

TEACHER'S ANSWER KEY

Detailed Explanations

Q1 — A

Article 15(1) prohibits the State from discriminating against a citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them.

A State university denying admission solely because of religion is a direct example.

Why not B, C or D?

Those are neutral academic/administrative requirements and, on the facts given, do not constitute discrimination on one of the specified grounds.

CLAT takeaway:

Look for:

STATE + CITIZEN + SPECIFIED GROUND + DISCRIMINATION

Q2 — C

The word “only” matters.

Article 15(1) is not saying:

“Whenever caste/religion/sex appears anywhere in a policy, the policy is automatically unconstitutional.”

The question is whether the prohibited ground is the sole basis of the discrimination contemplated by Article 15(1).

A is wrong: It reverses the constitutional principle.

B is too broad: Not every classification involving a listed ground is automatically unconstitutional.

D is obviously wrong: All five grounds do not need to be present together.

Q3 — C

Economic disadvantage is not one of the grounds listed in Article 15(1).

More importantly, merely treating people differently does not automatically establish a violation of Article 15(1).

The precise constitutional provision and nature of the classification must be examined.

CLAT trap:

Students often see “different treatment” and immediately choose “unconstitutional discrimination.”

That is too simplistic.

Q4 — B

A restaurant is specifically mentioned within Article 15(2)'s sphere.

The discrimination is based solely on caste, one of the prohibited grounds.

Therefore, Article 15(2) is the most direct provision.

Q5 — C

Article 15(2) specifically addresses access to certain public facilities, including public restaurants.

The other options concern employment, administrative requirements or academic classifications and do not fit Article 15(2) as directly.

Q6 — A

Article 15(2) expressly mentions shops.

Therefore, refusal to provide access to a shop solely on the basis of religion potentially falls directly within the provision.

Q7 — C

Article 15(3) expressly permits:

Special provision for women and children.

Therefore, the fact that men or older adults do not receive the same benefit does not automatically make the policy unconstitutional.

Core concept:

Equality does not always mean identical treatment.

Q8 — A

A scholarship exclusively for female students can potentially be supported by Article 15(3).

The provision expressly permits special provisions for women.

Q9 — B

Article 15(3) recognises that the State may make special provisions for women and children.

It does not authorise arbitrary discrimination against women.

The idea is that beneficial/protective measures may be constitutionally permissible.

Q10 — C

Article 15(4) specifically allows special provisions for:

Socially and educationally backward classes of citizens

Scheduled Castes

Scheduled Tribes

Therefore, C.

Q11 — D

Article 15(4) does not expressly list EWS.

EWS is dealt with separately through Article 15(6).

This is an important distinction.

Q12 — C

The student's reasoning ignores the structure of Article 15 itself.

Article 15(1) contains the prohibition, but Article 15(4) expressly permits certain special provisions for specified disadvantaged groups.

Thus, the constitutional scheme cannot be understood simply as:

15(1) = all differential treatment prohibited.

Q13 — A

Article 15(5) concerns special provisions for the advancement of:

Socially and educationally backward classes

SCs

STs

in relation to admission to educational institutions, including qualifying private educational institutions.

Q14 — A

Article 15(5) specifically extends to private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided, subject to its constitutional limitation regarding minority educational institutions under Article 30(1).

Therefore, A is correct.

Q15 — A

This is a key exception.

Article 15(5) does not apply to the minority educational institutions referred to in Article 30(1).

Students should learn to notice these exclusions because CLAT frequently tests the difference between a general rule and its constitutional exception.

Q16 — C

Article 15(6) concerns:

Economically Weaker Sections (EWS)

Q17 — B

Article 15(6) can provide constitutional support for special provisions, including reservation, for EWS in educational institutions, including qualifying private institutions.

However, the provision operates subject to its constitutional conditions.

Q18 — B

This distinction is fundamental:

Article 15(4) → SEBCs, SCs and STs

Article 15(6) → EWS

The two provisions address different constitutional categories.

Q19 — A

This is a classic Article 15(2) situation.

The government is denying access to restaurants on the ground of religion.

Article 15(2) directly addresses this kind of discrimination.

Q20 — B

We cannot answer this question simply by saying:

“Different treatment = unconstitutional.”

We need to know who the disadvantaged community is and what constitutional provision supports the measure.

For example:

Women/children → potentially Article 15(3)

SEBCs/SCs/STs → potentially Article 15(4)

Certain educational admissions → potentially Article 15(5)

EWS → potentially Article 15(6)

Q21 — A

The university is imposing adverse treatment based on sex.

The fact that the State is making the decision means Article 15(1) is directly relevant.

Article 15(3) does not prohibit sex-based distinctions; it creates permission for special provisions for women and children.

Here, the policy is not a beneficial provision for women. It is excluding them based on a stereotypical assumption.

Q22 — B

Article 15(4) expressly permits special provisions for the advancement of Scheduled Castes.

Therefore, simply identifying caste as the basis does not end the constitutional analysis.

Students must look at the specific clause and its purpose.

Q23 — C

The crucial facts are:

Socially and educationally backward classes

Admission

Private educational institution

Not a minority institution

That points directly to Article 15(5).

Q24 — D

The crucial word is EWS.

Therefore:

EWS + educational admission → Article 15(6)

Q25 — C

This is a classic trap.

Article 15(1) prohibits certain discrimination based on sex.

But Article 15(3) expressly permits special provisions for women and children.

Thus, the constitutional analysis depends upon the nature and purpose of the treatment.

Q26 — B

The statement that Article 15 applies only to government institutions is too broad.

Article 15(5), in particular, expressly concerns special provisions relating to admission to certain private educational institutions, subject to its terms.

Q27 — B

Article 15(4) exists precisely because constitutional equality does not always require identical treatment.

The Constitution recognises that special measures can be used to advance socially and educationally backward classes.

Q28 — B

This is an important conceptual distinction.

Article 15(1)'s five listed grounds do not include economic status.

But that does not mean economic disadvantage can never be constitutionally considered.

Article 15(6) expressly provides for special provisions for EWS.

Q29 — A

Correct matching:

Policy I: Religion-based denial → 15(1)

Policy II: Special provision for women → 15(3)

Policy III: Special provision for STs → 15(4)

Policy IV: EWS reservation in qualifying educational institution → 15(6)

Therefore:

A

Q30 — C

This captures the overall constitutional structure.

Article 15 does two things:

First:

It prohibits certain forms of discrimination.

15(1) + 15(2)

Second:

It permits certain constitutionally recognised special measures.

15(3) + 15(4) + 15(5) + 15(6)

Therefore, equality is not simply:

“Everyone must always be treated exactly the same.”

Q31 — B

This is one of the most important conceptual questions.

The Constitution itself recognises several situations where special provisions may be made.

Therefore:

Different treatment ≠ automatically unconstitutional discrimination.

Students should always ask:

Is the differential treatment constitutionally permitted?

Q32 — D

Article 15(6) concerns Economically Weaker Sections, not religious minorities.

Therefore, D is incorrectly matched.

TEACHER'S CONCEPT MAP

After the worksheet, put this on the board:

ARTICLE 15

15(1)

State shall not discriminate against citizens



Religion | Race | Caste | Sex | Place of Birth

15(2)

No specified discrimination in access to certain public places/facilities



Shops | Restaurants | Hotels | Public entertainment | Wells | Tanks | Roads etc.

15(3)

Special provision



Women + Children

15(4)

Special provision for advancement



SEBCs + SCs + STs

15(5)

Special provision concerning admission to educational institutions



SEBCs + SCs + STs

Includes qualifying private institutions

Excludes Article 30(1) minority institutions

15(6)

Special provision concerning EWS



EWS

Includes qualifying private educational institutions

Excludes Article 30(1) minority institutions

THE CLAT FORMULA FOR ARTICLE 15

Tell students to ask these questions whenever they see an Article 15 problem:

1. WHO?

Is the State involved?

2. WHAT?

Is it:

Discrimination?

Access to a public facility?

A special benefit?

Educational admission?

3. ON WHAT BASIS?

Is it:

Religion / Race / Caste / Sex / Place of Birth?

4. WHICH CLAUSE?

15(1) → Prohibited discrimination

15(2) → Public places/facilities

15(3) → Women & children

15(4) → SEBCs, SCs, STs

15(5) → Educational admissions — SEBCs, SCs, STs

15(6) → EWS

5. IS THERE AN EXCEPTION?

This is where many CLAT questions will be decided.

“Different treatment” is not the end of the analysis.

The student must ask:

“Is this difference constitutionally permitted?”

Suggested evaluation

27–32: Excellent command of Article 15

22–26: Good; minor confusion between clauses

16–21: Needs more application practice

Below 16: Re-teach the structure of Article 15 before moving ahead

One-line takeaway for students

Article 15 does not merely prohibit discrimination; it also recognises that achieving meaningful equality may sometimes require constitutionally permitted special treatment.