



THE REYNOLDS
COMPANY
ELECTRICAL SUPPLY

Machine Safety vs Process Safety - SIL vs PLe

May 19, 2021

Our Guest Panelists

Justin Ryan

ISA Certified Automation Professional

ISA84 SIS Expert

TÜV Cyber Security Specialist

Rockwell Automation

Eric Bombere

*Functional Safety Engineer –
Machinery (TÜV Rheinland)*

Rockwell Automation

2021 Online Events

Register to receive a calendar invite



- **Tech Talks**

- **PowerFlex Integration with Fisher ROC**

Wed, May 26, 2021 @ 10am

- **Stratix 5800 / Networks update**

Wed, June 9, 2021 @ 10am

- **Rockwell Automation Integrated Services Agreements**

Wed, June 23, 2021 @ 10am

- **User Groups**

- **System Redundancy Best Practices**

Wed, June 19, 2021 @ 10am

reynoldsonline.com



Intro to Safety – Machinery and Process

Improving Productivity and Safety Compliance

May 2021

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

**Rockwell
Automation**

Machine Safety




www.rockwellautomation.com

Machinery Safe Guarding & E-Stop



Controls & Safety Measures



<https://www.osha.gov/dts/osta/lototraining/hottopics/ht-relche-1-2.html>

What Is “Functional Safety?”

Formal Definition: “part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and EUC control system that depends on the correct functioning of E/E/PE safety related systems and other risk reduction measures” (IEC 61508-4 2010)

Practical Definition: Use of an automation system to guarantee safety of people

Some Standards to know & love

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

ISO 13849-1

Third edition
2015-12-15

Safety of machinery — Safety-related

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 13849-2

Second edition
2012-09-15

Safety-related systems —

des systèmes de commande relatifs

Reference number
ISO 13849-2:2012(2)

© ISO 2012

American National Standard

ANSI B11.26

American National Standard for Machinery

Functional Safety for Equipment

ANSI B11.19-2019

American National Standard

Performance Requirements for Risk Reduction Measures:
Safeguarding and other Means of Reducing Risk

ANSI-Accredited Standards Developer and Secretariat:



B11 Standards, Inc.
POB 66666
Houston, TX 77269, USA

APPROVED: 11 OCTOBER 2019
by the American National Standards Institute
Board of Standards Review



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ANSI B11.0 – 2020

American National Standard
Safety of Machinery

ANSI-Accredited Standards Developer and Secretariat:

ANSI/ISA R15.06-2012

american national standard

NFPA

79

Electrical Standard for Industrial Machinery
Safety Requirements

2018



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NFPA 70
National
Electrical
Code


2020




Example “Functional Safety” Control System



Example “Functional Safety” Control System



Example "Functional Safety" Control System



What's the likelihood (%)?
This will work when needed?

Is this "safe enough" for
"long enough"? 20 yrs. Mission time?

Is this "Safe Enough"?
Is it "overdesigned"
(spent too much \$?)

Electromechanical stuff = wear & tear



Example "Functional Safety" Control System

What's the likelihood (%)?
This will work when needed?


Is it "overdesigned"?
Is this "Safe Enough"?

Is this "safe enough" for
"long enough"? 20 yrs. Mission time?



Electronics stuff = time & temperature failures

Machine Safety Lifecycle



Risk Assessment “Scoring Systems” – Elements of Risk

6.4 Assess initial risk

The risks associated with each hazard shall be assessed using the following steps:

- 1) Select a risk scoring system ([6.4.1](#));
- 2) Assess risk using the risk factors of the risk scoring system ([6.4.2](#));
- 3) Derive a risk level ([6.4.3](#)).

*Continuous exposure?
Once an hour?
Once a month?*



*Bruise?
Cut?
Break?
Loss of limb?*

*Easy to avoid?
Slow moving machine?
Not possible to avoid?
Can't see see it coming?*

Risk Estimation / Scoring Systems & Models

HRN – “Hazard Rating Number”

- The likelihood of occurrence (LO)
- The frequency of exposure (FE)
- The degree of possible harm (DPH)
- The number of persons at risk (NP)

$LO \times FE \times DPH \times NP = H.R.N.$

$0.1 \times 0.1 \times 4 \times 1 = 0.04$

Degree of risk: = Negligible

$LO \times FE \times DPH \times NP = H.R.N.$

$2 \times 5 \times 4 \times 1 = 40$

Degree of risk: = Significant

N° Persons	Factor	Frequency	Factor
1-2 Persons	1.00	Annual	0.50
3 -7 Persons	2.00	Monthly	1.00
8 -15 Persons	4.00	Weekly	1.50
16 - 50 Persons	8.00	Daily	2.50
More than 50	12.00	Hourly	4.00
		Constant	5.00

Probability	Factor
Little/low possibility, under extreme circumstances	0.03
Highly improbable, but still likely	1.00
Improbable, but still possible	1.50
Possible, but unusual	2.00
Although improbable, it may occur	5.00
Probable , Not surprising	8.00
Probable , Can be expected	10.00
Certain , No doubt	15.00

Max. Loss	Factor
Scratch, bruise	0.10
Burn, cut, short illness	0.50
Minor bone fracture or minor temporary illness	2.00
Major bone fracture or major temporary illness	4.00
Loss of a limb, eye or hearing, permanent	6.00
Loss of two limbs, eyes or hearing, permanent	10.00
Fatality	15.00


HRN Result	Min.	Max	Colour
Negligible	0	5	Green
Low but relevant	5	50	Orange
High	50	500	Red
Unacceptable	500	10000000000	Red

Functional Safety Design

■ **IF** *we're going to use Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronics/Pneumatics/Hydraulics as part of the Safety System to be implemented,*

■ **THEN** *we need to design, verify & validate that system is adequate for the requirements*

■ **HOW** *do we do that???*



Design Requirements Commensurate with Risk Assessment


Table 2 – Risk level decision matrix

Severity of Injury	Exposure to the Hazard	Avoidance of the Hazard	Risk Level
S1 - Minor	E0 - Prevented		NEGLIGIBLE
	E1 - Low	A1 - Likely	
	E2 - High	A2/A3 - Not likely/ Not possible	
S2 - Moderate	E0 - Prevented		MEDIUM
	E1 - Low		
	E2 - High	A1 - Likely	
S3 - Serious	E0 - Prevented		LOW
	E1 - Low		HIGH
	E2 - High	A1/A2 - Likely/Not likely	HIGH
		A3 - Not possible	VERY HIGH
			VERY HIGH

Ref: ANSI/RIA TR R15.306



Table 5 – Minimum functional safety performance

Risk Level	PL _r	Structure Category
NEGLIGIBLE (see 6.5.3.1)	b	-
LOW	c	2
MEDIUM	d	2
HIGH	d	3
VERY HIGH (see 6.5.3.2)	e	4



Functional Safety Design

- Decide & Design appropriate levels of
- Redundancy?
 - Diagnostics & Monitoring?
 - Component & System Reliability?
 - Other System Design criteria?



Door / Gate Interlock Switch



Safety Monitoring Relay




Safety-Rated Motor Control

Categories / Architecture / Structure

- **Category B** (“Basic” – nothing special)




- **1** (“Safety Rated” devices)



- **2** (Testing/Monitoring/Diagnostics)

- **3** (Redundancy + Testing)




- **4** (Highest level of testing)

Calculate Performance Level of the Safety Function

- PL is based on combination of
 - Category (Architecture)
 - MTTFd (years)
 - Diagnostic Coverage %
 - Common Cause Failures #


$$MTTF_D = 2/3 \left[\frac{MTTF_D(ch1) + MTTF_D(ch2) - \frac{1}{\frac{1}{MTTF_D(ch1)} + \frac{1}{MTTF_D(ch2)}}}{1} \right]$$




$$DC_{avg} = \frac{\frac{DC1}{MTTFd1} + \frac{DC2}{MTTFd2} + \dots + \frac{DCN}{MTTFdN}}{\frac{1}{MTTFd1} + \frac{1}{MTTFd2} + \dots + \frac{1}{MTTFdN}}$$

Design to, and verify, Performance Level (PL)

- PL is based on combination of
 - Category (Architecture)
 - MTTF_d (years)
 - Diagnostic Coverage %
 - Common Cause Failures #



Do this for Each Safety Function on the Machine



What about Safety Integrity Levels?

ISO 13849-1: Performance Levels (PL)

IEC 62061: Safety Integrity Levels (SIL)

Table 3 — Relationship between performance level (PL) and safety integrity level (SIL)

PL	SIL (IEC 61508-1, for information) high/continuous mode of operation
a	No correspondence
b	1
c	1
d	2
e	3

When a safety-related control function is designed using one or more SRP/CS, each SRP/CS shall be designed either according to this part of ISO 13849 or according to IEC 62061/IEC 61508 (see also ISO/TR 23849) — although there is correspondence between the PLs of this part of ISO 13849 and the SILs of IEC 61508 and IEC 62061. SRP/CSs are to be combined according to [6.3](#).

What about Safety Integrity Levels?

ISO 13849-1: Performance Levels (PL)

IEC 62061: Safety Integrity Levels (SIL)

Standard:	ISO 13849-1	IEC 62061
“Ratings”:	PL (a ... e)	SIL (1,2,3)
Redundancy:	Structure (category: B,1,2,3,4)	Architecture (<u>A</u> , <u>B</u> ,C,D)
Reliability:	MTTF _d	PFH _D
Diagnostic/Monitoring (%)	DC	SFF
Common Cause Failures:	CCF Score 65 / 100	CCF, β factor (%)
Notes:	Readily applied to electromechanical devices	Readily applied to electronic systems

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition, published in 2005, Amendment 1:2012 and Amendment 2:2015. This edition constitutes a technical revision.




This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:

1. – structure has been changed and contents have been updated to reflect the design process of the safety function,
2. – standard extended to non-electrical technologies,
3. – definitions updated to be aligned with IEC 61508-4,
4. – functional safety plan introduced and configuration management updated (Clause 4),
5. – requirements on parametrization expanded (Clause 6),
6. – reference to requirements on security added (Subclause 6.8),
7. – requirements on periodic testing added (Subclause 6.9),
8. – various improvements and clarification on architectures and reliability calculations (Clause 6 and Clause 7),
9. – shift from "SILCL" to "maximum SIL" of a subsystem (Clause 7),
10. – use cases for software described including requirements (Clause 8),
11. – requirements on independence for software verification (Clause 8) and validation activities (Clause 9) added,
12. – new informative annex with examples (Annex G),
13. – new informative annexes on typical MTTFD values, diagnostics and calculation methods for the architectures (Annex C, Annex D and Annex H).

NEW Edition

IEC62061 “2nd Edition” (2021)

extended to non-electrical technologies



For pneumatic, mechanical and electromechanical components (pneumatic valves, relays, contactors, position switches, cams or position switches, etc.) it can be difficult to calculate the mean time to dangerous failure ($MTTF_D$ for components), which is given in years. Usually the manufacturers of these kinds of components only give the mean number of cycles until 10 % of the components fail dangerously (B_{10D}). This Clause 7 gives a method for calculating an $MTTF_D$ for components by using B_{10D} given by the manufacturer related closely to the application dependent cycles.

Figure 4 – Example of a combination of subsystems :

NOTE 3 Hydraulic components are mostly characterized with $MTTF_D$.

If the appropriate basic and well-tried safety principles are met, the $MTTF_D$ value for a single pneumatic, electromechanical or mechanical component can be estimated.

The mean number of cycles until 10 % of the components fail dangerously (B_{10D}) should be

IEC62061 “2nd Edition” (2021)



6.8 Security aspects

Security covers intentional attacks on the hardware, application programs and related software, as well as unintended events resulting from human error.

NOTE 1 Security aspects are considered in the security lifecycle of the machine (or higher system level) and throughout the life cycle of the machine.

NOTE 2 Since this document does not provide specific requirements on security aspects, guidance is provided in IEC TR 63074, ISA TR84.00.09, ISO/IEC 27001:2013, ISO TR 22100-4 and IEC 62443 (all parts).



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Process Safety



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Safety Moment

Safety Complacency



15-year anniversary of Texas City explosion

- 15 people killed; 180 people injured
- \$1.5B in financial loss
- Operational procedures were not followed
- Personnel training was inadequate
- Instrumentation failed or provided false information
- HMI did not provide adequate process information
- Blowdown drum was citing by OSHA in 1992
- “In the years prior to the incident, **eight** serious releases of flammable material from the ISOM blowdown stack had occurred”
- Contractors were attending a lunch celebrating a month without a worktime injury

Remember

1. A safety incident does not have to be a violation of the daily routine, it can be a product of it.
2. Good safety performance can lead to a false sense of safety
3. Always question any deviations from defined risk levels
4. Study near-misses from the viewpoint of *normalization of deviation*
5. Utilize outside & independent evaluations



KEY ISSUES:

SAFETY CULTURE
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
PROCESS SAFETY METRICS
HUMAN FACTORS

BP

TEXAS CITY, TEXAS
MARCH 23, 2005

Process Safety Overview

*Process Safety means different things to different people, so the first thing to do is to define what Process Safety is **NOT**, then to explain what it actually **IS** (and what standards cover it).*

Process Safety **IS NOT** about choosing a certified logic solver and calling it “Done”.

Process Safety **IS ACHIEVED** by following series of well defined activities starting with identifying and quantifying **RISK**, then implementing and managing safeguards to **Reduce and Maintain** that risk to an acceptable (tolerable) level, throughout the life of the Process.

Risk is defined by how often (frequency) and how bad (consequence) a hazardous event may be should it occur.

Risk Reduction is the SIL (Safety Integrity Level) required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.

IEC Standards Structure

Basic Safety Standard (BSS)

Defines “Functional Safety”

Defines the “Rules”

for achieving Functional Safety

(regardless of application, technology or industry)



IEC 61508 International Performance Based Standard for all Industries

This standard is also used to assess/certify the suitability of Technology for use in Safety Applications.

Sector Standards

IEC 61511 is now published as
ANSI/ISA61511 – 1:2018



IEC 61511 - Process Industry



IEC 61513 - Nuclear Sector



IEC 62061 - Machinery

Legal Requirement for Process Safety

OSHA Process Safety Management

In 1991 OSHA published 29CFR1910.119, Process Safety Management (PSM) of highly hazardous chemicals.


- Where it applies
 - “A process which involves a chemical at or above the specified threshold quantities...”
 - **10,000lbs of Anhydrous Ammonia**
 - **1,500lbs of Hydrogen Sulfide**
 - **10,000lbs of Flammable Liquid (flashpoint <100°F) or Gas (Category 1)**
 - “This OSHA standard is required by the Clean Air Act Amendments as is the EPA’s Risk Management Plan.”
- Even in industries that aren’t required to follow PSM, they often look to PSM as a best practices (RAGAGEP)

— OSHA PSM Problem Statement

Unexpected releases of toxic, reactive, or flammable liquids and gases in processes involving highly hazardous chemicals have been reported for many years. Incidents continue to occur in various industries that use highly hazardous chemicals which may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive, or may exhibit a combination of these properties. **Regardless of the industry that uses these highly hazardous chemicals, there is a potential for an accidental release any time they are not properly controlled.** This, in turn, creates the possibility of disaster.

IEC61511 – What is it ?

*It is THE sector standard for the Process Sector, a sector defined as:
“a wide variety of industries within the process sector for example, chemicals, oil and gas, pulp and paper, pharmaceuticals, food and beverage, and non-nuclear power generation”.*



- This standard takes the relevant parts of IEC61508 then applies ‘Process Sector’ language making it understandable to “Process Users”.

e.g.

EUC risk (IEC61508)

risk arising from the EUC or its interaction with the EUC control system

process risk (IEC61511)

risk arising from the process conditions caused by abnormal events (including BPCS malfunction).

IEC61511 = how to apply IEC61508 in the Process Sector

Other Important Standards (Application Standards)

IEC/ISA61511 is a standard that simply addresses how to mitigate identified hazards, specifically those in the Process Sector. It does not attempt to be specific about whether the hazard is related to Burner Management, Toxic exposure due to leaks, etc. It simply says that whatever the Hazard is (or what equipment is involved), here is a method you can use to quantify how much risk reduction is required to prevent the consequences.


NFPA – National Fire Protection Association

- NFPA85 – specific guidelines for Boilers
- NFPA86 – specific guidelines for Ovens and Furnaces
- NFPA87 – specific guidelines for Heaters
- NFPA72 – specific guidelines for Fire Alarm systems (not Gas and not Protection systems)

API – American Petroleum Institute


- API14C – specific guidelines for safety in offshore platforms (legal requirement in GoM)
- API17F – specific guidelines for Subsea Production systems
- API556 – specific guidelines for Heaters (Production, Refining and Chemicals)

Layers of Protection



Process Safety Lifecycle

Analysis Phase – Assessing Risk




The “Risk Reduction” is performed by identifying and quantifying the SAFEGUARDS, this is important to understand the effectiveness of the safeguards.

The “Risk Assessment” is performed assuming NO SAFEGUARDS, this is important to the next step. This analysis is done on the basis of understanding both the CONSEQUENCE of an event and the FREQUENCY of an event.

Safety Integrity Levels

Risk Reduction Factors



- SIL targets are assigned to each Safety Instrument Functions(SIF) NOT to the system.
- SIL is NOT a measure of reliability, it is a measure of the degree of risk reduction needed to meet a target
- SIL covers a range of risk reduction, appropriate Risk Reduction Factors(RRF) should be determined for a SIF.

SIL	RRF
SIL 1	$10 \leq RRF < 100$
SIL 2	$100 \leq RRF < 1000$
SIL 3	$1000 \leq RRF < 10000$


SIS Controller Portfolio



Small Applications

Compact GuardLogix®

- Multiple control disciplines
- Flexible and scalable
- Real-time information-enabled
- Standard, unmodified Ethernet
- One common integrated design environment
- Local and distributed I/O options



Large Applications

GuardLogix®



Process Safety Configured

ControlLogix w/1715 I/O


- Common platform with BPCS
- Fault Tolerant logic solver and I/O
- Online edit capability for safety logic
- Common programming environment



Process safety

AADvance® /Trusted®

- Scalable redundancy for fault tolerance
- Provides safety and availability requirements
- Diverse SIS offering
- Distributed processing power



Safety Functions Documents – Example Application Techniques

- Well over 100 examples
- BOM, Wiring, Configuration/Programming
- Verification & Validation
- Some now have .DXF, .ACD, other files attached

Click or Scan:




Link here: www.machinesafety.com

Application Technique Allen-Bradley

Emergency Stop Products: Integrated Safety Controller Connected to a Series of Dual-channel E-stop Buttons Safety Function


Products: GuardLogix 5570 or Compact GuardLogix 5370 Controller, POINT Guard I/O Safety Module, Dual-channel E-stop Button
Safety Rating: Cat. 3, PLd to ISO 13849-1: 2015



Topic	Page
Important Read Information	2
Summary of Changes	3
General Safety Information	3
Introduction	4
Safety Function Evaluation: Risk Assessment	5
Emergency Stop Safety Function	5
Safety Function Requirements	5
Functional Safety Description	6
RIS of the Risk	6
Setup and Wiring	7
Configuration	9
Programming	9
Calculation of the Performance Level	11
Notification and Validation Plan	13
Additional Resources	14

LISTEN. THINK. SOLVE! Allen-Bradley · Rockwell Software **Rockwell Automation**

Safety Functions Documents – Example Application Techniques



- Many now have attachments
- In Adobe, click the *paperclip icon*
 - AutoCad & ePlan files
 - .ACD file for Logix
 - SISTEMA File
 - Verification & Validation checklists

Click or Scan:



Link here: www.machinesafety.com

Safety Solutions

Safety Management

Deliver a measurable difference to plant safety, performance, and profitability

Optimize Performance

Machine Safety

Improve safety and performance, reduce development time to ISO 13849-1, IEC 62061

Increase Productivity

Process Safety

Safety instrumented systems to protect your people, assets, and the environment

Reduce Risk

Electrical Safety

Arc containment safety technologies and services

Reduce Exposure

Optimize Safety, Productivity, and Design Time

Services, Tools, and Technology for Best-in-class Performance

Numerous studies show that best-in-class performers achieve 5 to 7% higher OEE, 2 to 4% less unscheduled



www.machinesafety.com

- Whitepapers
- Videos
- Blog topics
- Application Examples
- Engineering Resources
- Self Maturity Self-Assessment tools
- Smart Safety Devices & Systems
- Software tools
- And more ... !



SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE AGE OF IIoT AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

Driving Business Performance Through Operational Excellence

CONNECTED

f t in @rockwell.com

LNS

MACHINERY SAFEBOOK 5

Allen-Bradley
GuardMaster

Safety related control systems for machinery
Principles, standards and Implementation
Devoted to the Safebook series

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Rockwell Automation

Safety through Security

Protecting People, the Environment and Critical Infrastructure against Industrial Security Threats

As industrial operations become more connected, organizations are making significant security investments to help protect their intellectual property, their operators and their brand. However, the inherent safety implications of security risks are too often overlooked. Integrating safety and security programs and following key steps, manufacturers and industrial operators can assess, manage and mitigate the cybersecurity risks of any assets in a connected enterprise.

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Reimagining Safety In The Connected Enterprise



harnessing the power of safety and operational data can substantially improve safety compliance and performance. The Connected Enterprise enables this, empowering safety professionals with a real-time understanding of worker behaviors, machinery compliance, causes of safety shutdowns or stoppages, and safety anomalies and trends.

Design Your Safety System for Improved Uptime

Chris Dwyer - Manager, Safety Business Development

Incorporating integrated safety technologies in the design stage can increase machinery availability, reduce MTTR and improve productivity.

It's a bit of a truism: **safer is also better** – safety and productivity are inseparable sides of the same coin in the manufacturing environment. Safety has traditionally been associated with compliance – both with regulatory requirements, sometimes not seeing past a need to meet their individual goals.

"There's no day that goes by that I don't acquire a savings in some stage or form with our safety systems."

Mike Douglas, Safety Manager or Health, Safety and Engineering for **General Motors**

However, top-performing practitioners are showing the opposite side of the coin with the use of contemporary approaches to safety. These leaders are using a combination of integrated safety solutions and new international standards to collect their machinery, optimize plant productivity. Simply put, safety is no longer just about staying, it's also about maximizing the value-related outcomes that under your ability to manage risk.

The key to the success of safety events – which inevitably occur when someone is in danger – and to make safety technologies that can make the length of those events. It's a matter of the design stage. Designing safety into your machinery upfront, with an individual view rather than a one-size-fits-all, can result in a more holistic system that can be optimized for better recovery.

Underpinning the standards that apply to your various machinery designs is all applications – and when it comes to compliance for the latest safety technologies – it's also crucial. A recent Global Design & Analytics survey found that the top safety design standard (32 percent) for machinery solutions was determining what standards and regulations apply. Standards are becoming more and more complex, with regulatory requirements and safety standards in the top three behind their respective safety practices.

This paper will guide you through some of the more common safety technologies, relevant standards and key compliance examples – all with the goal of ensuring safety of the safety of machinery uptime.



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Thank you!



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