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Europeanized Separatism – An European concept of  
Independence movements

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# Europeanized Separatism – An European concept of Independence movements

Roland Brandtjen

## ABSTRACT:

There are some very well-known independence movements in Europe. However, most of these movements and parties are less well-known. In an increasingly integrated and harmonized Europe, the question arises as to how the parties and movements are influenced by the European level. The fact is that the largest political, social and economic actor in Europe, with which an emerging state must act, is the EU. However, little research has been done on this. The question arises as to whether possible full EU membership is an argument for regions to declare their own state. What does the population say about this? Are there any possible explanations for the answer?

This paper attempts to explore and fill a scientific gap on this topic by presenting the results of adapted quantitative surveys conducted in 2019 and 2023 in all the mentioned regions. They are analysed by descriptive statistics. Correlation between regional language use and regional wealth, meaning of regional language use for the population and regional prosperity as well as the meaning of own unique culture for the regional population and the stated desired degree of autonomy are calculated and interpreted.

The paper concludes with a Conclusion, the bibliography and an annex.

## KEYWORDS:

Europeanization, Separatism, Europeanized Separatism, quantitative research, Independence Movements

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**Prof. Dr Roland Brandtjen** is professor at IU international University GmbH. As a European Studies scholar, his expertise lies in collective identities and their influence on politics. His focus is on the European integration process of regions of Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the UK, as well as all recognised micronations of Europe in relation to the concept of independence. He has studied and worked in Europe at home and abroad. He completed his doctorate at the RWTH in Aachen.

## Introduction

There are independence movements in many European countries. Some are more or less well-known. At the same time, the EU and the European level, including their influence on politics, structures and society, are on everyone's lips. This raises the question of how the European level also influences these movements. This paper tries to find out exactly this. To do this, the concept of Europeanized separatism is described by first taking a closer look at the terms Europeanization and separatism. Current independence movements in Europe are also presented. Finally, there is a brief summary of what was explained previously.

The existence of the concept is to be shown by this paper. Therefore, participants in 85 regions of Europe were asked between 2019 and 2023 in a total of 73 languages whether possible full EU membership could be seen as an argument for the independence of their own regions. This paper does not want to promote or denigrate any possible movement or political idea. After presenting the results, an attempt is made to find explanations using correlation calculations. The data for the correlation calculations come from previous publications.

The paper ends with a conclusion, a bibliography and an appendix including the translations of the main question and the data per region.

## Europeanized Separatism

Europeanised separatism is a concept that was first mentioned in 2019 and represents one facet of the complex concept of separatism. To understand this clearly, the terms Europeanisation and separatism are used separately. They are then brought together.

### **EUROPEANIZATION**

There are various research subjects within European Studies. The consideration or understanding of Europe as a process is a dynamic consideration and is subdivided into the research areas of "Integration", "Europeanisation" and "Constitutionalization". (Wessels, 2006; Schuppert, 2005; Sturm, 2005) Europeanization research focuses on finding answers as to what effects occur when European institutions have been built up and take up employment. Research on Constitutionalization highlights the relationship between international – or regional – law and national laws, including building up international – or supranational – institutions in order to guarantee international agreements such as human rights. Research on European integration, in contrast, considers the concept and explanation of why sovereign states merge on a European level, and the concept of its resulting political system. (Auel, 2011; Schuppert, 2005) This classification can be seen in the overview in Figure 1.

Europeanization and Internationalization or Globalization are closely linked. Globalization (in some literature called Internationalization) refers to the effect or interdependences of international – global – organizations on national states. (Beckfield & Brady, 2008; Paczynska, 2010) Over time, due to the growing supranational character of Europe, its internal intensity has been much stronger than at the international level and highlights the main differences to Globalization. (Gerontas, 2011; Ladrech, 2010) Therefore, Europeanization is an essential part of European rather than Global studies. In this field of research, it is part of the topic “Europe as Process”.

<b>European Studies’ Research subjects</b>	Localization of Europe	...
	Definition of Europe	
	<i>Europe as Process</i>	Integration research <i>Europeanization research</i> Constitutionalization research
	Post-national political system Europe	...
	European policies	
	Europe as institutional system	
	The international actor: Europe	
	Europe’s finality	

Figure 1: Incorporation of Europeanization into European Studies (Schuppert, 2005; Brandtjen, 2019)

Europeanization is therefore generally the emergence, the enlargement and the stronger integration of European states into the European political system. In this context, the European political system includes all types of political organisations in Europe, such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the EU or the Nordic Council. Due to the very strong integration process through the EU, the focus is mostly on the transfer process of parts of national sovereignty to supranational institutions. In a broad sense, this concept includes all kinds of interdependencies between the institutions, norms and processes of national policy and supranational ones. Both, interdependences between member states and the European political system and those between non-member states and this system – i.e. between candidate countries and the EU – are subject of this field of research. Two perspectives can be analysed; the top-down relationship – i.e. EU policy towards the national one – and the bottom-up relationship – i.e. national policy influencing the EU policy-making process. (Schmidt, 2010; Auel, 2011; Börzel & Panke, *Europäisierung*, 2011; Sturm, 2005; Ladrech, 2010; Kohler-Koch, Conzelmann, & Knodt, 2004; Brandtjen, 2019; 2021)

The lion’s share of the literature concerns the EU’s impact on intrastate structures – i.e. relations between central states and their regions. From the latest EU amendments, there has been some novel attention paid to regional governments building up in the “new members”, due to the EU’s influence, where there have not been such institutions before. Even less attention has been paid to such influences in “older ones” – except for Flanders and Sardinia. (Dieringer & Sturm, 2005; Fleurke & Willemse, 2006; Bache & Jones, 2000; Börzel, 2002; Bursens, 2007)

In the relationship between non-members and the EU-system, Europeanization is not only spreading advantages of European political systems or concepts, selling European products all over the world, promoting European habits or European education, but it calls for a reflection on what is *not* European. This mirror image was, from the European point of view, often quite negatively framed. Even though, non-members consciously decided to act differently to Europe. (Nolte, 2010; Derichs, 2010) This also illustrates the interdependences involved in Europeanization.

Figure 2 shows the dynamic at the domestic and supranational levels with the scheme of Europeanization. The supranational political output provokes the question whether domestic policy,

polity or politics still fit the political requirements – including international requirements. To find the answer to this question, domestic mediating variables start. This results in domestic changes, which both influence the supranational level and incite again the question of goodness of fit. Because there are the same dynamics of interdependence, differentiation between EU member and non-member does not need to be made. However, it is very important to define the degree of interdependence. (Ladrech, 2010; Deforche & Bursens, 2008)




Figure 2: Scheme of Europeanization (Ladrech, 2010; Deforche & Bursens, 2008; Brandtjen, 2019)

Europeanization can manage all kinds of critical situations of the many interdependences within the EU-system – political, security, economic or social ones – by changing the interests of conflicting parties, by reconstructing the definition of statehood and sovereignty (Leiß, 2009), by enforcing the application of rule of law, by diminishing corruption and by including amenity into business and political affairs. (McCormick, 2010; Schmidt, 2010) It is, therefore, a political and societal process, propelled by the European integration, which imposes pressure upon the national states and the European society to change towards European concepts, as well as it constrains the European institution to respond to national interests, resulting in a continuous alignment on the political level. (Sturm, 2005; Pehle & Strum, 2008; Börzel, 2002)

## INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE

In Europe, there are several well-known and lesser-known independence movements fighting for secession. Separatism is more than just secession. Therefore, in this section, separatism as state building process, emancipation and the right for self-determination are included. Finally, there is a brief overview of political parties in Europe which fight for independence.

### SEPARATISM AS STATE BUILDING PROCESS

Separatism is the political attempt to either create a state by detaching a territorial section of an existing state or leaving any kind of union of state or to join another state or union of states. (Schmidt, 2010; Laible, 2008) In this sense, secession and dismemberment are different concepts, as shown in diagram 3.




Figure 3: Differentiation between Secession & Dismemberment (Brandtjen, 2019)

Secession defines the separation of a subarea of a state – its antonym is incorporation. Dismemberment – the opposite being fusion – describes the creation of independent states by dissolution of the former state – i.e. the case of Czechoslovakia. (Riescher, 2007; Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Herdegen, 2006; Stein & von Buttlar, 2009) The pure economic definition of separatism tells us that separatism focuses on reaching independence by economic actions; balancing economic gains and losses of the new political structure. (King, 1973) It is more common to focus on the endeavour of creating a state than trying to reintegrate into another state. In general, it has been observed that a longer process of secession raises fewer problems (economic and minority problems, border conflicts or demagogic political supporters of secession) than a fairly rapid one. (Duursma, 1996)

Considering that nationalism tries to obtain and to use state power (Breuilly, 1993), separatism seems to have ties to nationalism. However, as soon as the creation, the strengthening or the fragmentation, or the desired reintegration, of a new political system – i.e. a state – arose, separatist parties become “nationalist”. Separatism converts into nationalism. In conclusion: separatism is a specific kind of nationalism. (Laible, 2008; Rosecrance, 2006; Smith, 1982; Alexseev, 2001) The reasons for separatism are therefore just as diverse as the reasons for nationalism. They range from identity-related to event-related, cultural-related and economic-related reasons, among others. (Brandtjen, 2019)

### EMANCIPATION AND THE RIGHT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

Emancipation is nowadays the detachment of a political, social, psychological or intellectual dependency. (Weiß, 2015) These includes goals claiming specific interests to provide a certain group-related autonomy, like female suffrage or recognition of another language as co-official, as well as goals providing a political utopia focusing onto a new kind of human being. Political Emancipation, which represents equality in a social society or state of every individual regardless any characteristic. This leads to both freedom, in relation to feudalism, and un-freedom, in relation to belonging to a social group and the need to follow certain social rules. (Crawls, 2009; Marx, 1884; Weiß, 2015) Movements of political or national emancipation include therefore also the wish of social group to obtain more autonomy or the right for self-determination. Social groups claiming self-determination are groups of

cultural, religious or ethnic communities, which directly or indirectly question the current state sovereignty of the system they live in. (Hager, 2018; Luft, 1996; Rieger, 2015) Self-determination is the ability to benefit from the values of life, wealth and remarkableness and to decide one's own future. The right for it exists in international law. (Danspeckgruber, 2011) However, the right for self-determination was the idea to provide a friendly relationship on the international scene. (Stein & von Buttlar, 2009; Duursma, 1996; Hillebrink, 2008) It connects closely to the right for decolonization after the First World War. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 1970 of the General Assembly of the UN describes it as followed:

*“[...] By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provision of the Charter. [...]”* (United Nations, 1970)

It shows the internal character of the declaration, the right to administrate freely peoples' own matters. Today's legal sciences include by means of this also the duty of every state to embrace all peoples in political decision making, the extent of this embrace, however, is not defined. This part of the declaration links self-determination with the protection of minorities. (Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Herdegen, 2006; Stein & von Buttlar, 2009) Furthermore the declaration describes the external character of self-determination:

*“[...] The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status feely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action with deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. [...] Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. [...]”* (United Nations, 1970)

This paragraph argues in favour of implementing the right of self-determination for secession. However, this is of high importance for many states and has therefore politically explosive power. (Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Herdegen, 2006) Because certain stability is essential for friendly relations between states, a right to secession based on the right of self-determination is generally not given. Only if peoples are facing discrimination and / or the political system hinder them to participate at the political decision-making, secession might be possible. By transferring certain autonomy to the people, participation in the political decision-making process appears. (Stein & von Buttlar, 2009) It is essential to audit each individual case. However, it seems to be very difficult to argue for the existence of an international right to separation or secession through the right of self-determination. (Herdegen, 2006) In the understanding of this right, there is no definition for the notion “peoples”, which makes it even harder to use it as the basic concept to justify separatism legally. (Stein & von Buttlar, 2009; Lorenzmeier

& Rohde, 2003; Duursma, 1996) Furthermore, the external aspect of self-determination prohibiting any intervention – especially the military kind – from the outside, i.e. from another state – and protecting even a state that does not provide the possibility of self-determination to its minority peoples, weakens this concept as an essential argument for secession. (Hilpold, 2011)

### OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN EUROPE WHICH FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE

At the European political scene, some national political parties which stand for regionalism, autonomism/separatism, ethnic minority interests, civic nationalism and progressivism joined together into one common party called European Free Alliance. This European party is a conjunction of a lot of national parties that stand for these political ideas. Some might be very radical parties and others are quite moderate. Some of its members have been elected to regional, national or European parliaments and others have not been elected. (European Free Alliance, 2024; Brandtjen, 2019; 2021)

Figure 4 shows a visual summary of all European regions with independence or autonomy movements. The figure is not enumerative.




Figure 4: European regions with independence or autonomy movements according to (European Free Alliance, 2024; Brandtjen, 2019; 2021)

The illustration shows that these movements exist in many regions. Some are quite well known, such as the various parties in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland or Flanders. Others are quite unknown, such as the parties in East Frisia, Wessex, Castile or in Sápmi (northern Finno-Scandinavia including parts of Russia). The phenomenon of these movements is therefore not limited to just a few countries and can take very different forms.

### THE CONCEPT THAT IS EMERGING

The European level affects a lot the domestic area by several concepts and through different channels. The EU, being the biggest organisation, common market and normative power in Europe becomes

attractive to regional independence movements. These movements have in some areas an already long history, arguing that certain regions should be sovereign over their own affairs. After second World War the European Integration Process was developed. Self-governance in the new supranational context materialized and started to weaken the concept of sovereignty for separatist movements or nationalist parties. (Laible, 2008; Duursma, 1996; Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006) This new possibility for political expression may lead to opposed effects: (1) separatists become moderate nationalists/regionalists or (2) it strengthens separatist movements. The European system, applying among others the principle of subsidiarity, enforcing political integration and recognizing ethnic groups, provides a certain chance to obtain political power and thereby reduces the feeling of being overruled by centralized states. However, gaining a degree of political power might result in fighting for autonomous status as a first step towards full independence. (Laible, 2008; Hale, 2008)

The facts are that EU members are proper states, which in combination govern the EU, and that the EU does not have full competence to deal with every political issue. This gives space for discussion around the concept of full sovereignty. Separatist movements or parties in European areas are alert to the importance of EU policy. After all, the EU becomes economically the biggest trading partner as soon as secession has come into effect. Those separatists who are nowadays part of the EU especially understand its necessity. The overall goal, for them, seems to change from striving for full independence to creating independence inside the EU. (Colomer, 2007; Laible, 2008; Corbin, 2009) Examples are easy to find – for instance, August Vermeyleen wrote in 1951: “Wij willen Vlamingen zijn, om Europeërs te worden”<sup>1</sup>. (Dardanelli, 2011; Brandtjen, 2019)

## Data and Method

The data reported here, were conducted in all regions (administrative regions such as federal states) in the states of France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as the autonomous territories of the Isle of Man, Gibraltar, the Faroe Islands, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Åland Islands, and Greenland. For this purpose, quantitative research was offered in the form of individualised quantitative online-based surveys in the respective languages of the regions. By means of virtual snowball sampling, these surveys were promoted via social media of Facebook and X (former: Twitter) and given to the population of the target group. For this purpose, relevant hashtags of the respective regions were set, regional media (e.g. TV Melilla in the Autonomous City of Melilla) were contacted and disseminated in region-related interest groups (e.g. FALE in Normandy or OSCEC in Extremadura).

This type of sampling serves to find participants in e.g., hard-to-reach groups of people. A person in such a group who participates in the survey gives the questionnaires to other people in their network or arranges participation in the survey. It can increase the representativeness of the results by the diffusion of the survey into the corresponding group of participants. (Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004; Atkinson & Flint, 2001) Challenges of a virtual snowball sampling might be the community bias, the lack of definite knowledge as to whether or not the sample is an accurate reading of the target population and that the target population might not always have access to the Internet. (Baltar & Brunet, 2012; Häder, 2006)

<sup>1</sup> We want to be Flemings in order to become Europeans.

The surveys in the autonomous territories take place annually from January to March, in the European small states from February to March, in the UK from March to April, in Germany from May to June, in France from June to July, in Italy from July to August and in Spain from August to September. The surveys of the autonomous territories were launched in 2019. The Spanish polls were published for the first time in 2020. In the UK and Italy, the polls were launched in 2021 and in Germany and France in 2022. In 2023 the surveys of each small European state were started. They are totally anonymous and fulfil the requirements of the GDPR. All surveys were offered in the official state language as well as in co-official, recognised, regional and minority languages where possible. To avoid misunderstandings, the surveys were translated by official translators. Thus, it was offered in about 73 languages.

The transfer of the results to the population still needs to be clarified. Due to the subject matter and the nature of the sampling, there are more men than women among the participants in all regions. In all regions, on the other hand, very few (less than 1%) have indicated that they do not belong to the binary gender groups. The age groups between 30 and 49 are most strongly represented in all regions. Younger and older groups are underrepresented. On average, participants have at least vocational training or higher. academics are overrepresented. Only the income groups of all regions are evenly distributed.

The final challenge to the data is that a region is defined the same in all countries. Thus, a region is a federal state in Germany and an autonomous city or community in Spain. In the United Kingdom, however, the constituent countries and Cornwall (because of its cultural and historical distinctiveness) have been defined as regions. In Italy and France, on the other hand, regions are legally defined. Particularities such as the region of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, which exists de jure but has relatively little de facto relevance for the population, have not been considered here. However, it is also confirmed that the regions in France were restructured in 2015. This reorganisation has come under great criticism from some of the participants.

The basic question from the surveys, which was also translated into the regional languages, was as follows:

*Do you think that the intention of joining the EU as a full member state would be an argument for total independence for [the corresponding region]?*

Participants could only vote "yes" or "no". There was no special enquiry about sub-regions, e.g. whether this question was answered in favour of Alsace instead of the entire Grand Est region. There are therefore no results regarding Europeanised separatism for sub-regions.

The individual Data of each year in each region can be found in the annex.

In order to find explanatory approaches for the results, these are correlated with the data from the publications on "(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?", "Europe vs EU -What extent does their synonymy have?" and "Regional desired Degree of Autonomy" (Brandtjen, 2024; 2024; 2024). More specifically, it states that the data relate to the regional economic level, the number of languages spoken in the region, the reported daily language use, the importance of the regional language and regional culture, the average scores on European identity, the image of the EU and each stated regional wish for autonomy.

## EUROPEANIZED SEPARATISM – THE DATA

Figure 4 shows the regional average support from 2019 to 2023 in % for the question of whether admission as a full EU member represents an argument in favour of complete independence for one's own region. Sardinia has the highest average share of supporters at 75.13%. Overall, an average of 12 out of 85 regions surveyed (i.e. approx. 14.1%) have more than 50% of participants in favour. Only 3 regions, Saxony-Anhalt with 8.55%, Berlin with 7.4% and the state of Bremen with 6.94%, on the other hand, show an average of less than 10% in favour among the participants.




Figure 5: Do you think that the intention of joining the EU as a full member state would be an argument for total independence of ...? - Yes / Average results of the Data from 2019 - 2023 (own interpretation)

Looking at the individual groupings, the approval ratings of the participants in the German federal states are relatively low. The mean approval rating of all average results in the German federal states is 14.92% of all participants in Germany. The frontrunners are Bavaria with an average of 31.21% and Saarland with an average of 28.41%. As mentioned in the general analysis, the 3 lowest approval ratings are found in Saxony-Anhalt, Berlin and the state of Bremen. It is striking that no German federal state shows a simple majority in favour of Europeanised separatism. Nevertheless, it should not be neglected that there are some, albeit few, participants in favour.

The mean approval rating of all average results in the Spanish autonomous communities and cities is 34.22% of all their participants. 3 autonomous communities have average approval ratings of more than 50%: Catalonia with an average of 67.55%, Euskadi with an average of 61.81% and Galicia with 57.95%. On the other hand, the Valencian Community with an average of 48.1%, Navarre with an average of 47.9% and the Balearic Islands with 47.43% show a fairly high approval rating without a simple majority. Support for Europeanised separatism is lowest in the predominantly historical and culturally Castilian autonomous communities: the Community of Madrid with an average of 16.48%, Castilla-La Mancha with an average of 13.88% and Castilla y León with an average of 12.66%. The latter

low result is speculatively due to the question, which only referred to the Autonomous Community of Castilla y León and not to sub-regions within this community. A cultural tension and discussion about autonomies between these sub-regions may be the decisive factor here. (Brandtjen, 2024)

Among the French regions, there is only a simple majority in favour of Europeanised separatism in Brittany with an average of 53.58% and a narrow minority in Corsica with an average of 49.36%. The mean approval rating of all average results in the French regions is 29.64% of all their participants. The regions of central metropolitan France, i.e. in Île-de-France with an average of 18.33%, in the Pays de la Loire with an average of 17.62% and Centre-Val de Loire with an average of 12.19%, show the highest approval ratings.

Similar to the Spanish communities and cities, there are 3 Italian regions that have a majority approval rating: Sardinia with an average of 75.13%, Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol with an average of 53.33% and the Veneto region with an average of 50.29%. Sicily and Lombardy have relatively small minorities with an average approval rating of 47.57% and 46.11% respectively. The lowest approval ratings, on the other hand, are in the regions of Lazio with an average of 16.58%, Umbria with 16.02% and Marche with an average of 14.61%. The average approval rating of the Italian regions is 34.06% of all their participants.

In the United Kingdom, only Scotland, with an average of 66.53%, and Wales, with an average of 62.66%, have approval ratings above 50%. The participants from Cornwall agreed on average with 49.04%. Participants in Northern Ireland were the least in favour with an average of 32.76% and England with an average of 26.87%. Due to the small number of regions in this group and the very high values, the average mean value for the United Kingdom is 47.57%. The relatively high approval rating of the UK's hegemonic region, England, is surprising.

Among the European autonomous micro-nations, an average of 45.83% of the participants agreed with joining the EU as a full member as an argument in favour of complete independence. The highest approval ratings are in the Crown Dependencies with an average of 59.86% in the Bailiwick of Jersey, an average of 58.59% in the Bailiwick of Guernsey and an average of 53.93% on the Isle of Man. These are also the only regions in this group with a majority in favour. Gibraltar's approval ratings just missed the majority with an average of 42.11%. Greenland had the lowest approval rating with an average of 31.55%, which is still a relatively high figure.

In summary, lower approval ratings can be seen in the hegemonic regions such as central France, central Italy, central Spain, England and the German federal states. Nevertheless, it can be said that approval ratings, albeit very low, can be found in all regions. In addition to the relatively high results in the United Kingdom, the high approval ratings in the Crown Dependencies are also striking. It is questionable what causes these results and why in some regions, which can be very different, more or less see full membership of the EU as an argument for independence. Some possible explanations are considered below.

## **EXPLANATORY APPROACH**

The reasons for Europeanised separatism can be diverse and complex. This chapter therefore only provides a few possible explanations and cannot be regarded as a conclusive analysis. In order to find explanatory approaches for the results, these are correlated with the data from the publications on

"(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?", "Europe vs EU -What extent does their synonymy have?" and "Regional desired Degree of Autonomy" (Brandtjen, 2024; 2024; 2024). More specifically, it states that the data relate to the regional economic level, the number of languages spoken in the region, the reported daily language use, the importance of the regional language and regional culture, the average scores on European identity, the image of the EU and each stated regional wish for autonomy. This selection of data attempts to cover three areas of influence: the relationship to the region, to Europe and to separatism.

### REGIONAL ECONOMIC LEVEL & EUROPEANIZED SEPARATISM

Relative wealth or relative poverty can change the desire for statehood. Looking at the categorisation of regional wealth from "(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?" (Brandtjen, 2024) and relates this to the average approval ratings, the scatter diagram, its trend line and the measure of determination are shown in Figure 6. With an R-value of +0.08563613, a very weak general positive correlation can be seen. This means that, in general, the richer the region surveyed is in comparison, the more likely it is to have a higher approval rating for Europeanized Separatism.



Figure 6: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Regional Economic Level & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

The correlations between the level of prosperity and the approval of statehood due to possible full EU membership appear clearer when the groups are analysed. With an R value of +0.20990876 among the German federal states and an R value of +0.172207566 among the Italian regions, there is a weak positive correlation. Among the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, however, a moderate positive correlation is shown with the R value of +0.37312703. In other words, for the German, Italian and Spanish regions considered, the richer a region is, the more likely the participants are to agree with Europeanized Separatism. The correlation is stronger in Spain than in Germany or Italy.

However, with R values of -0.236646761 among the French regions and -0.118398761 among the regions in the United Kingdom, a weak negative correlation is evident. Unlike Germany, Spain and Italy, for these regions, the poorer a region is, the more likely the participants are to vote, to a weak degree, for Europeanized separatism.

A correlation only among the European autonomous micro-nations is not possible with these data due to the relatively similar level of prosperity.

### REGIONAL LANGUAGE AND DIALECTS & EUROPEANIZED SEPARATISM

Another possible explanation is language. Figure 7 shows the scatterplot, trend line and measure of determination for the relationship between the number of official, co-official, recognized and minority languages in the regions and support for full EU membership as a reason for regional statehood. The data on the number of languages comes from "(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?" (Brandtjen, 2024) where the number 5 stands for 5 languages or more. In general, the R value is +0.26476217 and means a weak positive correlation. The more languages are spoken regionally, the higher the participants' approval rating. The number of regional languages therefore has a weak positive influence.




Figure 7: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Number of Languages & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

When looking at the groups, only in Germany is there a weak negative correlation between the number of languages and support for possible full EU membership as an argument in favour of regional statehood. The German R value is -0.260242653 and means that the fewer languages there are in a German federal state, the higher the approval ratings are within the weak framework. The French regions show a positive correlation with an R value of +0.000745469, but this is negligible. It can therefore be said that there is no or a negligible correlation for the French regions. The Spanish autonomous communities and cities have an R-value of +0.055889082, which represents a very weak positive correlation. To a weak degree, this means that the more languages are spoken in a region, the higher the approval ratings for Spanish regions. In contrast, the regions in the United Kingdom with an R-value of +0.546142999, the Italian regions with an R-value of +0.549473249 and the European autonomous micro-nations with an R-value of +0.626107467 show a strong positive correlation. The more languages are spoken in a region, the higher the approval of Europeanised separatism.

However, this was more of a linguistic analysis and does not reflect the regional languages and dialects used. For this reason, Figure 8 shows the scatterplot, the trend line and the measure of determination

with the stated daily main use of regional languages and dialects. The values relating to the main language use come from "(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?" (Brandtjen, 2024). In general, the R value is +0.49746287, which represents a moderate positive correlation. In general, it can be said that the more regional languages and dialects are used as the main daily language, the more likely participants are to agree with full EU membership as an argument in favour of regional independence.




Figure 8: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of stated Daily Use of Regional Languages and Dialects & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

When looking at the regional groups, all but the European autonomous microstates show strong positive correlations between regional language use and approval ratings for Europeanized separatism. The R values are +0.513551549 for the Italian regions, +0.639671109 for the French regions, +0.681070254 for the German federal states, +0.791786147 for the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, and +0.834982324 for the areas in the United Kingdom. Here, the more the regional languages and dialects are used as the main language, the higher the approval ratings for Europeanized separatism. Only the European autonomous microstates show a strong negative correlation with an R value of -0.711486327. In other words, the more a regional language is used as the main language, the lower the approval ratings.

The number of languages thus has a relatively large influence on the approval ratings, but the use of regional languages and dialects is much more important in determining the approval of Europeanized separatism.

### REGIONAL LANGUAGE OR REGIONAL CULTURE AS IMPORTANT REGIONAL SYMBOL & EUROPEANIZED SEPARATISM

In addition to the linguistic and language usage analysis, one can also consider the extent to which the language is seen as a symbol of the respective region. In Figure 9, the information on the symbolic power of the regional language and the approval ratings for Europeanized separatism are scaled in a scatterplot, including a trend line and measure of determination. The information on regional symbolism is from "(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?" (Brandtjen, 2024). In

general, this results in an R value of +0.49687448 and thus a moderate positive correlation. The more one's own regional language is seen as the most important symbol of the region, the greater the approval for regional statehood in order to become a full member of the EU.




Figure 9: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Most Important Regional Symbol (Language) & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

Looking at the regional grouping shows similar correlations to those for the main regional language use. All groups, except the European autonomous microstates, show a positive R value. The Spanish autonomous communities and cities with an R value of +0.849292808, the French regions with an R value of +0.647920418 and the Italian regions with an R value of +0.614900215 show a strong positive correlation between language as the main regional symbol and Europeanized separatism. The German federal states with an R value of +0.402844922 and the areas in the United Kingdom with an R value of +0.346004003 show only a moderate positive correlation. For all of them it can be said that the more strongly language is perceived as the main regional symbol, the greater the support for Europeanized separatism. Only the extent is either moderate or strong. The European autonomous micronations, on the other hand, show a strong negative correlation with an R value of -0.722795022. This means that the less important the language is as a main regional symbol, the higher the approval ratings.

Language is often considered part of culture. This means that one's own culture could also have an influence on the approval ratings of Europeanized separatism. Accordingly, the main regional symbolic power of one's own culture was also correlated with the approval ratings. Figure 10 shows the scatterplot, including the trend line and the measure of determination for this calculation. The data on the symbolic power of one's own culture also comes from "(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?" (Brandtjen, 2024). With a general R value of +0.01400743, a very weak positive correlation is shown. This means that the approval ratings are hardly or only very slightly higher if one's own regional culture is considered the main symbol of the respective region.



Figure 10: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Most Important Regional Symbol (Culture) & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

There are large differences in the correlations between the regional groups. The areas of the United Kingdom surveyed show a strong positive correlation with an R value of +0.88297614 and the French regions with an R value of +0.58256918. A moderate positive correlation with an R value of +0.480617233 can be seen in the German federal states. In contrast, the Spanish autonomous communities and cities have a weak negative correlation with an R value of -0.239569826. The correlation of the Italian regions, with an R value of -0.371373688, is moderately negative. And again, there is a strong negative correlation with the European autonomous micro-nations with an R value of -0.64406547. In summary, it can be said that there is generally no clear connection between the main regional symbolic power of one's own culture and Europeanized separatism but must be considered in each regional grouping.

#### EUROPEAN IDENTITY & EUROPEANIZED SEPARATISM

In addition to the regional level, such as one's own language and culture, there could also be influencing factors related to the European level, such as European identity and the image of the EU. The data for this comes from "Europe vs EU -What extent does their synonymy have?" (Brandtjen, 2024). When looking at the stated European identity with the agreement that possible full EU membership is an argument for regional statehood, there is generally a weak negative correlation with the R value of -0.12787718. Figure 11 shows the corresponding scatterplot with trend line and measure of determination. This generally means that the more one identifies as a European, the less one agrees with Europeanized separatism.

Weak positive correlations are evident in the German federal states with an R value of +0.08881027, in the Italian regions with an R value of +0.12015024 and in the French regions with an R value of +0.20486546. The R value of the areas of the United Kingdom, on the other hand, is +0.84868323 and corresponds to a strong positive correlation. The Spanish autonomous communities and cities show a weak negative correlation with an R value of -0.12625322. Finally, a moderate negative correlation is evident among the European autonomous micronations with an R value of -0.4640889. Even though most groupings show a positive correlation, there is a weak negative correlation overall. European

identity is therefore generally not a decisive factor for approval ratings, although it is more of a factor for grouped approval ratings.




Figure 11: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of European Identity & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

### IMAGE OF THE EU & EUROPEANIZED SEPARATISM

The data on the image of the EU, like the data on European identity, are from "Europe vs EU -What extent does their synonymy have?" (Brandtjen, 2024). Figure 12 shows the scatter diagram, including trend line and coefficient of determination, of the correlation between the positive image of the EU and the approval ratings for Europeanized separatism. In general, there is a very weak positive correlation with the R value of +0.01022481. This means that in general there is little or no connection.



Figure 12: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Image of the EU & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

Similar to the correlation calculation of the regional symbolic power of one's own culture, very differentiated relationships are revealed when looking at regionally grouped regions. A strong positive correlation due to the R value of +0.84522253 can be seen in the areas of the United Kingdom. Weakly positive correlations, on the other hand, can be found in France with an R value of +0.28234954 and Germany with an R value of +0.10213915. A weak negative correlation with the R value of -0.18118806 can be found in Italy. In Spain the correlation is moderately negative due to the R value of -0.38590117 and among the European autonomous micronations there is a strong negative correlation between the positive image of the EU and the concept of Europeanized separatism due to the R value of -0.59343306. Once again, a parameter emerges, the image of the EU, which has no generally predictable influence on Europeanized separatism and must be considered at a more fine-grained level.

### IN FAVOUR OF ... & EUROPEANIZED SEPARATISM

After analysing regional and European influencing factors, the following section examines the relationship to separatism as a factor influencing the results. The data on the desired degree of autonomy for the respective region comes from “Regional desired Degree of Autonomy”... . Figure 13 shows the scatterplot, the trend line and the measure of determination for the results of the desire for independence and Europeanised separatism. The macro view shows an R value of +0.83563292, which means a strong positive correlation. Generally speaking, the greater the desire for complete independence in a region, the greater the acceptance of possible full EU membership as an argument in favour of this complete independence.




Figure 13: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Being in Favour of Full Independence & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

The regional groupings also show exclusively positive correlations. With the exception of the European autonomous micro-nations, these are even strongly positive correlations. The R values are +0.95833216 for the Italian regions, +0.93449793 for the territories in the United Kingdom, +0.8933723 for the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, +0.79006501 for the German federal states and +0.66298088 for the French regions. Only the European autonomous micro-nations show only a weak positive correlation with an R value of +0.24130142. Nevertheless, this analysis also shows that the greater the

desire for complete independence in a region, the greater the acceptance of possible full EU membership as an argument in favour of this complete independence.

Figure 14 shows the scatter plot, including trend line and coefficient of determination, for the stated desire for more autonomy for the regions and Europeanised separatism. With a general R value of +0.13415478, there is a weak positive correlation. The greater the desire for more regional autonomy, the greater the approval of Europeanised separatism.



Figure 14: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Being in Favour of More Autonomy & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

Looking at the individual countries separately, a more differentiated picture emerges. In Italy with an R-value of +0.42033829, in Germany with an R-value of +0.38991981 and in France with an R-value of +0.38147419, there is a moderate positive correlation, which is similar to the general results. In contrast, there is a moderate negative correlation among the European autonomous micro-nations with an R-value of -0.49226718 and in Spain with an R-value of -0.48765045. In the United Kingdom, the negative correlation is even strong due to the R-value of -0.73319549. In the last 3 groupings, the more regional autonomy is desired, the lower the approval for Europeanised separatism.

The correlation between Europeanized separatism and the desire to maintain the status quo is, with an R value of -0.709287, generally strongly negative. This means that in general, the less the status quo is preferred, the greater the support for Europeanized separatism. Figure 15 shows the scatterplot with trend line and measure of determination for this connection.

Here, too, a different relationship between these values is only evident in the European autonomous micronations. Here, the R value is +0.89927035, which results in a strong positive correlation. The more the status quo is preferred in these nations, the greater the acceptance of Europeanized separatism. In Germany, with an R value of -0.41158918, there is a moderate negative correlation. All others, France with -0.62756571, the United Kingdom with -0.73528764, Spain with -0.79802427, and Italy with -0.83441028, showed a strong negative correlation. The less regional autonomy is desired, the greater the approval of Europeanized separatism.




Figure 15: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Being in Favour of Maintaining the Status Quo & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

Finally, the connection between the desire for less autonomy and more centralization and Europeanized separatism must be examined. The R value is -0.56684066 and thus there is generally a strong negative correlation. The less autonomy and thus more centralization is preferred, the greater the approval of Europeanized separatism. Figure 16 shows the scatter plot with trend line and measure of determination.




Figure 16: Scatterplot, trendline and measure of determination of the average data of Being in Favour of more Centralization and less autonomy & Europeanized Separatism (own interpretation)

A more detailed analysis also shows negative correlations and thus follows the general correlation. There is a strong negative correlation for the Spanish autonomous communities and cities with an R value of -0.79250879, for the Italian regions with an R value of -0.73653215 and for the German federal states with an R value of -0.53708832. In contrast, there is a moderate one for the European autonomous micronations with an R value of -0.48488035. Finally, there is a weak negative correlation for the French

regions with an R value of -0.16750016 and a very weak to no negative correlation for the areas in the United Kingdom with an R value of -0.02856134.

## Conclusion

This article attempts to introduce the concept of Europeanised separatism. Europeanisation is the emergence, expansion and greater integration of European states into the European political system, including their mutual influence. The EU plays an important role here as one of the most influential European organisations, not least as the largest economic player in Europe. Separatism can be understood as secession or dismemberment. There are many reasons for separatism. Europeanised separatism is therefore the consideration of the influence of the European level on separatist movements at the regional level. The basic question is whether a region would declare its complete independence with the aim of becoming a full member of the EU. To test this, participants in 85 region-specific surveys were asked the following question:

*Do you think that the intention of joining the EU as a full member state would be an argument for total independence for [the corresponding region]?*

These surveys were translated into the respective 73 regional languages.

In summary, lower approval ratings can be seen in the hegemonic regions such as central France, central Italy, central Spain, England and the German federal states. Nevertheless, it can be said that approval ratings, albeit very low, can be found in all regions. In addition to the relatively high results in the United Kingdom, the high approval ratings in the Crown Dependencies are also striking. It is questionable what causes these results and why in some regions, which can be very different, more or less see full membership of the EU as an argument for independence.

Possible explanations for these results can be found in the correlation calculation with data from the publications on "(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?", "Europe vs EU -What extent does their synonymy have?" and "Regional desired Degree of Autonomy" (Brandtjen, 2024; 2024; 2024) considered. This covers a regional reference, a reference to Europe and Europeanisation and a reference to separatism. The correlations are general and differentiated. For the German, Italian and Spanish regions, the level of prosperity leads to the observation that the richer a region is, the more likely participants are to agree with Europeanised separatism. The correlation is stronger in Spain than in Germany or Italy. In contrast to Germany, Spain and Italy, the following applies to these regions: The poorer a region is, the more likely it is that participants will vote in favour of Europeanised separatism to a lesser extent.

Language also appears to be a very important influencing factor for these results. The more languages are spoken in the region, the higher the participants' approval of Europeanised separatism. This does not seem to be true only for the German federal states. However, the results are much clearer when looking at the use of regional languages and dialects. With the exception of the European autonomous micro-nations, the more a regional language or dialect is used on a daily basis, the greater the understanding of possible full EU membership as an argument in favour of regional independence.

The information on the main regional symbol was checked as a further influencing factor. Again, with the exception of the European autonomous micro-nations, the more the regional language is perceived as the main regional symbol, the greater the support for Europeanised separatism. If, on the other hand, one looks at culture as the main regional symbol, little or no influence can generally be observed. However, this changes when looking at a smaller scale and produces very differentiated results in the individual states and groupings.

Looking at the European identity indicated, a negative correlation can generally be observed. This also applies to the correlations in Spain and the European autonomous micro-nations. In other words, the more participants identify themselves as Europeans, the lower the approval ratings for the concept in question. It is surprising that the correlations in Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom are positive. Here the approval ratings are high when more participants in a region identify themselves as European. Consideration of the stated positive image of the EU generally shows little or no influence on approval of Europeanised separatism. However, when looking at the regional groupings, very different results emerge that cannot be generalised.

The influence of the approval effects on Europeanised separatism appears to be one of a regional desire for independence. The greater the desire for complete independence, the greater the agreement that full EU membership is an argument in favour of this. This applies in general as well as in the groupings.

If participants would rather have more autonomy for their region, the correlation is generally only weakly positive. In the individual groups, however, different correlations arise which cannot be generalised. When it comes to the preference for the current autonomy status of one's own region, a negative correlation is generally evident. The more the status quo is preferred, the lower the approval ratings. This applies generally and to all groups of states, except for the European autonomous micronations. Finally, the desire for less autonomy and more centralization clearly shows a negative correlation generally and in all groups.

What is striking is the frequent correlations that run counter to the trend in the European autonomous micronations. The reasons for this are purely speculative and worth looking at more closely.

These results are subject to a number of limiting aspects. Firstly, the dissemination of the data collection method is prone to inaccuracies. Since the surveys were completely anonymous, it could not be guaranteed that no one would participate repeatedly. Furthermore, it should be noted that online surveys attract certain groups and perhaps even extreme-thinking groups. This can potentially falsify the data. Likewise, it was not possible to answer the main question on Europeanized separatism for subregions. For example, a participant who would vote for the concept of Europeanized separatism for the Alsace subregion would vote against the independence of the Grand Est in order to become a full member of the EU. However, in this case, only the answer for Grand Est was possible. After all, the representativeness of the population is not guaranteed. In the future, these limitations would have to be further reduced. A more detailed look at the reasons for these results and the differentiations would also be useful.

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## Annex:

### **DO YOU THINK THAT THE INTENTION OF JOINING THE EU AS A FULL MEMBER STATE WOULD BE AN ARGUMENT FOR TOTAL INDEPENDENCE FOR [THE REGION]?**

#### QUESTION IN EACH LANGUAGE

Albanian	A besoni se qëllimi për t'u bashkuar me BE si një vend anëtar i plotë do të ishte një argument në favor të pavarësisë totale nga ...?
Alsatian	Meine-n-ìhr, àss de Wille àls eijestandicher Mitgliedstàat ìn de EÜ bizetratte, e Àrgümant fer d'totàle Ùnàbhangichkeit vùm ... ward?
Aragonese	Piensa que a intenzión d'unir-se a l'UE como un estado miembro pleno serba un argumento ta una plena independencia de ...?
Aranese	Pensatz qu'era intencion de junher-se ara UE coma un estat membre plen serie un argument entà ua plea independéncia de ...?
Arpetan	Pensâd-vos que l'entencion de rejuendre l'UE coment Ètat membro a pârt entiére serêt un argument por lo ben d'una endèpendence totâla rapôrt a le ...?
Asturian	¿Piensa que la intención d'axuntase a la XE como un estáu miembru dafechu sedría un argumentu pa una plena independencia de ...?
Balear Catalan	Pensa que s' intenció d'unir-se as UE com a estat membre podria ser un argument per as plena independència de ...?
Barese	Pensi ca l'intenziune de abbracciare l'UE come Statu membru piene sarebbe na rais pe na totale indipendenza da ...?
Basque	Zure ustez, EBren estatu kide oso bat izateko asmoa ... erabateko independentzia lortzeko argudio bat izango litzateke?
Breton	D'ho soñj, daoust hag ar mennad bezañ ezel eus an UE evel Stad leun he ferzh a vefe un arguzenn a-du gant peurzizalc'hiezh ...?
Burgundian	Est-geûs qu'le fétcheon d'acoler l'UO coma étât membre frène reusse un atchûment en faveur d'na indépance totale vis-à-vis d'la ... ?
Castillian (Spanish)	¿Piensa que la intención de unirse a la UE como un estado miembro pleno sería un argumento para una plena independencia de ...?
Catalan	Pensa que la intenció d'unir-se a la UE com a estat membre podria ser un argument per a la plena independència de ...?
Cornish	A dybowgh bos an mynnas dhe junya an UE avel stat esel leun argument rag anserghogeth dien a ...?
Corsican	Pensate chî l'intenzione di aderisce à l'UE cum'è un statu membru pienu seria un argumentu per l'indipendenza tutale da a ...?

Croatian	Mislite li da bi namjera pridruživanja EU kao punopravna država članica bila argument u prilog potpune neovisnosti od ...?
Danish	Tror du, at intentionen om at blive medlem af EU ville være et argument for fuld uafhængighed af ...?
Doric Scots	D'ye think that the intent o jynin the EU as a full memmer state wid be an argyment fur hale independence o ...?
Dutch	Denkt u dat het voornemen om als volwaardige lidstaat tot de EU toe te treden een argument zou zijn voor volledige onafhankelijkheid van ...?
Emilian	Pènsa ch'el vular anfilierà all'UE pèr vèrs da întiar bin dè ... a lòngh rànz?
English	Do you think that the intention of joining the EU as a full member state would be an argument for total independence of ...?
Eonavian	¿Pensa qu'a/la intención de xuntarse á UE como un estao membro dafeito sería un argumento pra úa plena independencia de ...?
Extremadurian	Piensa que la intención d'ajuntal-si ala UU comu un estau biembru prenu sedría un argumentu pa una endependencia prena de ...?
Faetano / Cellese	Te pénsè che la 'ntenziùnne de fa pare dell'UE cóme state mèmbrè a tìtele piénne a-étte un cunte bunne pe la tutélede la 'ndepennénze de la ...?
Fala	¿Pensa que a intenciõ de unirsi à UE comu um estau membru plenu seria um argumentu para ùa plena independencia de ...?
Faroese	Heldur tú, at ætlanin at fara upp í ES hevði verið ein grundgeving fyri fullum ... sjálvræði?
Finnish	Katsotteko, että aikomus liittyä EU:hun olisi peruste ... täydelle itsenäisydelle?
French	Pensez-vous que l'intention de rejoindre l'UE en tant qu'Etat membre à part entière serait un argument en faveur d'une indépendance totale vis-à-vis de ...?
Friulian	Pensistu che la intenzion di aderî ae UE tant che Stât membri a titul plen saressie un argoment a pro di une indipendenza totâl de Regjon ...?
Galician	Pensa que a intención de unirse á UE como un estado membro de pleno dereito sería un argumento a favor da plena independencia por parte de ...?
Gallo Language	Cray'ous-ti qe le projet d'aherder a l'UE come ene etat souétier seraet de cai qi feraet qe le monde seraent pus fôt pour qe la ... seje deheûdée ?
Gallo-Italic of Sicily	Pinsai chi la ntenzian di treasir nta l'UE cam Stato membro a pieno titotlo fuss ng'argumant a favaur di l'indipendenza totale di la Rregian ...?
Gallurese	Ritèni chi la 'ntinziòni di adirì a l'UE come statu chi ni faci palti a pienu tittulu sarìa un algumentu in faóri di una cumpletta indippendenza di la ...?

German	Glauben Sie, dass die Möglichkeit ein Mitgliedsstaat der EU zu werden ein Argument für die vollkommene Unabhängigkeit für ... wäre?
Greek	Πιστεύετε ότι η πρόθεση ένταξης στην ΕΕ ως πλήρες κράτος μέλος θα αποτελούσε επιχείρημα υπέρ της πλήρους ανεξαρτησίας από την περιφέρεια της ...;
Greenlandic	Ilimagaaujuk, pilersaarut EU-mut ilaasortanngorneq ... kiffaanngissuseq tunngaviussasoq?
Guernsey Norman French	Pens-ous qué l'idée d'jouïnde l'UU srait éne raison pour l'entchière indépendance de ...?
Irish	An gceapann tú gur argóint ar son neamhspleáchas iomlán na ... a bheadh san intinn dul isteach san AE mar bhallstát iomlán?
Italian	Ritiene che l'intenzione di aderire all'UE come Stato membro a pieno titolo sarebbe un argomento a favore di una totale indipendenza de ...?
Ladin	Minëise che la poscibilitè da fá pert dl'UE sciöche Stat mëmber podess ester n'argomentaziun por l'independënza definitiva dla Regiun dl ...?
Ligurian	Sciâ retëgne che l'intençion d'aderî à l'UE comme stato membro o saieiva un argomento à favô pe-a piña independensa da ...?
Lombard	L'intenzion de vesser member de l'UE tant'mè Stat member a titol pien al saria un argument a favor del la total independenza de ...?
Lorrain	Vos pensiz-ti qu'l'idêye d'er'joinde l'UE comme membre entier s'rôt î n'argumat po ène indèpendance totâle vis-è-vis di ...?
Lorraine Franconian	Meenen Dir, datt de Absicht als eijenständijer Métgléiderstaat én der EU beizetreten, en Argument wär for en total Ònabhängigkeet vom ...?
Low Saxon (Low German)	Glöövst Se, dat de Mööglicheit en Liddmaatsstaat vun de EU to warnn en Argument för de vulle Unafhangigheit för ... weer?
Lower Sorbian	Wěrišo, až by móžnosć ćlonkojski stat EU staš se z argumentom dopoŋnje njewótwisnosći za ...?
Luxembourgish	Mengt Dir, datt d'Absicht als vollwäertege Member an d'EU bäitrieden wier en Argument fir eng komplett Onofhängegkeet vum ...?
Manx Gaelic	Vel oo smooïnaghtyn dy beagh y chiarail dy ve ny oltey jeh'n UE niartaghey yn chooish son slane seyrnsys ...?
Mòcheno	Denkt ir as benn men bellat toalnemmen en de EU abia an Stòtt pet en volle titl barat an stòrchen argoment ver de volle indipendenza van ...?
Neapolitan	Si 'a ... se mettesse dint' a ll'UA comme a 'nu stato libbero chesto ll'aiutasse a ttène ll'indipennenza?

Norman French	Pens-ouos que l'idaée d'arjouenre l'UU coume état membre à li touot seu s'sait eun argument en favou d'eune désahoquaunche fin-pllenne à l'ème de la ...?
North Frisian	Liawst, dat at mögelkhaid, en lasmaat-stoot faan't Eu tu wurden, en argument för't fol ünufhinghaid för ... wiar?
Occitan	Pensa que l'intencion de se jónher en l'UE coma un estat membre plen seriá un argument per una plea independéncia de ...?
Picard	Te pineses que l'idée d'erjointe l'UE comme mimbres tout intier ch'est bin comme raison pou l'indépendance intièrre par rapport à l' région ...?
Piemontese	I chërde che tachesse a l'UE com nē stat membro en pien-a règola a sarìa un bon argoment en favor ed n'indipendensa pien-a dël ...?
Poitevin-Saintongeais	Pensàu que de veloer jhéndre l'UE coume État parçounàe vrae pi entàe, o serét ine débllame pr ine émancipaciun cunplléte acuntre la ... ?
Portuguese	Pensa que a intenção de aderir à UE como Estado membro de pleno direito seria um argumento a favor da total independência de ...?
Réunion Creole French	Dapré ou, lintansyon rante dann l'UE konm manbr' en antié, ça i pé sèrve konm in rézon pou lindépendanse ...?
Romagnol	Scôşa che l'intenziòun d'aderêr a l'UE cumè stèd membro a gônf tètul srà un argumento a favôr d'una indipendènzà dl ...
Sardinian	Retenet chi s'intenzione de aderire a s'UE comente Istadu membru a prenu tìtulu diat èssere un'argumentu in favore de una totale indipendèntzia de sa ...?
Saterland Frisian	Leeuwe Jie, dät ju Muugelkhaid, n fullen Lid-Stoat fon ju EU tou wäiden, n Argument foar ju fulle Uunouhongeгаid fon ... waas?
Scots	Dae ye think thit the want fer jynin the EU as a fu memmer state wuuld be an argument fer tot independence o ..?
Scottish Gaelic	A bheil thu a 'smaoineachadh gum biodh an rùn a dhol a-steach don EU mar làn-bhallrachd na argamaid airson neo-eisimeileachd iomlan na ...?
Sicilian	Penzi ca a volontà di fari parti dill'UE comu Stato membru a titulu chinu putissi essiri n'argomentu a favuri d'a nnipennenza totali d'a ...?
Slovene	Ali menite, da bi bil namen vstopa v EU kot polnopravna država članica argument v prid popolni neodvisnosti od ...?
Swedish	Tror du att avsikten att gå med i EU skulle vara ett argument för ... fullständiga självständighet?
Tabarchino	Ti ritégni che l'intensiun de aderì à l'UE cumme Stotu che ne fa porte à tütüti i efetti u sâiè in argumentu à favù de 'na tutole indipendensa da ...?

Ulster Scots	Dae ye think thit the want fer jynin the EU as a fu memmer state wuuld be an argument fer tot independence o ...?
Upper Sorbian	Měniće, zo móžnosć jedyn čłonskim staće EU stać argument za dokonjanu njewotwisnosć za ... był?
Valencian	Pensa que la intenció d'unir-se a la UE com un estat membre seria un argument per a una plena independència de ...?
Venetian	Credèò che l'intension de aderir a l'UE cofà Stato membro a tìtoło pien ła sarìa na cuestion in favor de na totale independensa de ła Rejon de ...?
Walser German (Formazza)	Meinädär äs sigi än göti Sach, fer di gantzliche Friiheit fam ..., énzgään in der UE wé Schtaat Gléd mét follts Rächt?
Welsh	A ydych yn meddwl y byddai'r bwriad o ymuno â'r UE fel aelod-wladwriaeth lawn yn ddadl dros annibyniaeth lwyr i ...?

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**DATA – YES, IT WOULD BE AN ARGUMENT FOR FULL INDEPENDENCE OF MY REGION**

<b>EUROPEANIZED SEPARATISM</b>	<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>
<b>SARDINIA</b>	75,1%			87,9%	67,6%	69,9%
<b>CATALUNYA</b>	67,5%		68,2%	66,0%	63,9%	72,1%
<b>SCOTLAND</b>	66,5%			61,9%	65,9%	71,7%
<b>WALES</b>	62,7%			66,8%	63,1%	58,1%
<b>EUSKADI</b>	61,8%		61,8%	59,2%	61,2%	65,0%
<b>JERSEY</b>	59,9%			61,2%	57,6%	60,7%
<b>GUERNSEY</b>	58,6%			52,6%	65,6%	57,5%
<b>GALICIA</b>	57,9%		53,8%	62,2%	56,6%	59,3%
<b>ISLE OF MAN</b>	53,9%	60,1%	55,5%	47,7%	56,6%	49,7%
<b>BRETAGNE</b>	53,6%				52,8%	54,4%
<b>TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE</b>	53,3%			57,2%	47,2%	55,6%
<b>VENETO</b>	50,3%			51,8%	50,4%	48,7%
<b>CORSE</b>	49,4%				51,3%	47,4%
<b>CORNWALL</b>	49,0%			51,4%	44,9%	50,8%
<b>COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA</b>	48,1%		47,9%	51,4%	43,3%	49,8%
<b>NAVARRA</b>	47,9%		53,6%	53,6%	43,1%	41,4%

<b>SILICIA</b>	47,6%			49,7%	46,9%	46,1%
<b>ISLAS BALEARES</b>	47,4%		52,6%	48,3%	46,3%	42,5%
<b>LOMBARDIA</b>	46,1%			51,1%	43,2%	44,0%
<b>VAL D'AOSTA</b>	44,2%			43,7%	42,4%	46,5%
<b>MAYOTTE</b>	43,8%				30,4%	57,1%
<b>GIBRALTAR</b>	42,1%	40,5%	38,5%	45,1%	40,7%	45,8%
<b>CEUTA</b>	41,7%		19,0%	32,4%	15,4%	100,0%
<b>FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA</b>	41,1%			39,6%	42,2%	41,3%
<b>FAROE ISLANDS</b>	38,3%	44,8%	36,9%	39,0%	34,6%	36,5%
<b>ALAND</b>	36,8%			67,5%	22,0%	21,1%
<b>MARTINIQUE</b>	36,1%				32,1%	40,0%
<b>CAMPANIA</b>	35,3%			36,6%	31,8%	37,4%
<b>ISLAS CANARIAS</b>	34,3%		37,9%	39,2%	33,5%	26,5%
<b>ASTURIAS</b>	33,9%		32,5%	36,7%	31,3%	35,1%
<b>LIGURIA</b>	33,9%			34,7%	32,6%	34,3%
<b>ARAGON</b>	33,2%		34,2%	38,2%	26,8%	33,5%
<b>OCCITANIE</b>	33,1%				37,3%	28,8%
<b>NORTHERN IRELAND</b>	32,8%			34,4%	25,9%	38,0%
<b>PIEMONTE</b>	32,1%			29,6%	31,7%	35,1%
<b>GUADELOPE</b>	31,5%				22,2%	40,7%
<b>BAYERN</b>	31,2%				31,1%	31,3%
<b>GREENLAND</b>	31,1%			37,1%	25,4%	31,0%
<b>PROVENCE-ALPES-CÔTE D'AZUR</b>	29,5%				24,8%	34,3%
<b>LA RÉUNION</b>	29,4%				31,0%	27,9%
<b>GRAND EST</b>	29,2%				30,1%	28,3%
<b>NORMANDIE</b>	28,9%				26,0%	31,7%
<b>ANDALUCIA</b>	28,5%		30,0%	27,9%	25,9%	30,2%

<b>SAARLAND</b>	28,4%			21,7%	35,1%
<b>AUVERGNE-RHÔNE-ALPES</b>	28,0%			24,8%	31,1%
<b>TOSCANA</b>	27,8%		23,9%	31,5%	28,2%
<b>CALABRIA</b>	27,7%		26,7%	20,1%	36,1%
<b>BASILICATA</b>	27,5%		27,6%	28,7%	26,3%
<b>EMILIA-ROMAGNA</b>	27,4%		26,9%	28,3%	26,8%
<b>ENGLAND</b>	26,9%		27,9%	26,3%	26,5%
<b>CANTABRIA</b>	26,5%	22,4%	28,4%	22,5%	32,9%
<b>BOURGOGNE-FRANCHE-COMTÉ</b>	25,9%			31,3%	20,5%
<b>PUGLIA</b>	24,1%		25,9%	23,1%	23,3%
<b>NOUVELLE-AQUITAINE</b>	23,1%			23,0%	23,3%
<b>GUYANE</b>	22,2%			37,0%	7,5%
<b>HAUTS-DE-FRANCE</b>	21,7%			15,1%	28,3%
<b>EXTREMADURA</b>	21,6%	23,1%	21,7%	18,9%	22,8%
<b>MOLISE</b>	20,4%		20,2%	22,2%	18,6%
<b>REGION DE MURCIA</b>	20,3%	25,8%	22,8%	18,7%	14,1%
<b>ABRUZZO</b>	20,2%		18,6%	21,9%	20,0%
<b>MELILLA</b>	18,8%	20,5%	0,0%	14,8%	40,0%
<b>ÎLE-DE-FRANCE</b>	18,3%			15,4%	21,3%
<b>HAMBURG</b>	17,9%			17,2%	18,6%
<b>RHEINLAND-PFALZ</b>	17,9%			24,4%	11,4%
<b>PAYS DE LA LOIRE</b>	17,6%			22,9%	12,4%
<b>LA RIOJA</b>	17,5%	21,8%	10,9%	19,3%	17,9%
<b>BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG</b>	17,1%			16,3%	17,8%
<b>LAZIO</b>	16,6%		17,4%	18,3%	14,1%
<b>COMUNIDAD DE MADRID</b>	16,5%	20,9%	13,9%	15,4%	15,7%
<b>UMBRIA</b>	16,0%		14,5%	17,6%	15,9%

<b>NORDRHEIN-WESTPHALEN</b>	15,4%		14,0%	16,8%	
<b>MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN</b>	15,2%		16,0%	14,4%	
<b>SACHSEN</b>	15,0%		14,1%	15,8%	
<b>MARCHE</b>	14,6%		15,9%	11,8%	16,1%
<b>CASTILLA LA MANCHA</b>	13,9%	15,1%	13,8%	16,8%	9,9%
<b>THÜRINGEN</b>	13,5%		10,0%	16,9%	
<b>CASTILLA Y LEON</b>	12,7%	17,9%	11,1%	10,8%	10,9%
<b>CENTRE-VAL DE LOIRE</b>	12,2%		16,2%	8,2%	
<b>SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN</b>	12,0%		10,6%	13,5%	
<b>HESSEN</b>	11,3%		9,3%	13,2%	
<b>BRANDENBURG</b>	10,8%		14,5%	7,1%	
<b>NIEDERSACHSEN</b>	10,0%		7,0%	13,0%	
<b>SACHSEN-ANHALT</b>	8,6%		4,8%	12,3%	
<b>BERLIN</b>	7,4%		13,2%	1,6%	
<b>BREMEN</b>	6,9%		5,6%	8,3%	