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לעילוי נשמת אחי ורבי הרב ישראל יוסף אליהו בן ר׳ טוביה הלוי זצ״ל

ולעילוי נשמת ר׳ יצחק בן יהודה ז״ל

Note: This Shiur it is not intended as a source of practical Halachic (legal) rulings. For matters of Halacha (practical details of Jewish law), please consult a qualified Posek (rabbi).

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I. Introduction

The focus of this presentation is to explore the possible approaches for permitting multifetal pregnancy reduction (abbreviated as: MPR) in Halacha, by applying the teachings of the Talmud (Mishna, Braita and Gemara), post-Talmudic commentators and *Poskim* (Halachic authorities).

Multifetal pregnancies (abbreviated as: MFP) are associated with several risks including complete pregnancy loss (miscarriage and stillbirth) and very preterm birth (i.e., occurring before 32 completed weeks of gestation) which is often complicated by postnatal mortality (i.e., death after birth) and long-term disabilities. MPR is a procedure performed by obstetricians to reduce the number of fetuses *in utero* in a MFP, to improve the survival probability of the remaining fetuses. Reducing the number of fetuses leads to improved outcomes, as measured by lower rates of miscarriage, fewer very preterm births and reduced postnatal mortality (see Appendix C, p. 50). MPR is usually performed between 9 to 15 weeks of gestational age. Historically, MPR has been generally performed in triplet or higher-order pregnancies; however, cases of twin to singleton pregnancy reductions have also been reported.

It is understood that the goal of MPR is to optimize the survival chances of the remaining fetuses in cases where there is a high risk of fetal death without intervention. Yet, since MPR, by definition, terminates one or more fetal lives, contemporary *Poskim* and religious physicians have endeavored to understand how Halacha views this predicament. This dilemma falls into the rubric of a general question: Can we end one life to save another life? Generally, taking a life cannot be justified even if it is the sole means for promoting the survival of another life. This principle is described in Tractate Oholot as: אין דוחין נפשׁ מפני נפשׁ מפני נפשׁ"), i.e., we may not push aside one life on account of another life. Nonetheless, in very limited applications discussed below, we are instructed to save a life even if this will lead to the demise of another life. The following discussion describes selected applications and limits of y אין ציוחין נפשׁ מפני נפשׁ

וח the course of this discussion, we will explore two different approaches for permitting MPR in cases where the failure to intervene will lead to a high risk of total fetal/neonatal death (i.e., death either *in utero* or shortly after birth). One approach is derived from the discussion in the Talmud concerning the ruling that one must give up his or her life not to commit murder: יהרג ואל יעבור (i.e., be killed rather than transgress). Perhaps the basis for the rule is more valuable than any other life, may not apply in a case of multifetal pregnancy if the fetuses are likely to perish without intervention. If this is true, perhaps the principle of אין דוחין also will not apply under these conditions and MPR may therefore, be permitted. The second approach for permitting MPR is the expense of the pursuer's life. According to this approach, the fetuses that will be reduced (i.e., aborted) are considered as "pursuers" after the other fetuses. We develop this approach through the brilliant writings of the *Gaon* and *Tzaddik*, Rav Moshe Feinstein, 72%, (who was a

leading Halachic decisor, *Posek*, spanning a half-century period in America, who will henceforth be referred to as: "Rav Moshe") in his magnum opus, *Igros Moshe*. These approaches are built on two Talmudic cases, the "obstructed labor" and the "fugitive" situations, which will be explained below with different interpretations and their applications to MPR.

II. Two approaches to potentially permit multifetal pregnancy reduction:

Notwithstanding the general principle of אין דוחין, we will examine two approaches that could be applied to permit MPR in certain cases. These approaches, which originate from two different "life-vs.-life" discussions in the Talmud, will be referred to as: 1) the מאי הזית logic; and 2) the דין רודף.

1. The "coerced murder" case and the מאי חזית logic:

Definitions:

- α: The coerced person: The Jewish person who was ordered by the governor (i.e., the hooligan) to kill another Jew (β) under the threat of being killed if he refused.
- β : The hooligan's target: The person who α was ordered to kill.
- A. The Gemara Sanhedrin (Source 1) states that שׁפּיכת דמים (murder, i.e., violating the prohibition of לא תרצה, "do not commit murder"), is one of the three prohibitions for which one must sacrifice his or her own life rather than transgress. This ruling is called יהרג ואל יעבור.

Source 1: Talmud Bavli - Sanhedrin 74a: Three cases where Halacha requires one to sacrifice his life to avoid transgressing – (יהרג ואל יעבור).

רבי יוחנן said in the name of רבי יוחנן: They took a vote	<u>סנהדרין דף עד עמוד א</u> :
and decided in the attic of Nitzah's home in Lod: Concerning all	אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשׁוּם רַבִּי שָׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוֹצָדָק
prohibitions in the Torah, if they tell a person, "transgress and you	נִמְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ בַּעֲליַת בֵּית נִתְּזָה בְּלוֹד: כָּל עֲבֵירוֹת
will not be killed [but if you refuse to do so, we will kill you]," he	שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה אִם אוֹמְרִין לַאָדָם עֲבוֹר וְאַל תֵּהָרֵג
should transgress and not allow himself to be killed, except for idol	יַעֲבוֹר וְאַל יֵהָרֵג, חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים וְגִלּוּי
worship, illicit relations and murder (for which a person must	
sacrifice his life rather than transgress).	עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים.

B. The Gemara (Source 2) states that the Rabbis deduced the Halacha of יהרג ואל יעבור with respect to גמרא (murder), through a logical reasoning (סברא), for which the גמרא recounts a true incident: The governor ordered person "\alpha" to kill person "\beta" or else the governor would kill \alpha. (This case will henceforth be called the "coerced murder" case). רבא (or הבא nuled that \alpha must be killed rather than kill \beta because of the following logic: "גאי הזית"

ידרמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דההוא גברא סומק טפי "Why do you presume that your blood is redder? Maybe that man's blood is redder." This reasoning will henceforth be called the "מאי מאי logic".

Source 2: Talmud Bavli - Yoma 82b: Reason for the יהרג ואל יעבור ruling in the "coerced murder" case: The מאי חזית logic.

From where do we know that a person must sacrifice his life rather	יומא דף פב, עמוד ב:
than commit murder? It is based on logic (סברא) [as we see from	ןרוֹצַם גוֹפֵיה מְנָא לָן ? סְבָרָא הִיא. דְהַהוּא דְאָתָא
the following incident]: A certain person ($lpha$) came before רבא and	
told him, "The governor of my village said to me, 'Go kill So-and-So	לְקַמֵיהּ דְרָבָא וְאָמַר לֵיה אָמַר לִי מָרִי דוּרָאי זִיל
($oldsymbol{eta}$), and if you do not [kill him], I will kill you.'" רבא replied to him	קַטְלֵיה לִפְלָנְיָא וְאִי לא קַטְלִינָא לָדְ. אָמַר לֵיה
($lpha$), "Let him kill you and do not kill ($meta$). Why do you presume that	לְקְטָלוּך וְלֹא תִקְטוֹל. מַאי חָזִית דְדָמָא דִידָךָ סוּמָק
your blood is redder [than $oldsymbol{eta}$'s blood]? Perhaps the blood of that man ($oldsymbol{eta}$) is redder."	? טְפֵי דִילְמָא דָמָא דְהַהוּא גַבְרָא סוּמָק טְפֵי

- C. What is the meaning of the מאי הזית logic and how does it dictate the Halacha of יהרג ואל יעבור by שפיכת דמים (the "coerced murder" case)? The following two approaches are presented:
 - i. <u>Approach 1</u>: The מאי חזית logic operates from a perspective of uncertainty, i.e., since we do not know whose life is considered more valuable, the uncertainty dictates that one must maintain a passive stance (שב ואל תעשה) to avoid arbitrarily selecting who should be allowed to live versus who should be killed, even at the pain of his own death (Talmeidai Rabbeinu Yonah, Reference 1; see also p. 45, Source B-2). Rav Nochum Partzovitz (Reference 2) attributes this approach to Tosfot in Sanhedrin 74b.

According to this approach, in cases of MFP where there is a high risk of total fetal/neonatal death, an argument could be made to permit MPR. Since the fetuses that would be reduced (i.e., aborted) via the MPR procedure would likely die anyway if we remained passive, perhaps it is not considered selecting them for death and therefore, the מאי חזית logic would not apply. This will be discussed further below (see VII-2-C, p. 25).

ii. <u>Approach 2</u>: Rashi (Source 3) explains that although the גמרא derives the principle that מצות are pushed aside for the preservation of life from the words "והי בהם" (Vayikra 18:5, *"and he shall live by them"*, Source 4), this "והי בהם-dispensation" does not extend to the prohibition against murder because of the מאי הזית logic: If *a* would murder *β* to save his own life, the intent of the "והי בהם-dispensation", i.e., preservation of a Jewish life, cannot be fulfilled because a Jewish life (*β*'s life) will be lost through the very violation of the מצוה (i.e., transgression of the לא תרצה). In the absence of the והי בהם-dispensation", the ascence of the מצוה be observed even at the cost of his (*a*'s) own life. (See Figure 1, p. 5 for a schematic

diagram of Rashi's explanation). Rav Moshe, when discussing this Rashi, adds, *"Therefore, we infer [from Rashi] that with regard to this* דין [*of* דין], *his (\alpha's) life and the life of his friend (\beta) are equal"* (Reference 3). Possibly, Rav Moshe inferred the equality of both lives (α and β) from Rashi's explanation that the intent of the "בהם"-dispensation" is negated when the preservation of one life is neutralized by the destruction of another equally valued life (see Appendix B, pp. 43-49, for further aspects of Rashi's view of the α may an another explanation).

Source 3: Rashi's explanation of the מאי חזית logic: Inapplicability of the "coercedmurder" case (Talmud Bavli - Sanhedrin 74a):

[The logic is]: $lpha$ may not push aside his friend ($oldsymbol{eta}$'s) life which entails two	
[negative consequences, "תרתי"], a loss of ($oldsymbol{eta}'s$) life and transgression of	שלא תדחה נפש חבירו דאיכא תרתי אבוד
an עבירה (i.e., לא תרצה), in order to save himself [from being killed] which	נשמה ועבירה מפני נפשו דליכא אלא חדא
would only entail one [negative consequence, "הדא"], a loss of ($lpha$'s) life,	אבוד נשמה והוא לא יעבור.
but he will <u>not</u> transgress (לא תרצה).	
-וחי בהם" based on the מצות The Torah only permitted us to violate	דכי אמר רחמנא לעבור על המצות משום וחי
dispensation" because a Jewish life is precious in the eyes of Hashem.	בהם משום דיקרה בעיניו נשמה של ישראל.
However, here, regarding [the transgression of] murder, [i.e., if $lpha$ kills $oldsymbol{eta}$,	והכא גבי רוצח כיון דסוף סוף איכא איבוד
the "והי בהם-dispensation" will <u>not</u> apply for the following reason]: Since	נשמה למה יהא מותר לעבור ?
a life will be lost in any event, why should it be permitted to transgress?	בשכוח לכוח לחדו לעבוד:
Who says (<i>literally:</i> who knows) that your ($oldsymbollpha'$ s) life is dearer to Hashem	מי יודע שנפשו חביבה ליוצרו יותר מנפש
than your friend ($oldsymbol{eta}'$ s) life?	חבירו ?
Therefore, the word of Hashem (לא תרצה) may not be pushed aside.	הלכך דבר המקום לא ניתן לדחות.

<u>רש״י, סנהדרין דף עד ע״א, ד״ה סברא הוא:</u>

Source 4: Basis for the dispensation to suspend nearly all מצות for the preservation of human life: The "בהם-dispensation" (Vayikra 18:5 and Talmud Bavli - Yoma 85b).


You shall observe my statutes and ordinances which a man shall do and live by them, I am Hashem.	<u>ויקרא פרק יח: פסוק ה</u> : וּשְׁמַרְתָּם אֶת חֵקֹּתֵי וְאֶת מִשְׁפָּטֵי אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה אֹתָם הָאָדָם וָתֵי בָּהֶם אַנִי יקוק.
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The words "והי בהם"	<u>יומא דף פה עמוד ב</u> :
teach us that he shall live by them (the מצות) and he shall not die	אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל … וחי בהם ולא
by them.	שימות בהם.

Figure 1: Rashi explains the מאי חזית logic as the basis for יהרג ואל יעבור in the "coerced murder" case: The "והי בהם-dispensation" is inapplicable.

If α would murder β to save his own life (*Option 1*), there would be **two negative consequences**: the loss of a life (β 's life) and violation of a מצוה (i.e., transgression of לא תרצה). On the other hand, if α remains passive (Option 2), only one negative consequence would occur: the loss of α' s life, but no מצוה will transgressed. The reason for the "נפש ישראל) is dearer to Hashem than His מצות and thus, He prefers) וחי בהם and thus, He prefers to forego His מצות in favor of preserving a נפש ישראל. However, here, since a life (β) will be lost in end, why should Hashem be willing to forego his מצוה (i.e., why should He allow α to transgress ארצה?

The מאי הזית logic in the "coerced murder" case, according to Rashi:

"תרתי-נגד-הדא" - two negative consequences vs. one negative consequence



". Denotes the fulfillment of a מצוה.

2. Concept of Pursuer - The דין רודף (Source 5):

Definitions:

רודף - Pursuer: Person who endangers the life of a prospective victim.

- נרדף - Pursued person: The prospective victim, whose life is endangered by the רודף.

A. A pursuer who attempts to kill a prospective victim is called a רודף. The Torah authorizes the נרדף or anyone else to preemptively take the רודף's life to save the נרדף.

Source 5: Mishna - Sanhedrin 73a: The דין רודף: Saving the intended victim by killing the pursuer.

These are to be saved at the cost of their (attackers') lives: One	<u>סנהדרין דף עג, עמוד א</u> :
pursuing his fellow man to kill him	וְאֵלוּ הֵן שֶׁמַצִּילין אוֹתָן בְּנַפְשָׁן הָרוֹדֵף אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ
	לַהָּרְגוֹ

- B. For the purposes of this discussion, we will divide pursuers (רודפים) into two categories:
 - i <u>Intentional רודף</u>: This category refers to the classic pursuer who intends to kill or endanger another person. This category may perhaps be expanded to a situation where a person displays blatant disregard for another's life by engaging in an activity with the awareness that it may result in a loss of life even if his goal is not to bring about someone's death.
 - ii <u>Unintentional רודף</u>: This category refers to a pursuer who has no intention to endanger anyone, but nonetheless unwittingly poses a threat to another's life. This type of pursuer may be a passive participant in a process that leads to endangerment of another person, without knowledge nor intent of any potential harmful consequences.
- C. There are two approaches, as to whether the דין רודף applies only to (permit killing) intentional pursuers or to both intentional and unintentional pursuers.
 - i. <u>Intentional pursuit only</u>: According to the *Dina Dechayei* (authored by Rav Chaim Benveniste, Reference 4) and the *Minchat Chinuch* (authored by Rav Yosef Babad, Source 8, p. 8), the דין רודף only applies to cases of intentional pursuit.
 - ii. <u>Intentional and unintentional pursuit</u>: According to the *Chazon Ish* (authored by Rav Avrohom Yeshaya Karelitz, Reference 5; see pp. 57-58) and Rav Moshe (Source 15, p. 17), the דין רודף applies to cases of both intentional and unintentional pursuit.
- D. According to the position that the דין רודף applies even to unintentional pursuit, in cases of MFP where there is a high risk of total fetal/neonatal death, perhaps it would be permitted to reduce one or more of fetuses based on the premise that they pursue after the other fetuses. This will be discussed further below (see VIII, 2-7, pp. 27-30).

- III. The "obstructed labor" situation: When can the mother be saved at the expense of the fetus' life?
 - 1. Mishna, Tractate Oholot (Source 6): 'non-emerged fetus' vs. 'partially-emerged fetus'

This Mishna discusses the case of a woman in mortal danger during obstructed labor. The only way to save her life would be to dismember and remove the fetus. Before the fetus' head has emerged (henceforth described as the 'non-emerged fetus'), the fetus should be cut out (i.e., killed) to save his mother's life. The Mishna's reason to permit sacrificing the fetus is *"because her life takes precedence over his life"*. However, after the emergence of fetus' head (henceforth described as the 'partially emerged fetus'), we must allow the childbirth to proceed although the mother will die, because of the principle of Jetus' head, we may not push aside the fetus' life to save his mother.

Source 6: Mishna - Oholot 7:6: "Obstructed labor" situation:

Source for the permissibility to save the mother at the expense of the unborn fetus.

A woman who Is having difficulty giving birth (and her life is	<u>אהלות פרק ז, משנה ו</u> :
endangered), we cut the fetus within the womb and remove hin	ⁿ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד, מְחַתְּכִין אֶת הַוַלָד
limb-by-limb, because her life has precedence over his life.	110 10 10 1 440 4 3 12 1 10 4 (B 11 0 4 10 4 10 4 10 4 10 4 10 4 10 4
However, if his (i.e., the fetus') *head has emerged, we may not	בְּמֵעֶיהָ וּמוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ אֵבָרִים אֵבָרִים מִפְּנֵי
touch (i.e., kill) him, because we may not push aside one life on	שַׁםיֶיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְםיָיו. יָצָא *ראׁשוֹ, אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ
account of another life.	
*According to the text in Talmud Bavli - Sanhedrin 72b	לְפִי שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נָפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נָפֶשׁ.

Table 1: Summary of the "obstructed labor" situation. Whose life is spared: the mother or the fetus?

Case	Description	What is the Halacha?	Whose life is spared?	Reason stated in the Mishna
'non-emerged fetus'	Fetus is still totally <i>in utero</i>	Cut out the fetus	Mother	The mother's life has precedence over the fetus' life
'partially- emerged fetus'	Fetus' head has emerged during birth process	Remain passive	Fetus	We may not push aside one life to save another life

2. Gemara (Talmud Bavli) - Sanhedrin 72b (Source 7):

In this Gemara, רב הונא states that a child pursuer may be killed to save his prospective victim. posed the following challenge to רב הונא from the above Mishna in Oholot: Since the Mishna rules that we may not kill the *'partially emerged fetus'* to save his mother even though he is the cause of her endangerment, it is apparent that the דין רודף is not applied to kill a child pursuer? The Gemara answers, "שאני התם דמשמיא קא רדפי לה" – *"That (obstructed labor) case is different because she is being pursued by Heaven."* Two explanations of the Gemara's answer are presented:

- A. The Minchat Chinuch (Source 8), who believes the דין רודף does not apply in cases of unintentional pursuit, understands the phrase, "משׁמיא קא רדפי לה" she is pursued by Heaven to mean that, in fact, the 'partially emerged fetus' is not considered a רודף because physiology (childbirth), rather than volition, has endangered his mother's life (per Rabbi Dr. Zalman Levine, Reference 6). Accordingly, the Gemara answers the above question on רב הונא differentiating between the child pursuer and the 'partially emerged fetus', i.e., the דין רודף applies to the former case because the child pursuer intends to kill his prospective victim but not to the latter case because the emerging fetus lacks volition.
- B. The explanation of the Gemara's answer, according to Rav Moshe Feinstein, will be discussed below (VI, 4-6, pp. 14-17).

Source 7: Talmud Bavli - Sanhedrin 72b: Does the דין רודף apply to a child pursuer? Source of the משמיא קא רדפי לה concept.

רב הונא said, If a child pursues his fellow, (the fellow) may be	<u>תלמוד בבלי סנהדרין דף עב, עמוד ב:</u>
saved at the cost of the child's life רב חסדא posed a question	<u> ,, ,,</u>
to רב הונא [from a Mishnah]: <i>"If his (the fetus') head has emerged</i>	אַמַר רַב הוּנָא קַטָן הָרוֹדֵף נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ
we may not touch him for we may not push aside one life on	
account of another person's life." But why not kill the fetus – he is	אַיתִיבֵיה רַב חָסָדָא לְרַב הוּנָא יָצָא ראשׁוֹ אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ
a רודף (pursuer)? [The Gemara answers]: That [obstructed labor	לְפִי שֶׁאֵין דוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ. וָאַמַאי רוֹדֵף הוּא ?
case] is different because she (i.e., the mother) is being pursued	שאני הֶתָם דְּמִשְׁמַיָּא קַא רַדְפֵי לָה.
by Heaven.	

Source 8: *Minchat Chinuch,* Mitzvah 296: The דין רודף does not apply to unintentional pursuit.

(See Supplement 1, Source 3, p. 52, for a more extensive excerpt from the Minchat Chinuch).

The Gemara in Sanhedrin states that a child pursuer may be killed to	<u>מנחת חינוך, מצוה רצו</u> :
save his prospective victim. The Gemara asked from the Mishna in	דהנה מבואר בסנהדרין שם דאף קטן הרודף ניתן
Oholot, " If his head has emerged, we may not touch him because	להצילו בנפשו. ומקשה הש״ס ממשנה דאהלות
we may not push aside one life on account of another life. But - why	,
not kill the fetus – he is a רודף?" The Gemara answered, "that	יצא ראשו, אין נוגעין בו מפני שאין דוחין נפש מפני
[obstructed labor case] is different because she is being pursued from	נפש. ואמאי הא הוי ליה רודף ? ומשני הש״ס שאני
Heaven." Hence, the fetus is not a רודף and it is forbidden to save	התם דמשמיא קא רדפי לה, ואם כן לא הוי רודף
one life by taking another life since [the transgression of] murder is	ואסור להציל נפש עם נפש אחר כי שפיכת דמים
not pushed aside [to save a life].	
	אינו נדחה.

IV. The "fugitive" situation: When can the townspeople save themselves at the expense of the fugitive's life?

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Defintions:		
Fugitive:	Refers to the individual hiding in the city that the hooligans wish to kill. The hooligans order the townspeople to hand the fugitive over to them.	
Townspeople:	Refers to the remainder of the people in the city who are ordered by the hooligans to either hand over the fugitive or else they will all be killed.	
מסירה:	Refers to the act of handing over a Jew to the gentiles.	

Source 9: Tosefta Terumot 7:20: "Fugitive" situation (*Explanation is based on the Eitz Yosef on Bereishis Rabboh, 94*).

(See Supplement 1, Source 4, p. 53, for a more extensive explanation) : תוספתא מסכת תרומות פרק ז הלכה כ':

If a group of people [were accosted by] gentiles who said to them, "Give us one of you and we will kill him; and if not, we will kill all of you," [the ruling is]: Let them all be killed, and they may not give over one Jewish life to them.	סיעה של בני אדם שאמרו להם גוים תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרגהו ואם לאו הרי אנו הורגין את כולכם יהרגו כולן ואל ימסרו להן נפש אחת מישראל.
But if the gentiles designated someone (i.e., a ' <i>fugitive'</i>) in the manner that they designated ב.ב.ש, they should hand him over rather than all being put to death.	אבל אם ייחדוהו להם כגון שייחדו לשבע בן בכרי, יתנו להן ואל יהרגו כולן.
רבי יהודה said, when does this apply (i.e., they may not hand him over)? Only if the fugitive is in the exterior [and he can escape] while the townspeople are in the interior [and are unable to escape]. However, if all of them are in the interior since [no one can escape and consequently] they will all be killed, they should hand him over to them rather than all being put to death.	אמר רבי יהודה במה דברים אמורים בזמן שהוא מבחוץ והן מבפנים. אבל בזמן שהוא מבפנים והן מבפנים הואיל והוא נהרג והן נהרגין, יתנוהו להן ואל יהרגו כולן.

As it states, "And the woman approached all the people with her wisdom" (Shmuel II, Ch. 20, v. 22). She said to them, "Since he will be killed and you will be killed, give him over to them so that all of you will not be killed."	וכן הוא אומר ותבא האשה אל כל העם בחכמתה. אמרה להן הואיל והוא נהרג ואתם נהרגין תנוהו להם ואל תהרגו כולכם.
רבי שמעון said, so she said to them, "Anyone who rebels against the	רבי שמעון אומר כך אמרה להם כל המורד
kingdom of David, is liable to execution."	במלכות בית דוד חייב מיתה.

- Yet, the hooligans' designation of a specific victim (in most cases) is not sufficient to permit handing the fugitive over. In the Tosefta (Source 9, third statement), רבי יהודה states that the second requirement for permitting handover (מסירה) is that the fugitive must be unable to escape (*fugitive without escape capability'*) even if they do not hand him over. However, if the fugitive can escape (*fugitive with escape capability'*), it is forbidden to hand him over even though he was designated by the hooligans.
- The permissibility of מסירה is subject to further dispute between רבי יוחנן and מסירה and מסירה (ריש לקיש) in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Source 10). ריש לקיש maintains that the designated fugitive must liable to the death penalty (הייב מיתה) in order to permit handing him over, whereas רבי יוחנן believes that even if the fugitive was not liable to the death penalty, it is permitted to hand him over. Refer to Appendix A (pp. 35-41) for an explanation of the positions of the rest of the section.

Source 10: Talmud Yerushalmi, Terumot 8:4: Fugitive situation: Dispute between רבי יוחנן and רבי לקיש.

We learned: If groups of people, who were traveling on the road,	<u>תלמוד ירושלמי תרומות פרק ח, הלכה ד׳:</u>
were accosted by gentiles who said, "Give us one of you and we will	תני סיעות בני אדם שהיו מהלכין בדרך, פגעו להן גוים
kill him; and if not, we will kill all of you," [the ruling is]: Even if all	ואמרו תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרוג אותו ואם לאו הרי אנו
of them will be put to death, they should not hand over [even] one	הורגים את כולכם: אפילו כולן נהרגים לא ימסרו נפש
person of Israel. But if the gentiles designated someone (i.e., a	אחת מישראל. ייחדו להן אחד כגון שבע בן בכרי
ʻfugitive'), as in the ב.ב. ${\mathbb V}$ episode, they should hand him over and	
not get killed. רבי שמעון בן לקיש said, This is providing he is liable	ימסרו אותו ואל ייהרגו. אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש
to the death penalty like ש.ב.ב was. But רבי יוחנן said, This applies	והוא שיהא חייב מיתה כשבע בן בכרי. ורבי יוחנן אמר
even if he is not liable to the death penalty like コ.コ.ぴ.	אף על פי שאינו חייב מיתה כשבע בן בכרי.

- V. Reason for the difference within the two obstructed labor and the two fugitive situations (Approach 1):
 - 1. <u>Obstructed labor situation</u>: What is the reason that the mother's life is prioritized only over the life of the 'non-emerged fetus', but not over the life of the 'partially-emerged fetus'? The Sefer Meirat Einayim (ש"ש); Source 11b) and the Minchat Chinuch (Supplement 1, Source 3, p.52) take the approach that the unborn ('non-emerged') fetus does not have the Halachic status of a living human being. These commentaries interpret Rashi's statement regarding a fetus, "as long as he has not emerged into the air of the world, he is not a ששׁם" (Source 11a), to mean that a fetus is not deemed a Halachic life. As such, feticide does not constitute שׁפיכת דמים (murder) and therefore, the fetus' life may be pushed aside to save the mother, just as the imperative to save lives (שיקות נפּש) pushes aside all אפיכת דמים (other than murder, idolatry and illicit relations). However, once the fetus' head emerges, since he has the full Halachic status of a living being, killing him constitutes we must remain passive so as not to push aside one life on account of another life.

Source 11a-b: Rashi in Sanhedrin (11a) and the *Sefer Meirat Ainayim* (סמ״ע) on Shulchan Aruch (11b): Status of the 'non-emerged fetus' (See Supplement 1, Source 2, p. 51, for full text of Rashi):

Source 11a:	<u>רש״י סנהדרין דף עב: ד״ה יצא ראשו:</u>
This is referring to a woman who is having difficulty giving birth and her life is endangered. The first section of the Mishna states that the midwife extends her hand, cuts him and removes him limb-by-limb. As long as he (i.e., the fetus) has not emerged into the air of the world, he is not a UDI (i.e., a life) and it is permitted to kill him to save his mother.	באשה המקשה לילד ומסוכנת. וקתני רישא החיה פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו לאברים דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן להורגו ולהציל את אמו.
Source 11b:	<u>סמ"ע על שלחן ערוך חושן משפט סי׳ תכה ס״ק ח׳</u> :
Nonetheless, while he is still in utero, it is permitted to dismember him even	ואף על פי כן, בעודו במעיה מותר לחתכו אף על פי
though he is alive because there is no name (i.e., status) of a נפ ${{\mathfrak V}}$ on him	שהוא חי, שכל שלא יצא לאויר העולם אין שם
before he emerges into the air of the world. The proof is from the fact that	נפש עליו, והא ראיה דהנוגף אשה הרה ויצאו
one who strikes a pregnant woman aborting her pregnancy, must pay	ילדיה ומתו משלם דמי הולדות ואין שם רוצח
restitution for the fetuses, but there is no name of a murderer or death	
penalty upon him.	ומיתה עליו.

2. <u>Fugitive situation</u>: Why is it prohibited to hand over a 'fugitive with escape capability' while it is permitted to hand over a 'fugitive without escape capability'? The Chasdei Dovid (authored by Rav Dovid Pardo, Source 12) explains this distinction based on the logic of מאי חזית. If the fugitive has the capability to escape, the townspeople have two theoretical options: (1) they could either allow the fugitive to escape and they will all be killed, or (2) they could save themselves by handing over fugitive to be killed. This is the standard מאי חזית dilemma, i.e., Why do you presume that the townspeople's blood is redder than the fugitive's blood? Accordingly, the townspeople must remain passive and allow

the fugitive to escape. However, if the fugitive has no capability to escape, the מאי חזית logic does not apply since he cannot be saved even if the townspeople do not hand him over. Since the entire basis for the Halacha of מאי חזית by יהרג ואל יעבור is the מאי חזית logic, when the מאי חזית logic does not apply, i.e., if he is unable to escape, it is permitted to hand him over (See Supplement 2, p.46, paragraph 6a-b, for further explanation of the basis to permit apply.

Source 12: Chasdei Dovid on the Tosefta (Source 9): Basis for differentiating between the 'fugitive with escape capability': The מאי חזית logic.

(See Supplement 1, Source 5, p. 54, for a more extensive excerpt from the Chasdei Dovid).

When is it forbidden to hand over even a singled-out fugitive? [if the	: <u>חסדי דוד על תוספתא תרומות</u>
fugitive is in a location where] if the townspeople do not hand him over,	במה דברים אמורים שאסור על כל פנים
they will be killed and he will escape. In such cases, even if the hooligans	למוסרו ? שאם לא ימסרו אותו, הן נהרגים
designated him, it is forbidden to hand him over because of the reason of	והוא נמלט, אז אפילו יחדוהו להם אסור מטעמא
מאי הזית (Why do you presume that the townspeople's blood is redder	דמאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא
than the fugitive's blood?).	דההוא גברא סומק טפי כדאמרינן בעלמא
However, if everyone is in equal danger, i.e., they all are located in the	
inner sector such that if the hooligans would come, they would kill the	אבל אם כולם שוין בסכנה כגון שכולם מבפנים
fugitive along with the townspeople – then, if the hooligans designated	אז שאם יבאו עכו״ם הורגים אותו ואותם, אז
him, it is permitted [to hand him over] because the מאי חזית logic	אם יחדוהו הוא דשרי דהא לא שייך טעמא
does not apply when they all are in an equal state of danger.	דמאי חזית וכו׳ כשכולם שוין בסכנה.

- A. This explanation fits well with the opinion of the *Minchat Chinuch* that מסירה is called "שביזרא דשפיכת דמים" i.e., an "ancillary form" of murder. Accordingly, just as the ruling of אביזרא דשפיכת דמים by יהרג ואל יעבור is based on the מאי חזית logic, the ruling of מאי יעבור by is also based on the מאי חזית logic. Therefore, since the מסירה logic is inapplicable when the fugitive cannot escape, it is permitted to hand him over.
- B. On a deeper level, the *Chasdei Dovid's* understanding can be explained as follows: Perhaps the Halacha of יהרג ואל יעבור only dictates that one must remain passive (i.e., in the "coerced murder" case) when only one of the two parties will be killed and the only question is which of the two shall be killed. Since we don't know whose life is more valuable, the אי חזית logic dictates that we must remain passive rather than arbitrarily choosing one party to be killed. However, since the *'fugitive without escape capability'* will be killed regardless of which option the townspeople choose, there is no reason to remain passive since we are not choosing any person for death. The only choice is whether to have all the townspeople killed along with the fugitive or to spare them, for which we may argue that אי חזית does not pertain.

Table 2: Summary of Approach # 1 to explain the different rulings in the obstructed labor and fugitive situations:

Based on the position that an unintentional pursuer does not have a status of a רודף¹⁻².

Type of	Sub-	Who will be consequence the	of choosing	Is the active option a de facto selection? who shall live vs. who shall die?		ls the active option considered שפיכת דמים (murder)?		Does the מאי חזית logic apply to forbid choosing the active option?		How does the Halacha decide?
Situation	category	³ Active	Passive	Yes/ No	Why	Yes/ No	Why	Yes/ No	Why?	which option?
Obstructed	non- emerged fetus	Mother	Fetus	Yes	By terminating the fetus, we are choosing that the mother rather	No	Since the fetus is not a 'ພົອນ', feticide is not murder	No	מאי חזית only applies if the action is	Active (Feticide)
labor	labor partially- emerged N fetus	Mother	Fetus	Yes	mother, rather than the fetus, will live. Yes a 'שנש׳ status	Yes	considered murder.	Passive		
Fugitive	with escape capability	Towns- people	Fugitive	Yes	Fugitive will escape if we remain passive	Yes	מסירה is an ² "ancillary form"	Yes	מאי חזית only applies if the action selects	Passive
Tugitive	escape Towns- people No one No I	Fugitive will be killed even if we remain passive	Yes	of murder	No	who shall live <i>vs.</i> who shall die ⁴ .	Active זמסירה)⁵			

¹Dina Dechayai (see Supplement 1, Source 6c, pp. 54-55)

²*Minchat Chinuch* (Source 8, p. 8)

³The active option is as follows: In the 'obstructed labor' situation: feticide; in the 'fugitive' situation: מסירה (handing him over).

⁴Based on the *Chasdei Dovid* (Source 12, p. 12)

⁵מטירה maintains that מטירה is only permitted if there is a death sentence against the *'fugitive without escape capability'*.

VI. Reason for the difference within the two obstructed labor and the two fugitive situations (Approach 2):

According to Rav Moshe Feinstein and the other Halachic authorities who maintain that the דין רודף applies even to an unintentional רודף, both the fetus and the fugitive have the status of a רודף since they (albeit unintentionally) pose a danger to the mother or the townspeople, respectively. Accordingly, the permissibility to kill the *'non-emerged fetus'* or to hand over the *'fugitive without escape capability'* is based on the Trip. Rav Moshe (Reference 7), as well as Rav Chaim Soloveitchik (Reference 8) and Rav Elazar Menachem Man Shach (Reference 10), derive this approach from the Rambam (Source 13) who states that it is permitted to kill the *'non-emerged fetus'* because he is considered a Citpe and the states and the states and the feture and the feture applies of the states and the states approach from the respective applies and the states approach approach applies applies and the states approach applies and the states approach applies applies and the states approach applies and the states approach applies applies applies and the states applies applies applies and the states approach applies applies applies applies applies applies applies applies applies and the states approach applies applies applies applies applies applies applies applies and the states approach applies and the states approach applies applies

Source 13: The Rambam's view: The fetus is viewed as a רודף after the mother.

This is one of the negative commandments not to take pity on the life of a pursuer. On this basis, our Sages ruled regarding a woman who is	<u>רמב״ם, פרק א הל׳ רוצח ושמירת הנפש, הל׳ ט׳:</u> הרי זו מצות לא תעשה שלא לחוס על נפש הרודף.
having difficulty giving birth (and her life is endangered), that it is	לפיכך הורו חכמים שהעוברה שהיא מקשה לילד
permitted to cut out the fetus in utero, either medicinally or	מותר לחתוך העובר במיעיה בין בסם בין ביד מפני
manually, because the fetus is considered a pursuer after her to kill	שהוא כרודף אחריה להורגה. ואם משהוציא
her. However, if [the fetus'] head has emerged, we may not touch	
(i.e., kill) him since we may not push aside one life on account of	ראשו, אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש
another life and this is the natural order of the world.	וזהו טבעו של עולם.

- Rav Moshe deduces from the Rambam that a fetus is deemed a living being to the extent that feticide is included under the prohibition against murder (לא תרצה) unless the mother's life is threatened. If feticide was not included under the prohibition of לא תרצה, it would not be necessary to invoke the קרודך to authorize saving the mother at the fetus' expense since all prohibitions (other than the three prohibitions mentioned above) are pushed aside for the sake of saving lives (פיקוה נפש).
- 3. However, according to this view, since intent is not needed to be considered a רודף, the 'partiallyemerged fetus' should also be considered a רודף and therefore, should be killed to save his mother? What is the basis for the distinction in Halacha between the 'non-emerged fetus' and the 'partially emerged fetus'? Similarly, if the basis for handing over the fugitive is his status as a רודף, why is there a distinction between a fugitive who can escape and a fugitive who cannot escape? In both cases, he endangers the lives of the townspeople and should be handed over to save them?
- 4. To explain Rav Moshe's resolution of this dilemma, we must present his explanation of the phrase, "משׁמיא קא רדפי לה" - "she is being pursued by Heaven", which the Gemara (Source 7, p. 8) states is the reason the 'partially-emerged fetus' must not be harmed even to save his mother. According to Rav Moshe's explanation, the משׁמיא קא רדפי לה concept applies equally to the 'partially-emerged fetus' and 'fugitive with escape capability' cases. The following is the premise of his explanation:

- A. The obstructed labor and fugitive situations are cases of "bidirectional pursuit":
 - i. In the obstructed labor situation, the mother and fetus mutually pursue each other;
 - ii. In the fugitive situation, the fugitive and townspeople mutually pursue each other.

Definition: "Rodef_{- \aleph}" = fetus or fugitive and "Rodef_{- \square}" = mother or townspeople

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<u>Note</u>: The terms "opposing "רודפים" or "opposing parties" denote a confrontation between *"Rodef*-א" and *"Rodef*-ב".

- B. In the obstructed labor and fugitive situations, Heaven has arranged that there would be an "inverse relationship" between the respective survivals of *Rodef*-x and *Rodef*-z:
 - i. If the passive option is chosen, *Rodef*-x will live and *Rodef*-z will die;
 - ii. Conversely, if the active option is chosen, *Rodef*-2 will live and *Rodef*-8 will die.
- C. The reason why the fetus is considered a רודף despite having no intention to pursue or harm his mother, is because his only path to survival is by allowing the birth to proceed, which will cause his mother's death. Similarly, the fugitive is considered a רודף because his only path to survival is by escaping, which will lead to the death of the townspeople.
- D. One might ask, it is understandable that the fetus and fugitive are considered pursuers (רודפים) since their "arrival on the scene" threatens the lives of mother or townspeople, respectively. However, the mother and townspeople merely wish to defend themselves from the threat imposed on them. If so, how can they be defined as pursuers?
- E. Rav Moshe writes (Source 14) that the message of לה is: Despite the fact that the mother's life was not endangered until after the "arrival" of the fetus, we do not view the fetus as a unilateral רודף. Rather, Heaven ordained the "arrival" of the fetus with the purpose that both he and his mother would live, and only after this, the situation of danger befell both equally. My limited understanding of Rav Moshe's explanation is: Since Heaven designed the (obstructed labor or fugitive) situation with an inverse relationship between the respective survivals of *Rodef*-a, and *Rodef*-a, none of which intended to cause harm, therefore, neither party is considered a greater contributor or more responsible for this situation. Accordingly, the same logic that defines the fetus and fugitive as pursuers, also defines the mother and the townspeople as pursuers since their only path to survival is through the death of the fetus and fugitive, respectively.
- <u>Note</u>: Rav Moshe's understanding of Rashi's statement regarding a fetus, *"as long as he has not emerged ... he is not a עוֹפוָן,"* can be found in in Supplement 2, pp. 66, and is explained in Appendix D, p. LVII.

Source 14: Rav Moshe's explanation of the משמיא קא רדפי לה concept in the 'partially emerged fetus' case.

(See Supplement 2, pp. 80-82, for more extensive excerpts from the Sefer Igros Moshe).

¹The משמיא הא רדפי לה comes to refute the contention that the *'partially-emerged fetus'*, who came into existence after his mother, is considered a [unilateral] רודף after his mother since she was not in any danger prior to his arrival in her womb. [The גמרא 's rebuttal is, a 'גמרא קא רדפי לה', i.e., on the contrary], it was Heavenly decreed when the fetus initially arrived here at the inception of her pregnancy, that he also should be here, *(i.e., ²his initial arrival was not to pursue, but rather, with the purpose that they would both live)*. Thus, [it is viewed] as if the pursuit from Heaven befell both equally, whereupon it is only possible for one of them to live and therefore, it is not known who is killing whom.

<u>אגרות משה חושן משפט ח״ב, סימן עא׳</u>: הא דמשני משמיא קא רדפי לה ... היינו שנותן הגמרא טעם על מה שלא נחשב הולד שבא באחרונה לרודף על האם, שהרי כשלא היה הולד במעיה לא היתה מסוכנת. דהוא משום דמשמיא בא שם הולד תחילה משום דמשמיא בא שם הולד תחילה נסצנתעברה היינו שגם הוא צריך להיות כאן, והוי כבא הרדיפה משמיא על תרוייהו בשוה, דרק אחד מהם יוכל לחיות שממילא לא ידוע מי הורג את מי.

¹This translation is partially in paraphrase form.

²Words in parentheses are from a subsequent section in the same responsum.

- 5. Thus, the questions in paragraphs 3 and 4D (pp. 14 and 15) can be answered by explaining that the הא רדפי לה concept tells us that we view the obstructed labor or fugitive situations such that Heaven has arranged that *Rodef*-א and *Rodef*-a are equal participants in an impasse in which each one's survival is dependent on the other's demise, thus rendering both of them equal pursuers after each other. Consequently, we cannot apply the דין רודף to kill the *'partially-emerged fetus'* or hand over the *'fugitive with escape capability'* because of the מאי הזית logic (*Why should you presume that Rodef*-a more than Rodef-a pursues after Rodef-א?). See Source 15; also Figures 2-3, pp. 18-19, for schematic diagrams.
- 6. Rav Moshe points out that the Gemara's answer, אָא רדפי לה, is identical (or, similar) to an answer in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Source 16). The Yerushalmi attempted to prove that the דין רודף does not apply to a child pursuer, from the prohibition to kill the 'partially-emerged fetus' (stated in the Mishna in Oholot). The Yerushalmi then refuted this proof with the following statement, " שאיניא היא תמן " "That case (of the emerging fetus) is different because you do not know who is killing whom." Rav Moshe explains the meaning of the answer "שאין את יודע מי הורג את מי is: "you do not know who pursues whom", i.e., the mother and the 'partially-emerged fetus' equally pursue each other and therefore, the דין רודף כתחול באר מי הורג את הזית ווע מי הזית איי הורג את מי is logic. The Divrei Yissachar (Reference 9) and Rav Shach (Reference 10) also understand that our Gemara's answer, השאין את יודע מי הורג את מי".

<u>Note</u>: The term "מאי הזית" described by Rav Moshe is identical to that discussed above in Section **II-C**, pp. 3-5. However, to prevent confusion, we will refer to this term when used by Rav Moshe in the context of רודף (i.e., in the *'partially-emerged fetus'* and *'fugitive with escape capability'* cases), as "מאי הזית".

Source 15: Rav Moshe's explanation of the משׁמיא קא רדפי לה concept in the 'partially emerged fetus' and 'fugitive with escape capability' cases. (See Supplement 2, pp. 65-66; 68-70, for more extensive excerpts).

We must explain that the reason [to permit handing over the fugitive] is that he is considered a רודף because the townspeople will be killed on account of him. [One may question] since the fugitive had no intention to pursue them, [the דין רודף should not apply] because of the משׁמיא קא רדפי לה reasoning [as in the case of] the 'partially-emerged fetus'? We can answer that this [משמיא קא רדפי reasoning is only effective [to protect the fugitive] if he could [לה escape and hide. Since he has no intent to pursue, it is only Heaven Who arranged that it is impossible for both parties to survive, for if they spare the fugitive, the townspeople will die and if they spare themselves, the fugitive will die. This is analogous to the obstructed labor case after emergence of the fetus' head, where he and his mother are considered [equal] pursuers after each other. Although the fetus is the cause [of his mother's danger], since he has no intent [to harm], we cannot permit [killing him] on the basis of the דין רודף since [this is undermined by] the מאי חזית_{Rodef} logic – Why do you presume that the fetus pursues after his mother more than she pursues after the fetus?

<u>אגרות משה ,יורה דעה ח״ב סימן ס׳, ענף ב׳</u>: ולכן מוכרחין לומר שהוא מטעם דהוי כרודף כיון שעל ידו יהרגו, ואף שאין כוונהו לרודפם שאם כן הוא רק כמשמיא קא רדפי להו כמז שאמרו בסנהדרין שם לענין עובר שיצא ראשו, צריך לומר שמועיל טעם זה רק באם היה הוא ניצול כגון שיכול לברוח ולהתחבא, שהטעם הוא דמחמת שאין כוונתו לרדוף רק שמשמיא נזדמן כן שאי אפשר להו להתקיים שניהם דאם יצילו את זה ימות זה ואם יצילו את זה ימות זה, כעובדא דהמקשה לילד ויצא ראשו באהלות פ"ז מ"ו נחשבו כרודפים זה את זה, אף שהוא הסבה בזה כיון שהוא בלא כוונה, ולכן אי אפשר להתיר מטעם רודף דמאי חזית להחשיב את העובר יותר רודף את האם מכפי

Source 16: Talmud Yerushalmi - Shabbat 14: 4: The דין רודף does not apply to the 'partially emerged fetus'.

(See Supplement 1, Source 7b, p.55, for the commentary of the Pnei Moshe on the Yerushalmi).

Rav Chisda asked, Can you save an adult [who is being pursued], by	<u>תלמוד ירושלמי שבת פרק יד, הלכה ד</u> :
killing a child [pursuer]? Rav Yirmiya answered, Is this not	רַב חָסָדָא בָּעֵי מַהוּ לְהַצִּיל נַפְשׁוֹ שֶׁל גָדוֹל בְּנַפְשׁוֹ שֶׁל
addressed in the Mishnah (in Oholot), "If *most [of the fetus] has	קַטָן ? הַתִיב רַב יִרְמְיָה וְלָא מַתְנִי הִיא, יָצָא רוּבּוֹ
emerged, we may not touch him because we may not push aside	? אֵין נוֹגְעַין בּוֹ שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֵכֶשׁ מִפְנֵי נֶכֶשׁ
one life on account of another life?" Rav Yosse son of Rav Bon,	
quoting Rav Chisda said, That case [of the emerging fetus] is	רַב יוֹסָה בֵּי רַב בּוֹן בְּשֵׁם רַב חִסְדָּא שֶׁנְיָיא הִיא תַּמָּן
different because you do not know who is killing whom.	שֶׁאֵין אַתְּ יוֹדֵעַ מִי הוֹרֵג אֶת מִי.

*This text of the Mishna in Oholot differs from the version quoted in the Talmud Bavli (see Source 7, p. 8).

Figure 2:The 'partially-emerged fetus' case, as explained by Rav Moshe: The respective survivals of the fetus and mother are "inversely related":If the active option is chosen (i.e., if the fetus is killed), the mother will live at expense of the fetus' life. If the passive option is chosen,
the fetus will be born while his mother will die. Therefore, the fetus and his mother pursue each other equally and the mother logic
determines that we may not apply the Trip Closed.





Figure 3:The 'fugitive with escape capability' case, as explained by Rav Moshe: The respective survivals of the fugitive and townspeople are
"inversely related": If the active option is chosen (i.e., if the fugitive is handed over), the townspeople will live at the expense of fugitive's
life. If the passive option is chosen, the fugitive will escape and live while the townspeople will be killed. Therefore, the fugitive and the
townspeople pursue each other equally and the may not apply the the town of apply the
Trip.



- 7. However, this "flips" our original question (in paragraph 3, p. 14) "on its head". By his own definition of משמיא קא רדפי לה, how can Rav Moshe explain the permissibility to kill the 'non-emerged fetus' or to hand over the 'fugitive without escape capability' based on the ידין רודף? Since all the obstructed labor and fugitive situations involve bidirectional רדיפה, we always have a הזימ מאי הזית dilemma and therefore, the ידין רודף should not apply?
- 8. Rav Moshe explains that in the 'non-emerged fetus' and 'fugitive without escape capability' cases, Rodef-R has a lower "level" of life than Rodef-B. In the 'non-emerged fetus' case, the fetus has an "incomplete שׁם" status whereas the mother has a "complete שׁם" status. Similarly, in the 'fugitive without escape capability' case, the fugitive only has transient life (הדי שׁעה), הדי הי, i.e., short stay of execution until the hooligans invade the city and kill everyone if the townspeople do not hand him over), while the townspeople have the potential for normal life expectancy (הדי עולם) if they hand him over. Therefore, we say that there is a "differential" (abbreviated with the symbol "Δ") between the respective "life-levels" of Rodef-R and Rodef-B. Only Rodef-R pursues after this Δ and therefore, with respect to this Δ, only Rodef-R is a "CHTEP are not equal pursuers (with respect to the Δ), Rodef-R is assigned the "definitive" status and thus, there is no "fugitive without escape capability' to save the mother or townspeople, respectively

<u>Note</u>: See Table 3, p. 21 and Figure 4, p. 22, for depiction of the *"differential"* (Δ) concept.

- <u>Note</u>: The expression "definitive רודף" status, in reference to *Rodef*-אַ (the fetus or fugitive), is not intended to suggest that *Rodef*-אַ is considered more responsible (or a greater contributor) than *Rodef*-a for the perilous situation they are in. It is merely a convention that was created to refer to Rav Moshe's explanation that *Rodef*-א alone pursues a *"differential"* between their "life levels".
 - A. In the case of 'non-emerged fetus', only the fetus pursues after the שֹׂםו-∆ between the complete שׁםו of the mother and his own incomplete שׁםו. Therefore, the fetus has the "definitive רודף" status and the דין רודף will permit killing him to save his mother. However, after the emergence of his head, since both the mother and the fetus have a complete שׁםו, there is no שום-∆ between them. Therefore, they are equal רודפים and the רודף כמחוס לשמות there is no דין רודף logic (Source 17).
 - B. Similarly, in the case of the 'fugitive without escape capability', only the fugitive pursues after the life expectancy-\Delta between the townspeople's היי עולם (normal life expectancy) and his own רודף (transient life). Therefore, the fugitive has the "definitive "definitive" status and the vill permit handing him over to save the townspeople (see Figure 5, p. 23, for a

schematic diagram of the *'fugitive without escape capability'* case). However, if he can escape, since both the fugitive and the townspeople have potential for היי עולם, there is no *life expectancy-* Δ between them. Therefore, they are equal רודפים and the דין רודף cannot be applied because of the היית הזית Rodef logic (Source 18).

Source 17: Rav Moshe's explanation why the דין רודף applies to the 'non-emerged fetus' (See Supplement 2, pp. 65-66, 70-71):

However, [the 'non-emerged'] fetus does not yet have a complete \UD1, as	אגרות משה ,יורה דעה ח״ב, סימן ס׳, ענף ב׳ <u>י</u> :
we deduce from the fact that one does not incur capital liability (for killing	אבל בעובר שעדיין אינו נפש גמור כדחזינן שאין
an unborn fetus). Therefore, regarding the advantage (i.e., the ש-בנפש Δ)	נהרגין עליו, ונמצא שעל היתרון של האם מהעובר
that the mother has over the fetus – that she is a complete ${\mathbb Z}$ ם while he	שהיא נפש גמור והוא אינו עדיין נפש גמור, הוי רק
is not yet a complete נפש – only the fetus is a רודף and his mother is not	, , ,
a רודפת (pursuer). Therefore, the דין רודף applies to the fetus because of	העובר רודף והאם אינה רודפת. לכן יש להעובר
the advantage that the mother has over him.	דין רודף מחמת היתרון זה שיש להאם עליו.

Source 18: Rav Moshe's explanation why the דין רודף applies to the 'fugitive without escape capability' (See Supplement 2, pp. 67, 69):

However, if it is evident that everyone will die [including the fugitive, if	: <u>אגרות משה ,יורה דעה ח״ב, סימן ס׳, ענף ב׳</u>
they remain passive] the townspeople only pursue after the fugitive's	
- היי עולם) transient life) while he pursuers after all their life) -	אבל באם ברור שימותו כולם נמצא שהם רודפים
normal life expectancy). Thus, regarding the essential life – which is the	אותו רק על חיי שעה והוא רודף אותם בכל חייהם.
advantage (i.e., the life expectancy- Δ) that the townspeople have over the	הרי נמצא שעל עיקר החיים שהוא היתרון מחיי
fugitive's חיי שעה – the fugitive pursues after them while they do not	שעה, הוא רודף אותם והם אינם רודפים אותו כלל,
pursue after him at all. Thus, the דין רודף applies to the fugitive despite	יש לו דין רודף אף שהוא שלא בכוונה כיון שעל כל
his lack of intent to harm, since he nevertheless is the cause [of their	פנים הוא הסבה.
impending danger].	

Table 3: Description of "differentials" between the participant's respective "levels" of life in the 'non-emerged fetus' and 'fugitive without escape capability' cases

Case	Participant	"Level" of life	Type of "differential"	Abbreviation for <i>"differential"</i>
'non-emerged fetus'	Fetus	incomplete נפש	พ่อา-differential	ע-נפשׁ-∆
	Mother	complete נפש	ujjerentiai-دעש	
'fugitive without escape capability'	Fugitive	חיי שׁעה	life expectancy-	life expectancy A
	Townspeople	חיי עולם	differential life expec	life expectancy– Δ

Figure 4: The "differential" (Δ) in the 'non-emerged fetus' and 'fugitive without escape capability' cases: The term "level" refers to "life-level", either the " \Box or the "life expectancy-level". Rodef- Ξ 's "Level 2" is higher than, and is inclusive of, Rodef- κ 's "Level 1". The Δ refers to the "differential" between "Level 1" and "Level 2". Accordingly, only Rodef- κ pursues after the Δ and therefore, he has the "definitive Ξ " status.

Case	Rodef _{-×}		Rodef₋⊒		
Case	Name	"Level 1"	Name	"Level 2"	
'non-emerged fetus'	Fetus	incomplete נפש	Mother	complete נפש	
'fugitive without escape capability'	Fugitive	חיי שעה transient life	Townspeople	חיי עולם normal life expectancy	




Figure 5: The 'fugitive without escape capability' case: If the active option is chosen (i.e., if the fugitive is handed over), the townspeople will live at the expense of the fugitive's life. If the passive option is chosen, both the fugitive and townspeople will only have היי שׁעה (temporary life extension). Since there is a life expectancy- Δ between them, they do not pursue each other equally and there is no have dilemma.




Table 4: Summary of Approach # 2, (approach of Rav Moshe), to explain the different rulings in the obstructed labor and fugitive situations:Based on the position that an unintentional pursuer has a status of a רודף.

Type of Situation	Sub- category	Who will be saved, as a consequence of choosing the option?		Does ² <i>Rodef</i> - $_{\aleph}$ pursue a ³ Δ between the <i>"life-levels"</i> of <i>Rodef</i> - $_{\aleph}$ and <i>Rodef</i> - $_{\Xi}$?		⁴ Does משמיא קא	Who is assigned "definitive-	How does the Halacha
		¹ Active	Passive	Yes/ No	Explanation	רדפי לה apply?	רודף" status?	decide? which option?
Obstructed labor	non- emerged fetus	Mother's complete ແອງ	Fetus' incomplete ແອງ	Yes	The fetus pursues the ${}^3\Delta$ between the mother's complete complete נפש Σ and his own incomplete נפש	No	Fetus	Active (Feticide)
	partially- emerged fetus	Mother's complete พอเ	Fetus' complete ชอง	No	The fetus and mother equally pursue each other's complete נפש	Yes	No one	Passive
Fugitive	with escape capability	⁵ TP's היי עולם	Fugitive's היי עולם⁵	No	The fugitive and TP equally pursue each other's היי עולם.	Yes	No one	Passive
	without escape capability	⁵ TP's היי עולם	Fugitive's ⁷ חיי שׁעה	Yes	The fugitive pursues the ${}^3\Delta$ between the TP's היי עולם and his own היי שעה.	No	Fugitive	Active 8(מסירה)

¹The active option is as follows: In the obstructed labor situation: feticide; in the fugitive situation: hand-over (מסירה).

 $^{2}Rodef_{-\aleph}$ = fetus or fugitive; $Rodef_{-\Im}$ = mother or townspeople; $^{3}\Delta$ = "differential", either a \mathbb{W} -Let Δ or a life expectancy- Δ .

⁴For simplicity purposes, this can be regarded as synonymous with: *"Is there a מאי חזית Rodef dilemma?"*.

⁵TP = Townspeople

⁶חיי שעה⁷ = Normal life expectancy; ⁷חיי שעה = Transient life (expectancy);

⁸ מסירה maintains that מסירה is only permitted if the hooligans imposed a "death sentence" (they have a grievance) against the *'fugitive without escape capability'*.

- VII. Application of אין דוחין נפש מפני נפש to the multifetal pregnancy (MFP) situation:
 - 1. The following discussion refers to a hypothetical sextuplet pregnancy (6 fetuses), in which:
 - A. There is a high probability of fatality for all fetuses either *in utero* or shortly after birth, if MPR is not performed. In this scenario, " F_{reduce} " = the 3 fetuses that the physician wishes to reduce, and " F_{save} " = the remaining 3 fetuses that the physician wishes to save.
 - B. All fetuses have the same potential to survive if other fetuses are reduced.
 - C. No fetus displays a gross abnormality or malformation (based on ultrasound imaging studies).
 - 2. In light of the above discussions, several arguments can be made to either allow or prohibit MPR:
 - A. On one hand, perhaps the principle of אין דוחין would forbid performing MPR even though it would increase the survival probability of the remaining fetuses, since we would be forced to save some lives at the expense of others.
 - B. On the other hand, just as we are permitted to hand over the 'fugitive without escape capability' where everyone would die if the townspeople remained passive, perhaps we should be permitted to reduce some of the fetuses to save the others if all fetuses are otherwise likely to perish (without MPR). We have looked at two different approaches for the permissibility to hand over the 'fugitive without escape capability' (i.e., the permissibility for מסירה). The logic inherent in each of these approaches may also provide a basis to permit MPR.
 - Approach 1 Chasdei Dovid: The permissibility for מסירה is based on the inapplicability of the אי הזית logic. Since the fugitive will die whether or not the townspeople hand him over, the logic of מאי הזית does not apply.
 - ii. Approach 2 Rav Moshe: The permissibility for מסירה is based on the דין רודף since the fugitive is considered a רודף after the townspeople.
 - C. Rabbi Dr. Zalman Levine (Reference 6) suggests that the מאי חזית logic may not apply in a MFP situation where there is a high risk of total fetal/neonatal death without reduction. Therefore, just as the inapplicability of the מאי חזית logic permits מאי חזית (when the fugitive is unable to escape, according to the *Chasdei Dovid*, Approach 1), this approach may also permit MPR.
 - D. According to Rav Moshe (Approach 2), perhaps each fetus in an MFP situation has the status of a קרודף after the other fetuses. Just as the דין רודף permits מסירה (when the fugitive is unable to escape, according to Rav Moshe) despite the absence of volition to harm or wrongdoing, perhaps the דין רודף will permit MPR if the passive option is likely to lead to total fetal/neonatal death.

This approach is problematic, however, because Rav Moshe explains that the permissibility to hand over the *'fugitive without escape capability'* is based on the fugitive being considered the

"definitive רודף" due to the *life expectancy*- Δ between himself and townspeople. By MFP, there is no *life expectancy*- Δ between the fetuses, assuming all have the same survival probability. Accordingly, even if the fetuses are considered pursuers (רודפים), they all equally pursue after each other, and thus, we have a מאי הזית dilemma: *Why do you presume that that Freduce pursues after F_{save} more than F_{save} pursues after F_{reduce}* ? Apparently, it does not seem possible for the Trip to permit MPR?

- 3. In personal correspondence with Rabbi Dr. Zalman Levine (Reference 6), Rav Yosef Sholom Elyashiv ruled that the single deciding factor for permitting MPR is the probability of mortality for each of the fetuses. Rav Elyashiv permitted MPR (in a specific case presented to him by Rabbi Dr. Levine) if the probability of all fetuses perishing was greater than 50%. In addition, Rav Elyashiv ruled that major disability or morbidity (which is common in surviving multifetal-pregnancy babies) may not be considered a factor in allowing MPR.
- 4. In Sefer Nishmat Avraham (Source 19), Rabbi Dr. Abraham records the ruling of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (henceforth referred to as "Rav Shlomo Zalman") who permitted MPR in "cases where the pregnancy is at high risk" on the basis that "each of the fetuses has the status of a "Cases where the risk level necessary to be considered a "high risk" to the pregnancy, in order to permit MPR according to Rav Shlomo Zalman. Similarly, Rav Mordechai Eliyahu wrote that if all fetuses will otherwise die, each fetus is a CITP of the others and therefore, MPR would be permitted (Reference 11).

Source 19: Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach permits MPR in certain cases of high risk to the pregnancy based on the דין רודף; Sefer Nishmat Avraham. (see Supplement 1, Source 11, p. 58, for a more extensive excerpt).

The Gaon, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, *ZT"L*, explained to me that in cases where the pregnancy is at high risk due to multiple fetuses, *each of the fetuses has the status of a רודף and therefore the physicians are permitted to select those fetuses for reduction whose termination will cause the least risk of aborting the entire pregnancy. He also agreed that this is permissible even beyond 40 days The Gaon, Rav Yosef Sholom Elyashiv, *Shlita (now, ZT"L)* told me since the doctors state there is a risk in a quadruplet pregnancy that all the fetuses will be miscarried, it is permitted to reduce. On the other hand, it is known to me that the Gaon (Rav Elyashiv), Shlita, forbade reducing a triplet pregnancy.

נשמת אברהם חושן משפט סימן תכה:

הסביר לי הגאון זצ"ל שבמקרה של הריון בסיכון גבוה עקב ריבוי עוברים כל אחד מהעוברים יש לו דין של רודף ולכן מותר לרופא להרוג חלק מהם בזריקה בבחירת אותם לפי שיקול רופאי שהריגתם יגרום לסיכוי הקטן ביותר של הפלת כולם. והוא זצ"ל גם הסכים שמותר לעשות זאת אחרי ארבעים יום ואמר לי הגרי"ש אלישיב שליט"א שכיון שהרופאים אומרים שיש סכנה ברביעיה שתפיל את כולם, מותר לדלל. מאידך ידוע לי שהגאון שליט"א אסר דילול בשלישיה

*If none of the fetuses displays abnormalities (which is our hypothetical case), the physician selects the fetus(es) to be reduced based on their position in the uterus (per Rabbi Dr. Levine, Reference 6). It is beyond my level of understanding to determine whether such a selection is Halachically equivalent to the designation required to permit מסירה in the fugitive case, or even if such equivalency would be necessary to permit MPR based on the Trip Date.

- VIII. Possible approach to permitting MPR based on Rav Moshe Feinstein's explanation of the דין רודף:
 - <u>Note</u>: Rav Moshe has not published any ruling on the permissibility of MPR (possibly because this procedure was not yet clinically well established during his life time). Thus, any thoughts below are intended as merely an attempt to logically extend Rav Moshe's Halachic analysis from the fugitive and obstructed labor situations discussed above, to multifetal pregnancy.
 - Rav Hershel Schachter (Reference 12) explains that the position of Rav Moshe, i.e., the prohibition of feticide is included under לא תרצה, is based upon the eventuality that a fetus would become a viable born person. Therefore, if the physicians state with near-certainty that all fetuses will die unless MPR is performed, since the eventuality of a viable born person does not exist, there would be no prohibition of fetuses. According to this approach, Rav Moshe would presumably not agree with Rav Elyashiv that a mortality risk of merely greater than 50% suffices to permit MPR. Rather, a much higher mortality risk would likely be required to permit MPR.
 - 2. Above (VII-2-D, pp. 25-26), we suggested the possibility that perhaps Rav Moshe would consider each fetus as a רודף after the others and accordingly, the דין רודף would provide the basis for permitting MPR, which is the position of Rav Shlomo Zalman. However, we challenged this supposition: Since there is no life expectancy-\Delta between fetuses, the הזית Brodef logic (Why do you presume that Freduce pursues after Fsave more than Fsave pursues after Freduce ?) would prevent the Tref MPR?
 - 3. I would suggest that the key to determining whether the דין רודף can be applied to permit MPR is by assessing if the concept of משׁמיא קא רדפי לה extends to the MFP situation. If the משׁמיא קא רדפי לה concept applies to MFP, then, just as in the 'partially-emerged fetus' and 'fugitive with escape capability' cases, we cannot apply the דין רודף and thus, MPR would be forbidden. Conversely, if the הלין רודף לה concept does not apply to MFP, the קא רדפי לה concept applied (just as in the 'fugitive without escape capability' case) and MPR would be permissible.
 - 4. For purposes of simplicity, I suggest that Rav Moshe's explanation how the אירדפי לה concept applies in the 'partially-emerged fetus' and 'fugitive with escape capability' cases, may be presented as follows: There are two ends of the "active-vs.-passive option spectrum" (abbreviated as "A-vs.-P spectrum"): The "passive end" and the "active end". At the "passive end", Rodef-א (the fetus or fugitive) will live at the expense of Rodef-ב (the mother or townspeople); whereas, at the "active end", Rodef-ב will live at expense of the Rodef-א (see Figures 2-3, pp. 18-19). Since we see that their respective survivals are inversely related, it is evident that Heaven has arranged that Rodef-א and Rodef-ב are equally "opposing "רודפים". Accordingly, we have no basis to assign the "definitive" status to one party more than to the other and thus, the Tripe Cannot be applied.

- How does this help us determine if משמיא קא רדפי לה applies to the MFP situation? Two opposing perspectives are suggested, to either support or oppose applying משמיא קא רדפי לה MFP.

 - B. On the other hand, a strong argument could be made against applying א קא רדפי לה משמיא קא רדפי לה MFP, as follows: At the *"passive end"* of the *"A-vs.-P spectrum"* (i.e., if MPR is not performed), no fetus is likely to live at the expense of another fetal life since there is a high risk of total fetal/neonatal death. Only at the *"active end"* (i.e., if MPR is performed), some fetuses (i.e., *F_{save}*) will live at the expense of the others (i.e., *F_{reduce}*) (see Figure 6, p. 31). Accordingly, the survivals of *F_{save}* and *F_{reduce}* are not truly inversely related in the same manner as in the *'partially-emerged fetus'* and *'fugitive with escape capability'* cases. Therefore, we would not say that Heaven has arranged that all parties pursue each other equally. Accordingly, the argument has a beence of a *life expectancy-*Δ.
- 6. Thus, we have arguments both to support and oppose applying משׁמיא קא רדפי לה to the MFP situation. I would like to suggest the following approach why the משׁמיא קא רדפי לה concept should not apply to the MFP situation and thus, the דין רודף would permit MPR.


(Rodef-x's) pursuit, i.e., that she would suffer such a difficult labor that she cannot live if the fetus' life is spared, has also caused the fetus to become the object of the mother's pursuit. Since the fetus is an equal נרדף נרדף as the mother is, there is just as much imperative to save his life as there is to save his mother's life. The מאי חזית _{Rodef} logic, therefore, dictates that we choose the option of saving a נרדף uhich would not require actively taking a life. Only if we know that *Rodef*-x is the "definitive "rite" (in the *'non-emerged fetus'* and *'fugitive without escape capability'* cases), which is another way of saying *Rodef*-a is the "definitive", the imperative of saving *Rodef*-a determines that we must choose the active option.

- B. However, in the MFP situation, there is only one option that would result in saving a נרדף, i.e., the active option (MPR). The passive option is not likely to save any lives. Therefore, the imperative of saving the life of a נרדף should determine that we choose the active option, i.e., we should perform MPR to save some of the fetuses.
- 7. Rav Moshe's use of the מאי חזית הזית Rodef terminology in the context of the 'partially-emerged fetus' and 'fugitive with escape capability' cases, may be analogous to Rashi's understanding of the מאי הזית logic in the "coerced murder" case.
 - A. Rav Moshe portrayed Rashi's view of the מאי חזית logic in the "coerced murder" case as "two negative consequences vs. one negative consequence" (see Figure 1, p. 5).
 - B. Similarly, in the *'partially-emerged fetus'* and *'fugitive with escape capability'* cases, we have a "standoff" between two options:
 - i. If we choose the passive option, there will be one positive consequence, הצלת הנרדף (saving the pursued party), without performing an act of שפיכת דמים (murder).
 - ii. If we choose the active option, there will be a positive consequence, הצלת הנרדף, but there will also be a negative consequence, an act of שפיכת דמים.
 - C. Thus, we have a "standoff" between: (1) the passive option, which will only produce a positive consequence; vs. (2) the active option, which will produce both a positive and a negative consequence. Therefore, the מָאִי חזית produce logic dictates that we should choose the passive option which will only produce a positive consequence.
- 8. However, in the MFP situation, there is no similar "standoff" since the passive option will not likely produce any positive consequence. The only available option which will produce the positive consequence of הצלת הנרדף is the active option, i.e., performing MPR. Therefore, the משמיא הזית הנרדף logic and thus, the היות משמיא קא רדפי לה concept, will not apply and the דין רודף would permit MPR. The only remaining question is which fetus(es) to select for reduction. Perhaps this is not a question in

Halacha, but rather, a strategic medical question, i.e., which fetuses does the physician believe he can reduce while causing the least risk to the remainder of the fetuses as Rav Shlomo Zalman said (Source 19, p. 26).

- 9. There is a difficulty, however, with this rationale. Previously (VI-8, pp. 20-21), we explained that according to Rav Moshe, the reason why the אָא רדפי לה concept does not apply in the *'fugitive without escape capability'* situation is because of the *life expectancy*-Δ between the townspeople's היי עולם (normal life expectancy) and the fugitive's are logic in the *'fugitive without escape capability'* situation with escape the only end of *"A-vs.-P spectrum"* in which anyone will survive is at the *"active end"* (i.e., היי לה אול היי לה היי לה אול היי לה היי לה אול היי לה ה
 - A. Perhaps we can answer that in the *'fugitive without escape capability'* situation, even though there would be no survivors if the passive option was chosen, nonetheless, the fugitive would still have היי שׁעה remaining until the hooligans invade and kill everyone, which he stands to lose if the townspeople hand him over. Therefore, if not for the *life expectancy*-Δ between the townspeople's היי עולם and the fugitive's היי שׁעה, we would still have the same dilemma as in the *'fugitive with escape capability'* situation: If we choose the active option, the fugitive will lose his היי עולם and if we choose the passive option, the townspeople will lose their היי עולם and if we choose the passive option, the townspeople will lose their היי עולם and if we choose the fugitive, we must remain passive rather than performing an act of the life of the life expectancy-Δ, we can say that the respective pursuits of the "opposing parties" are not equal and therefore, the advection and the respective will not apply.
 - B. However, in the MFP situation, if we believe that the concept of היי שעה does not exist during fetal life *in utero*, which is the position of the *Yad HaMelech* (Reference 13), there will not be any fulfillment of הצלת הנרדף through the passive option. Although the passive option will temporarily prolong the existence of the fetuses, since they do not have היי שעה, this prolongation is not considered life-saving (הצלת הנרדף) at all. Only the active option (MPR) can achieve משמיא קא רדפי לה and the absence of a *life expectancy*-Δ and the דין רודף would permit MPR.

Figure 6: Multifetal pregnancy (MFP) case: If the passive option is chosen, there will not likely be any הצלת הנרדף since there is a high risk of total fetal/neonatal death. Only if the active option (MPR) is chosen, some of the fetuses (*F*_{save}) will survive at the expense of the other fetuses (*F*_{reduce}).



IX. Conclusion

- 1. Table 5 summarizes Rav Moshe's analysis of the fugitive and obstructed labor situations and compares these cases to the MFP situation.
- 2. We discussed several reasons to permit MPR in cases of high risk of total fetal/neonatal death:
 - A. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ruled that in cases of high risk to the pregnancy, *"each of the fetuses has the status of a* רודף," and on this basis, he permitted MPR.
 - B. Rav Hershel Schachter explained that even according to Rav Moshe who believes that feticide usually is a violation of לא תרצה, if there is a near certainty that all fetuses will die without MPR, there would be no prohibition of לא תרצה and therefore MPR would be permitted to save the remaining fetuses.
 - C. Rabbi Dr. Zalman Levine reasoned that if there is a high probability of fetal death, the מאי חזית logic would not apply (just as in the *'fugitive without escape capability'* case according to the *Chasdei Dovid's* explanation) and therefore MPR would be permitted.
 - D. Although Rav Moshe did not rule on the permissibility of MPR, perhaps he would agree with Rav Shlomo Zalman that we apply the דין רודף to permit MPR since Rav Moshe believes that the דין applies even to unintentional pursuit. This approach is based on a suggestion that the האי חזית applies and thus, the משמיא קא רדפי לה concept, only apply if both the passive and active options can achieve הצלת הנרדף, i.e., in the *'partially-emerged fetus'* and *'fugitive with escape capability'* cases. However, in the MFP situation, if we assume that the concept of הצלת הנרדף does not exist during fetal life, the only option that will achieve דין רודף is the active option (MPR). Therefore, קא רדפי לה will not apply and the דין רודף would permit MPR.
- 3. The question as to how Rav Moshe would have ruled regarding the permissibility of MPR cannot be definitively answered based on his rulings and insights that we have presented here. If we had the fortune to still have Rav Moshe leading us today, we could be certain that he would have marshaled his immense and profound understanding of all areas of *Shas* and *Poskim*, as well as his great *Yirat Shomayim* and *Mesirat Nefesh* for *K'lal Yisroel* to properly determine the Halacha in each type of multifetal pregnancy situation, to guide us through these very critical situations. It is our hope that through this essay, we have, in some small measure, demonstrated the timelessness of the Torah as well as the brilliance and ability of Torah giants such as Rav Moshe to transcend time and to thereby inspire the many to embrace the beauty that was Rav Moshe and that he left for us to further cultivate.

חבל על דאבדין ולא משתכחין, מי יתן לנו תמורתו

Woe is to us that Rav Moshe is lost and not found. Who will give us another as him?

Type of Situation	Sub- category	Who will be saved if the option is chosen?		Is there a Δ <i>(differential)</i> between 2 <i>Rodef</i> - $_{lpha}$ and <i>Rodef</i> - $_{ m a}$?		Does the משׁמיא קא רדפי לה concept apply?		
		¹ Active	Passive	Yes/ No	Explanation	Yes/ No	Why	
Obstructed	non- emerged fetus	Mother's complete ยอบ	Fetus' incomplete พวา	Yes	Δ between the mother's complete נפש ${}$ and the fetus' incomplete נפש	No	The fetus is considered the "definitive רודף" because of the נפשׁ Δ	
labor	partially- emerged fetus	Mother's complete נפש	Fetus' complete ยาว	No	Both the fetus and mother have a complete ພາວງ	Yes	מאי חזית _{Rodef} why do you presume Rodef _{-»} pursues Rodef _{-ם}	
Fugitive	with escape capability	³ TP's ⁴חיי עולם	Fugitive's ⁴חיי עולם	No	Both fugitive and TP have potential for חיי עולם		more than Rodef-ي pursues Rodef-» ? (i.e., they are mutually equal pursuers)	
	without escape capability	³ TP's ⁴חיי עולם	Fugitive's 5חיי שׁעה	Yes	Δ between the TP's היי עולם and the fugitive's היי שעה	No	The fugitive is considered the "definitive רודף" because of the <i>life expectancy-</i> Δ	
Multifetal Pregnancy <u>Assume</u> : High risk of total fetal/neonatal death without MPR		⁶ F _{save} (⁷ F _{reduce} will be lost)	High probability: No one	No	<u>Assume</u> : All fetuses have the same survival potential if others are reduced.	No	אשמיא קא רדפי לה only applies if both the passive option and active option would achieve הצלת הנרדף. However, by MFP, the only option that can achieve הצלת הנרדף is the active option (MPR).	

Table 5: Summary of Suggested Analyses of the Fugitive, Obstructed Labor and Multifetal Pregnancy Situations, Based on Rav Moshe's Insights

¹The active option is as follows: In the obstructed labor situation: feticide; in the fugitive situation: hand-over (מסירה); in the MFP situation: MPR (fetal reduction) ²Rodef- $_{R}$ = fetus or fugitive; Rodef- $_{\Xi}$ = mother or townspeople; ³TP = Townspeople; ⁴TP = Normal life expectancy; ⁵TP = Temporary life (expectancy) ⁶F_{save} = fetuses that the physician wishes to save; ⁷F_{reduce} = fetuses that the physician wishes to reduce.

X. References

1	תלמידי רבינו יונה על מס׳ עבודה זרה דף כח ע״ב, ד״ה דילמא דמא דחברך סומק טפי (See Appendix B, Source B-2, p. 45, for an excerpt and translation).
2	רבי נחום פרצוביץ, ספר זכרון טוב משה, בענין יהרג ואל יעבור
3	אגרות משה, יורה דעה ח״ב, סימן קעד׳, ענף ד׳ (See Supplement 2, pp. 83-85, for excerpts and translation).
4	דינא דחיי על ספר מצוות גדול, לאווין קסד׳ (See Supplement 1, Source 6c, pp.54-55, for an excerpt of the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol and Dina Dechayei).
5	חזון איש על מס׳ סנהדרין, סימן כה׳ (See Supplement 1, Source 10, pp.57-58, for an excerpt and translation).
6	Rabbi Dr. Zalman Levine: "Multi Fetal Reduction"; audio file on YUTorah.org, October 2007
7	אגרות משה, חושן משפט ח״ב, סימן סט׳, אות א׳-ב׳ (See Supplement 2, pp. 63-66, for excerpts and translation).
8	ידושי רבינו חיים הלוי על הרמב"ם הל' רוצח ושמירת הנפש, פרק א' הלכה ט' (See Supplement 3, pp. 91-94, for full Hebrew text and partial translation).
9	דברי יששכר, חושן משפט, סימן קסח׳ (See Supplement 1, Source 13, pp.60-61, for an excerpt and translation).
10	אבי עזרי על הרמב"ם הל' רוצח ושמירת הנפש, פרק א' הלכה ו', הלכה ט' (See Supplement 4, pp. 95-99, for excerpts and translation).
11	הרב מרדכי אליהו, תחומין, השמדת ביציות מופרות ודילול עוברים, כרך יא, תש"ן, עמ' 272
12	Rabbi Hershel Schachter: "Fetal Reduction"; audio file on YUTorah.org, March 2002
13	יד המלך על הרמב״ם הל' שׁבת, פרק ב׳ הלכה יח׳ (See Supplement 1, Source 16, pp.62-62A, for an excerpt of the Yad Hamelech).

This discussion pertains to a dispute between ר יוהנן and ריש לקיש) in the Yerushalmi (Source 10, p. 10) regarding the fugitive situation, where hooligans order the townspeople to hand over a victim (a "fugitive") to be killed, or else they will kill everyone in the town. In addition to the requirement that the fugitive was designated (i.e., singled out) by the hooligans, ר"ל also requires that he is מייב מיתה (deserving of death, defined below) to permit handing him over (מסירה). However, ריוהנן ריוהנים even if the designated fugitive is not מסירה.

A. The הסדי דוד הסדי בות (Rav Yoel Sirkes) explain that the term, מסירב מיתה (which הייב אוני), means that the fugitive deserves a legal death sentence because of his criminal actions. The מסירה writes, "The מית מאי הזית logic does not apply since he brought [the threat] on himself through his actions for which he deserves the death penalty by the non-Jewish laws" (Source A-1). Similarly, the דוד הסדי הסדי דוד הסדי היב מיתה the Tosefta (Source 9, pp. 9-10), writes, "However, שמעון believes that ... if the designated fugitive is הייב מיתה even if he could escape and the townspeople will be killed, it is permitted to hand him over because the logic of מאי הזית understand that: 1) הייב מיתה (Supplement 1, Source 5, p. 54). Both the הסדי בייה מות the Tosefta (that: 1) יהייב מיתה inter Tore and the מסדי הוות הסדי הייב מיתה, i.e., the fugitive deserves a legal death sentence, is identical to 's intent in the Tosefta; and 2) Since the היתר היית (permissibility) for היית מסירה is based on the fugitive deserving capital punishment because of his criminal actions, he should be handed over even if could escape (i.e., we prevent him from escaping, to save the others).

Source A-1: The מסירה' שמעון permits מסירה when the fugitive deserves the death penalty.

If the townspeople are in immediate danger, even if the fugitive is	<u>שו"ת בית חדש (ב״ח) (ישנות) סימן מג׳</u> :
outside the danger (i.e., he has escape capability), they should hand	אבל כשהן מבפנים לסכנה אף על פי שהוא מבחוץ
him over since he is הייב מיתה and the hooligans designated him.	לסכנה ימסרוהו להן מאחר שמחוייב מיתה וייחדוהו להן
The יהרג ואל יעבור of יהרג ואל יעבור (i.e., in the "coerced murder" case,	ולא אמרינין יהרג ואל יעבור מטעמא דמאי חזית דדמן
lpha must be killed rather than kill $meta$), which is based on the מאי חזית מאי חזית	סומקי טפי וכו אלא אם כן דאינו מחויב מיתה
logic, only applies if $oldsymbol{eta}$ is not הייב מיתה. However, if $oldsymbol{eta}$ is	
הייב מיתה, even if he is outside the danger, the הייב מיתה logic does	אבל במחוייב אף על פי שהוא מבחוץ לסכנה מכל מקום
not apply since he brought [the threat] on himself through his actions, for which he deserves capital punishment by the [non-	מאחר דאיהו גרם לנפשיה על ידי מעשיו שנתחייב מיתה
Jewish] laws. [In this case], we say, "On the contrary, the blood of α	בדיניהם אין אומרים בזה מה חזית וכו דאדרבא אמרינן
[and similarly, the blood of the townspeople] is redder," since he ($lpha$)	דדמא דהאי סומקא טפי דהרי לא עשה מעשה שיהא
has not done anything at all for which he deserves to be killed.	מחוייב מיתה כל עיקר.

B. However, Rav Moshe understands that the basis for the היתר to hand over the fugitive according to both ר יוהנן and הייל, is that he is considered a רודף after the townspeople (Source A-2). Rav Moshe explains when הייל stipulates that the fugitive must be הייב מיתה to permit מסירה, he does not require that a death sentence was issued by a legitimate justice system. Rather, הייב מיתה in the term, הייב מיתה, is that the hooligans have any grievance against a specific victim for which they wish to kill him, in which case, מסירה, Moreover, agrees with מסירה that מסירה is only permitted if the fugitive has no escape capability, but if he has escape capability, is prohibited even if the hooligans have a grievance against him.

- C. From Sources A-2 and A-3, we see that Rav Moshe understands that there is two-step process in order to apply the the מסירה to permit מסירה, according to both ר יוחנן and "ר"ל:
 - <u>Condition 1</u>: The fugitive must be considered the cause of the lethal threat (the exact term Rav Moshe uses is: "הסבה להרדיפה") facing the townspeople, thus defining him as a רודף; and
 - <u>Condition 2</u>: The fugitive must be unable to escape, in order to assign him the "definitive "definitive" status due to the *'life expectancy-differential*' between the townspeople's היי שׁעה and the fugitive's היי שׁעה (Section VI-8-B, pp. 20-21).

Source A-2: Rav Moshe's explanation of the position (ר"ל) ריש לקיש) in the Yerushalmi. (See Supplement 2, pp. 73, 75, for more extensive excerpts from the Sefer Igros Moshe).

... [According to ר"ל], if hooligans want to kill the fugitive [merely] because of their grievance against him, the דין רודף will apply to him even though he has no intention to pursue. Thus, the townspeople will be permitted to hand him over even according to "ד just as [*we may kill the 'non-emerged'*] fetus ... When the hooligans come with a grievance against the fugitive, ר"ל will agree with just cause of the מסירה] since, in this case, the fugitive is certainly the cause of the pursuit (i.e., the threat) to kill the townspeople.

According to how I have explained ... that ר"ל does not require that a [legitimate] death sentence [was issued against the fugitive, to permit מסירה], but rather, even if his death sentence came from [a grievance of] the gentile hooligans, ר"ל also agrees with (in the gentile hooligans, ר"ל vill not permit (in the tours the fugitive will certainly be killed along with the townspeople when the hooligans capture the city (i.e., if he has no escape capability). <u>אגרות משה יורה דעה ח״ב, סימן ס׳, ענף ג׳:</u>

... שגם ליסטים בעלמא כיון שהם רוצים להרגו מחמת טענה שיש להם עליו, הוא בדין רודף אף שהוא שלא בכוונת רדיפה, ומותרין למוסרו גם לר"ל כמו בעובר, וכמו לר יוחנן כיון שודאי באופן זה שבאין בטענה עליו הוא הסבה להרדיפה גם להרוג אותם שבזה מודה גם ר"ל לר יוחנן.

דלמה שבארתי ... דלא מצריך ר"ל חיוב מיתה אלא מה שחייב מיתה להעכו"ם הליסטים, גם לר"ל הוא כר יהודה ואין להתיר אלא דוקא כשודאי יהרג גם הא כשיתפסו העיר עמהן.

D. In Source A-2, Rav Moshe states, "Thus, the townspeople will be permitted to hand him over even according to *just as [we may kill the 'non-emerged'] fetus ... since, in this case, the fugitive is certainly the cause of the threat to kill the townspeople.*" Thus, ר"ל fundamentally agrees with ר יותנן that we consider the fugitive as a קוז after the townspeople despite his lack of volition or wrongdoing, because his only path to survival necessitates their death just as the fetus is considered a רודף after his mother because his only path to survival is through her death (Section VI-4-C, p. 15). ה יותנן and ר"ל merely disagree on the level of the hooligans' designation of a specific victim required to consider him the cause of the lethal threat and thus, to define him as a ¹ (condition #1). רודף believes that by merely designating an individual, the hooligans demonstrate that they are prepared to kill all the townspeople unless he is handed to them. Therefore, he is deemed the cause of the threat and is defined as a רודף after the townspeople. However, רייל requires a higher level of designation, i.e., a designation linked to that specific victim because of the hooligans' grievance against him. If the hooligans demand a specific victim because of their grievance toward him, their murderous desires will only be assuaged by receiving this individual, which identifies him as the cause of the threat against the townspeople, thus, defining him as a privace, if they have no grievance against this individual, it is evident that the hooligans' purpose is to demonstrate their ferocity and kill anyone they choose. If the selected person had not been present, the hooligans possibly would have picked out a different person and thus, their random selection cannot render him as the cause of the threat (Source A-3). The שיש היל היל s position in a similar manner (see Supplement 1, Source 10, p. 58).

Source A-3: Rav Moshe's explanation of the dispute between ר יוחנן and ריש לקיש (ר"ל) in the Yerushalmi. (See Supplement 2, pp.72, 74-75, for more extensive excerpts from the Sefer Igros Moshe).

... They disagree only insomuch as ר יוחנן understands that the "שבע בן בכרי" -analogy" is merely to require designation, whereas, according to די"ל, [the analogy comes to] additionally require designation similar to the שבע בן בכרי situation where there was a grievance specific to him.

 \dots ל"ל believes that we cannot assign the status of a רודף at all to the person that the hooligans designated to kill (in the absence of a grievance) since they have no basis to condemn him to die. It merely "fell upon" their minds to demonstrate their ferocity and kill a person who they singled out from the group, but this does not define him as the cause of the threat [facing the townspeople], since if he had not been present, it is possible that the hooligans would have designated someone else.

<u>אגרות משה יורה דעה ח״ב, סימן ס׳, ענף ג׳:</u>

... ופליגי רק שר יוחנן סובר שהמשל דשבע בן בכרי הוא רק לעצם הייחוד ור"ל מוסיף שהוא גם לענין כעין הייחוד דהיה שם בטענה רק אליו כמו שהיה בשבע בן בכרי.

... אבל בייחדו סובר שאין להחשיבו למי שייחדו העכו"ם להרגו לרודף כלל כיון דאין להם עליו שום חיוב מיתה רק שכך נפל בדעתם להראות אימתם ולהרוג אחד שייחדו מהסיעה, שאין זה אף סבה לרדיפה שאפשר אם לא היה זה שם היו מיחדין אחר.

- E. According to Rav Moshe, since הייהני לי הייל disagreement with אוד הייהני is merely to require a higher level of designation (condition 1), הייל will agree with הייהנו לוש that the fugitive must be unable to escape, so that the *'life expectancy-differential'* will enable the דין רודף to permit מיירה (condition #2). However, if the fugitive has escape capability, even if he was defined as a רודף either via designation alone or in conjunction with the hooligans' grievance, the townspeople are defined as equal pursuers (רודפים) after the fugitive, by the same logic that defines the fugitive as a רודף גרודף. Accordingly, the הודית logic states, *"Why do you presume the fugitive is more of a* רודף *after the townspeople, than they are after him?"*, which according to Rav Moshe is the essence of the הין רודף משמיא קא רדפי לה concept (pp. 16-17, 20-21). Therefore, the townspeople when he has escape capability, regardless of the level of designation and thus, מסירה is prohibited.
- F. Since the reason רודף requires a grievance against the fugitive is to define him as a רודף, if there are other means to define him as a רודף, Rav Moshe posits that ר יוחנן will agree with ר יוחנן that that a grievance is not required

to permit מסירה. Accordingly, Rav Moshe says if the fugitive was designated by the hooligans to be killed before he fled to the city, \neg will agree that the townspeople may hand him over even if hooligans have no grievance against him, providing he has no escape capability (Source A-4). Presumably the explanation is: Since the fugitive was designated for death before he fled to the city, it is evident that the hooligans specifically are targeting him alone. Therefore, the circumstances define the fugitive as a \neg (condition #1) despite the absence of a grievance against him.

Source A-4: Rav Moshe explains that ריש לקיש (ר"ל) does not always require a "death sentence" (i.e., a grievance). (See Supplement 2, p.74, for a more extensive excerpt from the Sefer Igros Moshe).

Even in a case where the hooligans have no grievance against the fugitive but nonetheless, if they designated him to be killed before he fled to the city and then the hooligans demand that the townspeople turn him over or else they will kill them all, it is as if the fugitive has a "death sentence". Since the hooligans previously designated him to be killed, it is as if he was sentenced to death by the hooligans and therefore, he is defined as a TITP even though he has no intent [to harm]. Accordingly, דיי שיוח agree with ריוהנן that if he is unable to escape to safety, but rather, everyone (including the fugitive) will definitely be killed, they are permitted to hand him over because of the *life expectancy-differential* that the townspeople have over his \neg , for which he is a saved, even though the townspeople will then be killed, it is forbidden to hand him over since he is not literally a TITP (i.e., he has no intent to harm).

אגרות משה יורה דעה ח״ב, סימן ס׳, ענף ג׳: וכן אף בלא טענה אבל ייחדוהו מקודם להריגה וערק להעיר ותובעים מהעיר שימסרו ובאם לאו יהרגו את כולם, הוא גם כן כחייב מיתה דכיון שכבר ייחדוהו מקודם להריגה הוא כחייב מיתה להם, שלכן ודאי הוא כרודף אף שהוא שלא להם, שלכן ודאי הוא כרודף אף שהוא שלא בכוונה. ויודה בזה גם ר"ל לר יוחנן שבאם אם אפשר לו לברוח ולהנצל אלא שודאי יהרגו כולם שמותרין למוסרו, מחמת היתרון על חיי שעה שהוא רודף אחרם ולא הם. ובאם יכול לברוח ולהנצל אף שאז יהרגו אסור גם בזה כיון שאינו רורף ממש.

¹ Was the fugitive aware that the	² Was the hooligans' designation of the	° °	³ Fugitive has escape capability	³ Fugitive has NO	escape capability
hooligans would discover his city of	fugitive based on a hooligans before or grievance specific after he took asylum	and ר' יוחנן ריש לקיש	ר' יוחנן	ריש לקיש	
asylum and potentially kill everyone?		in the city?	ls it permitted (מותר) or forbidden (אסור) to hand over the fugitive?		
	No	After	אסור³	מותר	אסור²
	(designation without a grievance)	Before	אסור³	מותר	מותר²
	Yes	Before or after	אסור³	מותר	מותר
⁴ Yes	Possibly no	t applicable?	מותר⁴	מותר	מותר

Table 1: Rav Moshe's analysis of the fugitive cases: When is a grievance or escape incapability required to permit handing over the fugitive?

¹Before he took asylum in the city whose residents were threatened by the hooligans to either hand him over or else everyone will be killed.

²If the hooligans had no grievance against anyone but randomly picked out a person in the city to kill, ר"ל maintains that the randomness (or capriciousness) of their designation cannot render this fugitive as the cause of the threat and thus, he is not defined as a רודף. However, if he was designated by the hooligans before he fled to the city, Rav Moshe maintains that against the value of the without a grievance even according to ר"ל ס.


³If the fugitive has the capability to escape, we have a מאי חזית dilemma and therefore, the דין רודף will not apply to permit.

⁴The fugitive knew that: (1) the hooligans wanted to kill him, (2) they would find him in the city in which he would hide, and (3) they had the ability to kill everyone in the city if he was not handed over, and despite this knowledge, he still took asylum in the city. Since he intentionally placed the townspeople at risk to save himself, he is considered like a רוזף with intent to harm and therefore, Rav Moshe says it is probable that they are permitted to hand him over even if he has the ability to escape. However, Rav Moshe states that further analysis is required to finalize the Halacha accordingly.

Note: If the fugitive was truly deserving of the death penalty even through a (legitimate) non-Jewish legal system, Rav Moshe would appear to agree with the

מסדי דוד and the מסדי ב״ה, i.e., that he may be handed over even if he has escape capability. The ז״ט (Supplement 1, Source 9b, p. 57) states that in such a case, such as one who revolts against the non-Jewish government, he should be handed over even if the authorities did not demand his apprehension since he is certainly a fter the other Jews because of his evil actions, while they have done nothing to endanger him. From the context in which Rav Moshe quotes this ז״ט (Supplement 2, p. 73), it appears that he concurs with the ז״ט. This would logically apply even if this individual is able to escape.

Figure 1: Two-step process (decision tree) to apply the דין רודף in the fugitive case, based on Rav Moshe's analysis:Condition 1: The fugitive must be the cause of the threat and thus, he is defined as a רבי יוחנן. According to רבי יוחנן, this isdetermined by the mere designation by the hooligans (Step 1a), whereas לקיש also requires that they have a grievanceagainst the fugitive (Step 1'b).Condition 2: The fugitive must have the "definitive "case, if he is unable to escape),because of the *life expectancy-differential* (Step 2a).However, if he can escape (2b), since the fugitive and townspeople (TP) areviewed as equal pursuers, there is a מאי חזית dilemma and the דין רודף cannot apply.



- H. In summary, the following two approaches for the היתר to hand over the designated fugitive were presented:
 - According to the הסדי דוד and the ב״ם, the townspeople are permitted to hand over the fugitive if the circumstances dictate that the מאי חזית logic does not apply, as follows:
 - a. If the fugitive has no escape capability, even if he does not deserve the death penalty, והנן in the Yerushalmi and ר יהודה in the Tosefta permit מסירה "because the reason of מאי חזית does not apply when they all are in an equal state of danger" (הסרי דוד, Source 12, p. 12, and the first approach of the ה"ם).
 - b. If the fugitive deserves a death penalty (הייב מיתה) via a legal justice system because of his wrongdoings, ר שמעון in the Yerushalmi and ר שמעון in the Tosefta permit מסירה regardless of his ability to escape. The reason for permitting מאי חזית is *"because the logic of מאי חזית does not apply when he is* מסירה מסדיר דוד).
 - <u>Note</u>: Both the הסדי דוד and the ב״ה offer approaches whereby ר שמעון and the הסדי כould agree with each other. The ב״ה maintains that ר יוהנן and ר יוהנן certainly disagree with each other.
 - According to Rav Moshe, the reason for the היתר for מסירה is that the fugitive is considered a רודף after the townspeople since he is the cause of their impending doom (הסבה להרדיפה). This approach is based on Rav Moshe's belief that intent to harm is unnecessary for a person to be considered a רודף. Both מסיר and ריוהנן angree that this applies only if the fugitive has no escape capability. היותנן and ריוהנן disagree as follows:
 - a. איוחנן believes that merely by being (randomly) selected by the hooligans, the fugitive is the cause of the townspeople's impending doom, thereby, defining him as a רודף. Therefore, he may handed over (providing he has no escape capability); whereas
 - b. רודף believes that the fugitive is only defined as a רודף if the hooligans have a grievance against him for which they wish to kill him. However, if the hooligans randomly selected a person, he is not defined as a רודף. Alternatively, if the hooligans designated the fugitive to be killed before he fled to the city, he is defined as a רודף even without any grievance against him.
- I. The approach of Rav Moshe with regard to the dispute between the Amoraim, היוהנן and הייל, in the Yerushalmi, also lends itself to a cogent understanding of the Tosefta which records the views of the Tannaim, and הייל and רייהוד glance, it might appear that the statements of function of the statements of the Tannaim in the Tosefta, which is perplexing. Why would the Yerushalmi not simply quote the Tosefta if the Amoraim state nothing new, and or at least mention that the dispute of the Amoraim is identical to the earlier dispute between הייה and רייהוד מעון As will be evident below, according to Rav Moshe's approach, this difficulty is readily resolved.

- J. The statement of ר יהודה יהודה 's in the Tosefta, requiring a situation of escape incapability in order to permit הסירה הוסרי אווי לא ווי העריד יהנון fund in the Yerushalmi. However, it is unlikely that the Yerushalmi's case is where the fugitive has escape capability, because 'ה יוהנן 's leniency to permit מטירה fund מטירה fund then defy explanation, from the perspective of either the מאי הזית logic or the ידין רודף. The fugitive has escape capability because the fugitive has escape capability applies if the fugitive has escape capability because the townspeople are then forced to choose between delivering him to die versus being killed in his stead if they allow him to escape. The ידין רודף will not apply when he has escape capability because the townspeople and the fugitive has no escape capability. Moreover, if we interpret 'r' s statement that the fugitive "must be avere the fugitive has no escape capability. Noreover, if we interpret 'r' s statement that the fugitive "must be havior, as the "די" and the הסדי דוד מירה מירה 's statement that the fugitive "statement. This reinforces our question, what information does the Yerushalmi offer that was not already covered in the Tosefta?
- In paragraph C (p. 36) and in the decision tree (Figure 1, p. 40), we explained that Rav Moshe understands the К. and היתר, which is based on the דין רודף, as a two-step process. The dispute of ר"ל and ר"ל and ר"ל pertains to the hooligans' designation of a fugitive to be killed (the 1st step in the decision tree): Is the designation requirement met if they merely randomly singled out any person (i.e., the position of ר יוחנן) or, must their designation be based on their grievance towards this individual (i.e., the position of ר"ל)? However, the statements of ר יהודה and ר יהודה in the Tosefta, pertain to a downstream step in the decision tree, after the designation requirement has been satisfied (as stipulated by either ר"ל or ר"ל). At this downstream step, stipulates that (in addition to designation), the fugitive must be assigned the "definitive ריהודה" status, i.e., he must be unable to escape, in order to permit מסירה (the 2nd step in the decision tree). The phrasing of 's statement suggests that he is not disputing יהודה 's statement (in contrast with the phrasing of the argument between ריוחנן and ר"ל in the Yerushalmi). רייל s statement, "When does this apply (i.e., they may not hand him over)? Only if the fugitive is in the exterior while the townspeople are in the interior," addresses the initial statement of the Tosefta which prohibits מסירה. Thus, ר יהודה is coming to define the parameters of this prohibition, i.e., מסירה is only prohibited if the fugitive has escape capability. On the other hand, ר שמעון 's statement, "So she said to them, 'Anyone who rebels against the kingdom of David, is liable to execution, " addresses the details of the שבע בן בכרי is coming to clarify the negotiations ר שמעון is coming to clarify the negotiations between the wise woman (according to the Midrash, סרה בת אשר) and the residents of the city, Avel. Based on his insightful analysis of the verses in ספר שמואל, Rav Moshe explains that the townspeople were satisfied that שבע בן בכרי met the two requirements of the decision tree, i.e., he was designated (according to the stipulations of both ריוחנן) and he also had the "definitive רודף" status because he had no escape capability (see Supplement 2, pp. 76-79). Thus, the requirements to permit מסירה as defined by ר יהודה , were met.

Nonetheless, this היתר is only sanctioned on the "מדינא" -level" (rough translation: the minimal fulfillment level of the Halacha), but the townspeople would only agree to hand שבע בן בכרי over if it was sanctioned on the "רשמעון (rough translation: the ideal fulfillment level of the Halacha). Accordingly, רשמעון explains that שבע בן בכרי tough translation: the ideal fulfillment level of the Halacha). Accordingly, the statements of סרה בת אשר because he revolted against המסירה, and therefore, השירה". Thus, according to Rav Moshe's approach, there is no redundancy; the statements of a mover in the Yerushalmi pertain to a different segment of the decision tree than the statements of the e, i.e., delineating the required level of designation to define the fugitive as a post of the decision tree) and the "היתר" and therefore, היתר שמעון he Tosefta. To accordingly, היתר "based on the 2nd step of the decision tree) and the "היתר", see Supplement 2, p. 74) that the Amoraic dispute in the Yerushalmi is identical to the Tannaic dispute in the Tosefta.

- L. Furthermore, the Yerushalmi is intrinsically more logical to understand according to Rav Moshe's approach. As explained above, the Yerushalmi appears to discuss a case without escape capability; otherwise, 'ר יוחנן' 's leniency would be untenable. Rav Moshe's understanding that לי לים does not require a legal death sentence to permit מסירה fits this scenario most closely for the following reason: If the fugitive legally deserved the death sentence (due to his criminal behavior), מסירה מסירה מסירה לים איסטול שנירה מסירה ''ל source A-1, p. 35). Consequently, if we interpret לי לים to mean that the fugitive must legally deserve the death penalty, we would be forced into an awkward explanation of the Yerushalmi, i.e., 'ה יוחנן' 's statement is limited to a situation where the fugitive has no escape capability whereas 'ר יוחנן' 's statement applies to either situation with or without escape capability providing that the fugitive deserves a legal death sentence. However, according to Rav Moshe', 'חיי 's requirement that that the fugitive "must be and therefore, 'חייב מיתה merely comes to stipulate a higher level designation than that required by ', and therefore, 'ב '' will also require a situation of escape incapability to permit מסירה, just as ', j
- M. Lastly, if ל"ל" יל intention is that the fugitive must legally deserve the death sentence to permit מסירה אלירה, what is the logical connection between the designation by hooligans who operate outside of any legal system, with the fugitive's death sentence? Since the fugitive's liability to the death penalty arises from his violation of Torah law or even civil law, if this liability alone is insufficient to permit מסירה how would the designation by lawless hooligans combine with the legal liability to complete the process to permit אסירה? However, according to Rav Moshe's understanding, "ל" יק requirement, הייב מיתה, comes to stipulate the nature of the hooligans' designation that is considered sufficient to define the fugitive as the cause of the threat, and thus, a רודף (Source A-3, p. 37). Accordingly, the hooligan's designation and the "death sentence", which in this context refers to the hooligan's grievance, are integrally connected.

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N. The רמב״ם (Source A-5) and the second opinion in the רמ״א (Rav Moshe Isserles, Supplement 1, Source 9a, p. 57) follow the position of r''_{γ} who requires a "death sentence" (i.e., the hooligans' grievance against this fugitive, according to Rav Moshe's interpretation) to permit מסירה. This poses a difficulty for the suggestion that multifetal pregnancy reduction could be permitted based on the דין רודף (Section VIII, pp. 27-30). Certainly, no fetus in the multifetal pregnancy situation has a "death sentence" against him. According to the רמב"ם and the second opinion in the דין רודף, how could the דין רודף be applied to permit multifetal pregnancy reduction?

Source A-5: The רמב״ם follows ריש לקיש's position regarding handing over the fugitive.

Similarly, if gentiles told [a group of Jews], "Give us one of you and we will kill him; and if not, we will kill all of you": Let them all be killed and they may not give over one Jewish life to them. However, if they designated someone and said, "Give us So-and-So, or we will *kill all of you"*: If the person is liable to the death penalty like שבע בן בכרי, they may give him over to them. However, at the ideal level of Halacha (לכתחלה), this instruction is not conveyed to them. If he is not liable to the death penalty, let them all be killed and they may not give over one Jewish life to them.

רמב״ם פרק ה׳ הלכות יסודי התורה, הלכה ה׳: וכן אם אמרו להם עובדי כוכבים תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרגנו ואם לאו נהרוג כולכם, יהרגו כולם ואל ימסרו להם נפש אחת מישראל. ואם יחדוהו להם ואמרו תנו לנו פלוני או נהרוג את כולכם, אם היה מחויב מיתה כשבע בן בכרי יתנו אותו להם, ואין מורין להם כן לכתחלה. ואם אינו חייב מיתה יהרגו כולן ואל ימסרו להם נפש אחת מישראל.

O. Perhaps we can answer this question based on Rav Moshe's understanding that the only reason r'' requires a "death sentence" is to define the fugitive as the cause of the threat (הסבה להרדיפה) confronting the townspeople and thus, define him as a רודף (see paragraphs C-D, pp. 36-37). In the fugitive situation, there is no inherent basis for any one person to be considered as the cause of the threat even if he was designated because the entire origin of the crisis (i.e., the hooligans) was externally imposed (according to Rav Moshe's understanding that ר"ל' ruling is unrelated to any culpability of the fugitive). Thus, we need some method to discern that this fugitive is considered the cause of the threat. The "death sentence", i.e., the hooligans' grievance (unjust as it is), serves to define him as the cause of the threat since it demonstrates that the hooligans specifically selected this individual and they will not be assuaged by handing over anyone else. As an illustration of this notion, Rav Moshe notes that רייל will agree with רייה that a grievance is not required if other situational details demonstrate that the fugitive is the cause of the threat, e.g., if the fugitive was designated before he fled to their city, the townspeople may hand him over even without a grievance (see paragraph F, pp. 37-38). By contrast, in the multifetal pregnancy situation, the cause of the danger is internally imposed, i.e., it is evident that the fetuses themselves are the origins of the threat and therefore, we do not require any external imposition of a "death sentence" to define any fetus as a רודף. Therefore, even according to ר"ל who requires a "death sentence" to define the fugitive as the רודף, presumably there would be no such requirement to define the fetuses in the multifetal pregnancy situation as רודפים (assuming that there are no other reasons to prevent the דין רודף from being applied in this situation).

- **Note:** This discussion refers to the "coerced murder" case described in Section **II-1A-B** (pp. 2-3). "Option 1" and "Option 2" in the following paragraph, are schematically depicted in Figure 1 on p. 5.
- ייהרג ואל יעבור (in די סל הבדרין of די סנהדרין conce 3, p. 4) explains the "הרג ואל יעבור" as the basis for the שפיכת דמים (murder, i.e., the איסור), as follows: The "שפיכת דמים-dispensation", which generally suspends observance of מצוה to save a Jewish life, is inoperative in the "coerced murder" case (pp. 3-5) for the following reason: If *α* would murder *β* to save his own life (*"Option 1"* in Figure 1), there will be two negative consequences (*"תרתי"*): The loss of a Jewish life (*β's* life) and violation of מצוה On the other hand, if *α* remains passive (*"Option 2"*), there will only be one negative consequence (*"הרת"*): The loss of a Jewish life (*β's* life) and violation of a מצוה On the other hand, if *β*, since a Jew will be killed and a מצוה the remains passive (*"Coption 1"* in Source B-1) states, *"... if you kill β, since a Jew will be killed and a מרתי-נגד-הדא"* will be violated, why should it be acceptable in the eyes of Hashem to violate his any argument *"two negative consequences vs. one negative consequence"* (see Supplement 2, pp. 86-87).

Source B-1: רש״י s explanation of the מאי חזית logic: Inapplicability of the "וחי בהם-dispensation":

רש״י יומא, דף פב ע״ב, ד״ה מאי חזית:

רבה or רבה responds to α who asked if he may accede to the hooligan's demand to kill β]: "What is your premise to permit [yourself to kill β]? Is it based on ווהי בהם ולא שימות?"	כלומר מאי דעתיך למשרי מילתא ? משום וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם ?
[Your premise is untrue because] the reason [for the "וחי בהם- dispensation"] is that Jewish lives are more precious to Hashem than the מצוות. Therefore, the Holy One, blessed be He, says, "let the abrogated (i.e., violated) and this person will live."	טעמו של דבר לפי שחביבה נפשן של ישראל לפני המקום יותר מן המצוות, אמר הקדושׄ ∈ּרוך הוא תבטל המצוה ויחיה זה.
But now [if you kill β], since a Jew will be killed and the מצוה will be violated, why should it be acceptable in the eyes of Hashem to violate his מצוה (i.e., לא תרצה)?	אבל עכשיו שיש כאן ישראל נהרג והמצוה בטילה, למה ייטב בעיני המקום לעבור על מצותיו ?
Why should your ($lpha'$ s) blood be more precious to Him [i.e., to Hashem] than the blood of your Jewish friend ($meta$)?	למה יהיה דמך חביב עליו יותר מדם חבירך ישראל ?

2. Rav Moshe comments, "We can infer [from this "רש"] that with regard to this די [of הרג ואל יעבור], his (a's) life and the life of his friend (β) are equal" (Supplement 2, p. 83). Perhaps Rav Moshe's inference is as follows: The reason for the "הרי בהם" dispensation" is that Jewish lives are more dear to Hashem than observance of השיין, above). If we accept the premise that all Jewish lives are deemed equal, it logically follows that the intent of the היי בהם" dispensation" cannot be met if a kills β to save himself, since the preservation of a's own life will be nullified by the loss of β's equally valued life. Therefore, since the "הי בהם" must be observed even at the cost

of α 's life. According to Rav Moshe's understanding, apparently רש״׳ believes that the Torah declares total equivalence between the two lives in question regardless of any factor that may appear to render one life more valuable than the other. Accordingly, even if there was a method to discern that α 's life has a higher value than β 's life, the inapplicability of the "הרג ואל יעבור", would remain in place.

- 3. Therefore, according to "ע", in a different "coerced murder" case where the hooligan orders *α*, "either kill *β* or I will kill both of you," although *β* will certainly be killed in any event, it appears logical that *α* would still be forbidden to save his life by killing *β* because of the "ערתי-נגד-הדא" reasoning: If *α* remains passive, even though both *α* and *β* will die, this would still be classified as "ערתי" ("one type of negative consequence"), without transgression of an עבירה. However, if *α* kills *β*, there will be "ערתי" ("two types of different negative consequences"): *β*'s death and a transgression of an עבירה. Therefore, the "עבירה dispensation" is inapplicable and the דין of הירג ואל יעבור הירגד-הדי, would apply even if *β* will certainly be killed anyway. Thus, on a fundamental level, since "שי considers the inapplicability of the "תרתי-נגד-הדא" hogic, and thus, the pair of of any of will certainly would apply even any of the "תרתי-נגד-הדי", will certainly be basis of the "עבירה of any of any of the "תרתי-נגד-הדי", where the basis of the "עביר of of any of the "תרתי-נגד-הדי", whenever we have a "תרתי-נגד-הדי", will apply of the "תרתי-נגד-הדי", whenever we have a "תרתי-נגד-הדי", will certainly be hilled any of the "תרתי-נגד-הדי", will certainly the transplicable any, will remain in force.
- 4. We discussed two approaches to understand the permissibility (היתר) of handing over (מסירה) the 'fugitive without escape capability' (see Appendix A, p. 41, paragraph H).
 - a. The אסדי דוד (Source 12, p. 12) explains since the fugitive will certainly be killed with the townspeople if he is not handed over, *"the logic of מאי הזית does not apply when they all are in an equal state of danger."* Since the מאי הזית logic is not applicable, the דין דין would not apply and therefore, the townspeople are permitted to hand over the fugitive.
 - b. However, according to Rav Moshe, the reason for the היתר to hand over the 'fugitive without escape capability' is because he is considered as a רודף after the townspeople (Source 15, p. 17). Below (paragraph 6b, p. 46), we will suggest a possible reason why Rav Moshe does not explain in the same way as the הסדי דוד.
- In Section II-1-C (pp. 3-4), we discussed two approaches for the מאי חזית logic in the "coerced murder" case and how it dictates the Halacha of יהרג ואל יעבור by יהרג ואי.
 - a. The תלמידי רבינו יונה (1st explanation; Source B-2), as elucidated by Rav Nochum Partzovitz, understand the מאי חזית logic as follows: Since we do not know whose life (α vs. β) is considered more valuable, therefore, the uncertainty dictates that α must remain passive (שב ואל תעשה), even at the pain of his own death. According to this approach, if there was a way to definitively determine that α's blood is redder than β's blood, (i.e., that α's life is definitively more valuable), since there is no uncertainty, perhaps α would be permitted to kill β to save himself.

Appendix B: Rashi's View of the מאי חזית Logic in the "Coerced Murder" Case, as Explained by Rav Moshe Feinstein

Source B-2: First understanding of the meaning of מאי הזית in the מאי רבינו יונה. The מאי הזית logic operates from a perspective of uncertainty (about the relative worth of the two lives):

The explanation is since his (i.e, your friend, β's) blood [may be]...redder [than your blood], he should continue to live and perform...remaining passive is different [i.e., preferable than the loss of life by a
Jew actively committing murder]. A person must refrain from actively
transgressing a sin....The explanation is since his (i.e, your friend, β's) blood [may be]
remaining passive is different [i.e., preferable than the loss of life by a
datux advent will as in a sin....The explanation is since his (i.e., preferable than the loss of life by a
datux advent will as in a sin....The explanation is since his (i.e., preferable than the loss of life by a
datux advent will as in a sin....The answer is [the loss of life by a
datux advent will will as in a sin....The answer is a sin....

- b. However, "עשיי, as explained by Rav Moshe, believes that the primary message of the השיי logic is the inapplicability of the "וחי בהם -dispensation" to the איסור איסור איסור. When the Gemara used the words "מאי חזית, it never meant to suggest that the ידרג ואל יעבור איסי could be influenced by any assessment of the relative worth of the two lives. Rather, the two lives in question are always considered equal, requiring *α* to sacrifice his life not to murder *β*, "even if *α* is *a* ולמיד חכם *β* is an *β* is an 'f is an עם הארץ (ignoramous)" (Supplement 2, p. 84). Rav Moshe expands this thought, "For [in the 'coerced murder' case] the logic of מאי חזית is based on a certainty ... it must be that the Heavenly decree is on *α* [to be killed], even though he has the [unlawful] possibility of saving himself by committing murder." Thus, Rav Moshe understands that the [and and and and and and and and the is more worthy, but rather on the inapplicability of the מאי חזית disc is not based on an uncertainty whose life is more worthy, but rather on the inapplicability of the מאי חזית disc is not based on an uncertainty whose life is more worthy, therefore, the הרתי-נגד-חדאי logic and thus, the יעבור לי עבור לי עבור לי עבור לי מאי חזית, cannot be undermined even if theoretically, one could determine that one life is more valuable than the other.
- 6. The two approaches to explain the היתר of handing over (מסירה) the 'fugitive without escape capability' may be related to the two approaches to understand the מאי הזית logic. The הסדי דוד אוס , who states that the logic does not apply if the fugitive has no escape capability, would likely subscribe to first opinion in the att ne nthe הלמידי רבינו יונה. The הלמידי רבינו יונה logic does not apply as logic dictates if we are uncertain about the relative worth of the two lives and thus, perhaps β's blood is redder than α's blood, this uncertainty forbids α from killing him. However, if the fugitive cannot be saved regardless of the townspeople's actions, the redness (i.e., relative worth) of his blood is irrelevant since he is certain to die anyway. Since the די הרג ואל יעבור אול ישרי is based on the מאי הזית to hand over the fugitive without escape capability' is because the save logic is inapplicable when he will be killed by the hooligans in any event. However, the 'no logic is napplicable will only permit handing him over to the hooligans, but not killing him with our hands. Therefore, if the hooligan orders α, "either kill β or I will kill both of you," this rationale (that the mirin all of the save) cannot permit α to kill β.

Source B-3: The מאי הזית explains the מאי הזית logic and the 'fugitive without escape capability':

We learned in the Talmud Yerushlami, *If travelers were accosted by non-Jews who said "Give us one of you so that we will kill him, and if not, we will kill all of you,"* ... It appears that the Halacha accords with and (γ, γ) , as in disputes between ריש לקיש, and certainly [when ביש לs view is recorded] in his Talmud (Yerushalmi). ... But if the hooligans say, *"I will kill all of you [unless you hand* β *over],*" they should hand β over since he was designated, rather than having all of them killed so that (many) lives will be saved, even if β does not deserve the death penalty by Torah law. However, the virtue of piety dictates that we delay handing him over and maintain composure, until the townspeople are about to be killed. One who rushes to hand him over, has abandoned the virtue of piety.

From this we learn that when הז״ל state the מאי הזית logic, this only applies if the hooligan says, *"Kill him (\beta) or else I will kill you,"* but if he orders (α), *"Kill \beta or else I will kill both of you,"* it is permitted to kill β . However, it appears that it is only permitted to hand β over, perhaps they will accept ransom or reconsider [their murderous plans], but it is not permitted to kill β with our hands.

<u>רב מנחם המאירי בית הבחירה, סנהדרין דף עב</u>: ושנו עליה בתלמוד המערב סיעת בני אדם מהלכין בדרך ופגעו בהם גוים ואמרו תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרגהו ... ויראה כר יוחנן שהרי כל שנחלקו שניהם הלכה כמותו וכל שכן בתלמוד שלו ... אבל אם אמר הריני הורג את כולכם או אתה והוא ימסרהו ואל יהרגו שניהם או כולם כולכם או אתה והוא ימסרהו ואל יהרגו שניהם או כולם וכו כל להצלת רבים אפילו לא נתחייב מיתה או שנתחייב ולא בדיננו הואיל וייחדוהו מותר אלא שמדת חסידות לעכב וליתן מתון בדבר עד דכדוכה של נפש וכל שממהר בכך הפקיע מעליו מדת חסידות.

ולפי דרכך למדת במה שאמרו מאי חזית דדמא דידך וכו דוקא כשאמר לו קטליה לפלניא ואי לא קטילנא לך אבל אם אמר לו קטליה לפלניא ואי לא קטילנא לדידיה ולדידך מותר לו להרגו. ומכל מקום יראה שלא הותר אלא למסרו לו שמא יקח ממנו כפר או יתחרט עליו אבל להרגו בידים לא.

<u>Table 1</u> : Summary of the מאי חזית basis for the יהרג ואל יעבור by שפיכת דמים (murder) and its relevance to
permit handing over the 'fugitive without escape capability':

ל יעבור Basis for	יהרג וא by יהרג וא	'fugitive without escape capability'		
Proponent	Meaning of the logic מאי חזית	ls the מאי חזית logic irrelevant?	Why <i>"yes"</i> or <i>"no"</i> ?	Reason to permit מסירה (hand-over)
1 st opinion in the תלמידי רבינו יונה*	Uncertainty about whose life ($lpha$ vs. $oldsymbol{eta}$) is more valuable	Yes (חסדי דוד)	The redness of the fugitive's blood is irrelevant since he is certain to die.	The מאי חזית logic does not apply
2 nd opinion in the תלמידי רבינו יונה (רש״י)	ישפיכת דמים is excluded from the "והי בהם- dispensation" because of the "תרתי-נגד-הדא argument	No (Rav Moshe)	מאי הזית is unrelated to the relative worth of the lives, but rather, on the "תרתי-נגד-הדא" argument which still applies.	The דין רודף: The fugitive is considered a רודף after the townspeople

*Rav Nochum Partzovitz attributes this approach to תוספות in Sanhedrin 74b (see p. 34, Reference 2).

Appendix B: Rashi's View of the מאי הזית Logic in the "Coerced Murder" Case, as Explained by Rav Moshe Feinstein

7. Perhaps the reason Rav Moshe offers a different explanation (to permit מסירה (מסירה מסירה)) than that advanced by the דוה (מסירה) is because he understands from "שי that the די of הסדי דוה is not based on any uncertainty about the relative worth of the respective lives, but rather, on the inapplicability of the "בהם" הוה בהם" dispensation" to שפיכת דמים של, due to the "תרתי-נגד-הדא" argument. Therefore, even though the *fugitive without escape capability* will certainly be killed if the townspeople remain passive, the "תרתי-נגד-הדא" argument and thus, the inapplicability of the "בהם" המרי בהם" argument and thus, the inapplicability of the "מירתי בנה" dispensation", will still remain true, as discussed above in paragraph 3 (p. 44). Although the איסור הי מסירה לי מסירה מסירה זי מור מיר איסור איסור פארציה מיר מיר מסירה לא תרצה מור מיר מסירה לא תרצה מסירה לא תרצה מסירה לא מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה לא תרצה מסירה לא תרצה מיסור מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה איסור מסירה איסור מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה לא תרצה מסירה איסור מסירה איסור מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה לא תרצה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה מסירה איסור מסירה גדיה לקיש מסירה איסור מסירה איסור מסירה מסירה

Source B-4: The ב״ה answers the כסף משנה s question regarding the *'fugitive without escape capability'*:

The ב״ה addresses the question of the כסף משנה (Supplemental Source 8b, p. 56): Why does ריש לקיש prohibit handing over the *'fugitive without escape* capability' if he is not הייב מיתה: *"The logic of מאי חזית does not apply since* the designated fugitive will be killed along with everyone else"?

(The ב״ה answers): This is not a difficulty since the primary reason for the ב״ה answers): This is not a difficulty since the primary reason for the logic is as object is as constant of the source B-1, p. 43) explains: *"[If* α would kill β to save himself], since a Jew (β) will be killed and the acceptable in the eyes of Hashem that you (α) should violate the should it be acceptable in the eyes of Hashem that you (α) should violate the why should your (α 's) blood be more precious to Him than the blood of this person (β)?" Therefore, [if the fugitive is not מצוה], all of [the townspeople] should be killed so that the acceptable.

However, if he is הייב מיתה, he caused [the danger] for himself and therefore, his blood is on his head. We should not become ensnared because of his blood and it is permitted to hand him over. We do not describe this as [a situation] where the מצוה is abrogated [if we hand him over] since he himself abrogated this מצוה through his actions, whereby he caused the death for himself. <u>שו"ת בית חדש (ב״ח) (ישנות) סימן מג</u>: ולא קשיא, טעמא מאי דהלא עיקר הטעם במאי דקאמר מאי חזית דדמך סומק טפי וכו אינו אלא כדפירש רש״י ... כיון שיש כאן ישראל נהרג והמצוה בטלה למה ייטב בעיני ישראל נהרג והמצוה בטלה למה ייטב מעיני חמקום שתעבור על המצוה, למה יהא דמך חביב עליו יותר מדמו של זה, ועל כן כולם יהיו נהרגין ולא תתבטל המצוה.

אבל היכא דמחויב מיתה דאיהו גרם לנפשיה, דמו בראשו ואין אנו נתפסין בדמיו ומותר למסרו, ואין אני קורא בזה דלא תתבטל המצוה דאיהו גופיה קא בטיל ליה מצוה זו על ידי מעשיו שגרם מיתה לעצמו.

8. With this same reasoning, Rav Moshe would maintain that, even if by some Halachic "gauge", one could assess that β's level of life is definitively lower than α's level of life, the יהרג ואל יעבור אל יעבור is would remain in force since the "תרתי-נגד-חדא" reasoning, and thus, the inapplicability of the הלמידי רבינו יונה and presumably the

אי חזית, since the מאי חזית logic is operative only if we are concerned that β 's life may be more valuable than α 's life, if we are certain that the opposite is true, the מאי חזית logic, and thus, the יעבור ס דין ס יעבור, may not apply. Killing an unborn fetus or a טריפה (person with only transient life remaining, due to an illness or injury) is not subject to capital punishment, whereas killing a שלם (person with normal life expectancy) incurs capital punishment. According to those who understand that the שריפה is based on the uncertainty about whose life is more valuable, if β is an unborn fetus or a שריפה and the hooligan threatens α to either kill β or be killed, perhaps α would be permitted to kill β to save his own life since here it is known that α 's life is "more valuable". However, if the יהרג ואל יעבור לס save his own life since here it is known that α 's life is "more valuable". However, if the in effect (i.e., α would be prohibited to kill β) even though a Halachic "gauge" tells us that α 's life is at a higher level than β 's life.

- a. The מנחת חינוך states that in the fugitive case, if a טריפה was in the town, the townspeople would be permitted to hand him over even if the hooligans did not single anyone out, *"because the logic of why do you presume that your blood is more red etc.* (מאי חזית) *does not apply since certainly the townspeople's blood is more red"* (Supplement 1, Source 3, p. 52). This position is also stated by the מאירי.
- b. By contrast, regarding the *'non-emerged fetus'*, Rav Moshe describes, *"the advantage that the mother has over the fetus, that she is a complete שו while he is not yet a complete "בפש", which is based on "the fact that one does not incur capital liability (for killing an unborn fetus)"* (Source 17, p. 21). Nonetheless, Rav Moshe does not say that the היתר של היתר לוג אל יעבור ליש אי חזית, the *'non-emerged fetus'* (to save his mother) is because the הרג ואל יעבור משי הרג ואל יעבור ס, the fetus aving the mother at the fetus' expense, per Rav Moshe's understanding of the היתר מב״ם (Supplement 2, pp. 63-66). Similarly, Rav Shach writes (explaining the same *fetus' is not, nonetheless, since feticide is included under the mealty whereas killing a 'non-emerged fetus' is not, nonetheless, since feticide is included under the איסור רציה משי חזית (prohibition against murder), both the fetus and mother are equal with regard to the avion איסור רציה and thus, the blood of a born person is redder than the blood of an unborn person because the murder of a born person is punishable by death whereas the murder of an unborn person is not," he still believes that the logic of a would have prohibited killing the <i>'non-emerged fetus'* if not for the still believes that the blood of a would have prohibited killing the *'non-emerged fetus'* if not for the still believes that the logic of a would have prohibited killing the *'non-emerged fetus'* if not for the still believes that the logic of a would have prohibited killing the *'non-emerged fetus'* if not for the still believes that the blood of an unborn person is not," he still believes that the logic of a would have prohibited killing the *'non-emerged fetus'* if not for the still believes that the logic of a would have prohibited killing the *'non-emerged fetus'* if not for the still believes that the logic of a would have prohibited killing the *'non-emerged fetus'* if not for the still believes that the logic of a would have prohibited killing the *'non-emerged*
- c. Moreover, Rav Moshe states, *"it is obvious that we would apply the יהרג ואל יעבור of יהרג ואל יעבור if hooligans attempt to coerce a שלם to kill a טריפה, "oven though murdering a healthy person is punishable by the death penalty while murdering a borver is not (ibid). The death penalty while murdering a briver is not (ibid). The שו״ת נודע ביהודה תנינא, סימן נט׳ is not (ibid). The או״ת נודע ביהודה תנינא, סימן נט׳ is not (ibid). The יהרג ואל יעבור זיים takes the same position. Thus, Rav Moshe's position is consistent that the יהרג ואל יעבור is fundamentally unrelated to the relative worth of the respective lives, but rather, on the inapplicability of the "והי בהם" dispensation, in accordance with ׳רש״ר 's explanation.*

Appendix B: Rashi's View of the מאי הזית Logic in the "Coerced Murder" Case, as Explained by Rav Moshe Feinstein

9. In a similar way, Rav Shmuel Rozovsky, based on the commentary of Rav Chaim Soloveitchik on the רמב"ם, explains "רמב" (in רש""), Source B-4) that the meaning of the מאי הזית logic is: Since the lives of *α* and *β* are equal and one life will be lost in any event, therefore, the imperative of saving *α*'s life (i.e., *α*'s שיקוה נפש imperative) cannot permit the איסור איסור (i.e., the "בהם")-dispensation" does not exist in this case). This is because the entire purpose of the "וחי בהם")-dispensation" is to save Jewish lives and here, a Jewish life (*β*) will be lost through the very transgression (see Source B-5).

Source B-5: רש״י's explanation of the מאי חזית logic: Inapplicability of the "וחי בהם-dispensation":

<u>רש״י פסחים דף כה ע״ב, ד״ה מאי חזית:</u>

רבה] responds to $lpha$ who asked if he may kill $meta$ to save himself]: "You are coming to ask [if you may kill $meta$] because you know that no מצוה stands in the way of שיסור]. Therefore, you believe that this איסור] therefore, you believe that this murder] should also be pushed aside because of your פיקוה נפש."	כלומר כלום באתה לישאל על כך, אלא מפני שאתה יודע שאין מצוה עומדת בפני פיקוח נפש וסבור אתה שאף זו תדחה מפני פיקוח נפשך.
However, this premise is untrue because] this (לא תרצה of לא מרצה] is unlike	אין זו דומה לשאר עבירות ,דמכל מקום יש כאן
other עבירות, since one life will be lost in any event.	אבוד נפש.
-הי בהם" only permitted pushing aside a מצוה (based on the הוחי	והתורה לא התירה לדחות את המצוה אלא מפני
dispensation"] because of the preciousness of a Jewish life.	חיבת נפשו של ישראל.
But, here [if you kill $oldsymbol{eta}$], an עבירה will be transgressed and a life will be lost.	וכאן עבירה נעשית ונפש אבודה.
Who says that your ($lpha '$ s) life is more precious to Hashem than $oldsymbol{eta} 's$ life?	מי יאמר שנפשך חביבה לפני המקום יותר משל
Maybe $oldsymbol{eta}'s$ life is more precious to Him?	זה ?דילמא של זה חביבה טפי עליו ?
And consequently, an עבירה will be transgressed and a life will be lost.	ונמצא עבירה נעשית ונפש אבודה.

Source B-6: Rav Shmuel Rozovsky: רמב״ם and the רמב״ם understand that there is no פיקוח נפש imperative (for saving α 's life) in the "coerced murder" case.

The following is <u>not</u> the explanation of the מאי חזית logic: Due to
the equivalence between the respective פיקוח נפש imperatives [i.e.,
the imperative of saving the lives] of $oldsymbollpha$ and $oldsymboleta$, therefore, $oldsymbollpha$ must
remain passive [so as not to actively push aside $oldsymbol{eta}$'s פיקוח נפש
imperative]. Rather, the explanation [of the מאי חזית logic] is:
Since $oldsymbollpha$'s life are equal and one of them will die in any
event, the imperative of saving $oldsymbol{lpha}$'s life cannot generate any
dispensation [to transgress לא תרצה] since his friend ($oldsymbol{eta}$) will be
killed through [the transgression]. This is because the entire reason
for the נפש-dispensation (i.e., the "וחי בהם-dispensation") is
so that a Jewish life will be saved.

<u>חידושי רבי שמואל על מסכת פסחים, סימן יב׳,</u> בענין יהרג ואל יעבור:

דהא דאמרינן מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דחברך סומק טפי, אין פירושו דמשום דחיוב פיקוח נפשו של חבירו שוה לחיוב פיקוח נפשו שלו, על כן צריך להיות בשב ואל תעשה. אלא פירושו דכיון דנפשו של חבירו ונפשו שלו שוין ובכל ענין ימות אחד מהן, שוב אין הצלת נפשו שלו גורמת שום היתר כיון שעל ידי כך ימות חבירו , דכל עיקר ההיתר של פיקוח נפש אינו אלא בשביל שתנצל נפש מישראל. 10. The כסף משנה (Supplemental Source 8b, p. 56) suggests that according to ריש לקיש (who prohibits handing over the "fugitive" unless he is deserving of death), הרג ואל יעבור for the דיענור of דיעבור by יהרג ואל יעבור by murder and therefore, even if the הזית logic does not apply, this Halacha remains in force. הזייל merely attributed a reason based on the מאי חזית of מאי חזית where applicable, but this is not the primary reason. Perhaps, we can explain the כסף משנה based on Rav Shmuel Rozovsky's explanation, as follows: הז״ל had a tradition that the Torah's words, "וחי בהם", i.e., the dispensation to transgress prohibitions to preserve life, were never intended for the איסור of לא תרצח, based on the presumption that all lives are equal (i.e., the מאי הזית logic) and thus, the purpose of "הוהי בהם", saving life, cannot be fulfilled by violating this איסור. From the perspective of this logic alone, however, killing the fugitive who is doomed to die anyway, could be considered a fulfillment of the purpose of "והי בהם", since it will save lives who were not doomed to die. Nonetheless, once we have determined that the "וחי בהם" directive was not stated for the איסור of לא תרצח, the מאי חזית logic is not used as a gauge to determine in which cases the יהרג ואל יעבור ל applies or not. In any situation where the איסור of איסול will be violated, there is no -וחי בהם יוחי dispensation" and thus, the יהרג ואל יעבור f יהרג ואל יעבור iremains in force even if the מאי חזית logic is inapplicable. This may be further explained through the הלמידי רבינו יונה (Source B-7) who explain that רש״י understands that our basic belief (i.e., our default position) is that the יהרג ואל יעבור of יהרג ואל יעבור, until the Torah stated "מאי הזית to allow transgressing עבירות to preserve life. The מאי הזית or מאי הזית to allow transgressing the Torah's words "וחי בהם" were never intended for the איסור, because the very result of α 's the very result of α ' self-preservation act, i.e., ending β 's life, violates the entire purpose of "בהם". Therefore, even if the does not apply in certain cases, it is irrelevant since we merely needed the מאי חזית to reveal that the Torah deemed the איסור לא תרצה לא תרצה ineligible for the "וחי בהם-dispensation", and thus, it reverts back to the default position of יהרג ואל יעבור, regardless of the unique circumstances of a given case.

Source B-7: The תלמידי רבינו יונה explain ׳רש״י understanding of the meaning of מאי הזית (refer to Source B-2, p. 45):

רש״י explains [how the reason of מאי חזית determines that] $lpha$ may not	אף
kill $oldsymbol{eta}$: Our basic belief is that [in the absence of a dispensation], we must be	ī
killed to avoid transgressing any מצוה. However, the Torah advocated [on	
behalf of Jewish life], stating "והי בהם", teaching that we should live rather	
taught that, except for three מצוות, and thus, הז״ל	
sins, we transgress all עבירות to preserve life. And now that the hooligans	
order $lpha$, "kill your friend ($meta$)," there is no [possibility to fulfill the intent of]	זרג
"וחי בהם", since the dead person is before us (i.e., by killing $oldsymbol{eta}$, the result of	
lpha's self-preservation act is death itself). Therefore, [since "והי בהם" cannot	۲
be applied to לא תרצה], we revert to the [default] basic belief that we must	בל
be killed rather than transgress any מצוה.	

ורש״י ז״ל פירש שהטעם הוא שאין לו להרגו, ואף על פי שיש בדבר ספק, לפי שעיקר האמונה היה שעל כל המצוות כולן יהרג ואל יעבור, אלא שהתורה הקפידה עליו ואמרה וחי בהם ודרשינן וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם, ומכאן אמרו חכמים שעל כל העבירות שבתורה יש לו לעבור ואל יהרג שעל כל העבירות שבתורה יש לו לעבור ואל יהרג סדי שיחיה חוץ מע״ז ג״ע וש״ד. ועכשיו כיון שאומרים לו הרוג חברך אין כאן וחי בהם שהרי המת לפנינו, אם כן נחזור לעיקר האמונה שעל כל המצוות יש לו ליהרג ואל יעבור. **Appendix C**: Medical Facts Relevant to Multifetal Pregnancies and Multifetal Reduction

- I. Adverse outcomes associated with multifetal pregnancies (from: Stone J and Berkowitz RL, Seminars in *Perinatology, volume 19: pp. 363-374, 1995):*
 - Morbidity (major illness or disability) and mortality associated with multifetal pregnancies increase with increasing numbers of fetuses. Many adverse outcomes are the consequence of preterm birth:
 - 11 percent of twins, more than one-third of all triplets, and more than two-thirds of all quadruplets and higher order multiples were delivered very preterm (<32 weeks of gestation), compared with less than 2 percent of singletons.
 - ✓ Early mortality (death from 20 weeks of gestation through the first year of life) was 4.8 percent for twins, 8.6 percent for triplets, 10.8 percent for quadruplets, and 28.9 percent for quintuplets.
 - The two most serious risks of multifetal pregnancies are: (1) loss of the pregnancy and (2) preterm birth, with its potential sequelae including perinatal mortality (i.e., death within the first week after birth), respiratory and gastrointestinal complications, infection and long-term neurologic impairment.
 - Prevalence of cerebral palsy ranges from 1.6 to 2.3 per 1000 surviving infants in singletons, 7 to 12 per 1000 surviving infants in twins, and 28 to 45 per 1000 surviving infants in triplets.
- II. Goals and clinical effects of multifetal pregnancy reduction:
 - The goal of MPR is to reduce the risk of adverse outcomes in survivors of multifetal pregnancies by decreasing the number of fetuses *in utero*, since the risk of complications is proportional to the number of fetuses.
 - Reducing pregnancies with three or more fetuses to a twin pregnancy results in fewer pregnancy losses, fewer preterm births and fewer postnatal infant deaths than in non-reduced pregnancies.
 - See table below for summary of the effects of fetal reduction on decreasing the rate of spontaneous pregnancy loss (*from: Evans M, Andriole S and Britt D, Fetal Diagnosis and Therapy, volume 35: pp. 69-82, 2014*):

Type of Pregnancy	Spontaneous Pregnancy Loss Rates (%)		
(starting # of fetuses)	Without fetal reduction	With fetal reduction	
Quintuplet (5)	50	10	
Quadruplet (4)	25	5.5	
Triplet (3)	15	3.8	

- Note: The following discussion is based on "ע"" (Source D-1) in the Gemara Sanhedrin (72b) which discusses the fetus whose head has emerged (the 'partially-emerged fetus') in the Mishna Ohalot (see Section III, pp. 7-8). This Mishna is the source of the "אין דוחין נפש מפני נפש" ruling (henceforth abbreviated as: "אין דוחין"), translated as, "we may not push aside one life on account of (i.e., to save) another life".
- יש״י (Source D-1) asks the following question concerning the Mishna's אין דוהין ruling in the 'partially-emerged fetus' case: Why were the townspeople in the בן בכרי (abbreviated as: "ב.ב.") episode permitted to push aside ב.ב.ש׳'s life to save their own lives? יש״י provides two answers, based on the statements of הרבי יהודה and ורבי יהודה the Tosefta Terumot (Section V, pp. 9-10): (1) In the ב.ב.ש episode, everyone (including ב.ב.ש) inevitably would have been killed if they did not hand ב.ב.ש over since he had no avenue of escape (i.e., he was a 'fugitive without escape capability'). Therefore, they were permitted to hand him over. However, if ב.ב.ש had the ability to escape, handing him over (שכירה) would have been forbidden.

(2) דוד המלך and thus, was deserving of the death penalty.

Source D-1: רש״י in Sanhedrin 72b: 1) Status of 'non-emerged fetus' vs. the 'partially-emerged fetus'; 2) How does the שבע בן בכרי episode differ from the 'partially-emerged fetus' case?

This is referring to a woman who is having difficulty giving birth and her life is endangered. The first section of the Mishna states that the midwife extends her hand, cuts him and removes him limb-by-limb. As long as the fetus has not emerged into the air of the world, he is not a WD1 and it is permitted to kill him to save his mother. However, once his head has emerged, we may not touch him (i.e., we do not intervene) to kill him since he is [legally] considered a born person and we may not push aside one life on account of another life. One may ask that in the L.L.W episode, where (*Shmuel II 20* states) "His head shall be thrown to you," they pushed aside one life (i.e., L.L.W's life) on account of other lives (i.e., the townspeople's lives)?

Answer: The □.□.𝔐 episode has two unique distinctions from the 'partiallyemerged fetus' case:

(1) There, even if they did not hand him (i.e., ב.ב.ש) over, he would have been killed in the city when יואב would capture it and they (i.e., the townspeople) would have been killed along with him. But if he could have been saved (i.e., if he could escape), even though the townspeople would consequently be killed, they would not have been permitted to hand him over to save themselves.
(2) Another answer is: [They were permitted to hand over __._] because he revolted against the kingdom. So it is explained in the would in the kingdom.

רש״י סנהדרין דף עב ע״ב, ד״ה יצא ראשו:

באשה המקשה לילד ומסוכנת. וקתני רישא החיה פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו לאברים, דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן להורגו ולהציל את אמו. אבל יצא ראשו אין נוגעים בו להורגו דהוה ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש מפני נפש. ואם ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש מפני נפש. ואם המאר מעשה דשבע בן בכרי (שמואל ב' כ') הנה ראשו מושלך אליך דדחו נפש מפני נפש ? התם משום דאפילו לא מסרוהו לו היה נהרג בעיר כשיתפשנה יואב והן נהרגין עמו אבל אם היה הוא ניצול אף על פי שהן נהרגין לא היו רשאין למסרו כדי להציל עצמן. אי נמי משום דמורד במלכות הוה והכי מפרש לה בתוספתא.

[Heaven is pursuing] the mother.

<u>רש״י ד״ה משמיא קא רדפי לה</u>: לאמיה.

- The first answer mentioned in רש״״ was previously discussed (see cross-references below). Two approaches were presented to explain the permissibility (היתר) to hand over a *'fugitive without escape capability'*:
 - A. The היתר (Section V-2; pp. 11-12) understands the היתר to hand over a *'fugitive without escape capability'* through the prism of the "אי חזית" objec" which is the basis of the obligation to sacrifice one's life rather than commit murder (described as: "הרג ואל יעבור"; see "coerced murder" case, Section II-1; pp. 2-5). In the *'fugitive without escape capability'* case, the מאי חזית logic is inapplicable because the fugitive will be killed whether he is handed over or not. Therefore, the prohibition against מסירה is pushed aside for the sake of the townspeople's equilation of the sake an endangered life).
 - B. Rav Moshe Feinstein ("Rav Moshe") explains that the היתר to hand over a 'fugitive without escape capability' is based on the דין רודף which sanctions killing a pursuer (רודף) to save the life of the pursued person (נרדף). This understanding is based on the following premises established by Rav Moshe:
 - (1) The דין רודף applies even in the absence of any volition to harm (i.e., an unintentional (רודף);
 - (2) The fugitive and townspeople are engaged in mutual (bidirectional) pursuit after each other; and
 - (3) The fugitive only has potential for היי שעה, i.e., temporary life extension until the hooligans destroy the entire city, if he is not handed over. Therefore, the pursuit of the fugitive after the townspeople is greater than their pursuit after him since he pursues after their חיי עולם (normal life expectancy), while they only pursue after his היי שעה. Consequently, the fugitive is deemed the "definitive "definitive atter the fugitive has no intention to harm the townspeople, the "definitive them to push aside his life to save their own lives (see Sections VI, 1-4, pp. 14-15 and VI-7 & 8, pp. 20-23).
- Rav Shmuel Rozovsky ("Rav Shmuel"; Source D-2) asks, why did רש"י develop his question about the ב.ב.ש 3. episode based on the Mishna's אין דוחין ruling in the 'partially-emerged fetus' case. Even without this Mishna, the <code>l.l.W</code> episode poses a difficulty, "It is obvious that we cannot kill one person to save another person?" The "obvious" aspect to Rav Shmuel's question may be: Why did רש״י need the Mishna's אין דוחין ruling to prompt him to ask about the אי חזית episode? רש"י could have asked the same question by invoking the מאי חזית logic: Just as the מאי חזית logic prohibits killing one person to save another in the "coerced murder" case, it should also prohibit handing J.J. W over to save the townspeople? Rav Shmuel offers the following answer: Without the Mishna's ruling of אין דוחין, we would have assumed that the דין רודף applies even to an unintentional , and this was the basis for the townspeople's היתר to hand ב.ב.ע over. However, once the Mishna ruled in the 'partially-emerged fetus' case, it is evident that the אין דוחין does not apply to an unintentional per the Gemara's statement, משמיא קא רדפי לה (*"she is pursued from Heaven"*; Source 8, p. 8) which is interpreted by Rav Shmuel that the fetus is not deemed a רודף because he lacks volition to harm. Accordingly, "was troubled, why was the $\exists . \exists . \forall . we prive the prive treated differently than the$ *partially-emerged fetus'*case? Inboth cases there is no volition to harm and thus, the דין רודף should not apply to either case? Rav Shmuel explains רש"י's first answer in the same manner as the חסדי דוד. Since everyone would be killed even if they did not hand מאי חזית over, the מאי חזית logic did not apply and therefore, it was permitted to hand him over to save the townspeople.

Source D-2: Rav Shmuel Rozovsky's explanation of "ש" (Source D-1):

Regarding the Mishna's statement, "If his head has emerged, we may not touch him because we may not push aside one life on account of another life," ישר שרש, "In the ב.ב.ש episode, why did they push aside one life on account of another life? There, even if they did not hand him over, he would have been killed along with the people in the city when ביואב יואב יואב episode] based on the Mishna's statement, שין 's difficulty [with the ב.ב.ש episode] based on the Mishna's statement, שין 's difficulty [with the ב.ב.ש episode] based on the Mishna's statement, שין 's difficult to explain – it is obvious that we cannot kill one person to save another person? Perforce, the ב.ב.ש episode is different [than the "coerced murder" case] because everyone (including ב...ש) would be killed in any event [even if they refused to hand him over]. Accordingly, why was [the ב.ב.ש episode] more difficult [for ""שר to reconcile] with the Mishna [than with the "coerced murder" case]?

<u>ספר זכרון שמואל סימן פגי:</u>

... דבהא דתנן יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, כתב רש״י ואם תאמר מעשה דשבע בן בכרי הנה ראשו מושלך אליך דדחו נפש מפני נפש, התם משום דאפילו לא מסרוהו לו היה נהרג בעיר כשיתפשנה יואב והן נהרגין עמו ... ולכאורה קשה מה דהעמיד רש״י קושייתו אהא דתנן בעובר שיצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין דתנן בעובר שיצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין קשה איך נפרש מעשה דשבע בן בכרי דהא פשיטא קשה איך נפרש מעשה דשבע בן בכרי דהא פשיטא דאין הורגין את האחד כדי להציל את השני ? ובעל כרחך דהתם שאני משום דבלאו הכי יהרגו כולם, ואם כן מאי קשיא ליה טפי אמתניתין ?

Τ

To understand "ע"ש", [at first glance], we might have understood [the ב.ב ש episode as follows]: When a person is designated (i.e., <i>"hand him over or else everyone will be killed"</i>), he has the status of a רודף. Although he is considered a complete diversion of circumstance) since Heaven, rather than the fugitive, caused the threat [to the townspeople], nonetheless, the fugitive can be [legally defined as] a רודף. (Thus, we might have assumed that ב.ב.ש was classified as a רודף 'לה"), that the Mishna taught us (based on the Gemara's answer, "ה רדפי לה"), that the fugitive is a complete is not applied when the pursuit has come "from Heaven" (i.e., the fetus is a complete why was it permitted to hand ".ב.ב")	ונראה בכוונת רש״י משום דהיה אפשר לפרש דכל שיחדוהו הוה ליה רודף, ואף על פי שהוא אונס גמור ומשמיא קרדפי לה, מכל מקום הוה רודף. אולם אחר דתנן כאן דכל היכא דמשמיא קרדפי לה אין עליו דין רודף, שפיר קשה מעשה דשבע בן בכרי.
This is the question that "ע"ר answers [by creating a distinction, i.e., the ב.ב.ש episode] is unlike [the Mishna's case of אין דוחין because everyone would be killed if they did not hand ב.ב.ש over to [אין דוחי]. Accordingly, the מאי חזית logic did not apply, as the מאי חזית said in the name of the רמ"ך (Supplemental Source 8b, p. 56), and therefore it was permissible to hand him over for the sake of the townspeople's שם logic applies because the <i>'partially-emerged fetus'</i> could be saved if we remain passive, and thus, we may not push aside his life even for his mother's "ס.	ועל זה תירץ רש״י דשאני התם דאם לא ימסרוהו להם כולם יהרגו וכיון שכן לא שייך הסברא דמאי חזית וכמו שכתב הכסף משנה בשם הרמ״ך, ולפיכך שרי למוסרו משום פיקוח נפש.

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- 4. Thus, according to Rav Shmuel, the דין רודף is inapplicable in any of the fetus and fugitive cases because the "pursuer" lacks volition to harm. The reason for the distinction in Halacha between the 'partially-emerged fetus' case (in which we must remain passive) and the 'fugitive without escape capability' (who we may actively hand over) is that the must remain passive) and the 'fugitive but not to the latter. Furthermore, according to Rav Shmuel's explanation, the Gemara's statement, קא רדפי לה, does not come to elucidate the Mishna's יחוית, but rather, קא רדפי לה, קא רדפי לה vuling, but rather, קא רדפי לה, יחוית vuling, but rather, קא רדפי לה, whereas שין דוחין bogic (Why do you presume that the mother's blood is redder than the fetus' blood?), whereas אין דוחין s not applied, i.e., because the fetus lacks volition to harm. Accordingly, "vuling was not by prompted by the Mishna's אין דוחין, but rather, by the Gemara's statement which precludes applying the קין רודף אין דוחין acases of unintentional pursuit.
- 5. However, Rav Moshe understands the משמיא קא רדפי לה concept differently than Rav Shmuel. Rather than saying the קא רדפי לה does not apply to an unintentional רודף, Rav Moshe explains that both the *'partially-emerged fetus'* and his mother are equal participants in an impasse in which each one's survival is dependent on the other's demise, thus rendering both of them mutually equal (bidirectional) pursuers after each other (Source D-3). Since we have no basis to declare the fetus' pursuit after his mother greater than her pursuit after him, we cannot apply the קין רודף to kill the *'partially-emerged fetus'* and consequently, we must remain passive (see Sections VI-5 & 6, pp. 16-19 and VI-8a&b, pp. 20-21).
- 6. According to Rav Moshe, the דין רודף איטוע apply to an unintentional רודף if he is considered the "definitive קורודף" (or, the greater (רודף), as opposed to a situation where the opposing parties (e.g., fetus vs. mother, or fugitive vs. townspeople) are mutually equal pursuers. If there is mutually equal pursuit, e.g., in the *'partially-emerged fetus'* and the *'fugitive with escape capability'* cases, the קא רדפי לה concept dictates that the קורודף cannot be applied since there is no "definitive קא רדפי לה". However, in the *'non-emerged fetus'* and *'fugitive with escape capability'* cases, the קא רדפי לה" and fugitive are each deemed the "definitive are each deemed the "definitive after his incomplete cases. The *'non-emerged fetus'* pursues after his mother's complete the townspeople's pursues after his incomplete שיט. Similarly, the *'fugitive without escape capability'* cases, respectively. Based on Rav Moshe's explanation, the following two observations may be made:
 - A. The Mishna's אין דוחין ציוחין אין principle is not a separate concept from the Gemara's statement, לה הלה. Rather, אין דוחין נפש מפני נפש מפני נפש מפני נפש מפני נפש *provides the reason we must remain passive, i.e., because both the 'partially-emerged fetus'* and his mother have an identical "שם level". The Gemara's statement, הלה provides further explanation of the Mishna's אין דוחין i.e., the fact that the emerging fetus and his mother have an identical "שם level", in turn, determines that their mutual pursuit is equal and thus, the קין רודף cannot be applied (i.e., there is no "definitive קירודף"; see Source D-3 to see how Rav Moshe understands the phrase, "משמיא קא רדפי לה", denotes mutually equal pursuit). Accordingly, "רודף squestion was indeed prompted by the Mishna's אין דוחין principle which is the

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operative ruling that precludes applying דין רודף in cases of mutually equal pursuit, and משמיא קא רדפי is merely an elucidation of this concept.

- B. The rule of אין דוחין works outside the purview of the standard the אין חזית logic which dictates the דין of יהרג ואל יעבור in the "coerced murder" case. The מאי חזית logic alone would not have prevented us from killing the fetus to save his mother since the מאי הזית ומאי הזית. The only reason we rule מאי הזית in the '*partially-emerged fetus*' case is because both parties are mutually equal pursuers due to their identical "נפש", and therefore, the ברדף cannot be applied. Consequently, Rav Moshe would not agree with Rav Shmuel's explanation of דין רודף question since (according to Rav Moshe), אין דוחין דוחין win the applicability of the pursuit of the opposing מונת לודף is greater than the pursuit of the opposing לרודף, but certainly the Mishna does not preclude applying the private the pursuit of pursuit in general.
- 7. It appears that Rav Shmuel's difficulty with ""ש"ל's question about the ב.ב.ש episode, would not present the same difficulty to Rav Moshe. Since the דין רודף can apply to an unintentional רודף (according to Rav Moshe), "שר certainly understood that the handover of ב.ב.ש was sanctioned because of his status as a הרודף certainly understood that the handover of ב.ב.ש was sanctioned because of his status as a "רודף certainly understood that the handover of ב.ב.ש was sanctioned because of his status as a "רודף certainly understood that the handover of ב.ב.ש was sanctioned because of his status as a "רודף certainly understood that the handover of ב.ב.ש was sanctioned because of his status as a "רודף". Therefore, the "him of a down or prevent handing over ב.ב.ש just as the "the townspeople's decision to hand over "ב.ב.ש". Only after the Mishna qualified the "הודיר, it is inapplicable to the 'partially-emerged fetus' case because it is a case of mutually equal pursuit, "rum"'s first answer, which is the position of access to be a case of mutually equal pursuit. ""ש"'s first answer, which is the position of "רב" יהודה Thus, "רב" יהודה the Tosefta, explains that ב.ב.ש was a 'fugitive without escape capability' and therefore, the mutual pursuit was not equal, thus, distinguishing the "ב.ב.ש" episode from the 'partially-emerged fetus' case where the mutual pursuit is equal.

Source D-3: Rav Moshe explains the Gemara's משׁמיא קא רדפי לה statement and רש״י sunderstanding of משׁמיא קא רדפי לה (see Supplement 2, pp. 65-66, for more extensive excerpts).

I have written that לה have written that the fetus is not a	אגרות משה חושן משפט ח״ב, סימן סט׳ אות ב׳:
רודף. Rather, this statement indicates that both the mother and the <i>'partially-emerged fetus'</i> are considered [equal] רודפים [The Gemara's expression, משׁמיא קא רדפי לה denotes that] it was arranged by Heaven	דהרי כתבתי שטעם משמיא קא רדפי לה אינו טעם לומר שאינו רודף, אלא דבשביל זה שניהם
that it would be impossible for both of them to live, for if the fetus will be born alive, his mother will die and conversely, [only] if the fetus will be dismembered, his mother will live. Therefore, we remain passive after his	רודפין היינו דמשמיא נעשה שאי אפשר שיחיו שניהן דכשיולד הולד תמות האשה, וכשלא יולד חי, שיצא אברין אברין תחיה האשה . שלפיכך מניחין
head emerges since both are equally [engaged in] pursuit Therefore, ייש only wrote that the <i>'non-emerged fetus'</i> is not a שנפע [but did <u>not</u> write, <i>"and consequently, feticide is a less severe prohibition (than murder),</i>	הדבר כמות שהוא, שזה הוי בהוציא ראשו שווו תרוייהו בהרדיפה ולכן כתב רש״י רק דלאו
which may which may be pushed aside for the mother's "פיקוח בפש"].	נפש הוא,

[The reason יש" stated the *'non-emerged fetus'* is not a שש was to contrast וכש was to contrast this case with the 'partially-emerged fetus' case]. Since the משנה's sole basis to prohibit killing the 'partially-emerged fetus' to save his mother is because of אין דוחין נפש מפני נפש , this implies that one could have rationalized a to kill the 'partially-emerged fetus' due to his status as a רודף [after his] mother]. However, this logic would also apply for the mother, i.e., she is considered a רודפת after the fetus, because this pursuit situation is a result of Heaven arranging that both parties cannot survive (i.e., their respective survivals are mutually exclusive). Accordingly, his pursuit [after her, which is manifested by the fact that] if the fetus will emerge alive, his mother will not live, cannot serve as a basis to choose that she should live and he should be killed, because they are both equally [engaged in] pursuit. Accordingly, prior to the emergence of the fetus' head, since he is not yet a [complete] \Im D1, we push aside his life because their respective pursuits are not equal, i.e., the fetus alone pursues after the mother's advantage (i.e., the ' \underline{U})-differential') that she is a [complete] נפש while he is not. This is the reason it is permitted to kill the 'non-emerged fetus' to save his mother ... It follows that "" also believes [the דין רודף is the basis for killing the 'non-emerged fetus'].

היינו כיון דכל הדין ביצא ראשו דאסור להורגו להצלת האם תנן לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, שמשמע דאיכא בעצם טעם להתיר להורגו שהוא מחמת שהוא רודף. אבל כיון שטעם זה איכא גם על האם שהיא גם כן נחשבת רודפת את העובר , מטעם דהרדיפה הוא מחמת שמשמיא עשו שלא יוכלו שניהם לחיות, שלכן איננו יכולין לדחות נפש יוכלו שניהם לחיות, שלכן איננו יכולין לדחות נפש הולד מחמת רדיפתו בזה שאם הוא יצא שלם לא הולד מחמת רדיפתו בזה שאם הוא יצא שלם לא הולד יהרג, שהרי אין לנו טעם לזה מצד הרדיפה והולד יהרג, שהרי אין לנו טעם לזה מצד הרדיפה הוא, דוחין העובר מפני שאין שוין ברדיפתן, שהעובר רודף היתרון שבאם שהיא נפש והוא אינו נפש עדיין, שלכן ניתן להרגו ולהציל את אמו ... ונמצא שגם רש״י סובר כן.

- 9. Rav Shmuel explained "ערש"'s first answer to mean that ב.ב.ש's inability to escape rendered the אי חזית logic inapplicable. Perhaps the reason Rav Moshe did not explain "ערתי-נגד-הדא" s answer in this way is because Rav Moshe understands that the שאי חזית logic is linked to the "ערתי-נגד-הדא" ("two vs. one") argument of "ער" (which renders the "ערתי-נגד-הדא") renders the "ערתי-נגד-הדא" inapplicable to murder; see Appendix B, #1, pp. 43-44). Although ב.ב.ש would be killed even if he was not handed over, the "ערתי-נגד-הדא" argument and thus, the מאי הזית logic, may nonetheless apply (according to Rav Moshe) regardless of the survivability of the situation.

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- 10. רש״״ (Source D-1), when discussing the *'non-emerged fetus'*, states: "As long as the fetus has not emerged into the air of the world, he is not a שֹׁם and it is permitted to kill him to save his mother." Previously, two interpretations of "רש״ ל's statement were presented (see cross-references below):
 - A. The ספר מאירת עיניים's statement, "he is not a "נפלי", to mean that the 'non-emerged fetus' is not deemed a life; consequently, feticide is not considered murder (i.e., it is not a transgression of הלא תרצח). The 'partially-emerged fetus', on the other hand, is deemed a life and therefore, killing him is a transgression of murder. Accordingly, the operative Halachic determinant whether or not to rescue the mother at the fetus' expense, is: Does the דין סדי מאירת ואל יעבור דין apply or not? The 'partially-emerged fetus' is not a transgression of murder; therefore, killing the 'partially-emerged fetus' is prohibited even to save the mother, and this is the very intent of the Mishna's 'יעבור דין statement. However, since killing the 'non-emerged fetus' is not a transgression of murder (according to these opinions), the just as nearly all prohibitions are pushed aside for שיקוה נפש ליעבור דין שיקוה נפש just as nearly all prohibitions are pushed aside for שיקוה נפש ליעבור ליעבור ליעבור ליעבור ליעבור ליעבור ליעבור ליש אין יעבור ליעבור מירג ואל יעבור ליעבור מירג ואל יעבור ליעבור מירג שיקוה נפש just as nearly all prohibitions are pushed aside for שיקוה נפש is prohibing to this approach, the uses of the transgression deficulty. If the effective difference between the 'non-emerged fetus' and the 'partially-emerged fetus' is whether the דין אין יעבור לידי applies or not, why was "ירעדי" squestion about the ש.ב.ש episode prompted by the Mishna's 'partially-emerged fetus' case; his question would fit more logically in the Sugya (Talmudic discussion) of just as nearly 74a-bi?
- 11. It is noteworthy that the אינפ״א (Source D-4) explains the concept, "the fetus is not a "נפ״, which was written by other Rishonim including the רמב״ן (on Mesechet Niddah 44b), as follows: When we are deliberating whether to refrain from saving the mother's life because of the אין דוחין principle, we say that the *'non-emerged fetus'* is not deemed a שׁם, and therefore his life is pushed aside to save his mother. Similarly, we say that, "the fetus is not a wills him from capital punishment. This explanation is consistent with the approach of

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Rav Moshe, i.e., the "WDl-level" of the 'non-emerged fetus' is lower than that of his mother, since killing the former does not invoke capital punishment while killing the latter is punishable by death.

12. According to Rav Moshe's approach, ""שר's question on the ב.ב.ש episode was indeed prompted by the Mishna's אין דוחין ruling because this precisely is the source that precludes applying the דין רודף in cases of mutually equal pursuit. ""שר, therefore, questioned why the ב.ב.ש episode, which appeared to also be a mutually equal pursuit situation, was treated differently than the *'partially-emerged fetus'* case. Thus, according to Rav Moshe's understanding, the logical flow of "שר's arguments appears more precise than according to the commentaries who interpret ""שר to mean that a fetus has no life.

Source D-4: Mishna, Gemara and Ritvah, Tractate Niddah 43b-44b

משנה מסי נדה דף מגי ע״ב - מדי ע״א:
תינוק בן יום אחד ונוחל ומנחיל וההורגו חייב.
גמרא מס׳ נדה דף מד ע״ב: וההורגו חייב: דכתיב (ויקרא כד, יז) ואיש כי
יכה כל נפש, מכל מקום.
<u>חידושי הריטב״א, ד״ה דכתיב ואיש כי יכה:</u>
פירוש ואפילו קטן בן יום אחד קרוי נפש. הקשו בתוספות דאלו הכא משמע דעובר לא חשיב נפש
וכן משמע מהכה את האשה ויצאו ילדיה שאין שם אלא תשלומי ממון דמי ולדות כשפחה
הנמכרת בשוק כדאיתא בפ״ק, והכי נמי משמע מהא דאמרינן בסנהדדין האשה שהיא מקשה
לילד חותכין את הולד ומוציאין אבר אבר יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש אלמא עובר לאו נפש הוא ואיכא למידק אם
כן היכי אמרינן בפ״ק דערכין האשה שישבה על המשבר ומתה בשבת מביאין סנין וקורעין אותה
ומוציאין את הולד וכיון דלאו נפש הוא היכי מחללין עליה את השבת ? ותירצו דאף על גב
דלאו נפש הוא היינו לחייב ההורגו או לדחות נפש אמו כדי שלא יגעו בו, אבל לענין הצלתו בשבת דינו כנפש דהא שייך לומר כן טעמא דאמרינן גבי בן קיימא חלל עליו שבת אחת כדי שישמור שבתות הרבה (יומא פה ע״ב).
-