In this week's daf we find that some sins cause a person to die without children, "ר״ל, סיווכי ראש and סיווכי אשת. Such is the severity of such acts! The Torah tells us (Bamidbar 32:22) 'you shall be clear before God and before Yisrael.' The Yerushalmi (Shekalim 3:2) teaches that a person is obligated to take care to appear justified and righteous in the eyes of all creatures as much as he must be careful to fulfill his obligations to Hashem. The Chasam Sofer wrote that he was always very concerned about these two commandments. These two obligations, to fulfill one's duties before Hashem and to maintain an impressive reputation and impeccable appearance in front of His nation Yisrael, are as yokes upon our necks. However, it is easier to fulfill the first obligation, the one to Hashem, than to fulfill the obligation to the people, who carry in their hearts foreign thoughts and ideas. Additionally, the punishment connected with the second obligation is infinitely harsher than that for one who does not fulfill his obligation to Hashem. We find this concept in the Gemara, where it states that one who desecrates Hashem's name has no atonement at all. An example of desecrating Hashem's name would be if a "rabbi" buys meat without paying for it immediately. Even if one is not in a position as a role model in the community, where people are seeking and expecting from him impeccable and straight conduct, such an act is desecrating Hashem's name, in spite of the fact that the person did not actually do anything wrong, and the negative impression which his conduct gave is in error and their judgment is hasty. Chasam Sofer's even wrote, 'And I thought several times whether it is possible for one to ever fulfill this verse properly.' Perhaps this is what Shlomo HaMelech was referring to when he said (Koheltes 7:20), "There is no righteous man in the land who will do good and will not sin." Moshe Rabbeinu warned the tribes of Reuven and Gad, when he said, 'And you will be clear from Hashem and from Yisrael.' Yet despite the fact that they did everything to fulfill their obligations by going at the front of the camp to conquer the land, in the end, the matter was not in their hands. And perhaps that is why they were the first of all the tribes to be exiled, since they could not satisfy the requirements of the people. (See I Divrei HaYamiim 5:26).
**MUSSEAR FROM THE DAF**

What is Important to You Is Important to Me

The Gemara says that even if a husband forbids his wife (through derech avarim) not to be with a man, she ultimately is mitzvah with that man. What is the causa of action of the husband can create the woman into a sotah with simply “derech avarim”? Let’s take a look at a fascinating Bais Halevi (chelek 2, 40) in which he brings an ostensible in the Rambam. The Rambam states that if a Shomer's Yibam is mitzva, then she is not assur to the Yavam. However, in another halachah he states that if a Yavam is mitzva, she is now and then she is mitzva with this man, she becomes a Sotah and is now assur to the Yavam. This, asks the Bais Halevi doesn’t seem to make sense. How is it that if a woman is actually mitzva with a man she is not assur, while if she is simply mitzva with a man that she was warned about (and now there is a safer if she was mitzva with him) she is now assur? The Bais Halevi is mechadesh the concept that the driving force in making a woman a Sotah is the Hakpuda of the husband. This can now answer that the causa of our Gemara is that the yovel is the of the other side that creates discord in the relationship. Performing an action which goes against the of the other side can be worse than simply committing an inappropriate action in a relationship. Learning to be sensitive to the needs, wants, and desires of the other in a relationship is the key to shalom. As Rav Noach Orlowek says, love can be defined by saying “what is important to you is important to me.”

**HALACHA HIGHLIGHT**

Is a Widow Considered Related to Her Deceased Husband?

Here is a dispute whether a widow is considered related to her husband following the death of her husband. Tosafos writes that a widow is no longer considered related to her husband after his death, but Tosafos in Bava Basra cites another Gemara that indicates that a widow is considered related after her husband’s death. Rav Moshe Feinstein suggests that this dispute can be utilized to understand an interesting explanation of Rav Shabsai Hakohen, the Shach. Shulchan Aruch rules that a woman has the authority to prevent the burial of her husband until she is paid her kesubah. This ruling is difficult because elsewhere Rema rules that a creditor has the authority to prevent the burial of his debtor until he is paid his debt unless the debtor is related to the deceased. Why then, does a wife have the authority to prevent her husband’s burial until her kesubah is paid if she is a relative? Shach suggests two resolutions to this difficulty. The first resolution is that the second ruling of Rema applies only to those who are blood relatives but those who are merely related by marriage are not included in that rule. A second resolution is to distinguish between a case where there are charitable funds available to bury the deceased and a case when charitable funds are not available. Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that the two different explanations of Shach can be understood in light of the dispute concerning the relationship between husband and wife following the husband’s death. According to the approach that maintains that upon the husband’s death the family relationship between husband and wife ceases one can assert that there is a difference between blood relatives and those who are related by marriage, as Shach suggests in his first answer. On the other hand, if the family relationship continues after the husband’s death, another resolution is required and that is the second resolution of Shach to distinguish between places where charitable funds may or may not be available.

**POINT TO PONDER**

The Gemara discusses which sisters in law are permissible after a brother’s death and suggests that perhaps a half brother’s wife where these two brothers shared a mother would be permitted to marry the surviving brother. Tosafos writes that a widow is not related to her deceased husband. We learned earlier that the Gemara uses the word pesukim to exclude a half brother from the same mother. Why doesn’t our Gemara bring this same pesukim which explicitly excludes half brothers who don’t have the same father?

Response to last week’s Point to Ponder:

Rashi explains that an asleep cannot be the of the because he is not a and therefore he can’t acquire anything. We learned in the Mishna that someone who has no intent to acquire, but is only interested in or someone who thought that he was living with someone else (his wife), are both able to acquire. Since we see clearly that intent to acquire is not necessary, what does Rashi mean when he says that he is not a ?

When Rashi writes that someone who is asleep is not a because he has the of being “present” and the of being “awake,” he doesn’t mean that is required for . Although a asleep without intent, he is someone who is capable of intent. However someone who is asleep is not capable of intent and can be viewed as not being “present”. Even though one doesn’t need any intent to do , he needs to be capable of having intent. This can also be seen in the Gemara’s explanation of who is drowsy or “sleepy”, as one who answers when called. Another example is found in the Gemara: who is capable of intent, regarding the difference between a drunk and someone who reached the level of . While a drunk can be , one who reaches the level of can’t. (See .)