RE•THINK

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HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP

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Humanitarian
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Humanitarian Online Funding

Leonie Bleiker and Bettina Schwab

Keywords

Online Fundraising, Donation Process, Inertia, Dual Process Theory, Nudges

Traditionally, funding for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is issued by governments and a few large corporate donors. However, according to prognoses, the percentage of private donations made over the internet will increase immensely over the next years. At the same time, there is a risk that the overall financial means at the ICRC's disposal will decrease due to a potential decline of government spending as many states are heavily in debts. Against this background, the concern of this paper is to analyse the fundraising strategy of the ICRC with the aim to give helpful suggestions for improvements. The invention of the internet has initiated the establishment of online fundraising, which differs from traditional fundraising. First, we elaborate on the differences between these kinds of fundraising. Our comparison will be based on a fundraising model whose generic terms function as an aid to orientation. Based on the comparison, we will point out that the advantages of the internet cause an increasing use of this medium by possible donors and therefore bring about a shift from traditional donation to online donation.

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1. Introduction

The mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of conflicts and other situations of violence around the world. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement form the biggest humanitarian organisation worldwide.[1] The need for money to accomplish its mission is high. In 2011, for example, the expenditure of the ICRC accounted for more than 1,206 million US dollar (cf. ICRC 2011). To defray these expenses, the ICRC raises money through donations. With governments contributing 83% to the total number of donations, the constitution of donors has been highly homogenous over the last decades. Governments, as the biggest group of donors, are followed by the European Commission, which contributed 9%, national societies, which contributed 5% and lastly private sources, which contributed only 2% to the total amount of donations received by the ICRC in 2011 (ibid.). As a consequence, the accomplishment of the ICRC's mission is largely dependent on the generosity of governments.

This dependence on governments' generosity is likely to cause difficulties for the ICRC in the future. If the budgets of governments decrease, they will cut their contributions for the ICRC. This will cause a direct lack of money in the budgets of the ICRC. The ICRC can react to this situation in two ways: either by cutting short the expenses and thereby reducing the need for money or by searching for other sources of money to maintain the budget. However, in consideration of the current global economic depression and the increase in global conflicts (cf. Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung 2016), the demand for money needed by the ICRC to accomplish its mission is more likely to increase than to decrease. Therefore to cut back on expenses might hinder the ICRC from accomplishing its mission. If the ICRC consequently aims to maintain the current height of budget, it has to take actions to compensate for the decrease of government donations by trying to increase the donation volume of the remaining donor types mentioned above.

As a consequence, the question arises as to which potential of the remaining donor types is underachieved. Where are the opportunities to increase the volume of contributions? To answer this question, we compare the percentile distribution of income of other internationally operating humanitarian organisations to that of the ICRC. The biggest difference lies between the percentages private donors contribute to the total income of the organisation. As stated above, private

1 For further details, see http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/movement/index.jsp (accessed: 10.01.2016).

sources contribute only around 2% to the total amount of donations received by the ICRC. Save The Children, by contrast, receives 48%[2] of its donations from private sources, a difference of 46%. UNICEF received 32% of its financial aid from private sources in 2012 (cf. UNICEF 2012), which is still a difference of 30% compared to the ICRC. We therefore see the biggest potential to increase the volume of donation in the private sector. Thus our paper focuses on how to achieve this goal.

There are two main possibilities to increase private donations: Either the volume of donations can be increased by acquiring new donors, or one-time donors need to be turned into long-term donors. A good fundraising strategy, therefore, should catch the attention of possible new donors, but also build up the relationship with its former donors. Consequently, we will analyse the fundraising strategy of the ICRC on the basis of two criteria: Whether the strategy motivates possible donors to donate and whether the strategy improves the quality of the relationship with the donor and thereby motivates him to commit himself longer to the organisation.

During the last decades, the invention of the internet has given rise to new ways of private fundraising, which differ from the traditional ways. We will distinguish between traditional fundraising and online fundraising in our analysis. In chapter 2, we contrast these two methods of fundraising on the basis of the criteria stated above. We come to the conclusion that online fundraising has a lot of advantages compared to traditional fundraising, because it provides better tools to achieve the aims of acquiring new donations and turning one-time donors into long-term donors than traditional fundraising does. The advantages of donating online have also become known to donors, since empirical evidence shows that the percentage of online donations is increasing.

Based on these findings, we analyse the ICRC's online fundraising strategy and in chapter 3 we point out that the ICRC makes use of all the different advantages the internet provides to achieve the two aims of fundraising. Yet there is still one obstacle remaining, which is the inertia of a possible donor. This can cause him to stop the process of acting out his intention to donate, when the method of donating is not easy to follow. To keep the possibility of rising inertia as small as possible, we suggest two changes in the ICRC's online fundraising strategy in chapter 4 by making the process of donation smoother. We suggest the integration of a "donate now" button into social networks and the offer for donors to commit themselves to donate more frequently. In chapter 5 we conclude that the ICRC has adapted well to the changes of framework (for this term see figure 1), but will need to continue the development of its online funding strategy.

2 See http://www.savethechildren.org/site/c.8rKLIXMGIpI4E/b.6229505/k.5C4E/Financial_Information.htm (accessed: 10.01.2016).

2. *Online Fundraising*

2.1 General Fundraising Model

Before we start with our analysis, we want to elaborate the differences between two kinds of fundraising. Our comparison is based on a general fundraising model, whose generic terms function as an aid to orientation. Fundraising is defined as the organised activity of soliciting money for charitable organisations. Fundraising activities can be modelled as follows: There are two different agents participating in them. On one side, there is an organisation whose fundraising strategy aims to solicit money. On the other side, there is a possible donor, who the organisation aims to motivate to donate money. The framework of the fundraising activities is composed by the media. The different media determine the possible ways in which the organisation and the donor can get into touch with each other. The fundraising activity itself is based on two different exchange processes. First, there is an exchange of information via information channels such as newspapers, television or the internet. The information channel is mainly used by the organisation to inform the potential donor and to motivate him to donate, but can also be used by the donor to ask questions or to give feedback. If the use of the information channel has been successful and the possible donor is motivated to donate money to the organisation, then the second exchange takes place, which is the exchange of money. Money is exchanged via donation channels such as bank transfer. The difference between the information channel and the donation channel lies in



FIGURE 1: GENERAL FUNDRAISING MODEL (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

the fact that the information channel can be used in both directions, whereas the donation channel is only used in one direction.

2.2 Traditional Fundraising and Online Fundraising

Based on this general fundraising model, we will now differentiate between traditional fundraising and online fundraising. We define traditional fundraising as all fundraising activities which are independent from the invention of the internet and therefore take place in the offline world. Online fundraising are all fundraising activities depending on the use of the internet. Since the invention of the internet has brought about many new features, the framework within fundraising activities take place is what makes the main difference between these two kinds of fundraising. The traditional framework of fundraising activities is composed by media such as direct mail, print media, radio or television. These media function as information channels and are mainly used by the organisation to catch the attention of a possible donor and then provide information that motivates him to donate money. If a potential donor has been successfully motivated to donate, he can use the donation channel to provide money for the organisation. To do so, he has to use a medium which enables him to transfer a donation, for example, a donation form. Other ways to transfer money are cheques or a transfer via a bank account. The crucial point in this is the necessity of switching the medium in order to get from the information channel to the donation channel. This can be a hindering impediment in a donation process. We will elaborate further on this point in chapter 3.



FIGURE 2: TRADITIONAL FUNDRAISING MODEL (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

The invention of the internet introduced many new features that can be used for fundraising. The online framework of fundraising activities is composed by such new ways of communication as email, websites, social media or mobile applications. These services are used to catch the attention of the possible donor and to provide information that motivates him to donate. Two main characteristics distinguish online communication from traditional media in terms of fundraising. First of all, some of the features can be used as an information channel to the same extent for both, organisation and donor. Social networks, for example, offer the possibility for the donor to directly give feedback to the information provided by the organisation. Furthermore the donor can also use social media to spread information about an organisation he supports to his circle of acquaintances, for example via the button "share" on Facebook. Thereby third parties are incorporated in the fundraising process. Second, also the donation channel has changed. The internet makes it possible to transfer a donation within the same medium in which the motivational information has been received. Donors can fill in an online donation form or use their online banking account to transfer money. This all takes place in the internet. A switch of media gets unnecessary and therefore the donation process is simplified.



FIGURE 3: ONLINE FUNDRAISING MODEL (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

Certainly, there is no strict and necessary separation between traditional fundraising and online fundraising. Donors, who have received information via traditional media, can use the internet to transfer their donation and the other way around. Consequently, both kinds of fundraising exist next to each other. Yet using the internet is advantageous when it comes to fundraising.

2.3 Advantages of the Internet

We have identified five advantages of using the internet to solicit donations: the possibility to create a network between donors; the absence of a communication time lag; the encouragement of interactivity between the donor and the organisation; the increase of transparency; and finally, the possibility of combining media materials. In the following, we will exemplify these advantages with reference to the aims of fundraising.

The first advantage of the internet is that the donors can connect to each other. Communication in traditional media such as newspaper or television is restricted to a small number of people. But nearly everybody in the world has access to the internet which abolishes this restriction. A donor does not stand alone anymore, but can communicate with like-minded people from around the globe.

The second and the third advantage are closely connected. Whereas the communication within traditional media is always affected by time lags, communication within the internet is fast and direct. In case of an emergency, the call for help via traditional media can waste valuable time. The time needed to inform potential donors should be kept as short as possible. The internet and especially social networks enable the spread of information around the globe in a virus-like manner. A call for help reaches the supporters of an organisation directly and without a time lag. In addition, the absence of a time lag simplifies the interactivity between the organisation and the donor, since donors can react directly to the information provided. These direct reactions can have different expressions. Possible donors can react by giving feedback, by donating or by spreading the information to internet users who are not yet involved in the fundraising activity. As a consequence, the supporters of an organisation become more involved.

The fourth advantage of the internet is that it can help to increase transparency. In traditional media, the donor only receives a selected extract of information, which the organisation makes available, while the internet provides a wide range of information, for example, on a webpage. The possible donor can decide in which information he is interested. Furthermore, the donor can also use other sources, such as experiences from other donors, to collect information about an organisation. Transparency increases the trust in an organisation and therefore also the willingness of people to give money to that organisation. As a side effect, this way of providing information is even cheaper than sending direct mails or advertising in newspapers.

Lastly, we see a fifth advantage of the internet in the possibility to combine different kinds of media materials with each other. Texts, pictures, sounds and videos can be used to present

information vividly. The presentation thus becomes more interesting and it is easier to catch the attention of possible donors which is the first step to a donation.

2.4 Implications for Fundraising

Our assumption that more and more people will donate online is also supported by scientific studies, which show that the percentage of online donations has increased from 7% in 2007 to 10% in 2012. For first time donors, the increase was even higher from 9% in 2007 to 16% in 2012.[3] In addition, the amount of money of one donation is also higher online than offline.

We further assume that people are not only aware of the advantages of the internet, but that they start to expect organisations to make use of them. The donor expects to find organisations represented in social media. He expects to find a webpage, and he expects to be offered the possibility to donate online. Based on this consideration and on the fact that more and more people donate online, our further analysis will focus on the ICRC's online fundraising strategy. We will investigate whether the ICRC makes use of the different advantages of the internet and whether its online fundraising strategy is expedient to the aims of acquiring new donors and making one-time donors into long-term donors.

3. Analysis and Evaluation of the Current Situation

3.1 Classification of ICRC's organisation structures

The ICRC is a large and traditional organisation. This characterisation brings along specific challenges. The betterplace lab, a think tank that tries to describe and evaluate trends in the online fundraising business, released a study about non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and their online fundraising habits. According to this publication, three types of NGOs can be distinguished when it comes to online fundraising: experimental, communicative and hesitating organisations.

The experimental NGOs are small organisations with fewer than 10 employees, which use many channels to raise money online. They often use external platforms. Their biggest problems

3 See http://trendreport.betterplace-lab.org/trend/online-fundraising (accessed: 10.01.2016).

are usually a shortage of time and know-how. The communicative category contains slightly bigger organisations with 11 to 50 employees. These organisations also make use of many channels to communicate with the interested public. They have potential concerning online funding, which could especially be improved through more knowledge about how it works and what its regulations are.

Though not categorised as a NGO, from its fundraising characteristics, the ICRC belongs to the group of hesitating organisations. The two main features of hesitating organisations are that they have a fairly great number of employees (more than 50) and raise the majority of their budgets offline. Nevertheless, most of the hesitating organisations have a website and also use e-mails to get into touch with donors. All of these characteristics apply to the ICRC. It has many employees (900 in the headquarters in Geneva, 1600 on missions and many locals who support the teams[4]). Since only 2% of the ICRC's funds are raised through private donations, the percentage of online donations cannot be higher than that. Government support is raised through different channels. The ICRC also has launched online fundraising instruments as shown in the former chapters.

The main problem the study sees for organisations as the ICRC is that they have such well-established structures. Even though clear structures can be seen as strength, they can also make an organisation rather inflexible, especially in comparison to smaller NGOs which are usually more open to change. But why did the ICRC develop such firm structures and a centralised way of communication? The reason for this lies in the special mission of the ICRC.

3.2 Special Mission

> The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and in-dependent Organisation whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance.[5]

The special mission of the ICRC to protect the lives and dignity of victims of conflicts has to be kept in mind at all times. Before changes are being made, it is important to investigate whether they may endanger the mission of the ICRC. As we have shown in chapter 2, the process of donation

4 See http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5r4j73.htm (accessed: 10.01.2016).

5 http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-mission-190608.htm (accessed: 10.01.2016).

is initiated by the exchange of information. Before talking about changes in the ICRC's online fundraising concept itself, we therefore have to evaluate the way information exchanges are managed first. This is done with consideration of the ICRC's mission. So far the communication of the ICRC has been centralised: all information is collected and evaluated in the ICRC's headquarters before it is published. This is necessary to ensure that the principles are not violated and to avoid secret information from becoming public. Another reason for the centralisation of the information is the worldwide trust the ICRC enjoys. Due to its impartiality, its unique stance empowers the ICRC to help even in areas where usually no strangers are accepted. To preserve this impartiality, it is necessary to evaluate and filter information about the ICRC's work before it is published. However, the internet established a process of decentralised communication via social networks and e-mail. The question here is whether the ICRC should change its communication management in order to improve transparency and the relationship towards the donor. For example, delegates could report their work on projects directly towards the donor via Facebook without first sending information to the headquarters. Such bottom-up changes can be very successful, but are also risky because the messages that reach the public cannot be controlled. Unfortunately, the risks described indicate that it is more reasonable to keep a rather centralised information policy. Such a top-down control of the online strategy is more suitable and already done quite well.

3.3 ICRC's Online Performance

On its website, the ICRC provides access to a wide range of information. People can directly look up what they are interested in. However, many pieces of information presented on the front page are not divided into categories but are linked directly, so that visitors have the possibility to click on about 40 continuative links. This restricts the clarity of the web page and thus increases the difficulty for visitors to orientate themselves and to find the information they are looking for. Complexity in the way information is presented can lower transparency. To decrease complexity, we recommend a clear and simple array of information, which can be achieved through subsuming information under different categories. Apart from this, the ICRC uses the website to combine different media such as photo and films. Furthermore, the presentation of information is linked with a "Donate Now" button. This simplifies the process of donation for possible donors since they can donate in the same channel in which they received information.

Besides offering a website, the ICRC is also represented in different social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Google+. The ICRC uses these networks as additional online information channels by posting videos and photos about different projects of the ICRC. However, the information channels of social networks differ from that of a webpage, since the information is not only presented to users, but the users have the possibility to react to it by pressing buttons which express like/dislike feelings, by commenting on posts or by sharing posts with their friends. The ICRC makes use of these possibilities by giving people incentives to engage in interaction with the organisation. These incentives can be photos or videos on which people can comment, but they can also be more creative. On the 150 birthday of Henry Dunant, for example, people were encouraged to send a photo to the ICRC, which shows them with the beard of Henry Dunant. These photos were then assembled in a collage that was posted on Facebook. This example shows that the ICRC uses social networks in order to get into contact with possible donors, to engage them and to interconnect supporters of the ICRC.

All in all, the ICRC uses the potential of social networks to improve the relationship to its supporters fairly well. But when we recall the aims of online fundraising stated in chapter 1, namely to acquire new donors and motivate people to donate more frequently, the question remains why the ICRC does not use social media to call for donations. Since the ICRC is mainly financed through government contributions, there was no necessity for private donations in the past. This explains why the ICRC has not made use of social networks to ask for donations. Because of their range, social networks provide ideal conditions to call people's attention to the need for money of the ICRC and through that turn supporters into donors. On Facebook, for example, over 1,100,000 people (as of 01.01.16) were connected to the ICRC via the "like"-button and the number is still growing. All of these people are in some way or another connected to the ICRC and can be asked for financial help to fulfil the mission of the ICRC.

In summary it can be said that the ICRC's online fundraising strategy makes use of the advantages of the internet. The information provided on the website is very comprehensive and therefore increases transparency, although transparency can be further improved by dividing information into subcategories. Social networks are used to create a network of supporters of the ICRC and interact with them. Here, a call for donations could raise the awareness of supporters for the ICRC's need for money. In addition to the website and social networks, e-mails and mobile applications are also used to exchange information. All of these tools make it possible to communicate with supporters of the ICRC from around the world, without time lags or media power playing a restrictive role.

The ICRC's online fundraising strategy, therefore, has the potential to acquire new donations due to a better exchange of information and to make one-time donors into long-term donors due to a better relationship with the donor.

3.4 Dual Process Theory

As a consequence, we only see one obstacle for the ICRC to overcome in order to reach its aims of acquiring new donations and to make one-time donors into donate multiple times. This obstacle is the inertia of a possible donor which can prevent a donation when impediments occur. Here, the psychological conception of decision-making processes plays an important role. Human decision making processes are affected by different mechanisms working in the brain. These mechanisms can be categorized into cognitive and affective. Cognitive processes determine controlled and conscious behaviour and are characterised by their deliberative effort. Affective processes, by contrast, determine uncontrolled, automatic and uncon¬scious behaviour and are characterised by their effortlessness and fastness. Most behaviour results from an interaction between these two processes: They can either collaborate or compete. If they collaborate, the resulting behaviour is very effective, whereas if the processes compete, a conflict arises. How the conflict is solved depends on different variables, for example, on the emotional state or the way a decision is modelled (cf. Camerer et al. 2005).

A conflict between the cognitive system and affective system can also arise when people want to donate money. The decision to donate money to a certain organisation can be the result of both cognitive mechanisms and affective mechanisms in the brain. If people decide to donate on the basis of a deliberative evaluation of information, then the underlying decision making mechanisms have been cognitive. When people decide to donate as a result of an emotional reaction, the underlying decision making mechanisms are affective. The underlying mechanisms can also stay in conflict. If, for example, organisations advertise for their mission with a picture of a very sad child, then the affective system reacts with pity, but at the same time, the cognitive system can react with anger about emotional manipulation. The same applies for the process of implementation of the intention to donate. Even if people decide to donate on the basis of a cognitive decision, the implementation can be affected by affective mechanisms. If, for example, a person intends to donate, but then obstacles during the implementation occur, which make the process of donation

more complicated and effortful, feelings of dislike and inertia can arise, which cause the possible donor to stop the process of donation.

Feelings, such as inertia, do not only interfere in the acquisition of one-time donations, but also play a crucial role in the effort to encourage people to donate regularly. We assume that many people have charitable impulses and further, that many people are also willing to donate frequently. The problem is that they have to follow the process from intending to donate to implementing this intention each time they want to donate. This implies that each time they are also susceptible to the influence of hindering feelings. People who are busy with their work, for example, often earn a lot of money and are also willing to give some of their money to charitable organisations, but fail to do so because they are too inert to take the time (cf. Thaler/Sunstein 2008: 227).



FIGURE 4: INERTIA AS IMPEDIMENT (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

For the ICRC's online fundraising strategy, the findings of the dual process theory imply that the process of the implementation of the intention to donate has to be created as smoothly as possible. Here, one huge advantage of the internet consists of the possibility to donate within the same channel as where the information is provided. This makes the process of donation easier in comparison to methods provided by traditional fundraising. However, the ICRC only partly makes use of this advantage. On the website of the ICRC, the ICRC provides a lot of information for interested people and at the same time offers the possibility to donate via a donation form. In social networks, by contrast, there is no direct possibility offered to donate. If a person receives interesting information about the ICRC in a social network and consequently wants to donate money, he has to leave the

social network and visit the homepage of the ICRC. This detour is problematic, since it can cause feelings of dislike or inertia. If, as a result of these feelings, people stop the process of donation, the organisation's aim to acquire new and more donations is not achieved adequately. To avoid these consequences, we therefore recommend creating a way to donate within social networks. We also recommend a tool which offers the possibility for donors to commit themselves to donate regularly.

4. Possible Improvements

4.1 Nudges – Smart Choice Architecture

Taking the special mission and the structures that developed on the basis of this mission into consideration, we conclude that vast changes are not suitable. Our suggestions aim at improving the ICRC's strategy by implementing changes that do not require a change in structure.

The overarching concept we have in mind is that the suggested changes should function as nudges. Nudges are little changes in the way choices are presented which push people in a favourable direction (ibid.: 6 ff.). Nudges are easy to implement and of low-cost. The nudges should influence the choices people make in their donation process positively and get more people to give their money to a good cause. Decision-making processes are highly influenced by circumstances. These can be inner circumstances (such as mood, lust, etc.) or a setting of the decision. Even though the inner conditions cannot be controlled directly, they are highly influenced by the outer circumstances. Modifications in the way decisions are presented are called choice architecture. These circumstances play a role in decision-making processes because our brain functions in the dual way we described in detail in chapter 3. As explained, small impediments can prevent a donation because inertia is at times stronger than the will to donate. This state is more likely to occur when the donation process is complicated in any way. We therefore suggest measures that simplify the process of donating for the donor. The decision to donate should not be spoiled by avoidable barriers such as detours to get to the donation form. Additionally, the measures are easy to implement.



FIGURE 6: CONCEPT OF NUDGES (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

4.2 Social Network Integration

The ICRC uses all kinds of social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Flickr etc.) to get in touch with the interested public. This is done in a very professional way. Even though information on some topics of the mission of the ICRC is restricted because of the special nature of the mission, the picture drawn for example on the Facebook page is a vivid one that gives a good impression of the work of the organisation. So far, these channels have not been used to acquire donations.

We will focus in the following section on Facebook, as it is the largest and most influential social network at the moment. We searched for a possibility for organisations to present their projects and results in social networks and ask for donations at the same time. This call for donations should not restrict or disturb the presentation of a certain project in any way. If organisations post information on Facebook, they can attach a link which leads the user to a continuative webpage. But it is only possible to attach one continuative link to a post. If organisations intend to attract new donations by presenting a cause via Facebook posts, they need to decide whether to link to further information about the cause or to directly link to the donation form. One way of solving this problem of space restriction is the integration of an additional button to the interface of the Facebook page. The additional button could be named "get involved" or "donate now" and would provide a direct link to the donation form on the ICRC's website besides the continuative link for further information about the cause. As a result, a single post can include a continuative link for further information and the connection to the donation form. Furthermore, the detour via the

main page of the website could be avoided which would make the donation process even smoother. It is a big issue in online fundraising that possible donors are often "lost" during the process of donation because difficulties come up. One of those barriers, the detour over the main page, can be avoided when using such a button. A smooth donation process also enables spontaneous and emotionally motivated donations (cf. Small 2010: 158). One product on the market for little tools to make online donation easier is the instrument developed by "elefunds", a company specialised in online funding.[6]

4.3 Long-term Commitment

Our second suggestion is also rooted in the problem of inertia. There are people who are willing to donate more money than they actually do (cf. Thaler/Sunstein 2008: 227). They are convinced that it is good to give money to a good cause and they also know that there are a great number of organisations out there who need their support. Nevertheless, the donation often does not happen for trivial reasons: Other things come along which appear to be more important at that moment (for example, the untidy living room, a comedy show on TV, etc.). Such cases are again ones in which inertia is stronger than willpower. Thaler and Sunstein came up with the idea of a long-term commitment to avert this problem. The idea is based on a program called "Save More Tomorrow" and is a nudge that motivates people to commit themselves to adjust the savings for their pension slowly in a step by step manner. The long-term commitment we have in mind would not be based on increasing the amount donated every year (even though this might be a possibility), but merely on donating on a regular basis. So far, the ICRC does not offer such a program. The idea is simple and turns donors automatically into long-term donors. Again, simplification is the key. The steps possible long-term donors have to go through need to be kept as limited as possible to avoid unnecessary barriers. It is also very important that the donors can leave the commitment without any trouble. The implementation of such a program can be done very easily. Integration in the regular donation process seems to be a good solution. Other organisations, including UNICEF and Misereor, have already established such an option.

6 See https://elefunds.de (accessed: 10.01.2016).

5. Conclusion

We showed what the specific challenges of the ICRC are concerning online fundraising, tried to identify a frame in which changes are efficient but unproblematic and suggested some nudges. Despite all the advantages elaborated in the former chapters, the internet does not only provide organisations like the ICRC with advantages. The new possibilities of the internet are also accompanied by new challenges.

We analysed the advantages the internet offers and pointed out how these advantages can benefit the acquisition process of new donors and the transformation of one-time donors to regular donors. We only pointed out the positive aspects of the internet. However, the invention of the internet also creates disadvantages for big and traditional Organisations concerning the acquisition of donations, which have to be considered in order to get a comprehensive understanding of online fundraising.

The invention of the internet also changed the framework of fundraising in terms of money. Since the internet is a medium, which itself is for free, there is very little budget needed to get started. This enables also smaller organisations to use the internet, because they can afford it. In the traditional framework, only organisations with a high budget could afford to communicate their causes, since advertising on television or in newspapers is very expensive. With online fundraising, any organisation can use the internet to raise money, irrespective of their size or budget. Small organisations can, for example, set up a website or present their cause on fundraising platforms. This development gives donors a broad range of organisations and projects to which they can give their money. Furthermore, in the online world, big organisations do not differ from small organisations in the way they are represented. With regard to the fact that there is a shift from traditional donation to online donation, this development increases the competition for money enormously. For this reason, it is even more important to optimise the online fundraising strategy of the ICRC.

We pointed out that the ICRC makes use of the advantages of the internet and therefore has a good online fundraising strategy, but that there is still the general obstacle of a donor's inertia. Since any inconveniences in the donation process promote inertia, we followed that it is necessary to make donating as simple as possible. The changes we suggest are small and easy to implement in the existing structures of the ICRC. This is of importance, since the ICRC is a traditional and large organisation with well-established structures and hierarchies, which indicates limited change capacities. The hierarchical structure of the ICRC arose from the need to protect impartiality and

the mission of the ICRC. The specific mission of the ICRC puts further constraints on possible changes. Our proposed changes focus on avoiding barriers in the donation process and influencing the behaviour of possible donors in a positive way by nudging them to act in a certain direction. We suggest a tool for better social network integration, a long-term commitment program and slight modifications in the donation form.

However, in the long run, the suggested changes will not suffice to optimise an online fundraising strategy, since the framework of fundraising will change constantly. These developments can be extensions. For example, Apple's App Store adds up to 400 new mobile apps every day. These developments can also be new innovations, such as Google glasses. Since no one can predict how these developments influence the framework of online fundraising or the behaviour of possible donors, it is important to watch these developments carefully in order to react to new trends appropriately. It is the main task of organisations like the ICRC, which want to strengthen the funds for their humanitarian work by raising private donations online, to adjust to such new developments in the framework. A well-organised and innovative approach to the task of online funding therefore can only be implemented with this constant change of framework in mind. The ICRC seems to be well prepared for that task. A new and improved donation form was recently introduced on the ICRC's webpage (summer 2013). Such improvements are necessary since the development of an online fundraising strategy is a neverending process.

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Help Alliance

HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP

Help Alliance

Together for Humanity

Clarissa Ruh and Alexandra Gerstmeier

Keywords

Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Logistics, Coopetition, Help Alliance, Responsibility

Global logistics, where companies spread all over the world are involved, are complex – especially in emergency situations when fast deliveries can be crucial in order to save lives. The International Committee of the Red Cross, a leading humanitarian institution, is confronted by this complexity in its daily work, as successful aid largely depends on the logistics involved. Therefore we see high potential for improvements on the enterprise level to support the ICRC's operations. Our idea is to create a 'Help Alliance' – an alliance of companies from different industries and sectors, which covers the entire end-to-end production – and supply chain for products needed in areas of conflict. The Help Alliance is self-organised and bound by the willingness to support the ICRC. By identifying companies as moral agents, we demonstrate their moral responsibility composed by positive and negative duties. Joining the alliance can fulfil these.

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1. Introduction

On 26th December 2004, a strong earthquake struck northwest of Sumatra and activated a giant tsunami, which extended throughout the entire ecosystem. The Great Indian Ocean Tsunami was an extraordinary event in the history of natural disasters, which affected 18 countries in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. It claimed approximately 230,000 lives.

1.7 million people were displaced, to say nothing about the number of people who lost their friends and families or were harmed physically and mentally. But the affected areas were not left alone. Over 40 countries and 700 hundred non-governmental organisations (NGOs) provided humanitarian help (cf. Swissre 2012). Among them was the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), being one of the world's largest and most honoured humanitarian organisations. The ICRC delivers emergency supplies such as tarpaulins, buckets, cooking pots, clothing and hygiene items and supports the nationally represented Red Cross Society of the countries affected by evacuating and medicating the wounded. Therefore it plays a crucial role in saving people's lives.

Within several minutes, the tsunami precipitated hundreds of thousands into death and millions into ruin, needy for immediate assistance. In such a sudden disaster, saving people's lives is a race against time. Mobilising workers, resources, skills and knowledge to help vulnerable people is the challenge humanitarian organisations have to deal with in disaster relief. Precisely for this reason, humanitarian logistics and supply chain management is brought in action. This includes "planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow of storage of goods and materials as well as related information, from point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people" (cf. Thomas and Kopzcak 2005: 2). 80% of disaster relief is about logistics; therefore, this is the starting point to establish improvements in order to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. Beside its enormous importance, logistics is also the most expensive part in disaster relief. Around US$15 billion a year are raised for this purpose, which is about 80% of the total costs in disaster relief (cf. Van Wassenhove 2006: 475).

For the ICRC, as an organisation operating mostly in armed conflicts and war, efficient logistics and supply chain management prove difficult. The guidelines and the fundamental principles strictly followed by the ICRC, are the reasons for their almost worldwide appreciation and therefore of primary importance. However, the realisation of optimal logistic processes becomes much more complicated. Every cooperation partner has to be checked to see whether it fulfils the ethical guidelines and does not violate its impartiality. Therefore above all, cooperation with

the private sector is challenging. But especially the presence of private-sector companies in the humanitarian relief environment can be a great enrichment. They are able to provide technological support, logistics staff and can also provide specific services such as electricity supply, engineering solutions or postal services, which are often unavailable after the occurrence of a disaster or in the turmoil of war. Because of their core capabilities in logistics and supply chain management, private providers can enhance the speed and efficiency of relief efforts (cf. Cozzolino 2012: 6). By sharing resources, assets and knowledge, cooperation with private-sector companies could definitely increase the efficiency of the ICRC's emergency aid response, which in turn would help more people and save more lives with the same or even less effort. A way to handle the complexity of humanitarian logistics and the useful cooperation with the private sector, without burdening the ICRC additionally, is the Help Alliance.

In the following chapters, we will demonstrate the main idea of the Help Alliance, including how it is constructed, what components it contains and its efforts for the ICRC. Furthermore, we will show that companies are moral agents, as which they have a moral responsibility with positive and negative duties.

2. Help Alliance

2.1 Basic Idea

The definition of alliance according to the Oxford Dictionary (n. d.) is a union or association formed for mutual benefit, especially between countries or organisations. Basically, the construction of the Help Alliance is consistent with this definition, but there are some divergences. First, the Help Alliance doesn't aim for mutual benefit. Instead, this association is formed for the benefit of the ICRC and therefore humanity. The second variance relates to the composition. The Help Alliance is an association of independent companies from all sectors and industries needed to cover the entire supply chain of emergency supply. These companies are bound by the willingness to fulfil their responsibilities towards humanity by supporting the ICRC. As mentioned before, humanitarian organisations, especially the ICRC with its high concentration in armed areas of conflict, can profit from such a business partnership because of their profound knowledge in logistics and supply chain management. The magic word is humanitarian business partnership, which is a new business model

between humanitarian organisations and companies focusing on building capacities and readiness to act in case of need. The idea of this kind of partnership started out after the above-mentioned tsunami in 2004. A later evaluation of the disaster relief showed that a lack of engagement between international or local non-governmental organisations and companies caused inefficiency in terms of cost, effort and time. A new business model in the form of an humanitarian business partnership, which coordinates the teamwork from the outset, would therefore bring relief and better outcomes (Global Humanitarian Platform: 2). This sort of partnership should be also assumed in the Help Alliance, in which some strength criteria have to be observed.

To enter a partnership with the ICRC, a company has to satisfy strict criteria derived from the committee's seven fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. The deciding ethical criteria for a possible partnership and therefore conditions to join the Help Alliance are the following: (cf. ICRC 2013)

1. The ICRC does not seek nor accept support from companies involved in the direct manufacture of sale of arms, or having a majority stake in such companies.
2. The ICRC does not seek nor accept support from companies involved in violations of international humanitarian law, based on the information available to the ICRC through its worldwide presence in conflict-prone areas.
3. The ICRC does not seek nor accept support from companies, which do not respect internationally recognised human rights and fundamental labour standards, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
4. The ICRC does not seek nor accept support from companies whose products are widely recognised as deleterious to health, or against which there are credible allegations of non-observance of widely recognised rules and regulations such as those elaborated under the World Health Organisation (WHO).
5. The ICRC further pays attention as to whether there are major public controversies tied to the products, policies or activities of a company, based on the reports and assessments provided by professional rating agencies and other information available from credible sources (ibid.).

In addition to these main criteria, the ICRC also emphasises sustainability and ecological management of environmental resources. Therefore the ICRC currently relies on at least two ethical rating

agencies that continuously provide the ICRC with information about the companies' behaviour concerning these criteria. Regarding this condition, it is obvious that the pool of qualified companies decreases and that monitoring the observance of all these requirements takes a huge amount of effort. Long term partners of the ICRC, as for example the UEFA, do not have to be checked only once when entering the partnership, but regularly and repeatedly. If the company does not follow the strict principles anymore, the partnership has to be dissolved.

Our main idea basically is to institute a Help Alliance to reduce the ICRC's efforts and make co-operation more efficient.



FIGURE 1: CONTACTING FOR DISASTER RELIEF (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

Currently the ICRC has to screen and contact each company separately. Instead, we suggest that it would be more efficient if the ICRC were connected to a self-generated Help Alliance as outlined above. If a network like Help Alliance existed, which includes several firms from the private sector with similar ethical understandings and a willingness to help in case of emergency, the situation would be much easier for the ICRC. Instead of contacting the firms separately and losing crucial time, it would then only have to take the first step of approach: contacting the Help Alliance. Hence, the monitoring costs would fall apart for the ICRC. A membership in this alliance would guarantee the observance of the requested criteria and will in the long term be screened by mutually checks and balances inside the Help Alliance (further explanations in 2.3). So the costs would shift from the ICRC to the Help Alliance, which means a great relief.

To explain the assignment the Help Alliance has to cover, we first have to point out the different stages of humanitarian logistics and supply chain management. A well-known segmentation of the functions a disaster relief includes is the Disaster Management Circle (cf. Warfield 2008). It includes four phases: mitigation, preparation, response and reconstruction.

The mitigation phase is the provisory part of disaster relief including the preparation of disaster prone areas with laws and mechanisms that reduce the social vulnerability and limit the impact of prospective disasters. This phase falls into the responsibility of governments (cf. Cozzolino 2012: 8) Hence, it does not belong to the Help Alliance's business. The preparation phase is crucial to emergency supply and should be therefore a task of the Help Alliance. In this phase, the physical network design, information and communication technology systems and bases for cooperation are developed (ibid.: 10). The third relevant stage is the response phase. It is called into action whenever a disaster occurs. Then all the actors have to be activated immediately and operate as fast as possible. This phase is, so to say, the output of all the preparation and organisation work done before. The first 72 hours are crucial (ibid.: 9). Here, the advantages of a Help Alliance clearly come to light. The members are a team of specialists, who combine all their capabilities and knowledge. Thanks to the consistent composition and the permanent contact within the alliance, their cooperation will develop a certain routine and guarantees high agility and a qualified and fast service. After



FIGURE 2: HELP ALLIANCE'S FIELD OF FUNCTIONS (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

a disaster has occurred and first relief efforts have been made, the reconstruction phase follows, where the problems raised should be solved in a long-term perspective. (ibid.: 10) Yet this phase does not fall under the Help Alliance's scope of responsibility. Consequently, the main field of Help Alliance's involvement is the preparedness and the response.

So far, we have seen how by the set-up of a Help Alliance effort made by the ICRC can be considerably reduced and why it therefore seems rational to establish such a network. Furthermore, we have shown what the Help Alliance's field of activity would be and why preparedness and response are the most important components. Let us now examine which companies should be part of a Help Alliance and which roles they play in it.

2.2 The Member's Role

"The diversity of the humanitarian community is an asset if we build on our comparative advantages and complement each other's contributions" (Global Humanitarian Platform 2007). To recall, the Help Alliance should be composed of private sector companies from different sectors and industries and consist of all stages of the entire supply chain. Thus there have to be, for example, pharmaceutical companies, logistics companies, textile manufacturers as well as food and beverage companies. These players show a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of financial conditions, purposes, interests, influences and capacities. What brings them together is their ethical and sustainable vision based on their ethical standards and values. In the common market environment, they are competitors or may have a business partnership. The overall goal and sense of purpose is maximising profits. As members in a help alliance, this state of competition between its companies is rescinded. Instead of rivalry, they complement each other in favour of the ICRC.

A fitting concept, therefore, is the coopetition based on Nalebuff and Brandenburger. Coopetition means the perfect combination of cooperation and competition between companies, by which the maximal value can be created (cf. Brandenburger and Nalebuff 2008: 11). This will be fulfilled by the alliance. The members are competitors, on the one hand, and cooperators on the other. Thereby there is always the incentive of each member to optimise their processes and their efficiency, which in turn benefits the cooperation within the Help Alliance. Hence acting as a Help Alliance member, the company acts beyond competition. To define the relation between the ICRC and the companies, one should analyse the different kinds of humanitarian - business partnership.

In this constellation, a company can support the humanitarian organisation as a collector, a donator or as a provider (cf. Cozzolino 2012: 14). As a collector, the support proceeds in the form of financial donors. The company collects donations from its customers, employees and suppliers for the humanitarian partners. In the second role, the donator gives his own financial contributions to fund aid operations in form of cash. The third role a company can play in this kind of partnership is the provider. In the form of an in-kind donation or a selling action, the company supports the humanitarian partner by providing goods or services while performing logistic operations (ibid.: 14). By applying this definition in terms of the Help Alliance, the companies within the alliance are acting as providers as well as by donating and by selling. Depending on their financial situations, members do their bit. Being part of the Help Alliance should not affect a company's financial stability. Everyone should give as much as possible as long as the members have enough capacities to build reserve assets (needed for participation in preparation phase) while keeping track of their daily business.

As a squad for extremely urgent operations, the Help Alliance should always be ready to be deployed. So whenever a disaster strikes, the alliance should be able to give an immediate response to the ICRC's needs. In the preparation phase, the alliance has to make sure that procurement, transportation, storage and can be arranged for the response phase. Therefore, the Help Alliance has to feature strategically pre-positioned stocks of operational support equipment, emergency staff to immediately appoint experts and distribution equipment by air, road and sea. Attention should also be paid to the missing infrastructure the ICRC is often confronted with. As in many areas of conflict, there is no developed road network, not to mention rail traffic. To reach needy people in hardly reachable areas, the equipment has to include terrain trucks, helicopters and landing craft (ibid.: 21). If all this is in place, the ICRC is ready to send their workers to conflict areas without worrying about logistic problems or missing equipment. Once activated by the Help Alliance, all logistic and supply aspects are automatically managed beyond the ICRC's management so that the ICRC can fully concentrate on the current operation and thus increase the effectiveness of its help.

An example for a successful humanitarian-business partnership can be seen with Coca-Cola, one of the leading beverage companies worldwide. The company entered into a partnership with the local Red Cross society and other aid agencies and used its capacities and soft-drink production lines to support them in disaster relief. Coca-Cola used its own network of distribution to deliver water bottles to areas of crisis. Further companies also take advantage of this kind of relationship. For example, British Airways, UPS, FedEx and DHL, in cooperating with a humanitarian

organisation, used their capacities for a good cause and undertook transportation either for free or subsidised (ibid.: 24). This is a way in which profitable incentives, optimised strategies and mechanisms can be used for humanitarian non-profit objectives. This is exactly what the Help Alliance should implement and increase.

2.3 Functionality of the Help Alliance

So far we have pointed out which companies can join the Help Alliance and in which relation they hold towards the ICRC. The advantages of the Help Alliance have also been outlined. But how is the network actually structured internally and how are companies screened by the Help Alliance in order to enter or to remain in the alliance? As mentioned before, there is a high degree of heterogeneity among the members; therefore, a clear strategy from inter-agency to cross-sector coordination is needed (ibid.: 7). First, we have to make clear in what kind of relation the companies stand to each other and how their mutual work is constructed.

There are three basic kinds of relationships in an inter-agency coordination (ibid.: 18). These are: Coordination through the market by prices; a hierarchy by instructions; and cooperation by agreements. Hence the members of the Help Alliance are beyond competition and their services for the ICRC are made up of free or subsidised goods and services, so the coordination by the market drops out. Additionally, hierarchy would not be the right coordination form for such a relationship. It is indeed successful in situations of decision problems, stress and pressure. The ICRC itself is structured hierarchically internally and coordinated by instructors, and it would definitely guarantee speed logistics and effectiveness as can be seen in the military. But in the Help Alliance, all members are independent and voluntary without self-interest as the main incentive. They are competitors on the market beyond the Help Alliance, so it would not be motivating to let one company give instructions to another without any previous agreement. So we see cooperation by agreements as the right form of coordination inside the alliance, although this requires a well organised management to bring positive results. The main factor influencing this kind of cooperation is communication. Every company is on the same level, apart from its size of contribution. To guarantee a successful preparation phase and quick response in disaster occurrence, the members constantly have to be in contact and communicate. Therefore each member has to arrange a Help Alliance Department. This department embodies two competent people in power; one is responsible for the preparation within its company, and the other is responsible for the response.

The responsibilities of each company build together the Help Alliance Preparation Team and the Response Team, which communicate continuously to exchange information on their states of affairs and raised issues. They coordinate the responsibilities and supporting scopes of each company in order to clarify which capacities of pre-stocks, staff and emergency supplies are needed, and every company can calculate its financial losses. The established contacts between the ICRC and the Help Alliance are phased out by the Response Team. Whenever a disaster occurs and the ICRC is needed, the Response Team is notified and sets the Help Alliance in operation.

This singular contacting is a great relief for the ICRC. Instead of contacting each company involved in the emergency supply when a disaster occurs, the alarm is activated by only one action: contacting the Alliance's Response Team. URL: that moment on, the ICRC can rely on the Help Alliance in regard to logistics. Briefly, the Help Alliance offers the ICRC a couple of qualified companies in only one action. Not having to contact every partner on their own and giving them information about what scope of support is needed saves time and costs. Furthermore, "time saved means lives saved" and "costs saved means more lives helped" (ibid.: 10).

As mentioned before, there still exists the problem of finding and screening the ICRC's long-term partners in terms of them following the ethical guidelines. The Help Alliance undertakes these efforts. Only the first check of whether a company fulfils the conditions to become a partner has to



FIGURE 3: INFORMATION FLOW WITHIN THE HELP ALLIANCE (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

be done by the ICRC or a deployed rating agency. But as soon as a company has joined, adherence to the guidelines will be guaranteed.

Being part of the Help Alliance is effectively an ethical seal of quality and a signalling effect. All members can identify in their corporate philosophy the willingness to support the ICRC. Comparable with the Star Alliance, which honours its member airlines for security and quality, the Help Alliance is a kind of brand, which stands for being economical in an ethical and sustainable manner and with the protection of human rights. Of course, each member has some advantages because of this seal of quality and its social prestige. Having someone in the alliance who does not act in these manners would damage the whole reputation of the alliance. So each company has its incentives to screen the others and a certain system of checks and balances within the alliance has to develop. The responsibility for this is also the field of the Preparation Team of each participating company. Its members have the full supply chain at its glance and are in a position to evaluate the work of their partners. If some inconsistencies are found, this has to be discussed in the Help Alliance Team, which is also permitted to exclude by agreement.

3. The Companies' Perspective

3.1 Understanding of Moral Responsibility

So far we have shown why optimising humanitarian logistics and supply chain management is crucial to save lives and how it benefits the ICRC. Founding a Help Alliance as developed above seems to be an easy and highly efficient solution. By empowering companies to join a self-regulated help organisation, the transaction costs of both the durance of organisation and costs spent can be immensely reduced. This in fact means more time and money available to be spent in other life-saving actions. However, we have not yet explained why companies should even join an alliance like 'Help Alliance'. Joining indirectly implies the acceptance of the idea that companies have a moral responsibility and duty to help in case of emergencies or the occurrence of disasters. In the following chapter, we are going to explain two major topics: first, why companies can be seen as moral actors with responsibilities and second, why this leads to not only negative duties but furthermore to positive ones.

Milton Friedman once said that the only social responsibility a company has is to increase profit (1970). Several tendencies in business ethics show that this view has been outworn. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) perhaps is one of the most famous theories in business ethics. It indicates that companies have a social responsibility that excludes their core business (cf. Herchen 2007: 25 f.). Unfortunately the 'Social' in CSR has never been defined properly. So, what is it that companies have a social or moral responsibility for?

To begin with, let us examine what responsibility in fact means. In everyday life, we do not only use 'responsibility' in terms of 'being responsible for' and therefore being liable/accountable for something we have done, but furthermore to emphasise that someone can 'hold responsibility' for something or someone, which can be understood as a responsibility of concern (cf. Kleinfelder 1998: 246 f.). Our main interest in this paper lies in showing that companies are not only responsible in the sense of being accountable for what they have done but besides that, they have a responsibility of concern which leads to a moral responsibility which in fact excludes their core businesses. But are companies actually capable of holding such a responsibility and how can we then draw the connection between actions, morality and responsibility?

There are two central aspects to when an actor is morally responsible. The first condition is the ability to decide and act freely within a certain scope. An actor, then, is free to decide which action to choose or not to choose – hence, he is responsible for his action. Second, to be morally responsible includes being able to evaluate your action alternatives from a moral standpoint (cf. Neuhäuser 2011: 56 ff.). Evaluating your decisions from a moral point of view means letting moral principles influence your process of deciding and considering. Only if an actor is capable of doing so can he be blamed for doing the opposite (ibid.: 64). He therefore is morally responsible for his actions. But however, does it also imply that companies can be moral actors?

3.2 Companies as Moral Actors

Intuitively, most people would agree that it seems reasonable to accept companies as moral actors. Individual actors seldom are able to fulfil the demands that arise in a cooperative environment. Companies instead are provided with an unproportionally larger scope of action (e.g. due to their high and flexible capital) (ibid.: 90 f.). Hence, they are more likely to be able to spend time and energy reacting to future or current needs and caring for their environment than individuals do. In fact, modern society tends not only to assign a higher potential of responsibility to the private sector,

but furthermore seems to believe that the private sector is much more suitable to cope with moral demands (cf. Wieland 2001: 23). But, unfortunately, intuition is not sufficient to prove any duty.

Christian Neuhäuser argues in his work "Unternehmen als moralische Akteure" (2011) that only moral actors are able to take responsibility. This was the second condition claimed above – an actor needs to be able to see whether an action is morally right or wrong. Consequently, it follows that he is moral responsible for his actions. If we want to assign any moral responsibility or duty to companies, we have to prove that they in fact are moral agents. In doing so, we will first show why in this context employees are crucial to enterprises and how they enable an enterprise to have the capabilities of moral actors (or as we will conclude: persons). The second step will be to show in what aspect companies through that role of moral actor can be seen as persons and how this produces certain duties for companies.

Companies as Moral Actors - Importance of Employees

First of all, let us give a brief summary of what is meant by a 'moral actor': An actor is a moral subject if he recognises certain responsibilities and is willing to accept them (cf. Kettner 2001: 148). Matthias Kettner suggests that an actor can only be a moral one if he possesses four capabilities (ibid.: 149 f.):

F1: Freedom of action: being able to choose among different possibilities of action and inaction.
F2: Foresight: being able to recognise the possible consequences depending on which action is chosen.
F3: Reason responsiveness: being able to evaluate and considerate rationally among the alternatives and define corresponding intentions.
F4: Sensitivity: being sensitive towards morally wrong or right actions and let this influence F1-F3.

Moral actors primarily are reasonable and rational actors. They possess self-confidence and are able to evaluate and even correct their desires and decisions under a moral point of view (cf. Neuhäuser 2011: 120 f.). We will henceforth claim that companies borrow those special capabilities from their employees and that through them, companies – similarly to children – have a disposition for moral acting (ibid.: 130).

Employees are the function owners of a company: Companies are not capable of acting in the proper sense. They can only do so if their primary are individuals that are willing to provide this capability for the company - in order to sign a contract for example (cf. Kleinfelder 1998:

330) Therefore, employees can be seen as individual beings acting as agents of corporate actors in order to achieve a joint goal (cf. Wieland 2001: 130). Therefore, their special capabilities can be assigned to the company. Firms, then, are reasonable and moreover moral actors only because their individual employees already own these capabilities (cf. Neuhäuser 2011: 123). Annette Kleinfeld, for instance, illustrates in Persona Oeconomica (1998) that it is part of human dignity to not only be able to act morally, but in addition to be willing to do so. It thus is part of individual fulfilment to live out this moral potential (cf. Kleinfeld 1998: 317). A company already has employees that have a moral self-concept of them and wish to also embrace this in their role as function owners of the companies (cf. Neuhäuser 2011: 130 ff.).

Individuals typically have intentions in their daily lives: they plan in order to achieve personal goals. Intentional behaviour of companies consists of the intentional behaviour of the individuals working in the company (ibid.: 96). It then is a necessary condition for a company's success that its employees aim their intentions at the goals and plans of the company (ibid.: 130 ff.). Only if the firm itself has moral plans, or to be more specific, if they let the moral convictions of their staff influence their interests is it finally possible for their employees to let moral considerations also influence their decisions in professional life and become moral agents of corporative actors.



FIGURE 4: COMPANIES' DISPOSITION THROUGH EMPLOYEES (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

Therefore a moral company needs moral duties which influence their acting and planning – similar to children who due to a certain learning process (parental control and social customs) internalise how to be moral. But how do such moral duties arise for firms?

Companies as Moral Actors - Companies as Persons

A basic approach in the realm of Anglo-Saxon business ethics is the attempt to connect the concept of a 'person' to companies. Being a 'person' includes being able to morally evaluate (ibid.: 94) and being willing to let those considerations influence your actions (cf. Kleinfeld 1998: 317). This leads to moral responsibility and moral duties. Hence, if we could show that companies have the required capabilities to be persons, we could automatically conclude that they, as moral persons, also have moral duties. Prima facie claiming that companies are persons seems uncommon. Obviously, they do not have a particular body, but still, as shown before, they have the required mental capabilities due to their employees. Still, intuitively, there seems to be a difference between a moral person and a company as a moral actor. Neuhäuser, for instance, believes that companies cannot be (complete) persons. As there are humans who are persons despite the fact that they do not possess the required capabilities, companies are not (complete) persons, though they do have the capabilities, which are necessary by definition (cf. Neuhäuser 2011: 109). Still it seems to be somewhat true that companies embody certain aspects of a 'person' due to their employees' capabilities.

Let us take animals as an example. Animals are not capable of acting morally as they do not possess the required mental capabilities of evaluation or even comprehension of what a moral act is. Nevertheless, they have to be morally considered as they are sentient and able to suffer (cf. Singer 1994: 85). Companies in contrast are not sentient, but they are able to act morally. A complete moral 'person' entails both features. Therefore neither an animal nor a company is a complete moral person; still, they can be seen as kind of 'half' persons. Hence, we conclude that animals do not have moral obligations since they lack the required capabilities, but have moral rights because they are capable of sensation. Firms then have no moral rights and do not have to be morally considered, but still have moral obligations since they are capable of acting and evaluating.

So far we have seen that companies not only are moral agents due to their employee's capabilities but that they furthermore possess various duties, because they can be seen as half persons with moral duties. Next, we will see what kind of duties these could be and how they can be assigned to companies.



FIGURE 5: COMPANIES AND ANIMALS AS HALF PERSON (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

3.3 Negative and Positive Duties

Human dignity is inviolable – independent of the different rules of law, there seems to be universal consent about the dignity of human beings. This approach goes back to the vision elaborated by Kant. He postulated that 'man must be treated according to his inherent dignity' and that 'no human being should be obliged to only serve the purposes of others' (cf. Dierksmeier et al. 2011: 81 ff.). According to Kant, people, due to their dignity, are the only things or beings, which cannot be exchanged or replaced. They possess a value which is not only intrinsic, but beyond that is not comparable to anything else (cf. Kant 2004: 68 f.). Therefore the loss of one person cannot be compensated by any further good. This belief in the unconditional value of a person is universal (cf. Neuhäuser 2011: 188 f.). The concept of Human Rights is generally based on these considerations, and especially on the inviolability of human dignity (which is fixed, for example, in Artikel 1 in German Constitution Law). But, consequently, if someone holds a right, this logically implies that someone else has the obligation or duty to adhere to this right. So, dignity of human beings and human rights generate duties for others (cf. Fredman 2008: 10 ff.). Since we have already shown that companies are moral actors, they are obliged to obey these rights or demands. The emerging duties can be split into two sections: first, negative duties and second, positive duties. Negative duties consist of the obligation not to violate existing rights or demands. Positive duties,

in contrast, also include the obligation to establish not existing rights and reconstitute or benefit violated rights (cf. Feinberg 1984).

Apparently there seems to be a difference between those two definitions, since negative duties demand that an agent refrains from violating someone's rights. Hence, for negative duties there seems to be a specific range of expectations, which is not defined within the scope of positive duties. For instance, if you ask a child to stop mobbing his classmates (which is a negative duty), you have expressed explicit expectations towards his behaviour, which the child can easily comprehend. Positive rights instead ask for more (cf. Berlin 1969). If you ask a child to act against mobbing and therefore to decrease suffering, he probably will not immediately understand what you want him to do. Similarly, it is easier for companies to only have to accept that certain rights need to be respected and cannot be violated and that this logically leads to negative duties for them. But what is the situation regarding positive duties? As already mentioned, there is no distinct border for positive duties – there is always one further action, which would benefit the rights of another person. So, how much can we expect of companies? They are still institutions with one primary goal: making profit. To request them to forget about their interests and to only obey any positive rights would be a complete misinterpretation. Unqualified acceptance of positive duties can lead to excessive demands of actors (cf. Neuhäuser 2011: 202). Therefore there must be restrictive boundary lines to which extent companies are responsible to interfere in order to still be able to pursue their own interests. As we will see later, these boundaries could be given by the Help Alliance.

Certainly there are good reasons needed before someone is made chargeable for something. If it comes to negative duties, which simplified are consistent with the forbearance of an action, it is fairly obvious that only the moral actor himself who caused the violation of the negative rights can do so and therefore only he himself is liable for it (ibid.: 204 f.). Referring to positive duties, allocation is much more difficult. It surely seems plausible that the actor who caused the damage should also correct it. This is what is generally understood as 'accountability'. Unfortunately, there are many occasions like natural disasters where moral actors in fact did not cause the harm, or the causing actor cannot be identified (for example, due to an assassination). There are also war situations thinkable where an actor has caused the harm but denies advocating for it. In such occasions, it is crucial to quickly find actors who are willing to take over the resulting positive duties, even if they have not violated the previous negative duties; interference of an uninvolved third party is inevitable (cf. Miller 2007: 81 ff.). As we have explained earlier, this interference is necessary for the dignity of human beings and resulting human rights, since dedication against

abasement is an expression of respect towards the fragile dignity of the involved individuals. As already mentioned, no human being can be replaced. Hence, it is out of greatest importance to diminish any suffering as quickly as possible.

3.4 Assignment of Responsibility and Help Alliance

As we have seen, when it comes to positive duties, it is much more difficult to define who is liable for something. According to Baier, there are three different ways how actors get to their responsibilities (cf. Baier 1991: 118 ff.):

1. 'Responsibility by choice'
   An actor here accepts his responsibility by choice (for example, godfathers/godmothers).
2. 'Responsibility by coincidence'
   An actor can hold responsibility simply because there is no one else available to hold it.
3. 'Responsibility by assignment'
   Responsibility can be assigned by an independent third person because it is the most reasonable and effective solution.



FIGURE 6: THREE TYPES OF RESPONSIBILITY (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

So far, we have not yet taken the third point into account as to how a Help Alliance could take over the assignment. Let us illustrate its importance with an example. Suppose there is a group enjoying a sunny day at the lake. Suddenly, the group notices that a child is drowning in the water. Fortunately, one of the members of the group happens to be a lifeguard. Naturally, the rest of the group expects the lifeguard to save the child - even though he is off duty and not responsible for the person drowning. People are right to expect him to step in and save the life, since it is a component of being a lifeguard to do so (cf. Neuhäuser 2011: 205).

In matters of companies, responsibility is a narrow property and companies seldom entail in their definition such components as the lifeguard does. On account of this, responsibility should be assigned in an economically clever manner. Hence, the idea of an independent institution that allocates responsibility to the most adequate actor (or a company in case of the Help Alliance) seems reasonable. The best-case scenario, then, would be an allocation that assigns different responsibilities to the most effective actors. This would lead to a network, which contains all those actors who see themselves as moral actors and feel the obligation to help in case of an emergency. Help Alliance could be such a network. By joining the Help Alliance, companies accept the obligation to care for damages that developed from a violation of negative duties that they have not caused. They therefore accept their positive duties. But as declared above, the assignment of positive duties is much more difficult than the assignment of negative ones. This difficulty can be resolved by reintroducing the basic idea of section 2.3 and consequently, things come full circle:



FIGURE 7: INFORMATION FLOW WITHIN THE HELP ALLIANCE (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

By organising the assignment in the Help Alliance through a Preparedness and Proportion Team, the most effective allocation is possible. Once the ICRC has informed the Response Team, the latter knows exactly which things are needed for the quick relief of the disaster situation. The Response Team then informs the Preparedness Team which checks the needs with the available potential of the separate firms. The Preparedness Team finally gives back information to the Response Team that answers ICRC's request, which enables quick and frictionless help.

Furthermore, Help Alliance guarantees not only a more effective allocation, but also a more just one, since it establishes certain constraints (ibid.: 209 ff.):

1. 'Assignment to the most qualified actors'
   Through the Response Team, it is possible to assign responsibility to the most suitable actor in order to make allocation more efficient.
2. 'Proportion to other actors'
   The burden for each company can be split since there are (in best case) several companies from one branch.
3. 'Proportion to own interests'
   The assignment, furthermore, has to be in accordance with the actor's own interests.
4. 'Right of excuse'
   Actors need to have the right to be excused if they, for financial or economic reasons, are not able to do as demanded.

Finally, if any assignment of responsibility is legitimate and interference is crucial, actors are obliged to help.

4. Conclusion

In the last decades, the number of natural disasters as the Great Indian Ocean Tsunami (mentioned at the beginning) has increased and considering the effects of climate change, this trend will continue (cf. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2015). Furthermore, the number of man-made disasters such as technological hazards, terrorism or armed conflicts has not abated.

All of these contribute to human suffering and put people in a position with a need for help. The ICRC is born from the desire to prevent and alleviate human suffering resulting from war.

Therefore it was our fundamental idea to create something with the objective of supporting the ICRC in fulfilling its desire. The Help Alliance creates opportunities to increase the efficiency of the ICRC's operations. To clarify, we conclusively list its advantages.

Advantages of the Help Alliance on the part of the ICRC:

1. In cases of emergency, the ICRC no longer has to contact each company to activate and inform them about the extent of needed supply. Instead, it can activate the supply system by alerting the Help Alliance.
2. The Help Alliance is a pool of hard-to-find companies qualified for a partnership, which otherwise are hard to find for the ICRC.
3. The Help Alliance ensures the constant state of preparedness of their members by the coverage of needed supplies with extra pre-stocks.
4. Reverting to the Help Alliance in disaster occurrences, the ICRC saves time which means saving lives and costs, which in turn means helping even more lives.

Advantages on the part of the joining companies:

1. Through a membership in the Help Alliance, companies, as moral agents, fulfil their responsibility, as they implement not only negative but also positive duties.
2. Every member of the alliance can impact a great deal with comparatively low losses. Through the implicit cooperation with other companies, they can add their knowledge and capabilities and achieve great efforts for humanity.
3. Natural or man-made disasters imply great economic losses and also influence the business situations of companies. These negative effects can be reduced by well-prepared disaster relief. Higher effectiveness of the ICRC's operations is also to the benefit for a company.

The disasters, conflicts and wars of today and the future can be no longer circumscribed in certain categories. Wars are not conducted by states, but by individuals; natural disasters are accompanied by human and technological failure. The borders blur and thus their consequences get out of hand

and become more difficult to handle. It is high time that these borders also blur in reducing these consequences. Therefore disaster relief is not only a field of humanitarian organisations but rather the business of the entire society and those entities which shape the society: the companies. For a successful disaster relief in future, the private sector has to participate and companies have to work hand in hand, together for humanity.

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HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP

Leadership Challenges of Handover Situations

Leadership Challenges of Handover Situations in Humanitarian Organisations

Using the Example of the International Committee of Red Cross

Caroline Burghardt and Marie-Lena Hutfils

Keywords

Handover Process, Knowledge Transfer, Humanitarian Organisation, Leadership, Staff Turnover

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is present in 80 countries around the world. The leader of each mission changes after around every year and a half. Even though handover processes are therefore a regular feature to the ICRC operations, there is no guideline or standardisation. Hence, valuable experience and already effective and efficient structures and processes might get lost. Communication skills and knowledge transfer are crucial for the success of the handover process. It is important to familiarize the future leader with his new working environment by enabling an exchange of experience and expectations on equal footing between former and future manager. The aim of this paper is to develop guidelines structuring the handover processes between two leaders in a mission of the ICRC.

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1. Introduction

A successful handover process is an important factor in every business or organisation that has to restructure a project or working team. This paper deals with the question of how changes of staff can be designed successfully during an ongoing project under challenging circumstances. This will be done by looking at the example of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Although operating in a purely humanitarian context, with around 12,000 people working across 80 countries, the ICRC shares many of the same management challenges that other public or private business projects have to deal with as well (cf. ICRC 2013). Because of this similarity, the term for the ICRC missions used in this paper will be projects.

Project management in business corporations can be taken as a good model for the analysis of handover processes in humanitarian leadership. Even in a humanitarian organisation like the ICRC, many processes work in a similar manner to those in a business corporation. The ICRC's aims are smoothly-run processes with maximum effectiveness and efficiency. As there is not a lot of literature about handover processes in humanitarian organisations, the following analyses and findings are mainly based on results in the business management sector. ICRC top managers in the delegations (a delegation representing a country or a region) change around every 12 to 18 months to uphold the 'Fundamental Principles of the ICRC', especially neutrality, independence and impartiality (cf. ICRC 1979), and to prevent corruption. In the run-up to the handover process, every newly assigned manager ('recipient' in the following) gets a one-day onboarding introduction in Geneva.[1] Apart from that, they are not necessarily familiar with the country, staff and working processes within the delegation. The on-site handover process itself normally takes two to three weeks and is not standardised. However, a standardisation would be possible as the majority of ICRC missions, though being in areas of conflict, are carried out in non-emergency situations. In Israel, for example, the ICRC has had a permanent presence since the aftermath of the 1967 war.

The two most important actors in this process are the recipient and the manager who previously led the project ('former manager'). In the ICRC's current handover processes, both managers have to organise the turnover mostly themselves as there are no guidelines, checklists or any other kind of standardisation. If every important aspect is not considered during the handover process, losses of information and knowledge might be the consequences of the lack of standard procedures. In

1 According to employees of the ICRC.

order to prevent such information losses, efficient knowledge transfer is indispensable. Therefore communication on equal footing and a certain structure in the process are necessary. Our aim is to point out which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to create a successful handover process.

In the following, we will first describe the current situation regarding the handover process at the ICRC in detail. Based on our analysis, we will then appoint out the distinctions among three cases regarding the consequences of the current handover process: In the first one, the recipients are able to handle the handover without any knowledge or process losses. In the second one, the new managers feel overstrained. Finally, in the third case, they are over-motivated and try to change or improve the current situation. In the following step, we will work out which criteria influence the successful handover process of a project. On the basis of those results, we will show which components have already been implemented in process employed by the ICRC and which ones still need to be considered in order to make the handover process even more effective and efficient.

2. What Makes a Handover Process Successful?

The handover process – and the change of manager that goes along with it – can bring new innovations and opportunities to the whole project. But at the same time, it must be ensured that the change between the two managers does not disturb the workflow in the ongoing project. It is necessary that, even though there is a change in the management, the rest of the staff can keep the project going. According to Sarnitz, a successful handover process should be "as quick as possible, autonomously, efficient and effective" (Sarnitz 2012: 2). The term 'effective' refers to a situation in which the process itself works as well as possible. 'Efficient' means that the process is organised with as little money and time as possible in order to save valuable resources without suffering from any losses. With a smoothly-functioning process, the likelihood for the success of the handover can be augmented significantly. In order to achieve such a process, several factors have to be considered. The highest aim of the handover is and should be the fruitful transfer of existing knowledge. Only if that is given can losses be kept to a minimum, and the new manager will be able to start his job with as much insight and background knowledge as possible (cf. Sarnitz 2012: 72 ff.).

There are three main factors determining the success of a handover; the process-specific factors, the interaction-specific factors and the framework conditions (see figure 1). In the following, we will mainly concentrate on the first two factors, namely the process-specific and the interaction-specific

factors, and point out how they can be optimised. Once they have been improved, it is possible to enhance the framework conditions as well by providing both managers with guidelines or checklists.

The process-specific factors refer to the structure of the process, adequate training and active participation and motivation of both the recipient and the former manager. According to Sarnitz, a well-structured process with regard to the content significantly influences the success of the handover process (cf. Sarnitz 2012: 72). With the establishment of the ICRC Humanitarian Leadership and Management School (HLMS), an adequate learning and development program has already been founded. Future managers will be given the opportunity to be trained in learning, responsibility, teamwork and creativity. In the following, we want to point out how the handover process could be



FIGURE 1: FACTORS FOR A SUCCESSFULL HANDOVER PROCESS (BASED ON SARNITZ 2012)

included in this programme in order to improve this factor even more. The last two of the process-specific factors, namely participation and motivation, are factors that will not be considered in any further depth. To select motivated staff is part of the human resources department and cannot be influenced to a significant degree during the handover process.

Interaction-specific factors refer to teamwork, communication, good leadership, successful knowledge transfer, feedback and setting clear goals. In the following, we will mainly focus on these factors as they set the foundation for a functional and successful handover process. The knowledge transfer should thereby be the priority and should be based on the other factors such as teamwork and communication (see table 1). All factors then should be integrated in such a way that a structure for the handover process can be developed.

To create a standardised handover process that is as easy as possible to implement, we will use the framework conditions already established in and by the ICRC. Such factors making up the framework conditions are, for instance, the manager's motivation, capability and experience (see figure 1). These are considered in the ICRC's human resources department and are of no further importance for this paper. Another framework condition for the handover process is time. Our propositions will be based on the time frame of two to three weeks for the handover process, just as it is the case right now. The last two factors making up the framework conditions are structure and material. Once we have analysed the important factors mentioned above in more detail, a possible structure can be developed and registered in guidelines or checklists.

3. Current Situation and Challenges

3.1 Current Circumstances in the Handover Process in the ICRC

Three typical and main characteristics of projects in the humanitarian sector are complexity, clear setting of objectives and limited resources, such as time, money and staff (cf. Wastian et al. 2012: 76). The frequent change of project managers is rational as it minimises the possibility of corruption and helps to keep the project lively. At the same time, this procedure involves the danger of knowledge, experience and structural losses during the handover process, but this will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

The recipient is not familiar with the local staff and knows from the beginning onwards that he will be in the field for only a limited time of about one and a half years. Furthermore, he has to face a certain task difficulty, as he has to work in a country and has to deal with structures in the particular project that in most cases are not familiar to the leader. There is no time for the new leader to slowly grow into the project. He has to deal with already established structures and processes. In every country, the recipient therefore has to face some kind of 'exceptional situation'; cultivated knowledge and knowhow is put into question (cf. Wastian et al. 2012: 79 ff.).

3.2 Three Cases of Handover Processes

In order to analyse how successfully the managers can handle this exceptional situation in the field, a distinction of cases is necessary. This distinction regards the situation of the recipient and how he handles the handover process without any given structure on the part of the ICRC. Three possible cases can occur.

In the best case, the recipient can easily handle the new working environment. Together with the former manager, he develops a framework and structure for the handover process. They discuss all the important aspects the successor has to keep in mind; he learns about the structures and processes in the country as well as in the work team. Even though there are no guidelines, the two managers handle the handover process without any problems and make it a successful one. Much like the handover itself, no problems occur in the first period and no further help is needed. If one were to ask the current managers about how successful they judged their handovers to be, most of them would probably classify themselves in this first category. But according to internal estimates of the ICRC personnel, only ten per cent of the handover processes can really be described as successful.

In the case of excessive demand, the recipient is overstrained by the situation. At first, he thinks he can handle the new environment, job and staff easily. After the handover process, he quickly notices that the new structures and processes in the country and within the work team are unfamiliar and do not necessarily reflect his expectations and experience. In most cases, the recipients are in the country where the project takes place for the first time or at least have never really lived there before. This excessive demand can not only hinder the progress of the project but also influence the manager personally. As he tries to deal with this challenge, an "accumulative stress syndrome" might be the result, causing "serious and long-term effects on [the] humanitarian

worker" (cf. Lupton-Bowers 2003: 65). The probability that he will not go into a next mission increases. These personal and environmental factors are some of the several factors explaining why there is such a high churn rate in the humanitarian sector (cf. Loquercio et al. 2006: 6).

In the case of overmotivation, the recipient enters the mission with high ambitions, wanting to improve and renovate the existing processes and structures. As he is convinced of his future success in the project, he does not think he will need a lot of help or knowledge from the former manager. This overambitious approach often does not work as intended. Expectations are too high; the entire project or staff members do not work as expected. The workflow in the new country is a different one.

> "Those [leaders] who pose a challenge to the status quo may, rather than being appreciated as potential sources of innovation and as breathing new life into stagnant Organisations, be labelled as 'maverick' or 'deviant' and suffer personally in terms of belittlement, backlash or exclusion from the 'inner core' of the Organisation" (Hill 2000: 113).

The teamwork with such an ambitious person is often considered difficult and in most cases the cause for damage throughout the working process.

3.3 Resulting Challenges

The distinction of cases in the previous section was necessary as it gives insights into the resulting challenges. The first case, i.e. when the recipient can easily handle the turnover, is quite unproblematic. The other two cases, however, show that a structured process making the handover more efficient and effective is useful and needed.

The highest aims and therefore the main challenges in project management are a constant workflow and as few disturbances and losses (e.g. of knowledge or established processes) as possible. Even if the project manager fails to lead successfully, well-elaborated processes are basic rules which should be known and followed by everyone. Therefore it is important that those established and well-working processes do not get lost during the handover. Especially inexperienced project managers often fail to arrange connections early enough and to strike up coalitions (cf. Wastian et al. 2012: 96). If the former manager and the recipient miss out on the chance to exchange

experiences and knowledge, the new leader might interrupt processes in the ongoing project. He might try to improve and renovate too much, or he simply does not consider the importance of the interchange of knowledge if he is an overstrained manager.

Another challenge for the recipient is to become familiar with his leading position in the new environment. Even if he was a manager in different missions of the ICRC before, each operation differs from the other and requires flexibility in order to handle the new situation. We will now have a look at the theory of good leadership and analyse which factors are important to be implemented in the handover process.

4. The Theory of Good Leadership

4.1 What is Good Leadership?

Four important aspects for successful humanitarian leadership are: the ability to communicate aims, to collaborate, to organise and to listen to people. These are characteristics that refer to social connection and are therefore of special importance for the handover as the latter can only be successful if the former manager, recipient and the work team are able to work together in a satisfactory manner.

Firstly, it is important that the manager of a mission communicates aims – no matter whether the leader is responsible for three, ten or hundred people. Having an aim raises the motivation for the leader and other members in the project. In a difficult and often dangerous environment – as it is the case in most of the ICRC missions – it is therefore even more important to clarify the aim of the mission so that everyone knows how to act and cooperate in such an environment. Once the aims of the project are clear to the staff, it will raise their motivation (cf. Wastian et al. 2013: 77 ff.). Secondly, the manager can, as the head of the project, foster collaboration with and within his work team. He should therefore reinforce the team's possibility to participate in decision making, boost the foundation of power, foster relationships and open access to information. For the manager, this results in an opportunity to be informed early in an 'informal way' and to get access to people with special features needed in case of emergency (cf. Wastian et al. 2012: 95). Thirdly, the leader has to organise relationships to stakeholders and staff by means of an effective use of political processes to influence and persuade others (cf. IASC 2009: 5). He should "establish

appropriate coordination structures to organize the contingency planning process" (IASC 2010: 27) and briefings with locals to discuss coordination mechanisms and structures to work more effectively. Working in an unorganised environment can make the leader and all employees feel on edge (cf. IASC 2010: 21, 65).

> "[The leader] needs to address the organisational structure, capabilities, constraints and operating procedures, and its values, vision, ethos and policies. [He is] ideally [informed about] an overview of relevant geographical and programmatic experiences, and the institutional history of the program or programs one is assigned to manage" (Brabant 1997: 33 ff.).

As mentioned above, to listen to others is a fourth characteristic that is important for good leadership. But as this is also a main point to a successful transfer of knowledge and therefore very important for the handover process, we are going to discuss this point more in detail in section 4.3. To summarise, a good leader needs not only to know how to organise himself in a new environment but also needs to be informed about every structure in the organisation.



FIGURE 2: THE SIGMOID CURVE (BASED ON HANDY 1991)

4.2 Charles Handy's S-Curve

The techniques mentioned in the previous section are the foundation for a successful handover and project. In this section, we will examine how a successful handover process can keep a project vivid and effective and is therefore of such importance for the whole mission. According to Charles Handy, the success of a business can be displayed as a bell-shaped curve. At the beginning, there is a phase of learning which results in growth. The key to further success is, according to Handy, not to rely on this growth, but to start thinking about future problems and about the decline that is about to come (cf. Handy 1991). In a phase of growth and success, it is possible to foresee and prevent future problems and thus start a new cycle of learning and growing. Therefore action has to be taken in the phase where transition is possible (see figure 2).

This is of importance for the handover processes in the ICRC, as the former manager has more insight into the project and the established structures. Even though his job in the particular country ends with the handover process, he should think about the future development of the mission. With the insight and know how he acquired during the eighteen-month period, he can think about future challenges that have to be dealt with and steps that should be taken in order to keep the success of the mission growing. He knows what has been working so far, what still needs to be done and in which areas of the project problems might occur in the future. Therefore, in order to start a new cycle of growth as described by Handy, a transfer of knowledge is important within the managing structures of the ICRC during a time of transition. With good communication and the successful transfer of knowledge, the handover can be the start of a new cycle of growth.

4.3 Communication and Transfer of Knowledge

The handover process and knowledge transfer in the ICRC can be called a 'direct handover' as the recipient takes over the work directly from the former manager during the ongoing project (cf. Sarnitz 2012: 62 f.). This allows the former manager to support his successor and make sure that no valid information and knowledge get lost. Therefore, good communication is indispensable for a successful transfer of knowledge.

It is necessary that the former leader knows about the previous experience of his recipient (e.g. How often has he been in the field? What is his experience?) (cf. Sarnitz, 2012: 71). With this

knowledge, the former manager is capable of encouraging the recipient and showing respect and sensitivity towards potential controversies (cf. IASC, 2009: 12).

Considering communication as the crucial means of creating a fruitful exchange of ideas and experiences, we should devote special focus to the capability of giving feedback. Particularly in complex situations and at the beginning of a mission, giving feedback can simplify procedures and help the leader to run his team. The feedback therefore should, on the one hand, be both positive and negative, so that it is not only associated with bad feelings and, on the other hand, be reciprocal, in order to guarantee its legitimacy and make everybody open to it (cf. Lupton-Bowers, 2003: 87). Not only is the feedback between locals and leader important but also between former manager and recipient (see table 2). If both sides formulate their expectations as specifically as possible, misunderstandings can be minimised. This is an important aspect during the handover, making the communication and therefore the process itself more efficient (cf. Sarnitz, 2012: 71ff).

When expectations are clarified, the next step, the transfer of knowledge, can be taken. This is probably the most important and most difficult aspect as missions suffer a loss of efficiency if the new leader has to start all over again without any knowledge. There are three important parts of knowledge: know-how, know-why and know-what. Know-how represents the concept of "learning-by-doing", an understanding of the generative processes that constitutes phenomena. Know-why can be described as the creation of knowledge ("learning-by-studying"), an understanding of phenomena in life worth pursuing. "Learning-by-using" can be called the 'know-what' part (cf. Garud 1997: 81, 86). As the transfer of knowledge should be as encompassing as possible in order to prevent any losses, all three parts of knowledge have to be considered by both leaders. But still, the benchmark should not be the utopian ideal of economic rationality or absolute information. It is more about avoidable mistakes in social information procurement: producible information which has not yet been produced; obtainable information that has not yet been obtained; existing information that has not yet been used or misunderstood even if it is relevant for decision making (cf. Scholl et al. 2012: 393). Therefore the recipient needs to talk to the staff in order to clarify who has which part in the project to avoid misunderstandings.

One factor of influence is a permanent exchange: "ongoing social interaction" stabilises the provision or receipt of task information, knowhow and feedback regarding a product or procedure (cf. Wastian et al. 2012: 85). The recipient should listen actively to his new work team. To avoid problems from the beginning, an empowerment-oriented leadership can be the key to successful work. Employees who feel significant and have participatory leadership give the best information

to superiors. Besides the value of information, there are five more necessary facts for empowerment-oriented leadership: coaching, leading by example, showing concern, interaction with the team and participative decision making (cf. Scholl et al. 2012: 409). Of course this cannot always be the case. If the mission takes place in an emergency situation, such as an armed conflict, quick decisions have to be made and the leader must take them. If decision making were done in the team, it would simply take too much time that is not available.

Showing concern does not only mean empathy but also not always to cling to one's own opinion. Again, active listening helps the leader to get to know his team. The leader should not only be a coordinator; he has to create a good, conducive working environment. The past has shown that an environment of fear can cause losses and can make people purposely hold back important information. If there is trust, there are more possibilities to experience and to act (cf. Döring-Seipel et al. 2012: 170). It is also possible that subordinates – in the case of ICRC, these are often local residents – try to whitewash existing aspects to manipulate the new leader. Incorrect information can exacerbate the start of the recipient and causes additional problems. Another reason for loss of information (especially in the last case where the leader is overmotivated) is wishful thinking: a research study by the German research community and Hans-Christof Gierschner and Lutz Hoffmann found out that wishful thinking in 15 out of 24 cases ended in failure. Wishful thinking means selective, skewed absorption of information, devaluation of other team members or an exaggerated opinion of oneself. If possible, the new leader should look for constant contact to the former leader before the mission starts (Scholl et al. 2012: 369 ff.). Such behaviour can prevent this problem. In the past, some leaders of the ICRC used to write reports for their successors giving an overview of the project. According to Sarnitz, a leader who has received a written document summarizing what has been done in the project so far and saying what the next steps are, evaluated their handover process much more positively than those who had to start completely new from the beginning (cf. Sarnitz 2012: 70). Therefore it would be helpful to implement some kind of report that should be written during or after the handover process. How this can be implemented in particular and made as easy and quick as possible for the recipient will be suggested in section five.

4.4 Teamwork

Pamela Lupton-Bowers writes, "The importance of teamwork cannot be overemphasized in humanitarian assistance operations" (Lupton-Bowers, 2003: 59). Teamwork is an essential factor that makes a handover process work. In this passage, we will discuss teamwork in general and particularly between the former manager and the recipient. The handover can only be efficient if both act together in a collective process. It can be assumed that the quality of handover is primarily determined by the quality of interaction (cf. Sarnitz 2012: 2). In general, one can say that good collaboration affects the evaluation of the handover process positively and leads to greater success (cf. Lupton-Bowers 2003: 70).

According to Lupton-Bowers, there is a model for describing effective teamwork, consisting of three components: what (concerning the task in terms of its common goal and objectives), 'how' (concerning the process of communication and decision making) and who (concerning the people's competencies and preferences). "The what gives the team its purpose and legitimacy. It describes what the team has to do, what it must achieve" (Lupton-Bowers 2003: 84). The common goal should be in line with the organisational mission (in our case, with the seven fundamental principles of the ICRC).[2] "Individual objectives develop out of this common goal. They are allocated fairly according to specific technical ability, skills, competencies, and capacity of each of the members" (Lupton-Bowers 2003: 85). They should also take into consideration, where possible, that individual style and preferences are needed. The individual profile of each team member and how they are able to contribute covers the who.

> "For optimal performance, teams must: respect individual differences, cultures, preferential work styles, be aware of and put to use people's potential [...]; be empowered , achieve within their respective roles and as mitted and encouraged if the team is to operate optimally; [...] pay attention to informal relationships: how will it celebrate success, how will it commiserate, how will it maintain energy and enthusiasm, how will it deal with stress?" (Lupton-Bowers 2003: 86).

2 The fundamental principles of the ICRC: humanity, independence, impartiality, voluntary service, unity, neutrality, universality.

INFLUENCING FACTOR	DERIVED COURSE OF ACTION
FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS	
MOTIVATION	IF POSSIBLE: CLARIFY MOTIVATION OF RECIPIENT AND THE FORMER MANAGER FOR THE HANDOVER
EXPECTATIONS	OPEN AND CLEAR COMMUNICATION ABOUT EXPECTATIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE HANDOVER
INTERACTION-SPECIFIC FACTORS	
TEAMWORK	CREATE A TENSION AND CONFLICT FREE WORKING ATMOSPHERE CONTINUOUS FEEDBACK LISTEN TO EACH OTHER
SUPPORT	ACTIVE DEMAND FOR SUPPORT (REGARDING RECIPIENT ACTIVE OFFER OF SUPPORT (REGARDING FORMER MANAGER) POSSIBILITY FOR CALL BACKS AT ANY TIME IF NECCESSARY, REFER TO A COMPETENT PERSON
PROCESS-SPECIFIC FACTORS	
CLARIFY PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE	IF POSSIBLE: EXPLAINING PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE REGARDING PROFESSIONAL, METHODICAL AND STRUCTURAL KNOWLEDGE
STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT AND MILESTONES	SHOWING STRUCTURE(S) OF THE PROJECT, AIMS OF THE PROJECT AND ALREADY ACHIEVD MILESTONES IDENTIFYING WHAT THE RECIPIENT CAN DO TO REACH THE AIMS OF THE PROJECT
EXPECTATIONS	COMMUNICATE OPENLY MUTUAL EXPECTATIONS AT THE BEGINNING DURING THE PROCESS: CHECKING WHICH EXPECTATIONS HAVE BEEN AND CAN BE ACHIEVED (IF NECCESSARY, ADJUST EXPECTATIONS)
STRUCTURE OF THE HANDOVER	SPECIFICALLY PLANNED HANDOVER MEETINGS STRUCTURED HANDOVER WITH REGARD CONTENT IDENTIFICATION OF CONTENT STRUCTURE DURING PROCESS: SUMMARIZING TURNED-OVER CONTENT IN THE RUNNING PROCESS: IDENTIFYING WHICH STEPS ARE STILL MISSING FOR COMPLETING HANDOVER
JOINT MANAGEMENT OF THE HANDOVER	GIVING THE RECIPIENT THE POSSIBILITY TO ACTIVELY TAKE PART IN THE HANDOVER PROCESS INVITE THE RECIPIENT TO DO SO ACTIVELY CONJOINTLY DETERMINE WHICH PARTS OF THE CONTENT THE RECIPIENT WORKS OUT BY HIMSELF AND WHICH ARE TURNED OVER DIRECTLY BY THE ANTECCESSOR

TABLE 1: IMPORTANT FACTORS INFLUENCING A SUCCESSFUL HANDOVER
(SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

The 'how' is characterised by describing how the team will operate and how each member will contribute and participate in the process. It is important to agree upon certain procedures in order to foster the cooperation within the team. These are namely: participation, decision-making, contribution, performance and progress. According to Sarnitz, the better the cooperation between the former leader and the recipient, the better is the overall performance of the handover evaluated is (see table 1: support).

Furthermore, teamwork "…and interpersonal relations contribute to raising people's ability to cope with stress" (Lupton-Bowers 2003: 67), which becomes very important when having in mind the limited time of the handover process and in general the surroundings in which the members of the ICRC are working. If stress and conflicts during the handover occur, the process is evaluated negatively. Sharing knowledge helps the team to facilitate cross-fertilisation, so that everyone benefits during the project (cf. Loquercio 2006: 19). Cross-fertilisation means "the mixing of ideas and customs of different places or groups of people, to produce a better result" (Cambridge Dictionary 2013). But not only teamwork in the whole project but also between former manager and recipient should be considered as an important factor to make a handover process successful. A surrounding where the former leader supports the recipient 'adequately' supports the performance of the handover process. Adequately means that the recipient can ask questions at any time and that his questions are responded to appropriately or that the former leader, in case he cannot answer them, passes the question on to a capable person. Therefore teamwork does not only refer to the capability of a group of people to work well together but also the opportunity to use everyone's abilities and talents. If all sides benefit from the exchange of knowledge, less information gets lost and the working atmosphere is more likely both tension and conflict free, which is important for a successful handover process (cf. table 1).

5. Implementation in the ICRC

Many of the basic skills mentioned above, such as teamwork and communication, will be considered in the HLMS. In the first module of the HLMS, four topics will be treated: learning, responsibility, collaboration and creativity. As mentioned above, teamwork and learning skills are highly important for a successful handover. Only with those two skills can the knowledge transfer be effective and efficient and this should be – as we have already seen – the highest aim of the handover process.

Team play on equal footing is needed in order to make the process work. Having a clear and structured guideline helps both the recipient and the former manager. Therefore it is important that guidelines or a checklist is provided for both parts. A possible set of guidelines, developed on the basis of the analysis of this paper, can be found in table 2. Furthermore the handover process will be rated better if turned-over content is summarised during the process (cf. Sarnitz 2012: 72). Therefore it would be useful if the guidelines were used as a structure for reporting and summarizing the handover. Each topic can be thought as a headline of one part of the report. There have already been sporadic, informal and unstructured reports in the ICRC but we recommend making use of a structured guideline (see below) that everyone has to use. This way, both managers and the ICRC ensure that all important factors have been dealt with. Gaps in the handover process can be determined more easily and content does not get lost as the successor can always look up what was discussed during the handover.

6. Conclusion

With this, the transfer of information and knowledge, which is the highest aim of a successful handover, can be assured. Furthermore, communication plays a pivotal role in making this transfer work. The former leader and new leader should meet on equal footing, trying to work as a team for the success of the project. The former leader should keep in mind that the project does not end with his time in the mission but that further progress is still to be achieved. Only if he takes the chance to give his successor the needed information, pointing out what worked well and what still needs to be improved, can the following leader go on with his work. Another point is the importance of foresight. With his experience and knowledge, the former leader might know which future problems could come up and where the new leader should be careful.

We suggest the ICRC to provide its leaders with a set of guidelines (like the one suggested in this paper) to ensure that no important factor in the handover is missing. These guidelines should be available in an easy-to-handle tool. With these guidelines, the handover can become more structured. To implement a model, respectively guidelines, suggested in this paper could not only prevent losses of knowledge, but furthermore save limited resources, such as valuable time and money. The process itself then becomes more efficient and effective.

The school is a good approach to equip the future leaders and managers with important basic skills. Nevertheless it would be helpful not only to give the recipients those general techniques, but also to place a focus on the handover process itself. For example, training could address which aspects are of special importance in order to create a fruitful working environment with a manager colleague. When former manager and successor are working together, there is no or at least should be no hierarchy. A fruitful exchange of information and a successful handover are only possible if both participants (recipient and former manager) can have a dialogue at eye level.

> "The personal identification with roles and authority tends to generate more overtly defensive aptitudes […]. Such potential threats have to be avoided, repulsed or suppressed. That creates tension, at a personal level, and at an interpersonal and organisational level" (Brabant 1997: 17).

PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE	WHAT EXPERIENCE DOES THE FOLLOWING LEADER HAVE? WHAT MIGHT BE DIFFERENT IN THIS MISSION?
AIMS	PAST: WHAT ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTED FUTURE: WHAT HAS TO BE DONE? WHAT COULD THE FUTURE PROBLEMS BE?
STAFF	ARE THERE ANY CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OR IMPORTANT TRADITIONS THE FOLLOWER HAS TO KNOW ABOUT? HIERARCHICAL SPECIFICS? GET TO KNOW / WHO IS WHO
STRUCTURES	CONTACTS AND COOPERATION PARTNERS PROBLEMATIC COOPERATION
FEEDBACK	STAFF SHOULD GIVE FEEDBACK TO THE FORMER MANAGER FORMER AND FOLLOWING LEADER SHOULD WORK THROUGH THE FEEDBACK

TABLE 2: GUIDELINE FOR A SUCCESSFUL HANDOVER PROCESS
(SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

As shown in the paper, it is helpful if turned-over content is summarised. Therefore we suggest including a report in the handover process that should be written by the successor during and after the handover. In doing this, the successor creates something like his own 'manual to the project' and the ICRC ensures that the important aspects and information of the handover do not get lost.

A handover process can and should be a source of new inspiration and input. This potential should be used, and giving the handover process a structure should ensure its success. The guidelines and tables presented in this paper can facilitate and improve the handover process between former manager and recipient and managers, work team, and the whole mission will benefit and be conducive to more effective and efficient work in humanitarian leadership.

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HUMANITARIAN
LEADERSHIP
Illegitimate
Humanitarian
Aid

Illegitimate Humanitarian Aid

Does a Lack of State Legitimacy Affect the Mandate of the International Committee of the Red Cross? *

Magdalena Marx and Daniel Schubert

Keywords

Humanitarian Aid, State Legitimacy, ICRC, Geneva Conventions, Somalia

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) derives its legitimate mandates from the ratification of the Geneva Conventions by states. Yet, what happens if a state turns out to be illegitimate? This paper suggests that the legitimacy of states is a necessary condition for the ICRC's mandate and therefore for its interventions to be legitimate. In case of illegitimate states, we develop the idea of organising democratic procedures in the countries lacking legitimacy, which will be supported by the ICRC, to solve the problem of state legitimacy for the ICRC's missions. It will be argued that the neutrality principle of the ICRC is not violated by engaging in this kind of activity, because all relevant groups in the country will participate equally. Furthermore, due to the strong commitment to this principle, the ICRC is in the best position to help solve the state's and therefore also the ICRC's legitimacy problem. The discussion will be applied to Somalia as a case in point.

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* *This contribution was submitted in 2013.*

1. Introduction

In the philosophical debate, much is said about the justification of nation states. Frequently in these discussions, the organisation of the world in nation states is questioned, but put aside for pragmatic reasons, even though this train of thought is an interesting and important one, especially in case of conflict within a state. The paper at hand will not attempt to answer whether the world should be organised in nation states either, but highlights related areas of conflict, namely the legitimacy of states and the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in armed conflicts or other situations of violence.

While questions of justification of states might highly overlap with questions of legitimacy in the affluent and so-called well-ordered world, differences become apparent in the realm of poorer or less well-ordered societies, where different national groups fight for independence or acknowledgment of their position in an existing state. Such conflicts are very often violent and cruel situations among different tribes or clans. External (armed) forces usually do not intervene here (while exceptions do exist[1]), but humanitarian aid can be provided by the ICRC. By doing so, the ICRC relies on a mandate provided through the ratification of the Geneva Conventions by participating nation states. The paper at hand analyses the problems caused by the legitimacy problem of these nation states. Crucial for the legitimacy of the state is the moral relationship between the state and the individual person, who has to subscribe to the state. This cannot be taken for granted, in the case that one or more groups in a country fight against the state's authority. It will be argued here that this affects the legitimacy of the ICRC's mandate, too, and accordingly, renders the whole humanitarian mission illegitimate. The aim of this paper is to convincingly argue that this problem can be solved by the ICRC by organising democratic procedures of collective decision making, in which all (relevant) groups participate.[2] This is not to argue for democracy in all nations, but as a device for solving legitimacy problems of states with violent conflicts.[3] It will be argued that the ICRC can do this without violating its principles of conduct, among which, in this case, the

1 The war in Kosovo, for example.

2 This even could – as a by-product – contribute to a just social order on the global level: "I argue tentatively that the system of democratic association is superior to international democracy" (Christiano 2010: 120). An association of democratic states is more feasible in the nearer future than international democracy is, which is why the ideas put forward in this paper would contribute to an advancement of the global order, even though it excludes the question of whether to have nation states or not.

3 Whether this supports or affects the discussion of democracy in other states is not pursued here, nor is a stance taken on this in the paper at hand. The purpose of democratic procedures of decision making is focused on their problem-solving capacity only.

most important is the neutrality principle. The ICRC solves its own legitimacy problem by setting up a mechanism which makes legitimacy possible again and thereby renders its own mandate legitimate. The theoretical considerations will be applied to a real world example, namely Somalia. Several groups have fought for a common state on the Somalian territory, but certain partialities could not be overcome by the group in power, regardless of whatever group obtained power. This can be seen – until now – as the root of violent conflicts within the Somalian territory. Even more important for the paper at hand, we consider Somalia to be a case in point of an illegitimate state: parts of the population did reject a draft of the constitution during a referendum, but their vote was turned over by the majority of another group and resulted in the adoption of this constitution. This made all people living in the territory subject to the constitution, irrespective of the fact that only a minority approved it.

This paper is organised in the following way: first, we will introduce the concept of justification and the concept of legitimacy and make a clear distinction between the two, and outline the possible consequences of an illegitimate state. In the second part, we will introduce the ICRC and its principles and discuss what problems occur for the ICRC due to illegitimacy of a state and the ICRC's mission within this state. In the third part, we propose a solution, which we see in procedures of democratic decision making. The concluding will be dedicated to a real-world case study, namely Somalia, and policy recommendations will be given.

2. The Legitimacy of States and How to Obtain it

In contemporary political philosophy, most of the debate is concerned with the justification of states rather than with its legitimisation. Here, we will be concerned with the legitimacy of states and only briefly discuss the justification of these states. Before discussing the two approaches, we have to be clear on the terms justification and legitimacy. A state is justified if it is preferable to any other ideal or feasible alternative. The answer to the question of justification gives information about the goodness or badness of a state, i.e. its social justice concerning its actions towards its inhabitants. In contrast, legitimacy depends on a special moral relationship between each individual and the state, i.e. whether the individual can consent or consents to the state. This is important because the state coerces people to do or not to do certain things (cf. Christiano 2010; Pettit 2010, 2012; Simmons 1999).

2.1 Justification vs. Legitimacy

Those scholars working within a Kantian framework take the existence and the participation of the people living in its territory for granted. Every person has an innate right to freedom and (provisional) property, which – according to Kantians – can only be fulfilled within a state, which uses coercive power (cf. Kant 1990). The questions of justification and legitimacy collapse into only one question: what should the state do? One outstanding example of such a justification is Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971), which tries to show how to find conditions for a state in which people can live under the state's authority, even though they have very diverse moral beliefs. In this sense, the specific state in which the people live is relative to the moral beliefs of the people forming it. It will be argued here that the sole fact of being born in a specific territory does not give an individual reason to subscribe to this specific state. This state might be most preferable to all alternatives available, but still is not legitimate (even though it might be possible to legitimise it), which means that people subscribe to a certain state and thereby decide whether to accept the coercive power of the state or not (cf. Pettit 2012: 140; Christiano 2010).

2.2 Relationship between Citizen and the State

We argue that each individual has a special moral relationship towards the state, which exercises coercive power over this individual. Here, the individual decides through his consent whether it wants to stay in a state of nature or not. The state's right, then, is the exclusive right to make people obey the laws of the specific state they consented to due to the special moral relationship between the individual and the state. This is the case only if people consent to the authority of the state; otherwise, they remain in a state of nature. We face a distinction here: the state can be legitimate due to the moral relationship towards the people it exercises coercive power over, but at the same time can be a bad state. A state being bad is understood in terms of the laws issued and enforced by the state, i.e. the goods provided or not provided through state authority. To use the terminology of the Kantian approach, the state might not be justified, even though it is legitimate. Pettit (2012) distinguishes four cases with reference to a just social order (justification) and a legitimate social order (legitimacy): if the social order is just and legitimate, people should accept the social order and comply with it. If the social order is unjust but legitimate, people should accept it. They then may oppose the laws imposed on them. In case the order is illegitimate but just, people may

resist the regime in power, but should comply with the laws. Lastly, the case which is of the most relevance in this paper, even though it might be a very rare case in the affluent world, is a situation of an unjust regime and an illegitimate social order, whose laws may be contested and resisted (cf. Pettit 2012).

SOCIAL ORDER	JUST	UNJUST
LEGITIMATE	SHOULD ACCEPT AND COMPLY	SHOULD ACCEPT AND CONTEST
ILLEGITIMATE	MAY RESIST, SHOULD COMPLY	MAY RESIST AND CONTEST

TABLE 1: THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY (CF. PETTIT 2012: 140)

Pettit says, "Few actual states may count as legitimate, [...], but many are likely to count as at least legitimizable" (Pettit 2012: 140). This already hints at the new task of the ICRC in the aforementioned contexts: how can states be legitimized? This will be discussed in later sections of this paper in more detail (cf. Christiano 2010; Pettit 2010, 2012).

2.3 States Lacking Legitimacy

> "States are not entitled to demand from unwilling inhabitants anything that one person may not demand from another independent of states" (Simmons 1999: 754).

In the Lockean tradition, these demands are very limited. A Lockean state of nature, for example, is one of abundance, where everybody lives in a situation of perfect equality among the people and enjoys perfect freedom within the laws of nature. This means that no one ought to harm another person, which comprises his life, health, possessions and so forth. Furthermore, as many people as possible should be preserved, they have to be provided with sufficient resources for their life. On the other hand, people have the right of self-preservation and self-defence, which mirrors the law of nature. In such a state of nature, people are the actors, not the states. Every person autonomously

decides whether to remain in the state of nature or to subscribe to a state (most probably the state of the territory the person lives in, but not necessarily).

While this is less of a problem in the affluent world, it obviously causes conflicts in countries which are not so well-off. The actions of these states do not satisfy the inhabitants' claims well, so they might not even be justified. Causes for this are not only the lack of resources in the specific country, but also a majority dominating minorities, i.e. other tribes within a country:

> "The problem of domestic legitimacy is that of ensuring that in the exercise of its public power, the domestic polity is not a dominating presence in the lives of its citizens. It is a non-dominating guardian against private domination and it is a non-dominating organizer of whatever other collective goods it seeks to advance" (Pettit, 2010: 143).

Dominance can occur because people are cognitively biased towards their own interests. Democratic institutions could help to realize the equal advancement of the state's members' claims (cf. Christiano 2010: 121). This challenges the ICRC in at least two respects: firstly, more and more conflicts are not fought state against state, but tribe against tribe; the ICRC, however, was set up for situations of armed and violent conflicts between states. The second reason is that the ICRC acts upon the Geneva Conventions, which are ratified by nation states. Yet, if the state ratifying the Geneva Conventions is illegitimate, no legitimate claim can be derived from these conventions, thereby rendering the mandate of the ICRC illegitimate, too. Can these challenges be overcome for the sake of humanitarian aid? (cf. Christiano 2010; Pettit 2010, 2012).

3. The ICRC, the State and the Geneva Conventions

3.1 The ICRC: Its Mandate and Its Principles

To figure out what the prospective role of the ICRC in a changing environment of violent conflicts could be, we will now focus on the ICRC and in particular its mandate, its mission as well as its fundamental principles.

The ICRC was founded with the intention to assist and protect wounded soldiers only; this changed over time, however, and it is now covering all victims of armed conflicts and other situations of violence, respectively (cf. ICRC 2009: 3). The ICRC is a private organisation[4], which is not only part of as well as a founding member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, but also one of the most widely recognised humanitarian organisations in the world.[5] As one of the leading humanitarian actors, the ICRC's main tasks are the protection and assistance for civilians, (supervision of) visits to detainees, tracing missing persons, promoting the reunion of families as well as the provision of medical services and food supply. The ICRC's mission and its humanitarian assistance are subject to strict legal regulations and conditions. Because humanitarian aid always affects sovereign states, the provision of humanitarian aid within a state's territory always requires a legitimate mandate which has to be acquired before the mission in order to act upon a reliable basis.

The ICRC obtains its legitimacy and its mandates, respectively, from the four Geneva Conventions.[6] By ratifying the Geneva Conventions, every state automatically issues a mandate to the ICRC and thereby consents to any form of humanitarian aid in case of violent conflicts within its territory. So, in brief, the ICRC's mandate relies on the Geneva Conventions acknowledged by the international community and every participating state. The core element of the organisation and its operations and so to speak the ICRC's identity is its mission statement:

> "The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent Organisation whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles" (ICRC 2009: 4).

4 Legally, the ICRC is "neither an intergovernmental nor a non-governmental Organisation. It is a private association under Swiss law with international mandates under public international law"(ICRC 2009: 6).

5 The ICRC, for example, has been awarded four Nobel Peace Prizes for its humanitarian commitment.

6 The four Geneva Conventions from 1949: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (cf. ICRC 2013: 1).

This directly leads us to another essential characteristic of the ICRC's work and mission: its fundamental principles, of which we will only discuss three in this paper, namely impartiality, independence and neutrality.[7] The principle of impartiality precludes and forbids any kind of discrimination, whether in terms of nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions, i.e. (humanitarian) assistance must always be impartial and in every circumstance proportional to the situation's severity and urgency. The independence principle, on the other hand, means that the entire movement has to be independent, i.e. the Red Cross and Red Crescent institutions should be independent from any political, financial, or ideological intervention, since in the end, the National Societies of the Red Cross or Red Crescent must always be autonomous and able to act in compliance with the Movement's basic principles (cf. ICRC 1996: 17f). The last principle we refer to here is the neutrality principle, probably even the most essential principle for the ICRC and its work because this guarantees and secures access to each state's territory in the first place. The principle of neutrality implies that "the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature" (ICRC 1996: 12). So the neutrality principle actually covers two facets: military and ideological neutrality. Military neutrality means that in situations of (violent) conflicts, the ICRC has to conduct itself in such a way so as not to provoke or cause any hostilities between the parties involved, i.e. National Societies of the Red Cross or Red Crescent have to be neutral when it comes to any military operation. On the other hand, ideological neutrality forbids the organisation from taking a position in any religious, ideological or political controversy, because taking a position would immediately undermine the trust in the Movement of at least one group and consequently jeopardize the whole operation (cf. ICRC 1996: 12f.).

3.2 Problem of Illegitimate Mandate

In the following, we are going to build a bridge between the previous part regarding the ICRC, its mission, and its mandate and the problem of state legitimacy. We will, furthermore, have a closer look at the (il-)legitimacy problem of states and the resulting consequences for the ICRC as well as its (il-)legitimate mandate.

7 The seven core principles were proclaimed by the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross in Vienna, Austria, in 1965 and are written down in the statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Altogether there are seven principles; those not discussed here are humanity, voluntary service, unity and universality.

It is essential for the legitimacy of a state that there is always a special moral relationship between the state and the individual citizen. According to the approach of state legitimacy put forward in the paper at hand, in all countries suffering from violent national conflicts because of domination through the state authorities by one or more groups, the violent conflict would shed doubt on the legitimacy of this state. Reality gives us reason to believe that this is a real problem, because more and more conflicts are not fought state against state anymore but within states, between different tribes, for example. The paper at hand asserts that the legitimisation of the ICRC's humanitarian operations and interventions require the Geneva Conventions to have been ratified by legitimate states.

If a state ratifying the Geneva Conventions turns out to be illegitimate, no legitimate claim can be derived from the Conventions, and ultimately the ICRC's mandate for the state concerned is rendered illegitimate, too. So, after all, the legitimacy problem of nation states affects the legitimacy of the ICRC's mandate as well as the entire movement considerably. As soon as the legitimacy of the respective state is not given, the ICRC loses this state's (once obtained) mandate and therefore its legitimisation to enter the country and provide humanitarian assistance. The ICRC's operations and interventions in the respective country concerned are rendered illegitimate, which weakens the position of the ICRC (and the entire movement), because it cannot rely on the recognition as an organisation acting upon an international agreement at least with respect to the people fighting against the current state. We will propose a solution to this problem: organising democracy and control by the people.



FIGURE 1: ICRC AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

3.3 A Way Out: Organising Democracy

Pettit claims that whereas social justice is concerned with the horizontal relations that the citizens should have amongst themselves, political legitimacy constrains the vertical dimension and the relations that citizens should have with their government and their state ruling them, respectively (cf. Pettit 2012: 136). While social justice, according to Pettit's republican theory, requires that citizens be free in the sense of non-domination, the requirement for political legitimacy (and accordingly the protection against public domination on the vertical level) is a form of shared, popular or civic control over the state and the government (ibid.: 149). But in the case that a state is dominating the public, it turns out to be illegitimate, and so are the laws and governmental authorities (ibid.: 139). The paper suggests that the ICRC should support democratic decision making in the circumstances of the aforementioned kind, which satisfies the condition of shared, popular control over the state and the government. In Pettit's view, even illegitimate regimes can be made legitimate and are in that sense legitimisable (ibid.: 139). A state, however, is legitimate only to the extent that individuals experience equal control over the government and thereby the state. This means that citizens not only have to support and influence the process leading to the result, but they also have to participate in imposing "a relevant direction on the process" (ibid.: 153), helping to achieve or at least push it into the direction of a result being acceptable to all (ibid.: 153). Moreover, the only system satisfying this form of equally shared, public control required for legitimacy is a democratic system. Establishing democracy is the only way of guaranteeing the sort of (public) non-domination guaranteeing legitimacy, because only democratic regimes respect and enhance freedom in the sense required for political legitimacy. Thus, based on these assumptions, we are developing the idea that the only solution to the ICRC's problem of illegitimate mandates is to establish and organise democracy in the (illegitimate) nation states concerned. This is not to argue for democracy in all nations, but considered as a device for solving legitimacy problems in states with violent conflicts. By fostering and establishing democratic structures, the ICRC solves its own legitimacy problem by setting up a mechanism which makes legitimacy possible again, and thereby renders its own mandate legitimate, too. One might oppose this proposal with the argument that engaging in such kind of activity would violate the neutrality principle of the ICRC. However, due to the fact that all citizens and all relevant groups in the country should "control" and participate equally and that legitimate orders (whether just or unjust) always impose a moral obligation on the state's citizens to accept the regime and its laws (ibid.: 140), the ICRC

can support democracy in countries without violating its principles of conduct, among which the most important here is the neutrality principle. On the contrary, the neutrality principle puts the ICRC (at least in principle) in a special position, because this principle demands that the ICRC "not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature" (ICRC 1996: 12). The problem is that groups obtain power over the state and thereby dominate other groups. Due to the strong commitment to the neutrality principle, the ICRC is the best actor to organise a decision procedure of equal and shared control of state power, i.e. solving the state's legitimacy problem and thereby its own legitimacy problem for the purpose of humanitarian aid provision.

In this sense, even though the intervention based on an illegitimate mandate acquired through the ratified Geneva Conventions is illegitimate, the intervention of the ICRC can be legitimised with reference to a higher order principle of legitimacy, which is the democratic procedure of conflict resolution fostered by the ICRC's actions. Thereby, the intervention of the ICRC strengthens its position towards the groups engaged in violent conflicts. This contributes, on the one hand, to a moral legitimization of the measures taken by each and every ICRC staff member and, on the other hand, can contribute to the goal of humanitarian aid provision.

In the subsequent chapter, the theoretical considerations so far will be applied to a real world example, namely, Somalia – one of the ICRC's largest operations.

4. Case Study: Somalia

In this section, we will apply the theoretical considerations to Somalia, which is seen as a case in point here. The ICRC began implementing humanitarian aid projects in Somalia in 1982 (cf. ICRC 2012a). In order to respond to the needs and vulnerabilities of the victims of the ongoing armed conflicts within the country and the aggravating circumstances due to natural disasters (like floods and droughts), the ICRC started to provide emergency aid to the people which were directly and severely affected and suffering (cf. ICRC 2012b: 163). The state's accession of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and thereby the legitimisation required for the ICRC's humanitarian operations in Somalia took place on July 12, 1962 (cf. ICRC 2013: 5). However, the extreme insecurity resulting from the continued fighting in southern, central and northern regions of the country significantly impedes the provision of humanitarian aid as well as the implementation of

relief projects for international aid agencies as – in our case – the ICRC. At the start of 2012, for instance, after local authorities in southern and central Somalia started to block food deliveries in mid-December 2011, the ICRC decided "to temporarily suspend its distributions intended for 1.1 million people in urgent need after having its food and seed relief commodities blocked in parts of central and southern Somalia" (ICRC 2012c). We argue that the accession to the Geneva Conventions was illegitimate.

In 1960, the Somalian areas colonised by the Italian and the British were declared to be independent. Before the independence, an idea of a greater Somalia evolved, which meant the unification of the two mentioned areas (cf. Brons 1993). The unification turned out to be more difficult than previously thought, because of different concepts of the common constitution for the common country. The draft of a constitution was then elaborated by an advisory board, which was set up by the president Aden Abdulle Osman, who had been elected by both the northern and the southern parts' representatives. The advisory board was dominated by people from the southern region, which significantly affected the content of the draft of the constitution. The referendum about the draft showed that the people from the northern part were not satisfied, so they rejected it, which was insignificant for the result of the referendum, because the broad majority of the people of the territories lived in the south. With their votes, the constitution was adopted anyway (cf. Bradbury 2008; Brons 1993). We argue that due to this rejection, the state was then imposed which was illegitimate, and because this state accessed the Geneva Conventions, this accession was also illegitimate. In the referendum, the southern people overruled the northern people, i.e. gaining power over them and used it for their interests. Several attempts were made to overcome this situation, but did not succeed. Even though some more or less peaceful periods have been seen, fostered by the facilitating position of some kind of council of elders, partiality in the democratic processes remains highly problematic. This situation did not change significantly even after the military dictatorship in 1991. A central government authority was not established despite the efforts to do so. In particular, the southern and central parts of the country remained affected by civil strife and unrest due to the continued violent conflicts between Somali authorities and the al-Shabaab group in the south as well as between Puntland and the Republic of Somaliland in the north. At least to some extent, the activities to reorganise a centralised state authority has even caused conflicts (cf. Menkhaus 2003, 2009). What, then, are the insights for the ICRC's policies derived from this case?

5. Policy Recommendations and Concluding Remarks

How can this problem be solved? Here, we propose the idea that the legitimacy problem can be solved by fostering and organising impartial, democratic procedures and thereby (re-)establishing the legitimacy of a state. The ICRC should take up a position of an impartial arbitrator among the groups in conflict and support impartial democratic procedures and consequently setting up a mechanism, which enables the (re-)legitimisation by equal and shared control by the people. In conformity with its three core principles (impartiality, independence, neutrality), the ICRC is supposed to seek

> "dialogue with all actors involved in a given situation of armed conflict or internal violence as well as with the people suffering the consequences to gain their acceptance and respect" (ICRC 2008).

Engaging in democratising activities is not contrary to the ICRC's principles, but contributes to the humanitarian focus of the ICRC's work in changed circumstances. We recommend that the ICRC act more proactively in analysing the conflicts and its roots in more detail and take up appropriate measures to legitimise the state in question. This will surely change the activities of the ICRC, but takes into account the contemporary challenges in humanitarian aid and will thereby help to save lives and form less violent circumstances for a number of people, especially in poorer regions of the world.

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Leadership &
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LEADERSHIP

Leadership and Management Effects on Humanitarian Impact Creation

Preparation for a Change Intervention – Case Study ICRC

Dirk Glienke

Keywords

Humanitarian Impact, Humanitarian Leadership Effectiveness, ICRC, Change Intervention

The humanitarian sector addressing humanitarian and social need situations is currently not covering all the need in the world, and leadership or lack of leadership has been claimed as a major contributor to ineffectiveness. As a result, both the professionalisation of the sector and more visibility for humanitarian impact creation have got a lot of momentum. I claim that within every organisation, the understanding of what defines successful value creation and the attributed leadership and management behaviour have a strong impact on the actual value creation. My research contributes in this area and aims at a better understanding and realisation of value creation, and will make focused recommendations for the learning and development offer at the ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross). The findings have been contrasted with research from social impact analysis, aid effectiveness and key findings in leadership and managerial behaviour effectiveness from the for-profit, non-profit and humanitarian sectors.

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1. Introduction

1.1 General

There is a concern that in the context of increased needs of beneficiaries globally and gaps in fulfilling these needs; the current humanitarian system is not managing this efficiently enough (cf. Harvey et al. 2012; Buchanan-Smith and Scriven 2011; Featherstone 2010). Harvey et al. stated that the effectiveness of humanitarian action has gaps with dramatic consequences for the survival and livelihood of people (cf. Harvey et al. 2012). Questions have been raised about the role of leadership in this context (cf. Buchanan-Smith and Scriven 2011; cf. Featherstone 2010; cf. CERF). The question at the heart of the research reported here is how leadership behaviour is perceived to affect the humanitarian impact. Surprisingly, there has been limited research available on the topic of leadership effectiveness in the humanitarian sector – especially as the perceived leadership ineffectiveness has been dominating the humanitarian sector for years (cf. Buchanan-Smith and Scriven 2011). To elaborate on the humanitarian context, I will provide an overview of the humanitarian system and key changes in recent years.

The term humanitarian system is understood as a network of national and international organisations and authorities, including military and private companies that are functionally connected in the humanitarian action (cf. OCHA FTS). From 2009 to 2010, the humanitarian sector responded to more than 200 natural disasters and close to 50 complex emergencies and spends around $20 billion annually (ibid.). The UN and The Red Cross Movement are the biggest individual humanitarian organisations, whereas most humanitarian staff is working for NGOs: NGOs: 140,000; UN: 85,000; Red Cross/Crescent Movement: 45,000 (cf. OCHA FTS; cf. Walker and Russ 2010). The past decade has seen rapid development and many changes in the humanitarian sector. As an example, it is - in contrast to the traditional way of working – no longer enough to provide the quick delivery of aid assistance. Humanitarian actors are more and more involved in long-term conflicts with more complexity and with increased exposure to physical risks for international staff and beneficiaries. Another big change has been that conflicts are no longer state A against B with clear uniformed parties; there are more and more within state conflicts, with new kind of weapons and with massive and fast scaling of conflicts and related humanitarian need. The perceived ineffectiveness of the humanitarian sector has been demanding from donors as well from beneficiaries more visibility for results in a comparable way to see the “bottom-line”

of humanitarian action more objectively (cf. Humanitarian Futures Program 2009; Jayawickrama 2011; Tuan 2008; Centre for Creative Leadership; Clark et al. 2003; Bolt 2007). As general accepted principles of reporting similar to those in the for-profit sector do not exist, the act of humanitarian impact reporting will remain difficult (cf. Hochschild 2010).

In this context, the ICRC introduced results-based management to be more transparent and has recently started the development of a learning and development program: the ICRC Humanitarian Leadership and Management School (HLMS). This move recognises that leadership and leadership development is crucial for the performance of the organisation. Maximising the humanitarian needs of beneficiaries in extreme and complex conflict situations assumes certain leadership and management behaviour will be successful. My research will make a contribution to inform the humanitarian leadership research by analysing these specifics in more detail.

1.2 Research Question – Description and Why It Is Important?

The central research question is: "How is leadership and management behaviour perceived to affect humanitarian impact creation?" According to Hamlin, there is no agreement about what constitutes effective leadership and management behaviour in general (cf. Hamlin 2006). The answer to this question could be used to guide the leadership and development program at the ICRC. I leverage, therefore, the diverse practical experiences of ICRC leaders with many years in the humanitarian field to recognise problems and challenges the managers are facing to reveal effective leadership and managerial behaviour. This has two advantages. It is firstly highly relevant to the practice of leaders and would secondly reveal leadership attributes specially needed in humanitarian action or under specific context conditions (cf. Jayawickrama 2011, Centre for Creative Leadership/People in Aid Review 2010). Some researchers listed specific behaviours that are mentioned as important in the humanitarian action, e.g. respecting beneficiaries, communicating, listening, negotiating, collaborating, envisioning, dealing with ambiguity and team building, but, to my knowledge, no consistent approach to humanitarian leadership effectiveness has been developed (cf. People in Aid 2007; Harvey et al. 2012; Buchanan-Smith 2011). Another important practical implication will be to go one step further than just documenting behaviour that will most likely not be applied. I will therefore introduce change perspectives to enable the actual deployment of findings and fostering of best practices. The next section will provide an overview of the structure and the scope of inquiry.

1.3 Organisation of the Inquiry

The inquiry structure unfolds in three blocks (cf. figure 1).



FIGURE 1: INQUIRY BLOCKS (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

I will first set up a framework to examine humanitarian impact (outside view) and apply to it the perspectives of ICRC leaders (inside view). Then I will summarise the main lessons from the generic leadership effectiveness literature in the for-profit, non-profit and humanitarian sectors (outside view) and contrast this with concrete examples from the ICRC (inside view). I will ask what humanitarian impact means to ICRC leaders and what perceived managerial and leadership behaviour is related to this, so I can explore the context of individual behaviour in more detail, e.g. the situation and intended results of actors. The last section will examine the change approach to address leadership challenges and improvement areas and will highlight change perspectives that would be useful to make successful changes in current practices at the ICRC.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Definition of Basic Terminology

In the following, I will elaborate the theoretical foundation of my research and will summarise the key concepts and theories used. Firstly, I will show the historical development in the area related to my research question, and secondly, I will develop my approach to leadership. Furthermore, perspectives and approaches from for-profit, non-profit and humanitarian sectors, which have been previously remained separate, are brought together. The next section will start by introducing basic terminology that will be used as common language for this research paper.

In leadership theory, we find paradigms differentiating leadership by trait (located in the person), situational (situation) or contingency theory (both situation and person) (cf. Grint 2010). I will use the contingency approach of leadership together with the behavioural paradigm, assuming that the actual behaviour can be observed and analysed from what leaders really do. But some limitations should be understood here, e.g. Yukl (2002) highlights in this context that there is a lack of agreement as to which behaviour might be relevant to measure effectiveness. Even if the behaviour can be measured by its frequency, duration, intensity and context, it remains a subjective measurement. I will use the leadership definition of Yukl:

> "Leadership is the process of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives." (Yukl 2002)

Alvesson and Spicer criticise Yukl's definition in that this might be correct, but due to its vagueness useless. I believe that the vagueness makes it at least a good starting point that can be made more concrete by using examples. Alvesson and Spicer argue that the leader's role is grossly overstated (cf. Alvesson and Spicer 2011). I, personally, also see this heroic view of leaders with criticism as in my experience, leaders are very much bound to the context. Alvesson and Spicer developed an ambiguity-centred approach to leadership that informs my research, assuming that leadership can be used in different ways by different people, focusing on how leadership is actually done and interpreted, giving a greater sensitivity to the context and recognising different meanings attributed to leadership. Another discussion in the literature is how to separate leadership from management

(cf. Zaleznik 2004; Maccoby and Scudder 2010; Kotter 2013). The key message is basically that management deals with processes and leadership with relationships as a personal dimension of leadership. To allow the inclusion of management as well as leadership behaviour in my research, I will use, as proposed by Yukl (2010), the term 'managerial leader' to describe daily leadership in the field (cf. Hamlin et al. 2011). To be able to conclude if observed leadership behaviour is effective or not, we need to understand what humanitarian impact means.

2.2 Humanitarian Impact

Most of the terminology and research investigating humanitarian impact is adapted from the non-profit sector. The understanding of common terms like 'social impact' varies from funder to funder and organisation to organisation (cf. The Rockefeller Foundation 2003). That is the reason why I will first introduce some basic social science terms summarised by Clark et al. that provide a common vocabulary and lead to more conceptual consistency (see figure 2). Then I will outline why impact measurement is becoming more important and how it has been done in practice.



FIGURE 2: THE IMPACT VALUE CHAIN (CF. CLARK ET AL. 2003)

Clark et al. (2003) use the lens of social science and describe outcomes as changes to the social system minus what would have happened anyway resulting in impact. Outcomes are e.g. changes in attitudes, behaviours, knowledge, skills, status or more general changes that one is trying to make in the world (as an example: finding a job; avoiding getting sick). The key in the concept is to differentiate outputs from outcomes. Outputs are results that an actor can measure directly (e.g. number of children participating in after-school programs) (cf. Clark et al. 2003).

Impact analysis has become very important for non-profit organisations as donors want to understand whether the funding has been used efficiently and the desired outcome has been achieved (cf. Clark et al. 2003; Emerson 2000). There was an outcry when the American Red Cross failed to distribute the funds raised for victims and families of the September 11 terrorist attack (cf. Ciulla 1999). Now social service organisations are giving hard evidence to prove their worth and support to better people's lives (cf. Harvey et al. 2012). I would claim that a detailed understanding of the humanitarian impact chain is fundamental to decide in a more informed manner about programs and cross-program fund allocations as it allows for a dialogue within an organisation (cf. Tuan 2008). To evaluate impact and performance, I would like to mention the

FIGURE 3: KEY PRACTICES OF EFFECTIVE UN LEADERS
(SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION ADAPTED FROM HOCHSCHILD 2010)

importance of evaluation research. Evaluation research is described as a systematic approach using social research methods for designing, collecting and sharing impact data which then can be used to judge a product, process or a program (cf. Stockmann 2004).[1] As better evaluations are claimed to have a positive effect on learning, accountability and performance in the humanitarian sector (cf. Beck 2006), I believe that standards have the potential to be established as harmonisation criteria. The OEC-DAC criteria for Humanitarian Aid Effectiveness, for example, are designed to understand the humanitarian action comprehensively (cf. Beck 2006; figure 3). The DAC evaluation criteria are the core of the evaluation of humanitarian action (cf. EHA), and have been clarified and specified in a more detailed way within the EHA frame with practical examples from the humanitarian sector (ibid.). The idea is that the criteria can be complementary or contradicting, and not all criteria need to be relevant in all cases.

Humanitarian Aid Effectiveness

Relevance/Appropriateness
- In line with local needs and priorities
- Tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs

Connectedness
- Ensure that activities of short-term emergency are carried out in a context that take longer-term and interconnected problem into account

Coherence
- Ensure consistency of policies
- Particularly take into account humanitarian and human rights

Coverage
- The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are

1 Stockman summarised how objectives could be evaluated (cf. Stockman 2004): ex-ante – looking forward to determine indicator for favorable investment to the present; on-going – control and consulting function, early-warning and corrective action, testing assumptions and planning, ex-post – impact measurement and evaluation, root-cause analysis and efficiency, looking back at past investments in order to inform future decisions.

Efficiency

- Measures the outputs achieved as a result of inputs
- Generally requires comparing alternative approaches to output

Effectiveness

- Extent to which an activity achieves its purpose or goal on time

Impact

- Wider effect of the project – social economic, technical, environmental – intended or unintended

The criteria relevance and appropriateness evaluates whether the overall goal and outcome is in line and tailored to local needs and cultures. The concept of connectedness considers the long-term goals while carrying out short-term relief or recovery activities. The criteria coherence checks if all actors were acting in the same direction. Coverage describes the affected population in need, efficiency the input/output ratio, while effectiveness makes a comparison to the purpose or goal (ibid.). An additional overview of key impact measurement concepts currently used in the non-profit sector can be found in more details at Clark et al. (2003). Key impact measurement concepts:

Cost-effectiveness Analysis:
The cost-effectiveness analysis summarises the "bang for the buck" expressed in terms like e.g. cost per child cured by malaria or costs per child with school degree

Cost-Benefit Analysis:
The Cost-Benefit Analysis allows for the comparison of programs to alternatives with net present value and could support decision-making

Acumen Fund (BACO ratio):
The Acumen Fund BACO ratio compares an investment with the best available charitable option. The purpose is to assess the prospective merit of an individual investment opportunity versus making a charitable grant

Cost per impact:
The cost per impact method addresses the difficulty of measuring and maximising the impact of charitable gifts. The purpose is to answer the question: "how much does the change cost?" Cost per beneficiary multiplied with Success Rate = Costs per impact

Generally, I see two areas of concern with standardised measurement concepts. The first one is a more ethical discussion about what a life is worth; as the comparison of number of days of life saved without looking at the individuals and the context is problematic. The second concern is about the practicability of measurement. According to the Rockefeller Foundation, there is a constant struggle to balance being practical with being comprehensive and comparable (cf. The Rockefeller Foundation 2003).

As I have been discussing impact and some key methods to measure this, I will now describe the role of leadership in this context and how leadership behaviour supports and drives effectiveness. Leadership is claimed to make a difference not only in terms of the overall success – the bottom-line performance – but also on the well-being of its employees (cf. Centre of Creative Leadership /People in Aid Review 2010; Hochschild 2010).

2.3 Leadership Effectiveness

It has been widely argued that leadership is the basis for improving performance and outcomes, and most researchers evaluate effectiveness with the consequences of leadership influence (cf. Yukl 2010). This influence can be seen in higher follower satisfaction and more willingness to put in extra effort, so that the performance goes beyond expectations (cf. Bass and Bass 2008). There is evidence that behaviour like more drive, positive energy and clearer focus on goal attainment indicates an effect on employee commitment, motivation, task performance and organisational outcomes (cf. Lowe et al. 1996; Bartling et al. 1996). Bresnen (1995) questions many assumptions of mainstream perspectives of leadership because of attribution bias and leadership as a social construction. In the next paragraph, I will show the historical development in this area related to my research question and I will highlight key concepts in leadership effectiveness research.

Historical Development

There is a debate if leadership behaviour is universal or more context-driven, situation dependent or cultural- or sector-specific (cf. Fotler 1981; Arvonen and Ekvall 1999). According to Yukl, leadership behaviour might differ in important ways when used for different purposes. He proposed, therefore, relating leadership behaviour to criteria of leadership effectiveness – and including objective measures of unit performance to measure aspects of the situation (cf. Yukl 2002). To illustrate this, Kotter used the metaphor of a golf back, as each unique context would require a different choice (cf. Kotter 1999). Interesting to note here is that effective behaviour which is overused will become ineffective, which highlights the balancing act displayed by each leader adapting to the situation (cf. Eichinger et al. 2007).

For-Profit Leadership Effectiveness

The early research on leadership effectiveness started with the Ohio State and Michigan studies during the 1950s. They proposed a differentiation between considerations and the initiating structure of effective behaviour having impact on employee satisfaction and performance (cf. House and Aditja 1997). Initiating structure means in this context task-oriented behaviour and consideration more relationship-oriented behaviour (cf. Blake and Mouton 1982). Later, researchers focused more on change-oriented behaviour, researching how managers cope with change and innovation effectively (cf. Yukl 2002; Ekvall and Arvonen 1991). Change-oriented behaviour showed a strong correlation with the perceived competence of the manager by the follower and employee-centred behaviour correlated highest with subordinate satisfaction with the manager (cf. Yukl 2002). An important concept mentioned in the literature examining for-profit sector is Yukl et al., with their hierarchical taxonomy of leadership and three meta-categories tasks, relations and change behaviour as they provide a good summary from state-of-the art leadership efficiency research (cf. Yukl et al. 2010). Another popular concept in leadership effectiveness research is Bass and Avolio's multifactor leadership theory (MLT) with transactional and transformational leadership behaviours that are necessary for efficient leadership performance (charismatic-inspirational, intellectual stimulation, individualised consideration, contingent reward, management by exception and laissez-faire leadership (cf. Avolio and Bass 1999). The key characteristic of transformational leaders is that they inspire others with their vision, promote this vision over opposition, demonstrate confidence in themselves and their mission and inspire others to support them (cf. Bass and Avolio 1994).

Non-Profit Leadership

As the second reference for generating effective leadership behaviour, I investigated the non-profit sector. According to Hesselbein, people working in this sector are "hungry for meaning and significance" and in order to take the lead here, building partnerships and outside orientation are increasingly important (cf. Hesselbein 2004; Dobbs 2004; Riggio et al. 2004; Renz 2010). Hamlin's generic framework of leadership effectiveness that has been confirmed in the non-profit sector collected concrete examples from a UK non-profit sector organisation of most effective and least effective leadership behaviour (cf. Hamlin 2011). I think that Hamlin's approach is relevant for this research as it represents, in my point of view, the human resources management approach to effectiveness, so that empowerment, involvement and people development are important elements. Crutchfield and (2012) Grant analysed high-impact non-profit organisations and worked out common practices. The special focus has been on scaling the impact to have a magnifying impact on the world. What gets my attention here is that the framework helps to create a shift away from a more inside-oriented, organisational mind-set to a more outside-oriented, relational mind-set. All high-impact organisations focused on the outside world and influenced others to advocate for their cause and to achieve collective impact.

Humanitarian Leadership

I will use the insights generated by Hochschild on the topic of humanitarian action in the UN organisation and the study from Buchanan-Smith and Scriven (cf. Hochschild 2010; Buchanan-Smith and Scriven 2011).

We should keep in mind that success in humanitarian actions in most cases must be achieved while working in challenging, hostile and dangerous work environments and being exposed to risks like hostage-taking and criminality, so that leader and manager need to work with people in distress and take decisions that can affect lives and livelihoods. In emergency situations, this can be done under pressure without full information about the situation. The working conditions, with long working hours and limited resources, cause extraordinary challenges, on both personal and organisational levels.

> "Salary is not the main recognition for performance in humanitarian action, it is more increased responsibility or more autonomy in decisions." (interviewee)

Hochschild presented in his research the key practices of effective UN leaders that are mainly visionary and relationship-oriented (see figure 3). All UN leaders exhibit a wide range of leadership practices, starting with self-awareness, good context understanding and giving space to other leaders, to a more networking behaviour that ends with being in touch with the staff and achieving short and long term gains (cf. Hochschild 2010; Adair 2009). Buchanan-Smith and Scriven analysed personal leadership qualities, strategic leadership, decision-making and relational leadership behaviours that would be needed for effective humanitarian action.

Leadership in Humanitarian Action (adapted from Buchanan-Smith and Scriven 2011)

Strategic Leadership

- Understand the context
- Clear and strategic vision
- Focus on affected population

Personal Qualities

- Integrity
- Self-aware
- Humility
- Determination
- Energy and enthusiasm

Management Skills

- Organization
- Strong team
- Good manager and good leader

Rational

- Listening and learning from others
- Willingness to share
- Courageous conversations
- Relations shipbuilding

- Connecting with people

Decision-making
- Fast decisions when needed
- Decision in uncertainty
- Flexibility to change
- Accountability
- Risk-taking
- Innovation

As a key message for effective leadership in humanitarian action from the two studies, I would name the importance of values and vision, the analysis of the context, decision-making and strong relationship-oriented behaviours.

2.4 Conclusion of the Literature Review

For humanitarian impact analysis, there are methodologies like impact value chain, evaluation research approaches and standardisation like the OECD-DAC criteria that allows a baseline for transparency and visibility. What is still missing is a sector-wide general accounting principles that can be applied consistently. There is still a huge amount of subjectivity in the progress reporting of humanitarian action, and cost data are incorporated only in very limited ways. The leadership effectiveness review has indicated a belief in the literature that there are effects from leadership behaviour on follower motivation and performance. Visionary, relationship-oriented and outside-oriented behaviour has been mentioned as important for high impact and high performance. Studies focusing on ineffective behaviour have not been in the focus, but I believe that some ineffective behaviour can have highly negative consequences on employee motivation and can be used for learning and reflective practice.

3. Research Approach

This section describes and explains my epistemological stance and the research methodology used. I will describe how the research has been carried out and how I collected the research.

I will use a social constructivist ontology and interpretivist epistemology, as I believe that human behaviour cannot be understood without relation to meanings and purposes of human actors. My aim is to get qualitative, data-rich insights into human behaviour to uncover emic insider views of individuals (cf. Guba and Lincoln 1994; Glaser and Strauss 1967). I believe that findings are created through the interaction with the researcher which influence the way the research method is carried out (cf. Guba and Lincoln 1994). My long experience as a business controller for a multinational company from a for-profit company and my education as a systemic coach have had an impact on my interview style and possible bias in ignoring important aspects from the interviewees. My research is an exploratory case study as I am dealing with one organisation – the ICRC. According to Yin, a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context and will have more variables of interests than data points (cf. Yin 2003). I will try to develop a "thick description" from the inside and leave the link to other social situations to the reader (cf. Geertz 1973).

Semi-structured Qualitative Interviews

A group of humanitarian leadership and management school participants took part in interviews to contribute to this research project. All interviews were done via telephone or video conferencing and in a semi-structured way. The questions that were used as a frame are listed in figure 4.

I prepared a transcript of each recorded interview. Based on these interviews, I did a content analysis (cf. Weber 1990) – to analyse the data systematically. I used thematic coding to cluster and categorise data according to humanitarian impact and leadership behaviour (cf. Strauss and Corbin 1990). Humanitarian impact data was referenced to impact value chain and OECD-DAC criteria of aid effectiveness, whereas the behaviour data was referenced to key leadership effectiveness studies. To assign the data to the reference coding, I used the methodology that Hamlin et al. described in their paper.[2]

2 They used the criteria "sameness", "similarity" and congruence as sematic level of evidence (ct. Hamlin et al. 2011). Sameness is defined when sentences or phrases are identical or nearly identical, similarity when the meaning was the same and congruence when there was an element of sameness or similarity in the meaning of certain phrases and/or keywords (cf. Hamlin et al. 2011).



FIGURE 4: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
(SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

4. Case Description – ICRC

In the following, I will describe the ICRC as my case object and will explore the specific context of ICRC to better understand and interpret the research data. I will first provide a brief overview about the ICRC organisation, its historical context, its mission and its specific areas of work. Then I will describe in more detail the humanitarian context in which the ICRC has been operating and I will highlight major changes in the context in the last 10 years.

The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian organisation whose exclusive mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed violence and other forms of violence, provide them assistance and promote the humanitarian laws that protect victims of wars to prevent suffering (cf. ICRC 2013). Its mandate to help victims of armed conflicts is historically and legally given by states and stems essentially from the Geneva Convention of 1949. The ICRC is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and directs and coordinates the international activities conducted by the movement in armed conflicts and other situations of violence. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, it employs around 12,000 people in 80 countries and made a total expenditure of close to $1 billion in 2010. A report on the economic and social value of Red Cross estimated the number of volunteers worldwide at 13 million (cf. ICRC 2011). The

ICRC is financed mainly by voluntary donations from governments and from National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. One key characteristic of the ICRC is the dual nature of its work as its helps operations and develops and promotes international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles.[3] Overall, the estimated need for humanitarian response has increased in recent years, mainly in the least developed countries so that we have seen an increase in the number of affected people. Another trend has been that there are a growing number of national actors managing responses in more independent way. In the last 20 years, the environment of the ICRC changed dramatically. According to the Humanitarian Futures Program, there have been commitments since the mid-1990s from key actors in the humanitarian system to improve the organisation's performance and to become more professional (cf. Humanitarian Futures Program 2009).

In figure 5, I summarised important items of change in the humanitarian sector with the old and the new reality. As already mentioned earlier, the key developments are in the change of the nature of conflicts, the duration of conflicts and the increased security risks. There are more and more interventions without end turning into chronic conflict in the context of rural societies and traditions. As an example, due to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that accounted for the majority of security incidents, rural areas in some Middle East countries can't be accessed. Armed conflicts and armed violence usually indicates some kind of complexity, but in more and more conflicts, a direct intervention would no longer possible, so that strategies for trust-building and positioning, adaptation to local cultures and traditions and negotiating access are door-openers to be able to provide humanitarian assistance. The main humanitarian actors are responding to changed needs with diversification of humanitarian services and more partnering and collaboration with NGOs to reinforce the impact of the humanitarian action (cf. Kellenberger 2012). The speed and scale of events, and the massive humanitarian needs they produced, set major challenges for an effective timely response (ibid.). The ICRC included the results-based management concept in its management system and deployed social science terminology like output, outcome and impact in the institutional framework (cf. ICRC 2013). The ICRC Institutional Framework differentiates between internal and external success factors.[4] In figure 6, I combined the description from the

3 As an example, in 2011, the ICRC distributed food to 5 million people, and essential household and hygiene items to 3 million people, while 4 million people benefited from sustainable food production programs or micro-economic initiatives. More than 20 million people benefitted from water, sanitation and construction activities (cf. ICRC Annual Report 2011).

4 Internal success factors are relevance of response (fulfilling the most pressing needs of people affected, evidence based and timely), professional, effective and efficient organization and processes, and Human Resources capacity and mobility. External success factors are access to victims, reputation, acceptance and positioning.

FIGURE 5: HUMANITARIAN SECTOR – OLD VERSUS NEW REALITY (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

ICRC annual report 2012 about terminology with the impact value map from Clark et al. (cf. ICRC 2013; Clark et al. 2003). The key differentiation here should be made between outputs, the products, goods and services that people receive as a result of ICRC activities and real outcomes – means changes to the field. The ICRC differentiated further between short-term outcomes (the likely or achieved short-term effect) and medium-term outcomes (likely or achieved mid-term effects in 1 to 5 years). The impact is seen here as long-term effects to which interventions contribute. The biggest difference to social science literature I see is that the ICRC is not looking at changes to the field and deducing the specific contribution that has been made by ICRC interventions. It estimates, based on outputs, the potential impact in short-term, medium-term and long-term timeframes. Furthermore, the measurement uses indicators that express real and verifiable changes and monitors the progress made towards the achievement of objectives (cf. ICRC 2013).

The ICRC programs are organised by 4 main pillars or domains for actions.

1. The protection area aims at preserving the lives, security, dignity and physical and mental well-being of people. As an example, ICRC activities are detainee visits or programs to restore family links after a war situation or internal displacements.

2. The assistance area is more the traditional domain of action to preserve lives and restore dignity of individuals and communities by e.g. providing access to basic survival means like access to water, food and non-food items, health or rehabilitation services.
3. The domain prevention covers people having a direct or indirect impact on the fate of people affected to prevent suffering.
4. The area cooperation with national societies has the main task to build local capacity for humanitarian responses.



FIGURE 6: HUMANITARIAN VALUE CHAIN FOR ICRC
(SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION ADAPTED FROM CLARK ET AL. 2003)

5 Data Analysis

The sample of humanitarian leaders consisted of 24 leaders with significant field experience of whom 20 participated in the interviews. The gender split between women/men was 35%/65%. The current location of participants was distributed quite diversely throughout the ICRC delegations. The participants have more than 300 years' of field experience in total, in average more than 15 years each in humanitarian action. The experience is, in most cases, truly mobile, meaning frequent change from one country and context to another. Leaders are currently working in different leadership positions ranging from head of administration, head of operations, head of functional expertise to head of delegation.

There is a broad range of examples for humanitarian impact. I grouped the answers according to the impact value chain I introduced previously and could see that around 50% of examples were related to activities and output and 50% to outcome or impact.

Activities

- Detention visits and socio-psychological care
- Promoting humanitarian law
- Influencing donors and lobbying and sensitising the government or the community

Outputs

- Direct assistance with food or non-food items (blankets, cooking material, shoes), handling out relief boxes and family support for victims
- Economic support programs like micro-economic programs, cash for work program, livestock vaccination programs
- Health services like emergency health care for wounded people, people treated with medicine or surgery, artificial limbs, vaccination program, dead body management, building of hospitals, orthopaedic centre or forensic clinic, first-aid training and seminar for doctors, technical and financial support
- Rehabilitation projects in the areas water and habitat, such as supply systems for water and sanitation, reconstructing of productive capital, transitional shelters

- In the area of weapon contamination, identification of dangerous areas, de-mining, and provision of alternative solutions for people (bringing water, firewood), releasing land for productive usage
- Messages for separated families, video calls for detainees, video calls in villages, collecting information about missing people and restoring family links e.g. with web-site
- Cooking and managing food distribution for prisoners' camp, delivering goods or providing protection for civilians

Humanitarian impact

- Preventing security incidents, getting access to beneficiaries, changing and improving people's lives, saving lives, knowledge, attitude and behaviour change, minimise the danger for the population
- Improving people's dignity and rights, human development, human welfare, no discrimination
- Helping people get in control about their lives, to manage their needs, their solutions, their ways to develop, and changing their confidence levels
- Preventing violence in treatment of prisoners, improved conditions and treatment, fate of loved ones is clarified, families are connected
- Prevent diseases from dirty water
- Re-integration into society for mine victims: walking and participating in life and preventing the need for medicine; providing job training
- Prevent incidents for population in motion; people rebuild themselves, people started to open their shops again; live in their own house and without begging or prostitution; alternative solutions provided instead of food; give employment or to make a productive project
- Victims of armed forces are protected; armed forces and authorities have a different attitude

My overall observation has been that there are very diverse views about what successful humanitarian impact means. For example, in comparison to assistance where impact can be measured quite tangibly, in all the other areas, it is very difficult to measure the impact, which could lead to frustration, as progress and success cannot be seen:

> "[...] founded in assistance, health monitoring, baseline and then work out if you have an impact, in the other three pillars it hasn't been taking of at all",

> "Life-days saved per person", "The first measurement is short-term, the long-term is never perceivable, it ends up in sum frustration as you don't know how your actions are connected to the people on the ground", "Very difficult to measure, there is no indicator for human dignity, we focus on individuals, you can't really have statistics [...]"

Humanitarian leaders then use other channels of subjective measurement, individual feedback and behaviour of actors or see the value when they stop the humanitarian activity:

> "It is more challenging if you don't get any reward – unless you see the person in front of you and start a human relationship. You have humanitarian impact if you face one person directly, don't lose that; it is why we are there [...]"

My interpretation of the split between activities/output and output/impact is that there is still a lot of focus on internal process for the people involved. This, to me, is a strong indicator that humanitarian services or products are initially internally created and then later rolled out. The standardisation of humanitarian service offerings allows for the fast delivery of basic services in emergency situations, but would have limitations in contexts that would need more adaptability in the approach.

Success from the ICRC management system's point of view has been defined on a result-based management level. The concept mainly uses effectiveness as key criteria for success, answering the question of how well the ICRC is doing compared to the stated plan. In the plan, there are concrete objectives to target beneficiaries (coverage), timeline, budget and indicators to measure progress.

> "[...] success is defined on whether or not we have achieved, what we set up to be achieved", "how do we perform against indicators, baseline in the first place [...]"

The biggest gap might be in two areas. Firstly, there is not enough connection between short-term and long-term activities. As stated by interviewees:

> "Something to be achieved after a year's long-term impact is never perceivable, as we don't know how our actions are connected to the ground", "we don't look at impact, and we look more at short-term results"

The need for more connectedness has been expressed due to the changed context and move from an emergency-oriented mode to a more developmental mode:

> "We need more capacity building", "hand-over to national organisations", "not just providing food and health services, building the capacity within people", "re-building themselves"

The second gap I see is related to relevance and appropriateness criteria.

> E.g.: "local people need to connect, too", "in country X there are more concerns for health services, poverty relief activities, serious diseases than IHL which leads to a relevance problem for ICRC", "connected to the ground", "integrate differences in global programs", "beneficiaries were asking for alternative solutions than food, e.g. employment or productive programs", "visible things that is fitting to the local culture and tradition"

My interpretation is that there is a conflict between global programs and local relevance. It is more relevant to pick the right humanitarian services out of the ICRC portfolio that will address the beneficiaries' needs in the best way. In addition, some interviewees see that appropriateness is more important for successful humanitarian value creation:

> "Hygiene program in [...] [a] country without linking to tangible solution will not work", "I rather employ local people instead of using folk-lift machines", "no ready-made recipes that we can unroll and that would apply to every context". The criteria coherence has been mentioned only marginally "together with national societies", "cooperation within movement", "coordinating intervention here for a country beyond our area", "alignment with donors"

The criteria coverage has been mentioned mainly in emergency situations and assistance with such examples as "number of people affected" and "affected population". In contrast, development mode coverage has not been mentioned as a key example for success; it has more qualitative impact than just coverage.

Another perspective on the data is to analyse how beneficiary needs have been fulfilled. I used Maslow's Pyramid of needs to understand what successful humanitarian impact is addressing (cf. Maslow 1954; figure 7).

Traditionally, preserving lives by addressing physiological needs and security needs has been the core of emergency interventions. Early recovery and development mode are requesting more and more needs higher in the hierarchy. I would claim that this model is very useful for the understanding and tailoring of activities to beneficiaries' needs.

I combined three common concepts of successful humanitarian impact generated by the interview data. The first concept assessing beneficiaries' needs by using Maslow's pyramid has been already described above. The second concept describes three steps needed to generate long-term sustainable impact. The long-term impact is achieved e.g. when people's lives and dignity



FIGURE 7: HUMANITARIAN IMPACT AND MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS
(SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION ADAPTED FROM MASLOW 1954)

are respected and preserved, and ICRC intervention would no longer be needed. This would be expressed in terms like:

> "Re-integration into society and participation in life", "people have successfully re-built themselves", "armed forces and authorities have a different attitude", "and knowledge, attitudes and behaviour have been changed"

In order to achieve this long-term sustainable impact visibility, awareness and access need to be addressed first as this will become a bottleneck.

> "The more you are visible the more you can do…if you don't get this – then you are blocked in the next steps, you can't do anything…in countries with no access, there is no possibility to provide assistance - even in natural disasters… humanitarian catastrophe…very inefficient way would be to use alternative channel (via national movements and landlords to hope that something is getting to the beneficiaries) to have humanitarian impact [...]"

The short-term impact is the core of the ICRC's successful humanitarian impact creation and should be relevant locally:

> "Local people need to connect to the activities [...] preventing security events", "providing emergency surgery", "providing artificial limbs", and "restoring family links"

The capacity building for sustainable impact should already be, in the best case, kept in mind right from the beginning:

> "[...] local NGO or institution can provide the same services than ICRC", "partner should be in financial stain to continue services", "success can be seen as hand-over to local organisations", "capacity building is the most important thing [...] I don't believe in short-term impact [...]"

The third concept explains successful humanitarian impact with the idea moving more people from a lack of control in their lives due to armed conflicts or other forms of violence to more control.

> "People who get control about their lives; can manage their needs, their solutions, their way to develop [...]. [...] providing food is a small solution for a short time for a concrete need and definitely needed, but if we can move more communities of people to control their lives we get more impact, sometimes we do a lot but we don't change their lives."

I claim that this model of humanitarian impact harnessed from the leaders in humanitarian action provides us with a more informed picture of humanitarian impact creation in the ICRC in different contexts.

The next section uses concrete examples of successful and less successful humanitarian impact. The logic is that for each example, I have assigned the intended humanitarian impact and what leadership and managerial behaviour was related to the outcome or would have increased the humanitarian impact.

Examples of Successful Humanitarian Impact
Related Management and Leadership Behaviour that helped to improve the outcome

Hygiene Program in a Middle East Country integrating with delivery of water pumps
- Preserve lives: First tangible result visible to beneficiaries then combined with prevention
- Understanding of local context and connecting with local communities

Ensure security in high conflict environment, get access, get door open
- Prevent suffering by influencing those who have a direct or indirect impact: Introducing what ICRC is about, awareness, visibility
- Networking/cooperation: weekly meetings with all international organisations, local community, authorities, getting an own view

Running a orthopaedic hospital in dangerous environment in spite of heavy fighting
- Preserve lives and/or restore the dignity: Dignity can't wait, humanitarian concern

- Strong believe in humanitarian impact, message to all parties: we are here to help – even if we are exposing ourselves to risks

Emergency programs: Rapid Response Team

- Preserve lives and/or restore the dignity: Providing fast assistance with food, non-food items, basic infrastructure and medical assistance
- Clear management, goals, roles & responsibilities, process and execution, strong trusting teams, fast decisions, flexible and adaptive

An interesting finding here is that for all successful examples, the most important relevant behaviour has been outside-oriented (understanding of external context, networking, understanding of beneficiaries need).

The less successful examples include understanding of beneficiaries' need not mentioned, as well as internal management problems like lack of planning and lack of clear roles and responsibilities.

Examples of Less Successful Humanitarian Impact

Related Management and Leadership Behaviour that could have helped to improve the outcome

Anti-Baby Pills program in a Middle East country

- Preserve the lives, security, dignity and physical and mental wellbeing: was seen suspiciously, do they want to reduce our population?
- Not just copying global initiatives, non-visible value needs to be carefully explained and take acceptance, time and trust first

Natural disaster in a Middle East country with no direct access to beneficiaries

- Preserve the lives, security, dignity and physical and mental wellbeing: no access to impacted areas
- Not targeting the right people and right beneficiaries, trusting local landlords, no visibility and no access

Eco-sec program in a Middle East country

- Preserve the lives, security, dignity and physical and mental wellbeing: global program has been rolled out to each country
- Cost efficiency questionable, high administrative costs, economically it would be better to use local NGOs specialised in this topic

Surprised by war and no assistance possible due to sea and air blockage

- Preserve the lives, security, dignity and physical and mental wellbeing: there was no scenario-planning and no in-country buffer stock for basic assistance capacity e.g. items for 2-3 weeks
- More pro-active and less reactive behaviour, more planning

My conclusion here is that success will be achieved mainly with a focus on beneficiaries' needs, outside orientation and with internal management capabilities.

In the following, I developed a model of perceived drivers for effectiveness in humanitarian action that is based on the most important behaviour mentioned by humanitarian leaders at the ICRC. I used here the data from the interview and analysed the transcripts to create high-order constructs that were aligned as much as possible with existing research in this area and are comprised of the top 10 most important behaviour constructs.

1. Role Model

Serves as role model, being trusted, inspirational, enthusiastic and optimistic:

- "Lead by example - you can't demand from others what you are not doing", "walk the talk", "live up what you preach"
- "Trusted", "reliable and predictable"
- "Inspire", "enthusiasm and optimism" "You have to earn trust and the credibility", "have a vision and the capacity to share this vision", pride, high drive, be convinced, believe in the outcome, confidence in thinking and acting
- "Commitment", "passion", "dedication", "persistence with the task, we don't give up easily", "determination" assertive, tenacious

2. External Relations

Networking, Cooperation, Communication and Negotiation:

- "Networking", "create a platform you can work on"
- "Cooperation"
- "Communication", "people need to know what ICRC is doing", "explain the mandate, no weapons", "accused because of the emblem", "create awareness", "dialogue", "briefing", "constant communication", "chatting", "explaining", "not hiding", "openly talking with people", "showing what we are doing", "build trust", "share"
- "Negotiation"

3. Empowerment

Delegation and empowerment, autonomy and confidence in your staff:

- "Delegation and Empowerment", "trusting people to solve problems", "make decisions without prior approval", "enable and empowers others to act on their own initiative", "give space to work", "make room for others to lead"
- "Give autonomy", "support of local decision", "give ownership, allow substantial responsibility while retaining accountability"
- "Confidence in the staff", "team should work ideally along without supervision, not interfering", "management by exception", "recognize the value of team work"

4. Consulting

Consulting People, Involvement, Open to other views:

- "Checking with people before making decisions that affect them", "communicates and consults well with staff and keeps them informed"
- "Encourage participation in decision-making", "involve and include people in the planning, decision-making and problem-solving", "engage with people", "can't enforce"
- "Listen to others' ideas and open to others' views", "using the ideas and suggestions of others", "remain in touch with staff", "deal with diversity"

5. External Monitoring

Analysing the external environment, strategic, reflective:

- "Analysing information about events, trends, and changes in the external environment to identify threats and opportunities for the organisational unit", "good understanding of what is going on", "understanding the context"

- "Relate to a bigger picture", "strategic analysis", "clear and strategic vision",
- "Reflection"

6. Fairness

Respectful, polite, fair, decisive in the rules, transparent:

- "Respectful"
- "Polite", "manage difficult situation in calm"
- "Fair", "honest style of communication", "treat everyone equal", "no discrimination", "fairness"
- "Decisive management approach", "direct", "decisiveness in the rules"
- "Open", "personal and trusting management approach", "adopts an open and approachable leadership style", "open", "transparent"

7. Adaptability

Flexibility, Adaptability, Pragmatism:

- "Flexible adjusted to country needs and to changes", "flexible for change", "flexible to change course of actions""
- Adapt to local context, traditions, cultures", "adapting to the situation", "adapting to the reality"
- "Pragmatism"

8. Coherence

Responsibility, make tough decisions:

- "Clear decisions", "stay the course", "honest, no false hope", "decide on tough call"
- "Coherence in what we do"
- "Take responsibility and sort out the staff escalation"

9. Envision Change

Taking risks, fast decisions, envision change, taking risks for change:

- "Courage for change", "have the courage to fail"
- "Risk-taking", "taking personal risks and making sacrifices to encourage and promote desirable change in the organisation", "allow mistakes and don't expect to be perfect",
- "Take fast decisions", "decisions in uncertainty when needed"

- "Presenting an appealing description of desirable outcomes that can be achieved by the unit", "describing a proposed change with great enthusiasm and conviction"

10. Innovative

Open-minded, innovative, creative:

- "Seeks different views", "suggests new ways", "different angles", "re-examine assumptions", "looking at different angles"
- "Leader should be open, not jumping immediately to one side", "integrate every idea to see new solutions"
- "To be innovative and creative", "required ad hoc solution"

These findings will be contrasted with the previous research by Hochschild as well as Buchanan-Smith and Scriven. I will first start with the comparison to Hochschild who investigated the effective leadership practices of UN leaders. The elements of role model, external relations, external monitoring and envision change have been strongly confirmed, whereas empowerment, consulting and coherence were found, but not in the same intensity. Fairness, adaptability and innovative were not mentioned at all in Hochschild's study. What was mentioned in Hochschild's study and not by ICRC leaders is "look for short-term and long-term, build teams with diversity and self-aware and resilient". In contrast to Buchanan-Smith and Scriven, we can find all mentioned categories, even adaptability and innovation, except fairness. On the other hand, the management skills and self-awareness categories mentioned by Buchanan-Smith and Scriven were not mentioned by leaders at the ICRC.

As a result of a short summary of this comparison, I would claim that the perceived ICRC leadership effectiveness constructs are generally confirmed with the previous research. I would conclude that fairness might be an ICRC-specific category that could be raised as an important topic because there might be currently concerns at the ICRC related to this behaviour, but this perception would need to be mirrored back to the organisation to clarify this further.

It has been confirmed that for all three humanitarian studies, relational, visionary and value-based leadership are key factors in the humanitarian sector. The focus on the outside world, adaptability to the context and concern for the beneficiary has been confirmed by two studies. My personal interpretation based on the interviews is that professionalisation in basic management skills is also very important, which Buchanan-Smith and Scriven would also confirm here.

The potential gaps in the top 10 behaviours, the strengths and history of ICRC practices, the improvement areas that constrain humanitarian impact generation and leadership challenges that create tension and conflicts will be used as mirror data for the proposed change intervention.

6. Change Approach

6.1 Change Perspectives

This section focuses on how to actually change and foster successful behaviour. I will offer different perspectives of change that might be helpful for change agents to address the historical situation and culture of the ICRC in the best way. Then I will make a recommendation for an activity theory-based intervention model – the change laboratory – to use the presented mirror data from the organisation and to collectively develop future leadership and management processes. I will start by introducing three change perspectives: Images of organisation (cf. Morgan 2006), problem view of leadership (cf. Grint 2010), and concept of colours (cf. Caluwé and Vermaak, 2003).

Morgan's idea is that thinking about organisation in metaphors would allow us to see, understand and manage organisations differently (cf. Morgan 2006). Clarke and Ramalingam (2008) claim that by rethinking what organisations are, we are opening our minds to new perspectives and we can become open to assimilating approaches to organisational change.

The ICRC could be understood with the metaphor of a machine, where the management is viewed as a process of planning, organisation, command, coordination and control in a hierarchical manner through precisely defined lines of command and communication. Another perspective could be to see the ICRC with the organismic metaphor. The organismic metaphor considers interactions between organisations and their environment in an open system and the ability of the organisations to adapt to the environment with flexible organisational approaches (cf. Morgan 1990). Another possibility to see the ICRC would be through the cultural perspective, focusing on values, behaviour and management style to understand the differences between 'what we say we do' and 'what we really do' (ibid.). All these perspectives would require different approaches to change when wanting to change practices sustainably. As an example a purely mechanistic approach to change might not be successful due to the rather complex humanitarian context.

The next concept claims that different problems demand different leadership behaviour. Grint differentiates between management and leadership by the context, and defined management as the equivalent of 'seen this before' and leadership as the equivalent of 'never seen before' (cf. Grint 2010). The concept is rooted in the distinction between certainty and uncertainty or tame and wicked problems developed by Rittel and Webber (1973). Tame problems are seen as puzzles for which there is always a solution (in the ICRC context, this is, for example, building a hospital, water pipeline, etc.) whereas wicked problems have high complexity and cannot be solved without affecting the context itself (in the ICRC context, examples would be delivering of assistance which will preserve lives but could reduce the self-responsibility of people taking care of themselves). The kinds of problems are subjective, with no stopping point and should be collectively addressed (cf. Grint 2012; Heifetz 1994). A critical problem is often associated with decisive action, and a commander is required to take action to provide the answer to the problem (cf. Grint 2012). In my point of view, the concept of commander could be seen as a different formal category whereas I think it only expresses a more decisive leadership and management behaviour. The key message in Grint's leadership construct is that we need clumsy solutions to be successful. This means that we need to consider how to adapt all three solutions to problems, so that the leader's role has to change from providing the answers to asking questions dependent on the context (ibid.). The concept would resonate very much with the current situation of the ICRC as the lines between interventions have been blurring among the categories of traditional humanitarian emergency, early recovery and developmental activity (cf. Kellenberger 2012).

In the traditional emergency situation, there is a need for more decisive leadership and management. Urgent humanitarian need requires fast execution of assistance and scaling of help to cover as many beneficiaries as possible. There is much consensus about the humanitarian situation and relief that would bring about an intervention. The more the ICRC is engaged in early recovery or development activity, the more complex the intervention will be, while would require a more consulting and adaptive mode that would focus on sustainability with more tailored impact.

Based on my initial observation to get change at the ICRC successfully implemented, Caluwés and Vermaack's (2003) concept of colours would help to develop the right change strategy, change communication and understanding of pitfalls. We see, on one hand, a more process-oriented and results-based management approach indicated by clear defined objective setting, monitoring the progress and strong rules. According to Caluwé and Vermaack, this represents blueprint thinking. On the other hand, we see a lot of people attracted to the humanitarian sector by the cause and

mission with a more humanitarian approach, which Caluwé and Vermaack would describe as red print thinking. The assumption here is that something changes when you make the approach attractive for people and exercise safeguard and fairness.



FIGURE 8: ICRC LEVELS OF INTERVENTIONS (SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION)

6.2 Change Laboratory Model – Activity Theory Interventions

In this paragraph, the main focus is to describe and propose a change intervention that I would recommend using at the ICRC as part of the learning and development program in order to work with research data and to collectively create changes in the practices that would enable more humanitarian impact. I will recommend a detailed design for an activity-theory intervention approach tailored to ICRC. Activity theory is a concept that is based on Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) (cf. Vygotsky 1978; Engeström 2007). It takes into consideration the specific historical, local situation, practices, habits and ways of thinking and is claimed to be a very effective organi-

sational learning tool as it represents a minimal meaningful system for analysis and intervention that captures dynamic and multifaceted views (cf. Virkkunen and Kuutti 2000; Engeström 2007). The key characteristic of the concept is that it provides the language to describe components of an activity system in a dynamic way so that re-configuration and remediation during interventions could be visualised (cf. Virkkunen and Kuutti 2000). Remediation means that objects are seen in a new context and interpreted in a new way. Engeström (2007), one of the founders of the activity theory concept, explained organisational learning as follows:

> "When the object of the activity is reinterpreted, and the actors' interaction with the object is remediated to the effect that the object of the activity expands, we can speak of 'expansive learning'. [...] it begins with the individual subjects questioning accepted practices, and it regularly expands into a collective movement or institution." (Engeström 1987)

An example in my research is of the leader's view on what should be improved in ICRC practices and what the leadership challenges or dilemmas are that hinder more humanitarian impact creation and as the result the way the themes are approached. Each individual has a slightly different view and interpretation of the object and purpose of the activity depending on the individual's position in the division of labour, his or her history in the activity, training and experience (ibid.). The basic assumption here is that change and learning in the activity system occur when tensions, conflicts, dilemma and contradiction are visible within the system (ibid.). The fundamental change principle is that the work community engages itself in a process of analysing its activity and relates the abstract model to concrete facts about everyday practices, gives meaning to the elements and their relations to work situations, and provides solutions to everyday problems themselves (cf. Virkkunen and Kuutti 2000).

In figure 9, Virkkunen and Kuutti describe the phases of a change laboratory process (ibid.). The process starts by gathering first-hand data of the practices in use and charting the situation by mirroring improvement areas of the current practices and the historical development of the activity. Participants of the change laboratory would get the result of the research as input data and would be asked to summarise, based on the data and based on their own understanding, the current areas in need of improvement and the most important leadership challenges that should be addressed. The assumption is that faced with difference in views, participants began to question the current

way of practices and to think about the whole activity. The discussion expands the participant's view of the object (cf. Engeström 1987).

As an example about leadership behaviour as an important improvement area, people would recognise that there is tolerance for misbehaviour at the ICRC that has negative effects on employee satisfaction and staff turnover. By sharing the different views on this topic, the discussion would be turned to collective learning about what can be done about this and experimental thinking of participants would be enforced. Overall, this intervention model would use the participative approach to change work practices, and by deconstructing leadership in daily practices, it can drive change in leadership practices that can be fostered later on. According to Daniels and Edwards, researchers are active participants in the development of the system and will see ideas born from tensions or contradictions, stimulate frank dialogue about gaps and shortcomings in leadership and



FIGURE 9: THE PHASES OF A CHANGE LABORATORY PROCESS
(SOURCE: OWN ILLUSTRATION ADAPTED FROM VIRKKUNEN/KUUTTI 2000)

focus on learning and accountability as a means to improve performance (cf. Daniels and Edwards 2010). The whole change laboratory cycle would then trigger the creation of a new activity system that will be first piloted and then spread out as new practices (cf. Virkkunen and Kuutti 2000).

In this section, I explored what could be done with the mirror data generated by the research to collectively use and design new practices that will bring more humanitarian impact to the beneficiaries of the ICRC. My recommendation would be to focus on a few critical shifts in behaviour and to also look for examples where people are already exhibiting the new desired practices as standard practice.

7. Results and Conclusions

This inquiry has investigated the nature of humanitarian impact and attributed leadership and managerial effectiveness and contributed to the understanding of humanitarian leadership effectiveness. The study set out to get a better understanding in terms of what is meant by successful humanitarian impact by ICRC leaders and compared it with standards from the humanitarian sector and social impact analysis research. Furthermore, the research harnessed perceived effective leadership and managerial behaviour and contrasted these findings with existing research. This research has shown that key elements from leadership effectiveness studies in the humanitarian sector have been confirmed, and thus relational and value-based leadership is important in the humanitarian sector. The research has clustered, explained and analysed the current view of the most important leadership and managerial behaviours that have been raised by humanitarian leaders of the ICRC. This project was undertaken to evaluate the findings and to come up with recommendations for the ICRC leadership and development. The research highlighted relevant practical leadership challenges managers are facing and revealed leadership attributes specially needed in humanitarian action or in specific contexts. The research had key practical implications as those gaps between desired behaviour and the current state give a clear prioritisation for leadership and development programs. In order to increase the success of change, the research offered perspectives on how to adapt changes to existing ICRC culture and context. I strongly recommended using a change laboratory intervention to work on leadership challenges and improvement areas on diverse views and tensions in the current systems to get a collective change and learning process started. The further deployment of the leadership and management school would provide an excellent base

for learning and change practices. This research could serve as a base for further studies in areas of research limitations or in areas in which interesting questions or dilemmas arose. The results of this study indicated the essence of the ICRC leadership portfolio. The findings suggest further that leadership is an art, as the type of leadership varies in different types of crisis and in different types of problems, and that being able to apply the whole portfolio of successful behaviour will ensure the needed adaptability and flexibility to cope with the fundamental changes in the humanitarian context. The study emphasised the importance of understanding the context in order to apply the appropriate leadership style.

This research provides preliminary support for a theory of humanitarian leadership and managerial effectiveness with the following key focus areas: Starting with the shared meaning of humanitarian impact, the approaches of leadership are at the core based on professional, relational and visionary behaviour with a short-term and long-term focus. The additional specific elements of successful humanitarian leadership are the concern for the beneficiaries, strong value orientation and the focus on the outside world and the adaptability to the context. The art of humanitarian leadership would be to develop clumsy solutions to specific contexts by applying the right portfolio of behaviours to maximise humanitarian impact while ensuring employee engagement.

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