores Spirit to itself.

523. If we contrast with the speech of this mind which is fully aware of its confused state, the speech of that simple consciousness of the true and the good, we find that in face of the frank and self-conscious eloquence of the educated mind, it can be no more than taciturn ; for to the latter it can say nothing that it does not already know and say. If it gets beyond speaking in monosyllables, it says, therefore, the same thing that is said by the educated mind, but in doing so also commits the folly of imagining it is saying something new and different. Its very words 'shameful', 'ignoble' are already this folly, for the other says them about itself. This latter mind perverts in its speech all that is unequivocal, because what is self-identical is only an abstraction, but in its actual existence is in its own self a perversion. The plain mind, on the other hand, takes under its protection the good and noble i.e. what retains its self-identity in its utterance, in the only way here possible—that is to say, the 'good' does not lose its value because it may be associated or mixed with the 'bad', for this is its condition and necessity, and in this fact lies the wisdom of Nature. Yet this plain mind, while

1 Diderot, Nephew of Rameau. 2 ibid.

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it imagined it was contradicting what was said, has, in doing so, merely condensed into a trivial form the content of Spirit's utterance ; in making the opposite of the noble and good into the condition and necessity of the noble and good, it thoughtlessly supposes itself to be saying something else than that what is called noble and good is in its essence the reverse of itself, or that, conversely, the 'bad' is the 'excellent'.

524. If the simple consciousness compensates for this

dull, uninspired thought by the actuality of the excellent, by adducing an example of the latter, either in the form of a fictitious case or a true story, thus showing that it is no empty name but actually exists, the universal actuality of the perverted action stands opposed to the whole of the real world in which the said example constitutes something quite single and separate, an espece, a mere 'sort' of thing; and to represent the existence of the good and noble as an isolated anecdote, whether fictitious or true, is the most disparaging thing that can be said about it. Finally, should the plain mind demand the dissolution of this whole world of perversion, it cannot demand of the individual that he remove himself from it, for even Diogenes in his tub is conditioned by it, and to make this demand of the individual is just what is reckoned to be bad, viz. to care for himself qua individual. But if the demand for this removal is directed to the universal individuality, it cannot mean that Reason should give up again the spiritually developed consciousness it has acquired, should submerge the widespread wealth of its moments again in the simplicity of the natural heart, and relapse into the wilderness of the nearly animal consciousness, which is also called Nature or innocence. On the contrary, the demand for this dissolution can only be directed to the Spirit of culture itself, in order that it return out of its confusion to itself as Spirit, and win for itself a still higher consciousness.

525. But in point of fact, Spirit has already accomplished

this in principle. The consciousness that is aware of its disruption and openly declares it, derides existence and the universal confusion, and derides its own self as well ; it is at the same time the fading, but still audible, sound of all this confusion. This vanity of all reality and every definite notion, vanity which knows itself to be such, is the double reflection

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of the real world into itself: once in this particular self of consciousness qua particular, and again in the pure universality of consciousness, or in thought. In the first case, Spirit that has come to itself has directed its gaze to the world of actuality and still has there its purpose and immediate content ; but, in the other case, its gaze is in part turned only inward and negatively against it, and in part is turned away from that world towards heaven, and its object is the beyond of this world.

526. In that aspect of the return into the self, the vanity of all things is its own vanity, it is itself vain. It is the self-centred self that knows, not only how to pass judgement on and chatter about everything, but how to give witty expression to the contradiction that is present in the solid elements of the actual world, as also in the fixed determinations posited by judgement; and this contradiction is their truth. Looked at from the point of view of form, it knows everything to be self-alienated, being for-self is separated from being-in-itself; what is meant, and purpose, are separated from truth ; and from both again, the being-for-another, the ostensible meaning from the real meaning, from the true thing and intention. Thus it knows how to

give correct expression to each moment in relation to its opposite, in general, how to express accurately the perversion of everything ; it knows better than each what each is, no matter what its specific nature is. Since it knows the substantial from the side of the disunion and conflict which are united within the substantial itself, but not from the side of this union, it understands very well how to pass judgement on it, but has lost the ability to comprehend it. This vanity at the same time needs the vanity of all things in order to get from them the

consciousness of self; it therefore creates this vanity itself and is the soul that supports it. Power and wealth are the supreme ends of its exertions, it knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it forms itself into the universal, attains to the possession of it, and in this possession is universally recognized and accepted : state power and wealth are the real and acknowledged powers. However,

this recognition and acceptance is itself vain ; and just by taking possession of power and wealth it knows them to be without a self of their own, knows rather that it is the power over them, while they are vain things. The fact that in possessing them it is itself apart from and beyond them, is exhibited in

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its witty talk which is, therefore, its supreme interest and the truth of the whole relationship. In such talk, this particular self, qua this pure self, determined neither by reality nor by thought, develops into a spiritual self that is of truly universal worth. It is the self-disruptive nature of all relationships and the conscious disruption of them ; but only as self-consciousness in revolt is it aware of its own disrupted state, and in thus knowing it has immediately risen above it. In that vanity, all content is turned into something negative which can no longer be grasped as having a positive significance. The positive object is merely the pure '/' itself, and the disrupted consciousness in itself this pure self-identity of self-consciousness that has returned to itself.

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Carly Simon - You're So Vain <https://youtu.be/mQZmCJUSC6g>

Jacques Ranciere - Anarchism, Para-Academia, Pure Politics, and the Non-Human <https://youtu.be/8n9l6QvfjXA?t=13m45s>

if you allow animals ..new form of absorption in politics of a police logic

Martin Garrix - Animals (Official Video) <https://youtu.be/gCYchZ2k5x0> sound of da police https://youtu.be/_BxBs4f4RIU

The Police - Every Little Thing She Does Is Magic <https://youtu.be/aENX1Sf3fgQ>

The Police - Every Breath You Take <https://youtu.be/OMOGaugKpzs>

Zizek - I don't care about surveillance <https://youtu.be/PBBzYG8szmc> Politburo Jerico Disco per l'Estate 1994 <https://youtu.be/oD04v-oCmko>

Mark Ronson - Uptown Funk ft. Bruno Mars <https://youtu.be/OPf0YbXqDm0> Gladiatrix Documentary Part One <https://youtu.be/cav2RnGHwDU>

Brooklyn Bounce - X2X We Want More <https://youtu.be/N5AyX-lerGI>

Hillary Clinton's Closing Statements: 'May the Force Be With You' <https://youtu.be/4-cw3VDwSa4>

Theresa May says 'Brexit means Brexit' and there will be no attempt to remain inside EU

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-brexit-means-brexit-conservative-leadership-no-attempt-remain-inside-eu-leave-europe-a7130596.html> Donald Trump <http://www.wsj.com/video/trump-i-am-the-law-and-order-candidate/87A87968-2A80-48E2-9FF5-84327DB3B6F1.html>

Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice - Official Final Trailer [HD] https://youtu.be/Cle_rKBpZ28

Gladiatrix Documentary Part One <https://youtu.be/cav2RnGHwDU?t=5m17s>

Thatcher Gave More Power to Finance https://youtu.be/w_UOwJhGHQo

The Parallax View - Trailer <https://youtu.be/KSMfrfpj9FQ>

Gladiatrix documentary part 2 <https://youtu.be/p2gxgjiufu8k?t=6m20s> art gallery killing ground

Babbie Mason "You Love Me" <https://youtu.be/ddkvQAnfUul>

Priceless Da ROC - Yiken (Certified)(Yike On It) TOP TWERK SONGS 2015 <https://youtu.be/k7Am1-9IL4U>

MMT's Michael Hudson Explains The Debt Deflation Era We Live In. <https://youtu.be/vjY5Y-eQZTw>

Aretha Franklin - Chain Of Fools (Lyrics) <https://youtu.be/gGAIW5dOnKo>

Circle of Life - Elton John (Lion King) Lyrics https://youtu.be/xQ_Zq_b4sBc

A Coconut Up Your Butt https://youtu.be/xifp_jFEBeY

Aaliyah - Try Again (HD) <https://youtu.be/aRcAvsZgjXA>

Slavoj Žižek: We Need Thinking <https://youtu.be/MtPghWHAQfs> Chuck Berry - Roll Over Beethoven <https://youtu.be/jLD5H4uQ1xs> Beyonce - Listen [Official Video] <https://youtu.be/6MFjSOwlkH4> The English house
Scoobidoo / Trippy

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Elvis Presley - In the Ghetto (Audio) <https://youtu.be/FJ-r0bilzhU>

Mia - Gorky (studiosversiel) https://youtu.be/6aFSp1V_mU0

Born Free - M.I.A (Misses White Remix)[Breakcore] <https://youtu.be/8uByPkQ5Zcc> Respect Yourself - Staple Singers
<https://youtu.be/k3nm3Znihj0>

Scoobidoo - It's Such a Good Night (Scoobidoo Love) <https://youtu.be/x8BRgQ0YGbQ> Antiserum & Mayhem - Trippy
<https://youtu.be/o95ZTp5fuF8>

Beyonce-Signs(with lyrics on screen)! [HD] https://youtu.be/_JjSTFdTtkc

General Idea - Shut The Fuck Up - Parts I & II <https://youtu.be/g2gVJ1IRxA0>

Think Twice https://ubusound.memoryoftheworld.org/RPM/RPM_20_Todd_Siler_-_Think_Twice.mp3

Abada & Mr.Skap & Сэм Саламов - Точикистон new 2016 <https://youtu.be/hB9UiGL1kb8>

J Quiles - Puteria <https://youtu.be/AVBCu92GABw>

Tellus -18_06_Lydia-Lunch_The-Cancer https://ubusound.memoryoftheworld.org/tellus_18/ Tellus-18_06_Lydia-Lunch_The-Cancer.mp3

Pharrell Williams - Happy (Official Music Video) <https://youtu.be/y6Sxv-sUYtM> Eurythmics "Sex Crime" 1984 <https://youtu.be/IcTP7YWPayU>

Wiz Khalifa - See You Again ft. Charlie Puth [Official Video] Furious 7 Soundtrack <https://youtu.be/RgKAFK5djSk>

7 Cases of Blackmail Gone Horribly Wrong <https://youtu.be/8H6pYvlbsko>

Ghosts of Abu Ghraib <https://youtu.be/DxfPpi7IUaU>

Why do some people become psychopaths? (30 Jan 2014) https://youtu.be/4yB_syUDbjs

American Psycho - Trailer <https://youtu.be/5YnGhW4UEhc>

iWPS Finals 2014 - Porsha O. "Capitalism" <https://youtu.be/53kJF0DQtNo>

TNW - Leo Kouwenhoven - Quantum Computing for You | The Next Web https://youtu.be/_KbAxTM5YbQQ

Eye Of Ra - A Simple Looking Hieroglyph Depicting Complex Anatomy https://youtu.be/_YVmBIGymsiU

Free will / spinoza <https://youtu.be/hiu5Q5-X6mA>

Cold As Ice - Foreigner lyrics <https://youtu.be/qCbtXC0u-Jo>

Archdukes, Cynicism, and World War I: Crash Course World History #36 https://youtu.be/_XPZQ0LAIr4

Cruel Irony <https://youtu.be/VVBywEqSa2Y> https://ubusound.memoryoftheworld.org/foucault_michel/conferences/Foucault_Michel_Conferences_1980_Juxtaposition-despaces-incompatibles.mp3

Dorothy E. Roberts: Fatal Invention: The New Biopolitics of Race https://youtu.be/_RUukdHM_2Uw

Sash! - Encore Une Fois (Original Edit) <https://youtu.be/0zN5MXP4aRc>

Ségolène et le porc cul noir Limousin <https://youtu.be/xxNVgILMlnA> https://ubusound.memoryoftheworld.org/four_horsemen/live-in-the-west/Four_Horsemen_Live-In-The-West_07_sonada.mp3

Irony <https://youtu.be/FYq2d7iKKhk>

Communism, A New Beginning? Day 3 - Jodi Dean: "Communist Desire" https://youtu.be/_g4xC9LEU4Fw?t=1h4m19s
https://youtu.be/_g4xC9LEU4Fw?t=1h16m6s

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Are you letting people take advantage of you? Here's what to do. https://youtu.be/_4vpcBsZFIYg

Dealing With Selfish and Manipulative People https://youtu.be/_E-htCUyElV8

The 6 Master Manipulations that Narcissists Use https://youtu.be/_kizgcgBViZ4

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Body Language of Narcissistic and Psychopathic Abuser https://youtu.be/_iFUuaw8Pf1M The Narcissist Woman https://youtu.be/_fQJhNjV8VHA

Narcissist's Objects and Possessions https://youtu.be/_3pXDHKi15hY magical thinking https://youtu.be/_3pXDHKi15hY?t=6m39s

How to Manipulate the Narcissist https://youtu.be/_X-6OhpcPHbo

How To Outsmart A Narcissist The Right Way https://youtu.be/_cRWbonFA5sU

The 7 Most Common Lies of a Narcissist https://youtu.be/_P2stXaOvUNI Marcel-Piqueray-Letrange https://ubusound.memoryoftheworld.org/belgian_surrealism/_Belgian-Surrealism_1939-1978_11-Marcel-Piqueray-Letrange-Histoire-Du-Grand-Chien.mp3

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593· Absolute freedom as pure self-identity of the universal will thus has within it negation ; but this means that it contains difference in general, and this again it develops as an actual difference. For pure negativity has in the self-identical universal will the element of subsistence, or the Substance in which its

moments are realized ; it has the matter which it can utilize in accordance with its own determinateness; and in so far as this Substance has shown itself to be the negative element for the individual consciousness, the organization of spiritual 'masses' or spheres to which the plurality of individual consciousnesses are assigned thus takes shape once more. These individuals who have felt the fear of death, of their absolute master, again submit to negation and distinctions, arrange themselves

in the various spheres, and return to an apportioned and limited task, but thereby to their substantial reality.

594· Out of this tumult, Spirit would be thrown back to its starting-point, to the ethical and real world of culture, which would have been merely refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the lord and master which has again entered men's hearts. Spirit would have to traverse anew

and continually repeat this cycle of necessity if the result were only the complete interpenetration explicitly objective to itself, and self-consciousness learns what absolute freedom in effect is. In itself, it is just this abstract self-consciousness, which effaces all distinction and all continuance of distinction within it. It is as such that it is objective to itself; the terror of death is the vision of this negative nature of itself. · But absolutely free self-consciousness finds this its reality quite different from what its own Notion of itself was, viz. that the universal will is merely the positive essence of personality, and that this latter knows itself in it only positively, or as preserved therein. Here, however, this self-consciousness which, as pure insight, completely separates its positive and its negative nature-completely separates the predicateless Absolute as pure Thought and as pure Matter-is confronted with the abso

C. (BB.) SPIRIT

tration of self-consciousness and Substance-an interpenetration in which self-consciousness, which has experienced the negative power of its universal essence acting on it, would desire to know and find itself, not as this particular individual, but only as a universal, and therefore, too, would be able to endure the objective reality of universal Spirit, a reality excluding self-consciousness qua particular. But in absolute freedom there was no reciprocal action between a consciousness that is immersed in the complexities of existence, or that sets itself specific aims and thoughts, and a valid external world, whether of reality or thought ; instead, the world was absolutely in the form of consciousness as a universal will, and equally self-consciousness was drawn together out of the whole expanse of existence or manifested aims and judgements, and concentrated into the simple self. The culture to which it attains in interaction with that essence is, therefore, the grandest and the last, is that of seeing its pure, simple reality immediately vanish and pass away into empty nothingness. In the world of culture itself it does not get as far as to behold its negation or alienation in this form of pure abstraction ; on the contrary, its negation is filled with a content, either honour or wealth, which it gains in place of the self that it has alienated from itself; or the language of Spirit and insight which the disrupted consciousness acquires; or it is the heaven of faith, or the Utility of the Enlightenment. All these determinations have vanished in the loss suffered by the self in absolute freedom ; its negation is the death that is without meaning, the sheer terror of the negative that contains nothing positive, nothing that fills it with a content. At the same time, however, this negation in its real existence is not something alien ; it is neither the universal inaccessible necessity in which

the ethical world perishes, nor the particular accident of private possession, nor the whim of the owner on which the disrupted consciousness sees itself dependent ; on the contrary, it is the universal will which in this its ultimate abstraction has nothing positive and therefore can give nothing in return for the sacrifice. But for that very reason it is immediately one with self-consciousness, or it is the pure positive, because it is the pure negative ; and the meaningless death, the unfilled negativity of the self, changes round in its inner Notion into absolute positivity. For consciousness, the immediate unity of itself with the

CULTURE

universal will, its demand to know itself as this specific point in the universal will, is changed round into the absolutely opposite experience. What vanishes for it in that experience is abstract being or the immediacy of that insubstantial point, and this vanished immediacy is the universal will itself which it now knows itself to be in so far as it is a pure knowing or pure will. Consequently, it knows that will to be itself, and knows itself

to be essential being; but not essential being as an immediate existence, not will as revolutionary government or anarchy striving to establish anarchy, nor itself as the centre of this faction or the opposite faction ; on the contrary, the universal will is its pure knowing and

willing and it is the universal will qua this pure knowing and willing. It does not lose itself in that will, for pure knowing and willing is much more it than is that atomic point of consciousness. It is thus the interaction of pure knowing with itself; pure knowing qua essential being is the universal will ; but this essential being is absolutely nothing else but pure knowing. Self-consciousness is, therefore, the pure knowing of essential being qua pure knowing. Further, as an individual self, it is only the form of the subject or of real action, a form which is known by it as form. Similarly, objective reality, being, is for it simply a selfless form ; for that reality would be something that is not known. This knowing, however, knows knowing to be essential being.

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Doctor P - Rekt Together (Every Single Night) <https://youtu.be/CJJgnHPDGG8>

Ryan Leslie Feat. Fabolous - Addiction https://youtu.be/rzZuHra_aF4

Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 12/30 <https://youtu.be/ L2nWVROxmfo> psychotic structure

Wire "I Am The Fly" <https://youtu.be/OnIXXe83fe4>

More People are Catching Pokemon than Dates on Tinder | WIRED <https://youtu.be/ YQAAJksJBhg>

Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 13/30 https://youtu.be/ Lrv_QSvoOSo?t=7m34s

Meet the real woman behind the voice of Siri <https://youtu.be/z2bTymnb1uE>

Drake - Controlla (Official Music Video) <https://youtu.be/S7sCisgu88k>

Stromae - Dodo (+ lyrics) <https://youtu.be/Jex4RwDNFAk>

Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 15/30 <https://youtu.be/ Dx4BnMRv0Ck?t=5m20s>

Bob Marley & the Wailers - Running Away <https://youtu.be/OXsLslqteB0>
Jacques Lacan: A Beginner's Guide | Unabridged Audiobook | Part 17/30 <https://youtu.be/2YTipNd7kQ8?t=2m40s>
Slavoj Žižek | The Politics of Comedy | Debate https://youtu.be/k7_hMmMTzQo?t=32m38s
Tragic madness
Bessie Smith (Down Hearted Blues, 1923) Jazz Legend <https://youtu.be/go6TiLleVZA> Anti-Oedipus (6 of 8) <https://youtu.be/HIGa-aS0fiA?t=1h9m32s>

Communism, A New Beginning? Day 3 - Slavoj Žižek <https://youtu.be/utmZmKzwqyQ?t=1h12m27s>

Predominant ideology

Man Don't Care - Jme ft Giggs <https://youtu.be/rivFCwwvoh8>

Chicks on Speed - Culture Vulture <https://youtu.be/rwS60Pww4g4?t=2m19s>

Anno dommini but add another d

Attention deficiency, that's me

I'm the disease of the century but I don't care

Stop flicking my channels with your remote control

Defining the world through regurgitated, updated, mediocre, mainstream media information

that smacks of sensation

Communism, A New Beginning? Day 3 - Slavoj Žižek <https://youtu.be/utmZmKzwqyQ?t=1h13m40s>

Communism, A New Beginning? Day 3 - Slavoj Žižek <https://youtu.be/utmZmKzwqyQ?t=1h14m10s> started with first magician's in pre-history who started to manipulate Communism, A New Beginning? Day 3 - Slavoj Žižek <https://youtu.be/utmZmKzwqyQ?t=1h38m8s>

subject alienation- collective reappropriation. Marx reading of Hegel. misreading Hegel's intent.

Slavoj Žižek | The Difference Between The Republicans & Democrats {VanP(a)rijs} <https://youtu.be/1l0sS8dgLa0?t=1h4m41s>

Slavoj Žižek Explains How Rammstein Undermine Nazi Ideology <https://vimeo.com/175326866>

AZIS -lover fucker https://youtu.be/W_2lmb7Puew

Drake - One Dance (feat. Wizkid & Kyla) https://youtu.be/g_uYn8AVqeU The Dandy Warhols - Not If You Were The Last Junkie On Earth https://youtu.be/APrpB-i4d_E

Be My Bitch (Lyrics) - 50 Cent feat. Brevi <https://youtu.be/YQcz1myaATw> What the hell is Laibach all about? <https://youtu.be/1BZl8ScVYvA>

Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome

- Joy DeGruy https://youtu.be/_9ErXogbVBs?t=32m1s

UN accused of failing as north-east Nigeria at risk of famine <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/14/un-accused-of-failing-as-nigerian-food-crisis-threatens-hundreds-of-thousands>

Pokémon GO servers down AGAIN as gamers around the world vent fury on social media <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/pokmon-go-servers-down-again-8437414> Slavoj Žižek: Power, Betrayal and Brexit <https://youtu.be/Xtfe4tfOoDM?t=51m6s>

Aaron Schuster, Slavoj Žižek & Maria Aristodemou | The Trouble With Pleasure: Deleuze and Psychoanalysis <http://mariborchan.si/audio/aaron-schuster/the-trouble-with-pleasure/> 1h14m22

1h53m20

John Zorn's Zohar - Mystic Fugu Orchestra (John Zorn & Y. Eye) Track 8 <https://youtu.be/FO92fgzpeXQ>

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How Stupid Americans Really Are! https://youtu.be/_mWtWz_aGyk?t=4m19s

Catherine Malabou. Giorgio Agamben's Philosophy of Life. <https://youtu.be/bEnERpYVaho?t=57m9s>

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Queen - Fat Bottomed Girls (Official Video) <https://youtu.be/VMnjF1O4eH0>

remix with

Twerk it V.I.C lyrics <https://youtu.be/lZrw28QGuXw>

--

Donna Lewis - I Love You Always Forever.

<https://youtu.be/B5wizkr-shY> The Beatles - Getting Better <https://youtu.be/QvMQWte5pik> -

Slavoj Žižek: Freedom, Possible and Impossible | 13th February 2016 <https://youtu.be/byhKJzPhHcY?t=16m30s>

True freedom is not the freedom of choice. True freedom is the freedom to collectively change the very conditions of choice. What can you choose? and so on.

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Catherine Malabou – Hegel on synthetic a priori judgments <https://youtu.be/EeKwW13LkUY> --

Provost Lecture - Catherine Malabou: From Sorrow to Indifference <https://youtu.be/ KoAd1IQ1bXM?t=17m27s>
soul: admiration/wonder - joy - sorrow -love - hatred - desire
so, stef: how do you feel about the voices of the real? Hhm... ha! funny.

23:05

mix to Shaggy - It Wasn't Me (Tip-Top Tropical Video Edit) <https://youtu.be/ CMWWWhJ7RF0>
Bob Luman - Let's Think About Living <https://youtu.be/6k3I2fh-8VQ>

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Seminar 5

Slavoj Zizek "To Begin from The Beginning" <https://youtu.be/XazepKzJhfU>

Catherine Malabou. The Sacralization of Life. 2012 <https://youtu.be/d04XJYIsfNI> <https://youtu.be/d04XJYIsfNI?t=24m15s>

agamben's critique of bataille

logic example (no capitalism without terrorism)

Barrington Levy - Murderer + Version (Tell Dem A Ready) YouDub Sélection <https://youtu.be/xHdz4i3ZN3s>

Introducing Galvani Bioelectronics https://youtu.be/7j_GHIZve7U

Stuart Hammeroff: Treating mental states through microtubule vibrations https://archive.org/details/Redwood_Center_2014_06_11_Stuart_Hammeroff

34:24 consciousness like music

The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy - The Whale and the Bowl of Petunias https://youtu.be/ YCsfHVM5x_I

Yoav Medan: Ultrasound surgery -- healing without cuts https://www.ted.com/talks/yoav_madan_ultrasound_surgery_healing_without_cuts

Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind Theme - Jon Brion <https://youtu.be/zI-YR4LBzL0>

-- mashup

The Magic Flute: Overture - Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart <https://youtu.be/Vwub-9dZLFU>

Team America - Blowjob Pact https://youtu.be/_xVk9nqmQGc

Devlin- Extra Extra (Wiley Diss) <https://youtu.be/mu4Mr2oGwPw>

Requiem de Mozart - Lacrimosa - Karl Böhm - Sinfónica de Viena <https://youtu.be/G- kJVmEWWV8>

Brilliant stuff !! Why Cow is Holy ? - By London Based Physicist Jay Lakhani <https://youtu.be/hRZzbh7ww>

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Try to imagine the future: dictatorship or democracy?

(Peter Sloterdijk vs Jeremy Rifkin) <https://youtu.be/67sUlcpWFNA?t=7m19s>

distributive capitalism -- power to the people

Crying Over You by: Soave <https://youtu.be/KACtMUo6ybU>

mashup How to Stop Your Dog Whining and Crying! <https://youtu.be/W9cXMNSCVRk> Jan Howard - Crying For Love <https://youtu.be/IC71B8tGtLc>

The Black Heart Procession - A Cry For Love <https://youtu.be/yz8b7GaYcFg>

Gone In 60 Seconds Trailer HD <https://youtu.be/o6AyAM1buQ8>

One hundred soldiers had Napoleon - Napoleó - a Catalan dance and game <https://youtu.be/ z11ordphWdI>

Rise Up Singing: Boom Boom Ain't it Great to Be Crazy? <https://youtu.be/sVLriQOFXg8> Bruno Latour et nos modes de vie <http://www.universcience.tv/video-bruno-latour-et-nos-modes-de-vie-7474.html>

Peter Sloterdijk - "nobody has time for an entire generation any more" https://youtu.be/ 9_fsFwf0juk

Film For People - Peter Sloterdijk Interview <https://youtu.be/mUrj0whdmxQ?t=19m10s> No Future Vive l'Avenir. Le futur, la prospective et l'innovation https://youtu.be/F7qZ__PG2nQ

deleted fb post

it rains in brussels like a tropical nineties kitsch elvis never dies kind of irony, sweet " Love Me Tender (Re-Mix) - Prince Unique https://youtu.be/pOI_0HpQxAA

Dionne Warwick - Raindrops Keep Falling On My Head <https://youtu.be/mcmaqoCCxml> ITS TIME FOR DA PERCULATOR
https://youtu.be/_UlhLd76lzQ

MOO COW SOUNDS Relaxing Nature [10 Hours]
<https://youtu.be/aqJr6Gj9vFo>

Singing Whale Sounds 8Hrs, for Deep Relaxation, Sleep or Stress Relief <https://youtu.be/ dhaBsuDVISU>

Amy Winehouse - Love Is A Losing Game https://youtu.be/nMO5Ko_77Hk

Play it, Sam <https://youtu.be/7vThuwa5RZU>

Ray Stevens - Misty <https://youtu.be/wSEg0fllqT8>

Ahab the Arab - Ray Stevens https://youtu.be/pLB15kBvn_c

Do Animals Laugh? https://youtu.be/4MgGeURu_TE

Profit Maximization <https://youtu.be/devjsF8shrU>

Ooh Aah..Just A Little Bit! - Gina G <https://youtu.be/PnPUKm9ExHo>

Lana Del Rey - Video Games <https://youtu.be/cE6wxDqdOV0>

Official Call of Duty®: Infinite Warfare Reveal Trailer <https://youtu.be/EeF3UTkCoxY> Pharrell Williams - Happy (Official Music Video) <https://youtu.be/y6Sxv-sUYtM> L'amour a la Papa - Indifferente - Serge Gainsbourg <https://youtu.be/RJ9mG8wcAtQ>

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Georg W. F. Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit

Spirit that is in and for itself and differentiated into its moments is a knowing that is for itself, a comprehension in general that, as such, substance has not yet reached, i.e. substance is not in its own self an absolute knowing.

80 1 . Now, in actuality, the substance that knows exists earlier than its form or its Notion- determined 'shape'. For substance is the as yet undeveloped in-itself, or the Ground and Notion in its still unmoved simplicity, and therefore the inwardness or the Self of the Spirit that does not yet exist. What is there, exists as the still undeveloped simple and immediate, or as the object of the picture-thinking consciousness in general. Cognition, because it is the spiritual consciousness for which what is in itself only is, in so far as it is a being for the Self and a being of the Self for Notion, has for this reason at first only a meagre object, in contrast with which substance and the consciousness of this

ABSOLUTE KNOWING

substance are richer. The disclosure or revelation which substance has in this consciousness is in fact concealment, for substance is still self-less being and what is disclosed to it is only the certainty of itself. At first, therefore, only the abstract moments of substance belong to self-consciousness ; but since these, as pure movements, spontaneously impel themselves onward, self consciousness enriches itself till it has wrested from consciousness the entire substance and has absorbed into itself the entire structure of the essentialities of substance. And, since this negative attitude to objectivity is just as much positive, it is a positive, it has produced them out of itself, and in so doing has at the same time restored them for consciousness. In the Notion

that knows itself as Notion, the moments thus appear earlier than the filled [or fulfilled] whole whose coming-to-be is the movement of those moments. In consciousness, on the other hand, the whole, though uncomprehended, is prior to the moments. Time is the Notion itself that is there and which presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time, and it appears in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Notion, i.e. has not annulled Time. It is the outer, intuited pure Self which is not grasped by the Self, the merely intuited Notion ; when this latter grasps itself it sets aside its Time-form, comprehends this intuiting, and is a comprehended and comprehending intuiting. Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and necessity of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself, the necessity to enrich the share which self-consciousness has in consciousness, to set in motion the immediacy of the in-itself, which is the form in which substance is present in consciousness ; or conversely, to realize and reveal what is at first only inward (the in-itself being taken as what is inward) , i.e. to vindicate it for Spirit's certainty of itself.

pg486-487

NEGATION OF THE NEGATION

: LACAN VERSUS HEGEL?

How does this Lacanian negation of the negation in its two main versions: the redoubled negation which generates the excess of the non-All, and the move from alienation to separation-relation to the Hegelian negation of the negation? Is the Hegelian version strong enough to contain (account for) the Lacanian version? Lacan repeatedly insists that his "negation of the negation;" in contrast to Hegel's, does not result in a return to any kind of positivity, no matter how sublated or mediated that positivity might be. In Vertigo, Scottie reaches the end when he discovers that Madeleine was a fake from the very beginning, "no longer (not) without Madeleine;" which, again, does not mean that he is with Madeleine, but that he has lost the loss itself, the very point of reference which circumscribed the place of the loss structuring his desire. In a way, he loses desire itself, its object-cause. This move is still Hegelian, for Hegel can well think the negation of the negation as a

radical loss. The question is thus not "Does the Hegelian negation of the negation erase the loss in a return to full unity?" but rather: "Can Hegel think the additional fourth phase in which the set relating movement of the negation of the negation itself engenders a particular tic, a Singular excessive-repetitive gesture (like Julie's suicidal explosion of passion at the end of *La nouvelle Héloïse*, or Sygne's tic at the end of Claudel's *r'Otage*) ?"

As we have already seen, the Lacanian negation is located on the feminine side of the "formulae of sexuation;" in the notion of the non-All: there is nothing which is not a fact of discourse; however, this non-discourse does not mean that all is discourse, but, precisely, that not-All is discourse what is outside is not a positive something but the *objet a*, more than nothing but not something, not One." Alternatively: there is no subject which is not 72 What Freud called a "partial object" is also more than nothing and less than One: One is a Body, a partial object is its lack or excess; i.e., it is not only a separated part of a Whole (body), it is partial with regard to itself -this is what Democritus did not see when he conceived atoms as Ones which can be counted, and the void as external to them, as the empty space surrounding them: as Hegel put it, one should internalize the void, conceiving it as the very core of the identity of the One-only in this way does movement become immanent to atoms.

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castrated, but this does not mean that all subjects are castrated (the non-castrated remainder is, of course, the *objet a*). The Real that we touch upon here, in this double negation, can be linked to Kantian infinite judgment, the affirmation of a non-predicate: "he is undead" does not simply mean that he is alive, but that he is alive as not dead, as a living dead. "He is undead" means that he is not-not-dead." In the same way, the Freudian Unconscious is like the undead: it is not simply not-conscious but non-not-conscious, and, in this double negation, it not only persists, but is even redoubled: undead remains not-dead and not-alive. Is not the *objet a* in the same way a non-not-object and, in this sense, an object which embodies the void?

This double negation can also have the structure of a choice which, while not forced, is rendered indifferent since, whatever our decision, the result will be the same. Such was allegedly the case in Vietnam where, after the defeat of the South, Northern propagandists picked up young people on the streets and forced them to watch a long documentary propaganda film. After the screening, the viewers were asked if they liked the film. If they answered no, they were told that obviously they did not really understand it and so would have to watch it again; if they answered yes, they were told: "Good, since you like it so much, you can now watch it again!" Yes and no amount to the same thing, which, at a more basic level, amounts to a "no" (the boredom involved in seeing the film again). Similar (but not the same) is the legendary answer of a Hearst newspaper editor to Hearst's inquiry as to why he did not want to take a long-deserved holiday: 'I'm afraid that if I go, there will be chaos, everything will fall apart but I'm even more afraid that, if I go, things will just go on as normal without me, proving that I am not really needed!" A certain negative choice (no holiday, seeing the film again) is supported by both yes and no; there is, however, an asymmetry in the answers, which comes out clearly if we imagine the dialogue as a succession of two answers: first, the reaction is the obvious (negative) one (I did not like the film; I am afraid everything will fall apart if I take a holiday); then, when this reaction fails to produce the desired outcome, the opposite (positive) reason is given (I liked the film; everything will be fine without me), which fails even more miserably. No wonder that the Hearst editor's answer can be reformulated as a dialogue along the lines of the Rabinovitch joke: "Why don't you take a holiday, you deserve it!"; "I don't want to, for two reasons. First, I'm afraid that everything will fall apart here if I take a holiday. . ."; "But you are totally wrong, things will just go on as normal when you're not here!" "That is my second reason." 73 This real of the double negation is nonetheless not the same as the Kantian sublime, where the Real is touched through the failure of phenomenal representation: the undead real is not sublime, but obscene.

THE NON-ALL, OR, THE ONTOLOGY OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 789

This Lacanian matrix of the "negation of the negation" is clearly discernible in Leo Strauss's notion of the need for a philosopher to employ "noble lies;" to resort to myth, to narratives *ad captum vulgi*. The problem is that Strauss does not draw all the consequences from the ambiguity of this stance, torn as he is between the idea that wise philosophers *W* the truth but judge it inappropriate for the common people, who cannot bear it (it would undermine the very fundamentals of their morality, which needs the "noble lie" of a personal God who punishes sins and rewards good deeds), and the idea that the core of truth is inaccessible to conceptual thought as such, which is why philosophers themselves have to resort to myths and other forms of fabrication to fill in the structural gaps in their knowledge. Strauss is, of course, aware of the ambiguity of the status of a secret: a secret is not only what the teacher knows but refrains from divulging to the non-initiated-a secret is also a secret for the teacher himself something that he cannot fully penetrate and articulate in conceptual terms. Consequently, a philosopher uses parabolic and enigmatic speech for two reasons: in order to conceal the true core of his teaching from the common people, who are not ready for it, and because the use of such speech is the only way to describe the highest philosophical insights.'

No wonder, then, that Strauss answers in a properly Hegelian way the common-sense reproach according to which, when we are offered an esoteric explanation of a work which is already in itself esoteric (as with, say, Maimonides's reading of the Bible), the explanation will be twice as esoteric and,

consequently, twice as difficult to understand as the esoteric work itself

thanks to Maimonides, the secret teaching is accessible to us in two different versions: in the original Biblical version, and in the derivative version of [Maimonides's] Guide. Each version by itself might be holly incomprehensible; but we may become able to decipher both by using the light which one sheds on the other. Our position resembles then that of an archeologist confronted with an inscription in an unknown language, who subsequently discovers another inscription reproducing the

translation of that text into another unknown language . . . [Maimonides] wrote the Guide according to the rules which he was wont to follow in reading the Bible. Therefore, if we wish to understand the Guide, we must read it according to the rules which Maimonides applies in that work to the explanation of the Bible.¹ⁱ

The redoubling of the problem thus paradoxically generates its own solution. One should bear in mind here that when Strauss emphasized the difference between exoteric and esoteric teaching, he conceived this opposition in a way

74 Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988, p. 57.

75 Ibid., pp. 60-1.

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almost exactly opposite to today's New Age defenders of esoteric wisdom. The content of New Age wisdom is some spiritual higher reality accessible only to the initiated few, while common mortals see around them only vulgar reality; for Strauss, on the contrary, and in a properly dialectical way, such narratives of spiritual mystery are the very model of fables concocted *ad captu vulgi*. Is this not confirmed by the success of the recent wave of religious thrillers epitomized by Dan Brown's *The Da Vinci Code*? These works are perhaps the best indicator of the contemporary ideological shift: the hero is in search of an old manuscript which will reveal some shattering secret that threatens to undermine the very foundations of (institutionalized) Christianity; a "criminal" edge is provided by the desperate and ruthless attempts of the Church (or some hard line faction within it) to suppress the document. The secret as a rule focuses on the "repressed" feminine dimension of the divine: Christ was married to Mary Magdalene; the Grail is actually the female body, etc. The paradox assumed here is that it is only through the "monotheistic" suspension of the feminine signifier, of the polarity of masculine and feminine, that the space emerges for what we broadly refer to as "feminism" proper, for the rise of feminine subjectivity (which ultimately coincides with subjectivity as such). For Strauss, by contrast, the unbearable esoteric secret is the fact that there is no God or immortal soul, no divine justice, that there is only this terrestrial world which has no deeper meaning and carries no guarantee of a happy outcome.

When Strauss deploys the inherent paradox of a theology which proceeds *ad captu vulgi*, he thus provides a textbook case of the Hegelian negation of the negation.⁷⁶ In the first step, Strauss, following Spinoza, asserts that, in the Bible, God speaks in the language of ordinary people, adapting his speech to vulgar prejudices (presenting himself as a supreme person, a wise lawgiver who performs miracles, utters prophecies, and dispenses mercy)-in short, he tells stories which mobilize the powers of human imagination. However, in the second step, the question necessarily pops up: is not the idea of a God as a supreme Person who employs ruses, displays mercy and rage, and so on, in itself a common idea which only can occur when one speaks "with a view to the capacity of the vulgar"?

Another example: Badiou uses the term "inaesthetics" (*inesthetique*) to refer to "a relation of philosophy to art that, maintaining that art is itself a producer of truths, makes no claim to turn art into an object for philosophy. Against aesthetic speculation, inaesthetics describes the strictly intraphilosophical effects produced by the independent existence of some works of art."⁷⁷ Badiou's opposition to philosophical aesthetics is thus double: (1) art is not

76 Ibid., pp. 178-9.

77 Alain Badiou, *Handbook of Inaesthetics*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press 2005, p. xii.

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opposed to thinking, art generates its own truth, which is why philosophy does not preside over art, explicating in conceptual terms the truth that art stages in preconceptual modes of representation (but it also does not elevate art into a privileged medium of truth); (2) philosophy does not deploy a universal theory of art, it describes the intra-philosophical effects of some works of art. Nevertheless, we should note that this distance from aesthetics is inherent to it, that the term "inaesthetics" functions like a predicate in an infinite judgment, as a negation which remains within the negated field—"inaesthetics" is non-*l1on aesthetics* (just as "inhuman" is non-human, non-human within the field of the human).

Where then is the non-All in the relationship between necessity and contingency? Is it that necessity is universal and contingency its constitutive exception?—everything is necessary except necessity itself, the fact of which is contingent, and so on; or vice versa—everything is contingent except contingency itself, the fact of which is necessary, etc.? A first hint is given by Le Gaufey, who ingeniously links this grounding of universality in the exception of its enunciation to the (in)famous cry of a compulsive neurotic: "nything but that!"—expressing his readiness to give away everything but that which really matters ("Take it all, just not this book!" etc.): "Anything but that!" the cry, if there is one, of a man confronted with castration, assumes here [in the case of 'all men are mortal'] the form of a 'everyone, but not me' which asserts itself as the *sine qua non* of the enunciation of an 'all'.⁷⁸ The difference between the two is that the exception which grounds universality is contingent (a contingency of enunciation grounding the universal necessity), while the compulsive neurotic's exception is necessary: the one thing he is not ready to give is necessary, every thing else is contingent. This means that contingency as exception is primary, and that the reversal of roles (necessity as exception) is its compulsive-neurotic inversion. This conclusion imposes itself—the moment we formulate all four positions that follow from each of these two opposed starting points: (1) everything is necessary; there is something which is not necessary; there is nothing which is not necessary; not-all things are necessary; (2) everything is contingent; there is something which is not contingent; there is nothing which is not contingent; not-all things are contingent. The true foundation of dialectical materialism is not the necessity of contingency, but the contingency of necessity. In other words, while the second position opts for a secret invisible necessity beneath the surface of contingency (the big compulsive topic), the first position asserts contingency as the abyssal ground of necessity itself.

In a brilliant move, Le Gaufey applies this logic of universality and its constitutive exception to the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and clinical

78 Le Gaufey, *Le Pasto t de Laca*, p. 145.

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practice. In the standard theoretical view, particular cases are used to verify (or falsify) a general concept-say, we analyze a concrete case of paranoia and see if it fits our general notion (e.g., paranoia is the result of displaced homosexual attachment, etc.). Le Gaufey, on the contrary, reads concrete cases as constitutive exceptions: each case "rebels" against its universality, it never simply illustrates it. However, Le Gaufey here all too naively endorses the opposition between conceptual realists and empirical nominalists: "For the first, the conceptual architecture first articulates the order of the world. For the second, it misses it at first, and it is from this failure that the object shines forth, is grounded in existence."⁷⁸ For a Hegelian, this is literally true-more literally than intended by Le Gaufey: it is not only that the object eludes our conceptual grasp, it is that the "object" in the strict sense emerges as the result of (is generated by) the failure of our conceptual grasp. This is why Le Gaufey also unwittingly speaks the truth when he writes: "The feature displayed by the object, the situation or the individual, and which allows us to subsume it under a concept, is actually not of the same nature as the feature present in the concept itself".⁷⁹ What this means, read literally, is that the "truth" of the discord between the individual case and its universal concept is the inherent discord within the concept itself: the feature in question redoubles itself into the universal feature and the same feature in its particular (over)determination.

It is because of this nominalist-empiricist (mis)reading of the logic of exception that Le Gaufey misses the opposite aspect of the Freudian relationship between theory and practice, the obverse of the excess of praxis: psychoanalytic theory is not merely the theory of psychoanalytic practice, but, simultaneously, the theory of the ultimate failure of this (its own) practice, a theoretical account of why the very conditions which gave birth to psychoanalysis render it "impossible" as a profession-theory here relates to the impossible-Real core of the practice." It is this ultimate failure of the practice that renders its theory necessary: theory is not simply external to practice, confronting practice as the immenseeld of reality; the opening of the very gap between theory and practice, the exemption (subtraction) of theory from practice, is in itself a practical act, maybe the most radical one.

We can thus articulate the relationship between theory and practice as a square of the formulae of sexuation: on the left (masculine) side: all cases are subsumed under a universal concept of clinical theory / there exists at least one case which is not subsumed under any universal concept; on the right (feminine) side: there is no case which is not subsumed under a universal concept /

79 Ibid., p. 122.

80 Ibid., p. 121.

81 Another parallel with Marxism, which is also a theory of revolutionary practice and an account of the failure of revolutionary attempts.

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not-all cases are subsumed under a universal concept. The feminine side (there is nothing outside theory, inconsistency is immanent to theory, an effect of its non-All character) is here the "truth" of the masculine side (theory is universal, but undermined by factual exceptions).

The Lacanian negation of the negation also enables us to see why the logic of carnivalesque suspension is limited to traditional hierarchical societies: with the full deployment of capitalism, it is "normal" life itself which, in a way, is today carnivalized, with its constant self-revolutionizing, with its reversals, crises, and reinventions. How, then, are we to revolutionize an order whose very principle is one of constant self-revolutionizing? This is the problem of the negation of the negation: how to negate capitalism without returning to some form of premodern stability (or, even worse, to some kind of "synthesis" between change and stability, a more stable and organic capitalism known as fascism . . .). Here, again, not-nat-capitalism is not a premodern order (or any combination between modernity and tradition, this eternal fascist temptation which is today re-emerging as the Confucian "capitalism with Asian values"), but also not the overcoming of capitalism the way Marx conceived it, which involved a certain version of the Hegelian Aufhebung, a version of throwing out the dirty bath water (capitalist exploitation) and keeping the healthy baby (unleashed human productivity). Therein resides the properly utopian misunderstanding of Aufhebung: to distinguish in the phenomenon both its healthy core and the unfortunate particular conditions which prevent the full actualization of this core, and then to get rid of those conditions in order to enable the core to fully actualize its potential. Capitalism is thus aufgehoben, sublated, in Capitalism: negated but maintained, since its essential core is raised to a higher level. What such an approach blinds us to is the fact that the obstacle to the full deployment of the essence is simultaneously its condition of possibility, so that when we remove the false envelope of the particular conditions, we lose the core itself. Here, more than anywhere, the true task is not to throw away the dirty water and keep the baby, but to throw away the allegedly healthy baby (and the dirty water will disappear by itself).

Recall the paradox of the notion of reflexivity as "the movement whereby what has been used to generate a system becomes, through a change in perspective, part of the system it generates."⁸⁰ As a rule, this reflexive appearance of the generating movement within the generated system, in the guise of what Hegel called the "oppositional determination," takes the form of the opposite: within the material sphere, Spirit appears in the guise of the most inert moment (crane, as in "the Spirit is a bone;" the formless black stone in Mecca); in the later stage of a revolutionary process, when the Revolution starts to devour its own children,

82 N. Katherine Hayles, *How We Became Post-Human*, Chicago: Chicago University Press 1999, p. 8.

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the political agents who effectively set the process in motion are relegated to the role of being its main obstacle, as wavers or outright traitors who are not ready to follow the revolutionary logic to its conclusion. Along the same lines, once the socio-symbolic order is fully established, the very dimension which introduced the "transcendent" attitude that defines a human being, namely sexuality, the uniquely human "undead" sexual passion, appears as its very opposite, as the main obstacle to the elevation of a human being to pure spirituality, as that which ties him or her down to the inertia of bodily existence. For this reason, the end of sexuality represented by the much-vaunted "post-human" self-cloning entity soon expected to emerge, far from opening up the way to a pure spirituality, will simultaneously signal the end of what is traditionally designated as the uniquely human capacity for spiritual transcendence. For all the celebration of the new "enhanced" possibilities for sexual life that Virtual Reality has to offer, nothing can conceal the fact that, once cloning supplements sexual difference, the game is effectively over.⁸

"THERE IS A NON-RELATIONSHIP"

So, to conclude, one can propose a "unified theory" of the formulae of sexuation and the formulae of four discourses: the masculine axis consists of the master's discourse and the university discourse (university as universality and the master as its constitutive exception), and the feminine axis of the hysterical discourse and the analyst's discourse (no exception and non-All). We then have the following series of equations:

5. = Master = exception 5. = University = universality \$ = Hysteria = no-exception a = Analyst = non-All

83 And, incidentally, with all the focus on the new experiences of pleasure that lie ahead with the development of Virtual Reality, neuronal implants, etc., what about new "enhanced" possibilities of torture? Do not biogenetics and Virtual Reality combined open up new and unheard-of horizons for extending our ability to endure pain (by widening our sensory capacity to sustain pain, by inventing new forms of inflicting it)? Perhaps the ultimate Sadean gure of the "undead" victim of torture, who can bear endless pain without recourse to the escape into death, may also become a reality? Perhaps, in a decade or two, the most horrifying cases of torture (say, what was done to the Chief-of-State of the Dominican Army after the failed coup in which the dictator Trujillo was killed-sewing his eyes together so that he was not able to see his torturers, and then for four months slowly cutting off parts of his body in the most painful ways possible, like using blunt scissors to detach his genitals) will look like naive children's games.

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can see here how, in order to correlate the two squares, we have to turn one 90 degrees in relation to the other: with regard to the four discourses, the line that separates masculine from feminine runs horizontally; that is, it is the upper couple which is masculine and the lower one which is feminine.⁴ The hysterical subjective position allows for no exception, no x which is not-Fx (a hysteric provokes its master, endlessly questioning him: show me your exception), while the analyst asserts the non-All-not as the exception-to-All of a Master-Signifier, but in the guise of a x which stands for the gap/inconsistency.s; In other words, the masculine universal is positive/affirmative (all x are Fx), while the feminine universal is negative (no x which is not-Fx)- 0 one should be left out; this is why the masculine universal relies on a positive exception, while the feminine universal undermines the All from within, in the guise of its inconsistency.

This theory nonetheless leaves some questions unanswered. First, do the two versions of the universal (universality with exception; non-All with no exception) cover the entire span of possibilities? Is it not that the very logic of "Singular universal" of the symptomatic "part of no-part" which stands directly for universality, is neither of the two versions? Second, and linked to the first, Lacan struggled for years with the passage from "there is no (sexual) relationship" to "there is a non-relationship": he was repeatedly trying "to give body to the difference, to isolate the non-relationship as an indispensable ingredient of the constitution of the subject."⁶

Frege drew attention to the ambiguity of the notion of indeterminacy: "We should, of course, talk about 'indeterminacy': but 'indeterminate' is not a qualitative epithet of 'number': it is rather an adverb modifying 'indicate'. One doesn't say that x designates an indeterminate number, it indicates in an indeterminate way numbers."⁸⁷ There is an underlying shift at work here: indicating in

84 And, insofar as, with regard to the Kantian sublime, the masculine position is dynamic and the feminine position mathematical, the formulae of sexuation also allow us to formalize the two modes of the sublime: the dynamic sublime focuses on the Master-Signifier as the intensity of the excessive force dominating the series, while the feminine sublime exposes itself to the endless series which cannot be totalized.

85 Atypical hysterical positionist that of a poet confronted with the theorist: he complains that the theorist reduces his art to an illustration of abstract theory, but at the same time challenges the theorist to go on and produce a theory which will effectively hold.

86 Le Gaufey, *Le Pastout de Lacan*, p. 151. There is also a non-relationship between the partial object and the body/organism to which it belongs: the partial object is not harmoniously inserted into the Whole of a body, it rebels against "its" body and acts on its own. However, this non-relationship is not simply homologous to the non-relationship between the two sexes-one can even say that the excess of the partial object with regard to the body comes first, i.e., that it is what causes the non-relationship between the two (sexed) bodies.

87 Gottlob Frege, *Séries logiques et philosophiques*, Paris: Seuil 1973, p. 163.

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an indeterminate way numbers to designating an indeterminate number (here, "indeterminate" is a qualitative epithet of a number)-or, to put it in a somewhat simplified way, a shift from designating a broad field of numbers (each of them determinate) which can occupy the place of x , to a single number which is immediately indeterminate. This direct "rei

cation" of indeterminacy, where the indeterminacy as such (as the lack of determination) becomes directly the determination of an object, is also at work in the *objet a*, an object which is the lack (of the object) positivized.

en Lacan opposes the One, he targets two of its modalities, the imaginary One (of the specular fusion into One-ness) and the symbolic One (which is reductive, concerning the unary feature-le trait *unaire*-to which an object is reduced in its symbolic registration; this one is the One of differential articulation, not of fusion). The problem is: is there also a One of the Real? Is this role played by the *Y a d'I'Un* mentioned in *Encore*, which is a One prior to the differential articulation of the big Other, a non-delimited but nonetheless particular One, a One which is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively determined, a "there is something of the One" designating a minimal contraction, condensation, of the libidinal flow into a sinthome?

Lacan's *if ny a pas de l'utre* is strictly correlative to his *Y a d'I'Un*, "there is something of the One": insofar as the One of *Y a d'I'Un* is an "indivisible remainder" which makes the sexual relationship nonexistent, *Y a d'I'Un* is also strictly correlative to *if ny a pas de rapport sexuel*: it is the very object-obstacle to this rapport. The One of *Y a d'I'Un* is not primarily the mystical all-encompassing One of the infamous "oceanic feeling" derided by Freud, but a "little piece of the real;" the excremental remainder which disturbs the harmony of the Two. Clarifying this crucial distinction, Le Gaufey draws our attention to a subtle passage in late Lacan from "if ny a pas de rapport sexuel" to "il y a du non-rapport (sexuel)" a shift which precisely traces Kant's distinction between negative judgment (the negation of a predicate) and infinite judgment (the affirmation of a non-predicate). "There is no sexual relationship" can still be read as a variation on the old motif of the eternal conflict between the sexes. "There is a non-relationship" implies something much more radical: the positivization of this impossibility of the sexual relationship in a paradoxical "trans-finite" object which overlaps with its own lack or which is in excess with regard to itself. This means that masculine and feminine are not simply two out-of-sync entities, but that sexual difference in a way precedes the two sexes (the difference of which it is), so that the two sexes somehow come (logically) later, they react to, endeavor to resolve or symbolize, the deadlock of the Difference, and this deadlock is materialized in the pseudo-object called the *objet a*. This is why we should not say of the *objet a* simply that it is not sexual: it is un-sexual in exactly the same sense in which vampires are undead: the "undead" are neither alive nor dead but

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the monstrous living dead, and, in the same way, the *objet a* is neither sexual nor non-sexual but "sexually asexual;" a monstrosity which does not fit the coordinates of either of the two sexes but is still sexual. As Lacan pointed out, what is at stake here is nothing less than a change in the "principle of all principles;" from the ontological principle of non-contradiction to the principle that there is no sexual relationship.

It is easy to see how this passage from "there is no relationship" to "there is a non-relationship" evokes the Kantian passage from negative to infinite judgment: "he is not dead" is not the same as "he is undead;" just as "there is no relationship" is not the same as "there is a non-relationship." The importance of this passage, with regard to sexual difference, is that, if we stop at "there is no sexual relationship" as our ultimate horizon, we remain in the traditional space of the eternal struggle between the two sexes. Even Jacques-Alain Miller sometimes sounds like this-when, for example, he reads "there is no sexual relationship" along the lines of "male with regard to female is not like a key which fits its lock;" as a simple assertion of disharmony in contrast to harmony. Once we pass to "there is a non-relationship;" even this kind of Heraclitean "unity/harmony in conflict" is left behind, since masculine and feminine are no longer symmetrical opposite poles: one of them (feminine) contains its own negation and thus breaks out of the confines of the opposition-man-woman is not man, but the abyss of not-woman within the feminine, as the undead remain within the domain of the dead (as the living dead).

François Wahl once made a critical remark, directed at Badiou, that "the argument that enjoins us to deduce the existence of non-belonging from the negation of belonging merely reiterates the ontological argument"- maybe, but is this not the only version of the ontological argument that a materialist can endorse?⁸⁸ The situation is strictly homologous to that of relationship: if there is no sexual relationship, there has to be an impossible object which gives body to a non-relationship (the asexual *objet O*); if there is no class relationship, there has to be a social agent which embodies this non-relationship, class struggle as such (the "part of no-part" of the social body, its "organ without a body"). This reversal of "there is no relationship" into "there is a non-relationship;" this notion of a paradoxical object in which negativity itself acquires positive existence, is crucial: without it, we remain at the abstract level of the "eternal struggle of two opposed principles;"

The passage from "il n'a pas de rapport sexuel" to "il y a du non-rapport (sexuel)" is also homologous to the passage in Hegel on determinate reflection

88 As paraphrased in Ray Brassier, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction*, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, p. 104, citing François Wahl, "Presentation, Representation, Apparition;" in Alain Badiou: *Penser le multiple*, ed. Charles Ramond, Paris: LHannattan 2002, pp. 169-87.

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to re-examine determination-or indeed to the passage in Marxism on materialist dialectics to dialectical materialism. The shift we are dealing with here is the key dialectical shift-the one most difficult to grasp for a "negative dialectics" in love with explosions of negativity, with all imaginable forms of "resistance" and "subversion;" but unable to overcome its own parasitizing on the preceding positive order-from the wild dance of the liberation from the (oppressive) System to (what the German Idealists called) the System of Liberty. Two examples from revolutionary politics should suffice here: it is easy to become enamored of the multitude of free-thinkers who blossomed in the pre-revolutionary France of the late eighteenth century, from libertarians debating in the salons, enjoying the paradoxes of their own inconsistencies, to the pathetic artists amusing those in power with their own protests against power; it is much more difficult to fully endorse the reversal of this unrest in the harsh new Order of the Revolutionary Terror. In a homologous way, it is easy to enjoy the creative unrest of the

years immediately following the October Revolution, with suprematists, turists, constructivists, and so on, competing for primacy in revolutionary fervor; it is much more difficult to recognize in the horrors of the forced collectivization of the late 1920s an attempt to translate this revolutionary fervor into a new positive social order.

We should also not confuse the series of Lacan's "il ny a pas. . ." (de l'utre) with the series of "nexiste pas": "nexiste pas" denies the full symbolic existence of the negated object (already for Hegel, existence is not being, but being as the appearing of an underlying symbolic-notional essence), while "il ny a pas" is more radical, it denies the very pre-essential nomadic being of specters and other pre-ontological entities. In short, la Femme nexiste pas, mais il y a des femmes. The same goes for God and the unconscious: God does not exist, but "there are gods" who haunt us; the unconscious does not exist as a full ontological entity (Tung thought it did exist), but it insists in haunting us-which is why Lacan said that the true formula of atheism is "God is the unconscious!"

The reason Lacan, in his later teaching, turned to the theme of knots was precisely in order to think the non-relationship as embodied in a paradoxical element (which would vaguely fit the singular universal, the "part of no-part").⁹⁰ Here enters the Borromean knot, consisting of three circles intertwined in such a way that no two are directly connected but are held together only through the third, so that if we cut the third knot, the other two will also be disconnected in short, there is no relationship between any two circles. What is this third circle? The objet a? The sinthome? The symbolic order itself? Here Lacan, at the

.89 Incidentally, this non-existence of God has nothing to do with Levinas's and Marion's "God beyond being":

90 As we have already seen, den, Democritus's name for the atom, is arguably the most appropriate name for a non-relationship.

THE NON-ALL, OR, THE ONTOLOGY OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 799 very end of his teaching, reached a deadlock to which, in an authentically tragic mode, he openly confessed:

The metaphor of the Borromean knot is, in its most simple state, inadequate. It abuses the metaphor, because there really is no thing which supports the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. What is essential in what I am saying is that there is no sexual relationship. That there is no sexual relationship because there is an imaginary, a symbolic, and a real, this is what I did not dare to say. But I nonetheless said it. It is evident that I was wrong, but I simply let myself slide into it. This is disturbing, it is even more than annoying. It is even more annoying that it is not justified. This is how things look to me today, and this is what I confess to you. All right!⁹¹

Two things should be noted here. First, retroactively, one can see where the obvious mistake lay: the Borromean knot works as a metaphor only if we think the three circles as simultaneous, intertwined on the same surface. (The only way to save this model would be to add a fourth element holding the three together, which Lacan did with his notion of the sinthome holding together the ISR triad.) Second, why was Lacan, by his own confession, wrong to say that there is no sexual relationship because there is an imaginary, a symbolic, and a Real? Because the three are not given simultaneously as a triad-they rather function like the Kierkegaardian triad of Aesthetic-Ethical-Religious, where the choice is always between two terms, an either/or; in other words, the three terms do not operate at the same ontological level, so that we encounter a certain minimal temporality: first the antagonism between the Aesthetic and the Ethical; then, with the passage to the Ethical, the antagonism repeats itself in the (new) guise of the jump from the Ethical to the Religious. One can thus even say that, in a weird "negation of the negation": the Religious is the return of the Aesthetic within the domain of the Ethical: the Religious is non-non-Aesthetic.⁹² Similarly, in Lacan's triad of imaginary-symbolic-Real, or in Freud's of ego-superego-Id, when we focus on one term, the other two get condensed into one (under the hegemony of one of them). If we focus on the imaginary, the Real and the symbolic get contracted into the imaginary's opposite under the domination of the symbolic; if we focus on R, I and S get contracted under the domination of S.⁹³

91 Jacques Lacan, seminar of January 9, 1979, in *Le séminaire, Livre La topologie et le temps* (unpublished).

92 One can even sexualize this shift: the aesthetic-ethical axis (the overcoming of the aesthetic attitude through ethical engagement) is masculine, while the ethical-religious axis (the religious suspension of the ethical) is feminine.

93 Therein resides the shift in Lacan's work announced by his Seminar VII on the ethics of psychoanalysis: the shift from the axis J-S to the axis S-R.

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What Lacan is struggling with here is how to formulate or formalize an impossible/Real object which keeps the two sexes apart and, simultaneously, is the only thing, a third thing, which indirectly connects the two. Insofar as this object is an obstacle to the identity of each sex, this means that every sex is grounded by its immanent impossibility. The inadequacy of the Borromean metaphor is that it makes it appear as if, when the third circle is cut off, the two other circles (the two sexes) simply wander off, each going its own way-as if the two sexes have some kind of consistency outside of their constitutive difference. How can we think this dependence of the two sexes outside differentiability?

In short, the non-relationship-which had the ambition to affirm the absence of relationship-loses its support. There is no "thing" to support such a . . . concept . . . To conclude, the non-relationship did not find its object, and remains an affirmation which can only be related to its enunciation.⁹⁴

But is then every object which gives body to non-relationship a fetish? Are we dealing here with something homologous to the structure of anti-Semitism: the two non-related circles are the two classes, capitalists and proletarians, and their non-relationship exists in the gure of the Jew? This (falsely) radical formula tion brings us to a "dynamic" position which presupposes a non-relationship as an unfathomable elusive "absolute difference" already betrayed by any object which tries to positivize "there is no relationship" into "there is (embodied in this object) a non-relationship:" like the objet a which

poses as the obstacle to the direct relationship between the sexes. We can see what is wrong here if we pursue further this homology of sexual difference and class antagonism. The axiomatic basis of communist politics is not simply the dualist "class struggle" but, more precisely, the Third moment as the subtraction from the Two of hegemonic politics. That is to say, the hegemonic ideological field imposes on us a plane of (ideological) visibility with its own "principal contradiction" (today, the opposition between market-freedom-democracy and fundamentalism/terrorism-totalitarianism-Islamo-Fascism etc.), and the first thing we must do is reject (subtract from) this opposition, recognize it as a false opposition destined to obfuscate the true line of division. Lacan's formula for this redoubling is $1 + 1 + a$: the "official" antagonism (the Two) is always supplemented by an "indivisible remainder" which indicates its foreclosed dimension. In other words, the true antagonism is always reflexive, it is the antagonism between the "official" antagonism and that which is foreclosed by it (this is why, in Lacan's mathematics, $1 + 1 = 3$). Today, again, the true antagonism is not between liberal

94 Le Gaufey, *Le Pastout de Lacan*, pp. 166, 168.

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multiculturalism and fundamentalism, but between the very field of their opposition and the excluded Third (radical emancipatory politics).

This is why Lacan's formula of " $1 + 1 + a$ " is best exemplified by the class struggle: the two classes plus the excess of the "Jew;" the *objet a*, the supplement to the antagonistic couple. The function of this supplementary element is double: it is a fetishistic disavowal of the class antagonism, yet precisely as such, it stands for this antagonism, forever preventing "class peace." In other words, if we had just the two classes, just $1 + 1$ without the supplement, we would not have a "pure" class antagonism but, on the contrary, class peace: two classes complementing each other in a harmonious Whole. The paradox is thus that it is the very element which blurs or displaces the "purity" of the class struggle that serves as its "prime mover." Critics of Marxism who point out that there are never only two classes opposed in social life thus miss the point: it is precisely because there are never just two classes opposed that there is class struggle. We never have a pure confrontation of the two antagonistic classes, there are always third elements which displace the struggle, and these third elements are not just a "complication" of the class struggle, they are the class struggle. Without them, we would not have class struggle proper, but a simple differential relationship of the two opposed classes: class struggle is precisely the struggle for hegemony, for the appropriation of these third elements.

Here is the final sentence from the Wikipedia description of the movie *Super 8*: "The movie ends with the star ship blasting off towards the creature's home planet while Joe and Alice hold hands." The couple is created when the Thing which served as the ambiguous obstacle disappears-an ambiguous, because it was nonetheless needed to bring the couple together in the first place. This is what *il n'a pas de rapport sexuel* means "in practice": the direct relationship is impossible, a third object serving as obstacle is needed to establish a link. Lars von Trier's *Melancholia* stages an interesting reversal of this classic formula of an object-Thing (an asteroid, aliens) which serves as the enabling obstacle to the production of the couple: the film's end, the Thing (a planet on a collision course with Earth) does not withdraw; it hits Earth, destroying all life, and the film deals with the different ways the main characters deal with the impending catastrophe (from suicide to cynical acceptance).

This allows us also to approach in a new way Badiou's concept of the "point" as the point of decision, as the moment at which the complexity of a situation is "filtered" through a binary disposition and thus reduced to a simple choice: all things considered, are we against or for (Should we attack or retreat? Support that proclamation or oppose it?). With regard to the Third moment as the subtraction from the Two of hegemonic politics, we should always bear in mind that one basic operation of hegemonic ideology is to enforce a false point, to impose on us a false choice-as in today's "war on terror;" when anyone who tries to

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draw attention to the complexity and ambiguity of the situation is sooner or later interrupted by an impatient voice saying: "OK, enough of this muddle-we are engaged in a difficult struggle in which the fate of the free world is at stake, so please, make it clear, where do you really stand: do you support freedom and democracy or not?"⁹⁵ The obverse of this imposition of a false choice is, of course, the blurring of the true line of division-here Nazism, with its designation of the Jewish enemy as an agent of the "plutocratic-Bolshevik plot;" remains unsurpassed. In this designation, the mechanism is almost laid bare: the true opposition ("plutocrats" versus "Bolsheviks;" i.e., capitalists versus proletarians) is literally obliterated, blurred into One, and therein lies the function of the name "Jew"-to serve as the operator of this obliteration. The first task of emancipatory politics is therefore to distinguish between "false" and "true" points, "false" and "true" choices, to bring back the third element whose obliteration sustains the false choice-just as, today, the false choice of "liberal democracy or Islamo Fascism" is sustained by the obliteration of radical secular emancipatory politics.

We should be clear, then, in rejecting the dangerous motto "my enemy's enemy is my friend;" which may lead us in particular into discarding a "progressive" anti-imperialist potential in fundamentalist Islamist movements. The ideological universe of organizations like Hezbollah is based on a blurring of the differences between capitalist neo-imperialism and secular progressive emancipation: within Hezbollah's ideological space, women's emancipation, gay rights, etc., are nothing but the "decadent" moral aspect of Western imperialism. We can see clearly here how the bourgeoisie functions in the masculine way, and the proletariat in the feminine: for the bourgeoisie, the field of the political is a closed dual relationship where the enemy of my enemy is my friend, for which they are now paying a heavy price-today's enemies, Muslim fundamentalists, were yesterday enemies of the (common) enemy (Soviet communism); for the proletariat as non-All, the field is not closed in this binary fashion-my enemy's enemy is not my friend (no alliance with religious

fundamentalists), but, on the other hand, to be non-non-bourgeois is not to be bourgeois again, but our (the proletariat's) prospective ally.

95 One can also imagine a humanitarian version of such pseudo-ethical blac ail: "OK. enough of this muddle about neocolonialism, the responsibility of the West, and so on-do you want to do something to really help the millions suffering in Africa. or do you just want to use them to score pOints in your ideologico-political struggle?"

THREE WHITES AND TWO BLACKS

We should reread Lacan's text on logical time, where he provides a brilliant interpretation of the logical puzzle of three prisoners. What is not so well known is that the original form of this puzzle comes from the eighteenth-century French libertinage with its mixture of sex and cold logic (which culminates in Sade). In this sexualized version, the governor of a woman's prison has decided that he will give amnesty to one of the three prisoners; the winner will be decided by a test of her intelligence. The three women will be placed in a triangle around a large round table, each naked from the waist below and leaning forward on the table to enable penetration a tergo. Each woman will then be penetrated from behind by either a black or a white man, so she will be only able to see the color of the men who are penetrating the other two women in front of her; all that she will know is that there are only five men available to the governor for this experiment, three white and two black. Given these constraints, the winner will be the woman who first can establish the color of skin of the man fucking her, pushing him away and leaving the room. There are three possible cases here, of increasing complexity:

In the first case, there are two black men and one white man fucking the women. Since the woman fucked by a white man knows that there are only two black men in the pool, she can immediately rise and leave the room.

In the second case, there is one black man and two white men doing the fucking. The two women fucked by white men can hence see one white man and one black man. The woman fucked by a black man can see two white men, but — since there are three white men in the pool — she also cannot immediately rise. The only way for a winner to emerge in this second case is if one of the two women being fucked by a white man reasons in this way to herself: "I can see one white man and one black man, so the guy fucking me might be white or black. However, if my fucker was black, the woman in front of me fucked by a white man would see two black men and immediately conclude that her fucker was white — she would have stood up and moved immediately. But she hasn't done this, so my fucker must be white."

In the third case, each of the three women is being fucked by a white man, so that each of them accordingly sees two other white men. Each can accordingly reason in the same mode as the winner in case 2 had, in the following way: "I can see two white men, so the man fucking me can be white or black. But if mine was black, either of the two others could reason (as the winner in 2 does): 'I can see a black man and a white man. So if my fucker is black, the woman fucked by a white man would see two black man and immediately conclude that her fucker was white and leave. But she hasn't done this. So my fucker must be white.' But since neither of the other two has stood up, my fucker must not be black,

but white too."

But here logical time enters. If all three women were of equal intelligence and indeed arose at the same time, this

4

would cast each of them into a radical uncertainty about who is fucking them. Why? Each woman could not know whether the other two women have stood up as a result of going through the same reasoning process she has gone through, since she was being fucked by a white man; or whether each had reasoned as the winner in the second type of case had, because she was fucked by a black man. The winner will be the woman who will be the first to interpret this indecision correctly and jump to the conclusion that it indicates how all three were being fucked by white men.

The consolation prize for the other two women will be that at least they will have been fucked to the end, and this fact gains its meaning the moment one takes note of the political overdetermination of this choice of men: among the upper-class ladies in the mid-eighteenth-century France, black men as sexual partners were, of course, socially unacceptable, but coveted as secret lovers because of their alleged higher potency and supposedly extra-large penises. Consequently, to be fucked by a white man means socially acceptable but intimately not-satisfying sex, while to be fucked by a black man means socially inadmissible but much more satisfying sex. However, this choice is more complex than it may appear, since, in sexual activity, the fantasy gaze observing us is always here. The message of the logical puzzle thus becomes more ambiguous: the three women are observing each other while having sex, and what they have to establish is not simply "Who is fucking me, a black or a white guy?" but, rather, "What am I for the Other's gaze while I am being fucked?", as if her very identity is established through this gaze.

https://archive.org/stream/SlavojZizekAudunMortensenMomusZizeksJokesDidYouHearTheOneAboutHegelAndNegation/Slavoj%20%C5%BD%C5%BEek%20Audun%20Mortensen%2C%20Momus%20-%20Zizek%27s%20Jokes%20%20Did%20You%20Hear%20the%20One%20about%20Hegel%20and%20Negation_djvu.txt

Slavoj Zizek - Where Hegel wasn't Hegelian Enough: Sex, Rabble and Revolution
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0uqUnOgwzl>

In defense of Hegel's madness

<http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=296&path%5B%5D=296>

<http://mariborchan.si/text/articles/slavoj-zizek/negation-of-the-negation> As we have just seen, the same goes for crime and law, for the passage from crime as the distortion ("negation") of the law to crime as sustaining the law itself, the idea of the law itself as universal- ized crime. We should note that, in this notion of the "negation of negation," the encompassing unity of the two opposed terms is the "lowest," "transgressive" one: it is not crime which is a moment of law's self-mediation (or theft which is a moment of property's self- mediation); the opposition of crime and law is inherent to crime, law is a subspecies of crime, crime's self-relating negation

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Qu'est-ce que la dialectique ? (Deuxième partie : Hegel) <https://youtu.be/m1xTP1cAgwE?t=8m45s> <https://youtu.be/m1xTP1cAgwE?t=13m42s>

Qu'est-ce que la dialectique ? (Troisième partie : Marx) https://youtu.be/MPQc0ABtQ_k?t=13m55s

Fuck Me In The Ass Cause I Love Jesus <https://youtu.be/NfRtkCGE40A>

Frank Ruda – The Dash (II): Working Through Absolute Knowing <https://youtu.be/-JDkluOr4Jk?t=28m54s>

32:35

Man 'twerking' in high heels and hot pants was most complained about advert in 2015 <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/weird-news/man-twerking-high-heels-hot-7421952> <https://youtu.be/ObhiOqCOgx0>

460. The human and ethical orders require one another. The human law has its roots in the divine order, whereas the Divine Law is only actual in the daylight realm of existence and activity.

461. The ethical system in its two branches fulfills all the imperfect categories that have led up to it. It is rational in that it unites self consciousness and objectivity. It observes itself in the customs which surround it. It has pleasure in the family life and necessity in the wider social order. It has the law of the heart at its root which is also the law of all hearts. It exhibits virtue and the devotion to the 'task itself'.

It provides the criterion by which all detailed projects and acts are tested.

487. Spirit now lives in two worlds, one of self-alienation and the other of faith, where, however, in fleeing from the former world, it is involved in another form of the same self-alienation. The principle of the former world, not being aware of its Notion, has the false limitation of being opposed to faith.

516. In the pursuit of wealth the noble-minded individual comes under the sway of an alien power.

517. In the pursuit of wealth an individual's personality becomes enslaved to the chance personality of another. What he personally is becomes utterly impersonal, a commodity like others to be bought and sold. Feeling that everything essential is reduced to unessentiality, the individual becomes profoundly rebellious.

518. The self, seeing itself thus superseded and rejected, supersedes this supersession and rejects this rejection. It is consciously for itself in and through them.

51g. In its inner independence the self rises above the distinction of the noble- and base-minded: both become a single attitude. Wealth in being universally dispensed gives self-conscious independence and freedom of choice to all, but these are exercised at the expense of others. An arrogance of wealth arises which generates unbounded resentment.

521. The absolute, universal inversion of reality and thought, their mutual estrangement, is the final product of culture. Everything becomes void of substance and confounded with its opposite. All values become transvalued. Spirit in this phase of culture speaks a language of utter disintegration, which takes the novel form of wit.

522. Wit runs the whole gamut of the serious and the silly, the trivial and the profound, the lofty and the infamous, with complete lack of taste and shame (see Diderot's Nephew of Rameau).

523. Plain sense and sound morality can teach this disintegrated brilliance nothing that it does not know. It can merely utter some of the syllables the latter weaves into its piebald discourse. In conceding that the bad and good are mixed in life, it merely substitutes dull platitude for witty brilliance.

524. The disintegrated consciousness can be noble and edifying but this is for it only one note among others. To ask it to forsake its disintegration is merely, from its own point of view, to preach a new eccentricity, that of Diogenes in his tub.

525. The disintegrated consciousness is, however, on the way to transcending its disintegration. It sees the vanity of treating all things as vain, and so becomes serious.

526. Wit really emancipates the disintegrated consciousness from finite material aims and gives it true spiritual freedom. In knowing itself as disintegrated it also rises above this, and achieves a truly positive self-consciousness.

783. Evil is nothing but the going-into-self out of the immediacy of nature and is accordingly the first step in the direction of good. To be evil one must be conscious of the norms one rebels against, and will ultimately obey. There is no element of chance in the going into-self which leads to evil: it is the essential movement of self-consciousness.

Boo. Systematic Science only appears when Spirit has achieved a purely conceptual self-consciousness and can reduce all objectivity to Notions, and so see itself in them.

80 r. Consciousness must go through a long process of first enrich-

VIII. ABSOLUTE KNOWING, §§793-808 591

ing its object, poor and abstract in its first appearance, and then appropriating and conceptually reabsorbing all that it has thus enriched. The pure Notion presupposes all these stages that lead up to it, but consciousness embraces them all in implicit non-notional form. Time is the Notion itself when presented to consciousness as an empty intuition, and Spirit appears to itself in time till it achieves full notional grasp and thereby abolishes time. Time is the destiny and the necessity of the as yet not perfected Spirit, i.e. until it has overcome the externality of objective Substance.

Denroy Morgan - Sweet Tender Love https://youtu.be/xksshJLk_4I
Tears For Fears - Everybody Wants To Rule The World <https://youtu.be/aGCdLKXNF3w>
"I Can Read with My Eyes Shut" by Dr. Seuss - read by Mrs. Drake, Cullman, Alabama <https://youtu.be/GZWRYuSwdaE?t=6m22s> If you read with your eyes shut you are likely to find that the place you are going is far far behind.
Trump And Dumber (Movie Trailer) <https://youtu.be/5oA4ZyTq5oI>
IMVU Twerk Queenz " Everybody Just Twerk " Song <https://youtu.be/dvDGI97POyg> Mind Body Problem - Dorian Electra (Music Video) https://youtu.be/LWAMCEp0b_I
Michael Hardt on The Politics of Love and Evil <https://youtu.be/hwOMLLOLLuQ?t=9m6s> <https://youtu.be/hwOMLLOLLuQ?t=9m52s>
<https://youtu.be/hwOMLLOLLuQ?t=46m13s>

BOB MARLEY & THE WAILERS -

Rat Race / Songs Of Freedom Version

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsLopod5LAs>

Cultural Theory: Althusser's Concept of Ideology <https://youtu.be/Wz3YNMPMNzU?t=3m06s>

"The Psychology of Transformation:Understanding Buddhist Tantra" with Ven. Robina Courtin, Session 1 <https://youtu.be/H2AJLLZMJ44?t=1h50m14s>

The Interpretation of Dreams by Sigmund Freud Audio Book Part 1 <https://youtu.be/tizZ-KBqwTg?t=1h34m50s>

How To Read Your Akashic Records <https://youtu.be/jkensiqbLms?t=18m20s> Chicks On Speed - Wordy Rappinghood https://youtu.be/lAe_VOGNJql

Slavoj Zizek | What Is Ideology? | Short Film <https://youtu.be/53GUygLogwA>

The Ontology of the Couple https://youtu.be/O_3xvUskx1A?t=4m52s

4m25 <https://www.ici-berlin.org/videos/slavoj-zizek-why-todestrieb-is-a-philosophical-concept/part/2/>

Karl Marx

The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature Difficulties Concerning the Identity Of the Democritean

and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature

Apart from historical testimony, there is much other evidence for the identity of Democritean and Epicurean physics. The principles — atoms and the void — are indisputably the same. Only in isolated cases does there seem to be arbitrary, hence unessential, difference.

However, a curious and insoluble riddle remains. Two philosophers teach exactly the same science, in exactly the same way, but — how inconsistent! — they stand diametrically opposed in all that concerns truth, certainty, application of this science, and all that refers to the relationship between thought and reality in general. I say that they stand diametrically opposed, and I shall now try to prove it.

A. The opinion of Democritus

concerning the truth and certainty of human knowledge

seems hard to ascertain. Contradictory passages are to be found, or rather it is not the passages, but Democritus' views that contradict each other. For Trendelenburg's assertion in his commentary to Aristotelean psychology, that only later authors, but not Aristotle, knew of such contradictions, is factually incorrect. Indeed, in Aristotle's

Psychology

it is

stated: "Democritus posits soul and mind [

Verstand

] as one and the same, since the phenomenon is the true thing."

(1)

But in his

Metaphysics

he writes: "Democritus asserts

that nothing is true or it is concealed from us."

(2)

Are not these passages of Aristotle

contradictory? If the phenomenon is the true thing, how can the true thing be concealed? The concealment begins only when phenomenon and truth separate. But Diogenes Laertius reports that Democritus was counted among the Sceptics. His saying is quoted: "In reality we know nothing, for truth lies at the deep bottom of the well."

(3)

Similar

statements are found in

Sextus Empiricus

.

(4) This sceptical, uncertain and internally self-contradictory view held by Democritus is only further developed in the way in which the relationship between the atom and the world which is apparent to the senses is determined

Sensuous appearance, on the one hand, does not belong to the atoms themselves. It is not objective appearance, but

subjective semblance

[

Schein

]. "The

true

principles are the

atoms and the void,

everything else is opinion, semblance

".

.

(5) "Cold exists only according to opinion, heat exists only according to opinion, but in reality there are only the atoms and the void."

(6)

Unity therefore does not truly result from the many atoms,

but rather "through the combination of atoms each thing

appears

to become a unity".

(7)

The principles can therefore be perceived only through reason, since they are inaccessible to the sensuous eye if only because of their smallness. For this reason they are even called ideas

.

(8)

The sensuous appearance is, on the other hand, the only true object, and the

aisthesis

[sensuous perception]

is the phronesis

[that which is rational]; this true thing

however is the changing, the unstable, the phenomenon. But to say that the phenomenon is the true thing is contradictory.

(9)

Thus now the one, now the other side is made the

subjective and the objective. The contradiction therefore seems to be held apart, being

divided between two worlds. Consequently, Democritus makes sensuous reality into subjective semblance; but the

antinomy, banned from the world of objects, now exists in

his own self-consciousness, where the concept of the atom and sensuous perception face

each other as enemies. http://cnqzu.com/library/Anarchy%20Folder/Philosophy/Marx,_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicurean_Philosophy_of_Nature.pdf

We consider finally the form of reflection which expresses the relation of thought to being, their mutual relationship. In the general relationship which the philosopher sees between the world and thought, he merely makes objective for himself the relation of his own particular consciousness to the real world. <http://www.politicalconcepts.org/sexual-difference-joan-copjec/>

Jouissance? Here is what Lacan says about it in the Encore seminar: jouissance is a "negative instance" that opposes itself to division, distribution, or reattribution. The word is derived from an old legal term, usufruct, which grants one the use of one's means, permits one to enjoy them, but not to acquire legal title to them nor use them up.³ In order to prevent, then, any further squandering of this common dimension, which we as subjects enjoy, let us look more closely at some of gender

theory's basic assumptions.

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<http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2016/10/slavoj-zizek-masterclass-1-between-philosophy- and-psychoanalysis/>
1h31 class division and sexual position gender division

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In Praise of Love

A.Badiou

pg21

When I was a very young man, I was very struck, almost disgusted, by a passage in Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex, where she describes, how, after having sex, the man feels the woman's body is flat and flabby and the woman feels in parallel that the man's body, apart from his erect member, is generally unattractive, if not slightly ridiculous. Theatrical farce or vaudeville makes us laugh with a constant usage of similar thoughts. Man's desire is the desire of the comic, big-bellied, impotent Phallus, and the toothless hag with sagging breasts is the future that awaits all beauty. Loving tenderness, when you fall asleep in the other's arms, is like Noah's cloak cast over these unpleasant considerations. But Lacan also thinks quite the opposite, that love reaches out towards the ontological. While desire focuses on the other, always in a somewhat fetishist manner, on particular objects, like breasts, buttocks and cock... love focuses on the very being of the other, on the other as it has erupted, fully armed with its being, into my life thus disrupted and re-fashioned. https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0B68W0wC0t_IXdFpUbnNzNIJZYUU

pg33 One has to understand that love invents a different way of lasting in life. That everyone's existence, when tested by love, confronts a new way of experiencing time. Of course, if we echo the poet, love is also the "the dour desire to endure". But, more than that, it is the desire for an unknown duration. Because, as we all know, love is a re-invention of life. To re-invent love is to re-invent that re-invention.

pg36-37 Love, particularly over time, embraces all the positive aspects of friendship but love relates to the totality of the being of the other, and the surrender of the body becomes the material symbol of that totality. People can say: "That's not true! It is desire and desire alone that's at work there." I would maintain that, within the framework of a love that declares itself, this declaration, even if it remains latent, is what produces the effects of desire, and not desire itself. Love proves itself by permeating desire. The ritual of bodies is then the material expression of the word, it communicates the idea that the promise to re-invent life will be fulfilled, initially in terms of the body. But even in their wildest delirium, lovers know that love is there, like their bodies' guardian angel, when they wake up in the morning, when peace descends over the proof that their bodies have grasped that love has been declared. That is why I believe love cannot be and isn't for anyone, apart from the ideologues keen to erase it, a mere cloak for sexual desire, a sophisticated, chimerical ploy to ensure the survival of the species.

pg52-53 I don't at all deny that love is sequential, in other words, that it's not autonomous. There are points, tests, temptations and new appearances, and, each time, you must replay the "Two scene", find the terms for a new declaration. After the initial declaration, love too must also be "re-stated". And that is why love is also the source of violent existential crises. Like all processes involving the search for truth. From this perspective, moreover, there is also a striking similarity between politics and love.

pg72-73 When I talk of the Communist hypothesis, I simply want to suggest that future forms of the politics of emancipation must be inscribed in a resurrection, re-affirmation, of the Communist idea, the idea of a world that isn't given over to the avarice of private property, a world of free association and equality. To that end, we can draw on new philosophical tools and a good number of localised political experiences, where there has been innovative thinking. In such a framework, it will be easier to re-invent love than if surrounded by capitalist frenzy. Because we can be sure that nothing disinterested can be at ease amid such frenzy. And love, like any process in the search for truth, is essentially disinterested: its value resides in itself alone and goes beyond the immediate interests of the two individuals involved. The meaning of the word "communism" doesn't immediately relate to love. Nonetheless, the word brings with it new possibilities for love.

pg 78-79 (surrealist) Art has a very powerful point, in the sense that it does justice to events. That could even be a possible definition of art: art is what, at the level of thought, does complete justice to the event. In politics, events are ordered by history in retrospect. But art is alone in restoring or attempting to restore completely their intense power. Only art restores the dimension of the senses to an encounter, an insurrection or a riot. Art, in all its forms, is a great reflection on the event as such. A great painting is the capture by its own means of something that cannot be reduced to what it displays. The latent event emerges and, we might say, breaks through what you can see. Breton reminds us, from this point of view, that art is very closely linked to love, since the latter is basically the moment when an event breaks through existence. This explains "l'amour fou". Love cannot be reduced to any law. There is no law of love. What's more, art has often demonstrated the asocial side of love. As the popular saying goes, after all, "lovers are on their own in this world".

pg80-81 However, some philosophers have maintained that eternity is the moment. We already find this idea in Greek thought. The only temporal dimension possible for eternity was the moment. That would support Breton. Naturally, the moment of the miraculous encounter promises the eternity of love, though what I want to suggest is a concept of love that is less miraculous and more hard work, namely a construction of eternity within time, of the experience of the Two, point by point. I go along with the miracle of the encounter, but I think it remains confined within Surrealist poetics if it is isolated, if

we don't channel it towards the onerous development of a truth that is constructed point by point. "Onerous" must be taken here as something positive. There is a work of love: it is not simply a miracle. You must be in the breech, on guard: you must be at one with yourself and the other. You must think, act and change. And then, surely, happiness follows, as the immanent reward for all that work.

pg88-89 The commonest, most exploited conflict on the stage is the struggle of chance love against implacable law. More subtly, it is the struggle of young people, helped by proletarians (slaves and servants), against the old, helped by Church and State. And now you will say, "Freedom has won out, arranged marriages no longer exist: the couple is pure creation." I'm not so sure. Freedom? What kind of freedom exactly? At what cost? Yes, that's a real question: what did love pay in the apparent gain of its freedom?

pg89-90 Yes, of course, that love exists! The theatre is a community and the aesthetic expression of fraternity. That's why I argue that there is, in that sense, something communist in all theatre. By "communist" I understand that which makes the held-in-common prevail over selfishness, the collective achievement over private self-interest. While we're about it, we can also say that love is communist in that sense, if one accepts, as I do, that the real subject of a love is the becoming of the couple and not the mere satisfaction of the individuals that are its component parts. Yet another possible definition of love: minimal communism!

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Differently from the previous configuration, in which the end (as possibility) was inherent to the repetition, what is at stake here is rather that repetition is inherent to the end; there is something about the end itself that drives the repetition, and repetition is essentially repetition of the end.

So, when looking at repetition from this perspective, we end up with two kinds of ends: the end that is repeating itself (and is thus one with repetition), and the end that could eventually put an end to this repetition (of the end).

It seems that there is an end on both sides of repetition; and that there is repetition on both sides of the end, since to put an end to the repetition itself (as repetition of the end) would not only amount to putting an end to this (repeated) end, but would also amount to repeating this end, "achieving" it, as it were.

By way of a short digression, could we not say that the stakes of the famous Hegelian thesis about the "end of art" is structured precisely following this mode of repetition, namely as an unceasing repetition of the end? In *The Man Without Content*, Giorgio Agamben takes seriously Hegel's claim that art has exhausted its spiritual vocation, and that it is no longer through art that Spirit principally comes to knowledge of itself.² But this is not to say, he argues, that Hegel proclaimed the "death of art" (as this is often interpreted). Rather, he proclaimed the indefinite continuation of art in what Hegel called a "self-annulling" mode. This indefinite continuation in a "self-annulling" mode does in fact correspond perfectly to what we are describing here as the repetition of the end. Art ends, again and again, with every significant ("new") artistic project...

...Zeno eventually finds a way out of his ordeal: he never returns to analysis, and hence effectively ends it. Not in any solemn way; he just postpones going there. And after a while, he realizes that he has ended it. In doing this, he also stops smoking: "I have finally succeeded in returning to my sweet habits, and stopped smoking. I am already much better since I have been able to abolish the freedom that foolish doctor chose to grant me."⁵ Here we have it most literally: "abolishing freedom" can have a most liberating effect, and this is indeed a very nice example that one should add to Ruda's list! What is also interesting in Zeno's wording here is the implication that one can abolish only the freedom which is formulated in respect to a certain situation (and concrete circumstances). In other words: the abstract freedom that inhibits us has first to find a concrete formulation that efficiently renders it, and only this rejection of a concrete (embodied) form of abstract freedom can eventually put us on the path of a concrete freedom. We do not arrive to concrete freedom simply by rejecting/abolishing the abstract freedom, but by saying no to a concrete existence of this abstract freedom. The doctor's suggestion ("you are free to smoke") efficiently

exposes the limits of the abstract freedom in this case: the impossibility masked by the (false) alternative, or choice, between smoking and not smoking. For this choice is clearly not what is at stake for Zeno: he is repeating the very failure of this alternative to capture what is at stake. The imperative to smoke and the imperative to quit smoking come from the same source, from the same structural place, and they effectively protect each other (and sustain the active core of repression). In a similar way the abstract freedom as freedom of choice is the very form of existence of an imperative: for example, the freedom to choose between different products is the form of existence of the imperative to buy... <http://provocationsbooks.com/2016/10/31/the-end-2/>

"Zeno eventually finds a way out of his ordeal: he never returns to analysis, and hence effectively ends it. Not in any solemn way; he just postpones going there. And after a while, he realizes that he has ended it" Strangely, when relapsing for a while, the time-frame also changes. The same persons in their relation to the addictions imply a demand for a personal regression to a previously known identity; similar to trying to relive the loss of innocence or virginity. Repeating the postponement becomes easier every time the actual demand for the not-yet-known exceeds the comfort of the nostalgia of a mutable substantial companion (the cigaret, joint, commo-titty)

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The identity cult of repetition must be challenged by love of what is different, is unique, is unrepeatable, unstable and foreign.

Alain Badiou, In Praise of Love

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"Lovers, of course, are notoriously frantic epistemologists, second only to paranoiacs (and analysts) as readers of signs and wonders."^[19] "Little things" are noticed and endlessly analyzed for meaning. Such excessive concern over trivia may not be entirely unfounded, however, as body language can indicate reciprocated feeling. What the limerent object said and did is recalled with vividness. Alternative meanings for the behaviors recalled are sought. Each word and gesture is

permanently available for review, especially those interpreted as evidence in favor of reciprocated feeling. When objects, people, places or situations are encountered with the limerent object, they are vividly remembered, especially if the limerent object interacted with them in some way.

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limerence> --

Be cosmos grows not just in Be bear

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Badiou Reflections on the Recent Election 11 9 16b democratic fascism <https://youtu.be/gRnUpVLc31w?t=24m44s>
link {affective language - bourse signifiers}
LACAN, NOUS ET LE RÉEL-5-Christian Dubuis Santini bourse signifiers <https://youtu.be/sCbZbwnjjz4?t=29m1s> oo aa
signifiers <https://youtu.be/u0LKorvyStE?t=31m50s> example
That power - Will.I.Am (ft. Justin Bieber), lyrics <https://youtu.be/PilfaO4IKlc>

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So, there is a new mind - the mind that is experiencing continuously without shaping or being shaped by the experience - only when the word, the past, is not used as a means of becoming.

krishnamurti - mirror of relationship <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1BEyTPS3jChXMpv1jZUD8RrZ2LoNYch1Eys4dOExcXNA/edit>

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There is thus no inner ground where actualization depends on external circumstances. The external relation of presupposing (ground presupposes conditions and vice versa) is surpassed in a pure tautological gesture, by means of which the thing “presupposes itself.” This tautological gesture is “empty” in the sense that it does not contribute anything new; it only retroactively ascertains that the thing in question “is already present in its conditions.” The totality of these conditions “is” the actuality of the thing. Such an empty gesture provides the most elementary definition of a “symbolic” act. <http://mariborchan.si/text/articles/slavoj-zizek/hegels-logic-as-a-theory-of-ideology/>

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Within psychoanalysis, this knowledge of drive which can never be subjectivized assumes the form of knowledge of the subject’s “fundamental fantasy,” the specific formula which regulates his or her access to jouissance. That is to say, desire and jouissance are inherently antagonistic, exclusive even: desire’s *raison d’être* (or “utility function,” to use Richard Dawkins’s term) is not to realize its goal, to find full satisfaction, but to reproduce itself as desire. How is it possible nonetheless to couple desire and jouissance, to guarantee a minimum of jouissance within the space of desire? This is made possible by the famous Lacanian object *a* that mediates between the incompatible domains of desire and jouissance. In what precise sense is object *a* the object-cause of desire? Object *a* is not what we desire, what we are after, but rather that which sets our desire in motion, the formal frame that confers consistency on our desire. Desire is of course metonymical, it shifts from one object to another; through all its displacements, however, desire nonetheless retains a minimum of formal consistency, a set of fantasmatic features which, when encountered in a positive object, insures that we will come to desire this object. Object *a*, as the cause of desire, is nothing but this formal frame of consistency. In a slightly different way, the same mechanism regulates the subject’s falling in love: the automatism of love is set in motion when some contingent, ultimately indifferent (libidinal) object finds itself occupying a pre-given fantasy place. This role of fantasy in the automatic emergence of love hinges on the fact that “there is no sexual relationship,” no universal formula or matrix guaranteeing a harmonious sexual relationship with the partner. Because of the lack of this universal formula, every individual has to invent

a fantasy of his own, a “private” formula for the sexual relationship; for a man, a relationship with a woman is possible only inasmuch as she fits his formula. The formula of the Wolfman, Freud’s famous patient, consisted of “a woman, viewed from behind, on her hands and knees, and washing or cleaning something on the ground in front of her”; the view of a woman in this position automatically gave rise to love. John Ruskin’s formula, which followed the model of old Greek and Roman statues, led to a tragicomic disappointment when, in the course of his wedding night, Ruskin caught sight of pubic hair not found on the statues. This discovery made him totally impotent, since he was convinced that his wife was a monster.

...
The Freudian point about fundamental fantasy would be that each subject, female or male, possesses such a “factor” which regulates her or his desire: “a woman, viewed from behind, on her hands and knees” was the Wolfman’s factor; a statue-like woman without pubic hair was Ruskin’s factor; etc., etc. There is nothing uplifting about our awareness of this “factor”: this awareness can never be subjectivized, it is uncanny, horrifying even, since it somehow “depossesses” the subject, reducing her or him to a puppet-like level “beyond dignity and freedom.”

<http://mariborchan.si/text/articles/slavoj-zizek/desire-drive-truth-knowledge/> --

As Fink's delineation of the aims of analysis reveals, transference works when the subject begins to develop a questioning relationship to its desire, no longer meekly accepting the desire of the Other as its own. This empowers it to rework the basic sketch of its psychic life, for the less it is willing to "cede on" its true desire, and aspires instead to actively speak the language of this desire, the less beholden it remains to the Other.

...
When we are alienated from the "truth" of our desire—when we are overrun by the hegemonic desire of the Other—our existence can feel lackluster and devoid of meaning. When we are caught up in soul-defeating fantasies, we go through the motions of daily existence in an apathetic and insipid manner, living at a distance from ourselves; we lack singularity, passion, and intersubjective grace. This is why analysis targets the nexus of desire, repetition, symptomatic rigidity, and the return of the repressed that characterizes psychic lives that are too dedicated, too faithful, to unyielding fantasy formations. When analytic intervention (however imperfectly) attains its aim, we can begin to loosen psychic patterns that cause us suffering. From this point of view, analysis strives to convert the symptomatic sticking points of our being into a more versatile sense of how our lives might turn out; it liquefies unconscious and bodily deposits of xity—deposits that are frequently experienced as an arresting sense of existential impossibility—into a living and breathing sense of possibility.

2012, *The Singularity of Being* pg 57-58

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The idea that ethics might be a matter of following one's desire to the point of self-annihilation and/or social destruction may appear individualistic and socially irresponsible.

...
To put the matter plainly, Lacan renounces the idea that ethics mediates symbolic relationships for the same reason that he repudiates the assumption that analysis aims at social adaptation, namely that the subject's desire and the demands of disciplinary power (the "morality of the master") are frequently inherently antithetical to each other:
Part of the world has resolutely turned in the direction of the service of goods, thereby rejecting everything that has to do with the relationship of man to desire—it is what is known as the postrevolutionary perspective. The only thing to be said is that people don't seem to have realized that, by formulating things in this way, one is simply perpetuating the eternal tradition of power, namely, "Let's keep on working, and as far as desire is concerned, come back later." (1960, 318)
Lacan asserts that one of the primary characteristics of our postrevolutionary (late capitalist) society is to make desire wait even as it simultaneously offers a multitude of shimmering lures that are designed to incite this very desire. The subject is drawn into the fold of commercially generated desires at the same time as it is expected to suppress the kinds of desires that do not directly serve the interests of consumer culture and ideology.

...
Lacan in fact ridicules both the Aristotelian path of moderation and the Kantian notion that ethics must be "disinterested," divorced from any idiosyncratic passions. Regarding the latter, he posits that the categorical imperative ("Act in such a way that the maxim of your action may be accepted as a universal maxim"), in today's docile society, implies that you should never act "except in such a way that your action may be programmed" (1960, 76–77). That is, the categorical imperative dictates that you should only do what the mainstream morality of the Other has conditioned you to do. Kant himself might have been as disturbed by this formulation as Lacan is.

2012, *The Singularity of Being* pg 74-75

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Sustained patterns of social oppression rob the subject exactly of what Kirshner describes as "the capacity to express a self in a form that can be communicated within a framework of shared meanings and social conventions" (2004, 19). While none of us can construe a coherent or conclusive account of ourselves, oppression violently attacks the subject's capacity for self-narration by coercing it to internalize the very signifiers that are calculated to disparage it. Such signifiers immobilize the subject into debilitating nodes of meaning, marking it with—and making it the unwilling bearer of—the oppressor's aggression. They turn the deprived subject into an object of use for the oppressor (so that the subject becomes an instrument of the oppressor's sadistic jouissance). Such signifiers illustrate the subject's psychic life and bodily constitution in the manner that I portrayed in the context of talking about the enigmatic desire of the Other, and the less the subject is able to counter them by signifiers of its own, the more devastatingly they operate. By depriving the subject of an agentic relationship to social meaning, they annihilate its capacity to actively mold its future. In this fashion, oppression reinforces the traumatic logic of the repetition compulsion whereby the very signifiers that carry harm are also the ones that are most insistently present in the subject's inner life, deepening its sense of despondency.

...
If analysis relies on the signifier to reconstruct our destiny, the act (usually temporarily) ushers us beyond signification—to a place that demolishes the quilting points that customarily hold together our symbolic universe. The hope, here, is that out of the ashes of this destructiveness rises a new private or collective set of possibilities. Clearly, neither of these approaches is perfect. But both have the potential to ensure that what seems "impossible" from the point of view of the normative symbolic, however fittingly, becomes possible. Both undermine our faithfulness to the hegemonic desire of the Other, allowing us to access deposits of passion that are more representative of our singularity than what we have inherited from our environment. As I stated in the end of Chapter 1, there is no way around the fact that we are constantly compelled to negotiate the tension between our cultural inheritance and our singularity, between social subjection and the capacity to claim a distinctive destiny. But, as I have underlined, it is only as singular creatures that we can attain "real" satisfaction—that we can develop an identity that is not entirely subsumed to the rules of social conventionality. This is why I have tried to illustrate that if we are to engage in embarrassing displays of surplus ardor, it is better that this ardor be directed at the "truth" of our desire than at social sites of authority that seek to secure our loyalty by convincing us that,

really, what we should desire is what the Other desires us to desire.

2012, The Singularity of Being pg 82

Truth as a Process

Somewhat paradoxically, the fact that truth has no choice but to seek expression through a mortal “some-one” who cannot ever wholly transcend its mundane “interests”—who cannot ever fully become the immortal it aspires to be—is what prevents the absolutization of truth: Because it is impossible for the subject to entirely overcome its rootedness in the world of everyday opinions, its attempts to name the truth will by necessity remain partial. Moreover, Badiou clarifies that, in any given situation, there is at least one element that is inherently unnameable. This element is “not susceptible to being made eternal,” which means that it represents the “pure real” of the situation (2002, 86), expressing, as it were, the life of the real beyond truth. In the same way that every situation is punctured by a void, every truth—even as it struggles to name this void—is, in turn, punctured by a kernel of impossibility that stays

unreachable; every truth contains an undecipherable component that cannot be drawn into the network of symbolization.

... From this perspective, the maxim of not ceding on one’s desire could be interpreted to mean that one should resist the temptation to completely close the space between the void and the “name” that aims to encapsulate this void; it could be said to imply that desire should remain partially unfilled, that some share of desire should always persist as desire rather than become completely overtaken by the jouissance of the act.

2012, The Singularity of Being pg 100-101

Zizek makes a compelling argument about the manner in which death is internal to life and life is internal to death: The living human being is “dead while alive” because it is colonized by a “dead” symbolic, but “alive while dead” (or “undead”) because a part of the real always escapes the murderous signifier. We have learned that this “undeadness” is what, in a certain sense, underlies the persistence of singularity, ensuring that the subject is always something more than just a piece of the world. However, what is noteworthy in the present context is that Zizek once again—against his own better judgment, as it were, and certainly against his scathing condemnation of Stavrakakis—posits a binary split between the symbolic and the real, the Other and jouissance, maintaining that the symbolic mortifies the body and its nonsymbolic jouissance, and depicting language as a “dead entity which ‘behaves as if it possesses a life of its own.’” Language, in other words, is a parasitical machine that gorges on the life-substance of the real. While thinkers from Derrida to Butler regard language as something inherently mobile—as a nimble entity that is able to bring forth a multitude of unexpected, startling, and rebellious meanings—Zizek connects it to the most stagnant and complacent components of the symbolic order.

2012, The Singularity of Being pg 113-114

We, potentially at least, have the power to link the sinthome as a site of compulsion—as what is inexorable in our existence in the sense that it “does not cease to write itself”—with the signifier as what allows us to write ourselves onto the map of the symbolic. While the symbolic is hegemonic in that

it carries the weight of tradition, of all the culturalictions that have over time solidified into seemingly binding conventions, it cannot ever draw us into its circuit in an entirely dependable fashion. This is why conceiving the relationship between the symbolic and the real as a unilateral process that translates the energies of the real into oppressive symbolic formations is too reductive. Likewise, the idea that symbolic subjectivity represses the asocial energies of the real cannot be remedied by a theory that completely annihilates the social in favor of the real, for this merely reverses the poles of the binary, replacing one form of brutality by another. (This, incidentally, is one of the problems with Zizek’s notion of divine violence as a “response” to the systemic violence of the establishment.) 2012, The Singularity of Being pg 121-122

Experimental narratives, in other words, provide a capacious, provocative, and affectively resonant space that, instead of positing acting out and working through as two mutually exclusive modalities, allows for their complex intertwining so that acting out may come to serve as a means of working through (or trying to get to working through) and working through may contain elements of acting out.

2012, The Singularity of Being pg 125 --

Judith Butler. To preserve the life of the Other. 2016

<https://youtu.be/ItgGE5GRbI0?t=52m18s>

Peter Sloterdijk - "nobody has time for an entire generation any more" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_fsFwf0juk

Yuri Bezmenov: Ideological Subversion has Four Stages / Yuri Bezmenov : manipulation de l'opinion https://youtu.be/xFqShpJm_zc

Complexity Theory Course (full) <https://youtu.be/y7aYDho247g?t=34m40s> & <https://youtu.be/y7aYDho247g?t=46m9s>

Miley Cyrus Wrecking Ball (Goats Edition) (Original) <https://youtu.be/EaBvyl8PLV0>

Slavoj Zizek | What Is Ideology? | Short Film <https://youtu.be/53GUygLogwA> 8m29 .. if you want the same joke

Patti Smith - A Hard Rain's A-Gonna Fall (ceremonia Nobel 2016) <https://youtu.be/DVXQaOhpfJU>

Slavoj Zizek | What Is Ideology? | Short Film <https://youtu.be/53GUygLogwA> 11m00 ... disgusting David Cameron sense

Deadly twin bomb attack strikes police near Istanbul stadium <https://youtu.be/cocEua8jQt4> AKP's constitution bill to change Turkey into dictatorship: Pundit <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/12/10/497302/Turkey-AKP-Erdogan-bill->

parliament-constitution-crackdown Slavoj Zizek on the new world coming at you (and me) : <https://youtu.be/L8BW3amMZTI> "The 'Cultural Idea' of Europe: the Universality of European Values", by Timo Miettinen (NES) <https://youtu.be/nYdcYfGaHZw>

Again,

Try to imagine the future: dictatorship or democracy? (Peter Sloterdijk vs Jeremy Rifkin) <https://youtu.be/67sUlcpWFNA?t=6m12s>

That is, the aim of fantasy is to obfuscate the fact that the enigmas of the other cannot ever be fully resolved, that each attempt to decode an intersubjective mystery can only spawn a multitude of new mysteries.

Singularity of Being pg176

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"Holy ghost is not a new collective spirit.

Holy ghost means: we are here alone without guarantee.

....

History is not circular, god is dead. there is a break, and the only hope after this break is an egalitarian community."

....

Hegel's deepest thought is that necessity retroactively emerges in a contingent way out of contingency"

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fidb5QHX7ME>

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Earth is 4.6 billion years old.... was discovering this fundamental truth worth exhuming hundreds of millions of years of pre-Mesozoic biomatter for a two-century fuel supply and inauguration of mass extinction? <http://www.e-flux.com/architecture/superhumanity/68640/on-anthropopolis/>

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dancers stereotype:

"she's an ultima. they like being pulled and pushed"

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Anne Dufourmantelle. Who is the master here? 2013 Metanoia <https://youtu.be/78LJjBlqPic?t=19m42s>

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Slavoj Zizek - First as Tragedy, Then as Farce <https://youtu.be/cvakA-DF6Hc?t=16m18s>

sex is the cut that makes the unity.

<https://youtu.be/X31ayDsG67U?t=47m9s>

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The implication is that in some forms of depression the role of ambivalence towards the lost object is a deeper and a more complex dynamic issue involving both destructive and reparative fantasies. This accords with Klein's later view that depression belongs aetiologically to the depressive position and its conflicts. In sparing the object further violence, in fantasy, depressed individuals spare themselves from going beyond depression into despair. <http://tandfbis.s3.amazonaws.com/rt-media/pp/common/sample-chapters/9780415576772.pdf> --

THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK by Miles Beller https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f4eA0H_LfTA

Johnny Bonaire - Onder Curatele - Promo <https://youtu.be/UyN1dKIExq4>

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But how does an introjection under the sway of greed or sadism or jealousy have any influence over a body organ or system? Meltzer (1960) maintains that a thorough conceptualization of the internalization process is necessary in order to understand how internalized objects have access to the body and to body tissue. He describes a two-stage process ± one involving a dynamic from outer to inner reality and another dynamic between internal objects (Meltzer 1960, p. 57). First, when an introjection occurs under the aegis of oral sadism this leads to bad objects being installed in the psyche. These objects are not ephemeral ± they do not float around without purpose but gravitate towards specific parts of the mental apparatus that can put them at their disposal. This, he suggests, is the intermediate step by which bad objects become lodged in the psyche before they can gain any currency for the body. The currency is established when

the ego identifies with the bad (or good) object.

Access to the body is therefore achieved via mechanisms peculiar to the ego. In the case of repression, the bad object reappears as an anxiety symptom or a conversion symptom. In the case of more primitive mechanisms, the bad object is subject to the processes of splitting, projection, and identification by projection that reappears as hypochondria. In the case of depression the bad object is a manifestation of the pain of loss and the conflict of ambivalence that is projected into those organs and systems providing essential life support. When the ego identifies with such an object a shadow is cast upon the ego that causes certain body functions to deteriorate ± as represented in vegetative symptoms and some psychomotor disturbance such as generalized restlessness.

In this account it is critical to realize these are the same systems that are loved, cared for and maintained during development by the ordinary devoted parents, hence they are associated in the psyche with internal and external parental objects. Any ill health that is incurred by these

objects with which the ego identifies can be expressed in superficial or chronic bodily aches and pain or in organ pain. These, briefly, are the object relations dynamics that govern the somatic process in depression. In many instances the qualities of the bad object determine their effects ± they can 'suffocate', 'bite', 'strangle' or they can

take control of an organ (Meltzer 1960, p. 59). As far as organ selection goes, this may turn out to be specific to the individual; however, there may be uniformity according to the nature of depression. Freud's notion of 'somatic compliance' would apply, in which case the unconscious meaning of the organ could be worked out in analytic work ± the emphasis in depression being on an aggressive cathexis that is displaced onto an organ. <http://tandfbis.s3.amazonaws.com/rt-media/pp/common/sample-chapters/9780415576772.pdf>

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Blue Velvet - Baby wants to fuck! <https://youtu.be/q78-6E7Y8jo> (till spread your legs...)

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Pharao - Ruimtereizen (prod. by Killing Skills) <https://youtu.be/WiTN13VpOyc>

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So, we can define our moment as the moment of the primitive conviction of liberalism as dominant in the form that private property and free market compose the unique possible destiny of human beings. And it's also a definition of a human subject. What is, in this vision, a human subject? A human subject is a beggar, a consumer, an owner, or nothing at all. That is the strict definition today of what is a human being. So that is the general vision, the general problem, and the general law of the contemporary world. <http://theoryleaks.org/it-was-during-the-horror-of-a-project-found-night-by-alain-badiou/>

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No Time | Mark Fisher | Virtual Futures

2011 <https://youtu.be/8Bk0kkRPmjE?t=14m24s>

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The key lies in the status of the "big Other" qua the order of "essential appearance": although the subjects never really believed in it, they nevertheless acted as if they believed, as the Party ruled with full legitimacy, they followed the "external" ritual, made the proper acclamations when it was necessary, etc. In other words, what is lost in a loss of what we never possessed is the "essential appearance" which ruled our lives.

ENJOY YOUR Symptom pg41

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Slavoj Žižek. The Function of Fantasy In The Lacanian Real. <https://youtu.be/AInfl9PiGHI?t=8m3s> identification <https://youtu.be/AInfl9PiGHI?t=11m32s> Dean Maccannell 4 codification of pornography jouissance expressions

<https://youtu.be/AInfl9PiGHI?t=15m32s> m/f homosexuality

<https://youtu.be/AInfl9PiGHI?t=19m22s> love <https://youtu.be/AInfl9PiGHI?t=38m19s> blue velvet

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Slavoj Zizek Is there a posthuman god <https://youtu.be/PiNu3YLVjH0?t=24m56s> collaborative commons

Slavoj Zizek Is there a posthuman god <https://youtu.be/PiNu3YLVjH0?t=1h31m51s> implications of capitalism reference mark fischer

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Slavoj Žižek | Maybe We Just Need a New Chicken | Full Film <https://youtu.be/hHqY3id5p5Y?t=27m37s>

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2 English Goes Underground doc series 10Youtube com

William <https://youtu.be/QFyPiFJOeUs?list=PLHzvYItPyWa-TPD3kKRGvG97wBHvUqVYo>

1077 White Tower - a palace, a prison, a treasury, fortress. (vs Badiou <https://youtu.be/gRnUpVLc31w?t=12m50s>)

the anglo-dutch dudes who did a great job in formulating a language wherein we cannot be imagining an outside to the libidinal investments of word-value production-consumption ideologies.

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anorexia nervosa: "One can see how a sexual relationship occupies this closed field of desire and plays out its fate there. This is because it is the field designed for the production of the enigma that this relationship gives rise to in the subject by doubly 'signifying' it to him: the return of the demand it gives rise to, in the form of a demand concerning the subject of need; and the ambiguity presented concerning the Other in question in the proof of love that is demanded. The gap constituted by this enigma avers [affirms] what determines it, namely, to put it as simply and clearly as possible, that for each of the partners in the relationship, both the subject and the Other, it is not enough to be subjects of need or objects of love – they must hold the place of the cause of desire.

This truth lies at the heart of all the defects found in the psychoanalytic field regarding sexual life. It also constitutes the condition of the subject's happiness there" (Ecrits, 690-692) <http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2010/05/what-does-lacan-say-about-desire/>

Metaphor <https://soundcloud.com/theoryleaks/8-jacques-lacan-an-introductory-guide-the-making-of-the-unconscious?in=theoryleaks/sets/jacques-lacan-an-introductory-guide#t=12:08>

<https://soundcloud.com/theoryleaks/17-jacques-lacan-an-introductory-guide-chapter-7-unspeakable-need-unquenchable-desire?in=theoryleaks/sets/jacques-lacan-an-introductory-guide>

Elissa Marder. The Perverse Tongue of Psychoanalysis. 2016 intentions - <https://youtu.be/7mQITGywtCI?t=21m30s>

Again,

Badiou - reflections on the recent elections <https://youtu.be/gRnUpVLc31w?t=24m48s> democratic fascist language Villanova Philosophy Conference Keynotes <https://youtu.be/liDeHZh4qJg?t=1h38m57s> absolute necessity

For example, say you're at a busy airport with people rushing every-where and I tell you, "Meditate! Meditate!" It's impossible, isn't it? Why?

Because all your sense doors are wide open and you just can't focus your mind on one point. Similarly, if you sit down to meditate and I poke you with a needle, saying, "Concentrate! Concentrate!" you can't do it.

Objects of sense gravitation attachment are just like a needle—they automatically agitate your mind and by not avoiding them you make meditation difficult for yourself.

One lama said, "The more you possess the greater your superstition."

It's true; the more possessions we have the more paranoid we are about protecting them and their constant presence in our mind causes it to be restless all the time.

In America, it's almost a right to possess a big house, a couple of cars, a refrigerator and all kinds of other stuff. Nobody looks at you twice and it doesn't necessarily take much effort to acquire such things. What takes effort is deciding, for example, what to have for breakfast; you have so many choices—"What should I eat? This? This? This? This? What about this?" It's such a waste of time; that kind of thing makes life difficult.

Take the middle path and choose your environment carefully; create your own mandala, just like Chenrezig creates his—surround yourself with people and things conducive to your practice. Sometimes we're very weak; we think everything's so difficult. However, you have to know that

human problems can be solved by human wisdom. So create your own mandala according to the way in which you want to develop—select carefully the kind of people with whom you want to associate, the kind of house in which you want to live, the activities in which you engage and so forth. That's very important. Otherwise you're just left with "Whatever happens happens. Who knows?" That's not the right approach. Karma

is strong. Just because you want something to work out in a certain way doesn't mean it will go the way you want but if you put yourself into the right environment, you give yourself every opportunity to develop the way you'd like.

http://www.lamayeshe.com/sites/default/files/pdf/141_pdf.pdf

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Interstitial

(son house -death letter) //

kali mantra / santa sabina - el angel

shakespear's sister - stay

do the bartman

Shut this down prince

The great quotes of: Morgaine le Fey

Pink Floyd Brain Damage - Vera - Us and Them // (Feed trailer - Slither trailer) //

Diamonds // short dick man // Brae - Is You

O.d.d. hey violet // What Causes Sinkholes? - Earth Juice (Ep 40) -Earth Unplugged // Rudy "It's A Bitch-Ass Life" - Cyanide & Happiness Shorts

// 10cc - I'm not in love // The Program (El ídolo) - Tráiler español (HD)

Baels - Unknown // Peggy Lee -- Is That All There Is? 1969 // The Notorious B.I.G. - "Juicy" (Official Video) / Asphyx - Last One On Earth (Lyrics & Subtitulado al Español) 5min /sync/ 2m20 Air - Johann Sebastian Bach

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Aaron Schuster : How to Research Like a Dog – Kafka's New Science <https://youtu.be/EDI9X2Qdc-8?t=21m30s> origin of dog philosophy

<https://youtu.be/EDI9X2Qdc-8?t=33m57s> 4 sciences

Aaron Schuster : The Trouble with Pleasure (Book-Launch at MaMa) <https://youtu.be/ Yrg5XAJQkIU?t=48m57s> ground of desire.(lacan) the thing: emptiness, indifference (true terror-psychosis-narcissism of the drive, self-withdrawal exclusion), arbitrariness

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Hegel Science of logic

- overview <https://autio.github.io/projects/scienceoflogic/>

§ 20

In life, the categories are used; from the honour of being contemplated for their own sakes they are degraded to the position where they serve in the creation and exchange of ideas involved in intellectual exercise on a living content. First they serve as abbreviations through their universality (for what a host of particulars of outer existence and actions is embraced by a conception -- battle, war, nation, ocean or animal, for example -- and in the conception of God or of love there is epitomised in the simplicity of such ideating an infinite host of ideas, actions, states, etc.!).

Secondly, the categories serve for the more exact determination and discovery of objective relations; but in this process the import and purpose, the correctness and truth of the thought involved, are made to depend entirely on the subject matter itself and the thought determinations are not themselves credited with any active part in determining the content. Such a use of categories, which above was called natural logic, is unconscious; and when in philosophical reflection the categories are assigned the role of serving as means, then thinking as such is treated as something subordinate to the other activities of mind. We do not indeed say of our feelings, impulses or interests that they serve us, rather do they count as independent forces and powers, so that to have this particular feeling, to desire this, is what we are. But probably we are more conscious of obeying our feelings, impulses, passions, interests, not to mention habits, than of having them in our possession, still less, in view of our intimate union with them, of their being at our disposal. Such determinations of feeling and mind soon show themselves as particular in contrast to the universality which we are conscious ourselves of being and in which we have our freedom; and we are disposed to regard ourselves as caught up in these particular states and dominated by them.

...

§ 22

Since, therefore, subjective thought is our very own, innermost, act, and the objective notion of things constitutes their essential import, we cannot go outside this our act, we cannot stand above it, and just as little can we go beyond the nature of things. We can however disregard the latter determination; in so far as it coincides with the first it would yield a relation of our thoughts to the object, but this would be a valueless result because it would imply that the thing, the object, would be set up as a criterion for our notions and yet for us the object can be nothing else but our notions of it. The way in which the critical philosophy understands the relationship of these three terms is that we place our thoughts as a medium instead of connecting us with the objects rather cuts us off from them. But this view can be countered by the simple observation that these very things which are supposed to stand beyond us, and at the other extreme, beyond the thoughts referring to them, are themselves figments of subjective thought, and as wholly indeterminate they are only a single thought-thing -- the so-called thing-in-itself of empty abstraction.

§ 23

Still, sufficient has been said of the point of view which no longer takes the determinations of thought to be only an instrument and a means; more important is the further point connected with it, namely that it is usual to regard them as an external form. The activity of thought which is at work in all our ideas, purposes, interests and actions is, as we have said, unconsciously busy (natural logic); what we consciously attend to is the contents, the objects of our ideas, that in which we are interested; on this basis, the determinations of thought have the significance of forms which are only attached to the content, but are not the content itself. But if the truth of the matter is what we have already stated and also is generally admitted, namely that the nature, the peculiar essence, that which is genuinely permanent and substantial in the complexity and contingency of appearance and fleeting manifestation, is the notion of the thing, the immanent universal, and that each human being though infinitely unique is so primarily because he is a man, and each individual animal is such individual primarily because it is an animal: if this is true, then it would be impossible to say what such an individual could still be if this foundation were removed, no matter how richly endowed the individual might be with other predicates, if, that

is, this foundation can equally be called a predicate like the others. The indispensable foundation, the notion, the universal which is the thought itself, in so far as one can make abstraction from the general idea expressed by the word 'thought', cannot be regarded as only an indifferent form attached to a content. But these thoughts of everything natural and spiritual, even the substantial content, still contain a variety of determinatenesses and are still charged with the difference of a soul and a body, of the notion and a relative reality; the profounder basis is the soul itself, the pure Notion which is the very heart of things, their simple life-pulse, even of subjective thinking of them.

To focus attention on this logical nature which animates mind, moves and works in it, this is the task. The broad distinction between the instinctive act and the intelligent and free act is that the latter is performed with an awareness of what is being done; when the content of the interest in which one is absorbed is drawn out of its immediate unity with oneself and becomes an independent object of one's thinking, then it is that spirit begins to be free, whereas when thinking is an instinctive activity, spirit is enmeshed in the bonds of its categories and is broken up into an infinitely varied material.

...

§ 28

The inadequacy of this way of regarding thought which leaves truth on one side can only be made good by including in our conception of thought not only that which is usually reckoned as belonging to the external form but the content as well. It is soon evident that what at first to ordinary reflection is, as content, divorced from form, cannot in fact be formless, cannot be devoid of inner determination; if it were, then it would be only vacuity, the abstraction of the thing-in-itself; that, on the contrary, the content in its own self possesses form, in fact it is through form alone that it has soul and meaning, and that it is form itself which is transformed only into the semblance of a content, hence into the semblance of something external to this semblance. With this introduction of the content into the logical treatment, the subject matter is not things but their import, the Notion of them. But in this connection we can be reminded that there is a multitude of Notions, a multitude of objects [Sache]. We have, however, already said how it is that restrictions are imposed on this multitude, that the Notion, simply as thought, as a universal, is the immeasurable abbreviation of the multitudes of particular things which are vaguely present to intuition and pictorial thought; but also a Notion is, first, in its own self the Notion, and this is only one and is the substantial foundation; secondly, a Notion is determinate and it is this determinateness in it which appears as content: but the determinateness of the Notion is a specific form of this substantial oneness, a moment of the form as totality, of that same Notion which is the foundation of the specific Notions.

This Notion is not sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an object, a product and content of thinking, and is the absolute, self-subsistent object, the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of what we call things; it is least of all the logos which should be left outside of the science of logic.

Therefore its inclusion in or omission from this science must not be simply a matter of choice. When those determinations of thought which are only external forms are truly considered in themselves, this can only result in demonstrating their finitude and the untruth of their supposed independent self-subsistence, that their truth is the Notion. Consequently, the science of logic in dealing with the thought determinations which in general run through our mind instinctively and unconsciously -- and even when they become part of the language do not become objects of our attention -- will also be a reconstruction of those which are singled out by reflection and are fixed by it as subjective forms external to the matter and import of the determinations of thought.

§ 29

No subject matter is so absolutely capable of being expounded with a strict immanent plasticity as is thought in its own necessary development; no other brings with it this demand in such a degree; in this respect the Science of Logic must surpass even mathematics, for no subject matter has in its own self this freedom and independence. Such an exposition would demand that at no stage of the development should any thought-determination or reflection occur which does not immediately emerge at this stage and that has not entered this stage from the one preceding it -- a requirement which is satisfied, after its fashion, in the process of mathematical reasoning. However, such an abstract perfection of exposition must, I admit, in general be dispensed with; the very fact that the science must begin with what is absolutely simple, that is, with what is most general and of least import, would restrict the exposition solely to these same quite simple

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expressions of the simple without any further addition of a single word; all that could properly be admitted would be negative considerations intended to ward off and banish any heterogeneous elements which otherwise might be introduced by pictorial thought or unregulated thinking. However, such intrusive

elements in the simple immanent course of the development are themselves contingent, so that the effort to ward them off is itself tainted with this contingency; besides which it is futile to try to deal with all of them, lying as they do outside the subject matter, and in any case, any demand for a systematic disposal of such random reflections could only be partially satisfied. But the peculiar restlessness and distraction of our modern consciousness compel us to take some account of the more readily suggested reflections and opinions. A plastic discourse demands, too, a plastic receptivity and understanding on the part of the listener; but youths and men of such a temper who would calmly suppress their own reflections and opinions in which original thought is so impatient to manifest itself, listeners such as Plato feigned, who would attend only to the matter in hand, could have no place in a modern dialogue; still less could one count on readers of such a disposition. On the contrary, I have been only too often and too vehemently attacked by opponents who were incapable of making the simple reflection that their opinions and objections contain categories which are presuppositions and which themselves need to be criticised first before they are employed. Ignorance in this matter reaches incredible lengths; it is guilty of, the fundamental misunderstanding, the uncouth and uneducated behaviour of taking a category

which is under consideration for something other than the category itself. This ignorance is the less justifiable because this 'something other' consists of determinate thoughts and concepts, and in a system of logic these other categories must likewise have been assigned their own place and must themselves have been subjected to critical examination within the system. This ignorance is most obvious in the great majority of the objections and attacks on the first Notions of logic, being and nothing, and becoming which, itself a simple determination -- the simplest analysis shows it to be so -- contains the two other determinations as moments. Thoroughness seems to require that the beginning, as the foundation on which everything is built, should be examined before anything else, in fact that we should not go any further until it has been firmly established and if, on the other hand, it is not, that we should reject all that follows.

§ 30

This thoroughness at the same time has the advantage of guaranteeing that the labour of thinking shall be reduced to a minimum; it has before it, enclosed in this germ, the entire development and reckons that it has settled the whole business when it has disposed of the beginning which is the easiest part of the business, for it is the simplest, the simple itself; it is the trifling effort of thought required to do this which really recommends this 'thoroughness' which is so satisfied with itself. This restriction to what is simple gives scope for the free play of caprice which does not want to remain simple but brings in its own reflections on the subject matter. Having good right to occupy itself at first only with the principle and in doing so not to concern itself with what lies beyond it, this thoroughness actually proceeds to do the opposite of this, for it does bring in what lies beyond, that is, categories other than those which constitute the principle itself, other presuppositions and prejudices. Such presuppositions as that infinite is different from finitude, that content is other than form, that the inner is other than the outer, also that mediation is no immediacy (as if anyone did not know such things), are brought forward by way of information and narrated and asserted rather than proved. But there is something stupid -- I can find no other word for it -- about this didactic behaviour; technically it is unjustifiable simply to presuppose and straightway assume such propositions; and, still more, it reveals ignorance of the fact that it is the requirement and the business of logical thinking to enquire into just this, whether such a finite without infinity is something true, or whether such an abstract infinity, also a content without form and a form without content, an inner by itself which has no outer expression, an externality without an inwardness, whether any of these is something true or something actual. But this education and discipline of thinking by which it acquires plasticity and by which the impatience of casual reflection is overcome, is procured solely by going further, by study and by carrying out to its conclusion the entire development.

...

§ 35

When logic is taken as the science of thinking in general, it is understood that this thinking constitutes the mere form of a cognition that logic abstracts from all content and that the so-called second constituent belonging to cognition, namely its matter, must come from somewhere else; and that since this matter is absolutely independent of logic, this latter can provide only the formal conditions of genuine cognition and cannot in its own self contain any real truth, not even be the pathway to real truth because just that which is essential in truth, its content, lies outside logic.

...

§ 39

Further, these two constituents -- for they are supposed to be related to each other as constituents, and cognition is compounded from them in a mechanical or at best chemical fashion -- are appraised as follows: the object is regarded as something complete and finished on its own account, something which can entirely dispense with thought for its actuality, while thought on the other hand is regarded as defective because it has to complete itself with a material and moreover, as a pliable indeterminate form, has to adapt itself to its material. Truth is the agreement of thought with the object, and in order to bring about this agreement -- for it does not exist on its own account -- thinking is supposed to adapt and accommodate itself to the object.

§ 40

Thirdly, when the difference of matter and form, of object and thought is not left in that nebulous indeterminateness but is taken more definitely, then each is regarded as a sphere divorced from the other. Thinking therefore in its reception and formation of material does not go outside itself; its reception of the material and the conforming of itself to it remains a modification of its own self, it does not result in thought becoming the other of itself; and self-conscious determining moreover belongs only to thinking. In its relation to the object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object; this, as a thing-in-itself, remains a sheer beyond of thought.

§ 41

These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness; but when these prejudices are carried out into the sphere of reason as if the same relation obtained there, as if this relation were something true in its own self,

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then they are errors the -- refutation of which throughout every part of the spiritual and natural universe is philosophy, or rather, as they bar the entrance to philosophy, must be discarded at its portals.

...

§ 43

But reflective understanding took possession of philosophy. We must know exactly what is meant by this expression which moreover is often used as a slogan; in general it stands for the understanding as abstracting, and hence as separating and remaining fixed in its separations. Directed against reason, it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests on sensuous reality, that thoughts are only thoughts, meaning that it is sense perception which first gives them filling and reality and that reason left to its own resources engenders only figments of the brain. In this self-renunciation on the part of reason, the Notion of truth is lost; it is limited to knowing only subjective truth, only phenomena, appearances, only something to which the nature of the object itself does not correspond: knowing has lapsed into opinion.

§ 44

However, this turn taken by cognition, which appears as a loss and a retrograde step, is based on something more profound on which rests the elevation of reason into the loftier spirit of modern philosophy. The basis of that universally held conception is, namely, to be sought in the insight into the necessary conflict of the determinations of the understanding with themselves. The reflection already referred to is this, to transcend the concrete immediate object and to determine it and separate it. But equally it must transcend these its separating determinations and straightway connect them. It is at the stage of this connecting of the determinations that their conflict emerges. This connecting activity of reflection belongs in itself to reason and the rising above those determinations which attains to an insight into their conflict is the great negative step towards the true Notion of reason. But the insight, when not thorough-going, commits the mistake of thinking that it is reason which is in contradiction with itself; it does not recognise that the contradiction is precisely the rising of reason above the limitations of the understanding and the resolving of them, Cognition, instead of taking from this stage the final step into the heights, has fled from the unsatisfactoriness of the categories of the understanding to sensuous existence, imagining that in this it possesses what is solid and self-consistent. But on the other hand, since this knowledge is self-confessedly knowledge only of appearances, the unsatisfactoriness of the latter is admitted, but at the same time presupposed: as much as to say that admittedly, we have no proper knowledge of things-in-themselves but we do have a proper knowledge of them within the sphere of appearances, as if, so to speak, only the kind of objects were different, and one kind, namely things-in-themselves, did not fall within the scope of our knowledge but the other kind, phenomena, did. This is like attributing to someone a correct perception, with the rider that nevertheless he is incapable of perceiving what is true but only what is false. Absurd as this would be, it would not be more so than a true knowledge which did not know the object as it is in itself.

...

§ 48

But what is commonly understood by logic is considered without any reference whatever to metaphysical significance. This science in its present state has, it must be admitted, no content of a kind which the ordinary consciousness would regard as a reality and as a genuine subject matter. But it is not for this reason a formal science lacking significant truth. Moreover, the region of truth is not to be sought in that matter which is missing in logic, a deficiency to which the unsatisfactoriness of the science is usually attributed. The truth is rather that the insubstantial nature of logical forms originates solely in the way in which they are considered and dealt with. When they are taken as fixed determinations and consequently in their separation from each other and not as held together in an organic unity, then they are dead forms and the spirit which is their living, concrete unity does not dwell in them. As thus taken, they lack a substantial content -- a matter which would be substantial in itself. The content which is missing in the logical forms is nothing else than a solid foundation and a concretion of these abstract determinations; and such a substantial being for them is usually sought outside them. But logical reason itself is the substantial or real being which holds together within itself every abstract determination and is their substantial, absolutely concrete unity. One need not therefore look far for what is commonly called a matter; if logic is supposed to lack a substantial content, then the fault does not lie with its subject matter but solely with the way in which this subject matter is grasped.

...

§ 53

This objective thinking then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.

...

§ 79

Thus what is to be considered is the whole Notion, firstly as the Notion in the form of being, secondly, as the Notion; in the first case, the Notion is only in itself, the Notion of reality or being; in the second case, it is the Notion as such, the Notion existing for itself (as it is, to name concrete forms, in thinking man, and even in the sentient animal and in organic individuality generally, although, of course, in these it is not conscious, still less known; it is only in inorganic nature that it is in itself). Accordingly, logic should be divided primarily into the logic of the Notion as being and of the Notion as Notion -- or, by employing the usual terms (although these as least definite are most ambiguous) into 'objective' and 'subjective' logic.

...

§ 82

His chief thought is to vindicate the categories for self-consciousness as the subjective ego. By virtue of this determination and its opposition; and besides the empirical element of feeling and intuition it has something else left over which is not posited and determined by thinking self-consciousness, a thing-in-itself, something alien and external to thought -- although it is easy to perceive that such an abstraction as the thing-in-itself is itself only a product of thought, and of merely abstractive thought at that. If other disciples of Kant have expressed themselves concerning the determining of the object by the ego in this way, that the objectifying of the ego is to be regarded as an original and necessary act of consciousness, so that in this original act there is not yet the idea of the ego itself -- which would be a consciousness of that consciousness or even an objectifying of it -- then this objectifying act, in its freedom from the opposition of consciousness, is nearer to what may be taken simply for thought as such. [2]

1. I would mention that in this work I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and that its merit remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in it. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude -- not unavenged -- contempt for them. The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently for genuine knowledge, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one must turn to that preceding exposition.

2. If the expression 'objectifying act of the ego' suggests other products of spirit, e.g. fantasy, it is to be observed that we are speaking of a determining of an object in so far as the elements of its content do not belong to feeling and intuition. Such an object is a thought, and to determine it means partly, first to produce it, partly, in so far as it is something presupposed, to have further thoughts about it, to develop it further by thought.

§ 83

But this act should no longer be called consciousness; consciousness embraces within itself the opposition of the ego and its object which is not present in that original act. The name consciousness gives it a semblance of subjectivity even more than does the term thought, which here, however, is to be taken simply in the absolute sense as infinite thought untainted by the finitude of consciousness, in short, thought as such.

...

§ 113

But there is a still further observation to be made about this procedure. The said analysis presupposes as familiar the idea of a beginning, thus following the example of other sciences. These presuppose their subject-matter and take it for granted that everyone has roughly the same general idea of it and can find in it the same determinations as those indicated by the sciences which have obtained them in one way or another through analysis, comparison and other kinds of reasoning. But that which forms the absolute beginning must likewise be something otherwise known; now if it is something concrete and hence is variously determined within itself, then this internal relation is presupposed as something known; it is thus put forward as an immediacy which, however, it is not; for it is a relation only as a relation of distinct moments, and it therefore contains mediation within itself. Further, with a concrete object, the analysis and the ways in which it is determined are affected by contingency and arbitrariness. Which determinations are brought out depends on what each person just finds in his own immediate, contingent idea. The relation contained in something concrete, in a synthetic unity, is necessary only in so far as it is not just given but is produced by the spontaneous return of the moments back into this unity -- a movement which is the opposite of the analytical procedure, which is an activity belonging to the subject-thinker and external to the subject matter itself.

With What must Science Begin?

...

General Division of Being

§ 123

Being is determined, first, as against another in general; Secondly, as immanently self-determining; Thirdly, setting aside the preliminary character of this division, it is the abstract indeterminateness and immediacy in which it must be the beginning.

...

Quality – Quantity – Measure Section One: Determinateness (Quality)

§ 130

Being is the indeterminate immediate; it is free from determinateness in relation to essence and also from any which it can possess within itself. This reflectionless being is being as it is immediately in its own self alone.

...

C Becoming

1. Unity of Being and Nothing

§ 134

Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being -- does not pass over but has passed over -- into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself.

Remark 1: The Opposition of Being and Nothing in Ordinary Thinking

Remark 2: Defectiveness of the Expression 'Unity, Identity of Being and Nothing'

Remark 3: The Isolating of These Abstractions

Remark 4: Incomprehensibility of the Beginning

2. Moments of Becoming: Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be 3. The Sublation of Becoming Remark: The Expression 'To Sublate'

§ 184

To sublate, and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a result which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinate from which it originates.

...

§ 266

If, however, an existence contains the Notion not merely as an abstract in-itself, but as an explicit, self-determined totality, as instinct, life, ideation, etc., then in its own strength it overcomes the limitation and attains a being beyond it. The plant transcends the limitation of being a seed, similarly, of being blossom, fruit, leaf; the seed becomes the developed plant, the blossom fades away, and so on. The sentient creature, in the limitation of hunger, thirst, etc., is the urge to overcome this limitation and it does overcome it. It feels pain, and it is the privilege of the sentient nature to feel pain; it is a negation in its self, and the negation is determined as a limitation in its feeling, just because the sentient creature has the feeling of its self, which is the totality that transcends this determinateness. If it were not above and beyond the determinateness, it would not feel it as its negation and would feel no pain.

But it is reason, thought, which is supposed to be unable to transcend limitation -- reason, which is the universal explicitly beyond particularity as such (that is, all particularity), which is nothing but the overcoming of limitation! Granted, not every instance of transcending and being beyond limitation is a genuine liberation from it, a veritable affirmation; even the ought itself, and abstraction in general, is in imperfect transcending. However, the reference to the wholly abstract universal is a sufficient reply to the equally abstract assertion that limitation cannot be transcended, or, again, even the reference to the infinite in general is a sufficient refutation of the assertion that the finite cannot be transcended.

§ 268

On the other hand, the ought is the transcending, but still only finite transcending, of the limitation. Therefore, it has its place and its validity in the sphere of finitude where it holds fast to being-in-itself in opposition to limitedness, declaring the former to be the regulative and essential factor relatively to what is null. Duty is an ought directed against the particular will, against self-seeking desire and capricious interest and it is held up as an ought to the will in so far as this has the

capacity to isolate itself from the true. Those who attach such importance to the ought of morality and fancy that morality is destroyed if the ought is not recognized as ultimate truth, and those too who, reasoning from the level of the understanding, derive a perpetual satisfaction from being able to confront everything there is with an ought, that is, with a 'knowing better' -- and for that very reason are just as loath to be robbed of the ought -- do not see that as regards the finitude of their sphere the ought receives full recognition. But in the world of actuality itself, Reason and Law are not in such a bad way that they only ought to be -- it is only the abstraction of the in-itself that stops at this--any more than the ought is in its own self perennial and, what is the same thing, that finitude is absolute. The philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the contradictions of Reason; but the truth is that the ought is only the standpoint which clings to finitude and thus to contradiction.

[c] Transition of the Finite into the Infinite

Chapter 2 Determinate Being 39 Science of Logic

C Infinity

- (a) The Infinite in General
- (b) Alternating Determination of the Finite and the Infinite
- (c) Affirmative Infinity

Transition

Remark 1: The Infinite Progress

Remark 2: Idealism

§ 316

The proposition that the finite is ideal [ideell] constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognising that the finite has no veritable being. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is actually carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally does not recognise finitude as a veritable being, as something ultimate and absolute or as something underived, uncreated, eternal. Consequently the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy has no significance. A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existence as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms are thoughts, universals, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that is, in their sensuous individuality -- not even the water of Thales. For although this is also empirical water, it is at the same time also the in-itself or essence of all other things, too, and these other things are not self-subsistent or grounded in themselves, but are posited by, are derived from, an other, from water, that is they are ideal entities. Now above we have named the principle or the universal the ideal (and still more must the Notion, the Idea, spirit be so named); and then again we have described individual, sensuous things as ideal in principle, or in their Notion, still more in spirit, that is, as sublated; here we must note, in passing, this twofold aspect which showed itself in connection with the infinite, namely that on the one hand the ideal is concrete, veritable being, and on the other hand the moments of this concrete being are no less ideal -- are sublated in it; but in fact what is, is only the one concrete whole from which the moments are inseparable.

§ 317

By the ideal [dem Ideellen] is meant chiefly the form of figurate conception and imagination, and what is simply in my conception, or in the Notion, or in the idea, in imagination, and so on, is called ideal, so that even fancies are counted as ideals -- conceptions which are not only distinct from the real world, but are supposed to be essentially not real. In point of fact, the spirit is the idealist proper; in spirit, even as feeling, imagination and still more as thinking and comprehending, the content is not present as a so-called real existence; in the simplicity of the ego such external being is present only as sublated, it is for me, it is ideally in me. This subjective idealism, either in the form of the unconscious idealism of consciousness generally, or consciously enunciated and set up as a principle, concerns only the form of conception according to which a content is mine; in the systematic idealism of subjectivity this form is declared to be the only true exclusive form in opposition to the form of objectivity or reality, of the external existence of that content. Such idealism is [merely] formal because it disregards the content of imagination or thought, which content in being imagined or thought can remain wholly in its finitude. In such an idealism nothing is lost, just as much because the reality of such a finite content, the existence filled with finitude, is preserved, as because, in so far as abstraction is made from such finite reality, the content is supposed to be of no consequence in itself; and in it nothing is gained for the same reason that nothing is lost, because the ego, conception, spirit, remains filled with the same content of finitude. The opposition of the form of subjectivity and objectivity is of course one of the finitudes; but the content, as taken up in sensation, intuition or even in the more abstract element of conception, of thought, contains finitudes in abundance and with the exclusion of only one of the modes of finitude, namely, of the said form of subjective and objective, these finitudes are certainly not eliminated, still less have they spontaneously fallen away.

...

§ 319

Being-for-self is first, immediately a being-for-self — the One.

Secondly, the One passes into a plurality of ones — repulsion — and this otherness of the ones is sublated in their ideality — attraction.

Thirdly, we have the alternating determination of repulsion and attraction in which they collapse into equilibrium, and quality, which in being-for-self reached its climax, passes over into quantity.

A Being-for-self as Such

(a) Determinate Being and Being-for-self

(b) Being-for-one

Remark: The German Expression, 'What For a Thing'

(Meaning 'What Kind of a Thing')

(c) The One

B The One and the Many

(a) The One in its own self

(b) The One and the Void

Remark: Atomism

(c) Many Ones — Repulsion

Remark: The Monad of Leibniz

C Repulsion and Attraction

(a) Exclusion of the One

Remark: The unity of the One and the Many

(b) The one One of Attraction

(c) The Relation of Repulsion and Attraction

Remark: The Kantian Construction of Matter from the Forces of Attraction and Repulsion

§ 373

Attraction and repulsion, as we know, are usually retarded as forces. This determination of them and — the relationships connected with it have to be compared with the Notions which have resulted from our consideration of them. Conceived as forces, they are regarded as self-subsistent and therefore as not connected with each other through their own nature; that is, they are considered not as moments, each of which is supposed to pass into the other, but rather as fixed in their opposition to each other. Further, they are imagined as meeting in a third, in matter, but in such a manner, that this unification is, counted, as their truth., on the contrary; each is regarded also as a first, as being in and for itself, and matter, or its determinations, are supposed to be realised and produced by them. When it is said that matter has the forces within itself, they are understood to be so conjoined in this unity that they are at the same time presupposed as intrinsically free and independent of each other.

...

§ 377

For Kant's method is basically analytical, not constructive. He presupposes the idea of matter and then asks what forces are required to maintain the determinations he has presupposed. Thus, on the one hand, he demands the force of attraction because, properly speaking, through repulsion alone and without attraction matter could not exist; and on the other hand he derives repulsion, too, from matter and gives as the reason that we think of matter as impenetrable, since it presents itself under this category to the sense of touch by which it manifests itself to us. Consequently, he proceeds, repulsion is at once thought in the concept of matter because it is immediately given therein, whereas attraction is added to the concept syllogistically. But these syllogisms, too, are based on what has just been said, namely, that matter which possessed repulsive force alone, would not exhaust our conception of matter.

It is evident that this is the method of a cognition which reflects on experience, which first perceives the determinations in a phenomenon, then makes these the foundation, and for their so-called explanation assumes corresponding basic elements or forces which are supposed to produce those determinations of the phenomenon.

...

§ 380

Now if the merit of such a construction of matter were at most that of an analysis (though a merit diminished by the faulty exposition), still the fundamental thought, namely, the derivation of matter from these two opposite determinations as its fundamental forces, must always be highly esteemed. Kant is chiefly concerned to banish the vulgar mechanistic way of

thinking which stops short at the one determination of impenetrability, of self-determined and self-subsistent puncticity, and converts into something external the opposite determination, the relation of matter within itself or the relation of a plurality of matters, which in turn are regarded as particular ones — a way of thinking which, as Kant says, will admit no motive forces except pressure and thrust, that is, only action from without. This external manner of thinking always presupposes motion as already externally present in matter, and it does not occur to it to regard motion as something immanent and to comprehend motion itself in matter, which latter is thus assumed as, on its own account, motionless and inert. This stand-point has before it only ordinary mechanics, not immanent and free motion. It is true that Kant sublates this externality in so far as he makes attraction (the relation of matters to one another in so far as these are assumed as separated from one another, or matter generally in its self-externality) a force of matter itself; still, on the other hand, his two fundamental forces within matter remain external to and completely independent of each other.

...

§ 384

Kant assumes further that 'through the force of attraction, matter only occupies space but does not fill it'; and 'because matter through the force of attraction does not fill space, this force can act across empty space since there is no intervening matter to limit it'. This distinction is much the same as the one mentioned above where a determination was supposed to belong to the concept of a thing but not to be contained in it; here, then, matter is supposed only to occupy a space but not to fill it. There it is repulsion, if we stop at the first determination of matter, through which the ones repel one another and so are only negatively related to one another, here that means, by empty space. Here, however, it is the force of attraction which keeps space empty; it does not fill space by its connection of the atoms, in other words, it keeps the atoms in a negative relation to one another. We see that Kant here unconsciously realises what is implicit in the nature of the subject matter, when he attributes to the force of attraction precisely what, in accordance with the first determination, he attributed to the opposite force. While he was busy with establishing the difference between the two forces, it happened that one had passed over into the other. Thus through repulsion, on the other hand, matter is supposed to fill a space, and consequently through repulsion the empty space left by the force of attraction vanishes. In point of fact repulsion, in doing away with empty space, also destroys the negative relation of the atoms or ones, that is, their repulsion of one another; in other words, repulsion is determined as the opposite of itself.

Chapter 3 Being-for-self pg44

...

§ 387

The difference between quantity and quality has been stated. Quality is the first, immediate determinateness, quantity is the determinateness which has become indifferent to being, a limit which is just as much no limit, being-for-self which is absolutely identical with being-for-other — a repulsion of the many ones which is directly the non-repulsion, the continuity of them.

...

§ 440

This one is thus the principle of quantum, but as the one of quantity. Hence, first, it is continuous, it is a unity; secondly, it is discrete, a plurality of ones, which is implicit in continuous, or explicit in discrete magnitude, the ones having equality with one another, possessing the said continuity, the same unity. Thirdly, this one is also a negation of the many ones as a simple limit, an excluding of its otherness from itself, a determination of itself in opposition to other quanta. Thus the one is [a] self-relating, [b] enclosing and [c] other-excluding limit.

...

§ 442

Quantum, merely as such, is limited generally; its limit is an abstract simple determinateness of it. But in quantum as number, this limit is posited as manifold within itself. It contains the many ones which constitute its determinate being, but does not contain them in an indeterminate manner, for the determinateness of the limit falls in them; the limit excludes other determinate being, that is, other pluralities and the ones it encloses are a specific aggregate, the amount — which is the form taken by discreteness in number — the other to which is the unit, the continuity of the amount. Amount and unit constitute the moments of number.

...

§ 444

Now the limiting one is the number as determined relatively to other numbers, as distinguished from them. But this distinguishing does not become a qualitative determinateness but remains quantitative, falling only within the comparing external reflection; the number, as a one, remains returned into itself and indifferent to others. This indifference of a number to others is an essential determination of it and constitutes the implicit determinedness of the number, but also the

number's own externality. Number is thus a numerical one as the absolutely determinate one, which at the same time has the form of simple immediacy and for which, therefore, the relation to other is completely external. Further, one as a number possesses determinateness (in so far as this is a relation to other) as the moments of itself contained within it, in its difference of unit and amount; and amount is itself a plurality of ones, that is, this absolute externality is in the one itself. This contradiction of number or of quantum as such within itself is the quality of quantum, in the further determinations of which this contradiction is developed.

...

§ 695

In the Remarks above on the quantitative infinite, it was shown that this infinite and also the difficulties associated with it have their origin in the qualitative moment which makes its appearance in the sphere of

Chapter 3 The Quantitative Relation or Quantitative Ratio 50

Science of Logic

quantity, and also how the qualitative moment of the ratio of powers in particular is the source of various developments and complexities. It was shown that the chief obstacle to a grasp of the Notion of this infinite is the stopping short at its merely negative determination as the negation of quantum, instead of advancing to

the simple affirmative determination which is the qualitative moment. The only further remark to be made here concerns the intrusion of quantitative forms into the pure qualitative forms of thought in philosophy. It is the relationship of powers in particular which has been applied recently to the determinations of the Notion. The Notion in its immediacy was called the first power or potency; in its otherness or difference, in the determinate being of its moments, the second power; and in its return into itself or as a totality, the third power. It is at once evident that power as used thus is a category which essentially belongs to quantum — these powers do not bear the meaning of the potentia, the dynamis of Aristotle. Thus, the relationship of powers expresses determinateness in the form or difference which has reached its truth, but difference as it is in the particular Notion of quantum, not as it is in the Notion as such. In quantum, the negativity which belongs to the nature of the Notion is still far from being posited in the determination proper to the Notion; differences which are proper to quantum are superficial determinations for the Notion itself and are still far from being determined as they are in the Notion. It was in the infancy of philosophic thinking that numbers were used, as by Pythagoras, to designate universal, essential distinctions — and first and second power, and so on are in this respect not a whit better than numbers. This was a preliminary stage to comprehension in the element of pure thought; it was not until after Pythagoras that thought determinations themselves were discovered, i.e., became on their own account objects for consciousness. But to retrogress from such determinations to those of number is the action of a thinking which feels its own incapacity, a thinking which, in Opposition to current philosophical culture which is accustomed to thought determinations, now also makes itself ridiculous by pretending that this impotence is something new, superior, and an advance.

...

§ 697

Philosophy needs no such help either from the world of sense or from the products of the imagination, or from subordinate spheres in its own peculiar province, for the determinations of such spheres are unfitted for higher spheres and for the whole. This unfitness is manifest whenever categories of the finite are applied to the infinite; the current determinations of force, or substantiality, cause and effect, and so on, are likewise only symbols for expressing, for example, vital or spiritual relationships, i.e. they are untrue determinations for such relationships; and still more so are the powers of quantum and degrees of powers, both for such and for speculative relationships generally.

...

§ 700

But this indifference is only the externality of having the determinateness not in its own self but in an other. Thirdly, we now have self-related externality; as self-related it is also a sublated externality and has within itself the difference from itself—the difference which, as an externality is the quantitative, and as taken back into itself is the qualitative, moment.

...

§ 703

The observation here made extends generally to those systems of pantheism which have been partially developed by thought. The first is being, the one, substance, the infinite, essence; in contrast to this abstraction the second, namely, all determinateness in general, what is only finite, accidental, perishable, non-essential, etc. can equally abstractly be grouped together; and this is what usually happens as the next step in quite formal thinking. But the connection of this second with the first is so evident that one cannot avoid grasping it as also in a unity with the latter; thus with Spinoza, the attribute is the whole substance, but is apprehended by the intellect which is itself a limitation or mode; but in this way the mode, the non-substantial generally, which can only be grasped through an other, constitutes the other extreme to substance, the third generally. Indian pantheism, too, in its monstrous fantasies has in an abstract way received this development which runs like a moderating thread through its extravagances; a point of some interest in the development is

that Brahma, the one of abstract thought, progresses through the shape of Vishnu, particularly in the form of Krishna, to a third form, that of Siva. The determination of this third is the mode, alteration, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be—the field of externality in general. This Indian trinity has misled to a comparison with the Christian and it is true that in them a common element of the nature of the Notion can be recognised; but it is essential to gain a more precise consciousness of the difference between them; for not only is this difference infinite, but it is the true, the genuine infinite which constitutes it. This third principle is, according to its determination, the dispersal of the unity of substance into its opposite, not the return of the unity to itself — not spirit but rather the non-spiritual. In the true trinity there is not only unity but union, the conclusion of the syllogism is a unity possessing content and actuality, a unity which in its wholly concrete determination is spirit. This principle of the mode and of alteration does not, it is true, altogether exclude the unity; in Spinozism, for example, it is precisely the mode as such which is untrue; substance alone is true and to it everything must be brought back. But this is only to submerge all content in the void, in a merely formal unity lacking all content. Thus Siva, too, is again the great whole, not distinct from Brahma, but Brahma himself. In other words, the difference and the determinateness only vanish again but are not preserved, are not sublated, and the unity does not become a concrete unity, neither is the disunity reconciled. The supreme goal for man placed in the sphere of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, of modality generally, is submergence in unconsciousness, unity with Brahma, annihilation; the Buddhist Nirvana, Nibbana etc., is the same.

...

§ 705

Here the mode has the specific meaning of measure. Spinoza's mode, like the Indian principle of change, is the measureless. The Greek awareness, itself still indeterminate, that everything has a measure — even Parmenides, after abstract being, introduced necessity as the ancient limit by which all things are bounded — is the beginning of a much higher conception than that contained in substance and in the difference of the mode from substance.

...

§ 707

The Idea of essence, namely, to be self-identical in the immediacy of its determined being, is already immanent in measure; so that the immediacy is thus reduced by this self-identity to something mediated, which equally is mediated only through this externality, but is a mediation with itself — that is, reflection, the determinations of which are, but in this being are nothing more than moments of their negative unity. In measure, the qualitative moment is quantitative; the determinateness or difference is indifferent and so is no difference, is sublated. This nature of quantity as a return-into-self in which it is qualitative constitutes that being-in-and-for-itself which is essence. But measure is only in itself or in its Notion essence; this Notion of measure is not yet posited. Measure, still as such, is itself the immediate [seiende] unity of quality and quantity; its moments are determinately present as a quality, and quanta thereof; these moments are at first inseparable only in principle [an sich], but do not yet have the significance of this reflected determination. The development of measure contains the differentiation of these moments, but at the same time their relation, so that the identity which they are in themselves becomes their relation to each other, i.e. is posited. The significance of this development is the realisation of measure in which it posits itself as in relation with itself, and hence as a moment. Through this mediation it is determined as sublated; its immediacy and that of its moments vanishes; they are reflected. Measure, having thus realised its own Notion, has passed into essence.

Section Three: Measure pg 53

...

§ 710

And in the realm of spirit there is still less to be found a characteristic, free development of measure. It is quite evident, for example, that a republican constitution like that of Athens, or an aristocratic constitution tempered by democracy, is suitable only for States of a certain size, and that in a developed civil society the numbers of individuals belonging to different occupations stand in a certain relations to one another; but all this yields neither laws of measure nor characteristic forms of it. In the spiritual sphere as such there occur differences of intensity of character, strength of imagination, sensations, general ideas, and so on; but the determination does not go beyond the indefiniteness of strength or weakness. How insipid and completely empty the so-called laws turn out to be which have been laid down about the relation of strength and weakness of sensations, general ideas, and so on, comes home to one on reading the psychologies which occupy themselves with such laws.

...

§ 737

In regard to the absolute relations of measure, it is well to bear in mind that the mathematics of nature, if it is to be worthy of the name of science, must be essentially the science of measures — a science for which it is true much has been done empirically, but little as yet from a strictly scientific, that is, philosophical point of view. Mathematical principles of natural philosophy—as Newton called his work—if they are to fulfil this description in a profounder sense than that accorded to them

by Newton and by the entire Baconian species of philosophy and science, must contain things of quite a different character in order to bring light into these

still obscure regions which are, however, worthy in the highest degree of consideration.

It is a great service to ascertain the empirical numbers of nature, e.g., the distances of the planets from one another; but it is an infinitely greater service when the empirical quanta are made to disappear and they are raised into a universal form of determinations of quantity so that they become moments of a law or of measure -- immortal services which Galileo for the descent of falling bodies and Kepler for the motion of the celestial bodies, have achieved. The laws they discovered they have proved in this sense, that they have shown the whole compass of the particulars of observation to correspond to them. But yet a still higher proof is required for these laws; nothing else, that is, than that their quantitative relations be known from the qualities or specific Notions of time and space that are correlated.

Of this kind of proof there is still no trace in the said mathematical principles of natural philosophy, neither is there in the subsequent works of this kind. It has already been remarked in connection with the show of mathematical proofs of certain relationships in nature, a show based on the misuse of the infinitely small, that it is absurd to try to demonstrate such proofs on a strictly mathematical basis, i.e. neither empirically nor from the standpoint of the Notion. These proofs presuppose their theorems, those very laws, from experience; what they succeed in doing is to reduce them to abstract expressions and convenient formulae.

Undoubtedly the time will come when, with a clearer understanding of what mathematics can accomplish and has accomplished, the entire, real merit of Newton as against Kepler -- the sham scaffolding of proofs being discarded -- will clearly be seen to be restricted to the said transformation of Kepler's formula and to the elementary analytical treatment accorded to it.

...

§ 778

In the moral sphere, in so far as it is considered under the categories of being, there occurs the same transition from quantity into quality and different qualities appear to be based in a difference of magnitude.

It is through a more or less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness is exceeded and something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus right becomes wrong and virtue vice. Thus states, too, acquire through their quantitative difference, other things being assumed equal, a distinct qualitative character. With the expansion of the state and an increased number of citizens, the laws and the constitution acquire a different significance. The state has its own measure of magnitude and when this is exceeded this mere change of size renders it liable to instability and disruption under that same constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its expansion.

...

§ 806

Thus we see that being in general and the being or immediacy of the distinct determinatenesses, no less than the implicit being, has vanished and the unity is being, an immediate presupposed totality such that it is this simple self-relation only as a result of the sublating of this presupposition, and this presupposedness and immediate being is itself only a moment of its repelling, the original self-subsistence and self-Identity is only as the resulting coming together with itself. Being, in its determining, has thus determined itself to essence, a being which, through the sublating of being, is a simple being-with-itself.

Volume One: The Objective Logic. Book Two: The Doctrine of Essence

Reflection – Appearance – Actuality § 807

The truth of being is essence.

Being is the immediate. Since knowing has for its goal knowledge of the true, knowledge of what being is in and for itself, it does not stop at the immediate and its determinations, but penetrates it on the supposition that at the back of this being there is something else, something other than being itself, that this background constitutes the truth of being. This knowledge is a mediated knowing for it is not found immediately with and in essence, but starts from an other, from being, and has a preliminary path to tread, that of going beyond being or rather of penetrating into it. Not until knowing inwardises, recollects itself out of immediate being, does it through this mediation find essence. The German language has preserved essence in the past participle [gewesen] of the verb to be; for essence is past -- but timelessly past -- being.

...

§ 812

But essence as it has here come to be, is what it is, through a negativity which is not alien to it but is its very own, the infinite movement of being. It is being that is in itself and for itself; it is absolute being-in-itself in that it is indifferent to every determinateness of being, and otherness and relation-to-other have been completely sublated. But it is not only this being-in-itself; as mere being-in-itself it would be only the abstraction of pure essence; but it is equally essentially being-for-self; it is itself this negativity, the self-sublating of otherness and determinateness.

§ 813

Essence as the completed return of being into itself is thus at first indeterminate essence. The determinateness of being are sublated in it; they are contained in essence in principle but are not posited in it. Absolute essence in this simple

equality with itself has no determinate being; but it must develop determinate being, for it is both in itself and for itself, i.e. differentiates the determinations which are implicit in it. Because it is self-repelling or indifferent to itself, negative self-relation, it sets itself over against itself and is infinite being-for-self only in so far as it is at one with itself in this its own difference from itself. The determining then is of a different nature from the determining in the sphere of being, and the determinations of essence have a different character from the determinatenesses of being. Essence is absolute unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself; consequently its determining remains within this unity and is neither a becoming nor a transition, nor are the determinations themselves an other as other, or relations to other; they are self-subsistent, but at the same time only in their association with each other in this unity. Since essence is at first simple negativity, it now has to posit in its own sphere the determinateness that is only implicit in it, in order to give itself determinate being and then being-for-self.

§ 814

In the whole of logic, essence occupies the same place as quantity does in the sphere of being; absolute indifference to limit. But quantity is this indifference in an immediate determination, and the limit is present in it as an immediately external determinateness, quantity passes over into quantum; the external limit is necessary to quantity and is affirmatively present in it [ist an ihr seiend]. In essence, -- on the other hand, the determinateness is not a simple immediacy but is present only as posited by essence itself; it is not free, but is present only as connected with its unity. The negativity of essence is reflection; and the determinations are reflected, posited by essence itself and remaining in essence as sublated.

...

§ 817

Essence issues from being; hence it is not immediately in and for itself but is a result of that movement. Or if essence is taken at first as an immediacy, then it is a specific determinate being confronted by another such; it is only essential, as opposed to unessential, determinate being. But essence is being that has been sublated in and for itself; what confronts it is only illusory being [Schein]. The illusory being, however, is essence's own positing.

Essence is first reflection. Reflection determines itself and its determinations are a positedness which is at the same time reflection-into-self.

Section One: Essence as Reflection Within Itself 61

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Secondly, we have to consider these determinations of reflection or essentialities.

Thirdly, essence as the reflection-into-self of its determining converts itself into ground and passes over into Existence and Appearance.

...

§ 819

Essence is sublated being. It is simple equality with itself, but only in so far as it is the negation of the sphere of being in general.

Essence thus has immediacy confronting it as an immediacy from which it has become and which in this sublating has preserved and maintained itself. In this determination, essence itself is simply affirmative [seiendes], immediate essence, and being is only a negative in relation to essence, not in and for itself; therefore essence is a determinate negation. In this way, being and essence are again related to each other as others; for each has a being, an immediacy, and these are indifferent to each other, and with respect to this being, being and essence are equal in value.

...

§ 822

Science of Logic

Closer consideration shows that when essence is characterised as essential only relatively to what is unessential, it is because it is taken only as sublated being or determinate being. In this way, essence is only the first negation, or the negation which is a determinateness through which being becomes only determinate being, or the latter becomes only an other. But essence is the absolute negativity of being; it is being itself, but not determined only as an other, but being that has sublated itself both as immediate being and also as immediate negation, as negation that is infected with otherness. Thus being, or determinate being, has not preserved itself as an other -- for we are in the sphere of essence -- and the immediate that is still distinguished from essence is not merely an unessential determinate being but the immediate that is in and for itself a nullity; it is only a non-essence, illusory being.

...

§ 825

Thus illusory being is the phenomenon of scepticism, and the Appearance of idealism, too, is such an immediacy which is not a something or a thing, in general, not an indifferent being that would still be, apart from its determinateness and connection with the subject. Scepticism did not permit itself to say 'It is'; modern idealism did not permit itself to regard knowledge as a knowing of the thing-in-itself; the illusory being of scepticism was supposed to lack any foundation of

being, and in idealism the thing-in-itself was not supposed to enter into knowledge. But at the same time scepticism admitted a multitude of determinations of its illusory being, or rather its illusory being had for content the entire manifold wealth of the world. In idealism, too, Appearance embraces within itself the range of these manifold determinatenesses. This illusory being and this Appearance are immediately thus manifoldly determined. This content, therefore, may well have no being, no thing-in-itself at its base; it remains on its own account as it is; the content has only been transferred from being into an illusory being, so that the latter has within itself those manifold determinatenesses, which are immediate, simply affirmative, and mutually related as others. Illusory being is, therefore, itself immediately determinate. It can have this or that content; whatever content it has, illusory being does not posit this itself but has it immediately. The various forms of idealism, Leibnizian, Kantian, Fichtean, and others, have not advanced beyond being as determinateness, have not advanced beyond this immediacy, any more than scepticism did. Scepticism permits the content of its illusory being to be given to

Chapter 1 Illusory Being 63

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it; whatever content it is supposed to have, for scepticism it is immediate. The monad of Leibnitz evolves its ideas and representations out of itself; but it is not the power that generates and binds them together, rather do they arise in the monad like bubbles; they are indifferent and immediate over against one another and the same in relation to the monad itself. Similarly, the Kantian Appearance is a given content of perception; it presupposes affections, determinations of the subject, which are immediate relatively to themselves and to the subject. It may well be that the infinite obstacle of Fichte's idealism has no underlying thing-in-itself, so that it becomes purely a determinateness in the ego; but for the ego, this determinateness which it appropriates

and whose externality it sublates is at the same time immediate, a limitation of the ego, which it can transcend but which has in it an element of indifference, so that although the limitation is on the ego, it contains an immediate non-being of the ego.

...

§ 827

It is the immediacy of non-being that constitutes illusory being; but this non-being is nothing else but the negativity of essence present within it. In essence, being is non-being. Its intrinsic nothingness is the negative nature of essence itself. But the immediacy or indifference which this non-being contains is essence's own absolute being-in-itself. The negativity of essence is its equality with itself or its simple immediacy and indifference. Being has preserved itself in essence in so far as the latter in its infinite negativity has this equality with itself; it is through this that essence itself is being. The immediacy of the determinateness in illusory being over against essence is consequently nothing other than essence's own immediacy; but the immediacy is not simply affirmative [seiend], but is the purely mediated or reflected immediacy that is illusory being-being, not as being, but only as the determinateness of being as opposed to mediation; being as a moment.

§ 828

These two moments, namely the nothingness which yet is and the being which is only a moment, or the implicit negativity and the reflected immediacy that constitute the moments of illusory being, are thus the moments of essence itself. What we have here is not an illusory show of being in essence, or an illusory show of essence in being; the illusory being in essence is not the illusory being of an other, but is illusory being per se, the illusory being of essence itself. What we have here is not an illusory show of being in essence, or an illusory show of essence in being; the illusory being in essence is not the illusory being of an other, but is illusory being per se, the illusory being of essence itself.

...

§ 830

Illusory being is the negative that has a being, but in an other, in its negation; it is a non-self-subsistent being which is in its own self-sublated and null. As such, it is the negative returned into itself, non-self-subsistent being as in its own self not self-subsistent. This self-relation of the negative or of non-self-subsistent being is its immediacy; it is an other than the negative itself; it is its determinateness over against itself; or it is the negation directed against the negative. But negation directed against the negative is purely self-related negativity, the absolute sublating of the determinateness itself.

...

§ 861

Essence is at first, simple self-relation, pure identity. This is its determination, but as such it is rather the absence of any determination.

Secondly, the proper determination is difference, a difference that is, on the one hand, external or indifferent, diversity in general, and on the other hand, is opposed diversity or opposition.

Thirdly, as contradiction, the opposition is reflected into itself and withdrawn into its ground. Remark: A = A

A IDENTITY

B DIFFERENCE

- (a) Absolute Difference
- (b) Diversity

Remark: The Law of Diversity

...

§ 904

That everything is different from everything else is a very superfluous proposition, for things in the plural immediately involve manyness and wholly indeterminate diversity. But the proposition that no two things are completely like each other, expresses more, namely, determinate difference. Two things are not merely two -- numerical manyness is only one-and-the-sameness -- but they are different through a determination. Ordinary thinking is struck by the proposition that no two things are like each other -- as in the story of how Leibniz propounded it at court and caused the ladies to look at the leaves of trees to see whether they could find two alike. Happy times for metaphysics when it was the occupation of courtiers and the testing of its propositions called for no more exertion than to compare leaves! The reason why this proposition is striking lies in what has been said, that two, or numerical manyness, does not contain any determinate difference and that diversity as such, in its abstraction, is at first indifferent to likeness and unlikeness. Ordinary thinking, even when it goes on to a determination of diversity, takes these moments themselves to be mutually indifferent, so that one without the other, the mere likeness of things without unlikeness, suffices to determine whether the things are different even when they are only a numerical many, not unlike, but simply different without further qualification. The law of diversity, on the other hand, asserts that things are different from one another through unlikeness, that the determination of unlikeness belongs to them just as much as that of likeness, for determinate difference is constituted only by both together.

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Remark: The Law of Ground

Chapter 3 Ground

pg 67

...

§ 907

The togetherness of both predicates is held asunder by the 'in so far', namely, when it is said that two things are alike in so far as they are not unlike, or on the one side or in one respect are alike, but on another side or in another respect are unalike. The effect of this is to remove the unity of likeness and unlikeness from the thing, and to adhere to what would be the thing's own reflection and the merely implicit reflection of likeness and unlikeness, as a reflection external to the thing. But it is this reflection that, in one and the same activity, distinguishes the two sides of likeness and unlikeness, hence contains both in one activity, lets the one show, be reflected, in the other. But the usual tenderness for things, whose only care is that they do not contradict themselves, forgets here as elsewhere that in this way the contradiction is not resolved but merely shifted elsewhere, into subjective or external reflection generally, and this reflection in fact contains in one unity as sublated and mutually referred, the two moments which are enunciated by this removal and displacement as a mere positedness.

(c) Opposition

C CONTRADICTION

Remark 1: Unity of Positive and Negative Remark 2: The Law of the Excluded Middle Remark 3: The Law of Contradiction

...

§ 1034

This presupposed un-conditioned is therefore the groundless immediate, whose being is nothing except to be present as something groundless. When, therefore, all the conditions of the fact are present, that is when the totality of the fact is posited as a groundless immediate, this scattered multiplicity inwardises [erinnert] itself in its own self. The whole fact must be present in its conditions, or all the conditions belong to its Existence, for all of them constitute the reflection; or, determinate being, because it is condition, is determined by form; consequently its determinations are determinations of reflection and the positing of one essentially involves the positing of the others. The inwardisation of the conditions is at first the falling to the ground [das Zugrundegehen] of immediate determinate being and the becoming of the ground. But this makes the ground a posited ground, that is, it is just as much sublated ground and immediate being, as it is ground. When therefore all the conditions of the fact are present, they sublate themselves as immediate being and presupposition, and equally ground sublates itself. Ground emerges merely as an illusory being that immediately vanishes; accordingly, this emergence is the tautological movement of the fact to itself, and its mediation by conditions and ground is the vanishing of both. The emergence into Existence is therefore immediate in such a manner that it is mediated only by the vanishing of mediation.

...

§ 1038

Secondly, then, it is Appearance. Appearance is that which the thing is in itself, or its truth. But this merely posited Existence which is reflected into otherness is equally the transcending of its itself in its infinitude; to the world of appearance is opposed the world that is reflected into itself, the world of essence.

§ 1039

But the being that appears and essential being, simply stand in relation to one another. Thus Existence is, thirdly, essential relation; what appears manifests what is essential, and this is in its Appearance.

The relation is the still-imperfect union of reflection-into-otherness and reflection-into-self; the perfect interpenetration of both is actuality.

...

§ 1063

Now the inadequacy of the standpoint at which this philosophy stops short consists essentially in holding fast to the abstract thing-in-itself as an ultimate determination, and in opposing to the thing-in-itself reflection or the determinateness and manifoldness of the properties; whereas in fact the thing-in-itself essentially possesses this external reflection within itself and determines itself to be a thing with its own determinations, a thing endowed with properties, in this way demonstrating the abstraction of the thing as a pure thing-in-itself to be an untrue determination.

Chapter 1 Existence 70

Science of Logic

(c) The Reciprocal Action of Things

B The Constitution of the Thing out of Matters

C Dissolution of the Thing

...

§ 1081

Accordingly Appearance is at first essence in its Existence; essence is immediately present in it. The fact that it is not immediate but reflected Existence, constitutes the moment of essence in it; or, Existence as essential Existence is Appearance.

...

§ 1083

But if it is said that something is only Appearance, in the sense that contrasted with it immediate Existence is the truth, then the fact is that Appearance is the higher truth; for it is Existence as essential Appearance, whereas Existence, on the contrary, is still essenceless Appearance because it contains only the one moment of Appearance, namely, Existence as immediate reflection, not yet as its negative reflection. When Appearance is called essenceless, one thinks of the moment of its negativity as though the immediate by contrast were the positive and the true; but the fact is that this immediate does not as yet contain the essential truth. It is when Existence passes over into Appearance that it ceases to be essenceless.

§ 1084

Essence at first reflects an illusory being [schein] within itself, within its simple identity; as such it is abstract reflection, the pure movement from nothing through nothing back to itself. Essence appears, so that it is now real illusory being, since the moments of illusory being have Existence. As we have seen, Appearance is the thing as the negative mediation of itself with itself; the differences it contains are self-subsistent matters which are the contradiction of being an immediate subsistence and at the same time only in an alien self-subsistence, of therefore having their subsistence in the negation of their own self-subsistence, and again for that very reason also only in the negation of this alien negation, or in the negation of their own negation. Illusory being is the same mediation, but its unstable moments have, in Appearance, the shape of immediate self-subsistence. On the other hand, the immediate self-subsistence which belongs to Existence is, on its part, reduced to a moment. Appearance is accordingly the unity of illusory being and Existence.

...

§ 1273

At first, reciprocity displays itself as a reciprocal causality of presupposed, self-conditioned substances; each is alike active and passive substance in relation to the other. Since the two, then, are both passive and active, any distinction between them has already been sublated; the difference is only a completely transparent semblance; they are substances only inasmuch as they are the identity of the active and the passive. Reciprocity itself is therefore still only an empty mode of representing this; all that is still required is merely an external bringing together of what is already both in itself and posited. First of all, it is no longer substrates but substances that stand in relation to each other; in the movement of conditioned causality, the still remaining presupposed immediacy has been sublated, and the conditioning factor of the causal activity is still only the passivity of being acted upon, or the passivity of the cause itself. But further, this 'being acted upon' does not originate in another causal substance, but simply from a causality which is conditioned by being acted

upon, or is a mediated causality. Consequently, this initially external moment which attaches to cause and constitutes the side of its passivity, is mediated by itself, is produced by its own activity, and is thus the passivity posited by its own activity. Causality is conditioned and conditioning; the conditioning side is passive, but the conditioned side equally is passive. This conditioning or passivity is the negation of cause by the cause itself, in that it essentially converts itself into effect and precisely through this is cause. Reciprocity is, therefore, only causality itself; cause not only has an effect, but in the effect it stands, as cause, in relation to itself.

§ 1274

Causality has hereby returned to its absolute Notion, and at the same time has attained to the Notion itself. At first, it is real necessity; absolute identity with itself, so that the difference of necessity and the related determinations in it are substances, free actualities, over against one another. Necessity is, in this way, inner identity; causality is the manifestation of this, in which its illusory show of substantial otherness has sublated itself and necessity is raised to freedom.

...

§ 1276

Absolute substance, which as absolute form distinguishes itself from itself, therefore no longer repels itself as necessity from itself, nor, as contingency, does it fall asunder into indifferent, self-external substances; on the contrary, it differentiates itself, on the one hand, into the totality — heretofore passive substance — which is originative as reflection out of the determinateness into itself, as a simple whole, which contains within itself its positedness and is posited as self-identical therein—the universal; on the other hand, it differentiates itself into the totality — heretofore causal substance — into the reflection equally out of the determinateness into itself to a negative determinateness which, as thus the self-identical determinateness is likewise posited as the whole, but as self-identical negativity—the individual. But because the universal is self-identical only in that it contains the determinateness within itself as sublated, and therefore the negative as negative, it is immediately the same negativity which individuality is; and individuality, because it is equally the determinate determinate, the negative as negative, is immediately the same identity which universality is. This their simple identity is particularity, which contains in immediate unity the moment of determinateness of the individual and the moment of reflection-into-self of the universal. These three totalities are, therefore, one and the same reflection, which, as negative self-relation, differentiates itself into these two, but into a perfectly transparent difference, namely, into a determinate simplicity or simple determinateness which is their one and the same identity.

This is the Notion, the realm of subjectivity or of freedom.

...

The Notion in General

§ 1279

What the nature of the Notion is, can no more be stated offhand than can the Notion of any other object. It might perhaps seem that, in order to state the Notion of an object, the logical element were presupposed and that therefore this could not in turn have something else for its presupposition, nor be deduced; just as in geometry logical propositions as applied to magnitude and employed in that science, are premised in the form of axioms, determinations of cognition that have not been and cannot be deduced. Now although it is true that the Notion is to be regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as the absolute foundation, yet it can be so only in so far as it has made itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt a first; yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must have made itself immediate through the sublation of mediation.

§ 1280

From this aspect the Notion is to be regarded in the first instance simply as the third to being and essence, to the immediate and to reflection. Being and essence are so far the moments of its becoming; but it is their foundation and truth as the identity in which they are submerged and contained. They are contained in it because it is their result, but no longer as being and essence. That determination they possess only in so far as they have not withdrawn into this their unity.

§ 1281

Objective logic therefore, which treats of being and essence constitutes properly the genetic exposition of the Notion. More precisely, substance is already real essence, or essence in so far as it is united with being and has entered into actuality. Consequently, the Notion has substance for its immediate presupposition; what is implicit in substance is manifested in the Notion. Thus the dialectical movement of substance through causality and reciprocity is the immediate genesis of the Notion, the exposition of the process of its becoming. But the significance of its becoming, as of every becoming is that it is the reflection of the transient into its ground and that the at first apparent other into which the former has passed constitutes its truth. Accordingly the Notion is the truth of substance; and since substance has necessity for its specific mode of relationship, freedom reveals itself as the truth of necessity and as the mode of relationship proper to the Notion.

...

§ 1284

1. Substance, as absolute power or self-related negativity, differentiates itself into a relationship in which what were at first only simple moments are substances and original presuppositions. Their specific relationship is that of a passive substance, of the original immediacy of the simple inwardness or in-itself which, powerless to posit itself, is only an original positedness and of an active substance, the self-related negativity which as such has posited itself in the form of an other and relates itself to this other. This other is simply the passive substance which the active substance through its own originative power has presupposed for itself as condition. This presupposing is to be understood in the sense that the movement of substance itself is, in the first instance, under the form of one of the moments of its Notion, the in-itself, and the determinateness of one of the substances standing in relationship is also the determinateness of this relationship itself.

...

§ 1286

3. But there is still more present in this than only this appearance, namely: (a) the cause acts on the passive substance and alters its determination; but this is positedness, there is nothing else in it to alter; the other determination, however, that it receives is causality; the passive substance therefore becomes cause, power and activity: (b) the effect is posited in it by the cause; but that which is posited by the cause is the cause itself which, in acting, is identical with itself; it is this that puts itself in the place of the passive substance. Similarly, with regard to the active substance, (a) the action is the translation of the cause into the effect, into the other of the cause, into positedness, and (b) the cause reveals itself in the effect as what it is; the effect is identical with the cause, is not an other; thus the cause in acting reveals the posited being as that which the cause essentially is. Each side, therefore, in both its identical and negative relation to the other becomes the opposite of itself, so that the other, and therefore also each, remains identical with itself. But the identical and the negative relations are both one and the same; substance is self-identical only in its opposite and this constitutes the absolute identity of the substances posited as a duality. Active substance, through the act of positing itself as the opposite of itself, an act which is at the same time the sublating of its presupposed otherness, of passive substance, is manifested as cause or originative substantiality. Conversely, through being acted on, posited being is manifested as posited, the negative as negative, and therefore passive substance as self-related negativity, the cause meeting in this other simply and solely with its own self. Through this positing, then, the presupposed or implicit originativeness becomes explicit or for itself; yet this being that is in and for itself is such only in so far as this positing is equally a sublating of what was presupposed; in other words absolute substance has returned to itself and so become absolute, only out of and in its positedness. Hence this reciprocity is the appearance that again sublates itself, the revelation that the illusory being of causality in which the cause appears as cause, is illusory being. This infinite reflection-into-self, namely, that being is in and for itself only in so far as it is posited, is the consummation of substance. But this consummation is no longer substance itself but something higher, the Notion, the subject. The transition of the relation of substantiality takes place through its own immanent necessity and is nothing more than the manifestation of itself, that the Notion is its truth, and that freedom is the truth of necessity.

§ 1287

I have already mentioned in the Second Book of the Objective Logic that the philosophy which adopts the standpoint of substance and stops there is the system of Spinoza. I also indicated there the defect of that system alike as to form and to matter. But the refutation of the system is another matter. With respect to the refutation of a philosophical system I have elsewhere also made the general observation that one must get rid of the erroneous idea of regarding the system as out and out false, as if the true system by contrast were only opposed to the false. The context itself in which Spinoza's system here finds mention provides the true standpoint of the system and the question whether it is true or false. The relation of substance resulted from the nature of essence; this relation and its exposition as a developed totality in a system is, therefore, a necessary standpoint assumed by the absolute. Such a standpoint, therefore, is not to be regarded as an opinion, a subjective, arbitrary way of thinking of an individual, as an aberration of speculation; on the contrary, speculative thinking in the course of its progress finds itself necessarily occupying that standpoint and to that extent the system is perfectly true; but it is not the highest standpoint. Yet this does not mean that the system can be regarded as false, as requiring and being capable of refutation; on the contrary, the only thing about it to be considered false is its claim to be the highest standpoint. Consequently, the true system cannot have the relation to it of being merely opposed to it; for if this were so, the system, as this opposite, would itself be one-sided. On the contrary, the true system as the higher, must contain the subordinate system within itself.

§ 1288

Further, the refutation must not come from outside, that is, it must not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in question and inconsistent with it. The system need only refuse to recognise those assumptions; the defect is a defect only for him who starts from the requirements and demands based on those assumptions.

Thus it has been said that for anyone who does not presuppose as an established fact the freedom and self-subsistence of the self-conscious subject there cannot be any refutation of Spinozism. Besides, a standpoint so lofty and so intrinsically rich as the relation of substance, far from ignoring those assumptions even contains them: one of the attributes of Spinoza's substance is thinking. On the contrary, Spinozism knows how to resolve and assimilate the determinations in which these assumptions conflict with it, so that they appear in the system, but in the modifications appropriate to it. The nerve, therefore, of the external

refutation consists solely in clinging stubbornly to the antitheses of these assumptions, for example, to the absolute self-subsistence of the thinking individual as against the form of thought posited in absolute substance as identical with extension. The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent's stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not. The only possible refutation of Spinozism must therefore consist, in the first place, in recognising its standpoint as essential and necessary and then going on to raise that standpoint to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic. The relationship of substance considered simply and solely in its own intrinsic nature leads on to its opposite, to the Notion. The exposition of substance (contained in the last book) which leads on to the Notion is, therefore, the sole and genuine refutation of Spinozism. It is the unveiling of substance, and this is the genesis of the Notion, the chief moments of which have been brought together above. The unity of substance is its relation of necessity; but this unity is only an inner necessity; in positing itself through the moment of absolute negativity it becomes a manifested or posited identity, and thereby the freedom which is the identity of the Notion. The Notion, the totality resulting from the reciprocal relation, is the unity of the two substances standing in that relation; but in this unity they are now free, for they no longer possess their identity as something blind, that is to say, as something merely inner; on the contrary, the substances now have essentially the status of an illusory being, of being moments of reflection, whereby each is no less immediately united with its other or its positedness and each contains its positedness within itself, and consequently in its other is posited as simply and solely identical with itself.

§ 1289

With the Notion, therefore, we have entered the realm of freedom. Freedom belongs to the Notion because that identity which, as absolutely determined, constitutes the necessity of substance, is now also sublated or is a positedness, and this positedness as self-related is simply that identity. The mutual opacity of the substances standing in the causal relationship has vanished and become a self-transparent clarity, for the originality of their self-subsistence has passed into a positedness; the original substance is original in that it

is only the cause of itself, and this is substance raised to the freedom of the Notion.

§ 1290

This at once provides us with a more precise determination of meditately the Notion. Because being that is in and for itself is immediately a positedness, the Notion in its simple self-relation is an absolute determinateness which, however, as purely self-related is no less immediately a simple identity. But this self-relation of the determinateness as the union of itself with itself is equally the negation of the determinateness, and the Notion as this equality with itself is the universal. But this identity has equally the determination of negativity; it is the negation or determinateness which is self-related; thus the Notion is the individual. Each of them, the universal and the individual, is the totality, each contains within itself the determination of the other and therefore these totalities are one and one only, just as this unity is the differentiation of itself into the free illusion of this duality—of a duality which, in the difference of the individual and the universal, appears as a complete opposition, yet an opposition which is so entirely illusory that in thinking and enunciating the one, the other also is immediately thought and enunciated.

§ 1291

The foregoing is to be regarded as the Notion of the Notion. It may seem to differ from what is elsewhere understood by 'notion' and in that case we might be asked to indicate how that which we have here found to be the Notion is contained in other conceptions or explanations. On the one hand, however, there can be no question of a confirmation based on the authority of the ordinary understanding of the term; in the science of the Notion its content and character can be guaranteed solely by the immanent deduction which contains its genesis and which already lies behind us. On the other hand, the Notion as here deduced must, of course, be recognisable in principle in what is elsewhere presented as the concept of the Notion. But it is not so easy to

discover what others have said about the nature of the Notion. For in the main they do not concern themselves at all with the question, presupposing that everyone who uses the word automatically knows what it means. Latterly, one could have felt all the more relieved from any need to trouble about the Notion since, just as it was the fashion for a while to say everything bad about the imagination, and then the memory, so in philosophy it became the habit some time ago, a habit which in some measure still exists, to heap every kind of slander on the Notion, on what is supreme in thought, while the incomprehensible and non-comprehension are, on the contrary, regarded as the pinnacle of science and morality. I will confine myself here to a remark which may help one to grasp the notions here developed and may make it easier to find one's bearings in them. The Notion, when it has developed into a concrete existence that is itself free, is none other than the I

or pure self-consciousness. True, I have notions, that is to say, determinate notions; but the I is the pure Notion itself which, as Notion, has come into existence. When, therefore, reference is made to the fundamental determinations which constitute the nature of the I, we may presuppose that the reference is to something familiar, that is, a commonplace of our ordinary thinking. But the I is, first, this pure self-related unity, and it is so not immediately but only as making abstraction from all determinateness and content and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself. As such it is universality; a unity that is unity with itself only through its negative attitude, which appears as a process of abstraction, and that consequently contains all determinateness dissolved in it. Secondly, the I as self-related negativity is no less immediately individuality or is absolutely determined, opposing itself to all that is other and excluding it — individual personality. This absolute universality which is also immediately an absolute individualisation, and an absolutely determined being, which is a pure positedness and is this absolutely determined being it only through its unity with the positedness,

this constitutes the nature of the I -- as well as of the Notion; neither the one nor the other can be truly comprehended unless the two indicated moments are grasped at the same time both in their abstraction and also in their perfect unity.

§ 1293

Now Kant went beyond this external relation of the understanding, as the faculty of notions and of the Notion itself, to the I. It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason that the unity which constitutes the nature of the Notion is recognised as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness. This proposition constitutes the so-called transcendental deduction of the categories; but this has always been regarded as one of the most difficult parts of the Kantian philosophy, doubtless for no other reason than that it demands that we should go beyond the mere representation of the relation in which the I stands to the understanding, or notions stand to a thing and its properties and accidents, and advance to the thought of that relation. An object, says Kant, is that in the notion of which the manifold of a given intuition is unified. But all unifying of representations demands a unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is this unity of consciousness which alone constitutes the connection of the representations with the object and therewith their objective validity and on which rests even the possibility of the understanding. Kant distinguishes this unity from the subjective unity of consciousness, the unity of representation whereby I am conscious of a manifold as either simultaneous or successive, this being dependent on empirical conditions. On the other hand, the principles of the objective determination of notions are, he says, to be derived solely from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Through the categories which are these objective determinations, the manifold of given representations is so determined as to be brought into the unity of consciousness. According to this exposition, the unity of the notion is that whereby something is not a mere mode of feeling, an intuition, or even a mere representation, but is an object, and this objective unity is the unity of the ego with itself. In point of fact, the comprehension of an object consists in nothing else than that the ego makes it its own, pervades it and brings it into its own form, that is, into the universality that is immediately a determinateness, or a determinateness that is immediately universality. As intuited or even in ordinary conception, the object is still something external and alien. When it is comprehended, the being-in-and-for-self which it possesses in intuition and pictorial thought is transformed into a positedness; the I in thinking it pervades it.

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§ 1296

The Kantian exposition cited above contains two other features which concern the Notion and necessitate some further observations. In the first place, the stage of the understanding is supposed to be preceded by the stages of feeling and intuition, and it is an essential proposition of the Kantian transcendental philosophy that without intuitions notions are empty and are valid solely as relations of the manifold given by intuition. Secondly, the Notion has been declared to be the objective element of knowledge, and as such, the truth. But on the other hand, the Notion is taken as something merely subjective from which we cannot extract reality, by which is to be understood objectivity, since reality is contrasted with subjectivity; and, in general, the Notion and the logical element are declared to be something merely formal which, since it abstracts from the content, does not contain truth.

§ 1297

Now, in the first place, as regards the relation of the understanding or the Notion to the stages presupposed by it, the form of these stages is determined by the particular science under consideration. In our science, that of pure logic, these stages are being and essence. In psychology the antecedent stages are feeling and intuition, and then ideation generally. In the phenomenology of spirit, which is the doctrine of consciousness, the ascent to the understanding is through the stages of sensuous consciousness and then perception. Kant presupposes only feeling and intuition. How incomplete to begin with this scale of stages is revealed by the fact that he himself adds as an appendix to the transcendental logic or doctrine of the understanding a treatise on the concepts of reflection a sphere lying between intuition and the understanding or being and the Notion.

§ 1298

About these stages themselves it must be remarked, first of all, that the forms of intuition, ideation and the like belong to the self-conscious spirit which, as such, does not fall to be considered in the science of logic. It is true that the pure determinations of being, essence and the Notion constitute the ground plan and the inner simple framework of the forms of the spirit; spirit as intuiting and also as sensuous consciousness is in the form of immediate being; and, similarly, spirit as ideating and as perceiving has risen from being to the stage of essence or reflection. But these concrete forms as little concern the science of logic as do the concrete forms assumed by the logical categories in nature, which would be space and time, then space and time self-filled with a content as inorganic nature, and lastly, organic nature.

§ 1299

Similarly here, too, the Notion is to be regarded not as the act of the self-conscious understanding, not as the subjective understanding, but as the Notion in its own absolute character which constitutes a stage of nature as well as of spirit. Life, or organic nature, is the stage of nature at which the Notion emerges, but as blind, as unaware of itself and unthinking; the Notion that is self-conscious and thinks pertains solely to spirit. But the logical form of the Notion is independent of its non-spiritual, and also of its spiritual, shapes. The necessary premonition on this point has already been given in the

Introduction. It is a point that must not wait to be established within logic itself but must be cleared up before that science is begun.

...

§ 1301

Now it must certainly be admitted that the Notion as such is not yet complete, but must rise to the Idea which alone is the unity of the Notion and reality; and this must be shown in the sequel to be the spontaneous outcome of the nature of the Notion itself. For the reality which the Notion gives itself must not be received by it as something external but must, in accordance with the requirement of the science, be derived from the Notion itself. But the truth is that it is not the material given by intuition and representation that ought to be vindicated as the real in contrast to the Notion. People often say, 'It is only a notion,' contrasting the notion not only with the Idea but with sensuous, spatial and temporal, palpable reality as something more excellent than the Notion; and then the abstract is held to be of less account than the concrete because it lacks so much of this kind of material. In this view, to abstract means to select from the concrete object for our subjective purposes this or that mark without thereby detracting from the worth and status of the many other properties and features left out of account; on the contrary, these as real retain their validity completely unimpaired, only they are left yonder, on the other side; thus it is only the inability of the understanding to assimilate such wealth that compels it to content itself with the impoverished abstraction. Now to regard the given material of intuition and the manifold of representation as the real in contrast to what is thought, to the Notion, is a view, the abandonment of which is not only a condition of philosophising but is already presupposed by religion; for how can there be any need for religion, how can religion have any meaning, if the fleeting and superficial phenomena of the world of sensuous particulars are still regarded as the truth? But philosophy gives a reasoned insight into the true state of the case with regard to the reality of sensuous being; it assumes the stages of feeling and intuition as precedent to the understanding in so far as they are conditions of its genesis, but only in the sense that it is conditioned by their reality. Abstract thinking, therefore, is not to be regarded as a mere setting aside of the sensuous material, the reality of which is not thereby impaired; rather is it the sublating and reduction of that material as mere phenomenal appearance to the essential, which is manifested only in the Notion.

§ 1302

Of course, if what is taken up into the Notion from the concrete phenomenon is to serve only as a mark or sign, it certainly may be any mere random sensuous particular determination of the object, selected from the others on the basis of any random external interest and of a similar kind and nature as the rest.

§ 1303

A capital misunderstanding which prevails on this point is that the natural principle or the beginning which forms the starting point in the natural evolution or in the history of the developing individual, is regarded as the truth, and the first in the Notion. Now in the order of nature, intuition or being are undoubtedly first, or are the condition for the Notion, but they are not on that account the absolutely unconditioned; on the contrary, their reality is sublated in the Notion and with it, too, the illusory show they possessed of being the conditioning reality. When it is a question, not of truth but merely of history, as in pictorial and phenomenal thinking, we need not of course go beyond merely narrating that we start with feelings and intuitions and that from the manifold of these the understanding extracts a universality or an abstraction and naturally requires for this purpose the said substrate of feelings and intuitions which, in this process of abstraction, remains for representation in the same complete reality with which it first presented itself. But philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is true in them, and further, on the basis of this cognition, to comprehend that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening.

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§ 1306

Consequently, the infinite unity of reason, too, is still deprived of the synthesis, and with it the beginning referred to above of a speculative, truly infinite Notion; reason becomes the familiar, wholly formal, merely regulative unity of the systematic employment of the understanding. It is declared to be an abuse when logic, which is supposed to be merely a canon of judgment, is regarded as an organon for the production of objective insights. The notions of reason in which we could not but have an intimation of a higher power and a profounder significance, no longer possess a constitutive character as do the categories, they are mere Ideas; certainly, we are quite at liberty to use them, but by these intelligible entities in which all truth should be completely revealed, we are to understand nothing more than hypotheses, and to ascribe absolute truth to

them would be the height of caprice and foolhardiness, for they do not occur in any experience. Would one ever have thought that philosophy would deny truth to intelligible entities because they lack the spatial and temporal material of the sensuous world?

§ 1307

Directly connected with this is the question of the point of view from which the Notion and the character of logic generally are to be considered, a question on which the Kantian philosophy holds the same view as is commonly taken: that is to say, in what relation do the Notion and the science of the Notion stand to truth itself. We have already quoted from the Kantian deduction of the categories that according to it the object, as that in which the manifold of intuition is unified, is

this unity solely through the unity of self-consciousness. Here, therefore, the objectivity of thought is specifically enunciated, an identity of Notion and thing, which is truth. In the same way, it is also commonly admitted that when thinking appropriates a given object, this thereby suffers an alteration and is changed from something sensuous to something thought; and yet that not only is the essential nature of the object not affected by this alteration but that it is only in its Notion that it is in its truth, whereas in the immediacy in which it is given it is only appearance and a contingency; that the cognition that truly comprehends the object is the cognition of it as it is in and for itself, and that the Notion is its very objectivity.

§ 1308

But, on the other hand, it is equally maintained that we cannot after all, know things as they truly are in themselves and that truth is inaccessible to the cognitive powers of reason; that the aforesaid truth which consists in the unity of the object and the Notion is, after all, only Appearance, and this time, again on the ground that the content is only the manifold of intuition. On this point we have already remarked that, on the contrary, it is precisely in the Notion that this manifoldness, in so far as it pertains to intuition in contrast to the Notion, is sublated and that through the Notion the object is reduced to its non-contingent essential nature. The latter enters into the sphere of Appearance and for that very reason the Appearance is not devoid of essential being, but is a manifestation of essence. But the completely liberated manifestation of essence is the Notion

§ 1309

These propositions of which we here remind the reader are not dogmatic assertions, for the reason that they are results that have issued from the entire immanent development of essence. The present standpoint to which this development has led is that the form of the absolute which is higher than being and essence is the Notion. Regarded from this aspect, the Notion has subjugated being and essence, which from other starting points include also feeling and intuition and representation, and which appeared as its antecedent conditions, and has proved itself to be their unconditioned ground. There now remains the second aspect, to the treatment of which this Third Book of the Logic is devoted, namely the exposition of how the Notion builds up in and from itself the reality that has vanished in it. It has therefore been freely admitted that the cognition that stops short at the Notion purely as such, is still incomplete and has only as yet arrived at abstract truth. But its incompleteness does not lie in its lack of that presumptive reality given in feeling and intuition but rather in the fact that the Notion has not yet given itself a reality of its own, a reality produced from its own resources. The demonstrated absoluteness of the Notion relatively to the material of experience and, more exactly, to the categories and concepts of reflection, consists in this, that this material as it appears apart from and prior to the Notion has no truth; this it has solely in its ideality or its identity with the Notion. The derivation of the real from it if we want to call it derivation, consists in the first place essentially in this, that the Notion in its formal abstraction reveals itself as incomplete and through its own immanent dialectic passes over into reality; but it does not fall back again onto a ready-made reality confronting it and take refuge in something which has shown itself to be the unessential element of Appearance because, having looked around for something better, it has failed to find it; on the contrary, it produces the reality from its own resources. It will always stand out as a marvel how the Kantian philosophy recognised the relation of thought to sensuous reality, beyond which it did not advance, as only a relative relation of mere Appearance, and perfectly well recognised and enunciated a higher unity of both in the Idea in general and, for example, in the Idea of an intuitive understanding, and yet stopped short at this relative relation and the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separate from reality thus asserting as truth what it declared to be finite cognition, and denouncing as an unjustified extravagance and a figment of thought what it recognised as truth and of which it established the specific notion.

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§ 1311

'What we require to know' Kant goes on to say, 'is a universal and sure criterion of any cognition whatever; it would be such a criterion as would be valid for all cognitions without distinction of their objects; but since with such a criterion abstraction would be made from all content of the cognition (relation to its object) and truth concerns precisely this content, it would be quite impossible and absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognitions.' Here, the usual conception of the formal function of logic is expressed very definitely and the argument adduced has a very convincing air. But first of all it is to be observed that it usually happens with such formal ratiocination that it forgets in its discourse the very point on which it has based its argument and of which it is speaking. It is alleged that it would be absurd to ask for the criterion of the truth of the content of cognition; but according to the definition it is not the content that constitutes the truth, but the agreement of the content with the Notion. A content such as is here spoken of, without the Notion, is something notionless, and hence without essential being; certainly we cannot ask for the criterion of the truth of such a content, but for the very opposite reason; not, that is, because the content, as something notionless, is not the required agreement, but simply because it cannot be anything more than a mere truthless opinion. Let us leave on one side the content which causes the confusion here the confusion into which formalism falls whenever it sets out to explain something and which makes it say the opposite of what it intends and let us stop at the abstract view that logic is only formal and, in fact, abstracts from all content; we then have a one-sided cognition which is not to contain any object, an empty, blank form which therefore is no more an agreement for an agreement essentially requires two terms then it is truth. In the a priori synthesis of the Notion, Kant possessed a higher principle in which a duality in a unity could be cognised, a

cognition, therefore, of what is required for truth; but the material of sense, the manifold of intuition, was too strong for him and he was unable to get away from it to a consideration of the Notion and the categories in and for themselves and to a speculative method of philosophising.

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§ 1319

Secondly, however, because it is absolute negativity, it sunders itself and posits itself as the negative or as the The Doctrine of the Notion Section One: Subjectivity 90

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other of itself; and further, because as yet it is only the immediate Notion, this positing or differentiation is characterised by the fact that the moments become indifferent to one another and each becomes for itself; in this partition, its unity is still only an external connection. As such connection of its moments, which are posited as self-subsistent and indifferent, it is Judgment.

§ 1320

Thirdly, though the judgment does contain the unity of the Notion that has vanished into its self-subsistent moments, yet this unity is not posited. It becomes so through the dialectical movement of the judgment, through which it has become the Syllogism, the Notion posited in its completeness; for in the syllogism there is posited not only the moments of the Notion as self-subsistent extremes, but also their mediating unity.

§ 1321

But since this unity itself as the unifying middle, and the moments as self-subsistent extremes, are in the first instance immediately opposed to one another, this contradictory relationship that occurs in the formal syllogism sublates itself, and the completeness of the Notion passes over into the unity of the totality, the subjectivity of the Notion into its Objectivity.

...

A The Universal Notion

§ 1325

The pure Notion is the absolutely infinite, unconditioned and free. It is here, at the outset of the discussion which has the Notion for its content, that we must look back once more at its genesis. Essence is the outcome of being, and the Notion, the outcome of essence, therefore also of being. But this becoming has the significance of a self-repulsion, so that it is rather the outcome which is the unconditioned and original. Being, in its transition into essence, has become an illusory being or a positedness, and becoming or transition into an other has become a positing; and conversely, the positing or reflection of essence has sublated itself and has restored itself as a being that is not posited, that is original. The Notion is the interfusion of these moments, namely, qualitative and original being is such only as a positing, only as a return-into-self, and this pure reflection-into-self is a sheer becoming-other or determinateness which, consequently, is no less an infinite, self-relating determinateness.

§ 1326

Thus the Notion is, in the first instance, the absolute self-identity that is such only as the negation of negation or as the infinite unity of the negativity with itself. This pure relation of the Notion to itself, which is this relation by positing itself through the negativity, is the universality of the Notion.

§ 1327

As universality is the utterly simple determination, it does not seem capable of any explanation; for an explanation must concern itself with definitions and distinctions and must apply predicates to its object, and to do this to what is simple, would alter rather than explain it. But the simplicity which constitutes the very nature of the universal is such that, through absolute negativity, it contains within itself difference and determinateness in the highest degree. Being is simple as immediate being; for that reason it is only something meant or intended and we cannot say of it what it is; therefore, it is one with its other, with non-being. Its Notion is just this, to be a simplicity that immediately vanishes in its opposite; it is becoming. The universal, on the contrary, is that simplicity which, because it is the Notion, no less possesses within itself the richest content.

...

§ 1331

The universal is therefore free power; it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without doing violence to it; on the contrary, the universal is, in its other, in peaceful communion with itself. We have called it free power, but it could also be called free love and boundless blessedness, for it bears itself towards its other as towards its own self; in it, it has returned to itself.

§ 1332

We have just mentioned determinateness, although the Notion, being as yet only the universal and only self-identical, has not yet advanced to that stage. However, we cannot speak of the universal apart from determinateness which to be more precise is particularity and individuality, for the universal, in its absolute negativity, contains determinateness in and for itself. The determinateness, therefore, is not introduced from outside when we speak of it in connection with the universal.

As negativity in general or in accordance with the first, immediate negation, the universal contains determinateness generally as particularity; as the second negation, that is, as negation of the negation, it is absolute determinateness or individuality and concreteness. The universal is thus the totality of the Notion; it is a concrete, and far from being empty, it has through its Notion a content, and a content in which it not only maintains itself but one which is its own and immanent in it. We can, indeed, abstract from the content: but in that case we do not obtain the universal of the Notion but only the abstract universal, which is an isolated, imperfect moment of the Notion and has no truth.

§ 1333

More precisely, the universal shows itself as this totality as follows. In so far as it contains determinateness, it is not merely the first negation, but also the reflection of this negation into itself. Taken expressly with this first negation, it is a particular, and it is as such that we are soon to consider it; but in this determinateness it is essentially still a universal; this side we have here still to consider. For determinateness, being in the Notion, is the total reflection, the two-fold illusory being which on the one hand has an illusory reference outwards, the reflection-into-other, and on the other hand has an illusory reference inwards, the reflection-into-self. The former reflection involves distinction from an other; from this standpoint, the universal possesses a particularity which has its resolution in a higher universal. Now even though it is merely a relative universal, it does not lose its character of universal; it preserves itself in its determinateness, not merely as though in its connection with the determinateness it remained indifferent to it -- for then it would be merely compounded with it but so that it is what we have just called the illusory reference inwards. The determinateness, as determinate Notion, is bent back into itself out of the externality; it is the Notion's own immanent character, which is an essential character by virtue of the fact that, in being taken up into the universality and pervaded by it, it equally pervades the universality, being of like compass and identical with it; it is the character that belongs to the genus as the determinateness that is not separated from the universal. Accordingly, the limitation is not outward-going but positive, for the Notion, through its universality, stands in free relation to itself. Thus even the determinate Notion remains within itself infinitely free Notion.

§ 1334

But in regard to the other side, in which the genus is limited by its specific character, it has been observed that this, as a lower genus, has its resolution in a higher universal. The latter, in its turn, can also be grasped as genus but as a more abstract one; but it always pertains only to that side of the determinate Notion which has a reference outwards. The truly higher universal is that in which this outward-going side is taken back into the universal, the second negation, in which the determinateness is present simply as posited or as illusory being. Life, ego, spirit, absolute Notion, are not universals merely in the sense of higher genera, but are concretes whose determinatenesses, too, are not species or lower genera but genera which, in their reality, are absolutely self-contained and self-fulfilled. In so far as life, ego, finite spirit are, as they certainly are, also only determinate Notions, their absolute resolution is in that universal which as truly absolute Notion is to be grasped as the Idea of infinite spirit, whose posited being is infinite, transparent reality wherein it contemplates its creation, and in this creation its own self.

§ 1335

The true, infinite universal which, in itself, is as much particularity as individuality, we have next to consider as particularity. It determines itself freely; the process by which it makes itself finite is not a transition, for this occurs only in the sphere of being; it is creative power as the absolute negativity which relates itself to its own self. As such, it differentiates itself internally, and this is a determining, because the differentiation is one with the universality. Accordingly, the universal is a process in which it posits the differences themselves as universal and self-related. They thereby become fixed, isolated differences. The isolated subsistence of the finite which earlier was determined as its being-for-self, and also as thinghood, as substance, is, in its truth universality, the form with which the infinite Notion clothes its differences -- a form that is, in fact, one of its own differences. Herein consists the creative power of the Notion, a power which is to be comprehended only in this, the Notion's innermost core.

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§ 1337

Connected with the above is the reason why latterly the Understanding has been so lightly esteemed and ranked as inferior to Reason; it is the fixity which it imparts to the determinatenesses, and hence to finite determinations. This fixity consists in the form of abstract Universality which has just been considered: through it they become immutable. For qualitative determinateness, and also determinations of reflection, are essentially limited, and, through their limitation, have a relation to their other; hence the necessity of transition and passing away. But universality which they possess in the understanding gives them the form of reflection-into-self by which they are freed from the relation-to-other and have become imperishable. Now though in the pure Notion this eternity belongs to its nature, yet its abstract determinations are eternal essentialities only in respect of their form; but their content is at variance with this form; therefore they are not truth, or imperishable. Their content is at variance with the form, because it is not determinateness itself as universal; that is, it is not totality of the Notion's difference, or not itself the whole form; but the form of the limited understanding is itself the imperfect form, namely, abstract universality. But further, we must recognise the infinite force of the understanding in

splitting the concrete into abstract determinatenesses and plumbing the depth of difference, the force that at the same time is alone the power that effects their transition.

§ 1338

Since, therefore, understanding exhibits the infinite force which determines the universal, or conversely, imparts through the form of Universality a fixity and subsistence to the determinateness that is in and for itself transitory; then it is not the fault of understanding if no further progress is made beyond this point. It is a subjective impotence of reason which adopts these determinatenesses in their fixity, and which is unable to bring them back to their unity through the dialectical force opposed to this abstract universality, in other words, through their own peculiar nature or through their Notion. The understanding does indeed give them, so to speak, a rigidity of being such as they do not possess in the sphere of quality and the sphere of reflection; but at the same time it spiritually impregnates them and so sharpens them, that just at this extreme point alone they acquire the capability to dissolve themselves and pass over into their opposite. The highest maturity, the highest stage, which anything can attain is that in which its downfall begins. The fixity of the determinateness into which the understanding seems to run, the form of the imperishable, is that of self-relating universality. But this belongs properly to the Notion; and consequently in this universality is to be found expressed, and infinitely close at hand, the dissolution of the finite. This Universality directly refutes the determinateness of the finite and expresses its incongruity with the universality. Or rather, the adequacy of the finite is already to hand; the abstract determinate is posited as one with the universality, and for that very reason is posited as not for itself -- for then it would only be a determinate -- but only as unity

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of itself and the universal, that is, as Notion. © C The Individual

§ 1339

1. In the first instance, therefore, individuality appears as the reflection of the Notion out of its determinateness into itself. It is the self-mediation of the Notion in so far as its otherness has made itself into an other again, whereby the Notion has reinstated itself as self-identical, but in the determination of absolute negativity. The negative in the universal whereby this is a particular, was defined above as a two-fold illusory being: in so far as the negative is an illusory being within the universal, the particular remains a universal; through the reference of the illusory being outwards it is a determinate; the return of this side into the universal is two-fold: either through abstraction which lets drop the particular and rises to the higher and the highest genus, or else through the individuality to which the universal in the determinateness itself descends. Here is where the false path branches off and abstraction strays from the highway of the Notion and forsakes the truth. Its higher and highest universal to which it raises itself is only the surface, which becomes ever more destitute of content; the individuality it despises is the profundity in which the Notion seizes itself and is posited as Notion. ©

...

§ 1342

Yet the unity of the Notion is so indissoluble that even these products of abstraction, though they are supposed to drop individuality are, on the contrary, individuals themselves. Abstraction raises the concrete into universality in which, however, the universal is grasped only as a determinate universality; and this is precisely the individuality that has shown itself to be self-related determinateness. Abstraction, therefore, is a sundering of the concrete and an isolating of its determinations; through it only single properties and

moments are seized; for its product must contain what it is itself. But the difference between this individuality of its products and the Notion's individuality is that, in the former, the individual as content and the universal as form are distinct from one another -- just because the former is not present as absolute form, as the

Notion itself, or the latter is not present as the totality of form. However this more detailed consideration shows that the abstract product itself is a unity of the individual content and abstract universality, and is, therefore, a concrete -- and the opposite of what it aims to be.

§ 1343

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2. But Individuality is not only the return of the Notion into itself; but immediately its loss. Through individuality, where the Notion is internal to itself, it becomes external to itself and enters into actuality. Abstraction which, as the soul of individuality is the relation of the negative to the negative; and, as we have shown not external to the universal and the particular but immanent in them; and through it they are concrete, content, an individual. But as this negativity, individuality is the determinate determinateness, is differentiation as such; through this reflection of the difference into itself, the difference becomes fixed; it is only through individuality that the determining of the particular takes place, for individuality is that abstraction which simply as individuality, is now posited abstraction.

...

§ 1345

When one understands by the universal, that which is common to several individuals, one is starting from the indifferent subsistence of these individuals and confounding the immediacy of being with the determination of the Notion. The lowest possible conception of the universal in its connection with the individual is this external relation of it as merely a common element. ©

Chapter 2 The Judgment

§ 1346

The judgment is the determinateness of the Notion posited in the Notion itself. The Notion's determinations, or what we have seen to be the same thing, the determinate Notions, have already been considered on their own; but this consideration was more a subjective reflection or subjective abstraction. But the Notion is itself this abstractive process, the opposing of its determinations is its own determining activity. The judgment is this positing of the determinate Notions by the Notion itself. Judging is thus another function than comprehension, or rather it is the other function of the Notion as the determining of the Notion by itself, and the further progress of the judgment into the diversity of judgments is the progressive determination of the Notion. What kinds of determinate Notions there are, and how these determinations of the Notion are arrived at, has to reveal itself in the judgment.

§ 1347

The judgment can therefore be called the proximate realisation of the Notion, inasmuch as reality denotes in general entry into existence as a determinate being. More precisely, the nature of this realisation has presented itself in such a manner that, on the one hand, the moments of the Notion through its reflection-into-self or its individuality are self-subsistent totalities, while on the other hand the unity of the Notion is their relation. The determinations reflected into themselves are determinate totalities, no less essentially in their indifferent and disconnected subsistence as through their reciprocal mediation with one another. The determining itself is only totality in that it contains these totalities and their connection. This totality is the judgment. It contains, therefore, first, the two self-subsistents which are called subject and predicate. What each is cannot yet really be said; they are still indeterminate, for it is only through the judgment that they are to be determined. The judgment, being the Notion as determinate, the only distinction present is the general one that the judgment contains the determinate Notion over against the still indeterminate Notion. The subject can therefore, in the first instance, be taken in relation to the predicate as the individual over against the universal, or even as the particular over against the universal, or as the individual over against the particular; so far, they confront each other only in general, as the more determinate and the more universal.

§ 1348

It is therefore appropriate and necessary to have these names, subject and predicate for the determinations of the judgment; as names, they are something indeterminate that still awaits its determination, and are, therefore, no more than names. It is partly for this reason that the Notion determinations themselves could not be used for the two sides of the judgment; but a stronger reason is because the nature of the Notion determination is emphatically to be, not something abstract and fixed, but to have and to posit its opposite within it; since the sides of the judgment are themselves Notions and therefore the totality of its determinations, each side must run through all these determinations and exhibit them within itself, whether in abstract or concrete form. Now in order to fix the sides of the judgment in a general way when their determination is altered, those names are most serviceable which remain the same throughout the alteration. The name however stands over against the matter in hand or the Notion; this distinction presents itself in the judgment as such; now the subject is in general the determinate, and is therefore more than which immediately is, whereas the predicate expresses the universal, the essential nature or the Notion; therefore the subject as such is, in the first instance, only a kind of name; for what it is is first enunciated by the predicate which contains being in the sense of the Notion. In the question: what is this? or: what kind of a plant is this? what is often understood by the being enquired after, is merely the name, and when this is learned one is satisfied and now knows what the thing is. This is being in the sense of the subject. But the Notion, or at least the essence and the universal in general, is first given by the predicate, and it is this that is asked for in the sense of the judgment. Consequently, God, spirit, nature, or whatever it may be, is as the subject of a judgment at first only the name; what such a subject is as regards its Notion is first enunciated in the predicate. When enquiry is made as to the kind of predicate belonging to such subject, the act of judgment necessarily implies an underlying Notion. But this Notion is first enunciated by the predicate itself. Properly speaking, therefore, it is the mere general idea that constitutes the presupposed meaning of the subject and that leads to the naming of it; and in doing this it is contingent and a historical fact, what is, or is not, to be understood by a name. So many disputes about whether a predicate does or does not belong to a certain subject are therefore nothing more than verbal disputes, because they start from the form above mentioned; what lies at the base is so far nothing more than the name.

§ 1349

We have now to examine, secondly, how the relation of subject and predicate in the judgment is determined and how subject and predicate themselves are at first determined through this very relation. The judgment has in general for its sides totalities which to begin with are essentially self-subsistent. The unity of the Notion is, therefore, at first only a relation of self-subsistents; not as yet the concrete and pregnant unity that has returned into itself from this reality, but only a unity outside which the self-subsistent sides persist as extremes that are not sublated in it. Now consideration of the judgment can begin from the original unity of the Notion, or from the self-subsistence of the extremes. The judgment is the self-diremption of the Notion; this unity is, therefore, the ground from which the consideration of the judgment in accordance with its true objectivity begins. It is thus the original division [Teilung] of what is originally one; thus the word Urteil refers to what judgment is in and for itself. But regarded from the side of externality, the Notion is present in the judgment as Appearance, since its moments therein attain self-subsistence, and it is on this external side that ordinary thinking tends to fasten.

§ 1350

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From this subjective standpoint, then, subject and predicate are considered to be complete, each on its own account, apart from the other: the subject as an object that would exist even if it did not possess this predicate; the predicate as a universal determination that would exist even if it did not belong to this subject. From this standpoint, the act of judgment involves the reflection, whether this or that predicate which is in someone's head can and should be attached to the object which exists on its own account outside; the very act of judging consists in this, that only through it is a predicate combined with a subject, so that, if this combination did not take place, each on its own would still remain what it is, the latter an existent object, the former an idea in someone's head. The predicate which is attached to the subject should, however, also belong to it, that is, be

in and for itself identical with it. Through this significance of attachment, the subjective meaning of judgment and the indifferent, outer subsistence of subject and predicate are sublated again: this action is good; the copula indicates that the predicate belongs to the being of the subject and is not merely externally combined with it. In the grammatical sense, that subjective relationship in which one starts from the indifferent externality of the subject and predicate has its complete validity; for it is words that are here externally combined. We may take this opportunity of remarking, too, that though a proposition has a subject and predicate in the grammatical sense, this does not make it a judgment. The latter requires that the predicate be related to the subject as one Notion determination to another, and therefore as a universal to a particular or individual. If a statement about a particular subject only enunciates something individual, then this is a mere proposition, For example, 'Aristotle died at the age of 73, in the fourth year of the 115th Olympiad,' is a mere proposition, not a judgment. It would partake of the nature of a judgment only if doubt had been thrown on one of the circumstances, the date of the death, or the age of that philosopher, and the given figures had been asserted on the strength of some reason or other. In that case, these figures would be taken as something universal, as time that still subsists apart from this particular content of the death of Aristotle, whether as time filled with some other content, or even as empty time. Similarly, the news that my friend N. has died is a proposition; and it would be a judgment only if there were a question whether he was really dead or only in a state of catalepsy.

§ 1351

In the usual way of defining the judgment we may indeed accept the indeterminate expression connection for the external copula, as also that the connected terms are at least supposed to be notions. But in other respects this definition is superficial in the extreme: not only, for example, that in the disjunctive judgment more than two so-called notions are connected, but rather that the definition is far better than its subject matter; for it is not notions at all that are meant, hardly determinations of the Notion, but really only determinations of representational thought; it was remarked in connection with the Notion in general and the determinate Notion, that what is usually so named by no means deserves the name of Notion; where then should Notions come from in the case of the judgment? Above all, in this definition the essential feature of the judgment, namely, the difference of its determinations, is passed over; still less does it take into account the relationship of the judgment to the Notion.

§ 1352

As regards the further determination of the subject and predicate, we have remarked that it is really in the judgment first that they have to receive their determination. Since the judgment is the posited determinateness of the Notion, this determinateness possesses the said differences immediately and abstractly as individuality and universality. But in so far as the judgment is in general the determinate being or otherness of the Notion which has not yet restored itself to the unity whereby it is as Notion, there emerges also—the determinateness which is notionless, the opposition of being and reflection or the in-itself. But since the Notion constitutes

the essential ground of the judgment, these determinations are at least indifferent to the extent that when one belongs to the subject and the other to the predicate, the converse relationship equally holds good. The subject as the individual appears, in the first instance, as that which simply is or is for itself in accordance with the specific determinateness of the individual — as an actual object, even though it be only an object in

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representational thought — as for example bravery, right, agreement, etc. — on which judgment is being made. The predicate, on the other hand, as the universal, appears as this reflection on the object, or rather as the object's reflection into itself, which goes beyond that immediacy and sublates the determinatenesses in their form of mere being; that is, it is the object's in-itself. In this way, one starts from the individual as the first, the immediate, and it is raised by the judgment into universality, just as, conversely, the universal that is only in itself descends in the individual into determinate being or becomes a being that is for itself.

...

§ 1354

But now this objective signification equally implies that the said differences, in reappearing in the determinateness of the Notion, are at the same time posited only as Appearances, that is, that they are not anything fixed, but apply just as much to the one Notion determination as to the other. The subject is, therefore, just as much to be taken as the in-itself, and the predicate, on the other hand, as determinate being. The subject without predicate is what the thing without qualities, the thing-in-itself is in the sphere of Appearance — an empty, indeterminate ground; as such, it is the Notion enclosed within

itself, which only receives a differentiation and determinateness in the predicate; the predicate therefore constitutes the side of the determinate being of the subject. Through this determinate universality the subject stands in relation to an externality, is open to the influence of other things and thereby becomes actively opposed to them. What is there comes forth from its being-within-self and enters into the universal element of connection and relationship, into the negative connections and the interplay of actuality, which is a continuation of the individual into other individuals and therefore universality.

...

§ 1356

But on the other hand the predicate, too, is a self-subsistent universality and the subject, conversely, only a determination of it. Looked at this way, the predicate subsumes the subject; individuality and particularity are

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not for themselves, but have their essence and substance in the universal. The predicate expresses the subject in its Notion; the individual and the particular are contingent determinations in the subject; it is their absolute possibility. When in the case of subsumption one thinks of an external connection of subject and predicate and the subject is conceived of as a self-subsistent something, the subsumption refers to the subjective act of judgment above-mentioned in which one starts from the self-subsistence of both subject and predicate. From this standpoint subsumption is only the application of the universal to a particular or an individual, which is placed under the universal in accordance with a vague idea that it is of inferior quality.

§ 1357

When the identity of subject and predicate are so taken that at one time one Notion determination applies to the former and the other to the latter, and at another time the converse equally holds good, then the identity is as yet still only an implicit one; on account of the self-subsistent diversity of the two sides of the judgment, their posited unity also has these two sides, in the first instance as different. But differenceless identity really constitutes the true relation of the subject to the predicate. The Notion determination is itself essentially relation for it is a universal; therefore the same determinations possessed by the subject and predicate are also possessed by their relation itself. The relation is universal, for it is the positive identity of the two, of subject and predicate; but it is also determinate, for the determinateness of the predicate is that of the subject; further, it is also individual, for in it the self-subsistent extremes are sublated as in their negative unity. However, in the judgment this identity is not as yet posited; the copula is present as the still indeterminate relation of being as such: A is B; for in the judgment, the self-subsistence of the Notion determinatenesses or the extremes, is the reality which the Notion has within it. If the is of the copula were already posited as the above determinate and pregnant unity of subject and predicate, as their Notion, it would already be the syllogism.

§ 1358

To restore this identity of the Notion, or rather to posit it, is the goal of the movement of the judgment. What is already present in the judgment is, on the one hand, the self-subsistence of subject and predicate, but also their mutually opposed determinateness, and on the other hand their none the less abstract relation. What the judgment enunciates to start with is that the subject is the predicate; but since the predicate is supposed not to be what the subject is, we are faced with a contradiction which must resolve itself, pass over into a result. Or rather, since subject and predicate are in and for themselves the totality of the Notion, and the judgment is the reality of the Notion, its forward movement is only a development; there is already present in it what comes forth from it, so that proof is merely an exposition, a reflection as a positing of that which is already present in the extremes of the judgment; but even this positing itself is already present; it is the relation of the extremes.

§ 1359

The judgment in its immediacy is in the first instance the judgment of existence; its subject is immediately an abstract individual which simply is, and the predicate is an immediate determinateness or property of the subject, an abstract universal.

This qualitative character of subject and predicate being sublated, the determination of the one is reflected, to begin with, in the other; the judgment is now, secondly, the judgment of reflection.

But this more external conjunction passes over into the essential identity of a substantial, necessary connection; as such it is, thirdly, the judgment of necessity.

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Fourthly, since in this essential identity the difference of subject and predicate has become a form, the judgment becomes subjective; it contains the opposition of the Notion and its reality and the equation of the two; it is the judgment of the Notion.

This emergence of the Notion establishes the transition of the Judgment into the syllogism.

...

§ 1389

It may suggest itself to define the judgment of reflection as a judgment of quantity, just as the judgment of existence was also defined as qualitative judgment. But just as immediacy in the latter was not merely an immediacy which simply is, but one which was essentially also mediated and abstract, so here, too, that sublated immediacy is not merely sublated quality, and therefore not merely quantity; on the contrary, just as quality is the most external immediacy, so is quantity, in the same way, the most external determination belonging to mediation.

§ 1390

Further, as regards the determination as it appears in its movement in the judgment of reflection, it should be remarked that in the judgment of existence the movement of the determination showed itself in the predicate, because this judgment was in the determination of immediacy and the subject consequently appeared as the basis. For a similar reason, in the judgment of reflection, the onward movement of determining runs its course in the subject, because this judgment has for its determination the reflected in-itself. Here therefore the essential element is the universal or the predicate; hence it constitutes the basis by which, and in accordance with which, the subject is to be measured and determined. However, the predicate also receives a further determination through the further development of the form of the subject; but this occurs indirectly, whereas the development of the subject is, for the reason stated, a direct advance.

...

§ 1406

Now in the judgment, this objective universality is posited; first, therefore, with this its essential determinateness as immanent in it, secondly, with its determinateness distinguished from it as particularity, of which this universality constitutes the substantial basis. In this way it is determined as genus and species.

- (a) The Categorical Judgment
- (b) The Hypothetical Judgment
- (c) The Disjunctive Judgment

D. THE JUDGMENT OF THE NOTION

...

§ 1418

The judgment of the Notion has been called the judgment of modality and it has been regarded as containing that form of the relationship between subject and predicate which is found in an external understanding, and to be concerned with the value of the copula only in relation to thinking.

...

§ 1420

In the disjunctive judgment the Notion was posited as identity of the universal nature with its particularisation; consequently the relation of the judgment was cancelled. This concretion of universality and particularisation is, at first, a simple result; it has now to develop itself further into totality, since the moments which it contains are at first swallowed up in it and as yet do not confront one another in determinate self-subsistence. The defect of the result may also be more definitely expressed by saying that in the disjunctive judgment, although objective universality has completed itself in its particularisation, yet the negative unity of the latter merely returns into the former and has not yet determined itself to the third moment, that of individuality. Yet in so far as the result itself is negative unity, it is indeed already this individuality; but as such it is only this one determinateness, which has now to posit its negativity, sunder itself into the extremes and in this way finally develop into the syllogism.

§ 1421

The proximate diremption of this unity is the judgment in which it is posited first as subject, as an immediate individual, and then as predicate, as the determinate relation of its moments.

- (a) The Assertoric Judgment
- (b) The Problematic Judgment
- (c) The Apodetic Judgment

§ 1431

This judgment, then, is truly objective; or it is the truth of the judgment in general. Subject and predicate correspond to each other and have the same content, and this content is itself the posited concrete universality; it contains, namely, the two moments, the objective universal or the enus, and the individualised universal. Here, therefore, we have the universal which is itself and continues itself through its opposite and is a universal only as unity with this opposite. A universal of this kind, such as the predicate good, suitable, correct, etc., is based on an ought-to-be and at the same time contains the correspondence of existence to that ought-to-be; it is not this ought-to-be or the genus by itself, but this correspondence that is the universality which constitutes the predicate of the apodeictic judgment.

§ 1432

The subject likewise contains these two moments in immediate unity as the fact. But it is the truth of the fact that it is internally split into what it ought-to-be and what it is; this is the absolute judgment on all actuality. It is because this

original partition, which is the omnipotence of the Notion, is just as much a return into its unity and an absolute relation of the ought-to-be and being to each other that makes what is actual into a fact; its inner relation, this concrete identity, constitutes the soul of the fact.

...

§ 1435

If we examine the positive element of this result which effects the transition of the judgment into another form, we find, as we have seen, that subject and predicate in the apodeictic judgment are each the whole Notion. The unity of the Notion as the determinateness constituting the copula that relates them, is at the same time distinct from them. At first, it stands only on the other side of the subject as the latter's immediate constitution. But since it is essentially that which relates subject and predicate, it is not merely such immediate constitution but the universal that permeates both subject and predicate. While subject and predicate have the same content, the form relation, on the other hand, is posited through this determinateness, determinateness as a universal or particularity. Thus it contains within itself the two form determinations of the extremes and is the determinate relation of subject and predicate; it is the fulfilled copula of the judgment, the copula pregnant with content, the unity of the Notion that has re-emerged from the judgment in which it was lost in the extremes. Through this impregnation of the copula the judgment has become the syllogism.

...

§ 1441

Thirdly, in that this reflecting or mediatedness of the extremes is reflected into itself, the syllogism is determined as the syllogism of necessity, in which the mediating element is the objective nature of the thing. As this syllogism determines the extremes of the Notion equally as totalities, the syllogism has attained to the correspondence of its Notion or the middle term, and its existence of the difference of its extremes; that is, it has attained to its truth and in doing so has passed out of subjectivity into objectivity.

A The Syllogism of Existence § 1442

1. The syllogism in its immediate form has for its moments the determinations of the Notion as immediate. Hence they are the abstract determinatenesses of form, which are not yet developed by mediation into concretion, but are only single determinatenesses. The first syllogism is, therefore, strictly the formal syllogism. The formalism of the syllogising process consists in stopping short at the determination of this first syllogism. The Notion, differentiated into its abstract moments, has individuality and universality for its extremes, and appears itself as the particularity standing between them. On account of their immediacy they are merely self-related determinatenesses, and one and all a single content. Particularity constitutes the middle term in the first instance since it unites immediately within itself the two moments of individuality and universality. On account of its determinateness it is on the one hand subsumed under the universal, while on the other hand the individual, as against which it possesses universality, is subsumed under it. But this concretion is in the first instance merely a duality of aspect; on account of the immediacy in which the middle term presents itself in the immediate syllogism, it appears as a simple determinateness, and the mediation which it constitutes is not yet posited. Now the dialectical movement of the syllogism of existence consists in the positing in its moments of the mediation that alone constitutes the syllogism.

- (a) First Figure of the Syllogism I–P–U
- (b) The Second Figure P–I–U
- (c) The Third Figure I–U–P
- (d) The Fourth Figure U–U–U

B The Syllogism of Reflection

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§ 1484

The extremes are the determinations of the judgment of reflection, individuality proper and universality as a connective determination or a reflection embracing a manifold within itself. But the individual subject also contains, as we have seen in the case of the judgment of reflection, besides the bare individuality which belongs to form, determinateness as universality absolutely reflected into itself, as presupposed, that is here still immediately assumed, genus.

§ 1485

From this determinateness of the extremes which belongs to the progressive determination of the judgment, there results the precise content of the middle term, which is essentially the point of interest in the syllogism since it distinguishes syllogism from judgment. It contains (1) individuality, but (2) individuality extended to universality as all, (3) universality which forms the basis and absolutely unites within itself individuality and abstract universality — that is, the genus. It is in this way that the syllogism of reflection is the first to possess genuine determinateness of form, in that the middle term is posited as the totality of the terms; the immediate syllogism is by contrast indeterminate, because the middle term is still only abstract particularity in which the moments of its Notion are not yet posited. This first syllogism of reflection may be called the syllogism of allness.

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- (a) The Syllogism of Allness
- (b) The Syllogism of Induction
- (c) The Syllogism of Analogy
- C The Syllogism of Necessity

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1503

This syllogism is pregnant with content, because the abstract middle term of the syllogism of existence posited itself as determinate difference to become the middle term of the syllogism of reflection, while this difference has reflected itself into simple identity again. This syllogism is therefore the syllogism of necessity, for its middle term is not some alien immediate content, but the reflection-into-self of the determinateness of the extremes.

...

§ 1526

In this way then the formalism of the syllogistic process, and with it the subjectivity of the syllogism and of the Notion in general, has sublated itself. This formal or subjective side consisted in the fact that the mediating factor of the extremes is the Notion as an abstract determination, and this latter is distinct from the extremes whose unity it is. In the consummation of the syllogism, on the other hand, where objective universality is no less posited as totality of the form determinations, the distinction of mediating and mediated has disappeared. That which is mediated is itself an essential moment of what mediates it, and each moment appears as the totality of what is mediated.

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§ 1528

Thus the Notion as such has been realised; more exactly, it has obtained a reality that is objectivity. The first reality was that the Notion, as within itself negative unity, sunders itself, and as judgment posits its determinations in a determinate and indifferent difference, and in the syllogism sets itself in opposition to them. In this way it is still the inwardness of this its externality, but the outcome of the course of the syllogisms is that this externality is equated with the inner unity; the various determinations return into this unity through the mediation in which at first they are united only in a third term, and thus the externality exhibits in its own self the Notion, which therefore is no longer distinguished from it as an inner unity.

...

§ 1530

In Book One of the Objective Logic, abstract being was exhibited as passing over into determinate being, but equally as withdrawing into essence. In Book Two, essence reveals itself as determining itself into ground, thereby entering into Existence and realising itself as substance, but again withdrawing into the Notion. Of the Notion, now, we have shown to begin with that it determines itself into objectivity. It is self-evident that this latter transition is identical in character with what formerly appeared in metaphysics as the inference from the notion, namely, the notion of God, to his existence, or as the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God. It is equally well known that Descartes' sublimest thought, that God is that whose notion includes within itself its being, after being degraded into the defective form of the formal syllogism, that is, into the form of the said proof, finally succumbed to the Critique of Reason and to the thought that existence cannot be extracted from the notion. Some points connected with this proof have already been elucidated. In Vol. 1, pp. 86 sqq., where being has vanished in its immediate opposite, non-being, and becoming has shown itself as the truth of both, attention was drawn to the confusion that arises when, in the case of a particular determinate being, what is fixed on is not the being of that determinate being but its determinate content; then, comparing this determinate content, for example a hundred dollars, with another determinate content, for example, with the context of my perception or the state of my finances, it is found that it makes a difference whether the former content is added to the latter or not—and it is imagined that what has been discussed is the difference between being and non-being, or even the difference between being and the Notion. Further, in the same Vol., p. 112 and Vol. II, p. 442 we elucidated a determination that occurs in the ontological proof, that of a sum-total of all realities. But the essential subject matter of that proof, the connection of the Notion and determinate being, is the concern of our consideration of the Notion just concluded, and the entire course through which the Notion determines itself into objectivity. The Notion, as absolutely self-identical negativity, is self-determining; we have remarked that the Notion, in determining itself into judgment in individuality, is already positing itself as something real, something that is; this still abstract reality completes itself in objectivity.

§ 1531

Now though it might seem that the transition from the Notion into objectivity is not the same thing as the transition from the Notion of God to his existence, it should be borne in mind on the one hand that the determinate content, God, makes no

difference in the logical process, and the ontological proof is merely an application of this logical process to the said content. On the other hand however it is essential to bear in mind the remark made above that the subject only obtains determinateness and content in its predicate; until then, no matter what it may be for feeling, intuition and pictorial thinking, for rational cognition it is only a name; but in the predicate with its determinateness there begins, at the same time, realisation in general. The predicates, however, must be grasped as themselves still included within the Notion, hence as something subjective, which so far has not emerged into existence; to this extent we must admit on the one hand that the realisation of the Notion in the judgment is still not complete. On the other hand however the mere determination of an object by predicates, when that determination is not at the same time the realisation and objectifying of the Notion, also remains something so subjective that it is not even the genuine cognition and determination of the Notion of the object-subjective in the sense of abstract reflection and uncomprehended pictorial thinking. God, as the living God, and still more as absolute spirit, is known only in his activity; man was early instructed to recognise God in his works; only from these can proceed the determinations, which are called his properties, and in which, too, his being is contained. Thus the philosophical [begreifende] cognition of his activity, that is, of himself, grasps the Notion of God in his being and his being in his Notion. Being merely as such, or even determinate being, is such a meagre and restricted determination, that the difficulty of finding it in the Notion may well be the result of not having considered what being or determinate being itself is. Being as the wholly abstract, immediate relation to self, is nothing else than the abstract moment of the Notion, which moment is abstract universality. This universality also effects what one demands of being, namely, to be outside the Notion; for though this universality is moment of the Notion, it is equally the difference, or abstract judgment, of the Notion in which it opposes itself to itself.

The Notion, even as formal, already immediately contains being in a truer and richer form, in that, as self-related negativity, it is individuality.

...

§ 1533

The custom of regarding the Notion merely as something one-sided, such as abstract thought is, will already hinder the acceptance of what was suggested above, namely, to regard the transition from the Notion of God to his being, as an application of the logical course of objectification of the Notion presented above. Yet if it is granted, as it commonly is, that the logical element as the formal element constitutes the form for the cognition of every determinate content, then the above relation must at least be conceded, unless in this opposition between Notion and objectivity, one stops short at the untrue Notion and an equally untrue reality, as something ultimate. But in the exposition of the pure Notion, it was further made clear that this is the absolute, divine Notion itself, so that in truth the relationship of our application would not obtain, and the logical process in question would in fact be the immediate exposition of God's self-determination to being. But on this point it is to be remarked that if the Notion is to be presented as the Notion of God, it is to be apprehended as it is when taken up into the Idea. This pure Notion passes through the finite forms of the judgment and syllogism because it is not yet posited as in its own nature explicitly one with objectivity but is grasped only in process of becoming it. Similarly this objectivity, too, is not yet the divine existence, is not yet the reality that is reflected in the divine Idea. Yet objectivity is just that much richer and higher than the being or existence of the ontological proof, as the pure Notion is richer and higher than that metaphysical void of the sum total of all reality. But I reserve for another occasion the more detailed elucidation of the manifold misunderstanding that has been brought by logical formalism into the ontological, as well as the other, so-called proofs of God's existence, as also the Kantian criticism of them, and by establishing their true significance, to restore the fundamental thoughts of these proofs to their worth and dignity.

§ 1534

As previously remarked, we have already met with several forms of immediacy, though in different determinations. In the sphere of being immediacy is being itself and determinate being; in the sphere of essence it is existence, and then actuality and substantiality; in the sphere of the Notion, besides immediacy as abstract universality, there is now objectivity. When the exactitude of philosophical distinctions of the Notion is not involved, these expressions may be used as synonymous; but the determinations mentioned have issued from the necessity of the Notion. Being is in general the first immediacy, and determinate being is the same plus the first determinateness. Existence, along with things, is the immediacy that issues from the ground—from the self-sublating mediation of the simple reflection of essence. But actuality and substantiality is the immediacy that has issued from the sublated difference of the still unessential Existence as Appearance and its essentiality. Finally, objectivity is the immediacy to which the Notion determines itself by the sublation of its abstraction and mediation. Philosophy has the right to select from the language of common life which is made for the world of pictorial thinking, such expressions as seem to approximate to the determinations of the Notion. There cannot be any question of demonstrating for a word selected from the language of common life that in common life, too, one associates with it the same Notion for which philosophy employs it; for common life has no Notions, but only pictorial thoughts and general ideas, and to recognise the Notion in what is else a mere general idea is philosophy itself. It must suffice therefore if pictorial thinking, in the use of its expressions that are employed for philosophical determinations, has before it some vague idea of their distinctive meaning; just as it may be the case that in these expressions one recognises nuances of pictorial thought that are more closely related to the corresponding Notions. One will be less ready, perhaps, to admit that something can be without existing; but at least, one will hardly use 'being' as copula of the judgment as interchangeable with the expression 'to exist' and say, 'this article exists dear, suitable, etc.', 'gold exists, a metal or metallic', instead of 'this article is dear, suitable, etc.', 'gold is a metal or metallic'.

...

§ 1536

When treating of the apodeictic judgment -- the consummation of the judgment -- where the subject loses its determinateness as against the predicate, we referred to the twofold meaning of subjectivity originating therefrom, namely, the subjectivity of the Notion, and equally of the externality and contingency opposed to the Notion. A similar twofold meaning also appears for objectivity which stands opposed to the self-subsistent Notion, yet is also the being that is in-and-for-itself. In the former sense, the object stands opposed to the I = I which in subjective idealism is enunciated as the absolutely true; in that case it is the manifold world in its immediate existence with which the ego or the Notion only engages in never-ending struggle, in order, by the negation of the intrinsic nullity of this other, to give to the first certainty of self the actual truth of its equality with itself. In a less specific sense it denotes an object in general for any interest or activity of the subject.

§ 1537

But in the opposite sense, objectivity signifies that which is in and for itself, and free from limitation and opposition. Rational principles, perfect works of art, etc., are called objective in so far as they are free and above all contingency. Although rational, theoretical or ethical principles belong only to subjectivity, to consciousness, yet that element in the latter that is in and for itself is called objective; the cognition of truth is placed in cognising the object as object, free from anything added by subjective reflection, and right conduct in the obedience to objective laws that are not subjective in origin and admit no caprice and no treatment that might overthrow their necessity.

§ 1538

At the present standpoint of our exposition objectivity signifies, in the first instance, the absolute being of the Notion, that is, the Notion that has sublated the mediation posited in its self-determination and converted it into immediate relation-to-self. Consequently this immediacy is itself immediately and wholly pervaded by the Notion, just as the Notion's totality is immediately identical with its being. But since, further, the Notion has equally to restore the free being-for-self of its subjectivity, there arises a relationship between the Notion as end and objectivity. In this relationship the immediacy of the objectivity becomes the negative element over against the end, an element to be determined by the activity of the end; this immediacy thus acquires the other significance, that of being in and for itself null in so far as it stands opposed to the Notion.

§ 1539

First, then, objectivity is an immediacy whose moments, by virtue of the totality of all the moments, exist in a self-subsistent indifference as objects outside one another, and in their relationship possess the subjective unity of the Notion only as an inner or an outer unity. This is Mechanism.

§ 1540

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But secondly, this unity reveals itself as the immanent law of the objects themselves, and thus their relationship becomes their peculiar specific difference founded on their law; it becomes a relation in which their determinate self-subsistence sublates itself. This is Chemism.

§ 1541

Thirdly, this essential unity of the objects is thereby posited as distinct from their self-subsistence; it is the subjective Notion, but posited as in and for itself related to objectivity, as end. This is Teleology.

§ 1542

Since the end is the Notion that is posited as in its own self relating itself to objectivity and as sublating by its own act its defect of being subjective, the purposiveness which is at first external becomes, through the realisation of the end, internal and the Idea.

...

§ 1543

As objectivity is the totality of the Notion withdrawn into its unity, an immediate is thereby posited that is in and for itself this totality, and is also posited as such, although in it the negative unity of the Notion has not as yet detached itself from the immediacy of this totality; in other words, objectivity is not yet posited as judgment. In so far as it has the Notion immanent in it, it contains the difference of the Notion, but on

account of the objective totality, the differentiated moments are complete and self-subsistent objects which consequently, even in their relation, stand to one another only as self-subsistent things and remain external to one another in every combination. This is what constitutes the character of mechanism, namely, that whatever relation obtains between the things combined, this relation is one extraneous to them that does not concern their nature at all, and even if it is accompanied by a semblance of unity it remains nothing more than composition, mixture, aggregation and the like. Spiritual mechanism also, like material, consists in this, that the things related in the spirit remain external to one another and to spirit itself. A mechanical style of thinking, a mechanical memory, habit, a mechanical way of acting, signify that the peculiar pervasion and presence of spirit is lacking in what spirit apprehends or does. Although its theoretical or practical mechanism cannot take place without its self-activity, without an impulse and consciousness, yet there is lacking in it the freedom of individuality, and because this freedom is not manifest in it such action appears as a merely external one.

...

§ 1545

1. In the first place therefore the object does not differentiate itself into matter and form — a matter as the self-subsistent universal side of the object and a form as the particular and individual side; such an abstract difference of individuality and universality is excluded by the Notion of object; if it is regarded as matter it

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must be taken as in principle formed matter. Similarly, it may be defined as a thing with properties, as a whole consisting of parts, as a substance with accidents, or in terms of other relationships of reflection; but these relationships have been altogether superseded already in the Notion; the object therefore has neither properties nor accidents, for these are separable from the thing or the substance, whereas in the object the particularity is absolutely reflected into the totality. In the parts of a whole, there is indeed present that self-subsistence which belongs to the differences of the object, but these differences are themselves directly and essentially objects, totalities, that are not, like parts, determined as such in contrast to the whole.

§ 1546

The object is therefore in the first instance indeterminate, in so far as it has no determinate opposition in it; for it is the mediation that has collapsed into immediate identity. In so far as the Notion is essentially determinate, the object possesses determinateness as a manifoldness which though complete is otherwise indeterminate, that is, contains no relationships, and which constitutes a totality that at first is similarly no further determined; sides or parts that may be distinguished in it belong to an external reflection. This quite indeterminate difference therefore means only that there are a number of objects, each of which only contains its determinateness reflected into its universality and does not reflect itself outwards. Because this indeterminate determinateness is essential to the object, the latter is within itself a plurality of this kind, and must therefore be regarded as a composite or aggregate. It does not however consist of atoms, for these are not objects because they are not totalities. The Leibnizian monad would be more of an object since it is a total representation of the world, but confined within its intensive subjectivity it is supposed at least to be essentially one within itself. Nevertheless, the monad determined as an exclusive one is only a principle that reflection assumes. Yet the monad is an object, partly in that the ground of its manifold representations — of the developed, that is, the posited determinations of its merely implicit totality lies outside it, and partly also in that it is indifferent to the monad that it constitutes an object along with others; it is thus in fact not exclusive or determined for itself.

§ 1547

2. As the object, then, in its determined being is a totality and yet on account of its indeterminateness and immediacy is not the negative unity of that determined being, it is indifferent to the determinations as individual, as determined in and for themselves, just as these latter are themselves indifferent to one another. These, therefore, are not comprehensible from it nor from one another; its totality is the form of general reflectedness of its manifoldness into individuality in general which is in its own self indeterminate. The determinatenesses, therefore, that it contains, do indeed belong to it, but the form that constitutes their difference and combines them into a unity is an external, indifferent one; whether it be a mixture, or again an order, a certain arrangement of parts and sides, all these are combinations that are indifferent to what is so related.

...

§ 1549

The object, therefore, being in its determinateness equally indifferent to it, it is the object's own nature that points it outside and beyond itself to other objects for its determination; but to these others, their determinant function is similarly a matter of indifference. Consequently, a principle of self-determination is nowhere to

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be found; determinism — the standpoint occupied by cognition when it takes the object, just as we have found it here, to be the truth — assigns for each determination of the object that of another object; but this other is likewise indifferent both to its being determined and to its active determining. For this reason determinism itself is also indeterminate in the sense that it involves the progression to infinity; it can halt and be satisfied at any point at will, because the object it has reached in its progress, being a formal totality, is shut up within itself and indifferent to its being determined by another. Consequently, the explanation of the determination of an object and the progressive determining of the object made for the purpose of the explanation, is only an empty word, since in the other object to which it advances there resides no self-determination.

§ 1550

3. Now as the determinateness of an object lies in an other, no determinate difference is to be found between them; the determinateness is merely doubled, once in one object and again in the other, something utterly identical, so that the explanation or comprehension is tautological. This tautology is an external futile see-saw; since the determinateness obtains from the objects which are indifferent to it no peculiar distinctiveness and is therefore only identical, there is before us only one determinateness; and its being doubled expresses just this externality and nullity of a difference. But at the same time the objects are self-subsistent in regard to one another; therefore in the identity above-mentioned they remain absolutely external to one another. Here, then, we have the manifest contradiction between the complete mutual indifference of the objects and the identity of their determinateness, or the contradiction of their complete externality in the

identity of their determinateness. This contradiction is, therefore, the negative unity of a number of objects which, in that unity, simply repel one another: this is the mechanical process.

B. The Mechanical Process § 1551

If objects are regarded merely as self-enclosed totalities, they cannot act on one another. In this determination they are the same thing as the monads, which for this very reason were thought of as exercising no influence whatever on one another. But the concept of a monad is, just for this reason, a defective reflection. For first it is a determinate conception of the monad's merely implicit totality; as a certain degree of the development and positedness of its representation of the world, it is determinate; now while it is a self-enclosed totality, it is also indifferent to this determinateness; therefore the determinateness is not its own, but one that is posited by another object. Secondly it is an immediate in general, in so far as it is supposed to be merely a mirroring entity; its relation to itself is therefore abstract universality; hence it is a determinate being open to others. To gain the freedom of substance it is not sufficient to represent it as a totality that is complete within itself and has nothing to receive from without. On the contrary, the mechanical [begriifflose], merely mirrored relation to itself is precisely a passivity towards another. Similarly determinateness, whether taken as the determinateness of something that is or of a mirroring entity, that is a degree of the monad's own spontaneous development, is something external; the degree that the development reaches has its limit in an other. To shift the reciprocity of substances on to a predetermined harmony means nothing more than to convert it into a presupposition, that is, to withdraw it from the Notion. The need to avoid the interaction of substances was based on the moment of absolute self-subsistence and originality which was made a fundamental assumption. But since the positedness, the degree of development, does not correspond to this in-itself, it has for that very reason its ground in an other.

§ 1552

When treating of the relationship of substantiality, we showed that it passes over into the causal relationship. But here what is, no longer has the determination of a substance, but of an object; the causal relationship has

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been superseded in the Notion; the originality of one substance in relation to the other has shown itself to be illusory, its action to be transition into the opposed substance. This relationship therefore has no objectivity. Hence in so far as the one object is posited in the form of subjective unity as active cause, this no longer counts as an original determination but as something mediated; the active object has this its determination only by means of another object. Mechanism, since it belongs to the sphere of the Notion, has that posited within it which proved to be the truth of the causal relationship, namely that the cause, which is supposed to be the original and self-subsistent factor is essentially effect, positedness, as well. In mechanism therefore the causality of the object is immediately a non-originality; it is indifferent to this its determination, therefore its being cause is for it something contingent. To this extent, one might indeed say that the causality of substances is only a subjective conception. But this causality as thus represented is precisely mechanism; for mechanism is this, that causality as identical determinateness of different substances and hence as the extinction of their self-subsistence in this identity, is a mere positedness; the objects are indifferent to this unity and maintain themselves in face of it. But, no less is this their indifferent self-subsistence also a mere positedness; they are therefore capable of mixing and aggregating and of becoming, as an aggregate, one object. Through this indifference both to their transition and to their self-subsistence, substances are objects.

(a) The Formal Mechanical Process

(b) The Real Mechanical Process

(c) The Product of the Mechanical Process

C. Absolute Mechanism

(a) The Centre

§ 1567

In the first place then the empty manifoldness of objects is gathered into objective individuality, into the simple self-determining centre. Secondly, in so far as the object as an immediate totality retains its indifference to determinateness, the latter is present in it also as unessential or as a mutual externality of many objects. The prior, the essential determinateness, on the other hand, constitutes the real middle term between the many mechanically interacting bodies, by which they are united in and for themselves, and is their objective universality. Universality exhibited itself at first in the relationship of communication as present only through positing; but as objective universality it is the pervading immanent essence of the objects.

§ 1568

In the material world it is the central body that is the genus, but it is the individual universality of the single objects and their mechanical process. The relationship in which the unessential single bodies stand to one another is one of mutual thrust and pressure; this kind of relationship does not hold between the central body and the objects whose essence it is, for their externality no longer constitutes their basic determination. Their identity with the central body is, therefore, rather rest, namely, the being in their centre; this unity is their absolute Notion. It remains, however, merely an ought-to-be, since the externality of the objects which is still also posited does not correspond to that unity. Their consequent striving towards the centre is their absolute universality, not a universality posited by communication; it constitutes the true rest that is itself concrete and not posited from outside, into which the process of the non-self-subsistent bodies must return. That is why it is an empty abstraction to assume in mechanics that a body set in motion would continue to move in a straight line to infinity if external resistance did not rob it of its motion. Friction, or whatever other form resistance takes, is only the manifestation of centrality; for it is centrality that in an absolute manner brings the body back to itself; for the thing in contact with which the moving body meets friction has the power of resistance solely through its union with the centre. In

the spiritual sphere the centre and unity with the centre assume higher forms; but the unity of the Notion and its reality which here, to begin with, is mechanical centrality, must there too constitute the basic determination.

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§ 1569

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Thus the central body has ceased to be a mere object, for in the latter the determinateness is an unessential element; for the central body no longer possesses the objective totality only implicitly but also explicitly. It can therefore be regarded as an individual. Its determinateness is essentially different from a mere order or arrangement and external connection of parts; as determinateness in and for itself it is an immanent form, a self-determining principle in which the objects inhere and by which they are bound together into a genuine One.

§ 1570

But this central individual is thus at first only a middle term which as yet has no true extremes; but as negative unity of the total Notion it sunders itself into such. Or in other words the previously non-self-subsistent, self-external objects are likewise by the regress of the Notion determined into individuals; the identity of the central body with itself which is still a striving, is infected with externality which, being taken up into the central body's objective individuality, has this latter determination communicated to it. Through this centrality of their own, these individuals placed outside that first centre, are themselves centres for the non-self-subsistent objects. These second centres and the non-self-subsistent objects are brought into unity by the above absolute middle term.

§ 1571

But the relative individual centres themselves also constitute the middle term of a second syllogism, a middle term that on the one hand is subsumed under a higher extreme, namely the objective universality and power of the absolute centre, and on the other hand subsumes under itself the non-self-subsistent objects whose superficial or formal individualisation is supported by it. Again, these non-self-subsistent objects are the middle term of a third, the formal syllogism, in that they are the link between the absolute and the relative central individuality to the extent that the latter has in them its externality by virtue of which the relation-to-self is at the same time a striving towards an absolute centre. The formal objects have for their essence the identical gravity of their immediate central body in which they inhere as in their subject and the extreme of individuality; through the externality which they constitute, that body is subsumed under the absolute central body; they are, therefore, the formal middle term of particularity. But the absolute individual is the objectively universal middle term which brings into unity and holds fast the being-within-self or inwardness of the relative individual and its externality. Similarly, too, the government, the individual

citizens and the needs or external life of the individuals, are three terms, each of which is the middle of the other two. The government is the absolute centre in which the extreme of the individuals is united with their external existence; similarly, the individuals are the middle term that activate that universal individual into external concrete existence and translate their moral essence into the extreme of actuality. The third syllogism is the formal syllogism, that of an illusory show, in which the individuals purport to be linked to this

universal absolute individuality by their needs and external existence; a syllogism which, as merely subjective, passes over into the others and in them has its truth.

§ 1572

This totality, whose moments are themselves the complete relationships of the Notion, the syllogisms in which each of the three different objects runs through the determination of middle term and of extremes, constitutes free mechanism. In it the different objects have for their basic determination the objective universality, the pervasive gravity that maintains its identity in the particularisation. The relations of pressure, thrust, attraction and the like, as also aggregations or mixtures, belong to the relationship of externality which forms the basis of the third of this group of syllogisms. Order, which is the merely external determinateness

of objects, has passed over into the determination that is immanent and objective; this is Law.

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(b) Law § 1573

In law, the more specific difference between the ideal reality of objectivity and its external reality is made prominent. The object, as immediate totality of the Notion, does not yet possess externality as distinct from the Notion which is not yet posited for itself. The object, being withdrawn into itself through the process, there has arisen the opposition of simple centrality against an externality which is now determined as externality, that is, is posited as that which is not in and for itself. That identical or ideal aspect of individuality is, on account of the relation to externality, an ought-to-be; it is that unity of the Notion, absolutely determined and self-determining, to which that external reality does not correspond, and therefore gets no further than a striving towards it. But individuality is in and for itself the concrete principle of negative unity, and as such itself totality, a unity that sunders itself into the specific differences of the Notion and abides within its self-identical universality; it is thus the centre expanded within its pure ideality by difference.

§ 1574

This reality which corresponds to the Notion is the ideal reality that is distinct from the reality that was merely a striving; it is the difference, not as in the first instance a plurality of objects, but difference in its essential nature and taken up into pure universality. This real ideality is the soul of the previously developed objective totality, the absolutely determined identity of the system.

§ 1575

The objective being-in-and-for-self appears therefore more specifically in its totality as the negative unity of the centre, which divides itself into subjective individuality and external objectivity, maintains the former in the latter and determines it

in an ideal difference. This self-determining unity that absolutely reduces external objectivity to ideality is the principle of self-movement the determinateness of this animating principle, which is the difference of the Notion itself, is law. Dead mechanism was the mechanical process considered above of objects that appeared immediately as self-subsistent but which for that very reason are, in truth, not self-subsistent and have their centre outside themselves; this process, which passes over into rest, exhibits either contingency and indeterminate dissimilarity or formal uniformity. This uniformity is indeed a rule, but not a law. Only free mechanism has a law, the spontaneous determination of pure individuality or of the explicated Notion; as difference, it is in its own self the imperishable source of self-kindling movement, and since in the ideality of its difference it relates itself to itself alone, it is free necessity.

(c) Transition of Mechanism

§ 1576

This soul, however, is still submerged in its body: the Notion of the objective totality, determinate now but inner, is free necessity -- the law has not yet confronted its object; it is the concrete centrality as universality immediately expanded into its objectivity. This ideality, therefore, has not the objects themselves for its determinate difference; these are self-subsistent individuals of the totality, or also, if we look back to the formal stage, non-individual, external objects. Law is indeed immanent in them and constitutes their nature and power; but its difference is confined within its ideality, and the objects are not themselves differentiated into the ideal difference of the law. But it is solely in the ideal centrality and its laws that the object possesses its essential self-subsistence; it is therefore powerless to resist the judgment of the Notion and to maintain itself in abstract, indeterminate self-subsistence and aloofness.

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§ 1577

By virtue of the ideal difference immanent in it, its existence is a determinateness posited by the Notion. Its lack of self-subsistence is in this way no longer merely a striving towards the centre, as against which, just because its relation to it is only a striving, it still has the appearance of a self-subsistent external object; on the contrary, it is a striving towards the object specifically opposed to it; and similarly the centre itself has in consequence fallen asunder and its negative unity passed has over into objectified opposition. Centrality is, therefore, now a relation of these reciprocally negative objectivities in a state of mutual tension. Thus free mechanism determines itself into chemism.

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§ 1578

Chemism constitutes in objectivity as a whole, the moment of judgment, of the difference that has become objective, and of the process. Since it already begins with determinateness and positedness and the chemical object is at the same time an objective totality, its immediate course is simple and is completely determined by its presupposition.

A. THE CHEMICAL OBJECT § 1579

The chemical object is distinguished from the mechanical by the fact that the latter is a totality indifferent to determinateness, whereas in the case of the chemical object the determinateness, and consequently the relation to other and the kind and manner of this relation, belong to its nature. This determinateness is at the same time essentially a particularisation, that is, it is taken up into universality; thus it is a principle -- universal determinateness, the determinateness not only of the one individual object but also of the other. In the chemical object, therefore, we now have the distinction between its Notion as the inner totality of the two determinatenesses, and the determinateness that constitutes the nature of the individual object in its externality and concrete existence. Since in this way it is in itself or implicitly the whole Notion, it has in its own self the necessity and the urge to sublate its opposed, one sided -- existence and to give itself an existence as that real whole that according to its Notion it is.

§ 1580

With regard to the expression chemism for the relation of the difference of objectivity as it has presented itself, it may be further remarked that the expression must not be understood here as though this relation only exhibited itself in that form of elemental nature to which the name chemism so called is strictly applied. Even the meteorological relation must be regarded as a process whose parts have the nature more of physical than chemical elements. In the animate world, the sex relation comes under this schema and it also constitutes the formal basis for the spiritual relations of love, friendship, and the like.

§ 1581

Examined more closely the chemical object, as a self-subsistent totality in general, is in the first instance an object that is reflected into itself and to that extent is distinct from its reflectedness outwards -- an indifferent base, the individual not yet specified as different; the person, too, is such a base related at first only to itself. But the immanent determinateness which constitutes its difference, is first reflected into itself in such a manner that this retraction of the relation outwards is only formal abstract universality; thus the relation

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outwards is the determination of its immediacy and concrete existence. From this aspect, it does not in its own self return into the individual totality; and the negative unity has the two moments of its opposition in two particular objects. Accordingly, a chemical object is not comprehensible from itself alone, and the being of one is the being of the other. But secondly, the determinateness is absolutely reflected into itself and is the concrete moment of the individual Notion of the whole, which Notion is the universal essence, the real genus of the particular object. The chemical object, which is thus the contradiction of its immediate positedness and its immanent individual Notion, is a striving to sublate the determinateness

of its existence and to give concrete existence to the objective totality of the Notion. Therefore, though it also lacks self-subsistence, it spontaneously tenses itself against this deficiency and initiates the process by its self-determining.

B. THE CHEMICAL PROCESS § 1582

1. It begins with the presupposition that the objects in tension, tensed as they are against themselves, are in the first instance by that very fact just as much tensed against one another — a relationship that is called their affinity. Since each through its Notion stands in contradiction to the one-sidedness of its own existence and consequently strives to sublate it, there is immediately posited in this fact the striving to sublate the one-sidedness of the other object; and through this reciprocal adjustment and combination to posit a reality conformable to the Notion, which contains both moments.

§ 1583

As each of the objects is posited as self-contradictory and self-sublating in its own self, it is only by an external compulsion [Gewalt] that they are held apart from one another and from their reciprocal integration. Now the middle term whereby these extremes are concluded into a unity is first the implicit nature of both, the whole Notion that holds both within itself. Secondly, however, since in their concrete existence they stand confronting each other, their absolute unity is also a still formal element having an existence distinct from them — the element of communication in which they enter into external community with each other. Since the real difference belongs to the extremes, this middle term is only the abstract neutrality, the real possibility of those extremes; it is, as it were, the theoretical element of the concrete existence of chemical objects, of their process and its result. In the material world water fulfills the function of this medium; in the spiritual world, so far as the analogue of such a relation has a place there, the sign in general, and more precisely language, is to be regarded as fulfilling that function.

§ 1584

The relationship of the objects, as a mere communication in this element, is on the one hand a quiescent coming-together, but on the other hand it is no less a negative bearing of each to the other; for in communication the concrete Notion which is their nature is posited as a reality, with the result that the real differences of the objects are reduced to its unity. Their previous self-subsistent determinateness is thus sublated in the union that conforms to the Notion, which is one and the same in both, and thereby their opposition and tension are weakened, with the result that in this reciprocal integration the striving reaches its quiescent neutrality.

§ 1585

The process is in this way extinguished; the contradiction between the Notion and reality being resolved, the extremes of the syllogism have lost their opposition and have thus ceased to be extremes both against each other and against the middle term. The product is neutral, that is, a product in which the ingredients, which can no longer be called objects, have lost their tension and with it those properties which belonged to them as tensed, while the capability of their former self-subsistence and tension is preserved. For the negative unity of the neutral product proceeds from a presupposed difference; the determinateness of the chemical object is identical with its objectivity, it is original. Through the process just considered this difference is as yet only immediately sublated; the determinateness is, therefore, as yet not absolutely reflected into itself, and consequently the product of the process is only a formal unity.

§ 1586

2. Now in this product, the tension of the opposition and the negative unity, as activity of the process, are indeed extinct. But since this unity is essential to the Notion and has at the same time come into concrete existence, it is still present, though its place is outside the neutral object. The process does not spontaneously re-kindle itself, for it had the difference only for its presupposition and did not itself posit it. This self-subsistent negativity outside the object, the existence of the abstract individuality whose being-for-self has its reality in the indifferent object, is now tensed within itself against its abstraction, and is an inward restless activity that turns outwards to consume. It relates itself immediately to the object whose quiescent neutrality is the real possibility of its opposition; that object is now the middle term of the previously merely formal neutrality, now inwardly concrete and determinate.

§ 1587

The more precise immediate relation of the extreme of negative unity to the object is that the latter is determined by it and thereby disrupted. This disruption may in the first instance be regarded as the restoration of that opposition of the objects in tension with which chemism began. But this determination does not constitute the other extreme of the syllogism but belongs to the immediate relation of the differentiating principle to the middle term in which this principle gives itself its immediate reality; it is the determinateness that the middle term in the disjunctive syllogism also possesses besides being the universal nature of the object, and by virtue of which the object is both objective universality and also determinate particularity. The other extreme of the syllogism stands opposed to the external self-subsistent extreme of individuality; it is therefore the equally self-subsistent extreme of universality; hence the disruption suffered by the real neutrality of the middle term in this extreme is that it is split up into moments whose relationship is not that of difference, but of indifference. Accordingly these moments are the abstract indifferent base on the one side, and its energising principle on the other, which latter by its separation from the base attains likewise the form of indifferent objectivity.

§ 1588

This disjunctive syllogism is the totality of chemism in which the same objective whole is exhibited first as self-subsistent negative unity, then in the middle term as real unity, and finally as the chemical reality resolved into its abstract moments. In these latter the determinateness has not reached its reflection-into-self in an other as in the neutral product, but has in itself returned into its abstraction, and is an originally determinate element.

§ 1589

3. These elementary objects are accordingly liberated from chemical tension; in them, the original basis of that presupposition with which chemism began has been posited through the real process. Now further, the inner

determinateness as such of these objects is essentially the contradiction of their simple indifferent subsistence and themselves as determinateness, and is the urge outwards that sunders itself and posits tension in its object and in another object in order to have something with which it can enter into a relation of difference and in which it can neutralise itself and give to its simple determinateness an existent reality. Consequently, on the one hand chemism has returned into its beginning in which objects in a state of reciprocal tension seek one another and then by a formal, external middle term, unite to form a neutral product. On the other hand, chemism by this return into its Notion sublates itself and has passed over into a higher sphere.

C. TRANSITION OF CHEMISM § 1590

Even ordinary chemistry shows examples of chemical alterations in which a body, for example, imparts a higher oxidation to one part of its mass and thereby reduces another part to a lower degree of oxidation, in which lower degree alone it can enter into a neutral combination with another [chemically] different body brought into contact with it, a combination for which it would not have been receptive in that first immediate degree. What happens here is that the object does not relate itself to another in accordance with an immediate, one-sided determinateness, but that in accordance with the inner totality of an original relation it posits the presupposition which it requires for a real relation and thereby gives itself a middle term through which it unites its Notion with its reality; it is absolutely determined individuality, the concrete Notion as principle of the disjunction into extremes whose re-union is the activity of the same negative principle, which thereby returns to its first determination, but returns objectified.

§ 1591

Chemism itself is the first negation of indifferent objectivity and of the externality of determinateness; it is therefore still infected with the immediate self-subsistence of the object and with externality. Consequently it is not yet for itself that totality of self-determination that proceeds from it and in which rather it is sublated. The three syllogisms yielded by the foregoing exposition constitute its totality; the first has for middle term formal neutrality and for extremes the objects in tension; the second has for middle term the product of the first, real neutrality, and for extremes the sundering activity and its product, the indifferent element; while the third is the self-realising Notion, which posits for itself the presupposition by which the process of its realisation is conditioned — a syllogism that has the universal for its essence. On account, however, of the immediacy and externality attaching to chemical objectivity, these syllogisms still fall apart. The first process whose product is the neutrality of the objects in tension is extinguished in its product, and it is an externally applied differentiation that re-kindles it; conditioned by an immediate presupposition, it exhausts itself in it. Similarly, the separation of the [chemically] different extremes out of the neutral product, as also their decomposition into their abstract elements, must proceed from conditions and stimulations of activity externally brought into play. Also, although the two essential moments of the process, on the one side neutralisation, on the other separation and reduction, are combined in one and the same process, and the union of the extremes by weakening of the tension between them is also a sundering into such extremes, yet on account of the still underlying externality they constitute two different sides; the extremes that are separated in that same process are different objects or materials from those that unite in it; in so far as the former emerge again from the process as [chemically] different they must turn outwards; their new neutralisation is a different process from the neutralisation that took place in the first process.

§ 1592

But these various processes, which have proved themselves necessary, are so many stages by which externality and conditionedness are sublated and from which the Notion emerges as a totality determined in and for itself and not conditioned by externality. In the first process, the mutual externality of the different extremes that constitute the whole reality, or the distinction between the implicitly determinate Notion and its existent determinateness, is sublated; in the second, the externality of the real unity, the union as merely neutral, is sublated; more precisely, the formal activity in the first instance sublates itself in equally formal bases or indifferent determinatenesses, whose inner Notion is now the indrawn absolute activity as inwardly

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self-realising, that is, the activity that posits the determinate differences within itself and through this mediation constitutes itself as real unity — a mediation which is thus the Notion's own mediation, its self-determination, and in respect of its reflection thence into itself, an immanent presupposing. The third syllogism, which on the one hand is the restoration of the preceding processes, on the other hand sublates the last remaining moment of indifferent bases the wholly abstract external immediacy, which in this way becomes the Notion's own moment of self-mediation. The Notion which has thus sublated all the moments of its objective existence as external, and posited them within its simple unity, is thereby completely liberated from objective externality, to which it relates itself only as to an unessential reality. This objective free Notion is end.

Chapter 3 Teleology – next section

Subjective End – The Means – The Realised End

§ 1593

Where purposiveness is discerned, an intelligence [Verstand] is assumed as its author, and for the end we therefore demand the Notion's own free Existence. Teleology is especially contrasted with mechanism, in which the determinateness posited in the object, being external, is essentially one in which no self-determination is manifested. The opposition between causae efficienes and causae finalis, between merely efficient and final causes, relates to this distinction; and this distinction, taken in a concrete form, is also made the criterion for deciding whether the absolute essence of the world is to be conceived as blind natural mechanism or as an intelligence that determines itself in accordance with ends. The antinomy between fatalism, along with determinism and freedom, is likewise concerned with the opposition of mechanism and teleology; for the free is the Notion in its Existence.

§ 1594

Earlier metaphysics has treated these concepts as it has treated others; it has for one thing presupposed a certain conception of the world and laboured to show that one or the other concept fitted it, while the opposite one was defective because it failed to explain that conception; and again, while doing this, it has not examined the concept of mechanical cause and of end, to see which possesses truth in and for itself. When this has been established independently, the objective world may present us with mechanical and final causes; but their existence is not the standard of truth: on the contrary, truth is the criterion that decides which of these existences is the true one. Just as the subjective understanding also exhibits errors in itself, so the objective world also exhibits aspects and stages of truth that by themselves are still one-sided, incomplete and only relationships in the sphere of Appearance. If mechanism and purposiveness stand opposed to one another, they cannot for that very reason be taken as indifferent concepts, each of which is correct on its own account, possessing as much validity as the other, the only question being where one or the other may be applied. This equal validity of both rests merely on the fact that they are, that is to say, that we have them both. But since they are opposed, the necessary preliminary question is, which of the two is the true one; and the higher and real question is, whether their truth is not a third concept, or whether one of them is the truth of the other. But the relation of end has proved to be the truth of mechanism — what exhibited itself as chemism is included with mechanism in so far as end is the Notion in free Existence; and to end stands opposed in general the unfreedom of the Notion, its submergence in externality; both of them, therefore, mechanism and chemism, are included under natural necessity; for in the former the Notion does not exist in the object. Since the object as mechanical does not contain self-determination, while in chemism the Notion either has a one-sided Existence in a state of tension, or, in emerging as the unity that disjoins the neutral object into tensed extremes, is external to itself in so far as it sublates this disjunction.

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§ 1595

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The more the teleological principle was linked with the concept of an extramundane intelligence and to that extent was favoured by piety, the more it seemed to depart from the true investigation of nature, which aims at cognising the properties of nature not as extraneous, but as immanent determinatenesses and accepts only such cognition as a valid comprehension. As end is the Notion itself in its Existence, it may seem strange that the cognition of objects from their Notion appears rather as an unjustified trespass into a heterogeneous element, whereas mechanism, for which the determinateness of an object is a determinateness posited in it externally and by another object, is held to be a more immanent point of view than teleology. Of course mechanism, at least the ordinary unfree mechanism, and also chemism must be regarded as an immanent principle in so far as the external determinant is itself again just such another object, externally determined and indifferent to such determining, or, in the case of chemism, the other object is one likewise chemically determined; in general, an essential moment of the totality always lies in something outside it. These principles therefore remain confined within the same natural form of finitude; yet though they do not seek to go beyond the finite and lead only to finite causes in their explanation of phenomena, which themselves demand a further progress, at the same time they expand themselves, partly into a formal totality in the concept of force, cause, and similar determinations of reflection which are supposed to denote a primariness, and partly also through the abstract universality of a sum total of forces, a whole of reciprocal causes. Mechanism shows itself to be a striving for totality in the fact that it seeks to grasp nature by itself as a whole that for its Notion does not require any other — a totality that is not found in end and the extra-mundane intelligence associated with it.

Now purposiveness shows itself in the first instance as a higher being in general, as an intelligence that externally determines the multiplicity of objects by a unity that exists in and for itself, so that the indifferent determinatenesses of the objects become essential through this relation. In mechanism they become so through the mere form of necessity, their content being indifferent; for they are supposed to remain external, and it is only understanding as such that is supposed to find satisfaction in cognising its own connective principle, abstract identity. In teleology, on the contrary, the content becomes important, for teleology presupposes a Notion, something absolutely determined and therefore self-determining, and so has made a distinction between the relation of the differences and their reciprocal determinedness, that is the form, and the unity that is reflected into itself, a unity that is determined in and for itself and therefore a content. But when the content is otherwise a finite and insignificant one, it contradicts what it is supposed to be; for end, according to its form, is a totality infinite within itself—especially when the activity that operates in accordance with ends is assumed to be an absolute will and intelligence. The reason why teleology has incurred so much the reproach of triviality is that the ends that it exhibited are more important or more trivial, as the case may be; and it was inevitable that the end relation of objects should so often appear trifling, since it appears to be so external and therefore contingent. Mechanism, on the contrary, leaves to the determinatenesses of objects, as regards their import, their contingent status, to which the object is indifferent, and these determinatenesses are not supposed to have, either for the objects or for the subjective intelligence, any higher validity. This principle, therefore, in its context of external necessity gives the consciousness of infinite freedom as compared with teleology, which sets up for something absolute what is trivial and even contemptible in its content, in which the more universal thought can only find itself infinitely cramped and even feel disgusted.

§ 1596

The formal disadvantage from which this teleology immediately suffers is that it only goes as far as external purposiveness. The Notion being thus posited as something formal, then for such teleology the content is also something that for the Notion is given externally in the manifoldness of the objective world — in those very determinatenesses which are also the content of mechanism, but appearing there as something external and contingent. On account of this community of content, it is solely the form of purposiveness by itself that constitutes what is essential in this teleology. In this respect,

without as yet attending to the difference of outer and inner purposiveness, the end-relation in general has proved itself to be in and for itself the truth of mechanism. Teleology possesses in general the higher principle, the Notion in its Existence, which is in and for itself the infinite and absolute—a principle of freedom that in the utter certainty of its self-determination is absolutely liberated from the external determining of mechanism.

§ 1597

One of Kant's great services to philosophy consists in the distinction he has made between relative or external, and internal purposiveness; in the latter he has opened up the Notion of life, the Idea, and by so doing has done positively for philosophy what the Critique of Pure Reason did but imperfectly, equivocally, and only negatively, namely, raised it above the determinations of reflection and the relative world of metaphysics. It has been remarked that the opposition of teleology and mechanism is in the first instance the more general opposition of freedom and necessity. Kant has exhibited the opposition in this form among the antinomies of reason, namely, as the third conflict of the transcendental ideas. His exposition, which was referred to earlier, I cite quite briefly, as the gist of it is so simple as to require no detailed analysis, and the peculiar features of the Kantian antinomies have been elucidated in more detail elsewhere.

The thesis of the antinomy here to be considered runs thus: Causality according to natural laws is not the sole causality from which the phenomena of the world can one and all be derived. For their explanation a causality through freedom must be assumed as well.

The antithesis is: There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely according to natural laws.

As in the case of the other antinomies, the proof first sets to work apagogically, the opposite of each thesis being assumed; secondly and conversely in order to show the contradictory nature of this assumption, its opposite, which is accordingly the proposition to be proved, is assumed and presupposed as valid. The whole roundabout method of proof could therefore be spared; the proof consists in nothing but the assertorical affirmation of the two opposed propositions.

Thus in order to prove the thesis we have first to assume that there is no other causality than that according to natural laws, that is, according to the necessity of mechanism in general, including chemism. This proposition we find to be selfcontradictory, because we take natural law to consist just in this, that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori, which cause therefore must contain an absolute spontaneity within itself; that is, the assumption opposed to the thesis is contradictory because it contradicts the thesis.

In order to prove the antithesis, we are to postulate that there exists a freedom, as a particular kind of causality, that absolutely initiates a state of things and therefore also a series of consequences of that state. But now, since such a beginning presupposes a state that has no causal connection whatever with its predecessor, it contradicts the law of causality which alone makes unity of experience, and experience at all, possible; in other words the assumption of freedom, which is opposed to the antithesis, cannot be made because it contradicts the antithesis.

§ 1598

What is essentially the same antinomy recurs in the Critique of Teleological judgment as the opposition between the assertion that all production of material things takes place according to merely mechanical laws and the assertion that some cases of production of material things according to such laws are not possible. The Kantian solution of this antinomy is the same as the general solution of the others; namely that reason can prove neither the one proposition nor the other, because we cannot have a priori any determining principle of the possibility of things according to merely empirical natural laws; that further, therefore, both

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must be regarded not as objective propositions but as subjective maxims; that on the one hand I am always to reflect on all natural events according to the principle of natural mechanism alone, but that this does not prevent me, when occasion demands it, from investigating certain natural forms in accordance with another maxim, namely, on the principle of final causes; as though now these two maxims, which moreover are supposed to be necessary only for human reason, did not stand in the same opposition as the propositions in question. As was remarked before, this whole standpoint fails to examine the sole question to which philosophic interest demands an answer, namely, which of the two principles possesses truth in and for itself; but for this point of view it makes no difference whether the principles are to be regarded as objective, which means here, externally existing determinations of nature, or as mere maxims of a subjective cognition; rather, that is a subjective, that is, a contingent conjunction which, as the occasion demands, applies one or the other maxim according as it holds it to be appropriate to the given objects, but without further enquiry into the truth of these determinations themselves, whether these are determinations of the objects or of cognition.

§ 1599

However unsatisfactory, therefore, the discussion of the teleological principle is in respect of its essential point of view, nevertheless the position that Kant gives to it is worthy of note. In ascribing it to a reflective judgment, he makes it a connecting middle term between the universal of reason and the individual of intuition; further, he distinguishes this reflective judgment from the determining judgment, the latter merely subsuming the particular under the universal. Such a universal which merely subsumes, is an abstraction which only becomes concrete in something else, in the particular. End, on the contrary, is the concrete universal, which possesses in its own self the moment of particularity and externality and is therefore active and the urge to repel itself from itself. The Notion, as end, is of course an objective judgment in which one determination, the subject, namely the concrete Notion, is self-determined, while the other is not merely a predicate but external objectivity. But the end relation is not for that reason a reflective judging that considers external objects only according to a unity, as though an intelligence had given this unity for the convenience of our cognitive faculty; on the contrary it is the absolute truth that judges objectively and determines external objectivity absolutely. Thus the end relation is more than judgment; it is the syllogism of the self-subsistent free Notion that unites itself with itself through objectivity.

§ 1600

End has shown itself to be the third to mechanism and chemism it is their truth. Since it still stands within the sphere of objectivity, or of the immediacy of the total Notion, it is still affected by externality as such and is confronted by an objective world to which it relates itself. From this side, mechanical causality, which in general is to be taken as including chemism, still makes its appearance in this end relation which is the external one, but as subordinate to it and as sublated in and for itself.

As regards the more precise relationship, the mechanical object is, as an immediate totality, indifferent to its being determined, and on the other hand is equally indifferent to being a determinant. This external determinedness has now developed into self-determination and accordingly the Notion, which in the object was merely the inner, or what is the same thing, merely the outer Notion, is now posited; end is, in the first instance, just this very Notion that is external to the Notion of mechanism. Thus for chemism too, end is the self-determining principle which brings back into the unity of the Notion the external determinedness by which it is conditioned.

From this can be seen the nature of the subordination of the two previous forms of the objective process; the other, which in them lies in the infinite progress, is the Notion posited at first as external to them, which is end; not only is the Notion their substance, but externality, too, is for them an essential moment constituting their determinateness. Thus mechanical or chemical technique, through its character of being externally determined, offers itself spontaneously to the end relation, which we have now to consider more closely.

...

§ 1614

That the end relates itself immediately to an object and makes it a means, as also that through this means it determines another object, may be regarded as violence [Gewalt] in so far as the end appears to be of quite another nature than the object, and the two objects similarly are mutually independent totalities. But that the end posits itself in a mediate relation with the object and interposes another object between itself and it, may be regarded as the cunning of reason. The finitude of rationality has, as remarked, this side, that the end enters into relationship with the presupposition, that is, with the externality of the object. In the immediate relation to the object, it would itself enter into the sphere of mechanism or chemism and thereby be subject to contingency and the loss of its determination as the Notion that is in and for itself. But as it is, it puts forward an object as means, allows it to wear itself out in its stead, exposes it to attrition and shields itself behind it from mechanical violence.

...

§ 1621

If we consider one of the premises, the immediate relation of the subjective end to the object which thereby becomes the means, then the former cannot immediately relate itself to the latter; for the latter is no less immediate than the object of the other extreme, in which the end is to be realised through mediation. Since they are thus posited as diverse, it is necessary to interpolate between this objectivity and the subjective end a means of their relation; but this means is likewise an object already determined by the end, and between that object's objectivity and the teleological determination a new means must be interpolated, and so on to infinity. Thus there is posited the infinite progress of mediation. The same thing takes place in respect of the other premise, the relation of the means to the as yet undetermined object. Since they are absolutely self-subsistent, they can only be united in a third, and so on to infinity. Or conversely, since the premises already presuppose the conclusion, the conclusion, being based on these merely immediate premises, can only be imperfect. The conclusion or the product of the purposive act is nothing but an object determined by an end external to it; consequently it is the same thing as the means. In such a product, therefore, only a means, not a realised end, has resulted, or the end has not truly attained an objectivity in it.

...

§ 1624

3. Thus we obtain the result that external purposiveness which has as yet only the form of teleology, really only comes to be a means, not an objective end -- because the subjective end remains an external subjective determination; or, in so far as the end is active and realises itself, though only in a means it is still connected with the object immediately, immersed in it; it is itself an object, and the end, one may say, does not attain to a means, because the realisation of the end is a prior requirement before that realisation could be brought about through a means.

§ 1625

In fact, however, the result is not only an external end relation, but the truth of it, an internal end relation and an objective end. The externality of the object, self-subsistent as against the Notion, which the end presupposes for itself is posited in this presupposition as an unessential illusory show and is also already sublated in and for itself; the activity of the end is therefore, strictly speaking, only the representation of this illusory show and the sublating of it. As the Notion has shown us, the first object becomes by communication a means, because it is in itself totality of the Notion, and its determinateness which is none other than externality itself is posited merely as something external and unessential and therefore appears within the end itself as the end's own moment not as a self-subsistent moment relatively to the end. Thus the determination of the object as a means is purely an immediate one. Accordingly, in order to make that object a means, the subjective end requires to use no violence against the object, no reinforcement against it other than the reinforcing of itself;

the resolve [Entschluss], the explication [Aufschluss], this determination of itself, is the merely posited externality of the object, which appears therein as immediately subjected to the end and possesses no other determination counter to it than that of the nullity of the being-in-and-for-self.

§ 1626

The second sublating of objectivity by objectivity differs from the above as follows: the former sublation, as the first, is the end in objective immediacy, and therefore the second is not merely the sublating of a first immediacy but of both, of the objective as something merely posited, and of the immediate. In this way, the negativity returns into it self in such a manner that it is equally a restoration of the objectivity but of an objectivity identical with it, and in this it is as at the same time also a positing of the objectivity as an external objectivity determined only by the end. Through the latter circumstance this product remains as before also a means; through the former it is objectivity that is identical with the Notion, the realised end, in which the side of being a means is the reality of the end itself. In the realised end the means vanishes, for it would be the objectivity that is as yet only immediately subsumed under the end, and in the realised end objectivity is present as the return of the end into itself; further, with it there also vanishes the mediation itself as a relation of something external, on the one side, into the concrete identity of the objective end, and on the other, into the same identity as abstract identity and immediacy of existence.

§ 1627

Herein is also contained the mediation that was demanded for the first premise, the immediate relation of the end to the object. The realised end is also means, and conversely the truth of the means is just this, to be itself a real end, and the first sublating of objectivity is already also the second, just as the second proved to contain the first, as well. That is to say, the Notion determines itself; its determinateness is external indifference, which is immediately determined in the resolution [Entschluss] as sublated, namely as internal, subjective indifference, and at the same time as a presupposed object. Its further passage out from itself which appeared, namely, as an immediate communication and subsumption of the presupposed object under it, is at the same time a sublating of the former determinateness of externality that was internal and enclosed within the Notion, that is, posited as sublated, and at the same time a sublating of the presupposition of an object; consequently, this apparently first sublating of the indifferent objectivity is already the second as well, a reflection-into-self that has passed through mediation, and the realised end.

...

§ 1630

First we saw subjectivity, the Notion's being-for-self, pass over; into its in-itself, objectivity, to be followed by the reappearance in the latter of the negativity of the Notion's being-for-self; in that negativity the Notion has determined itself in such a manner that its particularity is an external objectivity, or it has determined itself as a simple concrete unity whose externality is its self-determination.

The movement of the end has now reached the stage where the moment of externality is not merely posited in the Notion, where the end is not merely an ought-to-be and a striving to realise itself, but as a concrete totality is identical with the immediate objectivity. This identity is on the one hand the simple Notion and the equally immediate objectivity, but on the other hand, it is just as essentially a mediation, and only through the latter as a self-sublating mediation is it that simple immediacy; the Notion is therefore essentially this: to be distinct as an explicit identity from its implicit objectivity, and thereby to possess externality, yet in this external totality to be the totality's self-determining identity. As such, the Notion is now the Idea.

§ 1631

The Idea is the adequate Notion, that which is objectively true, or the true as such. When anything whatever possesses truth, it possesses it through its Idea, or, something possesses truth only in so far as it is Idea. The expression 'idea' has often been employed in philosophy as in ordinary life for 'notion', indeed, even for a mere ordinary conception: 'I have no idea yet of this lawsuit, building, neighbourhood', means nothing more than the ordinary conception. Kant has reclaimed the expression Idea for the notion of reason. Now according to Kant, the notion of reason is supposed to be the notion of the unconditioned, but a notion transcendent in regard to phenomena, that is, no empirical use can be made of such notion that is adequate to it. The notions of reason are to serve for the comprehension of perceptions, the notions of the understanding for understanding them. But in fact, if the latter really are Notions, then they are Notions -- they enable one to comprehend, and an understanding of perceptions by means of notions of the understanding will be a comprehension of them.

§ 1632

But if understanding is only a determining of perceptions by such categories as for example whole and parts, force, cause, and the like, it signifies only a determining by reflection; and similarly, by understanding can be meant only the specific representation of a completely determined sensuous content; thus when someone, having been directed that at the end of the wood he must turn left, replies 'I understand', understanding means nothing more than the grasping of something in pictorial thought and in memory. 'Notion of reason', too, is a somewhat clumsy expression; for the Notion is something altogether rational; and in so far as reason is distinguished from understanding and the Notion as such, it is the totality of the Notion and of objectivity. In this sense the Idea is the rational; it is the unconditioned, because only that has conditions which essentially relates itself to an objectivity, but an objectivity that it has not itself determined but which still confronts it in the form of indifference and externality, just as the external end still had conditions.

§ 1633

Reserving then the expression 'Idea' for the objective or real Notion and distinguishing it from the Notion itself and still more from mere pictorial thought, we must also reject even more vigorously that estimate of the Idea according to which it is not anything actual, and true thoughts are said to be only ideas. If thoughts are merely subjective and contingent, they certainly have no further value; but in this respect they are not inferior to temporal and contingent actualities which likewise have no further value than that of contingencies and phenomena. On the other hand if, conversely, the Idea is not to have the value of truth, because in regard to phenomena it is transcendent, and no congruent object can be assigned to it in the world of sense, this is an odd misunderstanding that would deny objective validity to the Idea because it lacks that which constitutes Appearance, namely, the untrue being of the objective world. In regard to practical Ideas, Kant recognises that 'nothing can be more harmful and unworthy of a philosopher than the vulgar appeal to an experience that allegedly conflicts with the Idea. This very experience would not even exist if, for example, political institutions had been established at the proper time in conformity with Ideas, and if crude conceptions, crude just because they had been drawn from experience, had not taken the place of Ideas and so nullified every good intention.' Kant regards the Idea as a necessity and as the goal which, as the archetype, it must be our endeavour to set up for a maximum and to which we must strive to bring the condition of the actual world ever nearer.

...

§ 1634

But having reached the result that the Idea is the unity of the Notion and objectivity, is the true, it must not be regarded merely as a goal to which we have to approximate but which itself always remains a kind of beyond; on the contrary, we must recognise that everything actual is only in so far as it possesses the Idea and expresses it. It is not merely that the object, the objective and subjective world in general, ought to be congruous with the Idea, but they are themselves the congruence of Notion and reality; the reality that does not correspond to the Notion is mere Appearance, the subjective, contingent, capricious element that is not the truth.

§ 1635

When it is said that no object is to be found in experience that is perfectly congruous with the Idea, one is opposing the Idea as a subjective standard to the actual; but what anything actual is supposed in truth to be, if its Notion is not in it and if its objectivity does not correspond to its Notion at all, it is impossible to say; for it would be nothing. It is true that the mechanical and chemical object, like the nonspiritual subject and the spirit that is conscious only of the finite, not of its essence, do not, according to their various natures, have their Notion existent in them in its own free form. But they can only be true at all in so far as they are the union of their Notion and reality, of their soul and their body. Wholes like the state and the church cease to exist when the unity of their Notion and their reality is dissolved; man, the living being, is dead when soul and body are parted in him; dead nature, the mechanical and chemical world -- taking, that is, the dead world to mean the inorganic world, otherwise it would have no positive meaning at all -- dead nature, then, if it is separated into its Notion and its reality, is nothing but the subjective abstraction of a thought form and a formless matter. Spirit that was not Idea, was not the unity of the Notion with its own self, or the Notion that did not have the Notion itself for its reality would be dead, spiritless spirit, a material object.

...

§ 1637

But because the Notion of the state so essentially constitutes the nature of these individualities, it is present in them as an urge so powerful that they are impelled to translate it into reality, be it only in the form of external purposiveness, or to put up with it as it is, or else they must needs perish. The worst state, one whose reality least corresponds to the Notion, in so far as it still exists, is still Idea; the individuals still obey a dominant Notion.

§ 1638

However, the Idea has not merely the more general meaning of the true being, of the unity of Notion and reality, but the more specific one of the unity of subjective Notion and objectivity. That is to say, the Notion as such is itself already the identity of itself and reality; for the indefinite expression 'reality' means in general nothing else but determinate being, and this the Notion possesses in its particularity and individuality. Similarly too, objectivity is the total Notion that out of its determinateness has withdrawn into identity with itself. In the former subjectivity the determinateness or difference of the Notion is an illusory being [semblance] that is immediately sublated and has withdrawn into being-for-self or negative unity; it is an inhering predicate. But in this objectivity the determinateness is posited as an immediate totality, as an external whole. Now the Idea has shown itself to be the Notion liberated again into its subjectivity from the immediacy in which it is submerged in the object; to be the Notion that distinguishes itself from its objectivity, which however is no less determined by it and possesses its substantiality only in that Notion. 'This identity has therefore rightly been defined as the subject-object, for it is as well the formal or subjective Notion as it is the object as such. But this must be understood more precisely. The Notion, having truly attained its reality, is this absolute judgement whose subject, as self-related negative unity, distinguishes itself from its objectivity and is the latter's being-in-and-for-self, but essentially relates itself to it through itself; it is therefore its own end and the urge to realise it; but for this very reason the subject does not possess objectivity in an immediate manner, for if it did it would be merely the totality of the object as such lost in objectivity; on the contrary, objectivity is the realisation of the end, an objectivity posited by the activity of the end, an objectivity which, as positedness, possesses its subsistence and its form only as permeated by its subject. As objectivity, it has in it the moment

of the externality of the Notion and is therefore in general the side of finitude, change and Appearance, a side, however, which meets with extinction in its retraction into the negative unity of the Notion; the negativity whereby its indifferent mutual externality exhibits itself as unessential and a positivity, is the Notion itself.

...

§ 1640

This yields the following more precise definitions of the Idea. First, it is the simple truth, the identity of the Notion and objectivity as a universal in which the opposition and subsistence of the particular is dissolved into its self-identical negativity and is equality with itself. Secondly, it is the relation of the explicit subjectivity of the simple Notion and its objectivity which is distinguished therefrom; the former is essentially the urge to sublate this separation, and the latter is the indifferent positedness, the subsistence that is in and for itself null.

As this relation, the Idea is the process of sundering itself into individuality and its inorganic nature, and again of bringing this inorganic nature under the power of the subject and returning to the first simple universality. The identity of the Idea with itself is one with the process; the thought which liberates actuality from the illusory show of purposeless mutability and transfigures it into the Idea must not represent this truth of actuality as a dead repose, as a mere picture, lifeless, without impulse or movement, as a genius or number, or an abstract thought; by virtue of the freedom which the Notion attains in the Idea, the Idea possesses within itself also the most stubborn opposition; its repose consists in the security and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes that opposition, in it meeting with itself.

...

§ 1643

In this second stage, the Idea is the Idea of the true and the good as cognition and volition. In the first instance, it is finite cognition and finite volition, in which the true and the good are still distinguished and each appears as yet only as a goal. The Notion has, in the first instance, liberated itself into itself and as yet given itself only an abstract objectivity for its reality. But the process of this finite cognition and action converts the initially abstract universality into a totality, whereby it becomes a complete objectivity. Or, to consider it from the other side, finite, that is, subjective spirit, makes for itself the presupposition of an objective world, just as life has such a presupposition; but its activity consists in sublating this presupposition and converting it into a positedness. In this way its reality is for it the objective world, or conversely, the objective world is the ideality in which it cognises itself.

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§ 1646

To this extent the necessity of treating of the Idea of life in logic would be based on the necessity, otherwise recognised, too, of treating here of the concrete Notion of cognition. But this Idea has come upon the scene through the Notion's own necessity; the Idea, that which is true in and for itself, is essentially the subject matter of logic; since it is at first to be considered in its immediacy, it must be apprehended and cognised in this determinateness in which it is life, in order that its treatment shall not be an empty affair devoid of determinate content. All that we need perhaps to remark is how far the logical view of life differs from any other scientific view of it; this is not the place, however, to concern ourselves with how life is treated in the unphilosophical sciences, but only with differentiating logical life as pure Idea from natural life which is dealt with in the philosophy of nature, and from life in so far as it stands in connection with spirit. The former of these, as the life of nature, is life as projected into the externality of existence and having its condition in inorganic nature, and where the moments of the Idea are a multiplicity of actual formations. Life in the Idea is without such presuppositions which are in the form of shapes of actuality; its presupposition is the Notion as we have considered it, on the one hand as subjective, on the other hand as objective. In nature life appears as the highest stage, a stage that nature's externality attains by withdrawing into itself and sublating itself in subjectivity. In Logic it is simple inwardness [Insichsein], which in the Idea of life has attained an externality that genuinely corresponds to it; the Notion that earlier appeared on the scene as subjective Notion is the soul of life itself; it is the urge that mediates for itself its reality throughout objectivity. Nature, having reached this Idea from the starting point of its externality, transcends itself; its end does not appear as its beginning, but as its limit, in which it sublates itself. Similarly, in the Idea of life the moments of its reality do not receive the shape of external actuality but remain enclosed within the form of the Notion.

§ 1647

In spirit, however, life appears partly as opposed to it, partly as posited as at one with it, this unity being reborn as the pure offspring of spirit. For here life is to be taken generally in its proper sense as natural life, for what is called the life of spirit as spirit, is its peculiar nature that stands opposed to mere life; just as we speak, too, of the nature of spirit, although spirit is not a natural being and is rather the opposite of nature. Life as such, then, is for spirit partly a means, and as such spirit opposes it to itself; partly spirit is a living individual and life is its body; and again, this unity of spirit with its living corporeality is born from spirit itself as an ideal. None of these relations to spirit concerns logical life and life is to be considered here neither as instrument [Mittel] of a spirit, nor as a moment of the ideal and of beauty. In both cases, as natural life and as life standing in relation with spirit, life possesses a determinateness of its externality, in the first case through its presuppositions which are other formations of nature, in the second case through the ends and the activity of

spirit. The Idea of life by itself is free from the former presupposed and conditioning objectivity as well as from relation to the latter subjectivity.

§ 1648

Life, considered now more closely in its Idea, is in and for itself absolute universality; the objectivity that it possesses is permeated throughout by the Notion and has the Notion alone for substance. What is distinguished as part, or in accordance with some other external reflection, has within itself the whole Notion; the Notion is the omnipresent soul in it, which remains simple self-relation and remains a one in the multiplicity belonging to objective being. This multiplicity, as self-external objectivity, has an indifferent subsistence, which in space and time, if these could already be mentioned here, is a mutual externality of wholly diverse and self-subsistent elements. But in life externality is at the same time present as the simple determinateness of its Notion; thus the soul is an omnipresent outpouring of itself into this multiplicity and at the same remains absolutely the simple oneness of the concrete Notion with itself. The thinking that clings to the determinations of the relationships of reflection and of the formal Notion, when it comes to consider life, this unity of its Notion in the externality of objectivity, in the absolute multiplicity of atomistic matter, finds all its thoughts without exception are of no avail; the omnipresence of the simple in manifold externality is

for reflection an absolute contradiction, and as reflection must at the same time apprehend this omnipresence from its perception of life and therefore admit the actuality of this Idea, it is an incomprehensible mystery for it, because it does not grasp the Notion, and the Notion as the substance of life. This simple life, however, is not only omnipresent; it is absolutely the subsistence and immanent substance of its objectivity; but as subjective substance it is the urge, and moreover the specific urge, of the particular difference, and no less essentially the one and universal urge of the specialised difference that reduces this its particularisation into unity and maintains it therein. It is only as this negative unity of its objectivity and particularisation that life is a self-related life that is for itself, a soul. As such it is essentially an individual, which relates itself to objectivity as to an other, to a non-living nature.

Consequently the original judgment of life consists in this, that it detaches itself as an individual subject from objectivity, and in constituting itself the negative unity of the Notion, makes the presupposition of an immediate objectivity.

§ 1649

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A The Living Individual

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Life is therefore first to be considered as a living individual that is for itself the subjective totality and is presupposed as indifferent to an objectivity that confronts it as indifferent.

§ 1650

Secondly, it is the life process, the process of sublating its presupposition, positing as negative the objectivity that is indifferent to it and actualising itself as that objectivity's power and negative unity. By so doing it makes itself into the universal that is the unity of itself and its other.

§ 1651

Hence life is thirdly the genus process, the process of sublating its individualisation and relating itself to its objective existence as to itself. Accordingly, this process is on the one hand the return to its Notion and the repetition of the first diremption, the becoming of a new individuality and the death of the first, immediate one; but on the other hand, the Notion of life that has withdrawn into itself is the becoming of the Notion that is in relationship with itself and exists universally and freely for itself – the transition into cognition.

...

§ 1679

The metaphysics of the spirit, or, as it was more commonly expressed, of the soul revolved round the determinations of substance, simplicity, immateriality -- determinations in which the general idea of spirit taken from empirical consciousness, was laid down as subject, and it was then asked, What predicates agree with our observations? This kind of procedure could get no further than the procedure of physics, which reduces the world of phenomena to general laws and reflective determinations since it too was based on spirit merely in its phenomenal aspect; in fact this procedure was bound to fall short even of the scientific character of physics.

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...

§ 1681

Since the predicates immediately yielded by spirit's phenomenal aspect in the first instance still belong to empirical Psychology, there only remain, strictly speaking, for the metaphysical consideration, the wholly inadequate determinations of reflection. Kant, in his criticism of rational psychology adheres to this metaphysics, insisting that, in so far as rational psychology purports to be a rational science, the smallest addition from observation to the general idea of selfconsciousness would transform that science into an empirical one and mar its rational purity and its independence of

all experience. Consequently, on this view, nothing is left but the simple representation, 'I', a representation devoid of any content of its own, of which we cannot even say that it is a notion but a mere consciousness that accompanies every notion. Now according to the further Kantian conclusions, by this 'I', or if you like, it (the thing) that thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is cognised only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of which, taken in its isolation, we can never have the least conception.

In this context, the 'I' has the inconvenience, to use Kant's own expression that we must already make use of it whenever we want make any judgement about it; for it is not so much a single representation by which a particular object is distinguished, but rather a form of representation in general in so far as this is to be called cognition. Now the paralogism committed by rational psychology, says Kant, consists in this, that modes of self-consciousness in thinking are converted into notions of the understanding as applied to an object; that the 'I think' is taken as a thinking being, a thing-in-itself; and that in this way, from the fact that I always occur in consciousness as a subject, and that too as a singular subject, identical in all the multiplicity of representation, and distinguishing myself from the latter as from something external to me, the unjustified inference is drawn that the 'I' is a substance, and further a qualitatively simple being, and a one, and something that has a real existence independently of the things of time and space.

§ 1682

I have drawn out this exposition in some detail, because it shows clearly the nature of the previous metaphysics of the soul and especially, too, the nature of the criticism by which it was made obsolete. The former aimed at determining the abstract essence of the soul; in doing so, it started originally from observation and converted the empirical universality of observation and the wholly external reflective determination attaching to the individuality of the actual, into the form of the above-mentioned determinations of essence. Kant in his criticism had generally in mind only the state of the metaphysics of his time, which in the main adhered to these abstract, one-sided determinations wholly devoid of dialectic; the genuinely speculative ideas of older philosophers on the notion of spirit he neither heeded nor examined. In his criticism then of those determinations, he followed quite simply Hume's style of scepticism; that is to say, he holds fast to the 'I' as it appears in self-consciousness, from which, however, since it is its essence -- the thing-in-itself -- that we are to cognise, -- everything empirical must be omitted; nothing then is left but this phenomenon of the 'I think' that accompanies every representation -- of which 'I think' we have not the slightest conception.

§ 1683

Certainly, it must be conceded that we have not the least conception the 'I', or of anything whatever, not even of the Notion itself, so long as we do not really think, but stop short at the simple, fixed general idea and the name. It is an odd thought -- if it can be called a thought at all -- that I must already make use of the 'I' in order to judge of the 'I'; the 'I' that makes use of self-consciousness as a means in order to judge, this is

indeed an x of which, as well as of the relationship of such 'making use', we cannot have the slightest conception. But surely it is ridiculous to call this nature of self-consciousness, namely, that the 'I' thinks itself, that the 'I' cannot be thought without its being the 'I' that thinks, an inconvenience and, as though there was a fallacy in it, a circle. It is this relationship through which, in immediate self-consciousness, the absolute, eternal nature of self-consciousness and the Notion itself manifests itself, and manifests itself for this reason, that self-consciousness is just the existent pure Notion, and therefore empirically perceptible, the absolute relation-to-self that, as a separating judgement, makes itself its own object and is solely this process whereby it makes itself a circle.

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§ 1699

From the other side, this urge is determined in the following manner: the Notion is, it is true, the absolute certainty of itself; but its being-for-self is confronted by its presupposition of a world having the form of implicit being, but a world whose indifferent otherness has for the self-certainty of the Notion the value merely of an unessentiality; it is thus the urge to sublate this otherness and to intuit in the object its identity with itself. This reflection-into-self is the sublated opposition, and the individuality which initially appears as the presupposed implicit being of a world is now posited as individuality and made actual for the subject; accordingly the reflection-into-self is the self-identity of the form restored out of the opposition -- an identity that is therefore determined as indifferent to the form in its distinctiveness and is content.

§ 1700

This urge is therefore the urge to truth in so far as truth is in cognition, accordingly to truth in its proper sense

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as theoretical Idea. Objective truth is no doubt the Idea itself as the reality that corresponds to the Notion, and to this extent an object may or may not possess truth; but, on the other hand, the more precise meaning of truth is that it is truth for or in the subjective Notion, in knowing. It is the relation of the Notion judgment which showed itself to be the formal judgment of truth; in it, namely, the predicate is not merely the objectivity of the Notion, but the relating comparison of the Notion of the subject-matter with its actuality. This realisation of the Notion is theoretical in so far as the Notion, as form, has still the determination of subjectivity, or has still the determination for the subject of being its own determination. Because cognition is the Idea as end as subjective, the negation of the world presupposed as an implicit being is the first negation; therefore also the conclusion in which the objective is posited in the subjective, has at first only this meaning, that the implicit being is only posited in the form of subjectivity, or in the Notion determination, and for this reason is not, in that form, in and for itself. Thus the conclusion only attains to a neutral unity or a synthesis, that is, to a unity of things that are originally separate and only are externally so conjoined. Since therefore in this cognition the Notion posits the object as

its own, the Idea in the first instance only gives itself a content whose basis is given, and in which only the form of externality has been sublated.

§ 1701

Accordingly, this cognition still retains its finitude in its realised end; in its realised end it has at the same time not attained its end, and in its truth has not yet arrived at truth. For in so far as in the result the content still has the character of a datum, the presupposed implicit being confronting the Notion is not sublated; equally therefore the unity of Notion and reality, truth, is also not contained in it. Oddly enough, it is this side of finitude that latterly has been clung to, and accepted as the absolute relation of cognition -- as though the finite as such was supposed to be the absolute! At this standpoint, the object is credited with being an unknown thing-in-itself behind cognition, and this character of the object, and with it truth too is regarded as an absolute beyond for cognition. In this view of cognition, thought determinations in general, the categories, reflective determinations, as well as the for Notion and its moments are assigned the position of being finite determinations not in and for themselves, but finite in the sense that they are subjective in rely on to this empty thing-in-itself, the fallacy of taking this untrue relation of cognition as the true relation has become the universal opinion of modern times.

§ 1702

From this determination of finite cognition it is immediately evident that it is a contradiction that sublates itself -- the contradiction of a truth that at the same time is supposed not to be truth -- of a cognition of what is, which at the same time does not cognise the thing-in-itself. In the collapse of this contradiction, its content, subjective cognition and the thing-in-itself, collapses, that is, proves itself an untruth. But cognition must, in the course of its own movement, resolve its finitude and with it its contradiction; this examination of it made by us is an external reflection; but cognition is itself the Notion, the Notion that is its own end and therefore through its realisation fulfils itself, and in this very fulfilment sublates its subjectivity and the presupposed implicit being. We have therefore to consider cognition in its own self in its positive activity. Since this Idea is, as we have seen, the urge of the Notion to realise itself for itself, its activity consists in determining the object, and by this determining to relate itself in the object identically to itself. The object is in general something simply determinable, and in the Idea it has this essential side of not being in and for itself opposed to the Notion. Because cognition is still finite, not speculative, cognition, the presupposed objectivity has not as yet for it the shape of something that is in its own self simply and solely the Notion and that contains nothing with a particularity of its own as against the latter.

...

§ 1706

We sometimes find the difference between analytic and synthetic cognition stated in the form that one proceeds from the known to the unknown, the other from the unknown to the known. But if this distinction is closely examined, it will be difficult to discover in it a definite thought, much less a Notion.

§ 1707

It may be said that cognition begins in general with ignorance, for one does not learn to know something with which one is already acquainted. Conversely, it also begins with the known; this is a tautological proposition; that with which it begins, which therefore it actually cognises, is ipso facto something known; what is not as yet known and is to be known only later is still an unknown. So far, then, it must be said that cognition, once it has begun, always proceeds from the known to the unknown.

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§ 1710

We have seen from the nature of the Idea of cognition, that the activity of the subjective Notion must be regarded from one side merely as the explication of what is already in the object, because the object itself is nothing but the totality of the Notion. It is just as one-sided to represent analysis as though there were nothing in the subject matter that was not imported into it, as it is one-sided to suppose that the resulting determinations are merely extracted from it. The former view, as everyone knows, is enunciated by subjective idealism, which takes the activity of cognition in analysis to be merely a one-sided positing, beyond which the thing-in-itself remains concealed; the other view belongs to so-called realism which apprehends the subjective Notion as an empty Identity that receives the thought determinations into itself from outside. Analytic cognition, the transformation of the given material into logical determinations, has shown itself to be two things in one: a positing that no less immediately determines itself as a presupposing. Consequently, by virtue of the latter, the logical element may appear as something already complete in the object, just as by virtue of the former it may appear as the product of a merely subjective activity. But the two moments are not to be separated; the logical element in its abstract form into which analysis raises it, is of course only to be found in cognition, while conversely it is something not merely posited, but possessing being in itself.

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§ 1712

This progress is, however, nothing but the mere repetition of the one original act of analysis, namely, the fresh determination as a concrete, of what has already been taken up into the abstract form of the Notion; this is followed by the

analysis of it, then by the determination afresh as a concrete of the abstract that emerges from it, and so forth. But the thought determinations seem also to contain a transition within themselves. If the object is determined as a whole, then of course one advances from this to the other determination of part,

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from cause to the other determination of effect, and so on. But here this is no advance, since whole and part, cause and effect, are relationships and moreover, for this formal cognition, relationships complete in themselves such that in them one determination is already found essentially linked to the other. The subject matter that has been determined as cause or as part is *ipso facto* determined by the whole relationship, that is, determined already by both sides of it. Although the relationship is in itself something synthetic, yet for analytic cognition this connection is as much a mere datum as any other connection of its material and therefore is not relevant to its own peculiar business. Whether a connection of this kind be otherwise determined as *a priori* or *a posteriori* is here a matter of indifference, for it is apprehended as something found already there, or, as it has also been described, as a fact of consciousness that with the determination whole is linked the determination part, and so forth. While Kant has made the profound observation that there are synthetic *a priori* principles and has recognised their root in the unity of self-consciousness and therefore in the identity of the Notion with itself, yet he adopts the specific connection, the concepts of relation and the synthetic principles themselves from formal logic as given; their justification should have been the exposition of the transition of that simple unity of self-consciousness into these its determinations and distinctions, but Kant spared himself the trouble of demonstrating this genuinely synthetic progress -- the self-producing Notion.

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(b) Synthetic Cognition § 1720

Analytic cognition is the first premise of the whole syllogism -- the immediate relation of the Notion to the object; identity, therefore, is the determination which it recognises as its own, and analytic cognition is merely the apprehension of what is. Synthetic cognition aims at the comprehension of what is, that is, at grasping the multiplicity of determinations in their unity. It is therefore the second premise of the syllogism in which the diverse as such is related. Hence its aim is in general necessity. The different terms which are connected, are on the one hand connected in a relation; in this relation they are related and at the same time mutually indifferent and self-subsistent, but on the other hand, they are linked together in the Notion which is their simple yet determinate unity. Now synthetic cognition passes over, in the first instance, from abstract identity to relation, or from being to reflection, and so far it is not the absolute reflection of the Notion that the Notion cognises in its subject matter. The reality it gives itself is the next stage, namely, the stated identity of the different terms as such, an identity therefore that is at the same time still inner and only necessity, not the subjective identity that is for itself; hence not yet the Notion as such. Synthetic cognition, therefore, has indeed the Notion determinations for its content, and the object is posited in them; but they only stand in relation to one another, or are in immediate unity, and just for that reason, not in the unity by which the Notion exists as subject.

§ 1721

This constitutes the finitude of this cognition; because this real side of the Idea in it still possesses identity as an inner identity, its determinations are to themselves still external; because the identity is not in the form of subjectivity, the Notion's own pervasion of the object still lacks individuality; what corresponds to the Notion in the object is indeed no longer the abstract but the determinate form and therefore the particularity of the Notion, but the individual element in the object is still a given content. Consequently, although this cognition transforms the objective world into Notions, it gives it Notion-determinations only in respect of form, and must find the object in respect of its individuality, its specific determinateness; such cognition is not yet self-determining. Similarly, it finds propositions and laws, and proves their necessity, but not as a necessity of the subject matter in and for itself, that is, not from the Notion, but as a necessity of the cognition that

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works on given determinations, on the differences of the phenomenal aspect of the subject matter, and cognises for itself the proposition as a unity and relationship, or cognises the ground of phenomena from the phenomena themselves.

We have now to consider the detailed moments of synthetic cognition. 1. Definition

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§ 1727

But, thirdly, in the case of definitions of concrete objects of Nature as well as of spirit, the position is quite different. In general such objects are, for representation, things of many properties. Here, what we have to do in the first instance is to apprehend what is their proximate genus, and then, what is their specific difference. We have therefore to determine which of the many properties belong to the object as genus, and which as species, and further which among these properties is the essential one; this last point involves the necessity of ascertaining their interrelationship, whether one is already posited with the other. But for this purpose there is so far no other criterion to hand than existence itself. The essentiality of the property for the purpose of the definition, in which it is to be posited as a simple, undeveloped determinateness, is its universality. But in existence universality is merely empirical. It may be universality in time--whether the property in question is lasting, while the others show themselves transitory in the subsistence of the whole; or it may be a universality resulting from comparison with other concrete wholes and in that case it goes no further than community. Now if comparison indicates as the common basis the total habitus as empirically presented, reflection has to bring this together into a simple

thought determination and to grasp the simple character of such a totality. But the only possible attestation that a thought determination, or a single one of the immediate properties, constitutes the simple and specific essence of the object, is the derivation of such a determination from the concrete properties of the subject matter. But this would demand an analysis transforming the immediate properties into thoughts and reducing what is concrete to something simple. Such an analysis, however, would be higher than the one already considered; for it could not be abstractive, but would have to preserve in the universal what is specific in the concrete, unify it and show it to be dependent on the simple thought determination.

§ 1728

The relations of the manifold determinations of immediate existence to the simple Notion would however be theorems requiring proof. But definition is the first, still undeveloped Notion; therefore, when it has to apprehend the simple determinateness of the subject matter, which apprehension has to be something

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immediate, it can only employ for the purpose one of its immediate so-called properties—a determination of sensuous existence or representation. The isolation, then, of this property by abstraction, constitutes simplicity, and for universality and essentiality the Notion has to fall back onto empirical universality, the persistence in altered circumstances, and the reflection that seeks the Notion—determination in external existence and in picture thinking, that is, seeks it where it is not to be found. Definition, therefore, automatically renounces the Notion—determinations proper, which would be essentially principles of the subject matter, and contents itself with marks, that is, determinations in which essentiality for the object itself is a matter of indifference, and which are intended merely to be distinguishing marks for an external reflection. A single, external determinateness of this kind is too inadequate to the concrete totality and to the nature of its Notion, to justify its selection for its own sake, nor could it be taken for the true expression and determination of a concrete whole. According to Blumenbach's observation, for example, the lobe of the ear

is absent in all other animals, and therefore in the usual phraseology of common and distinguishing marks it could quite properly be used as the distinctive characteristic in the definition of physical man. But how inadequate such a completely external determination at once appears when compared with the conception of the total habitus of physical man, and with the demand that the Notion determination shall be something essential! It is quite contingent whether the, marks adopted in the definition are pure makeshifts like this, or on the other hand approximate more to the nature of a principle. It is also to be observed that, on account of their externality, they have not been the starting point in the cognition of the Notion of the object; on the contrary, an obscure feeling, an indefinite but deeper sense, an inkling of what is essential, has preceded the discovery of the genera in nature and in spirit, and only afterwards has a specific externality been sought to satisfy the understanding. In existence the Notion has entered into externality and is accordingly explicated into its differences and cannot be attached simply to a single one of such properties. The properties, as the externality of the thing, are external to themselves; that is why, as we pointed out in the sphere of Appearance when dealing with the thing of many properties, properties essentially become even self-subsistent matters; spirit, regarded from the same standpoint of Appearance, becomes an aggregate of a number of self-subsistent forces. Through this standpoint, the single property or force, even where it is posited as indifferent to the others, ceases to be a characterising principle, with the result that the determinateness, as determinateness of the Notion, vanishes altogether.

§ 1729

Into concrete things, along with the diversity of the properties among themselves, there enters also the difference between the Notion and its actualisation. The Notion in nature and in spirit has an external presentation in which its determinateness shows itself as dependence on the external, as transitoriness and inadequacy. Therefore, although any actual thing no doubt shows in itself what it ought to be, yet in accordance with the negative judgement of the Notion it may equally show that its actuality only imperfectly corresponds to this Notion, that it is bad. Now the definition is supposed to indicate the determinateness of the Notion in an immediate property; yet there is no property against which an instance cannot be brought in which the total habitus, though it enables one to discern the concrete thing to be defined, yet the property taken as its characteristic shows itself immature or stunted. In a bad plant, a poor specimen of an animal, a contemptible human being, a bad state, aspects of its concrete existence are defective or entirely obliterated that otherwise might have been adopted for the definition as the distinguishing mark and essential determinateness in the existence of such a concrete. But for all that, a bad plant or a bad animal, etc., still remains a plant or an animal. If, therefore, bad specimens too are to be covered by the definition, then all the properties that we wanted to regard as essential elude us through instances of malformations in which those properties are lacking. Thus for example the essentiality of the brain for physical man is contradicted by the instance of acephalous individuals, the essentiality of the protection of life and property for the state, by the instance of despotic states and tyrannous governments. If the Notion is asserted against such an instance and the instance, being measured by the Notion, is declared to be a bad specimen, then the Notion is no longer attested by phenomena. But the self-subsistence of the Notion is contrary to the meaning of definition; for definition is supposed to be the immediate Notion, and therefore can only draw on the immediacy of

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existence for its determinations for objects, and can justify itself only in what it finds already to hand. Whether its content is in-and-for itself truth or a contingency, this lies outside its sphere; but formal truth, the agreement between the Notion subjectively posited in the definition and an actual object outside it, cannot be established because the individual object may also be a bad specimen.

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§ 1763

In synthetic cognition, therefore, the Idea attains its end only to the extent that the Notion becomes for the Notion according to its moments of identity and real determinations, or of universality and particular differences -- further also as an identity that is the connection and dependence of the diverse elements. But this subject matter of the Notion is not adequate to it; for the Notion does not come to be the unity of itself with itself in its subject matter or its reality; in necessity its identity is for it; but in this identity the necessity is not itself the determinateness, but appears as a matter external to the identity, that is, as a matter not determined by the Notion, a matter, therefore, in which the Notion does not cognise itself. Thus in general the Notion is not for itself, is not at the same time determined in and for itself according to its unity. Hence in this cognition the Idea which falls short of truth on account of the inadequacy of the subject matter to the subjective Notion. But the sphere of necessity is the apex of being and reflection; through its own essential nature it passes into its manifestation, which is the Notion as Notion. How this transition from the sphere of necessity into the Notion is effected in principle has been shown in treating of necessity; the same transition also presented itself as the genesis of the Notion at the beginning of this Book.

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§ 1766

This determinateness contained in the Notion and in the likeness of the Notion, and including within it the demand for an individual external actuality, is the good. It comes upon the scene with the worth of being absolute, because it is within itself the totality of the Notion, the objective that is at the same time in the form of free unity and subjectivity.

This Idea is superior to the Idea of cognition already considered, for it possesses not only the worth of the universal but also of the out-and-out actual. It is an urge in so far as this actuality is still subjective, positing its own self and not having at the same time the form of immediate presupposition; its urge to realise itself is, strictly speaking, not to give itself objectivity this it possesses within itself but merely this empty form of immediacy. Hence the activity of the end is not directed against itself in order to adopt and appropriate a given determination and by sublating the determinateness of the external world to give itself reality in the form of external actuality. The Idea of the will as explicitly self-determining possesses the content within itself. Now it is true that this is a determinate content and to that extent something finite and limited; self-determination is essentially particularisation, since the reflection of the will into itself as a negative unity in general is also individuality in the sense of the exclusion and presupposition of an other. Nevertheless, the particularity of the content is in the first instance infinite through the form of the Notion, whose own determinateness it is; and in this content the Notion possesses its negative self-identity, and therefore not merely a particular, but its own infinite individuality. Consequently, the above-mentioned finitude of the content in the practical Idea is tantamount to the latter being in the first instance the not yet realised Idea; the Notion is, for the content, something that is in and for itself; it is here the Idea in the form of objectivity that is for itself; on the one hand, the subjective is for this reason no longer something merely posited, arbitrary or contingent, but an absolute; but on the other hand, this form of concrete existence, being-for-self, has not yet the form of the in-itself as well. What thus appears in respect of form as such, as opposition, appears in the form of the Notion reflected into simple identity, that is, appears in the content as its simple determinateness; thus the good, although valid in and for itself, is some particular end, but an end that has not to wait to receive its truth through its realisation, but is already on its own account the true.

§ 1767

The syllogism of immediate realisation itself requires no detailed exposition here; it is altogether the same as the syllogism of external purposiveness considered above; it is only the content that constitutes the difference. In external as in formal purposiveness, it was an indeterminate finite content in general; here, though it is finite too, it is as such at the same time as absolutely valid content. But in regard to the conclusion, to the realised end, a further difference comes in. The finite end in its realisation, all the same, gets no further than a means; since in its beginning it is not an end already determined in and for itself, it remains even when realised an end that is not in and for itself. If the good again is also fixed as something finite, if it is essentially such, then notwithstanding its inner infinitude it cannot escape the destiny of finitude a destiny that manifests itself in a number of forms. The realised good is good by virtue of what it already is in the subjective end, in its Idea; realisation gives it an external existence; but since his existence is determined merely as an intrinsically worthless externality, in it the good has only attained a contingent, destructible existence, not a realisation corresponding to its Idea. Further, since in respect of its content the good is restricted, there are several kinds of good; good in its concrete existence is not only subject to destruction by external contingency and by evil, but by the collision and conflict of the good itself. From the side of the objective world presupposed for it, in the presupposition of which the subjectivity and finitude of the good consists, and which as a different world goes its own way, the very realisation of the good is exposed to obstacles, obstacles which may indeed even be insurmountable.

§ 1768

In this way, the good remains an ought-to-be; it is in and for itself, but being, as the ultimate abstract immediacy, remains also confronting is in the form of a not-being.

§ 1769

The Idea of the realised good is, it is true, an absolute postulate, but it is no more than a postulate, that is, the absolute afflicted with the determinateness of subjectivity. There are still two worlds in opposition, one a realm of subjectivity in the pure regions of transparent thought, the other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality that is an undisclosed realm of darkness. The complete elaboration of the unresolved contradiction between that absolute end

and the limitation of this actuality that insuperably opposes it, has been considered in detail in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

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§ 1771

But what is still lacking in the practical Idea is the moment of consciousness proper itself; namely, that the moment of actuality in the Notion should have attained on its own account the determination of external being.

§ 1772

Another way of regarding this defect is that the practical Idea still lacks the moment of the theoretical Idea. That is to say, in the latter there stands on the side of the subjective Notion -- the Notion that is in process of being intuited within itself by the Notion only the determination of universality; cognition knows itself only as apprehension, as the identity on its own account indeterminate of the Notion with itself; the filling, that is, the objectivity that is determined in and for itself, is for it a datum, and what truly is is the actuality there before it independently of subjective positing. For the practical Idea, on the contrary, this actuality, which at the same time confronts it as an insuperable limitation, ranks as something intrinsically worthless that must first receive its true determination and sole worth through the ends of the good. Hence it is only the will itself that stands in the way of attainment of its goal, for it separates itself from cognition, and external reality for the will does not receive the form of a true being; the Idea of the good can therefore find its integration only in the Idea of the true.

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§ 1774

For the subjective Notion the good is the objective; actuality in its existence confronts it as an insuperable limitation only in so far as it still has the character of immediate existence, not of something objective in the sense of a being that is in and for itself; on the contrary, it is either the evil or the indifferent, the merely determinable, whose worth does not reside within it. This abstract being that confronts the good in the second premise has, however, already been sublated by the practical Idea itself; the first premise of the latter's action is the immediate objectivity of the Notion, according to which the end communicates itself to actuality without meeting any resistance and is in simple identical relation with it. Thus all that remains to be done is to bring together the thoughts of its two premises. To what has been already immediately accomplished by the objective Notion in the first premise, the only addition made in the second premise is that it is posited through mediation, and hence posited for the objective Notion. Now just as in the end relation in general, the realised end is also again merely a means, while conversely the means is also the realised end, so similarly in the syllogism of the good, the second premise is immediately already present implicitly in the first; but this immediacy is not sufficient, and the second premise is already postulated for the first -- the realisation of the good in the face of another actuality confronting it is the mediation which is essentially necessary for the immediate relation and the accomplished actualisation of the good.

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§ 1776

Now if it is supposed that the end of the good is after all not realised through this mediation, this signifies a relapse of the Notion to the standpoint occupied by it before its activity -- the standpoint of an actuality determined as worthless and yet presupposed as real. This relapse, which becomes the progress to the spurious infinity, has its sole ground in the fact that in the sublating of that abstract reality this sublating is no less immediately forgotten, or it is forgotten that this reality is in fact already presupposed as an actuality that is intrinsically worthless and not objective.

§ 1777

This repetition of the presupposition of the end consequently assumes this character, that the subjective bearing of the objective Notion is reproduced and made perpetual, with the result that the finitude of the good in respect of its content as well as its form appears as the abiding truth, and its actualisation appears as a merely individual act, and not as a universal one. As a matter of fact this determinateness has sublated itself in the actualisation of the good; what still limits the objective Notion is its own view of itself, which vanishes by reflection on what its actualisation is in itself. Through this view it is only standing in its own way, and thus what it has to do is to turn, not against an outer actuality, but against itself.

...

§ 1781

The absolute Idea has turned out to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical Idea. Each of these by itself is still one-sided, possessing the Idea only as a sought for beyond and an unattained goal; each, therefore, is a synthesis of endeavour, and has, but equally has not, the Idea in it; each passes from one thought to the other without bringing the two together, and so remains fixed in their contradiction. The absolute Idea, as the rational Notion that in its reality meets only with itself, is by virtue of this immediacy of its objective identity, on the one hand the return to life; but it has no less sublated this form of its immediacy, and contains within itself the highest degree of opposition. The Notion is not merely soul but free subjective Notion that is for itself and therefore possesses personality -- the practical, objective Notion determined in and for itself which, as person, is impenetrable atomic individuality, but explicitly universality and cognition,

and in its other has its own objectivity for its object. All else is error, confusion, opinion, endeavour, caprice and transitoriness; the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth.

§ 1782

It is the sole subject matter and content of philosophy. Since it contains all determinations within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularisation, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to cognise it in these. Nature and spirit are in general different modes of presenting its existence, art and religion its different modes of apprehending itself and giving itself an adequate existence. Philosophy has the same content and the same end as art and religion; but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute idea, because its mode is the highest mode, the Notion.

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§ 1784

Method may appear at first as the mere manner peculiar to the process of cognition, and as a matter of fact it has the nature of such. But the peculiar manner, as method, is not merely a modality of being determined in and for itself; it is a modality of cognition, and as such is posited as determined by the Notion and as form, in so far as the form is the soul of all objectivity and all otherwise determined content has its truth in the form alone.

...

§ 1785

Accordingly, what is to be considered here as method is only the movement of the Notion itself, the nature of which movement has already been cognised; but first, there is now the added significance that the Notion is everything, and its movement is the universal absolute activity, the self-determining and self-realising movement. The method is therefore to be recognised as the unrestrictedly universal, internal and external mode; and as the absolutely infinite force, to which no object, presenting itself as something external, remote from and independent of reason, could offer resistance or be of a particular nature in opposition to it, or could not be penetrated by it. It is therefore soul and substance, and anything whatever is comprehended and known in its truth only when it is completely subjugated to the method; it is the method proper to every subject matter because its activity is the Notion. This is also the truer meaning of its universality; according to the universality of reflection it is regarded merely as the method for everything; but according to the universality of the Idea, it is both the manner peculiar to cognition, to the subjectively selfknowing Notion, and also the objective manner, or rather the substantiality, of things — that is of Notions, in so far as they appear primarily to representation and reflection as others. It is therefore not only the highest force, or rather the sole and absolute force of reason, but also its supreme and sole urge to find and cognise itself by means of itself in everything. Here, secondly, is indicated the difference of the method from the Notion as such, the particular aspect of the method. The Notion, when it was considered by itself, appeared in its immediacy; the reflection, or the Notion that considered it, fell within our knowing.

The method is this knowing itself, for which the Notion is not merely the subject matter, but knowing's own subjective act, the instrument and means of the cognising activity, distinguished from that activity, but only as the activity's own essentiality. In the cognition of enquiry, the method likewise occupies the position of an instrument, of a means standing on the subjective side by which this side relates itself to the object. In this syllogism the subject is one extreme and the object the other, and the former by means of its method unites with the latter, but in doing so it does not unite with itself. The extremes remain diverse because subject, method, and object are not posited as the one identical Notion; the syllogism is therefore still the formal syllogism; the premises in which the subject posits the form on its side as its method is an immediate determination, and therefore contains the determinations of form, as we have seen, of definition, division, and so forth, as facts found existing in the subject. In true cognition on the contrary, the method is not merely an aggregate of certain determinations, but the Notion that is determined in and for itself; and the Notion is the middle term only because it has equally the significance of the objective, and consequently in the conclusion the objective does not merely attain an external determinateness by means of the method, but is posited in its identity with the subjective Notion.

...

The immediate of sensuous intuition is a manifold and an individual. But cognition is thinking by means of notions, and therefore its beginning also is only in the element of thought — it is a simple and a universal. This form has already been discussed under definition. At the beginning of finite cognition universality is likewise recognised as an essential determination, but it is taken as a determination of thought and of Notion only in opposition to being. In point of fact this first universality is an immediate one, and for that reason has equally the significance of being; for being is precisely this abstract relation-to-self. Being requires no further derivation, as though it belonged to the abstract product of definition only because it is taken from sensuous intuition or elsewhere, and in so far as it is pointed out to us. This pointing out and derivation is a matter of mediation, which is more than a mere beginning, and is a mediation of a kind that does not belong to a comprehension by means of thinking, but is the elevation of ordinary thinking, of the empirical and ratiocinative consciousness, to the standpoint of thought. According to the current opposition of thought or concept and being it is regarded as an important truth that no being belongs as yet to the former, taken on its own, and that the latter has a ground of its own that is independent of thought. But the simple determination of being is in itself so meagre that, if only for that reason, there is no need to make much fuss about it; the universal is immediately itself this immediate, since as

abstract it also is merely the abstract relation-to-self, which is being. As a matter of fact, the demand that being should be exhibited for us to see has a further, inner meaning involving more than this abstract determination; what is meant by it is in general the demand for the realisation of the Notion, which realisation does not lie in the beginning itself, but is rather the goal and the task of the entire further development of cognition. Further, since the content of the beginning is supposed to be justified and authenticated as something true or correct by its being pointed out in inner or outer perception, it is no longer the form of universality as such that is meant, but its determinateness, of which we shall need to speak presently. The authentication of the determinate content with which the beginning is made seems to lie behind it; but in fact it is to be considered as an advance, that is, if it belongs to philosophical cognition.

§ 1787

Hence the beginning has for the method no other determinateness than that of being simple and universal; this is itself the determinateness by reason of which it is deficient. Universality is the pure simple Notion, and the method, as consciousness of the Notion, knows that universality is only a moment and that in it the Notion is not yet determined in and for itself. But with this consciousness that would carry the beginning further only for the sake of the method, the method would be a formal affair, something posited in external reflection. Since however it is the objective immanent form, the immediate of the beginning must be in its own self deficient and endowed with the urge to carry itself further. But in the absolute method the universal has the value not of a mere abstraction but of the objective universal, that is, the universal that is in itself the concrete totality, though that totality is not yet posited, is not yet for itself. Even the abstract universal as such, considered in its Notion, that is in its truth, is not merely the simple, but as abstract is already posited as infected with a negation. For this reason too there is nothing, whether in actuality or in thought, that is as simple and as abstract as is commonly imagined. A simple thing of this kind is a mere presumption that has its ground solely in the unconsciousness of what is actually present. Above, that with which the beginning is made was determined as the immediate; the immediacy of the universal is the same thing that is here expressed as the in-itself that is without a being-for-self. Hence it may indeed be said that every beginning must be made with the absolute, just as all advance is merely the exposition of it, in so far as its in-itself is the Notion. But because the absolute is at first only in itself it equally is not the absolute nor the posited Notion, and also not the Idea; for what characterises these is precisely the fact that in them the in-itself is only an abstract, one-sided moment. Hence the advance is not a kind of superfluity; this it would be if that with which the beginning is made were in truth already the absolute; the advance consists rather in the universal determining itself and being for itself the universal, that is, equally an individual and a subject. Only in its consummation is it the absolute.

...

§ 1790

The method of absolute cognition is to this extent analytic. That it finds the further determination of its initial universal simply and solely in that universal, is the absolute objectivity of the Notion, of which objectivity the method is the certainty. But the method is no less synthetic, since its subject matter, determined immediately as a simple universal, by virtue of the determinateness which it possesses in its very immediacy and universality, exhibits itself as an other. This relation of differential elements which the subject matter

thus is within itself, is however no longer the same thing as is meant by synthesis in finite cognition; the mere fact of the subject matter's no less analytic determination in general, that the relation is relation within the Notion, completely distinguishes it from the latter synthesis.

§ 1791

This no less synthetic than analytic moment of judgement, by which the universal of the beginning of its own accord determines itself as the other of itself, is to be named the dialectical moment.

Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences that have been most misunderstood in the metaphysics of the moderns, as well as by popular philosophy in general, ancient and modern alike. Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that, just as Thales was the founder of natural philosophy and Socrates of moral philosophy, so Plato was the founder of the third science pertaining to philosophy, namely, dialectic — a service which the ancient world esteemed his highest, but which often remains quite overlooked by those who have most to say about him. Dialectic has often been regarded as an art, as though it rested on a subjective talent and did not belong to the objectivity of the Notion. The shape it takes and the result it reaches in Kantian philosophy have already been pointed out in the specific examples of the Kantian view of it. It must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic is once more recognised as necessary to reason, although the result to be drawn from it must be the opposite of that arrived at by Kant.

...

§ 1792

Besides the fact that dialectic is generally regarded as contingent, it usually takes the following more precise form. It is shown that there belongs to some subject matter or other, for example the world, motion, point, and so on, some determination or other, for example (taking the objects in the order named), finite in space or time, presence in this place, absolute negation of space; but further, that with equal necessity the opposite determination also belongs to the subject matter, for example, infinity in space and time, non-presence in this place, relation to space and so spatiality. The older Eleatic school directed its dialectic chiefly against motion. Plato frequently against the general ideas and notions of his time, especially those of the Sophists, but also against the pure categories and the determinations of reflection; the more cultivated scepticism of a later period extended it not only to the immediate so-called facts of consciousness and maxims of common life, but also to all the notions of science.

§ 1793

Now the conclusion drawn from dialectic of this kind is in general the contradiction and nullity of the assertion made. But this conclusion can be drawn in either of two senses either in the objective sense, that the subject matter which in such a manner contradicts itself cancels itself out and is null and void — this was, for example, the conclusion of the Eleatics, according to which truth was denied, for example, to the world, to motion, to the point; or in the subjective sense, that cognition is defective.

One way of understanding the latter sense of the conclusion is that it is only this dialectic that imposes on us the trick of an illusion. This is the common view of so-called sound common sense which takes its stand on the evidence of the senses and on customary conceptions and judgements. Sometimes it takes this dialectic lightly, as when Diogenes the cynic exposes the hollowness of the dialectic of motion by silently walking up and down;; but often it flies into a passion, seeing it in perhaps a piece of sheer foolery, or, when morally important objects are concerned, an outrage that tries to unsettle what is essentially established and teaches how to supply wickedness with grounds. This is the view expressed in the Socratic dialectic against that of the Sophists, and this is the indignation which, turned in the opposite direction, cost even Socrates his life. The vulgar refutation that opposes to thinking, as did Diogenes, sensuous consciousness and imagines that in the latter it possesses the truth, must be left to itself; but in so far as dialectic abrogates moral determinations, we must have confidence in reason that it will know how to restore them again, but restore them in their truth and in the consciousness of their right, though also of their limitations. Or again, the conclusion of subjective nullity may mean that it does not affect dialectic itself, but rather the cognition against which it is directed and in the view of scepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy, cognition in general.

§ 1794

The fundamental prejudice in this matter is that dialectic has only a negative result, a point which will presently be more precisely defined. First of all as regards the above-mentioned form in which dialectic is usually presented, it is to be observed that according to that form the dialectic and its result affect the subject matter under consideration or else subjective cognition, and declare either the latter or the subject matter to be null and void, while on the other hand the determinations exhibited in the subject matter as in a third thing receive no attention and are presupposed as valid on their own account.

It is an infinite merit of the Kantian Philosophy to have drawn attention to this uncritical procedure and by so doing to have given the impetus to the restoration of logic and dialectic in the sense of the examination of the determinations of thought in and for themselves. The subject matter kept apart from thinking and the Notion, is an image or even a name; it is in the determinations of thought and the Notion that it is what it is. Therefore these determinations are in fact the sole thing that matters; they are the true subject matter and content of reason, and anything else that one understands by subject matter and content in distinction from them as

value only through them and in them. It must not therefore be considered the fault of a subject matter or of cognition that these determinations, through their constitution and an external connection, show themselves dialectical. On that assumption, the subject matter or the cognition is represented as a subject into which the determinations in the form of predicates, properties, self-subsistent universals, are introduced in such a manner that, fixed and correct as they are by themselves, they are brought into dialectical relationships and contradiction only by extraneous and contingent connection in and by a third thing. This kind of external and fixed subject of imagination and understanding and these abstract determinations, far from meriting the status of ultimates, of secure and permanent substrates, are rather to be regarded as themselves immediate, as just that kind of presupposed and initial immediate that, as was shown above, must in its own essential nature [in and for itself] submit to dialectic, because it is to be taken as in itself the Notion.

Thus all the oppositions that are assumed as fixed, as for example finite and infinite, individual and universal, are not in contradiction through, say, an external connection; on the contrary, as an examination of their nature has shown, they are in and for themselves a transition; the synthesis and the subject in which they appear is the product of their Notion's own reflection. If a consideration that ignores the Notion stops short at their external relationship, isolates them and leaves them as fixed presuppositions, it is the Notion, on the contrary, that keeps them steadily in view, moves them as their soul and brings out their dialectic.

§ 1795

Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself.

Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated — contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic consists solely of such.

§ 1796

Accordingly, what we now have before us is the mediated, which to begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a simple determination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is present. Now since the first also is contained in the second, and the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its predicate; for example, the finite, one is infinite, one is many, the individual is the universal. However, the inadequate form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the judgement it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form of the positive judgement, is incapable of holding within its grasp speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the negative judgement, would at least have to be added as well. In the judgement the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in them is not posited -- which would be precisely the purpose of employing a proposition.

...

§ 1798

If then the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgement, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical. this is solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For the material, the opposed determinations in one relation, is already posited and at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without reciprocal contact.

On this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable: but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation.

§ 1799

Now the negativity just considered constitutes the turning point of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of the negative relation to self, the innermost source of all activity of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublating of the opposition between the Notion and reality, and the unity that is truth. The second negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have arrived, is this sublating of the contradiction, but just as little as the contradiction is it an act of external reflection, but rather the innermost, most objective moment of life and spirit through which a subject, a person, a free being, exists.

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...

§ 1801

In this turning point of the method, the course of cognition at the same time returns into itself. As self-sublating contradiction this negativity is the restoration of the first immediacy, of simple universality; for the other of the other, the negative of the negative, is immediately the positive, the identical, the universal. If one insists on counting, this second immediate is, in the course of the method as a whole, the third term to the first immediate and the mediated. It is also, however, the third term to the first or formal negative and to absolute negativity or the second negative; now as the first negative is already the second term, the term reckoned as third can also be reckoned as fourth, and instead of a triplicity, the abstract form may be taken as a quadruplicity; in this way, the negative or the difference is counted as a duality. The third or fourth is in general the unity of the first and second moments, of the immediate and the mediated. That it is this unity, as also that the whole form of the method is a triplicity, is, it is true, merely the superficial external side of the mode of cognition; but to have demonstrated even this, and that too in a more specific application -- for it is well known that the abstract number form itself was advanced at quite an early period, but, in the absence of the Notion, without result -- must also be regarded as an infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy.

§ 1802

The syllogism, which is threefold, has always been recognised as the universal form of reason; but for one thing it counted generally for a quite external form that did not determine the nature of the content, and for another thing, since it progresses in the formal sense merely in the understanding's determination of identity, it lacks the essential dialectical moment of negativity; yet this moment enters into the triplicity of determinations because the third is the unity of the first two, and these, since they are different, can be in the unity only as sublated determinations. Formalism has, it is true, also taken possession of triplicity and adhered to its empty schema; the shallow ineptitude and barrenness of modern philosophic construction so-called, that consists in nothing but fastening this schema on to everything without Notion and immanent determination and employing it for an external arrangement, has made the said form tedious and given it a bad name. Yet the triteness of this use of it cannot detract from its inner worth and we must always value highly the discovery of the shape of the rational, even though it was at first uncomprehended.

§ 1803

Now more precisely the third is the immediate, but the immediate resulting from sublation of mediation, the simple resulting from sublation of difference, the positive resulting from sublation of the negative, the Notion that has realised itself by means of its otherness and by the sublation of this reality has become united with itself, and has restored its absolute reality, its simple relation to itself. This result is therefore the truth. It is equally immediacy and mediation; but such forms of judgement as: the third is immediacy and mediation, or it is the unity of them, are not capable of grasping it; for it is not a quiescent third, but, precisely as this unity, is self-mediating movement and activity. As that with which we began was the universal, so the result is the individual, the concrete, the subject; what the former is in itself the latter is now equally for itself, the universal is posited in the subject. The first two moments of the triplexity are abstract, untrue moments which for that very reason are dialectical, and through this their negativity make themselves into the subject. The Notion itself is for us, in the first instance, alike the universal that is in itself, and the negative that is for itself, and also the third, that which is both in and for itself, the universal that runs through all the moments of the syllogism, but the third is the conclusion, in which the Notion through its negativity is mediated with itself and thereby posited for itself as the universal and the identity of its moments.

§ 1804

Now this result, as the whole that has withdrawn into and is identical with itself, has given itself again the form of immediacy. Hence it is now itself the same thing as the starting-point had determined itself to be. As simple self-relation it is a universal, and in this universality, the negativity that constituted its dialectic and mediation has also collapsed into simple determinateness which can again be a beginning. It may seem at first sight that this cognition of the result is an analysis of it and therefore must again dissect these determinations and the process by which it has come into being and been examined. But if the treatment of the subject matter is actually carried out in this analytic manner, it belongs to that stage of the Idea considered above, to the cognition of enquiry, which merely states of its subject matter what is, but not the necessity of its concrete identity and the Notion of it. But though the method of truth which comprehends the subject matter is, as we have shown, itself analytic, for it remains entirely within the Notion, yet it is equally synthetic, for through the Notion the subject matter is determined dialectically and as an other. On the new foundation constituted by the result as the fresh subject matter, the method remains the same as with the previous subject matter. The difference is concerned solely with the relationship of the foundation as such; true, it is now likewise a foundation, but its immediacy is only a form, since it was a result as well; hence its determinateness as content is no longer something merely picked up, but something deduced and proved.

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§ 1808

Consequently, just as the absence of content in the above beginnings does not make them absolute beginnings, so too it is not the content as such that could lead the method into the infinite progress forwards or backwards. From one aspect, the determinateness which the method creates for itself in its result is the moment by means of which the method is self-mediation and converts the immediate beginning into something mediated. But conversely, it is through the determinateness that this mediation of the method runs its course; it returns through a content as through an apparent other of itself to its beginning in such a manner that not only does it restore that beginning -- as a determinate beginning however -- but the result is no less the sublated determinateness, and so too the restoration of the first immediacy in which it began. This it accomplishes as a system of totality. We have still to consider it in this determination.

§ 1809

We have shown that the determinateness which was a result is itself, by virtue of the form of simplicity into which it has withdrawn, a fresh beginning; as this beginning is distinguished from its predecessor precisely by that determinateness, cognition rolls onwards from content to content. First of all, this advance is determined as beginning from simple determinatenesses the succeeding ones becoming ever richer and more concrete. For the result contains its beginning and its course has enriched it by a fresh determinateness. The universal constitutes the foundation; the advance is therefore not to be taken as a flowing from one other to the next other. In the absolute method the Notion maintains itself in its otherness, the universal in its particularisation, in judgement and reality; at each stage of its further determination it raises the entire mass of its preceding content, and by its dialectical advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind, but carries along with it all it has gained, and inwardly enriches and consolidates itself.

§ 1810

This expansion may be regarded as the moment of content, and in the whole as the first premise; the universal is communicated to the wealth of content, immediately maintained in it. But the relationship has also its second, negative or dialectical side. The enrichment proceeds in the necessity of the Notion, it is held by it, and each determination is a reflection-into-self. Each new stage of forthgoing, that is, of further determination, is also a withdrawal inwards, and the greater extension is equally a higher intensity.

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Whatever objections to it might be raised -- say, the limitations of human knowledge, the need to examine critically the instrument of cognition before starting to deal with the subject matter -- are themselves presuppositions, which as

concrete determinations involve the demand for their mediation and proof. Since therefore they possess no formal advantage over the beginning with the subject matter against which they protest, but on the contrary themselves require deduction on account of their more concrete content, their claim to prior consideration must be treated as an empty presumption. They have an untrue content, for they convert what we know to be finite and untrue into something incontestable and absolute, namely, a limited cognition determined as form and instrument relatively to its content; this untrue cognition is itself also the form, the process of seeking grounds, that is retrogressive.. The method of truth, too, knows the beginning to be incomplete, because it is a beginning; but at the same time it knows this incompleteness to be a necessity, because truth only comes to be itself through negativity of immediacy.

...

§ 1814

By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation; this circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member. Links of this chain are the individual sciences [of logic, nature and spirit], each of which has an antecedent and a successor -- or, expressed more accurately, has only the antecedent and indicates its successor in its conclusion.

...

By reason of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is also utterly free -- the externality of space and time existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity. In so far as this externality presents itself only in the abstract immediacy of being and is apprehended from the standpoint of consciousness, it exists as mere objectivity and external life; but in the Idea it remains essentially and actually [in and for itself] the totality of the Notion, and science in the relationship to nature of divine cognition.

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Alenka Zupančič. The Real as Impossible

2011 - <https://youtu.be/Bj8WZpYOC2M>

...

CHAPTER 2 : ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMY OF EFFORT

Conducted in objective-subjective-subjective-objective manner; also called 'OSSO'.

For some ideas of a reference like: "breaking the mirror in the instant of glueing the broken pieces seamlessly together, whatever. Being just in some literal aktionistic zen state kind of way, known what is meant with that."

ALL PREVIOUS AND FOLLOWING TEXT HAS BEEN HAND-TYPED ON AN AZERTY KEYBOARD why?

COPY & KNOW (sense of subjective authentication and expression of available information) READ & REMEMBER (sense of attentive affection and activation of behavioral imagination)

OBJECT X = text SUBJECT Y = reader TIME-SPACE W Z = situation

At the end of an age it is worth while to reflect and situate ourselves in order to proceed towards any imaginable version of a potential future.

The history of the twentieth century is the history of the conflict and alliances of three figures. The sage is the heir of human labor, the bearer of the intelligence accumulated by the infinite succession of acts of labor and the infinite series of acts of the refusal of labor. The refusal of labor induces the evolutive motion of intelligence. Intelligence is the refusal of work, actualized into a socially useful form. Because of intelligence it becomes possible to substitute human labor with

machines. Because of the refusal of work, science is pushed forward, developed, put into practice. From the outset, modern science has been aware of its function in this respect.

Knowledge multiplies the human capacity to produce useful things and the spaces of freedom for all human beings, by reducing the necessary labor time to produce whatever society needs. **?**is means that to know is to have power. **?**e merchant and the warrior want to turn knowledge into an instrument of power. And to this end they have to subdue the sage. But this does not occur easily, because knowledge does not tolerate domination. **?**us, the warrior and the merchant resort to traps and deceit, to submit the power of thinking to the power of money and violence.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; **?**e Merchant, **?**e Warrior and **?**e Sage; page 58 - 59; Franco Bifo Berardi

Refusal of work does not mean so much the obvious fact that workers do not like to be exploited, but something more. It means that capitalist restructuring, technological change, and the general transformation of social institutions are produced by the daily action of withdrawal from exploitation, of the rejection of the obligation to produce surplus value and to increase the value of capital by reducing the value of life. I do not like the term 'Operaismo', because of the implicit reduction to a narrow social reference (the workers, 'operai' in Italian), and I would prefer to use the word 'compositionism' **?**e concept of social composition, or 'class composition' (widely used by the group of thinkers we are talking about), has much more to do with chemistry than with the history of society.

Autonomy is the independence of social time from the temporality of capitalism.

?is is the meaning of the expression refusal of work. It means quite simply: I don't want to go to work because I prefer to sleep. But this laziness is the source of intelligence, of technology, of progress. Autonomy is the self-regulation of the social body in its independence and in its interaction with the disciplinary norm.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; What is the meaning of autonomy today; page 77; Franco Bifo Berardi

?e division of time is reducible to a relative minimum instant of singular operations. In other words: to count time by action, not in duration. To generate other sense in the multiplicity of actions taking place, and to intend to re ect upon past related future actions in respect of their organization, and even larger behavioral cycles beyond the individual, the situation can be signi cant towards a choreographic sense of action within realtime-space. **?**us one hour time in this case has a dynamic uncountability depending on the operations brought into action during that period of countable time.

?e division of time into actions is an intend to authorize the individual to complete or revise their operations during any form of activity.

?e duration of any activity can be measured by other means of time, although the efficiency can not be based on any clock based assumptions of countability. In this time of networked societies, it has become apparent that global atomic clocks allowed for the labor time to synchronize into forms of continuous online Time presents.

During the century of communist revolutions, the Marxist-Leninist tradition disregarded and relegated to the background the notion of the General Intellect, even though in the post- industrial productive transformation it emerged as a central productive force. At the end of the century, thanks to digital technologies and the creation of the global telematic network, the general social process is rede ned by the General Intellect and the Leninist conception of the party de nitively abandons the stage. Even the Gramscian notion of the organic intellectual loses coherence since it is based on the adherence of intellectuals to an ideology, while what counts now is the formation of a new social concatenation, which we can call the cognitariat, representing the social subjectivity of the General Intellect.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; From the organic intellectual to the General Intellect; page 67; Franco Bifo Berardi

Relational aesthetics and constructed situations

?e Situationist "constructed" situation concept is intended to replace artistic representation by the experimental realization of artistic energy in everyday settings. ...

?e Situationist theory overlooks the fact that if the spectacle deals rst and foremost with forms of human relations (it is "a social relationship between people, with imagery as the go- between"), it can only be analyzed and fought through the production of new types of relationships between people. ...

It is possible to imagine "constructed situations" for private use, and even intentionally barring others. **?**e idea of "situation" extends the unity of time, place and action, in a theatre that does not necessarily involve a relationship with the Other. Artistic practice is always a relationship with the other, at the same time as it represents a relationship with the world. **?**e 'constructed situation' does not necessarily correspond to a 'relational world', formulated on the basis of a gure of exchange.

Is it by coincidence that Debord divides the time of the spectacles into two, between the "exchangeable time" of work ("endless accumulation of equivalent intervals") and the "consumable time" of holidays, which imitates natural cycles while at the same time being a spectacle "to a more intense degree"? **?**e idea of "exchangeable time" turns out, here, to be purely negative: the negative element is not the exchange per se, which is a factor of life and sociability. What Debord identi es, possibly wrongly, with the inter-human exchange are 'the capitalist forms of exchange'.

?ese forms of exchange stem from the "meeting" between the accumulation of capital (the employer) and the available work force (the employee-worker), in the form of a contract.

?ey do not represent exchange in absolute terms, but an historical form of production (capitalism). Work time is thus less an "exchangeable time" in the fullest sense, than a 'buyable' time in the form of a salary or wage-packet. **?**e work that forms a "relational world", and a social interstice, updates Situationism and reconciles it , as far as possible, with the art world.

Relational Aesthetics; page 84-85; Nicolas Bourriaud

At the end of this time present, wherein the individual is biologically bounded to other forms of activity than continuous labor, the value related to time has necessarily shifted towards value inherent in time, and previously time related.

To act has a duration relative to its countability in numerical form, no matter how precise. Quality or other values are therefore related to the manner any operation is brought into action, relative to its numerical expression in time.

The manner any action affects itself, can be related directly to the altered perception of the 'durationalities' between operation, action, perception.

In more practical terms: the intend to bring operation into action 'to do what is desired' is valued from the individual perception 'exactly, kind of, not at all' during the attachment to the intend. The shift of value, that occurs to notions of time for actions to take place within a commonly accepted norm, becomes an incremental disorder within any human based time system, except for full time automated online systems.

Instead of inventing more jobs for unemployed humans to give meaning to work, in respect of competing with automated full-time (24/7) labour forms, the main value to any human activity would be considered on the individual perception of the operation brought into action.

<https://soundcloud.com/sicksentz/02-sicksentz-aint-different>

In other words: when all necessities regarding modern human needs are fulfilled through automation, the question becomes "now you have all the time and money, how would you want to be doing and what would you want happening to you?"

Info-machines have taken the place of the mother, changing the process of language learning. Certainly the first video-electronic generation did enjoy the mother's bodily presence much less than in the past times. The bodily and affective contact was a factor of singularization of language, and it is lost. Emotion and word tend to divert in these conditions. Desire becomes a dimension which is more and more separated from verbalization, from conscious processing of information. Emotions without words tend to feed psychopathology and violence. Acting without verbal communication is closed to aggression. Words without emotion feed a sociality which is poorer and poorer, reduced to the logic of giving and receiving.

The verbal processing of information and of emotion that is connected to information is compressed in ever accelerated times, and is giving way to a disturbance of emotionality and verbalization. Aphasia can be interpreted as a consequence of the growing distance between info-stimulation and the time needed for the elaboration of info-stimuli. We may see an effect of this acceleration also in the phenomenon of dyslexia? that is especially affecting cognitive workers, those who are exposed to the rhythm of electronic communication. To read a text from the beginning to the end seems to be an impossible task for managers.

Desire dwells in conjunction, and is killed by connection. Connection means a relationship between formatted segments; making desingularized bodies compatible. Conjunction means singular, unrepeatable communication between round bodies. Connection means integration of smooth bodies in a space which is no space and in a time which is no time.

Conjunction is the meeting and fusion of round and irregular shapes that are continuously weaseling their way about with no precision, repetition or perfection. Connection is the punctual and repeatable interaction of algorithmic functions, straight lines and points that overlap perfectly, and plug in or out according to discrete modes of interaction that render the different parts compatible to a pre-established standard. The shift from conjunction to connection as the predominant mode of interaction of conscious organisms is a consequence of the gradual digitalization of signs and the increasing mediatization of relations.

Conjunction is a process of 'becoming other.' In contrast, in connection, each element remains distinct and interacts only functionally. Singularities change when they conjoin – they become something other than what they were before their conjunction. The combination of asignifying signs gives rise to the emergence of meaning which previously did not exist.

Connected bodies are subjected to a kind of progressive inability to feel pleasure, and forced to choose the way of simulating pleasure: the shift from touch to vision, from hairy bodies to smooth connectable bodies. The control on the body does not come from outside. The control is built inside, in the very relationship between self-perception and identity.

When the info-sphere becomes hyper-speedy, hyper-thick, and the impulses are proliferating beyond any limit, we become less and less able to elaborate in a conscious way on the emotional impulses reaching our skin, our sensitivity, our brain. Consciousness is detached from sensitivity, and subjugated by the connective machine.

Autistic behavior can be described as the effect of the inability to feel the other's emotionality, and to project in the other's body pleasure and pain that we feel in our body. Lack of empathy seems to be an endemic effect of the growing time of the exposure of the mind to the accelerated virtual info-sphere.

I'm not reclaiming any authenticity for the erotic self; I'm not fantasizing about the golden age of sexual happiness. I'm just interested in noting the signs of a pathology in the current proliferation of pornography: namely a pathology of emotionality. This pathology, which is latent in every kind of pornographic product, is highlighted by the mediatization, and especially by the net proliferation of porn. Since image and emotion are separated, the pornographic act (of vision) does not produce the emotional effect we are expecting. So we repeat the act (of vision).

Too few words, too little time to talk. Too little time to feel. Porn is an exercise in emotional automation and uniformity of the emotional time of response. Don't miss the implication between permanent electrocution, the shortening of linguistic attentive elaboration and atrophy of emotional response. Pornography is just the visible surface of this neuro short circuit.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; The obsession with the (vanishing) body; page 100 - 103; Franco Bifo Berardi

The mass of men serve the State thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, &c. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw, or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens.

Others, as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders, serve the State chiefly with their heads; and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it, as God. A very few, as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and 'men', serve the State with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated by it as enemies. A wise man will only be useful as a man, and will not submit to be "clay," and "stop a hole to keep the wind away," but leave that office to his dust at least:

"I am too high-born to be propertied,
To be a secondary at control,
Or useful serving-man and instrument
To any sovereign state throughout the world."

He who gives himself entirely to his fellow-man appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them is pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist.

How does it become a man to behave toward this American government to-day? I answer that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as 'my' government which is the 'slave's' government also.

Civil Disobedience; page 3; Henry David Thoreau

So what? I have no answer. All we can do is what we are actually doing already: the self-organization of cognitive work is the only way to go beyond the psychopathic present. I don't believe that the world can be governed by reason. The utopia of Enlightenment has failed. But I think that the dissemination of self-organized knowledge can create a social framework containing infinite autonomous and self-reliant worlds.

The process of creating the network is so complex that it cannot be governed by human reason. The global mind is too complex to be known and mastered by subsegmental localized minds. We cannot know, we cannot control, we cannot govern the entire force of the global mind. But we can master the singular process of producing a singular world of sociality. This is autonomy today.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; Fractal time and social pathology; page 84 - 85; Franco Bifo Berardi

Today's artists appears as an operator of signs, modeling production structures so as to provide significant doubles. An entrepreneur/politician/director. The most common denominator shared by all artists is that they show something. The act of showing suffices to define the artist, be it a representation or a designation.

Co-existence criterion

All works of art produce a model of sociability, which transposes reality of might be conveyed in it. So, there is a question we are entitled to ask in front of any aesthetic production: "Does this work permit me to enter into dialogue? Could I exist, and how, in the space it defines? " A form is more or less democratic. May I simply remind you, for the record, that the forms produced by the art of totalitarian regimes are peremptory and closed in on themselves (particularly through their stress on symmetry). Otherwise put, they do not give the viewer a chance to complement them.

0.0 production plan (zero point zero)

wednesday 12 to 18 = 6 hours / operation thursday 14 to 20 = 6 hours / organization friday 18 to 02 = 8 hours / event

saturday 16 to 21 = 5 hours / publication

25 working hours / week 1 euro / minute

720 euro / week

2880 euro / month

50% tax & investments / 50% artist cooperative members 60minutes times 25 hours (1440) times four weeks (5760)

For what kind of things you would pay 1 euro per minute for? ...

to be continued

Sexy service, massage, a limousine drive, some kind of a performance, or spectacular act.

Someone to listen to you talking shit to them, or try games with them or something. A good legal advisor, or someone you can trust and has the capacities to get

you what you want.

Complete relaxation, or just for inspiration, other information. Maybe just some sweet and loving care, a heart at ends of its despair, or some soup could do.

do 00:01 13-12-2012

Relational Aesthetics; page 108-109; Nicolas Bourriaud

Precarious is person who is able to know nothing about one's own future and therefore is hung by the present and praises God to be rescued from the earthly hell (the term precarity derives from praying). We speak of precarious labor when labor is subordinated to a form of flexible and unregulated exploitation, subjected to daily fluctuations of the labor market, and forced to endure the blackmail of a discontinuous salary. The precarious worker is not formally employed, and still his existence is not at all free, the waged relationship is discontinuous and occasional, and still the dependence is continuous and full of anxiety.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; Precarity; page 150; Franco Bifo Berardi

Have your place where you can invite people into. Live love, no less.

Only do the work that really matters to you. Don't argue, do.

Work beyond words And get rid of drugs.

The conscious-feeling organism is enveloped in a web of signs that are not simply the bearers of information, but also factors of perceptive stimulation and excitation. In the past, artistic experience was founded on the sensorial centrality of catharsis. The work of art created a wave of involvement and excitement that rushed forward towards a climax, a cathartic

state of agitation comparable to orgasmic release. In its classical, as well as romantic and modern conceptions, beauty was identifiable with the moment of completion, an overcoming of the tension implicit in the relationship between the feeling organism and the world: catharsis, harmony, sublime detachment. Reaching harmony is an event that can be compared to orgasmic release following the excitement of contact between bodies. Muscle tension relaxes in the fullness of pleasure. In the happy perception of one's own body and the surrounding environment what is at play is an essential question of rhythm, time and lived temporalities. But if, into the circle of excitement, we introduce an inorganic element such as electronics and impose an acceleration of stimuli and a contraction of psychophysical reaction times, something ends up changing in the organism and its forms of erotic reaction. Orgasm is replaced by a series of excitations without release. Orgasm is no longer the prelude to any accomplishment. Inconclusive excitation takes the place of orgasmic release.

In the post-urban dimension of the cyberspatial sprawl, contact seems to become impossible, replaced by precipitous forms of experience that overlap with commercialization and violence. Slow emotion is rare and improbable. And the very slowness of emotion is transformed little by little into a commodity, an artificial condition that can be exchanged for money. Time is scarce – time can be exchanged for money. Time, an indispensable dimension of pleasure, is cut into fragments that can no longer be enjoyed. Excitation without release replaces pleasure.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; Cybertime, eroticism and desensitization; page 92 - 93; Franco Bifo Berardi

In our post-industrial societies, the most pressing thing is no longer the emancipation of individuals, but the freeing-up of inter-human communications, the dimensional emancipation of existence.

few things to help:

A certain suspicion creeps in with regard to mediative tools, and transitional objects in general. And thus, by extension, to the work of art regarded as a medium whereby an individual expresses his/her vision of the world in front of an audience. Relations between artists and what they produce thus tend towards the feedback zone. For some years now, there has been an upsurge of convivial, user-friendly artistic projects, festive, collective and participatory, exploring the varied potential in the relationship to the other. The public is being taken into account more and more.

this "sole appearance of a distance"

It is in this sense that we can talk of a community effect in contemporary art. It does not involve those corporate phenomena which too often act as a disguise for the most die-hard forms of conservatism (in this day and age, feminism, anti-racism and environmentalism all operate too frequently as lobbies playing the power game by enabling it never to have to call itself into question in a structural way). Contemporary art thus introduces a radical shift in relation to modern art, inasmuch as it does not turn its back on the aura of the work of art, but rather moves its origin and effect. This was the thrust, some time back, of that masterpiece produced by the group General Idea, Towards an audience vocabulary (1977), which skipped the whole art object phase and spoke directly to the audience, offering it patterns of associations. But the audience concept must not be mythicized - the idea of a unified "mass" has more to do with a Fascist aesthetic than with these momentary experiences, where everyone has to hang on to his/her identity. It is a matter of predefined coding and restricted to a contract, and not a matter of a social binding hardening around totems of identity. The aura of contemporary art is a free association.

Relational Aesthetics; page 61; Nicolas Bourriaud

In the absence, then, of a satisfactory and comprehensive definition, we run the risk of defining fascism as everything that disgusts us, and of identifying fascism, simply, as the party of imbecility and violence: as the party of evil. And this, naturally, doesn't work, it doesn't define anything. The problem is that to which we are referring by using this word fascism which is imprecise and historically far too dated, is an extremely vast field of forms of life, behaviors, ideologies and prejudices that have, in the last analysis, a single element in common: the obsession with definition. The obsession to define is, in the last analysis, the characteristic common to the field of phenomena that we define as fascism. This is why this object is so difficult to define.

The pressure that seems to fundamentally guide those behaviors which fall within the ambit of fascism is the pressure to recognize ourselves as identical, identifiable, and therefore belonging to a community (of language, faith, race) based upon origin. Only origin bears witness to belonging, and as we know, origin is an illusion, a legend, an attribute that is more or less shared, but unfounded. Ethnic identity does not exist any more than linguistic identity. While each of us comes from a history of crossbreeding and contaminations that can neither be attested nor authenticated, there are illusions of ethnic belonging; while each of us speaks our own dialect that can never be fundamentally translatable by another speaker, there are illusions of linguistic comprehension. Living together is premised on these. The more the field of ethnic identifiability, of comprehensibility, of origin, are perturbed, the more acute becomes the need to identify, to the point of obsession.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; Fascism and identification; page 96; As Walter Benjamin writes: 'all efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war.' The becoming aesthetic of life is one aspect of this mobilization of social energies. The aestheticization of war is functional to the subjugation of everyday life to the rule of history. War forces the global masses to partake in the process of self-realization of the Hegelian Spirit, or, perhaps more realistically, to become part of capitalist global accumulation. Captured in the dynamics of war, everyday life is ready to be subjected to the unlimited rule of the commodity.

From this standpoint, there is no difference between fascism, communism and democracy: art functions as the element of aestheticization and mobilization of everyday life. Total mobilization is terror, and terror is the ideal condition for a full realization of the capitalist plan to mobilize psychic energy.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; Activism; page 128; Franco Bifo Berardi

Cooperative workspace and artist residence

- Modules with 3 to 15 members per cultural producer cooperative. The members cover for all the workspace expenses.
- The workspace provides artwork & gathers a travel budget.
- Partnered investment in energy plus living
- The workspace connects to similar venues, and becomes itself member of an investment fund for energy plus living.
- Local publishing and internet broadcasting
- The members publish artwork on an irregular basis, in a regular manner. The events are preferable broadcasted, or available soon after.
- International trilateral events
- The workspace connects to similar venues in multiple geographic areas and synchronizes its ongoing calendar of international multi-appearance.
- Workshop exchange venues

Among the members in all the venues of the cultural producer cooperatives, the exchange amongst venues is encouraged to host and guest all members internationally.

- One on one profit and expense

All profit is divided in 50% net salary and 50% taxes and cooperative investments. All expenses are related to the members according to their individual contributions.

Another example is intelligence. The intelligence cannot know itself unless it has something intelligible to hold; then the intelligence realizes itself. A person with a poetic gift who is born a poet, never realizes himself to be a poet till he has put his idea on paper, and his verse has struck a chord in his own heart. When he is able to appreciate his poetry, then is the time that he thinks: 'I am a poet'. Till then there was a gift of poetry in him, but he did not know it.

Franco Bifo Berardi

The eyes do not become more powerful by looking in the mirror. Only the eyes know what they are like when they see their reflection. The pleasure is in realizing one's merits, one's gifts, what one possesses. It is in realizing that the merit lies. No doubt it would be great pity if the eyes thought: 'We are as dead as the mirror', or if in looking in the mirror they thought: 'We do not exist except in the mirror'. So the false self is the greatest limitation.

The Mysticism of Sound and Music; page 230; Hazrat Inayat Khan

If, as Serge Daney writes, "all form is a face looking at us", what does a form become when it is plunged into the dimension of dialogue? What is a form when it is essentially relational?

Form is most often defined as an outline contrasting with a content. But modernist esthetics talks about "formal beauty" by referring to a sort of (con)fusion between style and content, and an inventive compatibility of the former with the latter. We judge a work through its plastic or visual form. The most common criticism to do with new artistic practices consists, moreover, in denying them any "formal effectiveness", or in singling out their shortcomings in the "formal resolution". In observing contemporary artistic practices, we ought to talk of "formations" rather than "forms". Unlike an object that is closed in on itself by the intervention of a style and a signature, present day art shows that form only exists in the encounter and in the dynamic relationship enjoyed by an artistic proposition with other formations, artistic or otherwise. There are no forms in nature, in the wild state, as it is our gaze that creates these, by cutting them out in the depth of the visible. Forms are developed, one from another.

When the aesthetic discussion evolves, the status of form evolves along with it, and through it.

In the novels of Polish writer Witold Gombrowicz, we see how each individual generates his own form through his behavior, his way of coming across, and the way he addresses others. This form comes about in the borderline area where the individual struggles with the Other, so as to subject him to what he deems to be his "being". So, for Gombrowicz, our "form" is merely a relational property, linking us with those who reify us by the way they see us, to borrow a Sartorian terminology. When the individual thinks he is casting an objective eye upon himself, he is, in the final analysis, contemplating nothing other than the result of perpetual transactions with the subjectivity of others.

The artistic form, for some, side-steps this inevitability, for it is publicized by a 'work'.

Through it, the artist embarks upon a dialogue. The artistic practice thus resides in the invention of relations between consciousness. Each particular artwork is a proposal to live in a shared world, and the work of every artist is a bundle of relations with the world, giving rise to other relations, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum.

The face, Lévinas asserts, is "what orders me to serve another", "what forbids me to kill". Any "inter-subjective relation" proceeds by way of the form of the face, which symbolizes the responsibility we have towards others: "the bond with others is only made as responsibility", he writes, but don't ethics have a horizon other than this humanism which reduces inter-subjectivity to a kind of inter-servility?

He maintains that form, in an image, is nothing other than the representation of desire. Producing a form is to invent possible encounters; receiving a form is to create the conditions for an exchange, the way you return a service in a game of tennis.

...form is the representative of desire in the image. It is the horizon based on which the image may have a meaning, by pointing to a desired world, which the beholder thus becomes capable of discussing, and based on which his own desire can rebound.

Tzvetan Todorov has shown how the essence of sociability is the need for acknowledgement, much more than competition and violence. When an artist shows us something, he uses a transitive ethic which places his word between the "look-at-me" and the "look at that". Daney's most recent writings lament the end of this "Show/See" pairing, which represented the essence of a democracy of the image in favor of another pairing, this one TV-related and authoritarian. "Promote/receive",

marking the advent of the "Visual". In Daney's thinking, "all form is a face looking at me", because it is summoning me to dialogue with it.

Form is a dynamic that is included both, or turn by turn, in time and space. Form can only come about from a meeting between two levels of reality. For homogeneity does not produce images: it produces the visual, otherwise put, "looped information".

Relational Aesthetics; page 21-24; Nicolas Bourriaud

Visibility:

To bypass ideas of audience expectations and questions about the affect of a performance on the audience, here is a list of the things and ideas that audience can see and understand about how the process of work was, resulting in a specific performance:

- Length of the time of the process.
- Budget.
- Relations between the people performing, especially if the choreographer performs.
- Method of work: Improvisation, Practice based, One action that repeats, Memorized sequences of movements.
- Relation to a tradition of dance as an aesthetic choice: Idealistic (Ballet), Emotional and expressive (Mary Wigman), Humanistic and expressive (Pina Bausch), Strong/decisive and sexual (Ohad Naharin), Quotidian (Yvonne Rainer), Relating to a discourse (Xavier Le Roy). - Relation with the audience or how the audience is positioned in relation to the performance. - Relation of the artist to the community, who the people are that come to see the performance.

Re Coming Boogie-Woogie; page 247; Mychoreography.org

Again, we have more information, less meaning; more information, less pleasure. Sensibility is within time. Sensuality is in slowness, and the space of information is too vast and fast to elaborate upon it intensively, deeply. At the point of intersection between electronic cyberspace and organic cybertime is found the fundamental crux of the present mutation.

The great majority of humanity is subjected to the invasion of the video-electronic ux, and suffers the superimposition of digital code over the codes of recognition and of identification of reality that permeate organic cultures.

Precarious Rhapsody, Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of post-alpha generation; The cognitariat against capitalist cybertime; page 72 - 73; Franco Bifo Berardi

Assignments:

- Dance solo minimum 45 minutes, strictly on "phrase". Phrase understood as material. No light design or original music. Set and costume should fit in a plastic bag. The piece should be danced by the choreographer. The relation to the material should be articulated and justified.
- 15 minute power point presentation, prepared during one week, in front of a jury pitching a proposal for a performance to be realized during one week utilizing the competitors as actors, performers, workers etc. Budget: 1000€.
- 7 people, 7 weeks, 7 pieces, using only each other. The pieces should utilize minimum three performers of which one can be the choreographer, minimum 48 minutes duration. No light design or original music. Set and costume should fit in a plastic bag. All seven performances should be performed the same day/evening.
- Solo choreography, minimum 30 minutes and not danced by the choreographer, that is a study for a full-night group piece. The solo should be an autonomous work, with no light design or original music. Set and costume should fit in a plastic bag. The choreographer should present a proposition/concept for the group piece, including a title, set-design, costume and music. The group piece is not to be realized, but the title of the group piece is also the title for an exhibition, that should be realized in all parts except the realization in the exhibition space, i.e. proposition, artists, pieces, program text, hanging, pedagogical profile etc.
- Group choreography for a classical theatre dispositif, minimum 48 minutes, with at least three professional performers. No light design or original music. Set and costume should fit in a plastic bag. Budget: equal to two weeks full-time employment for 4 performers.

Re Coming Boogie-Woogie; page 18-19; Mychoreography.org

What is sound? Is sound outside, or is it something within? The outside sound only becomes audible because the sound within is continued, and the day when the sound within is shut off, this body is not capable of hearing the outside sound. Man, living today the life of externality, has become so accustomed to the outside life that he hardly thinks of just sitting alone. When he is alone he busies himself with a newspaper or something else, always working with the life which is outside, always occupied with the life outside himself. In this way man loses attachment to the life which is within. So his life

becomes superficial, and the result is nothing but disappointment. There is nothing in this world in the form of sound, visible or audible, which is so attractive as the sound within; for all that the senses touch and all that is intelligible to the mind of man has its limitation. It has its limitation in time and effect; it makes no effect beyond that.

Re Mysticism of Sound and Music; page 253; Hazrat Inayat Khan

The idea of innocence faces two ways. By refusing to enter a conspiracy, one remains innocent of that conspiracy. But to remain innocent may also be to remain ignorant. The issue is not in between innocence and knowledge (or between the natural and the cultural) but between a total approach to art which attempts to relate it to every aspect of experience and the esoteric approach of a few specialized experts who are the clerks of the nostalgia of a ruling class in decline. (In decline, not before the proletariat, but before the new power of the corporation and the state.) The real question is : to whom does the meaning of the art of the past properly belong? To those who can apply it to their own lives, or to a cultural hierarchy of relic specialists?

Ways of seeing; page 25; John Berger

The current trend, which will continue for the foreseeable future, is for highly capitalized cultural producers to envision "projects" that can be realized in many different forms (as films, television programs, dvds, live performances, sound recordings, toys, collectibles, etc.) rather than individual cultural objects. Even if changing circumstances necessitate shifts of emphasis,

none of the particular manifestations of the project need be problematic as long as the project as a whole is.

Live performance in a mediatized culture; page 30; Philip Auslander

To Veblen, businessmen were essentially predators, however much they or their apologists might drape their activities in the elaborate rationale of supply and demand or marginal utility. Later, in an essay on "The Captain of Industry," Veblen described the businessman as he really saw him; the following passage explains what is meant by the phrase "watchful waiting," which had been used to describe the entrepreneurial function:

Doubtless this form of words, "watchful waiting" will have been employed in the first place to describe the frame of mind of a toad who has reached years of discretion and has found his appointed place along some frequented run where many flies and spiders pass and repass on their way to complete that destiny to which it has pleased an all-seeing and merciful Providence to call them; but by an easy turn of speech it has also been found suitable to describe that mature order of captains of industry who are governed by sound business principles. There is a certain bland sufficiency spread across the face of a toad so circumstanced, while his comely bulk gives assurance of a pyramidal stability of principles.

The wordly philosophers; page 239; Robert Heilbroner

The loss of competitive spur to exertion had not, indeed, done anything to interfere with the necessary production of the community, but how if it should make men dull by giving them too much time for thought or idle musing? But, after all, this dull thundercloud only threatened us, and then passed over. Probably, from what I have told you before, you will have a guess at the remedy for such a disaster; remembering always the many of the things which used to be produced - slave-wares for the poor and mere wealth-wasting wares for the rich - ceased to be made. That remedy was, in short, the production of what used to be called art, but which has no name amongst us now, because it has become a necessary part of the labour of every man who produces."

News from Nowhere; page 98; William Morris

This sound Hu is the beginning and end of all sounds, be they from man, bird, beast, or thing. A minute study will prove this fact, which can be realized by listening to the sound of the steam engine or of a mill, while the echo of bells or gongs gives a typical illustration of the sound Hu. The Supreme Being has been called by various names in different languages, but the mystics have known him as Hu, the natural name, not man-made, the only name of the nameless which all nature constantly proclaims. ...

The mystery of Hu is revealed to the Su who journeys through the path of initiation. The more a Su listens to sawt-e-sarmad, the sound of the abstract, the more his consciousness becomes free from all the limitations of life.

The soul soars above the physical and mental plane without any special effort on man's part, which shows its calm and peaceful state; a dreamy look comes into his eyes and his countenance becomes radiant; he experiences the unearthly joy and rapture of wayad or ecstasy. When ecstasy overwhelms him he is neither conscious of the physical existence nor of the mental. This is the heavenly wine to which all Su poets refer, which is totally unlike the momentary intoxications of this mortal plane.

Sex:

The Mysticism of Sound and Music; page 172; Hazrat Inayat Khan

Sex, like dance, is something you can do alone or with others and which has to do with the body. Like dance, it gives rise to a variety of sensations while you do it, and can result in everything from joy and ecstasy to boredom or embarrassment, or sorrow, or physical harm, and even death. Like dance, people pay money to see other people perform it, and like dance, there is a vast number of styles and variations, interpretations and opinions related to it. Like dance, sex can be addictive, and equally, if not performed for an extended period of time, the desire to do it may diminish and in some cases disappear completely. Like dance, sex both leaves and gives rise to traces in our bodies and the way we move or interpret objects and the movement of objects, which makes it more or less a constant present in our daily life. However, sex is not dance and dance is not sex, unless it is a kind of sex-dance.

The Coming Boogie-Woogie; page 195; Mychoreography.org

In Finnish, there is a specific word which maybe best combines both senses of the emerging power: miellivalta. It reads literally mind-power or sense-power - the meaning of the word mieli is etymologically in the German words der Sinn (sense), das Gemüt (mind), die Launen (mood), die Lust (desire), der Verstand (reason, understanding), die Ansicht (view, opinion), die Absicht (intent, mind), die Erinnerung (memory); and valta means power (in the sense of Macht, pouvoir, potestas) - but first meaning is a use of power that is not based on 'reason' (or on law, rules, objective facts), that is a power that is mindless and senseless or arbitrary. Mielivalta is arbitrary power over life of the mind.

Everything Under Heaven Is Total Chaos; page 302;

What is it we can do that only we can do?

This can, for example, be used in order to:

- Give backward reason to why things happened like they did.
- Create a feeling of necessity, a feeling of being indispensable, "I am needed and without me it would be something else, or this would not be possible."
- Think about a capacity of a group in a positive manner.
- Produce extreme specificity.
- Bypass other ways of reasoning or justifying why one does things.
- To create a circular argument where everything is OK since anything one does can not be something one can not do, and

any other group would never do exactly the same.

- Push things as far as possible and a bit more.

- To make one feel totally unnecessary, "Without me someone else would be here instead and this rule would apply anyway, and it would just be something else, equally specific and good."

Re Coming Boogie-Woogie; page 256; mychoreography.org

These "evil thoughts" can be collected into three groups:
lustful appetite (Gluttony, Fornication, and Avarice)

irascibility (Wrath)

intellect (Vainglory, Sorrow, Pride, and Discouragement)

Seven deadly sins; wikipedia.org

Time is Art - stef meul 2012

Commodities change from being marchandises to being denrées, they enter consumption; money as medium of circulation does not; at no point does it cease to be commodity, as long as it remains within the role of medium of circulation.

We now pass on to the third function of money; which initially results from the second form of circulation:

M-C-C-M; in which money appears not only as medium, nor as measure, but as end-in-itself, and hence steps outside circulation just like a particular commodity which ceases to circulate for the time being and changes from merchandise to denrée.

But first it must be noted that, once the quality of money as an intrinsic relation of production generally founded on exchange value is presupposed, it is possible to demonstrate that in some particular cases it does service as an instrument of production. 'The utility of gold and silver rests on this, that they replace labour.' (Lauderdale, p. 11.) [71] Without money, a mass of swaps would be necessary before one obtained the desired article in exchange. Furthermore, in each particular exchange one would have to undertake an investigation into the relative value of commodities. Money spares us the first task in its role as instrument of exchange (instrument of commerce); the second task, as measure of value and representative of all commodities (idem, loc. cit.). The opposite assertion, that money is not productive, amounts only to saying that, apart from the functions in which it is productive, as measure, instrument of circulation and representative of value, it is unproductive; that its quantity is productive only in so far as it is necessary to fulfil these preconditions. That it becomes not only unproductive, but faux frais de production, the moment when more of it is employed than necessary for its productive aspect – this is a truth which holds for every other instrument of production or exchange; for the machine as well as the means of transportation. But if by this it is meant that money exchanges only real wealth which already exists, then this is false, since labour, as well, is exchanged for it and bought with it, i.e. productive activity itself, potential wealth. The third attribute of money, in its complete development, presupposes the first two and constitutes their unity. Money, then, has an independent existence outside circulation; it has stepped outside it. As a particular commodity it can be transformed out of its form of money into that of luxury articles, gold and silver jewellery (as long as craftsmanship is still very simple, as e.g. in the old English period, a constant transformation of silver money into plate and vice versa. See Taylor) [72] ; or, as money, it can be accumulated to form a treasure. When money in its independent existence is derived from circulation, it appears in itself as a result of circulation; by way of circulation, it closes the circle with itself. This aspect already latently contains its quality as capital. It is negated only as medium of exchange. Still, since it can be historically posited as measure before it appears as medium of exchange, and can appear as medium of exchange before it is posited as measure – in the latter case it would exist merely as preferred commodity – it can therefore also appear historically in the third function before it is posited in the two prior ones. But gold and silver can be accumulated as money only if they are already present in one of the other two roles, and it can appear in a developed form of the third role only if the two earlier ones are already developed. Otherwise, accumulating it is nothing more than the accumulation of gold and silver, not of money.

(As an especially interesting example, go into the accumulation of copper money in the earlier periods of the Roman republic.)

Since money as universal material representative of wealth emerges from circulation, and is as such itself a product of circulation, both of exchange at a higher potentiality, and a particular form of exchange, it stands therefore in the third function, as well, in connection with circulation; it stands independent of circulation, but this independence is only its own process. It derives from it just as it returns to it again. Cut off from all relation to it, it would not be money, but merely a simple natural object, gold or silver. In this character it is just as much its precondition as its result. Its independence is not the end of all relatedness to circulation, but rather a negative relation to it. This comes from its independence as a result of M-C-C-M. In the case of money as capital, money itself is posited (1) as precondition of circulation as well as its result; (2) as having independence only in the form of a negative relation, but always a relation to circulation; (3) as itself an instrument of production, since circulation no longer appears in its primitive simplicity, as quantitative exchange, but as a process of production, as a real metabolism. And thus money is itself stamped as a particular moment of this process of production. Production is not only concerned with simple determination of prices, i.e. with translation of the exchange

values of commodities into a common unit, but with the creation of exchange values, hence also with the creation of the particularity of prices. Not merely with positing the form, but also the content. Therefore, while in simple circulation, money appears generally as productive, since circulation in general is itself a moment of the system of production, nevertheless this quality still only exists for us, and is not yet posited in money. (4) As capital, money thus also appears posited as a relation to itself mediated by circulation – in the relation of interest and capital. But here we are not as yet concerned with these aspects; rather, we have to look simply at money in the third role, in the form in which it emerged as something independent from circulation, more properly, from both its earlier aspects.

(‘An increase of money only an increase in the means of counting.’ Sismondi. [73] This correct only in so far as defined as mere medium of exchange. In the other property it is also an increase in the means of paying.)

‘Commerce separated the shadow from the body, and introduced the possibility of owning them separately.’ (Sismondi.) [74] Thus, money is now exchange value become independent (it never puts in more than a fleeting appearance as such, as medium of exchange) in its general form. It possesses, it is true, a particular body or substance, gold and silver, and precisely this gives it its independence; for what only exists as an aspect or relation of something else is not independent. On the other side, with this bodily independence, as gold and silver, it represents not only the exchange value of one commodity as against another, but rather exchange value as against all commodities; and although it possesses a substance of its own, it appears at the same time, in its particular existence as gold and silver, as the general exchange value of all commodities. On one side, it is possessed as their exchange value; they stand on the other side as only so many particular substances of exchange value, so that it can either transform itself into every one of these substances through exchange, or it can remain indifferent to them, aloof from their particularity and peculiarity. They are therefore merely accidental existences. It is the ‘précis de toutes les choses’, [75] in which their particular character is erased; it is general wealth in the form of a concise compendium, as opposed to its diffusion and fragmentation in the world of commodities. While wealth in the form of the particular commodity appears as one of the moments of the same, or the commodity as one of the moments of wealth; in the form of gold and silver general wealth itself appears as concentrated in a particular substance. Every particular commodity, in so far as it is exchange value, has a price, expresses a certain quantity of money in a merely imperfect form, since it has to be thrown into circulation in order to be realized, and since it remains a matter of chance, due to its particularity, whether or not it is realized. However, in so far as it is realized not as price, but in its natural property, it is a moment of wealth by way of its relation to a particular need which it satisfies; and, in this relation, [it] expresses (1) only the wealth of uses [Gebrauchsreichtum], (2) only a quite particular facet of this wealth. Money, by contrast, apart from its particular usefulness as a valuable commodity, is (1) the realized price; (2) satisfies every need, in so far as it can be exchanged for the desired object of every need, regardless of any particularity. The commodity possesses this property only through the mediation of money. Money possesses it directly in relation to all commodities, hence in relation to the whole world of wealth, to wealth as such. With money, general wealth is not only a form, but at the same time the content itself. The concept of wealth, so to speak, is realized, individualized in a particular object.

NOTEBOOK II

c. November 1857

The Chapter on Money (continuation)

(Superfluity, accumulation)

In the particular commodity, in so far as it is a price, wealth is posited only as an ideal form, not yet realized; and in so far as it has a particular use value, it represents merely a quite singular facet of wealth. In money, by contrast, the price is realized; and its substance is wealth itself considered in its totality in abstraction from its particular modes of existence. Exchange value forms the substance of money, and exchange value is wealth. Money is therefore, on another side, also the embodied form of wealth, in contrast to all the substances of which wealth consists. Thus, while on one side the form and the content of wealth are identical in money, considered for itself, on the other side, in contrast to all the other commodities, money is the general form of wealth, while the totality of these particularities form its substance. Thus, in the first role, money is wealth itself; in the other, it is the general material representative of wealth. This totality exists in money itself as the comprehensive representation of commodities. Thus, wealth (exchange value as totality as well as abstraction) exists, individualized as such, to the exclusion of all other commodities, as a singular, tangible object, in gold and silver. Money is therefore the god among commodities.

Since it is an individuated, tangible object, money may be randomly searched for, found, stolen, discovered; and thus general wealth may be tangibly brought into the possession of a particular individual. From its servile role, in which it appears as mere medium of circulation it suddenly changes into the lord and god of the world of commodities. It represents the divine existence of commodities, while they represent its earthly form. Before it is replaced by exchange value, every form of natural wealth presupposes an essential relation between the individual and the objects, in which the individual in one of his aspects objectifies [vergegenständlicht] himself in the thing, so that his possession of the thing appears at the same time as a certain development of his individuality: wealth in sheep, the development of the individual as shepherd, wealth in grain his development as agriculturist, etc. Money, however, as the individual of general wealth, as something emerging from circulation and representing a general quality, as a merely social result, does not at all presuppose an individual relation to its owner; possession of it is not the development of any particular essential aspect of his individuality; but rather possession of what lacks individuality, since this social [relation] exists at the same time as a sensuous, external object which can be mechanically seized, and lost in the same manner. Its relation to the individual thus appears as a purely accidental one; while this relation to a thing having no connection with his individuality gives him, at the same time, by virtue of the thing’s character, a general power over society, over the whole world of gratifications, labours, etc. It is exactly as if, for example, the chance discovery of a stone gave me mastery over all the sciences, regardless of my individuality. The possession of money places me in exactly the same relationship towards wealth (social) as the philosophers’ stone would towards the sciences.

Money is therefore not only an object, but is the object of greed [Bereicherungssucht]. It is essentially auri sacra fames. [1] Greed as such, as a particular form of the drive, i.e. as distinct from the craving for a particular kind of wealth, e.g. for clothes, weapons, jewels, women, wine etc., is possible only when general wealth, wealth as such, has become individualized in a particular thing, i.e. as soon as money is posited in its third quality. Money is therefore not only the object but also the fountainhead of greed. The mania for possessions is possible without money; but greed itself is the product of a definite social development, not natural, as opposed to historical. Hence the wailing of the ancients about money as the source of all evil. Hedonism [Genusssucht] in its general form and miserliness [Geiz] are the two particular forms of monetary greed. Hedonism in the abstract presupposes an object which possesses all pleasures in potentiality. Abstract hedonism realizes that function of money in which it is the material representative of wealth; miserliness, in so far as it is only the general form of wealth as against its particular substances, the commodities. In order to maintain it as such, it must sacrifice all relationship to the objects of particular needs, must abstain, in order to satisfy the need of greed for money as such. Monetary greed, or mania for wealth, necessarily brings with it the decline and fall of the ancient communities [Gemeinwesen]. Hence it is the antithesis to them. It is itself the community [Gemeinwesen], [2] and can tolerate none other standing above it. But this presupposes the full development of exchange values, hence a corresponding organization of society. In antiquity, exchange value was not the *nexus rerum*; it appears as such only among the mercantile peoples, who had, however, no more than a carrying trade and did not, themselves, produce. At least this was the case with the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, etc. But this is a peripheral matter. They could live just as well in the interstices of the ancient world, as the Jews in Poland or in the Middle Ages. Rather, this world itself was the precondition for such trading peoples. That is why they fall apart every time they come into serious conflict with the ancient communities. Only with the Romans, Greeks etc. does money appear unhampered in both of its first two functions, as measure and as medium of circulation, and not very far developed in either. But as soon as either their trade etc. develops, or, as in the case of the Romans, conquest brings them money in vast quantities – in short, suddenly, and at a certain stage of their economic development, money necessarily appears in its third role, and the further it develops in that role, the more the decay of their community advances. In order to function productively, money in its third role, as we have seen, must be not only the precondition but equally the result of circulation, and, as its precondition, also a moment of it, something posited by it. Among the Romans, who amassed money by stealing it from the whole world, this was not the case. It is inherent in the simple character of money itself that it can exist as a developed moment of production only where and when wage labour exists; that in this case, far from subverting the social formation, it is rather a condition for its development and a driving-wheel for the development of all forces of production, material and mental. A particular individual may even today come into money by chance, and the possession of this money can undermine him just as it undermined the communities of antiquity. But the dissolution of this individual within modern society is in itself only the enrichment of the productive section of society. The owner of money, in the ancient sense, is dissolved by the industrial process, which he serves whether he wants and knows it or not. It is a dissolution which affects only his person. As material representative of general wealth, as individualized exchange value, money must be the direct object, aim and product of general labour, the labour of all individuals. Labour must directly produce exchange value, i.e. money. It must therefore be wage labour. Greed, as the urge of all, in so far as everyone wants to make money, is only created by general wealth. Only in this way can the general mania for money become the wellspring of general, self-reproducing wealth. When labour is wage labour, and its direct aim is money, then general wealth is posited as its aim and object. (In this regard, talk about the context of the military system of antiquity when it became a mercenary system.) Money as aim here becomes the means of general industriousness. General wealth is produced in order to seize hold of its representative. In this way the real sources of wealth are opened up. When the aim of labour is not a particular product standing in a particular relation to the particular needs of the individual, but money, wealth in its general form, then, firstly the individual's industriousness knows no bounds; it is indifferent to its particularity, and takes on every form which serves the purpose; it is ingenious in the creation of new objects for a social need, etc. It is clear, therefore, that when wage labour is the foundation, money does not have a dissolving effect, but acts productively; whereas the ancient community as such is already in contradiction with wage labour as the general foundation. General industriousness is possible only where every act of labour produces general wealth, not a particular form of it; where therefore the individual's reward, too, is money. Otherwise, only particular forms of industry are possible. Exchange value as direct product of labour is money as direct product of labour. Direct labour which produces exchange value as such is therefore wage labour. Where money is not itself the community [Gemeinwesen], it must dissolve the community. In antiquity, one could buy labour, a slave, directly; but the slave could not buy money with his labour. The increase of money could make slaves more expensive, but could not make their labour more productive. Negro slavery – a purely industrial slavery – which is, besides, incompatible with the development of bourgeois society and disappears with it, presupposes wage labour, and if other, free states with wage labour did not exist alongside it, if, instead, the Negro states were isolated, then all social conditions there would immediately turn into pre-civilized forms.

Money as individualized exchange value and hence as wealth incarnate was what the alchemists sought; it figures in this role within the Monetary (Mercantilist) System. The period which precedes the development of modern industrial society opens with general greed for money on the part of individuals as well as of states. The real development of the sources of wealth takes place as it were behind their backs, as a means of gaining possession of the representatives of wealth. Wherever it does not arise out of circulation – as in Spain – but has to be discovered physically, the nation is impoverished, whereas the nations which have to work in order to get it from the Spaniards develop the sources of wealth and really become rich. This is why the search for and discovery of gold in new continents, countries, plays so great a role in the history of revaluation, because by its means colonization is improvised and made to flourish as if in a hothouse. The hunt for gold in all countries leads to its discovery; to the formation of new states; initially to the spread of commodities, which produce new needs, and draw distant continents into the metabolism of circulation, i.e. exchange. Thus, in this respect, as

the general representative of wealth and as individualized exchange value, it was doubly a means for expanding the universality of wealth, and for drawing the dimensions of exchange over the whole world; for creating the true generality [Allgemeinheit] of exchange value in substance and in extension. But it is inherent in the attribute in which it here becomes developed that the illusion about its nature, i.e. the fixed insistence on one of its aspects, in the abstract, and the blindness towards the contradictions contained within it, gives it a really magical significance behind the backs of individuals. In fact, it is because of this self-contradictory and hence illusory aspect, because of this abstraction, that it becomes such an enormous instrument in the real development of the forces of social production.

It is the elementary precondition of bourgeois society that labour should directly produce exchange value, i.e. money; and, similarly, that money should directly purchase labour, and therefore the labourer, but only in so far as he alienates [veräussert] his activity in the exchange. Wage labour on one side, capital on the other, are therefore only other forms of developed exchange value and of money (as the incarnation of exchange value). Money thereby directly and simultaneously becomes the real community [Gemeinwesen], since it is the general substance of survival for all, and at the same time the social product of all. But as we have seen, in money the community [Gemeinwesen] is at the same time a mere abstraction, a mere external, accidental thing for the individual, and at the same time merely a means for his satisfaction as an isolated individual. The community of antiquity presupposes a quite different relation to, and on the part of, the individual. The development of money in its third role therefore smashes this community. All production is an objectification [Vergegenständlichung] of the individual. In money (exchange value), however, the individual is not objectified in his natural quality, but in a social quality (relation) which is, at the same time, external to him.

Money posited in the form of the medium of circulation is coin [Münze]. As coin, it has lost its use value as such; its use value is identical with its quality as medium of circulation. For example, it has to be melted down before it can serve as money as such. It has to be demonetized. That is why the coin is also only a symbol whose material is irrelevant. But, as coin, it also loses its universal character, and adopts a national, local one. It decomposes into coin of different kinds, according to the material of which it consists, gold, copper, silver, etc. It acquires a political title, and talks, as it were, a different language in different countries. Finally, within a single country it acquires different denominations, etc. Money in its third quality, as something which autonomously arises out of and stands against circulation, therefore still negates its character as coin. It reappears as gold and silver, whether it is melted down or whether it is valued only according to its gold and silver weight-content. It also loses its national character again, and serves as medium of exchange between the nations, as universal medium of exchange, no longer as a symbol, but rather as a definite amount of gold and silver. In the most developed international system of exchange, therefore, gold and silver reappear in exactly the same form in which they already played a role in primitive barter. Gold and silver, like exchange itself originally, appear, as already noted, not within the sphere of a social community, but where it ends, on its boundary; on the few points of its contact with alien communities. Gold (or silver) now appears posited as the commodity as such, the universal commodity, which obtains its character as commodity in all places. Only in this way is it the material representative of general wealth. In the Mercantilist System, therefore, gold and silver count as the measure of the power of the different communities. 'As soon as the precious metals become objects of commerce, an universal equivalent for everything, they also become the measure of power between nations. Hence the Mercantilist System.' (Steuart.) [3] No matter how much the modern economists imagine themselves beyond Mercantilism, in periods of general crisis gold and silver still appear in precisely this role, in 1857 as much as in 1600. In this character, gold and silver play an important role in the creation of the world market. Thus the circulation of American silver from the West to the East; the metallic band between America and Europe on one side, with Asia on the other side, since the beginning of the modern epoch. With the original communities this trade in gold and silver was only a peripheral concern, connected with excess production, like exchange as a whole. But in developed trade it is posited as a moment essentially interconnected with production etc. as a whole. It no longer appears for the purpose of exchanging the excess production but to balance it out as part of the total process of international commodity exchange. It is coin, now, only as world coin. But, as such, its formal character as medium of circulation is essentially irrelevant, while its material is everything. As a form, in this function, gold and silver remain the universally acceptable commodity, the commodity as such.

(In this first section, where exchange values, money, prices are looked at, commodities always appear as already present. The determination of forms is simple. We know that they express aspects of social production, but the latter itself is the precondition. However, they are not posited in this character [of being aspects of social production]. And thus, in fact, the first exchange appears as exchange of the superfluous only, and it does not seize hold of and determine the whole of production. It is the available overflow of an overall production which lies outside the world of exchange values. This still presents itself even on the surface of developed society as the directly available world of commodities. But by itself, it points beyond itself towards the economic relations which are posited as relations of production. The internal structure of production therefore forms the second section; the concentration of the whole in the state the third; the international relation the fourth; the world market the conclusion, in which production is posited as a totality together with all its moments, but within which, at the same time, all contradictions come into play. The world market then, again, forms the presupposition of the whole as well as its substratum. Crises are then the general intimation which points beyond the presupposition, and the urge which drives towards the adoption of a new historic form.) 'The quantity of goods and the quantity of money may remain the same, and price may rise or fall notwithstanding' (namely through greater expenditure, e.g. by the moneyed capitalists, landowners, state officials etc. Malthus, X, 43). [4]

Money, as we have seen, in the form in which it independently steps outside of and against circulation, is the negation (negative unity) of its character as medium of circulation and measure. * We have developed, so far:

* In so far as money is a medium of circulation, 'the quantity of it which circulates can never be employed individually; it must always circulate'. (Storch.) The individual can employ money only by divesting himself of it, by positing it as being for others, in its social function. This, as Storch correctly remarks, is a reason why the material of money 'should not be

indispensable to human existence', in the manner of such things as hides, salt, etc., which serve for money among some peoples. For the quantity that is in circulation is lost to consumption. Hence, firstly, metals [enjoy] preference over other commodities as money, and secondly, the precious metals preference over those which useful as instruments of production. It is characteristic of the economists that Storch expresses this thusly: the material of money should should 'have direct value but on the basis of an artificial need'. Artificial need is what the economist calls, firstly, the needs which arise out of the social existence of the individual; secondly, those which do not flow from its naked existence as a natural object. This shows the inner, desperate poverty which forms the basis of bourgeois wealth and of its science.

Firstly. Money is the negation of the medium of circulation as such, of the coin. But it also contains the latter at the same time as an aspect, negatively, since it can always be transformed into coin; positively, as world coin, but, as such, its formal character is irrelevant, and it is essentially a commodity as such, the omnipresent commodity, not determined by location. This indifference is expressed in a double way: Firstly because it is now money only as gold and as silver, not as symbol, not in the form of the coin. For that reason the face which the state impresses on money as coin has no value; only its metal content has value. Even in domestic commerce it has a merely temporary, local value, 'because it is no more useful to him who owns it than to him who owns the commodity to be bought'. The more domestic commerce is conditioned on all sides by foreign commerce, the more, therefore, does the value of this face vanish: it does not exist in private exchange, but appears only as tax. Then: in their capacity as general commodity, as world coin, the return of gold and silver to their point of departure, and, more generally, circulation as such, are not necessary. Example: Asia and Europe. Hence the wailings of the upholders of the Monetary System, that money disappears among the heathen without flowing back again. (See Misselden about 1600.) [5] The more external circulation is conditioned and enveloped by internal, the more does the world coin as such come into circulation (rotation). This higher stage is yet no concern of ours and is not contained in the simple relation which we are considering here.

Secondly: Money is the negation of itself as mere realization of the prices of commodities, where the particular commodity always remains what is essential. It becomes, rather, the price realized in itself and, as such, the material representative of wealth as well as the general form of wealth in relation to all commodities, as merely particular substances of it; but

Thirdly: Money is also negated in the aspect in which it is merely the measure of exchange values. As the general form of wealth and as its material representative, it is no longer the ideal measure of other things, of exchange values. For it is itself the adequate [adäquat] reality of exchange value, and this it is in its metallic being. Here the character of measure has to be posited in it. It is its own unit; and the measure of its value, the measure of itself as wealth, as exchange value, is the quantity of itself which it represents. The multiple of an amount of itself which serves as unit. As measure, its amount was irrelevant; as medium of circulation, its materiality, the matter of the unit, was irrelevant: as money in this third role, the amount of itself as of a definite quantity of material is essential. If its quality as general wealth is given, then there is no difference within it, other than the quantitative. It represents a greater or lesser amount of general wealth according to whether its given unit is possessed in a greater or lesser quantity. If it is general wealth, then one is the richer the more of it one possesses, and the only important process, for the individual as well as the nation, is to pile it up [Anhäufen]. In keeping with this role, it was seen as that which steps outside circulation. Now this withdrawing of money from circulation, and storing it up, appears as the essential object [Gegenstand] of the drive to wealth and as the essential process of becoming wealthy. In gold and silver, I possess general wealth in its tangible form, and the more of it I pile up, the more general wealth do I appropriate. If gold and silver represent general wealth, then, as specific quantities, they represent it only to a degree which is definite, but which is capable of indefinite expansion. This accumulation [6] of gold and silver, which presents itself as their repeated withdrawal from circulation, is at the same time the act of bringing general wealth into safety and away from circulation, in which it is constantly lost in exchange for some particular wealth which ultimately disappears in consumption.

Among all the peoples of antiquity, the piling-up of gold and silver appears at first as a priestly and royal privilege, since the god and king of commodities pertains only to gods and kings. Only they deserve to possess wealth as such. This accumulation, then, occurs on one side merely to display overabundance, i.e. wealth as an extraordinary thing, for use on Sundays only; to provide gifts for temples and their gods; to finance public works of art; finally as security in case of extreme necessity, to buy arms etc. Later in antiquity, this accumulation becomes political. The state treasury, as reserve fund, and the temple are the original banks in which this holy of holies is preserved. Heaping-up and accumulating attain their ultimate development in the modern banks, but here with a further-developed character. On the other side, among private individuals, accumulation takes place for the purpose of bringing wealth into safety from the caprices of the external world in a tangible form in which it can be buried etc., in short, in which it enters into a wholly secret relation to the individual. This, still on a large historical scale, in Asia. Repeats itself in every panic, war etc. in bourgeois society, which then falls back into barbaric conditions. Like the accumulation of gold etc. as ornament and ostentation among semi-barbarians. But a very large and constantly growing part of it withdrawn from circulation as an object of luxury in the most developed bourgeois society. (See Jacob etc.) [7] As representative of general wealth, it is precisely its retention without abandoning it to circulation and employing it for particular needs, which is proof of the wealth of individuals; and to the degree that money develops in its various roles, i.e. that wealth as such becomes the general measure of the worth of individuals, [there develops] the drive to display it, hence the display of gold and silver as representatives of wealth; in the same way, Herr v. Rothschild displays as his proper emblem, I think, two banknotes of £100,000 each, mounted in a frame. The barbarian display of gold etc. is only a more naïve form of this modern one, since it takes place with less regard to gold as money. Here still the simple glitter. There a premeditated point. The point being that it is not used as money; here the form antithetical to circulation is what is important.

The accumulation of all other commodities is less ancient than that of gold and silver: (1) because of their perishability. Metals as such represent the enduring, relative to the other commodities; they are also accumulated by preference because of their greater rarity and their exceptional character as the instruments of production par excellence. The

precious metals, because not oxidized by the air, are again more durable than the other metals. What other commodities lose is their form; but this form is what gives them their exchange value, while their use value consists in overcoming this form, in consuming it. With money, on the other hand, its substance, its materiality, is itself its form, in which it represents wealth. If money appears as the general commodity in all places, so also does it in all times. It maintains itself as wealth at all times. Its specific durability. It is the treasure which neither rust nor moths eat up. All commodities are only transitory money; money is the permanent commodity. Money is the omnipresent commodity; the commodity is only local money. But accumulation is essentially a process which takes place in time. In this connection, Petty says:

'The great and ultimate effect of trade is not wealth as such, but preferably an overabundance of silver, gold and jewels, which are not perishable, nor as fickle as other commodities, but are wealth in all times and all places. A superfluity of wine, grain, poultry, meat etc. is wealth, but *hic et nunc* ... Therefore the production of those commodities and the effects of that trade which endow a land with gold and silver are advantageous above others.' (p. 3.) 'If taxes take money from one who eats or drinks it up, and give it to one who employs it in improving the land, in fisheries, in the working of mines, in manufactures or even in clothing, then for the community there is always an advantage; for even clothes are not as perishable as meals; if in the furnishing of houses, even more; in the building of houses yet more; in the improvement of land, working of mines, fisheries, more again; the most of all, when employed so as to bring gold and silver into the country, for these things alone do not pass away, but are prized at all times and in all places as wealth.' (p. 5.) [8] Thus a writer of the seventeenth century. One sees how the piling-up of gold and silver gained its true stimulus with the conception of it as the material representative and general form of wealth. The cult of money has its asceticism, its self-denial, its self-sacrifice – economy and frugality, contempt for mundane, temporal and fleeting pleasures; the chase after the eternal treasure. Hence the connection between English Puritanism, or also Dutch Protestantism, and money-making. A writer of the beginning of the seventeenth century (Misselden) expresses the matter quite unselfconsciously as follows:

'The natural material of commerce is the commodity, the artificial is money. Although money by nature and in time comes after the commodity, it has become, in present custom, the most important thing.' He compares this to the two sons of old Jacob: Jacob placed his right hand on the younger and his left on the older son. (p. 24.) 'We consume among us too great an excess of wines from Spain, France, the Rhine, the Levant, the Islands: raisins from Spain, currants from the Levant, cambrics from Hainault and the Netherlands, the silkenware of Italy, the sugar and tobacco of the West Indies, the spices of East India; all this is not necessary for us, but is paid for in hard money ... If less of the foreign and more of the domestic product were sold, then the difference would have to come to us in the form of gold and silver, as treasure.' (loc. cit.) [9] The modern economists naturally make merry at the expense of this sort of notion in the general section of books on economics. But when one considers the anxiety involved in the doctrine of money in particular, and the feverish fear with which, in practice, the inflow and outflow of gold and silver are watched in times of crisis, then it is evident that the aspect of money which the followers of the Monetary and Mercantilist System conceived in an artless one-sidedness is still to be taken seriously, not only in the mind, but as a real economic category.

The antithesis between the real needs of production and this supremacy of money is presented most forcibly in Boisguillebert. (See the striking passages in my Notebook.) [10]

(2) The accumulation of other commodities, their perishability apart, essentially different in two ways from the accumulation of gold and silver, which are here identical with money. First, the accumulation of other commodities does not have the character of accumulating wealth in general, but of accumulating particular wealth, and it is therefore itself a particular act of production; here simple accumulation will not do. To accumulate grain requires special stores etc. Accumulating sheep does not make one into a shepherd; to accumulate slaves or land requires relations of domination and subordination etc. All this, then, requires acts and relations distinct from simple accumulation, from increase of wealth as such. On the other hand, in order then to realize the accumulated commodity in the form of general wealth, to appropriate wealth in all its particular forms, I have to engage in trade with the particular commodity I have accumulated, I have to be a grain merchant, cattle merchant, etc. Money as the general representative of wealth absolves me of this.

The accumulation of gold and silver, of money, is the first historic appearance of the gathering-together of capital and the first great means thereto; but, as such, it is not yet accumulation of capital. For that, the re-entry of what has been accumulated into circulation would itself have to be posited as the moment and the means of accumulation.

Money in its final, completed character now appears in all directions as a contradiction, a contradiction which dissolves itself, drives towards its own dissolution. As the general form of wealth, the whole world of real riches stands opposite it. It is their pure abstraction – hence, fixated as such, a mere conceit. Where wealth as such seems to appear in an entirely material, tangible form, its existence is only in my head, it is a pure fantasy. Midas. On the other side, as material representative of general wealth, it is realized only by being thrown back into circulation, to disappear in exchange for the singular, particular modes of wealth. It remains in circulation, as medium of circulation; but for the accumulating individual, it is lost, and this disappearance is the only possible way to secure it as wealth. To dissolve the things accumulated in individual gratifications is to realize them. The money may then be again stored up by other individuals, but then the same process begins anew. I can really posit its being for myself only by giving it up as mere being for others. If I want to cling to it, it evaporates in my hand to become a mere phantom of real wealth. Further: [the notion that] to accumulate it is to increase it, [since] its own quantity is the measure of its value, turns out again to be false. If the other riches do not [also] accumulate, then it loses its value in the measure in which it is accumulated. What appears as its increase is in fact its decrease. Its independence is a mere semblance; its independence of circulation exists only in view of circulation, exists as dependence on it. It pretends to be the general commodity, but because of its natural particularity it is again a particular commodity, whose value depends both on demand and supply, and on variations in its specific costs of production. And since it is incarnated in gold and silver, it becomes one-sided in every real form; so that when the one appears as money, the other appears as particular commodity, and vice versa, and in this way each appears in both aspects. As absolutely secure wealth, entirely independent of my individuality, it is at the same time, because it is something completely external

to me, the absolutely insecure, which can be separated from me by any accident. Similarly, it has entirely contradictory qualities as measure, as medium of circulation, and as money as such. Finally, in the last-mentioned character, it also contradicts itself because it must represent value as such; but represents in fact only a constant amount of fluctuating value. It therefore suspends itself as completed exchange value.

As mere measure it already contains its own negation as medium of circulation; as medium of circulation and measure, as money. To negate it in the last quality is therefore at the same time to negate it in the two earlier ones.

If negated as the mere general form of wealth, it must then realize itself in the particular substances of real wealth; but in the process of proving itself really to be the material representative of the totality of wealth, it must at the same time preserve itself as the general form. Its very entry into circulation must be a moment of its staying at home [Beisichbleiben], and its staying at home must be an entry into circulation. That is to say that as realized exchange value it must be simultaneously posited as the process in which exchange value is realized. This is at the same time the negation of itself as a purely objective form, as a form of wealth external and accidental to individuals. It must appear, rather, as the production of wealth; and wealth must appear as the result of the mutual relations among individuals in production. Exchange value is now characterized, therefore, no longer simply as a thing for which circulation is only an external movement, or which appears individually in a particular material: [but rather] as relation to itself through the process of circulation. On the other side, circulation itself is no longer [qualified] merely as the simple process of exchanging commodities for money and money for commodities, merely as the mediating movement by which the prices of the various commodities are realized, are equated as exchange values, with both [commodities and money] appearing as external to circulation: the presupposed exchange value, the ultimate withdrawal of the commodity into consumption, hence the destruction of exchange value, on one side, and the withdrawal of the money, its achievement of independence vis-à-vis its substance, which is again another form of its destruction [on the other]. [Rather,] exchange value itself, and now no longer exchange value in general, but measured exchange value, has to appear as a presupposition posited by circulation itself, and, as posited by it, its presupposition. The process of circulation must also and equally appear as the process of the production of exchange values. It is thus, on one side, the regression of exchange value into labour, on the other side, that of money into exchange value, which is now posited, however, in a more profound character. With circulation, the determined price is presupposed, and circulation as money posits it only formally. The determinateness of exchange value itself, or the measure of price, must now itself appear as an act of circulation. Posited in this way, exchange value is capital, and circulation is posited at the same time as an act of production.

To be brought forward: In circulation, as it appears as money circulation, the simultaneity of both poles of exchange is always presupposed. But a difference of time may appear between the existence of the commodities to be exchanged. It may lie in the nature of reciprocal services that a service is performed today, but the service required in return can be performed only after a year etc. 'In the majority of contracts,' says Senior, 'only one of the contracting parties has the thing available and lends it; and if exchange is to take place, one party has to cede it immediately on the condition of receiving the equivalent only in a later period. Since, however, the value of all things changes in a given space of time, the means of payment employed is that thing whose value varies least, and which maintains a given average capacity to buy things for the longest time. Thus money becomes the expression or the representative of value.' [11] According to this there would be no connection at all between the latter quality of money and the former. But this is wrong. Only when money is posited as the autonomous representative of value do contracts cease to be valued e.g. in quantities of grain or in services to be performed. (The latter was current e.g. in feudalism.) It is merely a notion held by Mr Senior that money has a 'longer average capacity' to maintain its value. The fact is that it is employed as the general material of contracts (general commodity of contracts, says Bailey) [12] because it is the general commodity, the representative of general wealth (says Storch), [13] because it is exchange value become independent. Money has to be already very developed in its two earlier functions before it can appear generally in this role. Now it turns out in fact that, although the quantity of money remains uniformly the same, its value changes: that, in general, as a specific amount, it is subject to the mutability of all values. Here its nature as a particular commodity comes to the fore against its general character. To money as measure, this change is irrelevant, for 'in a changing medium, two different relations to the same thing can always be expressed, just as well as in a constant medium'. [14] As medium of circulation it is also irrelevant, since its quantity as such is set by the measure. But as money in the form in which it appears in contracts, this is essential, just as, in general, its contradictions come to the fore in this role.

In separate sections, to be brought forward:

(1) Money as coin. This very summarily about coinage. (2) Historically the sources of gold and silver. Discoveries etc. The history of their production. (3) Causes of the variations in the value of the precious metals and hence of metallic money; effects of this variation on industry and the different classes. (4) Above all: quantity of circulation in relation to rise and fall of prices. (Sixteenth century. Nineteenth century.) Along the way, to be seen also how it is affected as measure by rising quantity etc. (5) About circulation: velocity, necessary amount, effect of circulation; more, less developed etc. (6) Solvent effect of money.

(This to be brought forward.) (Herein the specific economic investigations.)

(The specific gravity of gold and silver, to contain much weight in a relatively small volume, as compared with other metals, repeats itself in the world of values so that it contains much value (labour time) in relatively small volume. The labour time, exchange value realized in it, is the specific weight of the commodity. This makes the precious metals particularly suited for service in circulation (since one can carry a significant amount of value in the pocket) and for accumulation, since one can secure and stockpile a great amount of value in a small space. Gold does not turn into something else in the process, like iron, lead etc. Remains what it is.)

'If Spain had never owned the mines of Mexico and Peru, it would never have had need of the grain of Poland.' (Ravenstone.) [15]

'Illi unum consilium habent et virtutem et potestatem suam bestiae tradent ... Et ne quis posset emere aut vendere, nisi qui habet characterem aut nomen bestiae, aut numerum nominis ejus.' (Apocalypse. Vulgate.) [16] 'The correlative quantities of commodities which are given for one another, constitute the price of the commodity.' (Storch.) 'Price is the degree of exchangeable value.' (loc cit.) [17]

As we have seen, in simple circulation as such (exchange value in its movement), the action of the individuals on one another is, in its content, only a reciprocal, self-interested satisfaction of their needs; in its form, [it is] exchange among equals (equivalents). Property, too, is still posited here only as the appropriation of the product of labour by labour, and of the product of alien labour by one's own labour, in so far as the product of one's own labour is bought by alien labour. Property in alien labour is mediated by the equivalent of one's own labour. This form of property – quite like freedom and equality – is posited in this simple relation. In the further development of exchange value this will be transformed, and it will ultimately be shown that private property in the product of one's own labour is identical with the separation of labour and property, so that labour will create alien property and property will command alien labour.

<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch04.htm>

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The New Cinema (1968)

<https://vimeo.com/135750398#t=1380s>

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