THE LIBERTARIAN REVIEW


April 1981
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LIBERTARIAN

El Salvador ☐ The IRS vs. Freedom

The Reagan Restoration

By Earl C. Ravenal



Haig Revives the Cold War

BLACK STAR

What we lack is a liberal Utopia . . . A truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the sensibilities of the mighty—F. A. Hayek

The idea of spontaneous order is among the most powerful—and exciting—concepts of free-market social philosophy.

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
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**Faculty varies with location.*

THE LIBERTARIAN REVIEW

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Volume 10, No. 4

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
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LETTERS TO LR



COPLEY NEWS SERVICE

Paying back the government

IN "BRINGING IN THE Sheep" [*LR*, September 1980], his otherwise fine review of two books, David Boaz states: "Contracts with criminals are not valid, so those who have borrowed money from the government are under no moral obligation to pay it back." Despite having become a slogan in certain libertarian circles, the statement is at best sloppy, at worst dangerous to the libertarian cause. Lest the comment be misused to create a stampede in search of criminals with whom to form non-obligatory contracts, an analysis of the statement's flaws is imperative....

Keeping stolen property instead of restoring it to its rightful owner is just as immoral as stealing it; therefore, the borrower of governmental funds is as much a criminal as the government which stole them. The base of the truism, "Contracts with criminals are not valid," is that *criminality is not valid.* Thus, in Mr. Boaz's example, both borrower and lender are outside of morality. The contract they have has no moral base and is not within the realm of validity. Yet Mr. Boaz's respectable abhorrence of governmental theft (which he apparently considers the greater crime in his example) prompts him to defend through implication the "lesser criminal," the borrower. His phrase "under no moral obligation to pay it back," and the surrounding arguments, imply that morality lies in not paying it back; and this implication allows an invalid entity, a criminal, an invalid justification. Since there is no morality in crime, I submit that this issue can not end with this result....

...If a criminal extracts a contract from an individual while holding a gun to his head, the individual is later under no moral obligation to uphold his part of the bargain. Only in similar circumstances does one party to a criminal contract absolutely have no obligation....

Certain libertarians have contracted for governmental student loans prior to understanding the libertarian principles involved. Because the former contract resulted in 1) a benefit which was used, 2) a voluntary obligation to repay, and 3) funds which were stolen, such libertarians now face the dichotomy of making non-libertarian actions compatible with libertarian principles—a task not so simple as Mr. Boaz implies.

"It was a contract with a criminal and therefore not valid" does not supersede the more personal libertarian principle that we are responsible for our actions, including responsibility for past actions with which we no longer agree. Yet flaws of history are not often correctable. A resolution to prevent their occurring again is often our only recourse.

The libertarian holding a student loan does not have a perfect possibility for solving his moral dilemma. He may opt to repay the loan, assuming that student loans predicated upon theft do exist and repayment of his at least replenishes the fund hopefully so the dollar amount will not be stolen again. Yet his repayment becomes a statistic which the government will use to defend its loan theft/redistribution. He may opt to return in some fashion the dollar amount to the citizenry (or some portion thereof) from which it was stolen. Yet there is no way to trace the specific funds he used to their rightful owners, and individuals have no more right to seize and redistribute than does a government. He may decide to keep the money and devote his funds and energy to advancing philosophic principles and fighting socialism as a form of "repaying" the debt.

Any of the above may be appropriate for libertarians in such quandary, but not one is perfectly moral (because there is no morality in crime). Whatever principled solution the individual in question may devise concerning his governmental loan, he must decide never again to participate voluntarily in the process of governmental theft of funds if he is to keep his honor intact.

In summary, libertarians must never forget that they stand for freedom of choice unhampered by force or fraud. Governmental student loans are criminal because they deal in stolen funds. The only valid libertarian stand on the issue is to demand that such future criminal acts be stopped. Such loans of the past provide no base upon which the libertarian cause can take any stand. That issue is a legitimate issue only with those libertarian individuals who are in the unfortunate circumstance of being a party to such criminal contract. They are compelled to work out principled solutions, individually, and to direct their future conduct toward avoidance of participation in criminal acts.

MICHAEL McCASEY
Shelby, NJ

A "special animus"?

I AM NOT KNOWLEDGEable enough to comment on the validity of the criticisms of Israel by Bill Birmingham and Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad. [*LR*, June and December 1980] Nor does the fact that they criticize Israel make them anti-Jewish. But even if, for the sake of argument, I accept their claims, I consider them anti-Jewish for singling out the only Jewish controlled country in the world for its human rights violations. If Israeli Arabs have been deprived of their rights, Jews in Arab countries have generally been made to feel so unwelcome that they felt fortunate to be allowed to emigrate. If Israel is far from a libertarian ideal, the countries lending moral and material support to the P.L.O. are still further from this ideal. Theoretically there is a distinction between being anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist but to those who run the anti-Israel boycott and who make anti-Israeli speeches at the U.N., the distinction is elusive.

DAVID KAHN
New York, NY

Another LP triumph

I KNOW YOU ALL ["STATE and Local Races: Mostly Runs and Hits" by Chris Hocker, *LR*, January 1981] are going to find this hard to believe, but the best Libertarian result in a 3-way race outside Alaska last November was in, of all places, York County, South Carolina, where Charles Blackwell got 22½ percent of the vote, coming in ahead of the Republican, for county council.

Some of our other candidates did pretty well, too: Tom Campbell got 12½ percent running for Congress, and (Ms.) Lee Bowie got 13 percent for state assembly....

JOHN HARLLEE, Secretary
South Carolina Libertarian Party
Florence, SC

Kudos

KUDOS TO JOHN SHEPherd! [*LR*, January 1981] Best book review I have ever read.

If only his paragraph on Howard Ruff's and Kirkpatrick Sale's homes could be *must* reading (through voluntary choices, of course) for all radical leftists, and those on the radical right, ours would truly be a better world.

That paragraph gave me the best laugh and good feeling that I have had in memory. Maybe yet there truly is hope.

KEN PRAZAK
Brookfield, IL

IN "THE FREEWOMAN" [*LR*, January 1981], Sharon Presley speaks of editors as often being unappreciated. Therefore, I shall say nothing about her stimulating piece and instead thank you for having accepted and printed the article—it made my day!

The illustration by Victoria Varga was quite good—is there nothing she can't do? And I enjoyed the layout and graphics, particularly, of the "Oh God" spread—designed by Melanie Price.

CHRISTINE DORFFI
Santa Barbara, CA

Coalition?

THE REVIEW OF KIRKPATrick Sale's *Human Scale* by John Shepherd (*LR*, January 1981) disappointed me as an environmentalist with libertarian tendencies. My disappointment came not from Shepherd's description of Sale's contribution but, rather, from an unsupported statement he made in his evaluation.

Shepherd wrote, "The alternative to the self-correcting free market is the steady-state economy which Sale embraces, warts and all. Doesn't he understand that to maintain the steady-state economy he would need a police state?" From the way he said this, I must assume that this relationship between a steady-state economy and a police state is common knowledge. If it is, it is based upon a self-evident reality that I fail to see.

The obscurity may stem from misconceptions concerning the nature of a steady-state economy or from the past actions of socialists promoting their ideology by jumping on the environmentalist's bandwagon. In the interests of survival and in the absence of a libertarian commitment to an ecologically sound society, desperation may force environmentalists to embrace coercion.

But I believe that a police state is neither necessary nor sufficient for a steady-state economy. The alternative to a self-correcting free market is a command economy similar to the Soviet Union. The economy of the Soviet Union is certainly not a steady-state. Moreover, a command economy requires centralization and homogenous taste in order to facilitate economic planning. The steady-state economy depends on decentralization and a diversity of tastes.

It seems clear to me that our present society is neither libertarian nor ecologically sound. If an ecologically sound and libertarian society is possible, perhaps a powerful coalition between environmentalists and libertarians could form for the difficult transition years ahead. I hope that *The Libertarian Review* and its readers will address this issue in depth.

GARY C. CHILSON
Lansing, MI ❑

The Libertarian Review *welcomes letters from readers. Letters intended for publication should be typed, double-spaced, and addressed to: Letters to the Editor, The Libertarian Review, 1320 G Street. S. E., Washington D. C. 20003.*


COMING SOON IN LR

Jeffrey Hummel on the Arms Race

Jeff Riggenbach's new National Letters column

Victoria Varga on Phyllis Schlafly

EDITORIALS



COPLEY NEWS SERVICE

Treading water

RONALD REAGAN DID the smart thing after being sworn in as the 40th President of the United States. He immediately proclaimed to the American people that "we are in the worst economic mess since the Great Depression."

And the new President's echo, George Will, wrote of the Reagan team, "They ... are amazed to discover the economy's in as bad a shape as they said it was. Worse, really."

Such public observations did well to disinculpate the Reagan crowd for the economic crisis, and that, of course, was a politically astute move. Not so convincing is Mr. Reagan's free market propaganda blitz.

The notion that dismantling government and returning functions to the private sector could save the economy is not in doubt. What is in doubt is the President's determination to act after his rhetoric leaves off. There are disturbing indications that he will increase government spending and interference rather than the reverse.

Take for example the "windfall profits" tax. Last year during the election campaign, Reaganites were stentorian in their criticism of this confiscatory, energy-production retardant piece of legislation. But this year, with the realization of power, the Reagan people have become strangely taciturn on this subject.

The explanation, as the modern-day Paul Bunyan, David Stockman, divulged in his Senate confirmation hearings, is that the windfall profits tax is "a pretty prodigious revenue generator." The OMB Director indicated that as a result of the windfall profits tax, the Reagan Administration will have an additional $22 billion to play with. Moreover, by making the decontrolling of oil one of the new administration's first acts—a gesture calculated to gain Reagan points as a true lover of the free enterprise system—another $2 billion in revenue has been won.

This new found fondness for the windfall profits tax is an all the more curious phenomenon in that it flies in the face of supply-side economics — the self-chosen, oft-advertised emblem of the Reagan Administration. Because oil companies retain only about 15 percent of the price rise from decontrol after taxes, there is little inducement for them to increase exploration and production. There is no significant incentive to increase supplies, only a discouragement of consumer demand.

More interestingly, as the price of world oil goes up, the U.S. government collects more and more money from the consumer, through what is actually an excise tax on crude oil, laundered through the oil companies under the guise of a windfall profits tax.

It may come as a surprise to those consumers who have unwittingly financed the government's "windfall" profits through decontrol by tanking up the family car or heating their homes, that there is still

not enough money floating around in Washington to balance the federal budget.

In fact, Mr. Stockman had better put that trusty ax to the sharpening stone one more time, for, as a by-lined piece by David Boaz in the *Washington Post* (February 15, 1981) pointed out, the OMB Director "has proposed $26 billion in reductions from a proposed budget that is $77 billion higher than the previous one. That is not a budget cut; it is a budget increase."

In trying to understand the Reagan-Stockman financial circus, it is essential to realize that it is employing its own version of the "supply and demand" theory. Taxpayers are demanding a solution to the economic mess, so the administration is supplying one.

Therefore we have had Stockman, carefully crafted as the archetypal budget slasher, stirring fear into the hearts of the poor. Then Reagan stepped up to assure everyone that basic social services would remain intact—that is, that their proposed increases would not be cut. As a result, citizens get the "best" of both worlds, the belief that responsible fiscal steps are being taken *and* the reassurance that no one will be adversely affected.

A quick look at those parts of the budget that Reagan declared to be "off limits" will illustrate the impossibility of a serious budget reduction. These are the "Seven Beauties": the basic social Retirement fund, future cost of living increases, Medicare, Supplemental Security Income, veteran's benefits, Head Start, and free breakfasts and lunches for school children. These programs alone account for $216 billion out of a $700 billion budget.

Add to this amount the proposed $31 billion increase in Defense spending, bringing the total to $189 billion (necessary, in the eyes of the Administration, to secure our position in the world) and the spiraling $100 billion a year interest payment on the Federal Debt, (resulting from our having secured our position in the past), and one observes that a full 70 percent of the budget is untouchable. When the battles in Congress over the remaining 30 percent have ended, we may find that the budget increase far exceeds the billions already proposed.

Aside from the runaway Federal budget, there have been other indications that Mr. Reagan may not be the free market advocate in practice that his own polished speeches present him as being. His refusal to let Chrysler die a natural death, his silence on the tobacco subsidy, a renege on the campaign promise to abolish the Departments of Energy and Education, continued talk of a New York City bailout, and failure to defuse the Danforth-Bentsen quota bill, a protectionist measure to curtail US importation of Japanese autos by 400,000 — all show a remarkable lack of commitment to laissez faire economics by one of its supposed proponents.

Whether the economic policies of Reaganism succeed or fail over the next four years only time will reveal—though as long as the Social Security-Welfare-Defense apparatus retains its sacrosanct status, the prognostication seems negative. But there is a more compelling question. How would the American people respond to a failure? Would it be said that the free enterprise system has been tried and failed? If so, then Ronald Reagan will have performed the ultimate disservice to America. By treading water now, he may precipitate a further shift from economic freedom in the election year of 1984.

—Lee Williams

Time marches on

"JEFFERSON, WHO VALued the press, could turn apoplectic when he considered the newspapers of his day. Said he: 'The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer the truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehoods and error.' Imagine what the sage of Monticello would have had to say about television."

Imagine what the sage of Monticello would have had to say about *Time,* Inc. and its "Special Project: American Renewal," from which, ironically, the above is taken.

More than merely a pretentious archipelago of editorials stretching through *Time*'s empire of magazines, "American Renewal" is an anticlimactic sequel to the "American Century" proclaimed just before World War II by *Time*'s founder and publisher, Henry Luce. Explicitly interventionist, Luce's *Time* proclaimed that America "must undertake now to be the Good Samaritan of the entire world... America as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, America as the training center of the skillful servants of mankind, America as the Good Samaritan, really believing again that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and America as the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice —out of these elements surely can be fashioned a vision of the 20th Century to which we can and will devote ourselves in joy and gladness and vigor and enthusiasm."

But now, more than forty years later, *Time* finds that something went wrong. Editor-in-Chief Henry Grunwald recites a litany of worries—declining industry, incompetent government, challenges to American influence and power overseas — and asks, "Is this what has become of the American Century?"

Not really, is Grunwald's own reply. Not only are things not as bad as they seem, but America can, with "a great and disciplined effort [exacting] a considerable price," regain its proper place in the world. We can achieve an American renewal.

Time spent 100 writers and researchers, 150 pages, 23 separate articles, and one million advertising dollars on a project which can perhaps be most accurately described, despite the incongruity of the term, as ostentatiously reformist. Thousands of words are spent to declare the need for such changes as mandatory presidential debates, four-year terms for U.S. Representatives, and revision of the civil service system. Thousands more are used to call for more effective nuclear weapons, stronger ties with our allies, clearer goals in our diplomacy, higher levels of conventional military forces, and a return to the draft. Other articles agonize over such questions as economic growth, technological advancement, education, the role of competition, revival of responsibility, and the benefits of voluntary service to others.

As with trying to lasso a waterfall, the fundamental problem with "American Renewal" is what isn't there: no central core, no basic premise, no principle. The concept of rights is utterly ignored, analysis of the nature of government is totally absent, and the idea of liberty is mentioned only in passing as a "value," to be offset by other, competing values. Because of what isn't there, "American Renewal" fails, both to answer what became of the American Century and to build a convincing framework for a true renewal.


What did become of the American Century? Henry Luce's vision of it never approached reality — it was an outgrowth of the myth that the United States government was somehow synonymous with America, its people, and its spirit of liberty. "America the Good Samaritan" inevitably became America the interventionist, America the friend of dictators, America the clear and present threat to lives and property both at home and abroad.

The *Time* of 1981 commits the same tragic error, attempting to fuse America, the symbol of hope and liberty, with the American State, the weakened superpower. This is an error that "the sage of Monticello," as *Time* called Thomas Jefferson with typical bombast, did not make. He knew the two concepts to be antithetical.

Jefferson is probably best known for an opinion which *Time* neglected to quote: that it is a self-evident truth that all people are endowed with certain unalienable rights. *Time* could have served its millions of readers well by pointing out that such rights are fundamental, not subject to renewal like so many magazine subscriptions, and that they should be the starting point for any discussion of how to improve the American experience. Real renewal for America will spring, not from renewing the power of the American State, but from renewing the liberty of the American people. ❑

—Chris Hocker

POLITICAL EYE



The ABC's of interventionism

CHRIS HOCKER

LET'S FACE IT, ON ECONOMIC matters so far, Reagan sounds pretty good — or at least far better than what we've been hearing from Presidents for a long while. He says he's for tax cuts (sure, he means cutting tax *rates,* not the actual dollar amounts), and spending cuts (I know, I know; he's only cutting the rate of increase so that actual spending will be higher), and decontrolling oil prices (yeah, yeah, the windfall profits tax is still there), and deregulating industry (well, except maybe for trucking and a few others). Why, he's even suggested that inflation has something to do with the supply of money in the economy; that there's more to it than high prices. Isn't all this preferable to higher taxes, higher spending, more regulation, and scapegoating Arabs every time the price of hamburger goes up?

Sure it's preferable. In the same way a cold is preferable to pneumonia.

Instead of just gratefully blowing our noses, we should be looking for ways to stay out of the oxygen tent. We should be checking to see if any of the viruses responsible for the serious disease are still there, even if dormant.

The virus of interventionism *is* still there, and now in a more virulent form than under Jimmy Carter. The central message of the Reagan foreign policy appears to be, "We will intervene," without further elaboration, qualification, or reservation.

I don't know, maybe I'm hallucinating, but every time I watch President Reagan on TV talking about how he's going to free up the economy, I see Al Haig standing next to him saying, "And if that doesn't work, we can always have a good war."

I realize that's a monstrously cynical thing to say, particularly in this Era of Good Feeling. It's considered the height of tacky to suggest that anyone, even Al Haig, would actually *want* war. No one *wants* war.

Actually, it would make things a lot easier if Haig or Cap Weinberger or someone in the Reagan Administration would announce at a news conference, "Ladies and gentlemen, today we decided to have a war. Not a great big nuclear war, just a medium-sized conventional war, just big enough to boost American industry, create jobs, and get people's minds off the problems of the economy."

"Mr Secretary, Mr. Secretary!" the reporters would ask, "have you decided where you're going to have this war?"

"We're waiting for the Task Force on Economic Revitalization to submit its report," would come the reply. "We'll be releasing full details on May 4. But I can tell you that we've narrowed it down to a choice between Central America and the Horn of Africa."

Like I say, this sort of thing would make political commentary a whole lot easier, because then we could focus on the major issue of war, which is that people are killed in large numbers. Instead, unfortunately, we're given phrases like "stopping terrorism" and "not backing down" and "protecting our vital interests," and since you'd have to be un-American not to favor all that, few people like to speculate about what the ultimate consequences of such policies might be.

One consequence might be war and killing people — but let's not talk about that, it's unpleasant and it leads to awkward gaps in the conversation.

Hmm, yes. (polite coughing and drumming of fingertips on the coffee table)

An even more certain consequence of an aggressive, interventionist foreign policy is that it will cause the failure of any free market oriented economic program that President Reagan comes up with. For the domestic economy, the implications of such a policy are simply devastating.

First and most obvious is the contradiction between "making government live within its means" — cutting taxes and spending, and reducing the budget deficit, even a little bit — and increasing the military budget by tens of billions of dollars, as Reagan has said he will do. Supply-side economists insist this really isn't a problem at all; if everyone gets a small tax break, the economy will take off like a rocket (a Titan missile, no doubt), all this new wealth will be created, and government will get more revenue while everyone pays proportionately less. Sort of like the miracle of the loaves and the fishes.

Suppose the supply-siders are right, and we really can get two pounds of flour out of a

pound of wheat. What would be so bad about a huge military budget and an interventionist foreign policy then?

The price tag for intervention doesn't just stop with the added costs of new tanks and bombers and missiles. Before we ever got to the point of having to use them, we will have spent billions of dollars in foreign aid, military and economic, to prop up the unstable regimes of dictators all over the world who, we're told, are our friends. The price of foreign aid between 1976 and 1980 was $30 billion, and that was with an administration that drew a few lines, expressed in terms of "human rights," before deciding who would be the beneficiaries of our bounty. The Reagan administration shows no inclination to draw any lines whatsoever, and how many "friendly," unstable dictatorships are there in the world who need our money to stay alive for another month? A is for Argentina, B is for Botswana, C is for Chile, all the way through Z for Zaire. So the potential combined burden on the taxpayers for weapons buildup and foreign aid *just over present levels* is staggering.

Moreover, all this spending doesn't even accomplish its ostensible purpose: to defend "our" allies, to "stabilize" their regimes against the Marxist hordes, and to secure "our vital interests" — usually access to natural resources or the protection of American business investments. Your typical friendly dictator will use his several hundred million dollars to enlarge his public sector at the expense of his private sector, to equip his army, build roads, erect government buildings, and pay the interest on the loans he's already obtained from American banks. This in itself is inherently destabilizing; as the public sector gets richer, the private sector gets poorer, until the middle class throws its support to whatever group of ideological revolutionaries appear to have the best chance of toppling the dictator. When this happens, the dictator is as good as gone; the U.S. abandons its investment and begins frantically to negotiate with the new rulers and start the cycle all over again.


Note the neat little redistribution-of-wealth scheme apparent in all of this. American taxpayers are being soaked to enable these countries to pay back loans to American banks, to pay the bills of American overseas corporations which are building the roads and government offices, and to pay the American manufacturers of the weapons and munitions which have gone in as military aid. All the while that our efforts to "stabilize" the regimes of our allies are failing, favored American companies are getting millions of dollars of subsidy, courtesy of the American poor and middle class.

Any suggestion that an interventionist foreign policy is necessary to defend "our great free enterprise system" is unadulterated hogwash. The exact opposite is true. Interventionism adds billions of dollars to the tax burden, subverts all attempts to build healthy market economies in other countries, and amounts to a systematic welfare program for those American businesses fortunate enough to be in on the scheme.

Luckily for the interventionists, this mass perversion of the free market tends to take a long time, perhaps even twenty or thirty years. In the short run, our government can pride itself on protecting our security interests while our military contractors and overseas corporations, with their employees and stockholders, can get wealthy.

In the long run ... well, as Keynes is supposed to have said, in the long run we are all dead. I'm sure Al Haig would agree. ❑

Chris Hocker is the publisher of *LR*. His "Political Eye" column appears monthly.



COPLEY NEWS SERVICE

FREE HERITAGE



MIKE FELISH

Robert LeFevre

The radical inactivist

VERN HANSEN

WHAT IS MAN'S GREATEST loss in his growth to adulthood? For one man in southern California — a former businessman, Army Air Force officer, and newspaper editor turned college president — it is the loss of the inquiring mind.

"From our earliest years," says Robert LeFevre, the eloquent champion of individualism, "we gradually begin to close our minds after barely opening them. We are handed so many 'truisms' that have been accepted by those who lived before us, and passed on on to us, we gradually learn not to learn."

The white-haired six-footer continues, "One of the great flaws in most of us is the tendency to take things for granted. Once we have found comfortable adaptations to life, we don't like to be disturbed, intellectually or emotionally, and we grow rigid in our attitudes. But every invention, whether it be one of machine or of method in improving the human condition, had its origin in the mind of a man who refused to be satisfied with the status quo. When man ceases to ask himself, 'what if this, instead of that?' he atrophies."

LeFevre's *bête noire* is political government, of whatever cast. Since he lives and works in Orange Country, California — where they say the political climate is so conservative even the chickens go to roost with their heads under their right wings — you might expect him to be an arch supporter of the political Right.

Not so. LeFevre is a-political: as remote from political participation as the point above a pendulum from which that pendulum swings. "The country is teeming with would-be revolutionaries at both ends of the political spectrum. What we need today," he declares, "is not more political activists, but radical inactivists."

Radical inactivism, says LeFevre, "not only means shunning all recourse to the political use of human energy, but the use of that energy in exploring free-market ways of

getting things done so that there is no real desire to resort to government."

More than anything, LeFevre abhors force and violence. "Violence is the anti-intellectual way out of anything, and the weak man's first resort." That is one of the chief reasons he is so antipathetic toward government. "Government is organized around the concept of coercion — and there are those against coercion who want it 'stamped out'" — he grins wryly at the thought of such a paradox — "but I say political government is one of the greatest paradoxes of all, and a delusion from which men must rise, if they want to be truly free. Government doesn't 'protect,' it oppresses; it doesn't 'preserve' order, it creates chaos; it doesn't 'free,' it binds."

Until his retirement last year, Robert LeFevre logged over 120,000 air miles each year giving lectures and seminars on the imperative need for thinking men and women — "of whom there are a few," he admits — to seek "radical inactivist" solutions to present-day problems.

LeFevre labels himself an "autarchist," a believer in individual self-government. He is convinced that the demise of political government is through non-dependence on it, rather than violent revolution. "All that violent revolutions produce is a new repression replacing the old. And all that violence from either the *left* or the *right* can produce is just more of what they don't want." He argues forcefully that there isn't anything at all that a totally free market can't provide, better and cheaper than government. And he has dedicated his working life toward convincing men that it can and must be done.

Born in Gooding, Idaho in 1911, and educated at Hamline University, St. Paul, Minnesota, LeFevre resumed a California real estate career following four years as an Army Air Force officer during World War II. He had a number of run-ins with minor officials over rents and building permits, and the harassment he got from the Office of Price Administration in San Francisco was greatly responsible for stimulating a searching exploration into the nature of Government. He combed libraries, stalked experts, constantly queried men in and out of office. He wrote and made speeches. He even ran for Congress in Los Angeles' 14th Congressional District. Finally, disenchanted with politics, he worked for the United Taxpayers of California.

He became a radio newsman at station WQAM in Miami, Florida, and later, news director for WFTL-TV, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In 1954, he joined the staff of the *Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph,* one of the late R.C. Hoiles' Freedom Newspapers chain, and remained there ten years, the last five of which he served as its editor. It was during this period, at a result of his growing convictions concerning the nature of government, that he decided to start a school.

Without money or prospective students, he set out to build the Freedom School in the foothills of the Rockies. Working with considerable volunteer help, LeFevre acquired 526 acres in Colorado's Rampart Range and built 14 snug log cabins for dormitories and classrooms. He taught the first in-residence course for two weeks' duration in 1957. His sincerity and dedication so impressed his publisher that he was kept on the *Gazette-Telegraph* half-time at full salary, so he could build the school and teach classes. This he did during afternoons and evenings, rising at four a.m. for breakfast and driving 26 miles to the newspaper in Colorado Springs so that he could begin writing his editorials at six o'clock.

The school drew a few pupils, published some treatises, and began to attract well-known economists and revisionist historians to Colorado. Ludwig von Mises visited the Freedom School and became a member of its advisory board. Frank Chodorov came to lecture and to discuss the individualist philosophy championed at the school. Milton Friedman journeyed to Colorado to participate in the school's program of exploring pro-liberty ideas. So did F.A. Harper, G. Warren Nutter, Roger J. Williams, and others.

Some came to debate with LeFevre and knock down his arguments. But many of these intellectual opponents became his biggest boosters. "He has a way of anticipating every question. He meets every objection squarely, and leads you, by logical reasoning, to make the same discoveries he has made," one such opponent conceded. And he was a master teacher.

Students didn't come flocking overnight, however. The struggle to survive was as difficult as carving the school out of the wilderness had been. "At the end of our first year," LeFevre recalls, "we had a total of 28 students — and then our funds ran out. At the conclusion of our final class in 1957, Gene Hausske, a capable draftsman who had quit his job with Boeing so he could work for nothing and help us get started, sat down on our porch and he was as glum as a man could be. I sat down beside him and put my arm around his shoulders to comfort him. 'We've done the best we could,' I told him, 'no man can do more than his best.' Rose Wilder Lane, who was visiting us at the time, came out on the porch at that moment. She noticed the gloom enveloping both of us and wanted to know what the problem was. She had been teaching for us, and was not a wealthy woman. She would not write professionally for a number of years because she stoutly refused to pay Social Security taxes. She had only her own meager savings. I would never have appealed to her for financial help. But we had conducted a fund drive and we hadn't taken in enough money to more than pay the cost of the drive. So, the road was ending. At her insistence, I told Rose Lane about it. I said, 'It seems like a shame that after all this effort, we'll have to close up. But we will. We've got about two more weeks and then the sheriff moves in.'

"Her eyes snapped fire, 'Indeed you will not be closing. Tell me precisely the sum of money you need.'

"She was so angry with me that I blurted out the sum. Something better than $1000, but I don't remember the exact amount. She harrumphed at me and then stalked back inside. In a moment she came out again and handed me a check for the full sum we were in arrears. So we managed."

The Freedom School managed throughout most of the 1960s, educating several hundred people in the basic principles of liberty, in two week comprehensive courses, one-week executive seminars, and special courses and seminars. Money was always a problem, but LeFevre and his dedicated staff managed to survive. In the mid-1960s, however, a devastating flood hit the Freedom School, just as it was attempting to evolve into Rampart College, a projected graduate school offering advanced degrees in history and economics. More harmful than the physical effects of the flood, however, was the financial disaster which hit the Freedom School-Rampart College in its wake. It never really recovered.

In the late 1960s, Rampart College sold its buildings and land to the Mennonites as a youth rehabilitation camp and moved to Santa Ana, California, where it occupied a suite of offices atop the First Western Bank at Fourth and Main. LeFevre kept the name "as a reminder of our early beginnings," and he and his associates continued giving the courses which had established Rampart College's reputation, many of them in locations outside of California, from Hawaii to the East Coast. In 1976, LeFevre gave a total of 26 seminars expounding his philosophy to college students, interested people in all walks of life, and business executives around the country — the bulk of the business seminars being conducted in South Carolina for the Deering Milliken Company.

In the annals of business, there is a well-known story that Charles Schwab, the steel magnate, once wrote a check for $25,000 for the personal worth he attached to some advice that Ivy Lee, an early day public relations practitioner, wrote on the back of an index card.

Roger Milliken, chief executive officer of the Deering Milliken firm, outdid Schwab in expressing what he thinks of LeFevre. A Deering Milliken employee who attended one of the early Freedom school courses in Colorado said he wished his president, Roger Milliken, had taken it with him. "When you get back to South Carolina," LeFevre said, "how about asking him to come?"

Milliken was too busy to get away. Instead, he invited LeFevre to come to South Carolina and put on a session there. "My deal with Milliken," LeFevre relates, "was that he was to cover my out-of-pocket expenses for the course. Then, he was to evaluate it and pay what he thought was worth. 'If you don't think it's worth anything,' I said to him, 'then you owe me nothing.'

"After the class that I conducted in Charleston, which both Roger and his cousin, Minot Milliken, attended, Roger asked me if I would mind flying back to Spartanburg with him. He wanted to talk things over with Minot. I was scheduled to fly back to Colorado from Charleston, but I could fly there from Spartanburg, so I went with them.

"We got into his private plane, a converted DC-3. Roger and Minot had a little talk in private, then he approached me. 'We want to give you two checks,' he told me, 'one for yourself, for your personal efforts, the other for the college.'

"'Thank you,' I said, 'but I work for the *Gazette Telegraph* and you don't owe me anything personally. I'm on salary. Whatever you want to give should be made out to the college.'

"'Well,' Roger Milliken said, 'we want to give you $40,000 for yourself and $60,000 for the college.' I nearly fell out of my seat. I had been dreaming that, perhaps, if he really liked the course, and if he was generous, I might get $5000. Perhaps $10,000. My mind hadn't gone beyond that. Naturally, I was elated.

"So the Millikens made out two checks that they mailed to us at the school. Both were made out to Rampart. One was for $40,000 and the other, $60,000."

Some men who listen to Robert LeFevre regard him as a sort of Don Quixote, hopelessly idealistic in tilting at the windmills of politics. But nearly all of them, whether completely in agreement with him, mildly so or turned off altogether, respect his integrity and his thought. LeFevre claims he has talked a few politicians into retiring from office on principle, and others into dropping out of politics altogether. Tom Gumbert, proprietor of an Omaha, Nebraska employment agency, won the nomination a few years ago for state senator from his district, as a Republican. After taking LeFevre's course, Gumbert returned to Omaha, refused to run, and appeared on television to tell people why he was not willing to run, and why he was resigning from the Republican party as well. Gumbert pointed out that a politician is supposed to be an agent, "But no politican can represent everyone in his district because the people in any district have different aims and objectives and desires." Therefore, he concluded, he could not in honor pretend to represent "the people," some of whom he would have to oppose.

LeFevre's philosophy in its simplest form is a moral philosophy. "Do as you please —but harm no other in his person or his property," is the essence of it. At the thought of abandoning political government, most people recoil in horror with a common question: "What about law and order?"

LeFevre expounds at length on the idea that all real law is the product of nature, not of men. "Laws are principles inherent in the characteristics and relationships between men and nature, irrespective of government. We can all build together constructively on that. Governments can't. They deal in legislation and the exercise of power over the governed, not to their benefit but rather to their ultimate detriment. All governments arrogate more and more power unto themselves, they don't relinquish it."

This frightens LeFevre. He draws a graph on his blackboard symbolizing government in the shape of a triangle, its base as the populace. He points to how sanctions for government actions flow upwards from the base of the triangle, those governed. These sanctions stretch the triangle upwards. It becomes taller and taller until it becomes top-heavy. Then in order to rebalance power at the top and support from below, the base is widened. More people are enlisted in its support. More government jobs are handed out. The voting franchise is extended by lowering the legal age for voting and bringing more people to the polls. As a result, government grows to monstrous proportions, corrupting those involved with it in order to maintain itself.

"It was Alexis de Tocqueville," LeFevre says, "who said that from the date of the ratification of our Constitution, he would give our country 200 years until we lapse into complete despotism." A glaring sign of that despotism, in Lefevre's estimation, was our involvement in the tortuous Vietnam war. He sees in this, too, an obvious illustration of governmental self-justification

Robert LeFevre: a personal tribute

When Robert LeFevre retired from active teaching last year, it marked the end of an era for libertarians across the country. Since the late 1950s, he has been one of the great teachers of liberty, spinning out his endless flow of stories and arguments, reaching minds, young and old alike, with his passionate enthusiasm for the philosophy of freedom.



LeFevre is one of the last of the giants of the "Old Right," the pro-free market, individualist, civil libertarian, and anti-war right of Albert Jay Nock, Frank Chodorov, Felix Morley, Rose Wilder Lane, Garet Garrett, and John T. Flynn which was the dominant force in opposing the New Deal Welfare-Warfare state until the emergence of Bill Buckley and his Cold Warriors. Bob LeFevre's consistent opposition to violence and aggression led him to remain dedicated to libertarian ideals even in the midst of the warmongering of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. When, in the 1960s, other individualist organizations virtually folded their radical banners (Frank Chodorov's Intercollegiate Society of Individualists becoming, without Chodorov at the helm, the watered-down and timid Intercollegiate Studies Institute) or remained relatively silent on issues such as war and peace (witness the later Foundation for Economic Education), the Freedom School remained principled and dedicated to a pristine individualism, supporting private property, the free market, and international peace. To the horror of the Buckley right, Robert LeFevre did not limit the preservation of private property to Americans even during the Vietnam War, holding that it was a principle which should have prevented us from bombing the North Vietnamese back into the Stone Age.

LeFevre's backers did not always understand his seemingly fanatical consistency, which often led to problems as Bob attempted to raise the funds which were needed to keep the doors at the Freedom School open. Nevertheless, during the 1960s LeFevre performed virtual miracles in keeping individualist thought alive, through writing his own books, including *Constitutional Government Today in Soviet Russia, This Bread is Mine,* and *The Nature of Man and His Government,* seeing into print such classics as Murray Rothbard's *What Has Government Done to Our Money* and Lysander Spooner's *No Treason,* and publishing *Rampart Journal.*

This journal of individualist thought, edited by Bob's longtime associate, Ruth Dazey, was perhaps the Freedom School's most significant contribution to libertarian literature. Not only did it bring back to public attention such long-neglected authors as Herbert Spencer and Auberon Herbert,

and the hypocrisy of its behavior as evidenced by the trial of Army lieutenant Calley.

"The trial," LeFevre declares, "was to establish that there is a 'moral' and a 'legal' way to conduct wholesale murder, called war. Calley departed from the legalities and the presumed moralities, and had to be found guilty. The Army could have found in no other way. If it was to condone the killing of civilians, then it would have to establish that the governmental designation of 'enemies' has no meaning. This would be contrary to all government policies — which make it clear that murder is a crime unless the murder occurs in such a way that the government declares that the victim was an 'enemy.'

"The public outcry in this affair was understandable. Many veterans came forth to protest that they did the same sort of thing that Calley did. Of course they did. War, as Sherman observed, 'is hell.' I think the public felt Calley was made a scapegoat. The public didn't like that. I don't either. But the killing of a human being is immoral, on principle. The killing that Calley did was immoral, not only in this case but in all others.

"Here's how I view the whole scene. Those who order killing are wrong. Those who do the killing are wrong. Each is wrong to the degree that he is the controller and the initiator of the acts that are wrong.

"Was the Calley case a replay of the Nuremberg trials, which found guilty, after public outcry, those who carried out orders they dared not refuse? Certainly, Calley was guilty of no trial at all."

"From either the left or the right, all that violent revolutions produce is a new repression replacing the old."

What does LeFevre offer? What is his solution to the problem of government? "People must stop sanctioning it. Let it wither away. Do not vote. If you are not in politics, stay out. If you are in politics, get out. Don't take anything from the government and give nothing to it, except when it pulling the trigger. Had he not done so, would he have been court-martialed for refusing to obey an order? Perhaps. Some are. From my point of view, the trial was a farce. The judges either had to make Calley look good or they had to make the Army look good. Who were the judges? Army brass. It was forces you to. Don't be slaves. Be men." And he adds, "Nobody knows how high or how far men can go when they abandon the shackling limitations of past thinking and present believing."

In spite of his energy and enthusiasm, does Robert LeFevre actually think he can convert any large numbers of men to his philosophy of individualism as opposed to Statism?

"It isn't necessary to convert everybody — or even attempt to," he answers. "All that is necessary is to convert a sufficient number with the courage to make the attempt to find a better way. By their example, once they have succeeded, the others will convert themselves." ❑

Vern Hansen is a free-lance journalist who has been in broadcasting, industrial advertising, and public relations. He first met Robert LeFevre in 1942 when they both were young officers in the Army Air Corps, and has kept in touch with him ever since.

but it published as well essays destined to become classics, including Rothbard's "Anatomy of the State" and "Myths of the Cold War," and an entire issue, prepared by Harry Elmer Barnes and James J. Martin, devoted to revisionist history.

But it was as a teacher that Bob LeFevre has made his most lasting impact on the libertarian movement. Thousands of students had the opportunity to hear him give his one- and two-week "Fundamentals of Liberty" course over the years: a comprehensive survey of liberty, from the nature of truth through questions of morality, property, economics, history, and even strategy.

And during the months-long "Phrontistery" — a Greek word meaning a place for learning — held in the early 1960s, a flood of notables descended on the campus, all of whom left their mark: people of such stature and learning as Arthur Ekirch, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, W.H. Hutt, Bruno Leoni, F.A. Harper, Sylvester Petro, Rose Wilder Lane, Gordon Tulloch, G. Warren Nutter, and Milton Friedman.

The campus was nearly a square mile of log cabins and trees, with a tiny brook winding behind the buildings. It had the solemn atmosphere of a retreat and the sense of being a spiritual retreat of sorts. There Robert LeFevre and his small staff worked and taught and influenced. The two-week-long "Comprehensive Course" was offered every summer, as was a special workshop for Freedom School graduates and a number of Executive Seminars. For six or eight hours a day, students of all ages listened to LeFevre and others make out the case for liberty.

And it was persuasive. I recall one summer when I, at the tender-yet-arrogant age of nineteen was an assistant instructor and observed just one example of the power of LeFevre's ideas. In the class was a young woman, whose husband, an army colonel, was auditing the course from the balcony. He had volunteered for a second tour of duty in Vietnam just before the course began. By its end, he was ready to resign his commission. That was just one tiny instance of LeFevre's powerful impact.

This impact didn't always stick. Some people drifted away from the idealism which LeFevre hoped to instill; others, like Roger Milliken, continued to be supportive of LeFevre's ideas even while contributing to the Republican Party of Nixon and Agnew. There was the issue of LeFevre's "pacifism," and his principled rejection of even retaliatory violence. And there was the issue of strategy.

LeFevre had a profound influence on me. We began corresponding in 1965, met in 1967 when I took the Comprehensive Course, and became better acquainted in 1968 after LeFevre published my first two "major" articles, including my first broadside against some of Ayn Rand's views, "Objectivism and the State." And LeFevre gave me the chance to teach sections of his course. Most of his ideas I accepted readily. But it was the issue of strategy which ultimately found me (and many others) in strong disagreement.

LeFevre's course on liberty built to a crescendo, until everyone seemed to understand the importance of individual freedom and reached out with the question, "What can we do?" LeFevre's answer was to "get into the market," the private sector of the economy, to withdraw one's sanction from the State, and to hope to watch its power wither as people became more responsible for their own lives. Participating in electoral politics was, in his view, out of the question.

It is paradoxical, therefore, that despite his insistence on this strategy LeFevre's ideas were one strain that found their way — he may never forgive me for this — into the creation of the Libertarian Party and an activist libertarian movement as a potential vehicle for actually reducing the power of government in all areas of our lives. But if many of us have taken a different path toward the achievement of a free society, we can only hope that the ideals which Robert LeFevre has helped to spread will always remain paramount in our minds. As Bob LeFevre retires from his dedicated teaching (or least slows down his pace!), everyone in the growing libertarian movement owes him a salute of thanks. ❑

— Roy A. Childs, Jr.

The Reagan Restoration

The Reagan administration has accepted the same dangerous "brinksmanship" foreign policy that has been paramount in the U.S. since the beginning of the Cold War.

EARL C. RAVENAL



Reagan's "first hundred days," probably because they created the illusion of a relatively clean slate, have provided an irresistible occasion for advice-giving, particularly in foreign and military policy. Some advice has been intended as a calling card by eager careerists; some has been more remote, though not necessarily more detached and objective.

These remarks are decidedly not intended to obtain a job offer from the Reagan administration. For I argue for profound reductions of defense spending, which must be based on deep cuts in our force structures, both nuclear and conventional, and in turn on severe curtailments in our foreign commitments and worldwide deployments.

This must seem a peculiarly inhospitable season for suggesting deep cuts in our national security efforts. Even those who want to set limits ask only how steep an increase should be; they take for granted some share of the national product, some diversion from other purposes, public or private. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird wants a "buildup" rather than a "binge," and he has been praised for his moderation. Laird is thinking of a mere 6 percent annual increase in defense spending authority after inflation. Others have been flaunting scarier

figures: Senator John Tower, the new chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wants 9 to 13 percent annual increases above inflation. Reagan advisor Fred Iklé envisions defense budgets, not so long from now, of a trillion dollars a year.

But the question is not "how much?" or even "how much is enough?" — the supposedly definitive query — but "enough for what?" and "how much can we stand?"

The Reagan administration's defense program does not, of course, accomplish the moves that I favor. It does not cut defense spending. It does not reduce force structures, either strategic nuclear or general purpose. It does not limit commitments to armed intervention and let America's alliance systems wither away. It does not attenuate the linkages that implicate us in regional conflict. It does not revise national strategies to minimize the chance of our own involvement in war, particularly the escalatory linkages that expose our homeland to nuclear attack. It does not revise those counterforce strategies which might precipitate nuclear war in crises, and which therefore destabilize our strategic nuclear balance with the Soviet Union.

On the contrary, the Reagan administration will further the drift to strategic counterforce by developing and deploying the MX missile, but without solving the notorious "basing mode" problem. (Something there is that doesn't love a nuke; even the conservative Western governors don't want one in their backyard.) Therefore, we'll probably end up with the worst of all worlds; the MX missile with its outsized yield and super-accuracy and multiple MIRV-ing, but stuffed into fixed silos or planted in shelter fields that would be a "sponge" for Soviet missiles.



NOUR NEWS PHOTOS WORLDWIDE

This administration will expand the Rapid Deployment Force. This is a tangible implementation of Jimmy Carter's Doctrine, which originally inspired the waggish comment, "He speaks stickly but carries a big soft." Now, apparently, we'll carry the stick, too.

And eventually, despite his campaign protestations, Reagan will probably install some form of conscription, when the planners discover that you can't "fund" an armed establishment of 2.1 million people with manpower of sufficient quality in the face of a declining population group and a competing private economy; so we'll get the quasi-enslavement of a generation. We sometimes forget that the levée en masse is a liberal idea. Just recently we read Leslie Gelb, the Politico-Military Director in Carter's State Department, coaching Reagan: "If I could choose one issue on which you could make your mark in history, and along the way send a signal of strength and determination abroad, nothing would be better than the draft." (*New York Times Magazine*, January 18,

1981.)

The Reagan administration has requested, in defense obligational authority for fiscal year 1982, $222 billion. That is even higher than Carter's bogus legacy for the same fiscal year — a budget for a year his administration would not have to face. It is also 14.6 percent (above a hopefully stated inflation rate of 10.2 percent) more than what finally turned out to be the FY 1981 defense authorization of $178 billion. No doubt Reagan will have to come back to Congress for a hefty supplemental allowance for 1982, too. We can also make some projections for the years beyond (using a continuing rate of inflation of 10 percent and assuming 7 percent real annual increases): FY 1983, $264 billion; FY 1984, $309 billion; FY 1985, $361 billion; FY 1986, $423 billion.

Of the total of $222 billion for 1982, strategic nuclear forces will take "only" about $45 billion. General purpose forces will take about $177 billion, of which NATO will account for $109 billion, Asia $37 billion, and other parts of the world $31 billion.

"The Soviet threat"

It is "the Soviet threat" that both pushes and justifies almost every category of our defense effort, whether it is the central strategic balance, our major alliance systems, our military arrangements in regions such as the Middle East, or our global naval deployments. But the facts of the Soviet challenge are not as interesting or important as the logic. We must presume that our foreign and military policies are "rational," even though policy-makers might be misguided or ignorant. Therefore, we should be concerned with the connection that might run, from Soviet politics and Russian character and Marxist ideology, to pressures on our regional allies and strategic points, to imputed danger to our own territory, cities, people, property, economic health, and way of life. In other words, the payoff question is not "what?" but "so what?"

Some would say the very question shows hopeless naivete. But I believe the unexpressed premises are more important than the surface facts — even if we grant that they are the facts. In other words, you could conceivably believe the worst that the native American right wing, the emigrés, and the reactionary historians say about Soviet leadership — its motives, goals, dreams, even what it spends on arms — and still come out with a non-interventionist position. Ironically, the worse the threat, the smaller the proper response: If things are really as bad as the hawks represent, then we need to put some distance between ourselves and the next war.

How can I say this? Unlike most critics, I don't try to nitpick the data customarily offered in official studies of the Soviet challenge. In particular, I have never been overly impressed by the "ruble war" — attempts by defense critics such as Congressman Les Aspin and former CIA analyst Arthur Macy Cox to impugn the CIA's methodology for stating Soviet arms expenditures. The CIA prices Soviet spending as if the Russians had to procure their manpower, equipment, and technology at *our* prices. Of course, the Soviets hold down their actual manpower costs by conscripting their population at the most abject rates of pay. But that doesn't invalidate the pricing of the Russian army in U.S. terms. As in all costing, you have to consider what the exercise is for. In this case, in order to be efficiently compared and intelligibly evaluated, the resources devoted to defense by both sides must be expressed in some common denominator, and one that is relevant to us.

Other defense critics cite the "legitimate" motives the Soviets might have for their military moves: among other things, their fear of NATO's impressive force buildup, Chinese pressure on their borders, and the new generation of American strategic weapons. Lately, the obvious excuses have been wearing thin, and doves have had to be more ingenious in imagining, or inventing, appropriate motives. That doesn't mean these mitigating judgments make no sense — only that I wouldn't want to found my case for disengagement and arms reductions on such benign diagnoses.

A better point of entry into the argument is not the facts, or even the motives, of Soviet arms acquisition and expansionist behavior, but the *linkage* our leaders forge between these disturbing acts and some "necessary" American military response. It is this linkage that needs to be cut. The United States has other options, in the form of hedging moves to blunt the effects of challenges, that are better than preparing for or precipitating war. In other words, it takes two to make a threat.

But in fact there is a lot to restrain the Russians even without the active opposition of the United States. First, the Russians can't do whatever they want in the world, any more than we can. One obstacle is simply the existence of other countries and peoples. We needn't dwell on this. To pacify Afghanistan, for example, the Soviet occupying forces must literally run over the freedom fighters and their sympathizers with tanks. There are a thousand times more Afghans than Soviet tanks.

Another factor undoubtedly restrains Soviet expansion. A would-be aggressor doesn't invade a neighboring country, let alone attack its major adversary, simply because the odds are that it can win. There is such a thing as the calculus of costs and benefits. Our apprehensive defense analysts should think before they measure.

Some propositions about war and spending

Defense spending and war are related, but not in simple ways, and it is well not to confuse them. It is just not true that big defense budgets and "arms races" cause wars — the thesis of the doves. And certainly the opposite is not true, either: that you get "peace through strength" — the thesis of the hawks — though of course, at the limit, you must try to deter pure nasty aggression against your own country. There is no particular correlation, one way or the other, at least over the interesting range of the problem. Arms don't cause war any more than they insure peace. They are something like the handguns in the propaganda of the National Rifle Association: Arms don't kill people, aggressors do (though it is somewhat harder to do with bare hands).

Just as, four years ago, the incoming members of the Carter administration were labeled variously as "McGovernites" or "Trilateralists," the early Reagan administration was billed as a battle between the Nixon-Ford retreads (or, I suppose, you'd have to call this bunch "re-runs"), who were cast as the moderates, and the authentic Kamikazes (the foreign policy fanatics, the suicidal hawks).

It hasn't turned out that way. Even Georgi Arbatov, Brezhnev's chief America expert, predicted that Reagan would move to the political center and that the Soviet Union could cut an arms control deal with him. The real point is that Reagan can hardly go far in *any* direction. You don't have to be too sanguine about the Reagan advisors to reject the more fanciful or hysterical prognostications. What is

missing from those criticisms is a theory of how foreign policy gets made. A proper theory tells us that the Reagan administration, no less than its predecessors, is caught between the upper and nether millstones: its foreign policy *objectives,* which are really not that different from Carter's, and the *constraints,* which are also not that different, including the tax revolt, the abhorrence of inflation, and the resistance to the draft.

It might seem strained to invoke the lack of public support for an ambitious foreign policy. After all, this is the early eighties, not the late sixties. We're supposed to have recovered from the Vietnam "trauma," or "syndrome," or whatever. In fact, so rare are overt demonstrations against the military that the odd confrontation, as when a thousand women marched on the Pentagon last November, is reported by the *Washington Post* in the Style section, not the news, and the headline reads "A '60s-Style Protest"—as if it were a fashion collection or a retrospective at the Modern Museum, not a serious political expression. No matter: The important constraints are implicit in the policy process, and as such they are still operative.

Avoiding war

A funny thing happened to our nuclear strategy on the way to the nineteen-eighties. Never a pure example of city-busting second-strike deterrence — the popular image of "MAD" or Mutual Assured Destruction — it took a more decisive turn with the Nixon-Kissinger State of the World messages of the early 1970s and the Schlesinger Doctrine of January 1974. These strategic statements recommended intermediate nuclear options between total abstinence and a spasm of retaliation. They implied the use of some fraction of our strategic nuclear force to attack a portion of the enemy's target system consisting of military installations, logistical complexes, and—to put first things last—missile silos and command bunkers. They contemplated nuclear war-fighting and even war-winning, and they told us how to define "victory."

PD-59, the famous leaked presidential directive of the Carter administration in July 1980, furthered the shift in our nuclear targeting. In a sense, it was not the last strategic act of the outgoing Carter administration, but the first of the incoming Reagan administration.

But this gravitation to counterforce is not so strange or arbitrary. It is virtually compelled by America's present commitment to its alliance systems, especially NATO. We have always unabashedly depended on the threat of our first use of nuclear weapons, and our continuous escalation from battlefield nukes to the final use of our strategic intercontinental weapons. That is called "extended deterrence," and in its practical consequences it differs sharply from the mere deterrence of direct nuclear attacks on our homeland. Extended deterrence is the omnipresent, though spectral, guest at the strategic banquet.

It isn't unworthy for the Reagan administration to strive for the protection of allies—though it may become unwise. And it isn't unintelligent to try to achieve this protection through extended nuclear deterrence — though this may turn out to be infeasible. It is the logical extension of these objectives that is troublesome.


The "logic" of extended deterrence and counterforce is full of ironies. The first is that many self-styled defense critics, including those of the liberal left, are as firm in supporting our defense of Western Europe as are the hawks (perhaps more, since many of the hawks are closet unilateralists who don't give much for allies); yet these critics are also supporting — implicitly, or "objectively" as the Marxists are fond of saying — preemptive nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.

For protection of Western Europe requires reliable conventional defense or credible extended deterrence; indeed, as we shall see, it probably requires both. Extended deterrence in turn requires the virtually assured invulnerability of our own society to Soviet attack—not to be confused with the invulnerability of our nuclear weapons—since no one really believes we would risk tens of millions of American lives to spread our protective mantle over Western Europe and other parts of the world. We would have to provide that invulnerability through both our defensive and our offensive strategic systems.

But, first of all, the attempt to acquire such a defensive capability is very demanding. It would require a vast program of shelters and evacuation, as well as measures such as area anti-ballistic missiles or laser or particle beam weapons in space, air defense against Soviet bombers and cruise missiles, and anti-submarine warfare against Soviet missile submarines. And these measures wouldn't even work; the extension of Soviet offense is always easier than the extension of our defense.

Societal invulnerability would also, rather understandably, require us to keep in reserve enough surviving nuclear weapons, enough sheer nuclear megatonnage and delivery vehicles, after any of the earlier stages of a protracted nuclear exchange, to threaten counter-city strikes to deter Soviet attacks on our own cities, so that the enemy would never think that he could threaten our cities and exact a political price, including our surrender.

But what is the purpose of the third requisite for extended deterrence specified by the nuclear hawks: the acquisition of counterforce—specifically "hard target kill capability" (the nuggety phrase that marks "where it's at" in the current strategic debate)? This would enable us to execute a "damage limiting" strike against the Soviets' time-urgent nuclear weapons — that is, primarily their missiles in silos. The



DENNIS WHITEHEAD/PICTURE GROUP

Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator John Tower, wants a 9-13 percent increase (above inflation) for defense.

theory is that we must be able to disarm our enemy, so he *can't* hit our cities effectively, while reserving enough of our retaliatory forces so he wouldn't *want* to hit our cities.

The hawks declare, rather innocently, that we must have our own hard target kill capability in order to "neutralize" the Soviets' hard target kill capability. But what does "neutralization" mean? Surely not simply matching our opponents symmetrically, because that would be even more meaningless than the "perceived essential equivalence" which counterforce domination is partially intended to supplant. Rather, it must be part of our intention to strike *preemptively.*

The "preemptive attack"


I'm aware that "preemptive attack" is one of the dirtiest words in the strategic lexicon. (And, mind you, I didn't even say "preventive war," which is even dirtier — at least preemptive attack is a *contingent* concept and would occur only in an already ripening confrontation with the Soviet Union.) The word is never-never used by euphemistic American war planners, except to describe the intent of the *other* side, something we uniquely have to defend against. But dirty or not, we had better examine the logic of preemptive attack. Because, in order to have a nuclear war, someone has to start it; and because the objective fear of our — or their — preemptive strike destabilizes the strategic nuclear balance in a crisis.

It is not well understood that counterforce and a first nuclear strike are mutually dependent. A first strike implies counterforce, since the only initial attack that "makes sense" is a damage-limiting strike against the enemy's nuclear forces, not his cities, where the missiles would be largely wasted from a strategic standpoint. And counterforce implies first strike — a preemptive attack — because a second strike against the enemy's missiles is useless to the extent that our missiles would hit empty holes, since we wouldn't know which silos are still full.

Admittedly, if we concede some rather bizarre scenarios, and if we accept some rather delicately poised assumptions about the surviving numbers of our own missiles and the residual numbers of unfired Soviet missiles — then perhaps we would have to grant that the hawks were at least *sincere*, though not infallible, in their representation that *second*-strike counterforce was a sensible mission. (Indeed, that is the peculiar "attraction" of the MX missile — highly accurate, very potent, and multiply MIRVed — in its mobile or multiple basing mode.) But what these hypothetical scenarios really prove is that the mathematics created by new technology endows the initial offense with such impressive advantage that it makes little sense to build expensive counterforce into the force structure and not also adopt a preemptive strike doctrine.

And expensive it is. Hard target kill probability is by far the most demanding of the various missions that are pushing the expansion of our nuclear force to 15,000 or 20,000 "RVs" or reentry vehicles, up from the present total of about 7,000 (excluding the weapons carried by bombers, which the Secretary of Defense so inelegantly calls "the air-breathing leg of the strategic triad").

Moreover, counterforce creates some nasty contradictions. Even the hawks claim that part of their intention in deploying counterforce weapons is to force our adversary to move to an invulnerable posture, through mobility or dispersion or putting his missiles to sea. That is called achieving



LIONEL DELVINGNE PICTURE GROUP

Reliance on nuclear submarines like the Trident would make the U.S. much less vulnerable to attack than would the MX system.

"crisis stability." But then we couldn't even disarm him and enhance the societal invulnerability we sought in the first place — a necessary condition to insure the credibility and feasibility of our extended deterrence. Crisis stability would actually undermine our deterrence of conventional aggression. Since neither we nor our enemy would have sufficient incentive to escalate to nuclear war, they might seek the verdict of a conventional war, and we might have to accept the verdict of a conventional war!

It isn't even clear, however, that we could proceed smoothly through counterforce to crisis stability. For even if *eventually* our hard target kill capability forced the Soviets to go mobile and reestablished crisis stability through the invulnerability of both sides' nuclear forces, this would be only at the end of a long process that must pass through a phase of acute *in*stability. The Russians, after all, might initially react by planning to launch on warning, or even preemptively.

But if all we want from *counterforce* is to reestablish *crisis stability,* which *is* a worthy objective in the design of our — and their — nuclear forces, then counterforce isn't even necessary. There are other, better, ways to achieve crisis stability. For it takes only one of the nuclear antagonists to achieve weapons invulnerability for himself, and that is all you need for crisis stability. We can achieve this unilaterally, by cancelling our vulnerable land-based missiles (our Minuteman IIIs) and not replacing them with the mobile MX or anything else. We would move to a diad of strategic nuclear forces, consisting of nuclear submarines — not necessarily a new breed to put alongside the Trident force — and bombers armed with stand-off medium-range air-launched cruise missiles.

An alternative policy

What emerges from this analysis is that we can't easily or cheaply or conveniently — if at all — provide the requisite conditions for extended deterrence. Of course, the argument proceeds, we could attempt to build a self-sufficient conventional defense that would not depend on escalation, particularly to strategic nuclear weapons. But that would defeat the very economies we hoped to obtain through linking local defense to general deterrence. And it would "decouple" us from Europe, anyway, because we could not credibly threaten escalation to nuclear war.

If this long train of reasoning is correct — if the game of extended deterrence is over and crisis stability alone can be pursued through unilateral and non-threatening and inex-

pensive moves—then the stage is set for a major alternative policy that has long been ignored: a policy of non-intervention, consisting of war-avoidance and self-reliance. These themes come together in the discussion of our defense of other regions of the world.

"Coupling" is the key to regional defense in a nuclear age. In the case of Europe, this piece of exotica signifies the linkage of our escalatory reponses, from conventional war in the theater, through tactical nuclear weapons, to our strategic nuclear arsenal. Obviously coupling creates stronger—though never perfect—deterrence. The question is whether this linkage is safe in an age of nuclear parity and nuclear plenty. If deterrence fails... then coupling entails the swift and virtually automatic progression to higher levels of violence and wider extensions of conflict. Thus our alliances become transmission belts for war rather than bulwarks against the spread of war.

I believe our circumstances indicate a strategy of compartmentalization of conflict rather than linkage. This means the delegation of defensive tasks to our allies. Most essentially, it also means our acceptance of the results, win or lose. Understandably, people on both sides of the Cold War have trouble appreciating, even imagining, the disintegration of those apparent fixtures, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But now, with Poland, we can foresee the crumbling of the Eastern bloc. Why should we be so resistant to the notion of the eventual erosion of the Western alliance?

President Reagan inherited the Carter Doctrine, which threatens intervention in the Persian Gulf. Since the Doctrine was announced in January 1980, the United States has acquired a series of stepping stones in the western Indian Ocean. It has also put as many as sixty ships into that Ocean, including two carrier task forces—about a sixth of our Navy.

Reagan has also inherited the Rapid Deployment Force, the 100,000-plus group of Marines, Army, Air Force, and Navy units, mostly for missions in the Persian Gulf. But the salient feature of this force is its irrelevance in the emergencies we are most likely to encounter—such as the Iran-Iraq conflict, where we don't even know whose side we are on, let alone what to do when we get there. It is the old question, straight out of the children's poems of A. A. Milne (who seems to have had a profound understanding of diplomacy and bureaucracy): "Pussycat, pussycat, what *did* you there?" To which the flustered feline replies: "I frightened a little mouse under the chair."

Paradigm and counter-paradigm

Rather predictably, the Reagan administration has embraced the same paradigm that has shaped the foreign and military policy of the United States since the inception of the Cold War. It has two components: deterrence and alliance. These have been mixed in various proportions over the past 35 years, and the varieties and oscillations have been more than trivial. But the underlying paradigm has scarcely been challenged during that time. Unless this paradigm is substantially altered, we will be condemned to periodic exercises of "brinkmanship," credibility-enhancing regional confrontations, and limited wars—and the hovering threat of global nuclear destruction.

The essence of a counter-paradigm would be war-avoidance and self-reliance—in a word, non-intervention. Our security and welfare would depend on our simple abstention from regional quarrels and, in the strategic nuclear dimension, on what I would call "finite essential deterrence." (FED — there's a nice acronym for security bureaucrats to roll on their tongues, much nicer than MAD.)

These general formulations — war-avoidance and self-reliance—are not mere abstractions. They translate into a particular and tangible set of force structures and major weapons systems, to which in turn defense budgets can be assigned. We could defend our *essential* security and core values with a much smaller and tighter force structure than we now have. Such a force structure would provide the following general purpose forces: 8 land divisions (6 Army and 2 Marine), 19 tactical air wing equivalents (11 Air Force, 2 Marine which are equal to 4, and 4 Navy), with 6 carrier task forces. With the addition of a diad of strategic nuclear deterrent forces (submarines and stand-off bombers), it would require 1,250,000 men (Army 390,000, Air Force 360,000, Navy 370,000, Marine Corps 130,000). The total defense budget, at the end of a period of adjustment, would be about $100 billion a year, in FY 1982 dollars. In contrast, we have the Reagan administration's request for FY 1982: 19 land divisions and 45 tactical air wing equivalents, with 13 carrier task forces; 2.1 million men; and $222 billion.

What emerges from this analysis is that—if we put our hearts and minds to it—we could save over *half* of the defense budget projected by Ronald Reagan. And at the end of a decade, we would be spending $256 billion in inflated dollars, while conservative (not wishful) projections of the Reagan administration's program would yield a defense budget of over $1 trillion. If we dare to contemplate the cumulative cost of defense over a decade, it would be: our forces $2 trillion; Reagan's, a cool $5 trillion.


Viewing the Reagan inauguration—the ceremonies, the festivities—you got the feeling of a kind of Restoration, after a period of usurpation. The trouble is that this administration thinks it has received a mandate to restore the prestige and power, as well as the style, of the 1950s—to "make America great again," in the world as well as among ourselves.

But this invites a cruel dilemma, because no amount of wishing, orating, or posturing will summon the resources for this global task. This dilemma is nothing more or less than the classic situation of the mature empire: it must defend a vast security perimeter that is beset by multiple probes from without, while at home overblown governmental structures, on a rotting base of popular support, run out of fiscal tricks, and thus out of revenues to realize their foreign policy designs.

The beginning of wisdom is to be clear about one's situation. If we are to accommodate ourselves to a world of diffuse challenges and indecipherable signals — most of them indistinguishable from noise—then we have to *de*-sensitize ourselves, to blunt our responses rather than sharpen our attitudes. We have to cultivate, at the official national level—though not necessarily at the private personal level—a studious neutrality, almost an indifference, in the literal sense, to opportunities of foreign intervention—even if that intervention promises to set things right.

In the continuing glow of the Reagan Restoration, that might seem strange, even forbidding, advice. But it is the basis for a constructive adjustment of America's posture to a confused and antagonistic world. ❑

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EL SALVADOR

The Roots of Conflict

ROY A. CHILDS, JR.

Only a little more than two months into its reign, the Reagan administration is off and running, proposing a change in direction in our domestic policies and in our foreign policies as well. While much of the early attention given the new administration has centered around Reagan's controversial budget "cuts," far more important changes —in terms of potential harm wrought—are being made in foreign policy, changes which indicate that Reagan will revive a decaying Cold War rhetoric and restore aggressive intervention into the Third World. The new direction in foreign policy was initiated with Reagan's harsh words toward the Soviet Union at his first presidential press conference, and is being boldly put into practice by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who once thought Henry Kissinger was "too soft" on the Vietnamese.

He began with a series of mainly symbolic acts: Robert White, Ambassador to El Salvador and opponent of American military intervention there, was fired; Anatol Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., was deprived of his privilege of entering the State Department through the garage; Haig announced that former President Carter's alleged "human rights" policies were a dead letter, and that "human rights" concerns

Mourners at the funeral of Archbishop Oscar Romero scatter after being fired upon by security police.



would henceforth be limited to U.S. opposition to terrorism; President Chun Doo Hwan, the dictator of South Korea, was invited to make the first major visit of a foreign head of state to the U.S.; NATO was chastised, more harshly than ever before, for dragging its feet in escalating its defense spending; aid to El Salvador's junta was stepped up. And, if the point were still not made, the administration promptly lifted Carter's ban on trade assistance for Chile's military government.

But these were almost minor measures. Secretary Haig lost no time in getting down to more serious business.

"U.S. Says Salvador is 'Textbook Case' of Communist Plot," proclaimed a headline in the February 20 *New York Times*. And what followed was a report on the opening salvo in an administration battle to portray El Salvador as a "test issue" in a revived East-West conflict, a propaganda blitz designed to promote Haig's quest for huge increases in the "defense" budget, and to gain public and Allied support for a more brashly aggressive foreign policy.

Haig then launched a carefully crafted campaign to convince the American people and our allies that the guerrilla war now raging in El Salvador is not primarily generated by indigenous forces, but is rather a "communist plot" to take over another country in the Western Hemisphere. At his briefing of representatives of NATO, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Spain on February 17, Haig announced that

> A well-orchestrated international Communist campaign designed to transform the Salvadoran crisis from an internal conflict to an increasingly internationalized conflict is under way. With Cuban coordination, the Soviet bloc, Vietnam, Ethiopia and radical Arabs are furnishing at least several hundred tons of military equipment to the Salvadoran leftist insurgents.

Haig waved a thick collection of documents — a White Paper entitled "Communist Interference in El Salvador" — which claimed to chart the itinerary of Salvadoran Communist boss Shafik Handal, to show meetings with foreign Communist leaders in which Handal asked for help, and to document arms shipments to El Salvador, both current and proposed.

Haig's portrayal of the junta was equally clear-cut: it was a "coalition, headed by a true Christian Democrat," Napoleón Duarte, which included "moderate military and independent civilians"; it had been caught in a crossfire between terrorists of both the left and the right, but was nonetheless making "progress" in restoring peace and implementing

democratic reforms. It was this "progress," he asserted, that saw the left increasingly without a cause, losing its popular support, a situation which forced it to turn more openly to the Soviet bloc:

The Communist nations intervened in 1980 to provide the insurgents with large amounts of military supplies.... During the first weeks of this Administration we have taken a number of steps to deal with this situation. *After, and only after,* the external intervention we furnished the Salvadoran Government the additional military supplies it urgently needs to meet the threat of the Cuban-supported guerrillas. *There were no lethal military supplies before that – none – until large-scale military attacks had been executed* [my emphasis].


It seemed, somehow, as though we had heard it all before. A small, beleaguered nation, saddled for years with an oppressive regime, desperately trying to "reform" and "modernize" itself, harassed by "leftist terrorists" who are being supported by weapons supplied from "outside" the country, and, of course, aided, trained and supported by the Soviet bloc. After, and only after, that outside Communist interference has been established "beyond doubt," the U.S. intervened to supply arms and a few minor advisers.

Having painted the scenario skillfully (almost as if from memory) Haig announced that an intensive investigation was underway to determine precisely what help, in addition to the $63 million already committed in fiscal year 1981, was necessary to help the Salvadoran junta in the near future. And the troops snapped to attention. Senator Charles Percy intoned, "this is where we draw the line" to stop Communist expansion. He said that the use of U.S. troops was "unlikely"—but did not rule it out. Senator Howard Baker supported sending arms and "as many as 150 advisers" to El Salvador, to help defend it against Cuban attack (as if, through a subtle change, alleged Cuban arms shipments had now become an open "attack"). The chief counsel to the President, Edwin Meese III, went further on ABC's "Issues and Answers," threatening possible "direct action" against the Cubans, if their support of the Salvadoran insurgents didn't come to an abrupt halt. That could take the form of a blockade of Cuba — apparently Reagan's solution to every world problem—or even the use of American troops against Cuba.

Nor was this foreign-policy swaggering limited to the administration itself. William Safire wrote that "A generation ago and half a world away, South Korea was chosen to be the place where the line was drawn against Communist expansion. President Reagan has chosen El Salvador to be this generation's and this hemisphere's South Korea." What should we do? "First, we must break the Communist winning streak," Safire said and, "Second, El Salvador is a place where we can win.... Our purpose... is not merely to stop Western Hemispheric penetration but to turn the global tide." Nor was Safire naive about what this might entail: "What is 'winning'? Is it supporting a military junta that kills the opposition but by its repressive nature produces more opposition that [sic] becomes necessary to kill? If need be, yes...."

Not to be left behind in the scramble toward intervention was Mr. Establishment himself, Joseph Kraft. "If this country cannot sustain the junta by a limited application of muscle, then it should quit the Great Power business," he wrote. "If the junta now collapsed, the United States would cut a ridiculous figure all over the world." And that, presumably, is reason enough to make El Salvador this generation's Korea... or Vietnam.

Reagan himself was not unaware of the parallels, for in a meeting with reporters he complained that those who were already questioning the wisdom of American intervention were victims of the "Vietnam syndrome," and he, for one, was not about to be cowed by so much ancient history. Someone was heard to mumble, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it," but that was probably some obscure McGovernite. And anyway, weren't the McGovernites defeated in the last election?



SYGMA

When Archbishop Romero began to suggest that revolt was justified, he was brutally assassinated while serving mass.

"The past is like a funeral gone by"

While the Reaganites are eager to have another chance at Vietnam, this time in a small Central American country, with a population of 4.5 million, and a territory, as legend has it, "the size of Massachusetts," the fact is that the administration's and Haig's caricatures of the situation in El Salvador are almost entirely devoid of truth or logic. The notions that El Salvador's junta is composed of "moderates," that they are "reformers" trying to end both righ-wing and left-wing terrorism, that their primary opposition is Soviet or Cuban-backed Marxists, that the guerrillas are primarily fighting with arms supplied by the Soviet bloc, and, especially, that the U.S. intervened in El Salvador only after the intervention of that bloc, are such obvious distortions of the facts that only the media's "memory hole" approach to current political crises allows them to get away with it. Cicero once wrote "Not to know what happened before one was born is always to be a child." What then are we to call those unaware of events barely gone by? Do policymakers in the Reagan Administration really need to be reminded that what is happening in El Salvador is not part of any "Communist plot," but part and parcel of a struggle against the legacy of feudalism which is sweeping so much of Latin America? Or that U.S. involvement in Latin America did not begin as Reagan took office, pretending to respond to a Cuban "threat," but dates back to the nineteenth century? Apparently so. But we need not recall the literally dozens of instances of American military intervention in Latin America over the past century and a half just yet. Let us simply remind the Reagan Administration of a memorandum written by Under Secretary of State Robert Olds, in 1927:

Our ministers accredited to the five little republics, stretching from the Mexican border to Panama...have been advisers whose advice has been accepted virtually as law in the capitals where they respectively reside. ... We do control the destinies of Central America and we do so for the simple reason that the national interest absolutely dictates such a course. ... Until now Central America has always understood that governments which we recognize and support stay in power, while those we do not recognize and support fall.

The United States was not the first nation to try to dominate the affairs of what is now called Latin America. That distinction belonged to Portugal and Spain, particularly Spain which, a scant three decades after Columbus's discovery, had succeeded in sending major expeditions to conquer Latin America.

In El Salvador, the Spaniards defeated the Pipil Indian tribe in 1527, seized their land, and reduced them to serfdom. While initial Spanish conquests concentrated on extracting as much gold as possible from the New World—enslaving Indians to work in the mines, where necessary—Spaniards later settled on the land, carved up vast quantities into feudal estates, and forced the Indians to work on the farms to pay tribute.

When El Salvador gained independence from Spain in the 1820s, the internal system changed very little until the introduction of coffee in the 1850s as a major crop in El Salvador. Coffee was labor-intensive, and required more work from the peasants than had earlier crops. Laws were passed by the feudal landlords to expel the Indians from their property. The landowners also created "rural judges" who had the power to force the Indians to work the coffee plantations. Occasional uprisings began (the first in El Salvador on any large scale was recorded in 1889), but they were dealt with harshly by the *Hacienda* police, a rural police force whose methods were often as brutal as those of the security police and "death squads" which are so oppressive in El Salvador today.

The role of the United States in Latin American affairs was ambitious from the outset. With the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States tried to ban any European intervention into Latin American affairs, but its own intervention vastly increased. The doctrine of Manifest Destiny served as a rationalization for further conquests throughout North America, including those of the Mexican-American war. The North Americans intervened militarily in the affairs of Latin American countries dozens of times throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the U.S. government used both military force and economic "aid" to promote American business interests and obtain the acquiescence of Latin American nations in the "leadership" of the North American giant.

In the early twentieth century, under the (Theodore) Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, U.S. businessmen hoping to open up new markets and establish new investments in Latin America were backed by U.S. Marines, which promptly established protectorates over Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, including much of what is now El Salvador. From the time of the so-called Good Neighbor Policy on, more subtle means of intervention were relied upon, including the encouragement of wide-scale state planning of Latin American economies in the name of "development." Economic aid functioned as a form of "leverage," much as did the policies of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, the InterAmerican Development Bank and the Alliance for Progress. This meant that U.S. economic and military policies were used simultaneously as carrot and stick, to induce Latin American nations to promote agricultural and industrial policies congenial to American business and political interests alike, at the expense of taxpayers in the U.S. and Latin America. To protect business investments, and to ensure steady repayment of loans — whether governmental, quasi-governmental (the IMF and World Bank), or private — stability became the watchword in international affairs. Without "stability," officials claimed, neither foreign investment, nor international government-to-government loans, nor economic growth, (within carefully planned channels) would be forthcoming. What was at stake was an internationalization of liberal-Keynesian "planning" and "reform" — a reform which, until the 1960s, usually entailed the protection, above all else, of the feudal land tenure system and the oligarchs of Latin America whose survival and wealth depended upon it. This was portrayed as an extension of "capitalism" to Latin America, but it was a very odd capitalism indeed, as we shall see.

Feudalism and capitalism

None of this went unnoticed by Latin Americans, who revolted against both their own oppressive oligarchic regimes and foreign imperialism. In Mexico there were more than a thousand armed uprisings between 1800 and 1940; in Bolivia, there were more than 130 — and these uprisings were not atypical. Neither was the brutality with which such revolts were put down. The self-consciousness of Latin Americans concerning the oppressiveness of their feudal-oligarchic political system was eloquently expressed in the early 1960s by the Mexican intellectual Carlos Fuentes, in his lecture "The Argument of Latin America: Words for the North Americans." Fuentes addressed the North American ignorance of the plight of the Latin Americans:

> You have had four centuries of uninterrupted development within the capitalistic structure. We have had four centuries of underdevelopment within a feudal structure.
>
> You must understand this key word: *structure*. You had your own origin in the capitalistic revolution, liberal and Protestant. You were born without an anachronistic link.... On the contrary, we were were founded as an appendix of the falling feudal order of the Middle Ages; we inherited its obsolete structures, absorbed its vices, and converted them in institutions on the outer rim of the revolution in the modern world. If you come from the Reformation, we come from the Counter-Reformation: ... a customs house closed to modern ideas....
>
> You must understand that the Latin American drama stems from the persistence of those feudal structures over four centuries of misery and stagnation, while you were in the midst of the industrial revolution and were exercising a liberal democracy. *You must understand that the only solutions for Latin Americans will be to destroy all those structures at once* [emphasis added].

What had developed throughout Latin America, in short, despite the more-than-occasional talk of "modernization," was *not* free market capitalism, based on just property titles acquired by homesteading or voluntary purchase, but what sociologist Stanislav Andreski calls "a parasitic involution of capitalism," with limited and politically-controlled markets which are based on feudal land titles. In El Salvador, the ruling feudal-oligarchy used every political means possible to monopolize the land in the hands of the so-called "fourteen families," including conscript labor, controls on exports, investments, industrialization and the banking system, land theft, and mass executions. By the early twentieth century, the rule of El Salvador's fourteen families was consolidated, and they had gained control of nearly 90 percent of the land of the country.

By the late 1920s, their most profitable crop, coffee, dominated the nation's economy, accounting for nearly 95 percent of the nation's exports. When more land was needed, it was seized. And when the Great Depression hit, the price of coffee fell dramatically, wiping out many of the small landowners. Neighboring countries, such as Nicaragua, were similarly hard-hit. Wages on large plantations fell

from 50¢ to 20¢ per day, and the Hacienda police were brutal in dealing with those who complained too loudly about their condition or the political system which had led up to it. In Nicaragua, there was a revolt against the U.S.-installed Somoza, answered by a continuing U.S. intervention which was to keep the Somoza dynasty in power until 1979. In El Salvador, there was a mass uprising, led by Agustin Farabundo Marti, a founder of the Central American Socialist Party.

The uprising in El Salvador was brutally put down by government troops. And then a *real* massacre began: the systematic executions of some 30,000 peasants and Indians — *some 4 percent of the population* — by firing squads. Those whose only crime was to have Indian features were summarily lined up and shot. The wholesale slaughter made its point; for the better part of the next 50 years El Salvador's population remained in the grip of one military regime after another.

When Castro's revolution against Batista succeeded in Cuba in 1959, Americans suddenly became nervous about the stability of the feudal system which they had supported so eagerly for decades. Out of a desire to forestall a peasant uprising, New Frontiersmen began toying with the idea of pressuring El Salvador into adopting some significant reforms, particularly land reform, but the oligarchy resisted. And so, to obtain "stability-at-any-price," Kennedy — and later Johnson — began to arm the Salvadoran military as a "precautionary measure," and to build up the security forces.

Oligarchy and opposition

The limited reforms of the early 1960s in El Salvador produced a ray of hope among opponents of autocratic government. The founding of the Christian Democratic Party (PCD) in 1962, squaring off against the "official" party, the Party of National Conciliation (PCN), in a number of local elections, fueled their hopes that electoral, rather than violent, means could be used to transform the system. The striking successes of the PCD in the late 1960s caused the military and the oligarchy to worry. In 1967, these groups set up the major security police, ORDEN, a paramilitary group primarily consisting of active army reservists and retired military men under the leadership of General Jose Alberto, to deal with "disruptions" in the rural areas of El Salvador. ORDEN's 70,000 to 100,000 men, far outnumbering the small Salvadoran army of less than 15,000, began to practice those ways of dissent which were to make it the most corrupt, feared, and brutal of El Salvador's paramilitary groups.

Sensing a chance for victory against the military and the oligarchy in the 1972 presidential election, the leaders of the Christian Democrats joined in a united front with the Social Democrats (MNR) and the legal arm (UDN) of the tiny and outlawed Communist Party, long considered one of Latin America's most conservative communist groups (they regularly opposed nonelectoral means of changing the government, and in 1979 were to be among the first to back the first military-civilian government junta). This united front was called the National Opposition Union (UNO), and ran as its slate of candidates prominent Christian Democrat Napoleón Duarte for President and Guillermo Ungo, a leader of the Social Democrats, for Vice President. The wealthy landowners ran General Alberto, head of ORDEN, while the military backed the PCN candidate, Colonel Arturo Molina. When the Duarte-Ungo slate was the clear winner, the army simply ignored the results and declared Colonel Molina the new President. Duarte and Ungo were exiled; Duarte, whom the military and oligarchs considered to be a "dangerous radical," was to remain in exile for nearly eight years, while Ungo, considered less radical and less dangerous, was allowed to return after four months. Less than nine years later, the two candidates would be bitter enemies, on opposite sides in the developing conflict.

The Reagan administration's motives are dubious, its claims falsehoods, its actions dangerous and ill-considered.

When President Molina indicated half-hearted support for land reform, he was ousted in 1977, again through fraudulent elections. Molina was replaced by the autocratic General Carlos Humberto Romero who, as Minister of Defense, had blocked a proposed land reform project. Much of the population at that point became radicalized, moving to support one or another of the opposition groups which had dismissed electoral politics as a political strategy after the failure of their repeated efforts to have elections conducted fairly and their results observed. The Communist Party, however, opposed these groups; in the eyes of the PCS, they were "ultra-leftist."

During General Romero's reign, opposition to the government often proved to be fatal; according to the *Los Angeles Times,* "Up to 800 people are believed to have died or 'disappeared' for political reasons during his two year regime." (November 26, 1979) Opposition to Romero mounted, among the people, in the Carter Administration, and even in the military. When the United States made it clear in 1977 that it was planning to cut off military aid to El Salvador under Carter's "human rights" policies, the Salvadoran government renounced U.S. aid — as did several other dictatorships in Latin America — in protest against "U.S. interventionism." Even so, American aid to the military dictatorship was never really cut off — it was simply disguised. As the *Los Angeles Times* reported,

> the U.S., which quietly pressured Romero to resign, continued to support the regime publicly. While the U.S. Agency for International Development provided $8 million in "basic human need" grants and loans, and the U.S.-supported Inter-American Development Bank gave $30 million more [in 1979], Romero's congress transferred $21 million out of housing, education and health budgets and into the military [November 26 1979].

By mid-1979, at least three different groups were planning to overthrow Romero as violence escalated. Still smarting from its failure in Nicaragua, where long-time U.S. ally Somoza had been overthrown by the Sandinistas, the U.S. lost no time in hastening to defuse the situation. The U.S. embassy worked with a group of young, "progressive" army colonels to overthrow Romero and set up a civilian-military junta in his stead.

On October 15, 1979, the colonels made their move, ousting Romero and "retiring" scores of senior military officers upon whom they blamed much of the violence and repression. Within 48 hours, the army named a five-man junta consisting of Colonel Adolpho Majano, 41, deputy chief of El Salvador's military school, who was chosen unanimously by the military; Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, 43, a conservative military leader; Roman Mayarga

Quiros, 36, an MIT-educated electrical engineer who was formerly rector of the University of Central America, with close ties to the popular Archbishop Oscar Romero (no relation to the deposed General) of San Salvador; Guillermo Manuel Ungo, 47, a university administrator and respected Social Democrat who had been Napoleón Duarte's vice-presidential candidate in 1972 and then was exiled briefly by the military; and Mario Antonio Andino, an engineer with close contacts to American interests, who held "progressive" political views and represented private enterprise groups in El Salvador.

Within a scant few weeks, the junta would be wrecked on the shoals of Salvadoran military reality. Although the military members were prominent on the junta, they were portrayed as "progressive" military leaders, with the civilians having an equal voice. Reforms were promised, including land reform and an end to repression by the army and paramilitary forces. Leftist and centrist opposition groups decided to give the junta a chance, and Archbishop Romero took to the airwaves to give the junta his blessing, pleading with his countrymen to give the new regime time to prove that "its beautiful promises are not dead letters, but rather a real hope that a new era has begun for our country."

It was, alas, not to be.

Two months into the new regime, while murders by the right-wing death squads as well as by government security forces were escalating, a massacre took place in the town of El Congo, where the army dispatched a number of civilians who had not been accused of any crime. The civilians on the junta demanded an investigation and were thwarted. On January 3 and 4, Guillermo Ungo, Mario Andino, and Roman Mayarga Quiros abruptly resigned. Mayarga was so shaken that he left the country, vowing never to set foot in it again.



NOUR NEWS PHOTOS WORLDWIDE

Napoleón Duarte, President of the junta, is little more than a figurehead in a nation dominated by the military.

The Christian Democrats had formed no part of the junta, but as the army desperately sought replacements for the three civilians who had left, the PCD was the only party which would agree to give them a chance. On January 7, Hector Dada and Antonio Morales Erlich, both of the PCD, and Dr. Ramon Avalos Navarrete, a physician and close friend of Colonel Gutierrez, were named as replacement junta members. Again, promises were made, and again they were not kept, as the number of deaths in the early months of the junta's reign were more than twice what they had been under General Romero. An ambitious program of land reform, largely designed by Americans, was announced on March 6; on March 7, the banking system was nationalized; soon thereafter, the export industry followed suit.

In mid-March, Dada resigned to protest the repression, and he was replaced by Napoleón Duarte, who returned from eight years of exile. The violence continued.

As the killings increased — and there were more than 2,000 during the junta's opening few months—Archbishop Oscar Romero began to run out of patience and began to preach in his sermons the right of rebellion against tyranny when all other avenues to social and political change had been exhausted. In late March, Archbishop Romero was assassinated while offering Sunday mass in San Salvador, gunned down by an assassin reportedly working with the right-wing death squad, the White Warrior's Union, commanded by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, head of Salvadoran military intelligence until 1979. Hundreds of thousands of mourners took to the streets in a peaceful demonstration days later, only to be fired upon by the army and security forces. Corpses of unarmed demonstrators littered the streets of San Salvador. Two days after the Archbishop's brutal assassination, the U.S. House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations held hearings on further aid for El Salvador; $5.7 million was approved on April 1.

The junta found itself isolated from the people. The civilian members of the junta had failed to carry through on their promises. They failed in their efforts to oust Defense Minister Jose Garcia (a supporter of ORDEN and the right-wing death squads), and in their attempts to control the military and paramilitary units. Every investigation into the murders committed by the military was thwarted. Finally, faced with a mounting list of tortured, maimed, and murdered civilians, every political party in the country, except the Christian Democrats, deserted the junta. Its presumed "popular support" — a facade at best — had disappeared. Ungo and the Social Democrats joined the opposition; so did an entire faction of the Christian Democrats who deserted the PCD's two junta members. The progressive Colonel Majano remained, hoping to fight the repressive elements in the military, but when in May he helped to thwart an attempted coup engineered by D'Aubuisson, the military refused to support him. Majano was stripped of his command, while D'Aubuisson, who had been jailed, was freed immediately. Later, Majano was ousted from the junta altogether, and in February of this year was arrested. Jose Napoleón Duarte was named President of El Salvador, but the right-wing remained in control of the army and security police. In fact, Duarte was a mere figurehead, an adornment shining atop a murderous regime, tolerated by the military only because of their desperate need of a symbol, any symbol, which they could use to claim, in the court of international public opinion, that, somehow, the junta remained "moderate," "reformist," and "centrist" —

when in fact it was a military dictatorship in everything but name.

On April 11, 1980, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) was created, comprised of more than 150 organizations, including unionists, teachers, slum dwellers, professionals, technicians, market vendors, religious figures, university rectors, and children. The FDR was legal, it was said in El Salvador, but the penalty for membership was death. The first president of the FDR was Enrique Alvarez, a wealthy landowner who had resigned as Minister of Agriculture in the first junta of 1979 because of the military domination of the government. Alvarez was one of six FDR leaders who met in a Jesuit High School in November 1980. Soldiers surrounded the school, while a group of heavily armed men dressed in civilian clothes entered the building and seized the opposition leaders. Later, they were found: tortured, mutilated, and dead.

The FDR choose as its new leader Guillermo Ungo, Napoleón Duarte's running mate in 1972, and one of the members of the original junta which overthrew General Humberto Romero in October 1979. Duarte and Ungo had become bitter opponents.

Haig's complaint

That is one reason we should be skeptical of the chicken-little scenario painted by Alexander Haig and company. In the event of a victory by FMLN, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front which serves as the guerrilla arm of the FDR, it is widely believed that the new government of El Salvador would be run by top leaders of the FDR, with Ungo as its most likely President. If Ungo is a "Marxist-Leninist," why was he *not* a Marxist-Leninist when the U.S. supported his appointment to the original junta? The fact is, of course, that Ungo is a Social Democrat, a socialist in the tradition of many governments in Western Europe, that he was a Social Democrat in 1972, was one in 1979 when appointed to the junta, and remains one today. As president of the FDR, he is the head of a wide coalition of different groups opposed to the military junta, including dissident Christian Democrats, religious groups, and peasants.

There are Marxists in the opposition, of course, including many fighting in the guerrilla forces. But they are far from dominant in the guerrilla forces, who number among themselves a disproportionate number of very young Salvadorans flatly and simply opposed to the current junta. And while socialism is certainly a disreputable and even evil social system, someone should ask Secretary Haig a question: How does the socialism of Ungo differ from the practice of the current regime, which has for the most part nationalized—not "redistributed"—large segments of land, the banking system, and the export industry, "reforms" which Haig says we will continue to support?

This, however, is a minor question. Even larger questions loom as we examine Haig's charges, with which we began our analysis. Haig, you will recall, claimed that the ruling junta was a "moderate coalition" headed by a "true Christian Democrat" — Duarte — which was implementing significant "reforms," while it battled "extremist" elements of both the left and the right. According to Haig, the guerrillas are all "leftists" and "Marxist-Leninists," with no popular support, who are only able to continue their battle against the junta because they are supplied with arms from the Soviet bloc. Moreover, Haig claimed that the U.S. supplied military aid "after and only after" the "external intervention."

Clearly one does not have to be a Marxist-Leninist to oppose rampant slaughter; more than 12,000 civilians have been murdered in the last 14 months in El Salvador, 80 percent of these murders, according to a vast array of sources, attributable to the army and government security forces. Even former Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White put this point bluntly: "The chief killer of Salvadorans is the government security forces," he told a group of mostly Republican Senators. "Do you want to associate yourself with this kind of killing?"

Just as clearly, one does not have to be a Marxist to see through the ploy which holds that the junta is a "moderate coalition." The "moderate" segments in the junta, including every cabinet member in the original except the Minister of Defense, have long since left or been ousted, and the quicker they came to see that the junta was a front for a murdering military, the quicker they departed.

"After, and only after"?

What, then can we say to answer Haig's main charge, to wit, that the U.S. had supplied no lethal weapons to El Salvador, and intervened "after, and only after" the evidence of "external intervention" by the Soviet bloc?

Unfortunately, a great deal. There is, to begin with, the little matter of hypocrisy. Let us consider at some length the question of "external interference," and where it began. Haig's specific charge, in the State Department Special Report No. 80, is: "By providing arms, training, and direction to a local insurgency and by supporting it with a global propaganda campaign, the Communists have intensified and widened the conflict, greatly increased the sufferings of the Salvadoran people and deceived much of the world about the true nature of the revolution."

Now, anyone who has bothered to spend even a weekend studying the history of El Salvador, not to mention the rest of Latin America, is perfectly aware of the fact that the U.S. began intervening there in the mid-nineteenth century and has continued ever since. We have mentioned a few of the interventions earlier. Let us look at U.S. military aid, training, and support, as well as that of its allies.

From 1950 until 1979, El Salvador received the following in direct U.S. military aid: $4.9 million in Military Assistance Program grants; $3.5 million in Foreign Military Sales Agreements; $2.5 million in Excess Defense Articles; and $5.8 million in International Military Education and Training Program grants, totalling $16.7 million. Until the mid-1970s, El Salvador's armed forces were equipped with surplus U.S. equipment. In 1980, $5.7 million in security assistance was provided, in addition to $50 million in "economic aid," a good portion of which has almost certainly been diverted to the military and security forces, a time-honored custom in the Third World. Five million, two hundred thousand dollars in military aid was provided in fiscal year 1981, and a loan from the International Monetary Fund provided, with U.S. backing, a whopping $180 million.

The issue of direct training of Salvadoran military personnel can also be quickly addressed. From 1950 through 1976 the U.S. trained 1925 Salvadoran officers, mostly at the U.S. Army School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. Moreover, in 1957, the U.S. instituted a public safety program, under the auspices of AID (the Agency for International Development), which undertook to "develop the managerial and operational skills and effectiveness of the [Salvadoran] civil police forces." *(Miami Herald,* April 14,

1980) From 1963 until 1974, the program emphasized the National Guard. One of the "graduates" of U.S. training facilities was ... Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, torturer extraordinaire.

The "unofficial channels" through which the U.S. is supplying arms should not be neglected, either. Just as the Soviet Union, East Germany, Vietnam, and Cuba are supplying the Salvadoran guerrillas with arms through various "unofficial" means, so too is the U.S. The CIA has long had a practice of providing military assistance to various countries through illegal channels. So, too, have at least a select few of the multinational companies which operate in Third World nations. Sometimes these are observed, sometimes not. On March 18, 1974, for example, the U.S. customs announced that its agents had seized $22.5 million in military helicopter parts that were being illegally shipped from Long Beach, California to El Salvador. *(New York Times,* March 19, 1974) Similarly, on May 16, 1976, the Chief of Staff of the Salvadoran armed forces was arrested in New York and charged with plotting, with six other men, a sale of arms worth $2.8 million. Moreover, when the U.S. government provides a grant of economic aid and some of it is diverted by the Salvadoran government to military purchases, this is not counted by the State Department as military aid. And none of the direct purchases of American arms from private arms suppliers is counted as "military aid," either. In the Soviet bloc, of course, there is no private sector, so all military assistance is government-to-government.

Another means the U.S. has used to aid El Salvador is the indirect routing of military equipment. "In order to bankroll the Salvadoran military without provoking still more criticism on human rights grounds," Penny Lernoux wrote recently in *The Nation,* "Washington is using the [Christian Democratic] Government in Venezuela as a screen. Former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez charges that the Venezuelan Government is funneling arms and money to the Salvadoran military through Costa Rica, which has emerged as a black market arsenal for the region." (December 13, 1980).

Finally, since Haig is quick to point out that the Soviet Union *itself* is not *directly* sending arms to El Salvador, but is supporting such shipments largely through allies, such as Cuba, we should glance at the military assistance given to El Salvador by *America's* allies. Over the past few years, the Salvadoran government has received military assistance and arms from France, Venezuela, Brazil, Germany, and, especially, Israel. The largest supplier has been Israel, which supplied 81 percent of El Salvador's military imports between 1972 and 1977, including 25 ARAVA aircraft, UZI sub-machine guns, and Galil assault rifles, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Figures for sales since 1977 have been more difficult to compile, but large shipments of arms and aircraft have been seen arriving in Israeli ships at Salvadoran ports.

Again, let us ask Secretary Haig: *whose* external intervention? What we have documented is a history of intervention by the U.S. and its allies. When did the Communist support for the insurgents begin? *According to Haig's own State Department Special Report, the first weapons shipped from the Communist bloc nations to the Salvadoran guerrillas did not reach them until late September, 1980.*

The point is not merely that Alexander Haig and his platoon of Pentagon propagandists are misrepresenting the facts, claiming that the U.S. "intervened" in El Salvador "after and only after" the Communist bloc nations began to ship military hardware. The point is that these are *deliberate, systematic* distortions of the truth designed to mislead the American people, and to stampede them into an ill-informed support for increased defense spending and American Third World intervention. And, furthermore, El Salvador isn't even the main focus of these efforts on the part of the Reagan administration to revive the Cold War. It is, as administration officials openly admit, a means of *"sending the Russians a message."* Before the U.S. government begins to escalate its intervention in Central America, leading possibly even to the use of American troops, before it blockades Cuba, before it rushes to ship off American "advisers" as potential targets of the guerrillas, and before it dumps a proposed *$200 million* into the government coffers there, both directly and through the International Monetary Fund, why doesn't it try Western Union, instead?

The junta in El Salvador is not a "moderate, centrist" regime—it is a military dictatorship with a weak civilian at its helm. The murders in El Salvador are not being committed by "left and right-wing extremists," but, for the most part, by the government security forces and the army themselves. The reforms being imposed—virtually at American direction—are dubious at best, and malicious at worst. And the guerrillas are not "Marxist-Leninists," although some among them are, but rebels carrying on a struggle against oligarchy and oppression which has been decades, if not centuries, in the making. If Salvadoran Communist boss Handal has traveled to Communist nations to gain support, other opposition leaders, such as Guillermo Ungo, have appealed to Western governments, Germany, Mexico, France, Scandanavia—and to the United States—for help. Ungo has offered to negotiate with the U.S., saying he will talk with the owners of the circus, but not the clowns, but the State Department has turned him down.


Playing into the hands of Communists and Socialists everywhere, the Reagan administration is apparently going to continue the policies of earlier administrations, offering U.S. aid to feudal, autocratic, and authoritarian regimes, in the name of "free enterprise" and "anti-Communism."

The Reagan administration's motives are dubious; its claims are outrageous falsehoods; its planned actions, dangerous and ill-considered. It has exaggerated the "Soviet threat," whitewashed U.S. involvement in El Salvador, and misrepresented the nature of the opposition to the junta. It claims to be opposed to "terrorism," but the only terrorism it actually *sees* is that of "the left," never the terrorism of governments themselves. If the murders committed by the Salvadoran army and security forces over the past year and a quarter were translated into terms that Americans could understand, it would be the equivalent of the U.S. government murdering the population of New Orleans. If *that* is not terrorism, one can only wonder what *is.*

The Reagan administration's policies in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America ought to be opposed vigorously by all freedom-loving Americans. Libertarians and others concerned with this new adventurism in foreign policy ought to organize teach-ins, and make the course of our entire foreign policy a matter of open public discussion. Already the Reaganites, supposed budget-cutters, are shackling us with the largest increases in "defense" spending since the second World War. And, as if to make up for having lost the Vietnam war, and failed to get involved heavily *enough* in the Middle East, the American defense establishment and its intellectual supporters are charging full-speed ahead into the quagmire of Latin America. It's time for someone to send *them* a message. ❑

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Terrorizing America:



How the IRS Threatens Our Liberties

ROBERT JAMES LEE

A century and a half ago, the U.S. Supreme Court intoned that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." Today, we are finding that the power to *collect* taxes involves the power to destroy, for the government enforces America's confiscatory, incomprehensible, and inequitable tax laws by frightening — even terrorizing — the American people.

The use of fear is not surprising, since the IRS fears the breakdown of "voluntary compliance." New York City University economist Peter Gutmann has estimated the untaxed "subterranean economy" to be more than one-sixth the size of the official Gross National Product — $450 billion today. And various government sources estimate that some forms of income, such as farmers' income and rental income, may be understated by 50 percent or more.

And the terror is likely to worsen. Federal taxes and spending may exceed a trillion dollars in 1985—a five year tax increase of half a trillion dollars. Resistance and evasion will only increase, as will efforts to force compliance and submission.

While in theory the IRS is supposed to administer the tax laws "fairly," in practice, it seeks to extract as much money as possible from the taxpayer. For example, in 1979, one judge said of a particular regulation: "Viewed as a hunting license to authorize IRS agents to flush up additional revenue from employers, the regulation is brilliantly conceived. As a guide to employers in their regulations [sic] with employees, it is nearly worthless."

In fact, the IRS admits that its purpose is to terrorize. Former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander responded to a Congressman's question about the IRS's "campaign of terror among the American people": "I think you and I understand the realities of this world. The truth is that we have such a limited budget, such limited manpower to enforce the income tax laws and collect the revenue, that the only way we can keep them honest and paying their taxes is to keep them afraid."

The weapons used by the IRS to scare the American people are many and varied.

First is the presumption of guilt. The IRS almost automatically rules against the taxpayer, forcing the payment of substantial legal and accounting costs in order to prove innocence.

Not only did the IRS ruthlessly extract capital gains tax from the victims of the Grand Teton Dam disaster in Idaho who were forced to sell their property, but it routinely attacks "tax shelters," is seeking the power to decide the validity of marriages in order to prevent tax-induced divorces, and is attempting to revoke the tax exemptions of churches such as the Church of Scientology which do not follow the IRS's undefined "accepted public policy."

Where withholding is impossible—for example, with tips — the IRS uses the weapon of an economic model for income reconstruction which estimates income and taxes. Nevada Senator Laxalt has testified about the refusal of the IRS to take into acount shift differentials, short shifts, and the differing qualities of entertainment — or ever detailed and extensive taxpayer records—in assessing taxes. The IRS simply conclusively presumes the taxpayer to be guilty.

An even more fearsome tool used to force compliance with IRS rulings is the audit. The number of returns audited has fallen from 5 percent in the early 1960s to approximately 2 percent. However, not all taxpayers are created equal. The odds of an audit vary among income groups, types of deductions taken, and by state.

But the audit serves three purposes other than to check those taxpayers with the greatest revenue potential:

1. To increase its perceived "efficiency." According to A.W. Carney, Jr., a former tax auditor, the IRS tends to focus on middle-income non-business taxpayers because their returns take 30 percent to 50 percent less time to audit than other groups.

2. To gather statistical norms. Every two years, the IRS takes a statistical sample—roughly one half of one percent of all returns—as part of the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), and audits them line by line, requiring proof of everything. Former IRS Tax Law Specialist Paul N. Strassels calls the TCMP audit the "single worst thing the IRS can inflict on you, short of sending you to jail."

3. "To produce the greatest volume of voluntary compliance." Many returns are audited primarily for their fright potential. According to Strassels, the IRS attempts to audit people with individual or group visibility, leading to "a statistical strategy that allows them to reach all across America, across all income levels and classes, and into as many pockets of society as they can."

(IRS audit terror is compounded by IRS audit error. The General Accounting Office (GAO) found that examiners made technical or computational errors in roughly 40 percent of the audited returns. The American Bar Association concluded that it is "solely by reason of chance" that an audit may determine the correct tax liability.)

Litigation is also used to cow the American taxpayer. One internal memo from the Boise, Idaho, District Office Group Manager explained:

> It is stated you do not wish to litigate a case you may lose. However, failure to attempt litigation will foster their (the taxpayers') program far more than a loss in court. At least by litigating, the Taxpayer is forced to produce the necessary substantiation. In addition, the Taxpayer is committed to spend time and money defending his position. Perhaps the inconvenience alone will inspire future compliance.

The IRS is attempting to use withholding to combat the growing underground economy. Since businesses do not withhold income, social security, or unemployment compensation taxes from independent contractors, the IRS began a full-scale assault on independent businesspeople in the 1970s. According to a 1977 GAO report, "It appears that the IRS's approach to solve such non-compliance problems is to limit the number of self-employed persons instead of using the array of administrative mechanisms available to it."

For instance, Reginald and Barbara Dwyer run a small logging business in Vermont. The Dwyers contract with several independent contractors to fell, haul, and cut the wood. Each of these sub-contractors is a specialist, owns his own equipment, and is paid by the work performed, not the time worked.

Though audits in 1969 and 1970 found nothing wrong, in 1977 the Dwyers were audited and assessed back taxes of $18,500 for the "employee" woodsmen for 1973 through 1975. The IRS didn't even consider the taxes already paid by the woodsmen. The Dwyers resisted, and, after two years, the IRS dropped the case.

The IRS has similarly descended upon other independents —from Vermont lumbermen to Texas truck drivers, Georgia barbers, and Maine lobstermen. The IRS is attempting to destroy independent workers and businesses, in order to increase its ability to collect taxes.

Another IRS weapon is the power to embarrass taxpayers. IRS agents not only interrogated Massachusetts accountant Donald R. Lord, confiscated his papers and threatened him with jail; but they questioned his neighbors and relatives, including his 88-year-old grandmother, as well. Idaho businessman L. Jack Stolfo suffered through a similar experience in 1977 when his friends and social and business acquaintances were questioned, and his parents threatened.

Also in Idaho, the IRS has padlocked the doors of restaurants and attorneys' and doctors' offices, and chained a logger's pickup truck to a telephone pole in an attempt to collect overdue taxes. In fact, the Idaho IRS office circulated a memo that unashamedly stated that "[a] proven method of preventing delinquency has been through embarrassment."

The national IRS office then said that the memo did not "reflect" national policy.

A more brutal weapon is taxpayer harassment, which takes many forms. For example, Alaska Congressman Don Young recently related the case of an Alaskan fisherman who was interrogated in a 4′ x 8′ room for seven hours. The IRS agents refused him permission to call his attorney or CPA, or to go to the bathroom, threatening him with contempt.

Another Alaskan, Charles Bumpus, a city councilman and bank director, was interrogated at the regional IRS headquarters for two hours; he was refused a chair and had to sit on the floor. And the unconscionable investigative techniques used against a well-known publisher caused the nervous collapse and hospitalization of an employee. The publisher, a Nazi war camp survivor, was remined of Gestapo interrogations.

Similar disregard for the law was evidenced by the IRS when it demanded a depositor's record from Missouri bank president Gordon W. Warren. Warren tried to notify the depositor and was promptly threatened with a $10,000 fine and ten years' imprisonment. In another case, the IRS filed an $80,000 delinquent tax claim against a corporation bookkeeper, for which she had no liability, solely to force her to testify against her employer. And this is not an isolated case.

More serious still is the use of force. The IRS once proposed to use an armed squad as an "educational instrument" for taxpayers. On October 16, 1975, Howard Martin, then an Idaho IRS District Director, authorized a "Returns Compliance Program" for Fremont County, Idaho. At a time when the community had but five policemen, some 25 armed IRS agents were to go door-to-door to request to see copies of back tax returns. The 25 IRS stormtroopers were to operate from two headquarters, maintain a complicated communications system, and have back-up forces, to descend on some 167 supposed tax resisters and dangerous people including women, missionaries, bedridden patients, and community leaders.

The plan was cancelled four days before its implementation date because of pressure by some IRS employees and their union, yet its originator was not only commended, he was subsequently promoted to the national office, to administer the Freedom of Information Act!

Nor were these the only people put on the IRS's "prone to violence" list. Church members, ordinary citizens who've paid their taxes, nonviolent protesters, and others end up on such secret lists. Though former IRS Commissioner Kurtz did not confess to keeping the secret lists, he did admit that the IRS's Intelligence Division worked with the FBI and the Idaho State Police to generate the names of potentially violent people, to "forewarn" IRS personnel.

Perhaps the most important, and misused, weapon is the lien/levy/seizure. A tax lien is automatically created when a tax liability is assessed and not paid, and can then be filed. A levy is used against a taxpayer's assets held by third parties, such as salaries, bank accounts, and accounts receivable. A seizure involves the taking of the taxpayer's property and selling it.



ERIC MUEHLING FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER

The devices allow the IRS, according to a study by the federal Administrative Conference, to "reduce individuals to penury, make them indigent overnight and strip them of all means of supporting their families." And that is precisely what the IRS does.

The Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee found that the IRS virtually ignores alternative payment mechanisms, such as installment pay agreements and special trust accounts, which ensure payment but do not destroy lives. Even J. R. Starkey, Director of Collections, admitted that the IRS had no evidence that the more draconian measures increased taxpayer compliance.

Yet, in the first six months of fiscal year 1980, the number of seizures increased 44 percent, and the rate of seizures 33 percent. The Subcommittee found that "This increase in the rate of seizure, while alarming in and of itself, is made more ominous because there is evidence that many seizures are made arbitrarily and unnecessarily, and are even counterproductive."


It found that many seizures were made "not for the purpose of collecting delinquent taxes, but for purposes of IRS management policies such as improving statistics. . . ." Agents were officially assigned revenue quotas through 1974, after which date such quotas were officially banned. But nothing has really changed.

The Subcommittee heard testimony, read affidavits, and saw memos and performance evaluations which demonstrated the existence of an unofficial quota system in states such as Michigan, Missouri, and Alabama. They illustrated "a penchant within the IRS for seizure and enforcement statistics, with little attention to the amount of money collected, or to the circumstances of the particular case."

Indeed, during the July hearings the national IRS officials were forced to admit again and again that regional officials were not following national policies, and that the national office continued to circulate seizure statistics, despite the fact that this policy created a pressure for quotas.


This situation has led to a parade of horrors:

- In August 1979, the IRS smashed the windows of Stephen and Mona Oliver's car, and dragged the couple out over the glass, in order to seize the car.
- An army chaplain requested to be allowed to pay in installments since he had to pay for a very costly operation for his wife; the IRS emptied his bank account before the taxes were even due.
- In 1965, after 30 years as a lumberman, Ed McCanse was assessed $119,000 for unpaid taxes. The IRS seized his bank account and lumber-mill stock, forcing McCanse to sell the stock for a fraction of its value. He spent $90,000 in legal fees before the IRS, in 1969, admitted that it was wrong and rufunded McCanse's $119,000 plus interest.
- Los Angeles contractor Melvin J. Morris, Jr., was charged with a delinquency and his property was seized. Credit dried up and he was forced out of business; two years later the IRS admitted that he owed no tax.
- Reese Brothers, a forest management company of Kelso, Washington, fell behind in employee tax withholding, but finally sent the IRS the required $10,000. However, the regional office failed to tell the local office, and the local IRS chained the business's doors, seized 148 items, and locked



ERIC MUEHLING FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER

In early August of 1979, IRS agents tried to impound the car of Stephen and Mona Oliver of Fairbanks, Alaska. The Olivers got in the car, however, and refused to get out, so the agents smashed in the windows and dragged them from the vehicle.



COURTESY CONGRESSMAN YOUNG'S OFFICE

In response to taxpayer complaints, Alaska Congressman Don Young is currently supporting a bill that would prevent the IRS from seizing property without a court order.

up the company payroll. Ten days later the IRS admitted its mistake.

• King and Virginia David of Washington, D.C., paid their back taxes. But the local office either didn't know, or didn't care, seized the couple's bank account (causing several checks to bounce) and levied upon Ms. David's salary. Three months later the money was refunded.

Even innocent third parties cannot escape. A Miami handyman saw his car confiscated, and only after great expense, was able to prove that it was his, and not the delinquent taxpayer's. It took a Miami plumber six months, and James White, a carpenter, $1,500 and eight months, to recover their cars in similar incidents.

And Chicago accountant Howard F. MacNeil was personally assessed for the taxes of a former client. His bank account and home were seized, and he lost his business. He later won the case.

Such capriciousness is particularly devastating for small businesses. The Oversight Subcommittee found that liens tie up property, levies strip cash flow reserves and cause lost clients and work, and seizures paralyze and often close down businesses, bankrupting them.

Collections Chief Starkey testified that the IRS kept no statistics on the number of business closures, but others provided stories of all too many. For instance, Maurice Bishop's Michigan business suffered an embezzlement, and owed $40,000 in back taxes. The IRS placed a lien on virtually all of his property—$400,000 worth—making it impossible to borrow, and to run the business. Even months after payment, the lien was not discharged.

In another case, a corporation owed $60,000 in taxes and gained new management. An agreement was reached with the IRS to pay in installments. The IRS official in charge changed, the agreement was voided, and the company was given ten days to pay. The company petitioned for bankruptcy.

Finally, in Alaska, a publisher sold his newspaper. The new owner fell behind in his payments, and the old owner took back the paper. The IRS went to the old owner for $300,000 in taxes, then seized and sold the paper.

In response, former Commissioner Kurtz testified last July, "It is inevitable that some things will go wrong...."

But "things going wrong" cannot explain the agency's lawlessness. In the mid-1960s, Missouri Senator Edward V. Long chaired a Senate Subcommittee that constructed a three-year probe of the IRS. He found that the IRS used two-way mirrors, microphones, infrared sniper-scopes, lock picks, and wiretaps, and opened mail and stole records, to spy on taxpayers. The investigation did not stop the agency.

And in hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee's Oversight Subcommittee last May, IRS officials admitted to the use of mail covers in investigations, but denied that they were abused. However, there is evidence of illegal mail opening in the cases of Idaho businessman L. Jack Stolfo and Alaska bank director Charles Bumpus.

Stolfo has also discovered interference with his phone, despite the assurances of then IRS Commissioner Kurtz last year that the IRS does not use wiretaps. Bumpus claims that his taxpayer organization has been subject to electronic surveillance, and Massachusetts accountant Donald R. Lord was called to a conference with the IRS that was bugged.

The IRS also admits that it regularly monitors phone conversations and meetings if it has the consent of one of the speakers, and occasionally uses pen registers, which record the date, time, and number of phone calls.

In an investigation in the Bahamas, the IRS paid an informant, Sybil Kennedy, to have sex with Michael Wolstencroft, the resident manager of the Nassau Castle Bank. Her job on the night of January 15, 1980 was to keep Wolstencraft "occupied" so that the contents of his briefcase could be copied.

In Idaho, Larry Fullmer wrote an anti-tax letter to the editor. An IRS agent contacted Fullmer without identifying himself, borrowed Fullmer's materials and books, and refused to return them. The IRS also started a file on him.

The IRS's attack on Fullmer exposes the final, and perhaps most terrifying, weapon: intimidation. Blake Fleetwood, in a *Saturday Review* article, "The Tax Police," explores the cases of Senators Long of Missouri and Joseph Montoya of New Mexico, both of whom investigated IRS abuses.

Long's tax returns were illegally leaked during his 1968 reelection bid, and all sorts of irregularities were suggested. He was cleared of any tax violations—after losing his first race in 38 years.

In 1972 Montoya was privately labeled a "dangerous protester" by the IRS, and, in 1976, his campaign was ruined in part by allegations of tax irregularities. He lost, and his 40 year career was over.

Also in 1976, Idaho Representative George Hansen, a severe critic of the IRS, faced stories that he hadn't paid his income tax and had filed late through a special arrangement with the IRS. The charges were not true, and he won the election despite them.

Fleetwood also documents the cases of retaliation against *Playboy* magazine, which published critical articles in 1976 and, three months later, had $7.7 million assessed against it; ABC documentary writer Paul Altmeyer, who was responsible for a 1975 investigation of the IRS, and was audited two weeks after the special IRS screening; and *Las Vegas Sun* publisher Hank Greenspun, who also investigated the IRS and was harassed. *Washington Star* tax columnist E. Edward Stephens says that few people "complain because the IRS has the power to destroy their business."

The IRS has also used its extensive powers for political, rather than revenue-raising, purposes, starting with alleged mobsters in the 1930s and culminating with political dissidents in the Nixon era. This chilling form of totalitarianism is a different form of abuse, and lies beyond the scope of this article.


The IRS does its best to convince everyone that all is basically well. Indeed, former Commissioner Kurtz once said that "a lot of people have an emotional reaction to the tax system... but I think in their more reflective moments most have to say that it's a fair system...."

Nevertheless, the IRS is desperately fighting all reform proposals to help protect taxpayer's rights, such as proposals to allow taxpayers to recover attorneys' fees against the IRS, and to require court orders for property seizures, for any such limitations would threaten its virtually unprecedented power.

The IRS is an agency beyond control. It ignores the law. It rules on whim. It acts capriciously. It seizes people's property and violates their privacy. It spys on them. It harasses them. It embarrasses them. And it bankrupts them. How long will we permit America's tax Gestapo to continue to plunder and terrorize America? ❑

Robert James Lee is a Washington attorney.

Preaching at the Juggernaut:



The Constitution and the IRS

JOAN KENNEDY TAYLOR

Tax-paying month is also tax-resisting month, and all over the United States hundreds of earnest Americans, having talked to anti-tax friends, read the Constitution carefully, read a book, taken a "tax-resistance seminar," or done all of these, are filing what the IRS considers to be illegal income tax returns, secure in the thought that the Constitution of the United States will protect that action. Well, it won't.

Although rebellion against taxes antedates the Constitution itself in this land, the present wave of constitutional protesters of the income tax can be said to have started with Vivien Kellems, who on February 20, 1948, stopped collecting withholding taxes from her employees at her manufacturing company in Westport, Connecticut. Her intention was not to encourage her employees to evade paying taxes — in fact, she ex-

plained to them what she was doing, and the employees thereupon all paid their taxes directly to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her intention was to test the constitutionality of the withholding tax law by claiming in court that it violates the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude. As she wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury:

> If Congress should pass a law compelling me to dig a ditch for the Internal Revenue Department, and, adding insult to injury, compel me to buy the shovel with which to dig, I doubt if you could enforce that law. Under our Constitution, there is absolutely no difference between forcing me to buy a shovel and dig and forcing me to collect taxes and to pay for collecting them. Both are involuntary servitude expressly forbidden under the Thirteenth Amendment.

A thought-provoking argument, you might think. The Supreme Court must have had a difficult time with that one. It didn't, because it never had to hear it. Although Miss Kellems publicly announced her opposition to withholding and her refusal to do it and asked to be arrested in order to test the constitutionality of the law, she was not. Instead, the IRS seized double the amount in question from her bank account, even though all taxes due had already been paid directly to the IRS by Kellems's employees.

So Miss Kellems arranged with her employees to photograph them buying money orders to pay their taxes, and sent copies of the photos with the money orders to the IRS by registered mail. She wrote several times to the Secretary of the Treasury and twice to the President of the United States, asking to be indicted.


She still was not. She then brought two suits against the IRS after it seized money from her bank account again. She won recovery of the money seized in the second raid in a jury trial, and lost a second suit which was decided by a judge. But the constitutionality of the withholding tax law was never allowed to be tested. In 1952 she wrote a book based on these experiences: *Toil, Taxes, and Trouble.*

In the late 1960s, she finally became an overt tax rebel by refusing to surrender her records to the IRS when they questioned her deductions. In retaliation, the IRS merely disallowed all of the deductions claimed for the years in question and assessed her thousands of dollars in additional taxes, which she refused to pay. From the time of this confrontation until she died eight years later, in 1975, she filed no returns and she paid no taxes.

According to a book which encourages such anti-tax actions, *The Continuing Tax Rebellion: What Millions of Americans are Doing to Restore Constitutional Government,* by Martin A. Larson (Devin-Adair, 1979), she had become so sensitive a case that the IRS had decided she must not be prosecuted, and no action was taken against her. Mr. Larson goes on to state, "Shortly after her death, I received a letter from the firm of attorneys who handled her $1.8 million estate and who stated that only $265,000 had been paid the government in complete settlement. Thus no income taxes were paid even after her death."

In other words, Vivien Kellems, even though she never got the constitutional test case she was seeking, nevertheless made the IRS back down. Or did she? A story on tax rebels in *Barron's* by James Grant, dated April 2, 1979, reported, "Last April, it was disclosed that the government had recovered some $816,949.97 from Miss Kellems' estate." So whatever was "settled" shortly after Kellems's death was not really settled until the IRS had taken what it wanted.

Undaunted by the inconclusiveness of Vivien Kellems's fight, a number of people with what they see as convincing constitutional arguments against taxation are busy telling as much of the American public as they can get to listen to them that "you too can be a tax resister—without jeopardy." The reasoning seems to be that the particular argument that the particular tax-resistance seminar leader advocates is so compelling that the IRS wouldn't *dare* to let it be tested in court (which may be so, but in a way they don't anticipate, as we will see in a moment). Such tax resisters, according to an article in *The Wall Street Journal* (March 26, 1979) "spout an array of legalistic arguments. They claim that the federal income tax violates, among other things, the Con-



UPI

Tax-resister Irwin Schiff was certain that he would never be arrested because his arguments were incontestable. He is now appealing his second conviction.

stitution, Magna Carta, the Mayflower Compact, the Northwest Ordinance, the Articles of Confederation and the Bible."

I spoke at a state convention of the Libertarian Party of Connecticut in 1976 or 1977, where a fellow speaker was a tax-resister named Irwin Schiff. Mr. Schiff explained to a rapt audience that since 1973 he had been filing returns, as the law required, but had refused to fill in the blanks or compute a tax as the returns directed. Instead, he appended case citations and other material to inform the government that the Fifth Amendment meant that he didn't need to fill in the information asked for because to do so would be to incriminate himself. Schiff also informed the government, he said, that "I received no money income, only irredeemable, non-interest bearing, worthless notes of a Federal Reserve Bank, which are not redeemable in 'lawful money'."

Schiff concluded his talk at the convention by saying that he had not been arrested and indicted because the IRS knew that his argument was incontrovertible. Anyone who wanted to follow in his footsteps, he was convinced, would be similarly immune from prosecution.


Mr. Schiff was wrong. It took them a couple of years, but they did arrest him. And they didn't even rely on his incriminating himself—the IRS subpoenaed his bank records. He was convicted on February 13, 1979, of two counts of willfully failing to file a return. A new trial was ordered early in 1980 by the U. S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals because a prejudicial videotape was shown to the jury, on which Tom Snyder of NBC's *Tomorrow* show told Schiff, "You're going to jail—do you know that?" He has since been convicted again, and is in the process of appealing the second conviction at this writing.

The contentions presented by Irwin Schiff: the Fifth Amendment argument against self-incrimination (some tax rebels call the IRS form 1040 a "confession sheet") and the monetary argument (Article I Section 8 of the Constitution gives the federal government the power "to coin money, and regulate the value thereof"; Section 10 provides that "No State shall...coin money, emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts"; and the Coinage Act of 1792 defines a "dollar" as 412.5 grains of 90 percent silver or 1/42 troy ounce of fine gold) are not the only arguments based on the Constitution which tax rebels have used, although they are perhaps the most widespread.

There are several arguments leveled against the constitutionality of the Sixteenth (income tax) Amendment, one of which is that wages do not constitute income, and another, that Ohio hadn't been properly been voted into the Union at the time that it ratified the Amendment.

There is also, according to the right wing newspaper *American Crisis,* an argument based on Article I Section 9, which "prohibits the government from conferring any 'title of nobility.' The tax rebels interpret this as an injunction prohibiting the government from establishing a 'privileged' class of citizens as distinguished from a 'discriminated' class. They claim that all government cash subsidies violate this clause. By taking money from some citizens for the exclusive benefit of other citizens, the government is, in fact, setting up two classes of citizens. One class, a 'nobility' if you will, is to be served and maintained at the expense of the other class...."

Unfortunately, impressive as such arguments may seem to be to their adherents, they usually are not even allowed to be argued in court.



Many tax rebels claim that IRS form 1040 is such a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution that it should always carry the Miranda Warning printed in red. So far, no court has agreed with them.

A federal judge in Salt Lake City, Utah, in July, 1972 denied John T. Grismore the right to quote the Constitution in defending himself from a charge of impeding federal officers in the performance of their duty. He had refused to allow IRS agents to remove a car without a court order, to satisfy a tax assessment. "Since his whole defense was based on the Constitution, on his rights thereunder and his duty as a citizen to uphold those rights, this left him in a virtually indefensible position," wrote Henry J. Hohenstein in *The IRS Conspiracy* (Nash Publishing, 1974). "Moreover, since some hint of constitutionalism had been bandied about (though the jury had been instructed to disregard it) the judge, in his final instructions solemnly warned the jurors that the Constitution was 'irrelevant'!"

At the trial of Dr. James A. Owen in Portland, Oregon, in December, 1972 the judge consistently sustained objections to constitutional arguments from the government prosecutor, and when Dr. Owen tried to quote the document in his summary to the jury, the judge said, "Doctor, I've told you not to make that argument. I do not intend to repeat the admonition."

That same month, a group of individuals who became know to the media as The San Diego Ten were tried for conspiracy and "attempting to rescue property seized by the IRS" before a judge who barred from the jury anyone doubting the constitutionality of the Internal Revenue Code and who made it a contempt-of-court offense to quote from the Constitution.

One of the leaders of tax resistance seminars, Marvin Cooley of Mesa, Arizona, was arrested 5 months after his anti-IRS book, *The Big Bluff,* was published. He was sentenced to three years in jail on October 28, 1973, after a trial during which the defense was forbidden to mention the Constitution in the jury's hearing.

Dr. Edward A. Cupp brought suit in a District Court in Pennsylvania to dismiss an IRS tax assessment which had been compiled by obtaining his bank records after he had filed three years of protest returns, using the monetary argument. He also argued in his suit that many of the IRS provisions were unconstitutional. On August 14, 1973, his suit was dismissed and his constitutional arguments were declared to be without merit.

Mike Tecton, a successful architect of McLean, Virginia, who became convinced that the federal system of taxation was unconstitutional and therefore filed no tax returns for 15 years, was brought to court soon after he began to make this conviction public in 1973. His first trial ended in a deadlocked jury; at his second trial in September, 1974 he was told by the judge that he would be held in contempt if he argued the unconstitutionality of the tax laws.

And in Seattle, Washington, another anti-tax activist, Walter M. Froembgen, charged with threatening violence against a federal agent in the performance of his duty, heard the judge tell the jury that the IRS is constitutional and his instructions on the law must be obeyed by them, at his trial and conviction in April, 1979.

One person who has learned the hard way that arguments which seem convincing may not prevail in court is airline pilot and flight engineer Sam Goeltz, who was arrested in 1973 in Salt Lake City. Marvin Cooley was a big influence in getting him into tax resistance, says Goeltz, and he is full of admiration for Cooley and other pioneer tax rebels, who he says were "fantastic guys and very courageous individuals."

But, he says, among other things he didn't reckon with the fact that, unlike the people running tax seminars, he was on a salary, which could be attached by the IRS. "And so, you know, I was misled. I wasn't knowledgeable enough. And neither were they." He learned about his vulnerability only after he was already involved with the law, he told me. "I was just one of those guys flying down the mountain on a pair of runaway skis, and there wasn't a lot I could do about it at the time."


So Sam Goeltz, tax protester, was arrested with his co-protester Karl Bray by a combined group of IRS undercover people and FBI men about 10:30 or 11:00 o'clock one night, "and they put us in the slammer and kept us there for about 16 or 17 hours while they were trying to come up with a charge."

Finally, "they" decided to invoke a never-used 1932 law against "illegal possession of a government seal." Goeltz and Bray had obtained, perfectly legally, an IRS seizure notice which bore in its upper left hand corner the IRS logo. This, said the government, was a government seal — and possession by the accused was banned by a law originally written to prevent anyone from using sheriff's or marshal's badges to muscle in on food lines during the Depression.

And the charge stuck. In 1974, the two came up before a man they had coincidentally been working to impeach for three years, Judge Willis Ritter, who refused to disqualify himself, refused them a jury trial, and sentenced them each to six months in jail (even though the seizure notice had been obtained through the Freedom of Information Act), saying that Goeltz and Bray intended to use the "government seal" against the interests of the government.

How had they intended to use it? "We intended to use it to show people that the IRS goes out and seizes property without going through a court," says Goeltz today.

But telling people that the IRS seizes property in a way that may violate the Fourth Amendment, and showing people documents that have been gained through the Free-



COURTESY SAM GOELTZ

Sam Goeltz turned from tax resistance to political activism after his constitutional arguments lost in court.

dom of Information Act is obviously exercising the right of political speech, something supposedly guaranteed by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, when Karl Bray and Sam Goeltz appealed their conviction, it was upheld by a three-judge tribunal, and they served their time, even though, Goeltz points out, "They acknowledged that our First Amendment rights were abridged to a significant degree." Why wasn't that enough to overturn the conviction?

The answer is, of course, that the Constitution doesn't only limit the powers of government, it also specifically grants powers to the federal government, one of the most important of which is the power to tax. Courts balance the "needs" of the government against the rights of the individual — and any time there is a conflict, the government wins. In the case of taxation, the very point that the tax rebels pin their hopes on—the point that if the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were upheld in this area, the IRS would be out of business, putting the government largely out of business — is the *reason* that federal courts refuse to admit constitutional arguments.

Henry Hohenstein put it this way in *The IRS Conspiracy*:

> Often literature issued and circulated by various tax protest groups is especially dangerous in this respect. Everything they say is true. Everything they say is valid. But the trouble is, it's all based on the Constitution!
>
> They say the IRS has no legal right to examine your tax records unless you voluntarily submit them; and that an IRS attorney admitted to a congressional committee that the IRS would have to respect a "good faith" challenge based on the Fifth Amendment.
>
> They say the IRS has no legal right to force employers to collect withholding taxes from employees, since this is a violation of the "involuntary servitude" guarantees of the Constitution....
>
> They say tax courts are illegal, since they do not have trial by jury and are, in fact, a part of the executive branch of the government.
>
> They say the IRS has no legal right to levy upon wages or bank accounts when the amount in dispute is over $20.
>
> And this is true....That's why the document is dangerous: IRS will handle its case against you in its own way, on the basis of statute law. And the federal judge who hears the case will decide on that basis, too. He will assert, as the judge in Grismore's case did, that the Constitution and its supposed guarantees of your freedom are "irrelevant" to your case.

Sam Goeltz concurs. "Of course, as a libertarian, the entire thrust of taxation is contrary to what I believe, because it is theft," he says. But, he continues, "Regardless of the correctness in a philosophical sense of one's arguments against taxation, these arguments are not going to be upheld in court in the long run, because of the supposed 'greater need' to continue the government."

What advice would he give to someone considering a refusal to pay taxes on constitutional grounds? Examine the consequences of such an action carefully. "There are still people out there who are leading people down the primrose path." If you are considering divesting yourself of property by putting it in the name of someone else, be aware that you have to do so *before* making any move against the taxing authorities. Expect that you will lose property, and be aware, too, as he was not when he started his protest, that your salary can be seized by the government. And at all cost avoid any actions that could be considered to be fraud or conspiracy, because the penalties for these offenses are a $10,000 fine and ten years in jail.

If you have considered all this, and are still "willing to risk a lot of time, and a lot of money and harassment," then start researching past cases of tax protest. You will find, says Goeltz, "that the money issue has not been upheld in court. And neither has the Fifth Amendment — testifying against yourself — which is in fact what you do."

Instead, pay attention to the arguments which have been successful in court. The most successful protest cases, he points out, haven't addressed themselves to the principle of taxation or to the IRS as a institution, but have attacked "the nuts and bolts" of how the Service operates. On this seemingly piecemeal basis, significant court battles have been won against the IRS, like the case of Phil and Sue Long of Bellevue, Washington, who used the Freedom of Information Act to force the IRS to let them copy thousands of pages of previously secret interoffice directives and procedure manuals.

"Would you do it again?" I asked. "Yes, but not in the way that I did," Sam Goeltz answered. "To address the courts—the courts are perhaps the seat of the trouble."

Karl Bray can't be asked that question, as two years after he served his time in jail he died of cancer. Perhaps, had he lived, he might have moved as Sam Goeltz has, away from tax resistance into political activism. In 1980, Sam ran for the San Francisco Board of Supervisors as a Libertarian Party candidate. He explains it this way.

"You can't live in the hope that you can simply stand up and tell the government to go jump in the lake, and you'll survive. It's just not going to happen. They have too many ways of getting to you. And there's not going to be a mass uprising. People become entrenched in their ways, and they're certainly not going to risk what security they might have now for an improved life further down the road. To think they will do it is ridiculous.

"That's why I think the main thrust should be through a political organization, to try and start a revamping of the system. But don't approach the problem from the idea that the government is ever going to stop its source of revenue because it happens to see that what it's doing is unconstitutional. We're just not dealing with a principled society."

The Thirteenth Amendment argument which Vivien Kellems tried to use against withholding taxes has also been used against the income tax itself — an argument which to many begins to seem more cogent as the annual Tax Freedom Day (computed annually by the Tax Foundation)—the date on which the average worker, working steadily from January 1, will have paid all taxes—reached May 6 in 1978, May 8 in 1979, and May 11 in 1980.

However, those idealists who might still be tempted to think that they may be able to use the Constitution to get the government to commit suicide would do well to contemplate the reaction of one Illinois legislator to the tax limitation movement that swept the country in 1979. State Representative Raymond Ewell of Chicago sponsored legislation that would require all citizens of Illinois who were between the ages of 7 and 64 to work a certain number of hours each year directly for the government. Those between the ages of 7 and 10 would work 12 hours; those 11 to 14, 24 hours; those 15 to 18, 48 hours; and those between 19 and 64, 96 hours.

"We are in a 'Proposition 13' era," he said to an Associated Press reporter, "which means that there are no new tax increases on the horizon. So we must have some method of addressing increased costs."

Involuntary servitude, anyone? As Sam Goeltz puts it, "We're just not dealing with a principled society." ❑

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BOOKS AND ARTS



THE BETTMAN ARCHIVE

"Although George Gilder recites Adam Smith's classic proposition that production is the source of all wealth, we soon find ourselves threading through a series of arguments of which Smith would never have dreamed."

A theology for capitalism

TYLER COWEN

Wealth and Poverty, *by George Gilder, Basic Books, 306.pp., $16.95.*

"THIS IS *THE* BOOK!" IS being said in some circles about *Wealth and Poverty,* for George Gilder's latest work is being touted by the New Right as *the* answer to New Deal liberal social philosophy as well as *the* definitive Post-Keynesian manifesto on economic theory and policy. These are highly ambitious claims, which is no real surprise, as *Wealth and Poverty* is an extremely ambitious book. Within a mere 269 pages of text, Gilder attempts to provide a moral defense of capitalism, an explanation of the causes of wealth and poverty, a psycho-sociological theory of the effects of the welfare state on sexual relationships, and a case for supply-side economics. Although Gilder fails on each of these counts, he does provide us with a fair amount of provocative thinking (intentionally), as well as with a number of important insights into the bankruptcy of modern conservative thought (unintentionally).

A key clue to what is going on in *Wealth and Poverty* can be found in the book's first chapter, entitled "The Dirge of Triumph," where Gilder surveys the ideological failure of capitalism. When discussing Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, and Milton Friedman, Gilder applauds their "technical" analysis of how the market works, but laments the fact that "... none of these writers sees reason to give capitalism a *theology.*" (emphasis added)

Although one of Gilder's main goals is to outline a moral defense of capitalism, *Wealth and Poverty* fails to provide a specific definition of just what capitalism is. There is absolutely no discussion of the role of the state (if any) in a capitalist society. Instead, we are told that "...capitalism begins with giving." Gilder's search for an understanding of modern capitalism begins, not with its ideological and historical roots, such as the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, or classical liberalism, but rather with "potlatching," an obscure tribal ritual practiced by the Kwakiutl Indians of Northwestern America. Potlatching is essentially a tribal process administered by an Indian chief where each member of the tribe offers a gift to the entire tribe with the expectation of receiving something in return. What makes this sort of offer so interesting to Gilder is that the compensation for such an offering is not defined beforehand. In some sense, the Indian is engaging in an act of faith. Gilder would have us believe that it is the logic of potlatching that underlies capitalistic investment and production. If capitalists made investments with the hope of reaping a monetary profit, thinks Gilder, investment would never occur at all, for investment is a far too risky a process to be ruled by reason and common sense. Rather, it is a faith in the "...compensatory logic of the cosmos..." a belief that he will receive some sort of undetermined return, either in this life or after, that compels the capitalist to invest. Because the return on the investment is never known with certainty, Gilder labels investments as gifts. Hence, capitalism becomes nothing but an advanced form of potlatching.

According to *Wealth and*

Poverty, the secret of capitalist success is to be found in production. Although the reader is initially overtaken by a sense of comfort when Gilder recites Adam Smith's classic proposition that production is the source of all wealth, we soon find ourselves threading through a series of arguments of which Smith would never have dreamed.

Like most supply-siders, Gilder starts with Say's Law—"supply creates its own demand"—and quickly proceeds to twist it into a nearly unrecognizable form. Say was attempting to communicate two fundamental and corollary truths about the market economy—production is the source of demand, and, as a consequence, a general overproduction of supply is impossible since any good produced carries the potential strength of a demand for another good. However, Gilder interprets Say's Law to mean that supply is the active, driving force in a market economy and that demand is relegated to a purely passive role both in our analysis and in reality. The Austrian doctrine of consumer sovereignty is turned on its head. It is not consumer demand that guides production and determines the prices of both consumption goods and factors of production, as well as the return of the capitalist. In Gilder's world, the fancies of the capitalists determine consumer demand: "... demand, like public opinion, does not exist in any very definite and identifiable ways; it is a flux of hungers and sentiments which assume particular forms chiefly in response to the flow of supplies."

It is Gilder's uncompromising adherence to the primacy of the supply side that blinds him to perhaps the two greatest practical abilities of the free market — its skills in coordinating individual plans and in servicing consumer demand — and the greatest moral virtue of the market — the essentially voluntary nature of all transactions. Perhaps this is why he is forced to look elsewhere (to faith) for a justification of the market.

In Gilder's mind the success of capitalism is due to the entrepreneur, the driving force behind production and innovation. His analysis of entrepreneurship is admirably dynamic and somewhat reminiscent of both Joseph Schumpeter and the Austrian view as represented by Israel Kirzner's *Competition and Entrepreneurship.* However, Gilder tends to ascribe entrepreneurial ability only to the rich and/or specially talented capitalists. In reality, consumers are not the inert lumpen masses that Gilder describes; the words *consumer, producer, capitalist,* and *entrepreneur* denote different roles, not necessarily distinct and separate individuals. Therefore consumers, as a group of people, may possess just as much entrepreneurship as producers, or as any other group in society.

Gilder's entrepreneurial elitism is responsible for such fallacies as "The rich remain the chief source of discretionary capital in the economy." In fact, it is quite well established that most of our capital formation comes from corporate investment, as well as from middle and lower class savings. Gilder sees the willingness of the *rich* to risk their money in new investments as the chief determinant of how an economy progresses (or regresses) and as "...the secret of capitalist ferment and creativity." Our biggest problem today, therefore, is that the wealthy have lost their desire to "potlatch" (invest) because of the effective high marginal tax rate which inflation and taxes have imposed on the act of saving and the receipt of "unearned" income (dividends and interest). As a result, the rich turn to conspicuous consumption, which, in turn, arouses public hostility against the rich. This leads to the imposition of even higher levels of progressive taxation which then proceeds in a vicious spiral to cause even higher levels of consumption.

When evaluating Gilder's defense of the market one should keep in mind his description of socialism, the system which he considers to be the polar opposite of capitalism: "In a socialist economy... rationality rules, and it rules out the awesome uncertainties and commensurate acts of faith that are indispensable to an expanding and innovative system." The trouble with socialism is not that it can't plan (see Hayek's *Collectivist Economic Planning),* but rather, that it *can* plan! Gilder is saying that capitalism's "anarchy of production" truly means *chaos,* not merely the absence of a central planner. Socialism is capable of eliminating chaos all too well.

This error may stem from Gilder's neglect of *demand* as an active, driving force behind economic activity, and his underemphasis on microeconomic coordination as the crucial factor in the success of "anarchic" capitalist planning. Both capitalism and socialism "plan" both investment and production. The important questions are: how is the planning to be done? who is to do the planning? and for whose ends do we plan? The mere ability of certain socialist economies to fulfill certain macroeconomic growth statistics does not mean they can plan successfully. Satisfying consumer demand is the name of the game and this is where every socialist economy falls flat on its face. However, if, like Gilder, we believe that demand is an essentially unimportant phenomenon, then socialism *would* be able to plan better than capitalism. After all, who cares what the consumers want? They may grow to like standing in bread lines.

The market is merely the spontaneous order arising from all voluntary exchanges. Only in this sense can it be "justified."

The most serious flaw in Gilder's defense of capitalism is that he is trying to justify the market on a holistic level by invoking its "practical" achievements. There is absolutely no mention of individual rights in *Wealth and Poverty.* In truth, capitalism in the aggregate sense cannot be morally justified. What *can* be justified are what Robert Nozick has called "capitalist acts between consenting adults." The libertarian theory of self-ownership and the right to all justly acquired property lead us to endorse (or at least tolerate) all voluntary exchanges and relationships. The market is merely the spontaneous order arising out of all such interpersonal contract, and only in this sense can it be morally justified. To quote Descartes, "Divide each problem into as many parts as possible; that each part being more easily conceived, the whole may be more intelligent." *(Discourse on Method)*

As indicated by the title of the book, *Wealth and Poverty* presents both a theory of wealth and a theory of poverty. Gilder's theory of wealth is essentially a dynamicized version of supply-side economics. It is in the analysis of poverty, however, that Gilder's book provides us with some truly excellent insights. His theory is basically sociological — "The only dependable route from poverty is always work, family, and faith." Work, the first member of this trio, would probably be the most important factor in a free society. (Gilder's case for the importance of family is somewhat unclear, while the role he projects for faith is downright dubious.) Gilder's discussion goes far beyond the usual insight that welfare benefits provide a disincentive for work. There is a brilliant analysis of the phenomenon of "credentialism," a growing trend that places more and more emphasis on paper credentials. As Gilder points out, "The poor benefit from a dynamic economy full of unpredictable capital gains (they have few capital losses!) more than from a stratified system governed by educational and other credentials that the rich can buy."

The reader can get a good deal of insight into poverty if he reads the book carefully, although many of the arguments are not fully developed. For instance, Gilder presents some interesting ethnic history to show how those groups that were attracted to government jobs (i.e., the Irish) and those groups that have been recruited for government jobs (i.e., the blacks), have been hurt by their participation in

the public sector. The chapter on racial discrimination is also another part of *Wealth and Poverty* that is particularly worth reading. Gilder provides a definitive refutation of the myth that racism is responsible for the low incomes of much of the black community. Instead, the blame is placed on the state, especially on federal welfare programs.

When he turns to the subject of family, much of Gilder's case is based on the claim that the welfare system has broken up the nuclear family by emasculating the male's role as provider and breadwinner. Only through monogamous marriage can men be responsible and productive. Here Gilder's argument is somewhat controversial and it is worth quoting him at length:

> ... female sexuality ... is psychologically rooted in the bearing and nurturing of children, women have long horizons within their bodies, glimpses of eternity within their wombs. Civilized society is dependent upon the submission of the short-term sexuality of young men to the extended maternal horizons of women. This is what happens in monogamous marriage: the man disciplines his sexuality and extends it into the future through the womb of a woman... The woman gives him a unique link to the future and a vision of it, he gives her faithfulness and a commitment to a lifetime of hard work.

Gilder's psycho-sexual biases are based on Steven Goldberg's *The Inevitability of Patriarchy* and his own *Sexual Suicide.* In some ultimate sense his views could be described as Freudian. Although most feminists will be outraged by his portrayal of women, many people will consider his treatment of men to be even more sexist. Single males are painted as a loathsome and lazy breed of people infected by drugs, alcoholism, homosexuality, and worst of all, unemployment. It is reassuring to reread the preface and discover that Gilder is married.

Finally, of course, Gilder emphasizes faith as a method of overcoming poverty. He says, "Faith in man, faith in the future, faith in the rising returns of giving, faith in the mutual benefits of trade, faith in the providence of God are all essential to successful capitalism." Without this belief in the "compensatory logic of the cosmos," ordinary life appears to be too risky and too frustrating to be worthwhile. Once people have this faith they are willing to save without the certainty of a given return, and they are willing to work beyond the requirements of the job. Capitalism can survive.

Despite all of its flaws, Gilder's analysis of poverty leaves little doubt in one's mind that the poor are the biggest losers when it comes to the welfare state. Gilder could make his case far stronger if he discussed the pernicious effects of the minimum wage (which is mentioned only briefly) and the tragedy of occupational licensing (which is never mentioned at all). But an important question comes to mind: If the interests of the poor are hurt by state intervention and if society is fighting a "war against the rich," as Gilder would have us believe, then, who, in Gilder's eyes, are the people who benefit from statism? Surely not the middle clsss?

And indeed, *Wealth and Poverty* suffers from a lack of any clearly defined theory of class. There appear to be no net tax-consumers in Gilder's world, even in the short run. But if this is the case, how are we to understand state intervention? Without a knowledge of its causes it will be quite difficult to find its cures. For instance, Gilder's arguments about poverty could be strengthened immeasurably by introducing the class analysis of Piven and Cloward's *Regulating the Poor.* Piven and Cloward demonstrate that the *purpose* of welfare legislation has often been to "keep the poor quiet" and stifle social dissent and unrest.

The absence of a class theory also distracts Gilder from one of the most important aspects of inflation, the attendant redistribution of wealth. Those groups who receive the new money first (i.e., government, large banks, defense contractors) benefit just as if they were counterfeiters, while those who receive the new money last (i.e., fixed income recipients) lose considerable wealth. Gilder sees inflation as important only because it reflects the huge burden of government spending which the private sector must support.

Like most supply-siders, Gilder plays down the distortive effects of monetary expansion and plays up the distortive effects of taxation. There is no effective way, however, to achieve the tax cuts which supply-siders advocate without making a serious commitment to radically slashing government spending so much that non-expansionary monetary policy could accompany the tax cut. Gilder never clues us in on his views on the proper level of government spending or what monetary policy (if any) the government should adopt.

In sum, *Wealth and Poverty* is a highly flawed book which fails to achieve its objectives. However, it must be credited with both originality and some very perceptive insights into the nature, causes, and cures of poverty. As a moral defense of capitalism it is a total failure which reveals the intellectual bankruptcy of the New Right. For such a defense one must turn away from *Wealth and Poverty* and look to such works as Wilhelm von Humboldt's *Limits of State Action,* Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics,* and Murray Rothbard's *For a New Liberty.*

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The War and the intellectuals

JUSTUS D. DOENECKE

Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information, *by Stephen L. Vaughn. University of North Carolina Press, 397 pp., $21.00.*

ON APRIL 6, 1917, THE United States declared war on Imperial Germany. Within a week, President Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public Information (CPI), the federal government's first attempt at large-scale propaganda. When the nation entered the conflict, its population was heterogeneous. Even though the majority favored war, isolationism persisted. Massive numbers of German and Irish Americans opposed mobilization. Some parts of the country harbored strong pacifists; other parts, particularly the hinterlands, housed much apathy. It was to be the job of the CPI to unite public opinion around the war effort.

The committee made prodigious attempts to do just this. Its pamphlets numbered in the millions. Some 74,500 Four Minute Men gave brief speeches on the war, with each address closely controlled by Washington. Six hundred thousand schools received the committee's *National School Service,* a 16 page bimonthly designed to inculcate "unswerving loyalty" by using the teacher as "an officer of the state." (This language came from the bulletin itself.) The CPI printed the first government daily, entitled *Official Bulletin* and posted in nearly every military camp and some 54,000 post offices.

Results were spectacular. The CPI publicized the government's war aims skillfully and with imagination, popularizing the notion that America was involved in a great struggle to save democracy. It served as a nationalizing agent, fostering such collective allegiance that at times it preached a civil religion. It established an apparatus so comprehensive that few citizens could escape its messages. It even subsidized a front entitled the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy to attract trade unionists and socialists. And by the end of the war, the committee had achieved its essential aim: most Americans accepted its case against German militarism.

Although scholars have long written on various aspects of the committee's work, only now do we have an authoritative account. Stephen L. Vaughn, Assistant Professor of History at Indiana University, has combed over fifty manuscript collections, including the committee's own records housed in the National Archives. His narrative is fresh and thorough — and, whether he would concede it or not, most damning.

As far as the brigades of the typewriters were concerned, World War I was the liberal's war. Even before the United States entered the conflict, two progressive journalists, Walter Lippmann and David Lawrence, pressed Wilson to establish a government publicity

bureau. So did the muckracking reporter and novelist Arthur Bullard, once editor of the *Socialist Call.* In fact, Bullard's memos to Wilson's chief confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, did much to outline the structure of the committee. Americans, Bullard said, must be made to desire mobilization.

Yet Wilson chose progressive journalist George Creel to head the committee, and the CPI became informally known as the Creel Committee. Creel combined an arch-reformism with a brash personality. Child labor laws, anti-corruption practices, women's suffrage, the single tax, public ownership of utilities — all found in the Denver Wilsonian a doughty champion. If, as one reporter noted, he was "a fascinating talker who looked like a gargoyle," Creel had an acid tongue. Creel once compared the mind of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to the New England soil: "highly cultivated, but naturally sterile." When asked about the mind of Congress, he snapped back that he did not go slumming.

Creel was not alone in his efforts. For those who spiced their reformism with more than a touch of coercion, work on the committee was ideal. Vaughn finds the CPI "a veritable magnet" for reformers of all shades, and the roster of CPI workers reads like a who's who of the progressive movement. Among those working for the committee were such historians as Carl Becker, Charles A. Beard, and Sidney B. Fay, such political scientists as Edward S. Corwin, Charles E. Merriam, and George H. Sabine, such muckrakers as S. S. McClure, Ida Tarbell, and Samuel Hopkins Adams, and such novelists as Booth Tarkington and Upton Sinclair. Several socialists, including Charles Edward Russell, Algie M. Simons, and John Spargo, worked enthusiastically for the committee. So did business analyst Roger W. Babson, pacifist settlement worker Jane Addams, advertising executive Edward L. Bernays, film director D. W. Griffith, illustrator James Montgomery Flagg, and journalist Heywood Broun.

To many such people, the war would not only retain democracy. It would make reform international, globalizing what they saw as the crusade against exploitation and oppression. Committee workers often perceived life, and politics in particular, as a crusade of good against evil, or to use the metaphor of Franklin K. Lane, "the world of Christ . . . come again face to face with the world of Mahomet." To them, the Kaiser was committing — on a much greater scale — the sins of Tammany Hall and Standard Oil.



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CPI attacks on Germany approached the hysterical, and posters were sought that were deliberately inflammatory.


With such a perspective, it is hardly surprising to find committee propaganda advocating various forms of government interventions. The CPI's *War Cyclopedia* defended the excess profits tax, while a CPI bulletin found the income tax rooted in the "copartnership of mankind, a certain vague sense of the brotherhood of man." One *Cyclopedia* editor, constitutional expert Edward S. Corwin, claimed that the state needed wide police powers to promote the general welfare; Corwin saw Lincoln's temporary suspension of civil liberties during the Civil War as a model for Wilson to follow. Economist John R. Commons predicted that "American labor will come out of this war . . . with as much power to fix its own wages by its own representatives as employers have."

Moral regulation went hand in hand with reform. One professional educator (who had written a textbook with Charles A. Beard) mixed pleas for hygiene with warnings against youthful sex drives. Creel claimed that universal military training was bound to result in increased public health and civic virtue. Indeed the committee's reformist thrust was so strong that CPI staffer and historian Guy Stanton Ford later regretted that "the Germans spoiled some perfectly good enterprises by ending the war when they did."

Committee writers promoted a militant form of nationalism. If today we find much committee rhetoric vacuous and insipid, many Americans then undoubtedly found the words stirring. Interior Secretary Franklin Knight Lane told his countrymen to love America "because it is holy ground." Katherine Lee Bates, author of "America the Beautiful," offered "The New Crusade," a poem that began "Life is a trifle/Honor is all/ Shoulder the rifle/Answer the call." Stuart P. Sherman, later an editor of the *Cambridge History of American Literature,* believed — in Vaughn's words — that "any person not indoctrinated with American ideals was a menace to the republic." Historian Carl Becker, deploring the disappearance of the frontier, found the conflict a war "to save our own soul," by which he meant to prevent America from backsliding into a class struggle as much as to defeat Kaiserdom. "Free education," added Becker, aims at "good citizens rather than good scholars."

Vaughn notes perceptively how the committee used ideology in an attempt to provide social stability, something that progressives found sorely lacking amid the turmoil created by industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and the war itself. The committee would "hold fast the inner lines," reinforcing a traditional America where, as one historian notes, "old landmarks were losing their familiar contours." Yet Vaughn himself finds such a focus disturbing. Defining political freedom in terms of community service opens the possibility of undermining individual liberty and submerging the individual in the will of the state.

In its effort to impose unity, the committee fostered a powerful presidency. Wilson asked his countrymen to think of him



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as a symbol "of the power and dignity and hope of the United States." Creel concurred, once claiming that "a President of the United States, in time of war, is either a *dictator* or a *traitor,* for dictatorship in war is the Constitution's direct intent." (emphasis his)

The committee encouraged domestic spying, urging citizens to report "defeatist" rumors to the Department of Justice. Said one CPI poster, "Do not wait until you catch someone putting a bomb under a factory. Report the man who spreads pessimistic stories, divulges — or seeks — confidential military information, cries for peace, or belittles our efforts to win the war."

Censorship was assumed. So was suppression of unpopular ideas. Creel confessed that his agency had "suppressive features," but he hoped that they would be overshadowed by positive propaganda efforts. The CPI chief sought to ban publications portraying the United States unfavorably or containing material deemed too dangerous for the public. Among such "dangerous" material were books "laudatory of Germany." Although the committee itself lacked the power of censorship, it publicized statements — some made by reformers — advocating the suspension of free discussion. (Quotations by Clarence Darrow, William Jennings Bryan, and Edward S. Corwin did quite nicely.)

Occasionally a committee speaker went further. For example, socialist Charles Edward Russell charged that traitors and pacifists had ended Russia's participation in the war. Speaking in Madison, Wisconsin, he called for the removal of the antiwar senator Robert M. La Follette.

Attacks on Germany approached the hysterical, with scholars willingly adding their imprimatur to the cause. Wallace Notestein used German quotations to bolster his claim that the Second Reich sought world domination. The Cornell historian also accused the Germans of viewing the state "as something almost divine," causing Vaughn to muse whether Notestein had ever read CPI messages by Lane and Sherman. An English professor at Stanford described a possible German capture of New York City — as well as a German pillaging of Lakewood, New Jersey. The committee distributed a map of a German-occupied United States. (Milwaukee was renamed "Prosit"; Savannah, "New Vienna.") Sometimes fabricated atrocity stories were used, with Four Minute Men being told directly to appeal to fear. Such committee personnel as illustrator Charles Dana Gibson sought posters that were deliberately inflammatory. One drawing showed German officers chopping off the hands of a boy, another portrayed a soldier ready to commit rape. The indictment, of course, was always selective: German starvation of Poles was attacked, but not the British blockade of Germany. Even a bulletin aimed at secondary schools featured such articles as "American Aviators Bomb Hun Airdromes."

In an effort to win black support, the committee claimed that Germany was no place for Negroes, as the Kaiser favored slavery. (Such arguments did not prevent committee films from stereotyping Afro-Americans. One film showed blacks tap-dancing, with the caption indicating that they had as much "rhythm" in France as under the southern sun.)

At one point, the committee promoted a pamphlet claiming that Lenin was in the pay of the German government. Although it was based upon false documents, J. Franklin Jameson, the managing editor of the

American Historical Review, claimed that the materials were authentic.

A one-sided view of America's own past was almost inevitable. In 1776, so Sherman claimed, America had not been at war with Britain; the problem had been with "only a little ring of musty old drones from the German hive." Evarts B. Greene, a specialist in the American Revolution, found a global-mindedness in such figures as George Washington, James Madison, and John C. Calhoun. Frontier historian Frederick Jackson Turner called upon historians to stress close ties to Britain and France. Dexter Perkins pointed to what he called "the impossibility of our maintaining our older isolation." Carl Becker argued that the logical implication of the Monroe Doctrine was two million doughboys in France.

What makes Vaughn's indictment so effective is that he is not a muckraker. Vaughn in fact finds much of the committee work "well intentioned" and "worthwhile," and he notes how often the committee stressed "antimilitarism, antiauthoritarianism, and the defense of democratic government." The concept of propaganda itself did not have the negative connotation in 1917 that it has since acquired, and Creel never harbored the contempt for mass opinion that Hitler or Goebbels did. The committee did not harass any immigrant group; indeed it went out of its way to stress that German-Americans, in particular, were loyal. Historian Guy Stanton Ford, who directed a CPI division employing several hundred scholars, attempted to uphold standards of documentation. And in comparison to some propaganda emanating from other belligerents, and from unofficial sources within the United States, CPI material was tempered — some of the strongest criticism of the committee came from groups that thought it too mild in condemning Germany. Vaughn points out that the most severe repression of civil liberties did not come from the Creel Committee; rather it came from the state councils of defense and from such extra-governmental organizations as the National Security League.

Despite Vaughn's attempt at balance, an effort this reviewer can only find commendable, the legacy of the Creel Committee emerges as most destructive. Vaughn's excellent study shows that the CPI oversimplified complex international issues — and accompanying economic ones — to the point of caricature. Evil was projected upon the Germans and the Kaiser by the very people who had denounced "the trusts" and "the bosses" with such abandon. Professors abandoned their professional responsibilities to rally to the colors. Rather than presenting the world in all its complexity, many deliberately embraced indoctrination.

The French commentator Julien Benda once popularized the phrase "la trahison des clercs" — the treason of the intellectuals — in a book by that title. Although that book deals with Europeans of pre-World War I vintage, Mr. Creel's World War I efforts could offer some excellent illustrations.

Justus D. Doenecke is Professor of History at New College of the University of South Florida.

On View

The women

DAVID BRUDNOY

WHAT DOES WOMAN want? asked Dr. Sigmund Freud. To be tougher than nails, said Dr. Robin Cook, the Boston ophthalmic surgeon who sat down to study the elements of the novel and came up sometime later with *Coma* (1977) and, last year, with *Sphinx*. Robin Cook's horror story of a sinister traffic in human organs struck to the core of many people's queasiness about the unsettled question, When does death occur? — *vide* the Karen Anne Quinlan case. And along the road to making Dr. Cook a very affluent young man indeed it also set back, at least temporarily, the cause of transplant donorship. *Coma* was a super quick-read novel and in 1978 it became a stylish, intriguing, fairly successful movie. But one of Robin Cook's goals, the creation of a believable female protagonist with brains, daring, and insight, was realized in the book but fell partially by the wayside in the film. Hollywood somehow manages, on rare occasions, to come up with a *Gloria* (reviewed in the December 1980 *LR*), but comes up with flibbertygibbets by the dozen. The movie *Coma*'s Dr. Susan Wheeler (Genevieve Bujold) was less notably capable than the book's Dr. Wheeler, less activator, more acted-upon. *Coma*'s story, a corker, survived the transformation from the page to the screen, but Dr. Wheeler ran out of steam.

Americans don't like strong women and American movies don't portray what American movie-goers don't like.

Now along comes *Sphinx*, a lesser novel, though intelligently derived from Robin Cook's long-time and slightly more than amateur interest in Egyptology, and with *Sphinx* comes another of Cook's dynamic heroines, Erica Bacon, who stumbles around Cairo and Luxor and into a devious plot concerning the traffic in stolen antiquities. One of these days Robin Cook will have to go the route of Joseph Wambaugh, whose excellent cop stories underwent grotesque mauling when made into movies, such that Wambaugh finally took matters into his own hands and turned himself into a moviemaker (*The Onion Field*), thus rescuing his ideas and his characters from the clumsiness of others. Director Franklin J. Schaffner and screenwriter John Byrum have given us, in *Sphinx*, the movie, a gorgeous travelogue, a luscious invitation to catch the first plane to Egypt, but they have translated Cook's heroine, via the exceptionally attractive and utterly talentless Lesley-Anne Down, into a standard movieland image of the much put-upon female in distress. The perils of this Pauline are nicely enhanced by the scenery and by Frank Langella, who plays the part that Omar Sharif would have played ten years ago — the dark, glamorous, urbane Egyptian who bears the weight of millennia on his shoulders, and who reflects the mysterious habits of an ancient race in his smouldering eyes (you get the picture) — but by the time the mystery is unravelled, and we have seen the riches of the ancient kingdoms of upper and lower Egypt and the unpleasant deaths of characters both noble and venal, we have been left with one pretty girl straight out of the Hollywood book, standing tall but shaken.

Bujold, who can act, put enough of her skills into *Coma* to show us on screen some hints of the courageous, ingenious character Robin Cook focused on in his book. But Down is one of those actresses who, either of her own volition or because her keepers insist, always appears just to have left the hairdresser's, even after she has suffered the torments of the darned. I saw *Sphinx* months in advance of the public opening, with, among others, Robin Cook, and periodically I heard sighs, perhaps actually they were polite moans, coming from Cook's direction. That occasion was his first look at the movie, and mine, and while I realized that yet another intelligent woman's role had been all but erased, Cook realized that yet another of *his* intelligent woman's roles had been trashed.

Why does this happen?

Much has been made lately of the new crop of women directors in Hollywood, people like Claudia Weill, whose little movie, *Girl Friends*, impressed everybody, though nobody went to see it, but who was at last permitted to make a bigger movie, *It's My Turn*, which promptly invited unhappy reactions from her fickle fans, because the heroine, played by Jill Clayburgh, showed us exactly nothing more of the "new" woman image than any of a hundred male directors might have concocted. Maybe there's a correlation between the size of a movie's budget and the rigid adherence to formula:

if you make a film on a shoestring you can do as you like, if you are backed by big money you cannot.

But that is at once too facile and too futile for further discussion. It's also untrue. John Cassavetes finally made *his* big movie, *Gloria*, and in the capable hands of Gena Rowlands the protagonist was, *is*, exquisitely self-reliant, mythically so, the sort of woman who can be called a "tough broad" without exciting the fury of the modern guardians of liberated language. The problem goes beyond budgets, beyond even the varying skills of directors and screenwriters, surely beyond all that. It goes to the heart of the American conception of Woman. You can name a dozen or two dozen exceptions to this, you can throw Bette Davis and Joan Crawford and a few other big name screen toughies at me, but I can throw five hundred counter-examples back.

Americans don't like strong women and American movies don't portray what American moviegoers don't like. Even in our days of declension, even at the nadir of our contemporary appreciation of heroism, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the screen, like life, boasted a few valiant heroes, And with *Rocky* and *Superman* and *Star Wars* and other blockbusters in the late 1970s the screen once again welcomed manly men, heroic men, men with ideals and admirable ambitions and self-confidence enough for two, the sort of men Ayn Rand glorifies. But the sort of *women* Rand created are nowhere to be seen.

On screen, as I write this, are a dozen significant women characters, each at best a little gutsy, each at worst a mite silly, each, at last, more a caricature of the submissive woman than a fully-fashioned heroine. (I exclude *Gloria*.) These are the women in significant movies; these are Hollywood's women.

These are, in no particular order, Vicky La Motta (*Raging Bull*), Judy Benjamin (*Private Benjamin*), Olive Oyl (*Popeye*), the loving waitress (*Inside Moves*), the vengeful secretaries (*9 to 5*), Beth Jarrett (*Ordinary People*), the put-upon housewife (*A Change of Seasons*), the prize-winning pianist (*The Competition*), the second wife (*The Jazz Singer*), and the ex-wife (*Tribute*). The movies vary in quality and in style and type, but the women are best comprehended as slightly differing versions of the same person.

Vicky La Motta (Cathy Moriarty, an exquisite and awesomely talented newcomer) is the young girl who fell for the debonair, excitable young boxer who briefly held the middleweight championship (1949-'51) and for a considerably longer time tyrannized all those who loved him. *Raging Bull* is based to some extent on the actual life of Jake La Motta, and according to the real Vicky, now divorced from Jake but doing the circuit with him to promote the movie, she was as naive and timid way back then as the movie depicts her. Robert De Niro dominates the film, and by the time you read this he will almost certainly have picked up an Oscar for his work, but the submissive Vicky La Motta is one of the two major foils (the other is Jake's brother) off whom the protagonist must play, and against whose decency and passivity his grossness and insensitivity stand out so boldly.

Vicky evidently was the way the movie reveals her. So, too, Olive Oyl (Shelley Duvall) conforms to the (cartoon) character — is, in fact, much finer an incarnation of Popeye's girlfriend than is Robin Williams as the title character. She *looks* the part and she sounds it, to the last desperate "oh oh OH oh oh oh oh oh OH oh oh...." Of Vicky and Olive we have, I suppose, a right to expect nothing but what life (*Raging Bull*) and the classic cartoon (*Popeye*) insist upon.

Not so, the other female characters. Goldie Hawn's Judy Benjamin does grow in her part, from the vapid, spoiled little Jewish-American Princess to the somewhat matter-of-fact woman from whom we part at the end of her riotous stay in this man's army. She outwits a female tyrant (Eileen Brennan), she eludes various lecherous soldiers, she walks out on her wedding to a "schmuck" (Armand Assante), and we cheer for her (and dread the inevitable sequel, or sequels), but what has she accomplished? She's toughened up, she's learned to polish her boots, she's come to see the difference between a dream prince and a chauvinist pig, but she's unemployed, uninvolved, unmotivated — I know, it's a hit, so the sequel ought to remedy that — and she's still batting her baby blues to get her way. *Private Benjamin* is a sweet little comedy and Goldie's a peach, to be sure, but Judy Benjamin has moved about eight inches along the road to maturity.

Inside Moves drew critical raves and no audiences in its first appearance in December, though by the time you read this it should be back with a new promotional campaign. It deserves success, sentimental though it is, primarily because of the remarkably believable work of its male leads (John Savage and David Morse) and a handful of supporting actors. The women in it are dreary. A junkie (Amy Wright), who may be ignored here, and a nice cocktail waitress (Diana Scarwid) are the women who float through the life of the young bartender turned basketball star (Morse), and the waitress eventually realizes that the crippled would-be suicide (Savage) is a swell guy, swell enough to love, gimp and all. She is the proximate cause of the rift between the two male buddies, and long after it is apparent to anyone over the age of three that Roary (Savage) is the man to love, the waitress comes around to loving him. She is a gentle simpleton.

Beth Jarrett (Mary Tyler Moore) makes life neat but cold for her husband Calvin (Donald Sutherland) and miserable for her unhappy son (Timothy Hutton), but these *Ordinary People* are wonderful to know. The movie's very fine, Robert Redford has made his directorial debut in great form, all the acting is first-rate. And Moore has, let us hope once for all, shed her shackles to the sweet Miss Mary role she perfected on television. Moore is nothing short of tremendous, and her Beth Jarrett is awful enough to convince us that young Conrad and poor, sappy Calvin could in fact be dominated by her. But domi-

Goldie Hawn plays Private *(Judy)* Benjamin, *who moves about eight inches along the road to maturity in a "sweet little comedy" that leaves her unemployed and unmotivated at the end.*



WARNER BROTHERS, INC.



COLUMBIA PICTURES

Amy Irving and Richard Dreyfuss star as competing pianists who fall in love in The Competition, *a movie whose sellout ending tries to make us forget that, "damn it, she won, not he."*

nance is not authority, and bitchiness is not strength. Beth is a shrew, a harpie, a scold. She is neither admirable nor potentially improvable: she has mastered the art of psychological castration, as the nearly gelded Calvin so pathetically demonstrates, but the movie's sympathies rest entirely with the men, particularly, and quite properly, with the anguished young man who is her son. One question nags: from whom did Conrad get his personality, his decency? From his gutless dad? From his chilly mom? Beth Jarrett could put a frost on Havana in July.

The three secretaries (Lily Tomlin, Jane Fonda, and Dolly Parton) who work their aching little fingers off all day for a boorish, vain boss (Dabney Coleman), manage at long last to turn the tables on the bastard and introduce day-care centers and flexi-plans to the company, and a middling good time is had by all. Still, *9 to 5*, which, admittedly, is not the social tract that might be expected of any latter-day Jane Fonda project, degenerates midway through into a slapstick farce, messy and dumb and ultimately demeaning. The boss pays for his sins, and that's nice, but what happens to the ladies? The efficient one (Tomlin) stands taller, the awkward one (Fonda) gets some gumption, and the ditsy one (Parton) shows that even chesty blondes come with some grey matter upstairs. So what? Their energies are devoted entirely to humiliating a stupid man and to engineering a few cosmetic changes in their work environment. Imagine them five years hence: Tomlin is a vice president with an ulcer, Fonda is a field manager with an American Express gold card, and Parton has more and bigger wigs in her closet.

The remaining four roles are all failures, too, if they were intended in any way to suggest women as equal to men. In *A Change of Seasons* Shirley MacLaine tosses off another attractive middle-aged wife taking up with a younger man — she did virtually the same routine in *Loving Couples*, also in 1980 — and in both cases the motive is neither love, nor lust, but revenge. In the earlier movie she punishes her husband (James Coburn) for his obtuseness, in the newer film she does with a young carpenter what her husband (Anthony Hopkins) does with one of his students (Bo Derek). She is energized by me-too-itis. You're gonna cheat on me (with work, or with a 10), I'll cheat on you with a stud of my very own. The movies are appalling, devoid of imagination, consumed by cutesiness, mindlessly inattentive to any consistent set of values, and especially in *Change of Seasons*, MacLaine's character functions entirely as a get-even doll.

Amy Irving competes with and then falls in love with Richard Dreyfuss as they pound the ivories for *The Competition*. When she wins and he comes in second, he almost gives way to terminal pout. But we need a happy ending, and nothing, *nothing*, along the way suggests anything but a happy ending, so she comforts him and he becomes a good sport, this big overgrown infant piano whiz, and suffers her to be the champ. By the time they move in for the final clinch, we've already forgotten that, damn it, *she* won, not he. You must project a bit into the future to contemplate the resolution to this tale (which, thankfully, will not spawn a sequel). They will undoubtedly wander around the country concertizing, he will knock her up — that's the way he'd put it to the guys — and she will retire to make babies while he becomes Glenn Gould. It's written in the stars.

Lucie Arnaz is the only reason even to contemplate subjecting yourself to *The Jazz Singer*, arguably Laurence Olivier's most obnoxious performance ever, and the first (if God exists, the last) screen role for Neil Diamond. The 1927 weeper, notable mainly because it introduced sound to moviegoers, was hideous enough when Al Jolson took it to the movies from George Jessel's stage play, but its current version, the third on screen, simply reeks. Arnaz at least cares enough to give it a try, and she acts, not, like Lord Olivier, to her gums but all the way down; she cares and she acts and she tries, oh mammy how she tries. And would you care to know how she gets the twerp back? She makes a baby. His Yiddische papa forgives him because he comes back to the synagogue and sings Kol Nidre, he goes on stage, and she puts on a pretty dress, hires a babysitter for the kid, and beams. After the concert, presumably, the singer and his father toss off a couple of Mogen Davids, and she goes home to give the baby his 4 a.m. feeding.

Tribute? Lee Remick is at least making a graceful transition to supporting roles. In *The Competition* she plays Irving's piano teacher; here, she lectures her self-righteous, priggish son (Robby Benson), getting him to stick around while dad (Jack Lemmon) dies. At the end she comes back and smiles through the tribute to the funnyman rotting with cancer. But all the attention in *Tribute* is paid to crossing the t's and dotting the i's on a case of unresolved father-son awkwardness, not quite an Oedipal number, but the next worst thing. Mom, the ex-wife, ever-smiling, ever-sensible, contributes to the plot by getting it on with Scottie (Temple) for old time's sake, then conveniently disappearing until she's needed again for the glycerine finale.

These are twelve pretty ladies. They'd have a nifty afternoon of bridge and gossip. They're what we get as heroines when we go to the movies. Schlafly's won. ❑

***LR*'s film critic also reviews for WNAC-TV (CBS), WHDH-AM, and *The Boston Herald American*. He hosts "The David Brudnoy Show" on radio and "Nightscene" on television, writes a nationally syndicated newspaper column, and reviews books for a number of journals.**

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
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
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
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
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