

TEARFUND'S RESPONSE TO HURRICANE MATTHEW, HAITI, 2016-2018

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION



Environmental Partnerships for Resilient Communities

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CEEH	Concile des Eglises Evangeliques d’Haiti (Council of Evangelical Churches of Haiti)
DPC	Department of Civil Protection
FEPH	Federation des Ecoles Protestantes d’Haiti
FRERE	Fond de Réponse Rapide et Efficiente
HH	Household
HTG	Haitian Gourde*
RIHPED	Réseau Intégral Haïtien pour le Plaidoyer et l’Environnement Durable
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

*At the time of this evaluation HTG1,000 was equivalent to GBP11 or USD15

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Sincere thanks are expressed to all those people met during the course of this evaluation, who gave freely of their time to speak to the evaluation team and shared their experiences in such an open and helpful manner. Without your important insights, our work would not have been possible.

At Tearfund Haiti, we would like to express a very warm “*Thank You*” to Jean Claude Cerin, Country Representative, Marc-Romyr Antoine, Advocacy/DRR Officer and Disaster Response Manager, Christon Domond, Response Manager and Odette Austil, In-country Administrator. The skill and care taken by our drivers in the field is also gratefully acknowledged.

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At Tearfund UK, special thanks to Peter Arthern, Programme Officer, for effectively guiding and supporting this evaluation from start to finish. Also at Tearfund UK we would like to take this opportunity to again thank Oenone Chadburn, Head of Humanitarian Support, Kay Morrow, Internal Auditor, Guy Calvert-Lee, ELAC Deputy Geo Head and Matt Brimble, Operations Support Manager for taking time to share their reflections on the project through key informant interviews.

And last, but not at all least, we would like to sincerely acknowledge the time given all of those beneficiaries who we met and spoke with in Haiti. Your inputs have been truly informative in helping us understand how this response was implemented and what this has meant for you and your families. Without this first-hand knowledge, we would not have been able to get a realistic overview of this response: your experiences and opinions have allowed us to hopefully provide very credible feedback and recommendations to Tearfund and its partners and our thanks again for taking time to speak with us on this.

David Stone
Myrta Eustache
Luc San Vil
Norman Molina

Cover Illustration: Farmers are slowly starting to regain some of their former food and livelihood security. Photo credits: Norman Molina and David Stone.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

On 4 October 2016, Hurricane Matthew, a Category 4 storm, made landfall at Les Anglais in Haiti's southwestern peninsula, bringing with it 240km/h winds, storm surges, and between 50 and 100cm of rain. This made it the strongest storm to hit the nation since Hurricane Cleo in 1964, and the third strongest Haitian landfall on record. This storm's impacts were especially devastating due to high levels of deforestation and the underlying vulnerabilities of the impoverished rural populations it hit. Damage and losses resulting from the hurricane were estimated to be US\$2.8 billion, or one-third of the country's Gross National Product.

Grand'Anse bore the brunt of Hurricane Matthew, but many towns in Sud and Nippes Departments were also heavily impacted. The hurricane's high winds and related flooding killed more than 600 people, displaced an estimated 175,000, and affected 2.1 million people. The hurricane also caused widespread damage to homes, roads, public infrastructure, hospitals, and schools. Most of the homes in its path could not stand the force of its impact which blew away roofs and walls, destroying an estimated 90 percent of homes in the worst hit areas. Also severely impacted, were the largely agricultural and fishing livelihoods of the affected population whose crops and assets were wiped out. Of the 2.1 million people affected by the storm, 1.4 million were left in urgent need of humanitarian assistance in its wake. Damage and losses resulting from the hurricane are estimated to be US\$2.8 billion, or 32 percent of the country's GNP.

Tearfund – which already had an in-country presence for quite a number of years, had taken a series of proactive moves to actively monitoring the path and evolution of the hurricane for days before it actually approached Haiti. Building on its experience as recent as the 2010 earthquake response Tearfund had:

- developed a Tearfund disaster contingency plan which it had shared with potential implementing partners in Haiti, in the event of a disaster happening;
- established the Réseau Intégral Haïtien pour le Plaidoyer et l'Environnement Durable (RIHPED – Integrated Haitian Network to Advocate for a Sustainable Environment), which was made up of 13 organisations, including Integral Alliance Members and Tearfund partners;
- established the FRERE (Fond de Réponse Rapide et Efficiente) Fund, for immediate use in the event of a disaster;
- the above-mentioned contingency plan was equally shared with all RIHPED members; and
- strengthened the capacity of communities to respond to disasters through various disaster risk reduction activities and through training to Pastors and local churches.

The combination of the above meant that Tearfund was as well prepared as it possibly could be at the time, given continuing uncertainties with regards the hurricane's path and potential impacts.

CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES

This programme – from response to recovery – faced a great many challenges, despite the excellent preparedness by Tearfund and its partners, which built on a wealth of experience from past disaster response activities.

The various projects responded to needs in a situation where there were very few other actors present and virtually no support forthcoming from government. The need shifted constantly and the

programme had to try and adapt to this. Needs assessments seem to have been done timely, but implementation was delayed in the case of seed distribution in some areas, which meant that optimal planting seasons were not met.

The overall programme was also designed for three phases: immediate response, mid-term recovery and longer term recovery. However, selecting different beneficiaries in each phase made it difficult to clearly see the process of recovery. For most beneficiaries, the project represented an immediate response and less as a recovery.

“We complained a lot before the cyclone. But after this happened we realised that we had had a much better life before. We didn’t appreciate the quality of life we had, but now at least we are able to make a fresh start.”

Project Beneficiary, Leon

PURPOSE OF THIS EVALUATION

This end-of-programme evaluation was undertaken by Proaction Consulting at the request of Tearfund UK and Tearfund Haiti. The evaluation builds on evidence gathered by Tearfund as part of a Real Time Review on the emergency response in December 2016. As stated in the evaluation’s Terms of Reference, the goal of this evaluation was to “assess the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and localisation of Tearfund’s response, in order to inform future emergency responses”.

Among some the topline findings of this evaluation are the following.

1. Relevance

Findings: Overall, project beneficiaries are extremely grateful for the support they received and the relevance of the support to their immediate needs. This opinion is fully shared by the Evaluation Team. This project’s objectives were both valid and appropriate in meeting the most pressing needs of its beneficiaries, while also contributing to the immediate needs of others in the respective communities. Early consideration was given by Tearfund and partners to addressing obvious priority needs of some of the most vulnerable people in the worst affected departments. Three sectors – shelter, food security and livelihood security – were prioritised with the second and third being closely interdependent in this instance. Direct assistance was provided through cash vouchers and materials.

2. Effectiveness

Findings: Key to achieving effectiveness in this instance was the timely identification of needs and response with selected resources. Paired with this was the need for transparent selection of intended beneficiaries. While judged overall to have been “quite effective”, there were nonetheless several areas of inconsistency, particularly in relation to the selection of individuals and consideration of beneficiary coverage, which ultimately detracted from the possible overall performance of this project. Lessons can, however, be quickly learned from shortcomings which in large can be quickly addressed by Tearfund Haiti.

3. Sustainability

Findings: While this programme cannot be said to be sustainable, it has prepared the groundwork for some of its components to likely continue in the future. One of the most appreciated elements of this programme has been the different levels of training it provided to carpenters and beneficiaries on safer construction techniques. The combination of hard and soft skills in this context was judged especially important. While not always done to desired standards, hopefully, this innovation will trigger additional interest and open pathways for future development-type projects with a longer timeframe and greater resources.

4. Localisation

Findings: This was Tearfund's first attempt at giving more autonomy to local (national and international) partners in Haiti. In this context, many aspects worked extremely well though it should be noted that Tearfund retained overall financial and administrative control of the programme. The success of the attempt is largely due to the relations that had already been in place through previous joint activities as well as the fact that partners were aware of the existing Contingency Plan and were quick to respond and apply funding provided through FRERE.



Many, if not most, households that received shelter support from this programme have not been able to completely repair their houses, leaving them vulnerable to future storms, high winds and heavy rainfall.

SNAPSHOT OF SOME POSITIVE FINDINGS...

- ✓ Tearfund and partners were prepared for an eventuality such as Hurricane Matthew.
- ✓ The existence of strong church networks in the respective departments meant that the response and recovery were locally informed and, thus, well aligned with the context and needs.
- ✓ The existence of an emergency response fund was of significant importance in the rapid response seen.
- ✓ Localisation of assistance worked well despite this being the first time it was initiated in Haiti by Tearfund.
- ✓ This programme deliberately targeted some of the most vulnerable people affected by Hurricane Matthew.
- ✓ Beneficiary selection also included non-church attendees – support was extended to the broader community.

- ✓ Positive examples were seen of community members coming together to share received benefits and work together on reconstruction.
- ✓ The distribution of cash coupons was both effective and straightforward for beneficiaries.

...AND SOME CONCERNS

- There is a significant need to provide adequate, safe shelter materials to beneficiaries: none of the households represented in this evaluation had a complete roof and are vulnerable to the next high winds. Early assessments did not adequately consider needs.
- Transparency of the beneficiary selection in both response and recovery phases. Project reports indicate incomplete accountability in the response phase by some partners.
- In the recovery period, some beneficiaries were not aware why they had been chosen, particularly in CEEH programmes. Neither were the beneficiaries consulted on their needs.
- Feedback systems put in place by some partners were neither transparent nor sufficient: some did not even do this.
- No consideration seems to have been given with regards matching seeds provided with the agro-ecological conditions of some areas: community leaders were not consulted.
- Not all partners engaged equally and openly in the relief-recovery process.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Assess how the immediate needs of already supported beneficiary households can be made fully secure in terms of shelter requirements.
2. If accepted, provide training on disaster preparedness to DCP staff/volunteers at the district and local levels.
3. The role, structure and future operating modality of RIHPED needs to be reviewed and strengthened.
4. Tearfund needs to revisit the issue and mechanisms relating to complaint and feedback mechanisms, with partners.
5. Tearfund and IPs need to identify, design and use some basic guiding principles and minimum standards of intervention for future early recovery projects.
6. Tearfund – Haiti and UK – should revisit the operational arrangements which were in place prior to and immediately following Hurricane Matthew, in advance planning for another climatic event.
7. Beneficiary selection criteria need to be agreed and applied consistently across a project/programme for the sake of consistency and transparency.
8. Decide whether it is more appropriate for intended beneficiaries to receive complete rather than partial support in a specific sector.
9. Partners, or first responders, should conduct a more thorough needs-based assessment in order to provide a more complete response to everyone targeted.
10. A more comprehensive training package should be envisaged for carpenters and masons.

11. In a society where agriculture dominates livelihoods, it is essential to assess soil conditions immediately after a major climatic event.
12. Partners such as CEEH should research and promote a wider range of crops that are better suited to current climatic conditions in Grande Anse.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THIS INITIATIVE

Haiti has experienced recurring natural catastrophes in the past, many of which have strongly dented the country's development. Due to its large coastal area, the country is extremely vulnerable to hurricanes and tropical storms but has also been struck by powerful earthquakes and tsunamis. Combined with its geographical location, the country also remains dangerously exposed to environmental threats such as floods and mudslides, because of past levels of deforestation, a real lack of coping capacity and the very high fragility and susceptibility within society, including the lack of quality, safe evacuation shelters.

The Haitian population is one of the most exposed in the world to natural disasters: the number of disasters per kilometre tops the average for other Caribbean countries. For the period 1995-2015, the Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index ranked Haiti third in the world for impacts of climatic events. The country is among the 10 zones in the world considered most vulnerable to climate change.

On 4 October 2016, Hurricane Matthew, a Category 4 storm, made landfall at Les Anglais in Haiti's southwestern peninsula, bringing with it 240 km/h winds, storm surges, and depositing 50- 100 cm of rain, much of it in concentrated areas. This made it the strongest storm to hit the nation since Hurricane Cleo in 1964, and the third strongest Haitian landfall on record¹. This storm's impacts were especially devastating due to high levels of deforestation already experienced in affected areas, together with the underlying vulnerabilities of the impoverished rural populations it affected. The slow movement of the hurricane off the south coast meant that exceptionally heavy rainfall was experienced. Damage and losses resulting from the hurricane were estimated to be US\$2.8 billion, or one-third of the country's Gross National Product.


Grand'Anse bore the brunt of Hurricane Matthew (Figure 1), but many towns in Sud and Nippes Departments were also heavily impacted. The hurricane's high winds and related flooding killed more than 600 people, displaced an estimated 175,000, and affected some 2.1 million people. The hurricane also caused widespread damage to homes, roads, public infrastructure, hospitals, and schools. Most of the houses in its path could not stand the force of its impact, which blew away roofs and walls, destroying an estimated 90 per cent of homes in the worst hit areas. Also severely impacted were the largely agricultural and fishing livelihoods of the affected population, whose crops and assets were wiped out. Of the 2.1 million people affected by the storm, 1.4 million were left in urgent need of humanitarian assistance in its wake.

Although people were warned in advance of the potential arrival of this hurricane, few took any form of preparation ahead of the event. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) reported that 2.1 million people were affected across Haiti and that 1.4 million were in

¹ https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/haiti_hno_2017.pdf (25 November 2017)

need of humanitarian assistance². A large majority of those who were forcibly displaced were children – an estimated 894,000 of the total, it is believed. Initial surveys identified that some 806,000 people were in urgent need of food, almost 150,000 were displaced and living in temporary shelters. In some departments, 80-90 per cent of the agricultural harvest was destroyed: figures of total decimation in communities such as Les Irois (Grande’Anse) were reported to this evaluation, in addition to 100 per cent loss of boats and fishing gear.

Figure 1. Predicted path of Hurricane Matthew after it struck Haiti. (Note the heaviest affected area – Grande Anse –in red.)



Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Hurricane Matthew's track prediction as of 7 October 7 2016.

Tearfund – which already had an in-country presence for quite a number of years – had taken a series of proactive moves to actively monitor the path and evolution of the hurricane for days before it actually approached Haiti. Building on its experience of responding to the 2010 earthquake response, Tearfund had:

- developed a Tearfund disaster contingency plan, which it had shared with potential implementing partners in Haiti, in the event of a disaster happening;
- established the Réseau Intégral Haïtien pour le Plaidoyer et l'Environnement Durable (RIHPED – Integrated Haitian Network to Advocate for a Sustainable Environment), which was made up of 13 organisations, including Integral Alliance Members and Tearfund partners;
- established the FRERE (Fond de Réponse Rapide et Efficiente) Fund, for immediate use in the event of a disaster; and

² UNOCHA Haiti: Hurricane Matthew - Situation Report No. 18 (31 October 2016). <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SITREP%2018%20-%20HAITI%20%2831%20OCT%202016%29%20-%20ENG.pdf> (3 November 2016)

- strengthened the capacity of communities to respond to disasters through various disaster risk reduction activities and through training to Pastors and local churches.

“This project helped us take a first step after the cyclone. It allowed us to buy food and a chicken. This assistance has saved our lives.”

Project Beneficiary

RIHPED is governed by an Executive Committee and currently has three sub-committees: disaster risk reduction and resilience, the FRERE Fund and Creation Care. FRERE, specifically, was designed to provide rapid response funds for disasters, with a particular focus on supporting needs assessments and providing immediate emergency assistance. Prior to Hurricane Matthew, the FRERE Fund totalled US\$90,000, of which Tearfund had contributed close to 90 per cent. This fund was managed by World Concern (Haiti) at the time of the disaster.

A Real Time Evaluation (RTR) was conducted by Tearfund in December 2016 in order to assess progress, identify challenges and learn lessons from the immediate relief phase.

Tearfund also decided to conduct an end of programme evaluation (this evaluation) towards the end of the 2nd phase of longer term recovery, as described in Section 2 of this report.

1.2 EVALUATION GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

As stated in the evaluation’s Terms of Reference, the goal of this evaluation was to “assess the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and localisation of Tearfund’s response, in order to inform future emergency responses”.

In relation to the above, which is largely in line with selected OECD DAC evaluation criteria, the following linked, broad objectives were defined:

- **Relevance** – Were the types of projects implemented by the partners relevant to the needs of the communities?
- **Effectiveness** – How effectively did the response help to reconstruct communities’ food security, shelter, agriculture/livelihoods needs in a timely way, to achieve desired outcomes?
- **Sustainability** – Are communities (and particularly the most vulnerable people in those communities) more resilient to future disasters, especially hurricanes?
- **Localisation** – Were Tearfund’s systems and procedures sufficiently responsive and flexible to allow localised responses? How could they be improved?

In addition to analysing the overall programme design – and its relevance to perceived and documented needs on the ground – particular attention was given to determining what changes have taken place in specific sectors or situations (e.g. shelter or agriculture) and in identifying where the project has contributed to any such change – deliberate and unintentional.

Consultations were conducted with a broad range of programme beneficiaries on the ground, using key informant interviews and focus group discussions as the main evaluation tools. Other stakeholders consulted, including representatives from each of the four implementing partners, local Pastors and staff from Tearfund Haiti and Tearfund UK.

1.3 ABOUT THIS EVALUATION

This end-of-programme evaluation was undertaken by Proaction Consulting at the request of Tearfund UK and Tearfund Haiti. The evaluation builds on evidence gathered by Tearfund as part of a Real Time Review (RTR) on the emergency response in December 2016. The RTR focussed mainly on the partners, location and projects summarised in Table 1.

Given the comprehensive coverage of the RTR, this evaluation was requested to focus primarily on the recovery phase of work, as implemented through four Tearfund Partners – CEEH, FEPH, World Concern and World Relief. This effectively covered the “Early Recovery Phase, from 1 November 2016 to 31 March 2017” (Table 2) and the subsequent “Longer Term Recovery from 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018” (Table 3).

For the purpose of this independent evaluation, a multidisciplinary team of people was brought together, comprising David Stone (Lead Consultant, Proaction Consulting), Norman Molina (Design, Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, Tearfund Honduras), Ms Myrta Eustache (National Consultant) and Luc St Vil (National Consultant).

Table 1. Relief Phase – 5 October 2016 to 16 November 2016
(US\$ figures rounded to nearest US\$1 in the following three tables)

PARTNER	PROJECT	SOURCE OF FUNDS	PROJECT COST (\$)	GRANT (\$)	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	PROJECT SUMMARY
World Concern	HAI212	FRERE	355,357	10,000	Sud-Est	Assess and Assist - Food, hygiene kits, water filters and tarpaulins to 3,150 HHs (IMASS Project) ³
World Concern	HAI232	Tearfund	82,480	75,000.00	Sud-Est	Assess and Assist - Cash distribution of HTG3,000 to 500 HHs
World Relief	HAI212	FRERE	29,140	5,000	Sud, Sud-Est	Assess and Assist - Food and hygiene kits to 1,470 HHs.
	HAI235	Tearfund Appeal		24,000.00		
Living Water	HAI212	FRERE	5,665	5,000	West	Assess and Assist - food kits to 100 HHs, water purification kits to 2,000 HHs, cholera prevention awareness training.
MTI	HAI212	FRERE	5,000	5,000	Sud	No assist. Grant to support needs assessments in 3 communes in Sud Department.
Micah	HAI212	FRERE	5,000	5,000	Nippes	Assess and Assist - Cash distribution of HTG 2,000 to 125 HHs.
CEEH	HAI212	FRERE	14,000	5,000	Grand’Anse, Nippes	Assess and Assist - Cash distribution to 424 HHs (HTG 1,500 to 300 HHs; HTG 2,000 to 84 HHs; HTG 250 to 40 HHs).
	HAI233	Tearfund Appeal		8,939		
FEPH	HAI212	FRERE	11,366	3,346	Grand’Anse, Sud	Assess and Assist - Cash distribution of HTG 2,000 to 100 HHs
	HAI225	FRERE		1,654		

³ Consortium between Food for the Hungry, Medair, Medical Teams International and World Concern

	HAI234	Tearfund Appeal		6,366		
UEBH	HAI225	FRERE	5,000	5,000	North-West, Artibonit, Ouest	Assess and Assist-Cash distribution of HTG 2,000 to 7 HHs, 2.5kg seeds to 287 HHs
FOKA	HAI225	FRERE	5,000	5,000	West	Assess and Assist - Cash distribution HTG 2,000 to 110 HHs
FONHEP	HAI225	FRERE	5,000	5,000	Sud, Sud-Est	Assess and Assist - Cash distribution of HTG 1,500 to 48 HHs, 15 tables for 5 schools & 3 tables for school community

Table 2. Early Recovery Phase – 1 November 2016 to 31 March 2017

PARTNER	PROJECT NO.	GRANT (US\$)	DEPARTMENT	PROJECT SUMMARY	NO. DIRECT BENEFICIARIES
World Relief	HAI236	37,476	Sud, Grand'Anse, Nippes	Mobilise and equip local churches within World Relief's Church Empowerment Zone to respond to shelter, health and agriculture needs.	2,393
CEEH	HAI238	57,680	Grand'Anse	Recovery of agricultural production. Increased food security and income for 500 households	3,000
World Relief	HAI239	107,778	Sud, Sud-Est, Grand'Anse	Food security	2,825
CEEH	HAI240-0	79,129	Nippes	125% increase in food security for 500 households	2,065
CEEH	HAI242	145,200	Grand'Anse	Goal: 83% of families verified that houses were built according to hurricane resistant standards and were confident in the construction	2,272 direct 262 indirect

Note: all funding for this phase came from a Tearfund Appeal. Source Tearfund.

Table 3. Longer Term Recovery Phase – 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018

PARTNER	PROJECT NO.	SOURCE OF FUNDS	GRANT (US\$)	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	PROJECT SUMMARY	NO. ⁴ DIRECT BENEFICIARIES
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⁴ Calculated as percentage contribution towards project

FEPH	HAI243	Tearfund Appeal	189,241	Grand'Anse	Cash payments for 7,500 beneficiaries to address emergency food insecurity	7,500
World Concer n	HIA230	Tearfund HIAF	3,928	Sud	Support 80 household's self-recovery of strong and safe housing solutions in Torbeck Commune using anti-cyclonic construction standards	480
	HAI232	Tearfund Appeal	22,780			
	HAI244-0	Tearfund Appeal	83,912			
World Concer n	HAI244-1	Tearfund HIAF	19,513	Sud	Support 15 households' self-recovery of strong and safe housing solutions in Torbeck Commune using anti-cyclonic construction standards	100
World Concer n	HAI244-2	Tearfund HIAF	40,242	Sud	Support 29 households' self-recovery of strong and safe housing solutions in Torbeck Commune using anti-cyclonic construction standards	174
CEEH	HAI240-1	Tearfund HIAF	39,624	Grand'Anse	Support for PREPAVOM beneficiaries who lost their harvest due to crop disease in the area	



Given the fertile soils and climate, recovery and diversification of agricultural crops and fruit should be a priority initiative to reduce peoples' dependence on just a few crops, some of which are likely to become more affected by changing climate conditions.

1.4 SNAPSHOT OF KEY FINDINGS

1.4.1 Successful initiatives

- ✓ Tearfund and partners were prepared for an eventuality such as Hurricane Matthew: their contingency plan (which was shared with partners), the composition of RIHPED and the existence of FRERE made a substantial competitive advantage for the Assess and Assist work, followed by recovery assistance.
- ✓ The existence of strong church networks in the respective departments meant that the response and recovery were locally informed and, thus, well aligned with the context and needs.
- ✓ Localisation of assistance worked well despite this being the first time it was initiated in Haiti by Tearfund.
- ✓ Projects deliberately targeted some of the most vulnerable people affected by Hurricane Matthew. No other support was provided to these recipients, neither by other NGOs nor the government.
- ✓ Tearfund ensured that all partners from each of the departments were kept informed of decisions taken at cluster meetings, for example. This was especially important where local partners were not permitted to attend such briefings.
- ✓ The distribution of cash coupons – both by respective agencies and formal structures such as UNITRANSFER – was both effective and straightforward for beneficiaries, thanks to support from the partners in explaining the process.

- ✓ Despite the cash transfer being the only source of support people received, many examples were cited (see also Box 1) where recipients shared some of the funds with friends, neighbours or others in need.
- ✓ The fond appreciation that beneficiaries showed for partner staff on the ground was a clear testament to the relevance and confidence established between the two groups.
- ✓ In some instances, partners providing cash transfer gave some advice to recipients on how to spend their funds, for example, to purchase some seeds in order to rebuild their livelihoods, to invest some of the funds for future security, or to repair their houses.
- ✓ At the same time, beneficiaries greatly valued the flexibility that cash transfers gave them, compared with receiving specific goods or materials – though these would also have been welcomed given the circumstances.
- ✓ Working with local authorities (e.g. CASEC) created a strategic alliance between communities and local authorities.

1.4.2 And Some Elements that Need Consideration

- There is a significant need to provide adequate, safe shelter materials to beneficiaries: none of the households represented in this evaluation had a complete roof and are vulnerable to the next high winds.
- Transparency of the beneficiary selection in both response and recovery phases. Project reports indicate incomplete accountability in the response phase by some partners.
- However, in some instances, e.g. with FEPH, local staff stood up for beneficiary selection to ensure the “right” people were selected.
- In the recovery period, some beneficiaries were not aware why they had been chosen, particularly in CEEH projects. Neither were the beneficiaries consulted on their needs.
- Delays in receiving some elements of support (though some of this was outside of the scope of this programme to have influenced, e.g. heavy rainfall and flooding in Grande Anse).
- No consideration seems to have been given with regards matching seeds provided with the agro-ecological conditions of some areas, as exemplified by World Relief’s food security projects: community leaders were not consulted.
- In all food security projects, no advice was given to farmers that they might need to take additional preparatory measure to restore soil fertility to its previous condition.
- Failure of some organisations during the response to provide adequate records of distribution.
- Some partners claim to have provided “training” on early preparedness to beneficiaries, e.g. FEPH. This (15 minutes), however, was far from adequate and, in addition to being done while people were receiving cash vouchers, likely had no impact whatsoever.
- More intensive training events were organised in relation to, e.g. agriculture. These were not as well attended as possible: people believe they already have enough knowledge, e.g. in relation to agriculture, but this is seen as a missed opportunity to inform people on new farming techniques and to promote diversification, which would help act as both a safety net and improve nutritional diversity.
- During the Assess and Assist evaluation, engineers based their estimations of shelter needs on an average household: the provided materials (standard for all beneficiaries) in many cases were insufficient. As a result, many shelters programmes today – particularly in Torbeck with World Concern – there are a large number of incomplete shelters or some which have been reconstructed using old wood and old corrugated sheeting which will not endure.
- Missed opportunities to inform people about practical, inexpensive approaches and practices they might take in the event of an alert, e.g. moving livestock and vital livelihood support services such as fishing equipment to safe places.

2. REPORT STRUCTURE

An overview of the context and some of the main findings of this evaluation was given in the previous section. Section 3 presents the methodology used in the approach and implementation of this evaluation, including a description of the main tools used, essentially a combination of literature review, personal and group consultations with project beneficiaries and project staff, as well as direct observations on the ground with selected communities. The Survey Questionnaire used in Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) is presented in Annex IV.

Section 4 presents the main findings of this evaluation. It begins with an overview of findings from two of the main sectors covered by the programme – shelter and food security – before then going on to provide observations and comments on other components of the programme, as seen during this evaluation.

Section 5 provides a summary analyses using selected OECD-DAC Criteria (Section 5.1-5.4) and against Tearfund’s Corporate Outcomes (Section 5.5).

Section 6 presents the main conclusions from this evaluation, followed in Section 7 with a set of actionable recommendations. The latter have been deliberately sub-divided into “Immediate” – given that some action is still possible within the remaining time frame left under this project – and “longer term”, to inform and guide actions should the project be extended with other funding or should this model example be used for similar activities elsewhere in the Caribbean and beyond.

A list of materials consulted prior to, during and following the actual evaluation on the ground is presented in the Bibliography.

Please refer to the Table of Contents for additional information contained in the annexes appended to this evaluation.

3. METHODOLOGY

The methodology applied in this evaluation followed the broad steps outlined in the evaluation’s Terms of Reference (Annex I) which, in summary, included:

- an initial briefing (via Skype) between the Team Leader and the Haiti Programme Officer at Tearfund UK to discuss the overall evaluation and needs, the broad approach and situation on the ground. Following this, a proposal was submitted to Tearfund concerning the possible scale of coverage and scope of the evaluation – site visits (using selection criteria), desired/practical level of consultation and so forth;
- review the selection of other team members, being conscious of required tasks;
- an initial review of key documents provided by Tearfund UK;
- in-country briefing (including security updates) of the evaluation team with Tearfund Haiti senior management and project staff;
- development of a questionnaire (see Annex IV) for guidance during interviews with Tearfund and partner project staff;
- fieldwork conducted, using FGDs and key informant interviews (KIIs) as the main data collection tools, supplemented where possible with spontaneous site visits to verify findings;
- data analysis and consolidation with the evaluation team;

- an in-country debriefing/validation with Tearfund Senior Management and partner staff, at the invitation of Tearfund Haiti;
- interviews with some key informants from Tearfund UK;
- compilation, with input from team members, of a draft evaluation report, shared with Tearfund UK and Tearfund Haiti; and
- reflection on feedback from this review and completion of the final report.



Focus group discussions with project beneficiaries were one of the main sources of information for this evaluation, in addition to key informant meetings with project and partner staff.

Field work was conducted between 20 and 27 February 2018, with preparatory work first having been undertaken through a desk review of reports provided Tearfund. An initial debriefing was provided by Tearfund UK to the Team Leader while all members of the team benefitted from a first-hand briefing Tearfund Haiti in Port au Prince, upon arrival.

The evaluation focused on the activities undertaken in Nippes, Sud and Grande Anse departments under the oversight of Tearfund Haiti and in association with their respective local implementing partners. A short visit was made to one particular site of intervention in the Nord Ouest Department, where World Concern had planned to undertake a distribution of Non-food Items. This was in relation to Hurricane Irma (which struck this region on 7 September 2017). Unfortunately, upon arrival, no beneficiaries could be identified and only a representative of the Department of Civil Protection (DCP) was on hand to answer a few questions. While this evaluation had hoped to learn from this intervention – particularly to see if lessons learned from Hurricane Matthew had been applied – it was not able to do so. Tearfund Haiti may, however, seek to follow-up on this intervention as the evaluation team were not able to access project documentation of any substance in relation to this initiative.

4. KEY FINDINGS

The findings described below specifically address the requirements of the Terms of Reference and are based on evidence gained directly as a result of this independent evaluation. They make a balanced assessment of the current situation and take account of the views of individual household beneficiaries, many of whom were chosen as being amongst the most vulnerable members of respective communities. Findings are based on a combination of direct observations and consultations with project beneficiaries.

“Without the assistance we received... I would not have been able to feed our children.”

Project Beneficiary

This section begins with an overview of the main activities supported through this project. This is then followed in Section 5 by an analysis according to the following criteria outlined by the OECD-DAC:

- **relevance** – the extent to which the activity was suited to the priorities and policies of the target communities;
- **effectiveness** – the degree to which the programme helped reconstruct communities’ food security, shelter, agriculture/livelihoods needs in a timely way, to achieve desired outcomes;
- **sustainability** – an indication as to whether the benefits perceived from an activity are likely to continue after funding has been concluded; and
- **localisation** – the extent to which local actors were involved in the roll-out of the various project activities.

In addition to the above, the evaluation was requested to assess the contribution made by this project towards one specific Tearfund Corporate Outcome: *“Disasters Responded To – Communities Affected by Disasters Recover Quickly and are Better Equipped to Face Future Hazards”* (Section 5.5).

4.1 OVERVIEW OF EVALUATION COVERAGE

With knowledge of an impending disaster, Tearfund (UK and Haiti) were actively monitoring the shifting track and transformation of Hurricane Matthew (which was at one stage categorised as “5), keeping its local partners informed of the situation. This is seen as having been a key, perhaps critical, moment in pre-positioning Tearfund’s later response, in particular the speed at which it was then able to mobilise funds and human resources.

The overall response supported by Tearfund’s co-ordinated response began the day after Hurricane Matthew reached land: many partners (mainly local churches) were quick to respond to the situation by carrying out Assess and Assist missions in some of the worst affected parts of the country. This work has been previously evaluated as part of the RTR and was not a specific subject to enquiry in the present evaluation.

As part of this evaluation, work focused on Grande Anse, Nippes and Sud departments as shown in Table 4, which also indicates which partner was primarily responsible for activities and the nature of the interventions. A total of six projects – four implementing partners – were reviewed, covering cash distributions (n=5), food security (n=7) and shelter (n=5).

Table 4. Projects Viewed as Part of this Evaluation

DEPARTMENT	PROJECT	COMMUNITY/ COMMUNITIES	PARTNER	SUBJECT
Nippes	HAI240	Paillant	CEEH	Food security

	HAI240	Bouzi	CEEH	Food security
Grande Anse	HAI238	Leon/Jeremie	CEEH	Shelter
	HAI238	Leon	CEEH	Food Security
	HAI242	Abricot	CEEH	Food Security
	HAI242	Abricot	CEEH	Shelter
	HAI243	Les Irois	FEPH	Cash distribution
	HAI243	Les Irois	FEPH	Cash distribution
	HAI243	Dame-Marie	FEPH	Cash distribution
	HAI243	Dame-Marie	FEPH	Cash distribution
	HAI243	Chambellan	FEPH	Cash distribution
	HAI242	Jeremie	CEEH	Shelter
Sud	HAI244	Solon	World Concern	Shelter
	HAI244	Moreau	World Concern	Shelter
	HAI239	Dichity	World Relief	Food Security
	HAI239	Fonfred	World Relief	Food Security
	HAI239	Massey	World Relief	Food Security

As Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate, more than 340 people (with more women than men) contributed to what were very active and informative exchanges with the evaluation teams as part of the FGDs. Smaller numbers of people were then deliberately selected for KIIs, representing the personal viewpoints from people, such as carpenters and Pastors, to implementing partner staff and government representatives. Overall, the evaluation team is satisfied with the coverage and representation it was able to achieve in the time available on the ground.

Table 5. Number of People who Participated in Focus Group Discussions

DISTRICT	COMMUNITY	SECTOR	WOMEN	MEN
Nippes	Paillant	Food Security	13	14
	Bouzi	Food Security	6	7
Grande Anse	Leon	Shelter	11	5
	Leon	Food Security	8	12
	Abricot	Shelter	13	5
	Abricot	Food security	7	11
	Les Irois	Cash distribution	9	12
	Les Irois	Cash distribution	16	2
	Dame-Marie	Cash distribution	16	8
	Dame-Marie	Cash distribution	12	5
	Chambellan	Cash distribution	22	7
	Jeremie	Cash distribution	9	4
Sud	Solon	Shelter	8	3
	Moreau	Shelter	10	3

	Dichity	Food security	18	23
	Fonfred	Food security	4	15
	Massey	Food Security	11	16
Total			193	152

Table 6. Number of People who Participated in Key Informant Interviews

DISTRICT	COMMUNITY		WOMEN	MEN
Grande Anse	Leon	Beneficiaries	2	1
		CEEH staff	-	2
	Abricot	Pastor	-	1
	Les Irois	Beneficiaries	1	1
		FEPH staff	-	1
	Dame-Marie	FEPH staff	-	1
	Chambellan	FEPH staff	-	2
Jeremie	Beneficiary	1	2	
Sud	Solon	Beneficiary	1	-
	Solon	Government representative	1	-
	Moreau	Government representative	1	-
	Moreau	World Concern staff	-	1
	Dichity	Pastor	-	1
	Dichity	Beneficiary	-	1
	Dichity	World Relief staff	-	1
Total			7	15

The following sections provide specific observations on the key areas of intervention, in addition to some other general findings.

4.2 SHELTER

Shelter, and in particular, the repair of roofs, was rapidly identified as a priority need for many affected households. As such, the intervention was effective, but only partly, as the timing and amount of material given in some cases limited the effectiveness and impact of the project.

With the exception of cash distribution, the approach to shelter was more or less uniform across all partner responses (where this was a consideration), consisting of the provision of 15 sheets of corrugated iron, 15 pounds of nails, 12 pieces of 2x4 foot timber, additional timber boards and some mastic. Some, but not all houses also received a bag of cement and most received an additional cash distribution as well.

Provision of these quantities was based on an initial assessment by engineers from the respective partners, during the Assess and Assist phase of emergency relief. The quantity of metal sheets distributed was supposed to have covered an entire roof – this was in fact one of the beneficiary selection criteria applied by some partners: if the walls of a house had been destroyed or were not judged strong enough to support a new roof, this beneficiary was not selected.

In virtually all cases encountered as part of this evaluation, however, the amount of roofing materials provided (or allocated for) was not sufficient⁵. As a result, a great many beneficiaries – let alone non-beneficiaries – today still live in houses partially covered with tarpaulin.



Some, but not all, housing projects have benefitted from skilled carpentry assistance in rebuilding a more resilient shelter.

The timing of delivering materials varied from one community to another. Some received them right at the beginning of the raining season (September) and were able to protect their assets and family from the rain. But others received the materials in late January 2018 so had had to endure the wet season without protection.

Several learning aspects from this particular activity are examined below.

For example, technical knowledge on how to build/repair was provided to two groups of people – to already skilled carpenters (who were trained in safer construction/reconstruction techniques) as well as some project beneficiaries. Of the carpenters spoken with, it appeared that the training was very relevant and gave them new insights to building safer houses. At the same time, however, some noted that the techniques learned were not applied in their entirety (by project beneficiaries – see below) and that some of the materials were not only insufficient but of poor quality. Both aspects were independently verified by house visits as part of this evaluation with, for example, wire used to

⁵ This is clearly a dilemma: when beneficiaries were asked if they would have preferred to have enough materials but fewer beneficiaries in their communities, they almost always said “No”. Yet, you could still see that they were suffering.

tie down beams are already going rusty and nails of inadequate length being used to allow them to be bent back into the wood for added strength.



Some house repairs, however, were not conducted according to training or recommendations: nails were not returned into the beams for added security and old wood and iron were supplemented to extend the coverage of the shelter.

Training was also provided for some beneficiaries to allow them to undertake their own at least some of their own home repairs. While this engaged participants, who found the sessions “very practical”, questions hang over the safety of this approach as some repairs – even by the accounts of carpenters – did not take into account of standards and therefore do not meet established safety criteria. Roofing repairs by World Concern in the 3rd communal section of Solon community (Sud Department), for example, were done well with the same quality throughout, because the Carpenter-Supervisor conducted regular quality controls. This was not the case, however, in the 4th communal section of Moreau, where the quality of repairs was much inferior as there was no regular supervision by the Carpenter-Supervisor.

It is not clear whether the construction modules were fully understood by the beneficiaries or that they gave enough importance to the training.

While, an “average” household owner is used to building their own shelter in the first instance and might be able to repair the roof to an acceptable level of quality, the question stands out as to whether s/he is able to repair their home to the same quality as a trainer carpenter?

In addition, although trained beneficiaries may have acquired new knowledge and competence, this does not mean that they have access to same quality of materials and will be most likely to use old and damaged beams and iron sheets. This is important in terms of future safety and sustainability and would benefit from further consideration again in preparing for another eventual disaster similar to Hurricane Matthew. What is also important is for each implementing partner to apply the standards that it taught the workers/carpenters. This was not the case in every community visited as part of this evaluation: beneficiaries are calling for better care, even with regard to safety and in view of the arrival of the rainy season and the hurricane season. Many examples were seen where beneficiaries are afraid that their partially repaired house will not withstand the weather because salvaged building materials have either not been replaced or have been used to try and bridge the gaps.

Partners generally tried to buy certified wood⁶, galvanised nails and thick corrugated iron sheets. These, however, were not always available on the local market or their prices had increased dramatically given the demands, which obliged some partners to procure these from elsewhere, particularly beam and corrugated iron sheets.

Solidarity played a big role in rebuilding the roofs. Beneficiaries participated in the construction of each other's roof, once they had received the training.

"We are very happy with the materials, we on our own would not have been able to find or afford such materials of superior quality".
Project Beneficiary

Positive, innovative, actions were taken on several occasions on the part of partners. For example, in Grand'Anse, to prevent beneficiaries from being exploited by carpenters demanding higher wages, part of the intended cash distribution was retained to especially pay carpenters when they had completed their work, thereby helping ensure quality as well as fairness. Likewise, when it was found that distribution centres were far from some of the beneficiaries' homes, transportation means were arranged to deposit materials closer to where they were going to be needed. Such needs should be factored in to future contingency planning and budgets for partners as they were important contributions to people in this instance.

Perhaps one of the most significant gaps identified in this evaluation was the failure to address the full shelter needs of beneficiaries, even if that was to mean that fewer people received assistance. Today, 16 months after Hurricane Matthew, a seemingly great number of people cannot complete the rehabilitation of their houses, with many still in precarious situation about where to shelter and sleeping when it's raining. There are also unmet shelter needs apart from roofing: many house walls were damaged or totally destroyed. Today people still resort to plastic sheets as walls: no evidence was seen of a completely rebuilt house, or repairs to major structural damages. As the project was designed with the objectives to repair the roofs, it perhaps lost some relevance to some families.

4.3 FOOD AND LIVELIHOOD SECURITY

⁶ The evaluation was not able to fully understand the inference of "certified wood" in this instance. Partners sought to buy this quality of wood but were not able to explain it. Normally, this term relates to an accredited standard – such as the FSC-Forest Stewardship Council – which is an international recognition, the intention of which is to promote and ensure sustainability of harvested wood stocks. The system, however, is open to loopholes and – even though there no evidence to the contrary – it is very unlikely in the Haiti context that provided wood would have come from a sustainable source. Caution should therefore be used in applying such concepts in project proposals and reports as this could be misleading.

The main sources of subsistence and income for the vast majority of people affected by Hurricane Matthew were agriculture, fishing and livestock keeping. All three were devastated as a result of this disaster, in many localities to an extent of 100 per cent. Crops were totally destroyed, fishing boats and equipment lost to sea and livestock washed away. Addressing peoples' food and livelihood security was therefore the second priority that needed to be addressed through this programme.

As with Shelter, several learning aspects – positive and sometimes less so – in relation to rebuilding peoples' food security are examined below.



Farmers are gradually starting to recultivate lands, though there is still a heavy dominance on monoculture planting.

This project intervention focused primarily on the provision of seeds, to quickly stimulate agricultural recovery and allow people to regain some nutritional and livelihood security. While this project intervention intention was clearly a much-needed response, several fundamental errors were made in the design response.

Overall, this component aimed to do “too much with too little”. Given the limited number of staff with technical capacities, available funds, limited time to respond and the number of people in need, the scope of the programme was too wide to address every need and reconstruct a community's food security. In addition to geographical and agricultural considerations discussed below, there was not, for example, adequate time to properly test seeds for every region where this programme had planned to intervene. Such aspects were not seemingly given sufficient consideration in the planning and early implementation of this programme.

A general – and very obvious – failing of the food/livelihood response and subsequent recovery was the lack of attention given to the fact that the communities being supported (even in the same Department) live in quite different ecological zones with a range of altitudes (from sea level to mountain sides) and agro-ecological situations. Any food security project should have taken these and other considerations into account, including the choice of farming systems to support, sowing and harvesting calendars, wet seasons and crop varieties that are adapted to the specific areas.

Some positive findings were noted which showed a degree of flexibility for beneficiaries, for example:

- in Nippes, the CEEH project used cash distribution to provide more choices to beneficiaries to select their own seeds;
- in Grande Anse, the project distributed in-kind seeds. However, to compensate losses suffered, a small cash distribution was additionally provided to the same farmers at the end of 2017 to allow them to purchase a variety of new seeds; and
- in the case of World Relief in the south, a larger variety of seeds, vegetable and fruit tree seedlings were provided to beneficiaries in this region, than elsewhere.

Food security projects do, nonetheless, need to take account of the potential consequences of climate change. Normally a food security project – even in an emergency situation – should take into account the constraints of farmers, such as their loss of livestock, which likely represented a significant part of their savings of the farmers. Consideration should have therefore been given to facilitating at least some farmers re-invested in livestock at the time. Yet, in this instance, the choice of the technical package was the same for all farmers and failed to consider their actual situations and needs.

An additional oversight in some areas, at least (especially those that received the highest levels of rain) related to land preparation immediately after the hurricane: even without precise tests, it can be expected that soil conditions will obviously change with such quantities rain in a very limited period of time. Added to this must be nutrient wash out and changes in soil structures, in addition to salt intrusion from the rain and wind. The combination of these elements would have brought immediate changes to the soils of parts of Grande Anse and Sud, in particular, which likely resulted – or at least contributed significantly to – in the failure of the crops planted immediately after the hurricane. Technical support provided to beneficiaries at this stage should have been aware of this and alerted farmers to the need that “practice as standard” was not enough in this instance. Deeper ploughing might have helped as would the additional input of fertilisers, while recognising that at the same time soil preparation costs were reportedly higher than normal⁷.

These examples indicate that the fundamental steps taken in the response were not well thought through. Implementing partners failed to take in account the reality of the different zones in which they were working, as well as the views of the community leaders. As a consequence, in communities such as Fonfred and Dichity, Sud Department, the crop varieties (mainly corn and beans) provided by World Concern were neither well chosen nor adapted to the local conditions. In the lowlands, for example, the last bean crop that was planted was intended for harvesting during the winter season and not for the current month, March.

⁷ Beneficiaries spoken with in Sud Department mentioned the very high price (up to HTG125 per person per hour in addition to food provided) and scarcity of labour in the area following Hurricane Matthew. This parameter in farming was not included in proposal.

Some training was provided to farmers but there are questions with regards whether people will continue to apply the learning once the project is over. In Sud Department, for example, most of the training was provided by World Concern for Pastors who were then expected to replicate this as a Training of Trainers fashion. From the evaluation's observations, however, Pastors did not – were not able to – dedicate enough time and importance to replicate the trainings, so the anticipated impact was likely not gained. It was not immediately obvious in some instances – as very few beneficiaries were able to give details of any training and training modules were not available for review – beneficiaries did not receive any/sufficient training that would have allowed them to succeed better. Project reports state that farmers did not attend training events as they “already knew how to do this”. This, however, is seen as a significant missed opportunity to discuss former farming practices, to inform and share new experiences and approaches with people and to take the opportunity to, for example, identify and work with “model farmers” to introduce more resistant, early maturing and higher yielding varieties in a positive bid to move away from peoples’ total reliance on just one or two staple food crops.

The involvement of the Pastor's Committee in training, however, is seen as a positive approach in several ways, particularly in their ability to encourage people to work together to mobilise when there is a need and to share resources with others who might not be as well off as some. For some, this might be a new approach for communities to work closely together with church assemblies on agricultural rehabilitation: the Pastor's Committee in Fonfred and Massey, for example, have started the initiative to set up mutual associations and agricultural services linked with ploughing. While such innovations are clearly welcomed and should be applauded, they should not be the sole form of support provided in terms of awareness raising, technical training or subsequent monitoring and providing technical assistance, if required.

Despite the above setbacks, compared with the situation three months after Hurricane Matthew – as experienced as part of the RTR – vegetation is recovering and there have been good harvests of some items, particularly bananas and jackfruit, which are considered the daily bread of many people in the affected regions.

4.4 CASH DISTRIBUTION

Cash distribution was an innovative aspect of this response and recovery programme, which appears to have been highly effective and greatly appreciated. This is all the more significant given that it was the first time that Tearfund had trialled this approach in Haiti. Certainly, early training provided to partners was instrumental to the design of the approaches and the relative ease by which people were able to retrieve the funds.

In Grande Anse, given the time period in which cash was distributed – and FEPH's expertise in education rather than construction and agriculture – the decision to issue cash for beneficiaries was a very opportune action as this provided people with the opportunity to choose their own priorities according to the needs of the moment. High levels of appreciation were expressed by beneficiaries as this approach, which gave them freedom to choose how to spend the money (see below) and confidence over their buying power.

From many of the FGDs and KIIs, it would appear that many beneficiaries opted to following the “advice” provided by the implementing partner to, for example, buy seed even when they knew the season for planting had passed, or to put a little away as a saving. What was interesting to note from discussions was the far-ranging set of activities that people invested in (Box 1), which in turn, will positively influence household situations (e.g. through school subscriptions and family items) as well as community wide activities such as markets.

BOX 1. EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT WITH CASH DISTRIBUTED

Income-generating activities:

purchase (replacement) of fishing materials and equipment;
agricultural inputs;
livestock;
small business;
debt repayment; and
repair of houses.

Social and other activities:

payment of school fees;
medical care;
purchase of foods; and
sharing money and food with neighbours.

In looking to the future, and particularly in closely set church networks, it might be advisable for Tearfund and partners to have a prior discussion on how partners should “advise” vulnerable people in those conditions, making sure that their suggestion is not a “condition” that might prevent some people from making their own decisions and using the money in a manner that could be more beneficial for them at that point in time. This discussion, however, should not be to the detriment of future localisation moves.

4.5 BENEFICIARY SELECTION PROCESS

The selection of beneficiaries is often a difficult moment where needs need to be balanced by available resources, with the potential for decisions to be influenced by people with alternative and sometimes competing interests. In this instance, Tearfund had a clear set of criteria established to guide and narrow down the selection of beneficiaries to “the most vulnerable people”. Its partners were aware of this at the outset of the emergency response.

Not all partners, however, respected this approach. In some instances, the selection of beneficiaries appears to have been realised with transparency by local authorities (CASEC members) and project staff – see above comments on World Concern’s shelter programme in Torbeck. In other situations, however, decisions were influenced by individuals coming from different backgrounds.

What is important to note in this instance is that not all beneficiaries the evaluation spoke with were familiar with the selection criteria applied – they did not know why they, and not their neighbours, for example, who might also have been in a similar difficult situation, had been selected. Those benefiting from HOMS1, for example, responded timidly to this question, but it was felt that there was no clear and precise communication issued at the time in relation to the selection process and they had not been asked for their opinion. In this instance, the choice, size and quality of assistance was made by CEEH, who applied a single formula for all cases: there was no specific analysis of individual needs or requirements.

4.6 NEEDS ASSESSMENTS

Despite impressive pre-planning and deployment to the field once the hurricane had passed, the ensuing activities were not always conducted according to expected standards. In particular, issues were identified in relation with the selection of beneficiaries (see above) and, subsequently the needs assessment process. While it is important to recognise that many people received essential and possibly life-supporting assistance through the various initiatives supported through this response, if this assistance had been based on better situational assessments (in particular in relation to shelter and agriculture), their impacts would almost certainly have been greater, though less widely felt.

In Sud Department, Word Concern appeared to have given time to visiting even very isolated, affected communities. Engagement with the community leaders during those visits – and afterwards – helped inform their decisions on how to then proceed. CEEH, on the other hand, could have done some quick minimum surveys of farmer's former practices and needs, including where they used to purchase their seeds, before actually buying them. It is unfortunate that the provision of unsuitable seeds resulted in this instance in a loss of confidence and income. If farmers had been consulted, the risk of crop losses would be less important, since the beneficiaries said that the aid came too late compared to the planting season. They could have chosen to invest in livestock rather than agriculture.

While the distribution of seeds and/or seedlings are globally appreciated by beneficiaries, technicians should first – and always – assess the appropriateness of each variety for a given season and situation. Some important aspects of the communities were ignored in this instance, for example, the type of seeds generally planted by the farmers, the cultures they would have preferred, the timing of planting certain varieties in relation to seasons, and so forth. The assessments also failed in this respect to consider the financial implications for affected households if having to hire labour – an important cost for families that have lost everything.

4.7 FEEDBACK MECHANISMS FOR BENEFICIARIES

Feedback mechanisms routinely feature as part of many NGOs response programmes and are an integral part of the Core Humanitarian Standards. Tearfund itself has routinely applied these systems in Haiti in the past.

In this instance, however, feedback mechanisms were either not applied or were considered for just a short period of time, without respect to proper norms. While most feedback was received from beneficiaries during the emergency response, the extended period of distributions and support seen in this programme would have warranted such a system being in place for the duration – for learning purposes in particular. Some organisations, such as FEPH, did have an initial system which they advertised: this was largely based on the provision of a staff phone number, which in itself is not a suitable mechanism to receive complaints or feedback. Likewise, the church network as a structure is not enough to monitor and detect problems and enable people to provide confidential feedback in the knowledge that this will not affect their standing in the church or community as a whole.

In this instance, the evaluation is of the opinion that partners gave insufficient attention to this important aspect of project management, by not providing (and explaining) a suitable feedback system which would have offered confidentiality and personal safety to those wishing to lodge a complaint or seek clarification on something. This is thought to not result from any negligence *per se* on the part of Tearfund's partners, but rather on their lack of appreciation to put such a system in place (see Recommendation 7.1.4).

4.8 LACK OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

Peoples' knowledge of disaster preparedness is, in general, very low. Districts included in this evaluation experience multiple climatic threats each year, but rural and urban communities are poorly equipped to deal with "non-average" event such as Hurricane Matthew.

In this instance, in addition to lives being lost and livelihoods destroyed, people were traumatised and unable to return to their homes, some for many months. Significant losses were recorded in terms of agricultural produce (estimated at 100 per cent in parts of Grande Anse – Les Irois, for example), in addition to livestock (80 per cent) and fishing equipment (100 per cent).

Although people were aware that a storm was coming – through messages disseminated by radio and SME, in addition to some volunteers actively mobilising people to move, most did not appreciate the level of threat this posed. Had preventative actions been taken, losses would likely to have been significantly less, for example, if houses were better prepared, if livestock were moved to designated safe places and if fishing gear and boats were likewise moved to a safer haven⁸.

4.9 WILLINGNESS TO SHARE RESOURCES

Focus group discussions revealed that a great many beneficiaries actively shared some of the benefits they received either through cash distribution or as a result of having bought, for example, seeds as a result of having received this cash. This is seen as a very spontaneous, generous social gesture (see Box 2).

BOX 2. KONBITS – WORKING TOGETHER FOR EACH OTHER

To facilitate the participation of households and encourage solidarity in Sud Department, World Concern organised households into "*konbits*" – a Haitian Creole term which describes a model of community members working as volunteers, based on solidarity, in order to complete tasks that benefit the wider community, such as harvesting of crops or repairing a road.

Each *konbit* consist of around 10 households who have worked with each other to, in this instance for example, carry heavy materials to each house from the distribution point and participate in the repair work, with the support of local carpenters and the project engineer. This approach seems to have worked very well in the majority of cases.

4.10 OVERALL CO-ORDINATION

In Haiti, programme co-ordination was assured by Tearfund staff who, in general, appear to have done a very skilled and satisfactory job. There were (and still are), however, some noticeable differences in experiences, skill sets and internal capacity within its chosen partners.

Issues such as reporting and accounting appear to have improved as the project evolved. Early capacity strengthening provided by Tearfund was central to the quick and effective distribution of

⁸ At the time of this evaluation, Tearfund Haiti had just started a local church and disaster training programme for partners and RIHPED members, the aim being is to improve the level of preparedness in communities where its partners are working.

assistance (particularly during the Assess and Assist response), while subsequent monitoring has helped keep the different project components mostly on track. Future use of mobile platforms to collect data during the emergency phase would go a long way to having a timely and complete set of baseline data available against which to then track and monitor progress.

As this was the first time that Tearfund made a deliberate effort in Haiti to allow its partners to take the lead in emergency and recovery activities it will be wanting to learn from this, while at the same time, respecting the “principles” of localisation in terms of ownership, management and monitoring. One area that could nonetheless be important for Tearfund to continue to work on with partners is respect for guidance given by Tearfund, such as in relation to beneficiary selection against predetermined and agreed criteria, transparency and internal and external accountability, to their respective organisations and their beneficiaries, respectively.

Strengths and weaknesses in Tearfund’s partnership systems also require scrutiny: on the one hand, working with church networks such as that provided by CEEH has many advantages in a pre- and post-disaster situation but, at the same time, it might not be adequate in being able to inform and guide ensuing activities, deal with external agencies and detect problems in time to take aversive actions. This, compared with what the evaluation saw as a very robust recovery support programme from FEPH, which has such systems already in place. The two situations are not directly comparable but perhaps some learning and middle ground could be found from this which would help inform future response and recovery programmes.

Further review is also required of the existing structure and working modality of RIHPED. Feedback on this issue from the emergency period suggested that ownership amongst local partners was missing: local partners lacked the experience of working as a collective and there were no systems in place to facilitate this at the time. This is not to take away from the important role that this structure facilitated and played, but merely to show that its structure and role needs to be reviewed – as a matter of priority – in light of the earlier experience. More dedicated resources – including at least one full time person to run a Secretariat – are essential for RIHPED if this is to reach its full potential in Haiti and inspire similar structures elsewhere in the Caribbean.

Co-ordination issues were reported to the evaluation between Tearfund UK and Tearfund Haiti, mainly in terms of emergency planning and the preparation of initial project concepts for funding. This element, in particular appeared to have been extremely time consuming given the nature of the emergency and also the amount of funds being considered. Some would say that “Tearfund lost heavily in terms of wasted funds and resources” by the extended discussions at times between the two offices. This issue, however, related more to the RTR and was covered explicitly in this evaluation given that all facts are not known and that this is largely an internal co-ordination discussion.

5. ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO OECD-DAC CRITERIA

Table 7 summarises the findings of the evaluation team based against the OECD-DAC criteria, which have a scale of 0-4, and defined as shown below:

- 1 *“Low or no visible contribution to the criteria”;*
- 2 *“Some evidence of contribution to this criteria but significant improvement required;”*

- 3 *“Evidence of satisfactory contribution to this criteria but requirement for continued improvement”;*
- 4 *“Evidence of good contribution to this criteria but with some areas for improvement remaining”;*
- 5 *“Evidence that the contribution is strong and/or exceeding that which was expected by the intervention”.*

Table 7. Summary of Attributed Scores to this Project (according to the above)

CRITERIA	ATTRIBUTED EVALUATION SCORE
Relevance	3.5
Effectiveness	2.5
Sustainability	2
Localisation*	2.5

*Localisation is not an explicit OECD DAC criteria though given the increased attention this approach has started to receive since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit it is given the same level of enquiry here.

Note also that “Impact” – a commonly measured variable under OECD DAC – is not specifically addressed here as some activities were still ongoing at the time of this evaluation and their full impact is not expected to be realised for some time.

Based on the above, the evaluation acknowledges the appropriateness of this project and the support it was designed to provide. All provided support has been widely appreciated, especially in view of the fact that in addition to losing their homes, many people also lost their entire source(s) of livelihood and security.

5.1 RELEVANCE (CRITERIA SCORE 3.5)

Overall, project beneficiaries are extremely grateful for the support they received and the relevance of the support to their immediate needs. This opinion is fully shared by the Evaluation Team.

The evaluation finds that this programme’s objectives were both valid and appropriate in meeting the most pressing needs of its beneficiaries, while also contributing to the immediate needs of others in the respective communities. In areas such as Torbeck (Sud Department), an estimated 90 percent of houses were affected as a direct result of Hurricane Matthew: some lost their roofs, others had their walls damaged and some were completely destroyed. Affected people were forced to stay in temporary shelters such as schools or churches for more than five months. Others sought shelter in caves, with neighbours or built temporary family shelters with salvaged materials so that they had some protection from the rain. Similar situations were reported from Grande Anse and Nippes.

“People have started to diversify from only growing black beans as we were able to purchase new seeds.”

Project Beneficiary, Bouzi Community

Regardless of the nature of the intervention – cash distribution, food security or shelter – project beneficiaries were unanimous in believing that the project’s objectives were valid and appropriate in meeting the most pressing needs of those affected by the hurricane. After the cyclone, there was certainly the need to acquire agricultural inputs following the losses recorded, so a food security project was appropriate. After a dramatically failed harvest on account of Hurricane Matthew, getting farmers back on their feet through the quick instruction of cash and materials was both a timely and highly relevant strategy

Early consideration was given by Tearfund and partners to addressing obvious priority needs of some of the most vulnerable people in the worst affected departments. Three sectors – shelter, food security and livelihood security – were prioritised with the second and third being closely interdependent in this instance. Direct assistance was provided through cash vouchers and materials.

Faced with a situation where there was a myriad of competing needs immediately after Hurricane Matthew, the narrow range of sectors (shelter and food, primarily) supported and implemented by partners was still very relevant to the needs of those affected. Shelter was an obvious choice given the need to have a safe place to sleep and keep possessions safe. After the cyclone, the need to acquire agricultural inputs following the losses recorded was also evident so, again, measures taken to address food security were appropriate. Providing people with some cash and providing them with a choice on how to spend this, meant a great deal to beneficiaries. To have added other activities at the time of emergency response would have represented further dilution of assistance reaching those affected and in need.

For those that received cash vouchers for the first time in their lives, the careful guidance (ensuring as far as possible that everything was in place for the receipt of cash) and advice provided to people was greatly appreciated. Partners often suggested that beneficiaries purchase one item or another and/or put away a little for a future need – information that was taken on board by some, clearly. Many people took the opportunity to pay school fees, provide medical care to family members, purchase foods and household items and pay workers to repair their homes.

Relevant and important in this particular context and approach has been autonomy and integrity: information on the amount that each beneficiary received was known to all, which has been an important move towards transparency in the process. This is especially important in the current context given the risk of corruption.

On the other hand, what was found lacking in this context was the degree of consultation with beneficiary households, the manner in which some of these had been selected (some families were clearly in less need of support than others) and the opportunities provided for interaction with project personnel. These are areas which could/should be addressed in terms of preparing for future emergency responses in Haiti and elsewhere in the region to ensure that this is 100 per cent relevant to peoples' needs.

5.2 EFFECTIVENESS (CRITERIA SCORE 2.5)

Key to achieving effectiveness in this instance was the timely identification of needs and response with selected resources. Paired with this was the need for transparent selection of intended beneficiaries. While judged overall to have been “quite effective”, there were nonetheless several areas of inconsistency, particularly in relation to the selection of individuals and consideration of beneficiary coverage.

In Grande Anse, the beneficiary selection approach applied by FEPH was appropriate and effective. Distribution was well done: all the beneficiaries got what had been planned for them, all are satisfied with the distribution planning because we have acted with them with respect and dignity. Other partners, especially CEEH, were not as consistent in their selection processes.

The approach used by FEPH is effective for several reasons: the amount allocated to beneficiaries could not, for example, have met the full requirements to repair or reconstruct houses. For others, needs such as health care, buy foods and keeping children in school are legitimate and extremely

important for the morale of parents and children. Receiving money gave the recipients hope and value.

Some gaps were identified where beneficiary needs were not (fully) addressed, particularly in relation to the timing of seeds delivery or the quantity of shelter materials provided which were – in general – not sufficient to allow people to completely repair the roofs of their houses.

Other areas where effectiveness might be improved in a future, similar, response programme are in relation to beneficiary selection and feedback mechanisms. While Tearfund had established a clear set of criteria to guide the selection of beneficiaries, this was not applied equally by all partners during the emergency response. The strongest evidence of targeting the most vulnerable affected people was seen in the FEPH programme in Grande Anse: elderly, disabled and people with difficult family situations were clearly prioritised in these instances. Less clear was some of the targeting performed by CEEH, also in Grande Anse, where comments shared with the evaluation team related to attempts by local politicians to influence who might receive support from the project. In Nippes, however, CEEH's partner Micah specifically targeted beneficiaries who were volunteers of Micah.

In most instances a committee of representatives was formed to oversee the selection process, this comprising community members, representatives from local churches and local officials such as the Mayor. Meetings were organised to inform people that they had been identified to receive support and what this would constitute. Some beneficiaries spoken with, however, were not sure why or how they had been selected, which again points to the fact that information was not always being shared in an open and transparent manner. At the same time, however, cases of extreme hardship and vulnerability were brought to the attention of the evaluation team from people who had not been selected as beneficiaries but who clearly were in need of assistance. As such, the project lacked a degree of flexibility in relation to the needs of some elderly and handicapped people who might not have been selected because the condition of their houses was not strong enough to support a new roof.

It is likely that effectiveness would also have been even greater if more thorough consultations were conducted with beneficiaries at the start, with regards the type(s) of support/services people would like to receive. Inconsistencies were seen in relation to this aspect across the programme.

At the same time, agricultural and shelter consultations were also conducted by CEEH in Grande Anse but – in the opinion of the Evaluation Team – both could have been more thorough and cognizant of local factors and needs. A quick survey of farmers and from where they purchase seeds, for example might have resulted in better quality seeds being obtained than was the case. As it happens, some farmers now have less confidence in the system, and have suffered direct loss of revenue due to failed crops last season. Some risk of crop loss might also have been reduced if the assistance was actually well timed to match the planting season. Otherwise, if given the choice, some farmers would have opted to invest in livestock rather than agriculture.

Finally, with regards the quality of assessments, early enquiries failed to take appropriate measures to respond to the needs of households with elderly and handicapped people.

Overall, the different approaches applied to this entire programme offers a great wealth of learning for Tearfund and its partners, given the relevance of many of the approaches and initiatives, such as the *Konbit* solidarity groups, focused training and involvement of the Pastoral Committees.

5.3 SUSTAINABILITY (CRITERIA SCORE 2)

The issue of sustainability was possibly never really well considered in this project, especially given the size of the initiative, the resources available and the timeframe. As such, while this project cannot be said to be “sustainable” in the general sense of the word, it has prepared important groundwork for some of its components to likely continue in the future and will, hopefully, trigger additional interest and open pathways for future development-type project with a longer timeframe and greater resources.

Apart from the direct provision of funds or materials, one of the appreciated elements of this project has been the training it provided on safer construction techniques. Training of carpenters and beneficiaries in safer construction techniques is a skill that will remain in the communities once this project is completed. Carpenters can be expected to continue to use their newly acquired/attuned skills on safer construction techniques (which should help with income generation), while beneficiaries will almost certainly use their know-how as well for personal benefit and, potentially to also help inform and guide neighbours and friends in similar situations to their own.

“I had never seen this kind of way of building a roof, I now know how to do it myself... It’s a knowledge worth passing on to my children”.

Project Beneficiary

There were many calls for greater and longer training for more carpenters: the training was appreciated but felt not to have “been enough”. Theoretical training without accompanying practice under the supervision of a qualified technician does not guarantee the quality of the work or its durability.

Less obvious in terms of continuation is the degree to which training provided in terms of agricultural support will be used in the future, largely on account of the scale of training (number of people who attended), relevance of the training and lack of technical support in going forward. At the same time, some of the people trained in agriculture/agronomy are probably least able to actually persevere with future training of beneficiaries.

The provision of cash gave beneficiaries confidence and dignity as they also in some instances gave some of their resources to others. As an unexpected outcome, the assistance provided was transformed into a good example of solidarity and people working together, strengthening community capacity.

While limited in the extent provided, some communities also gained knowledge about how to protect themselves from cholera and some simple steps they might take to save their lives in the event of a future cyclone. In situations like Les Irois, Grande Anse, people also said that they would in future respect the instructions from authorities, especially the DCP, in the event of a weather warning.

As discussed above (Disaster Preparedness), given the topography of these departments, the increasingly high risks of degradation and continued exposure to natural disasters, any future activities should have an integral built in system of risk analysis and remediation. In this regard, it is important to note that World Relief has built its future response in three communities with the perspective of longer term involvement. In each community, it has initiated an association of churches which is serving as a basis to launch their Church Empowerment Zone Programme in order to build sustainability. Tearfund Haiti is also implementing its local church and disaster training

programme with CEEH in two of the communities where the response projects have been implemented.

5.4 LOCALISATION (CRITERIA SCORE 2.5)

Tearfund was proactive on several fronts in anticipating an event such as Hurricane Matthew, as evidenced from its original Contingency Plan (which was subsequently revised after Hurricane Matthew), the formation of RIHPED and the establishment of FRERE. Any one of these would have been beneficial in a “normal” relief programme but the existence of the three – and knowledge of these amongst many eventual partners – was a definite strategic advantage for Tearfund to mobilise its Assess and Assist Initiative within a very short timeframe.

That this response and later recovery programme did so, for the first time in Haiti, entirely through local partners was a significant achievement. More details of this are provided in the RTR, so remaining comments on RIHPED relate to feedback to this evaluation.

One concern raised in terms of localisation was the degree of equality shown between members. “Ownership” seems to have been an issue with some partners, and there were particular differences seen here between national and international NGOs.

Clearly, some local partners did not have the experience (technical nor managerial) of some larger organisations, though Tearfund tried to fill obvious gaps either by temporarily drawing in and making staff available to help and/or by providing training on specific aspects of the support programme: two training sessions, for example, were provided on cash distribution.

It was also reported to the evaluation that some international NGOs also did not feel comfortable being accountable to Tearfund in this instance, nor with working with some local partners. Clearly there is much to be done here to try and encourage those with greater resources, experience and influence to mentor local institutions who largely lack the capacity to deal with situations such as this. Assistance could, for example, have been forthcoming in helping local churches and structures develop more solid project concepts which would, in turn, have removed this burden from Tearfund.

One challenge faced by several of the local partners during the response phase was their – seemingly deliberate – exclusion from co-ordination meetings. Recognising this, Tearfund made particular effort to attend these meetings and subsequently share information with all of its partners. This was important both for co-ordination purposes as well building trust and confidence between itself and its partners.

While more needs to be done in terms of confidence building and capacity strengthening of local partnerships – while at the same time aligning international NGO’s approaches to more of a mentoring role with less experienced NGOs and community- and church-based structures, a great deal has been achieved in terms of moving the localisation momentum forward in this instance.

5.5 ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO TEARFUND OUTCOMES (CRITERIA SCORE 2)

In addition to the above described OECD-DAC criteria, this evaluation was also asked to identify the contribution made by the programme towards Tearfund’s Corporate Outcome *“Disasters Responded To – Communities Affected by Disasters Recover Quickly and are Better Equipped to Face Future Hazards”*.

As captured in the RTR and referred to above, the relief and subsequent recovery programme certainly offered a rapid response to the immediate needs of some of the most affected communities by Hurricane Matthew in Haiti. The combination of multisectoral preparatory work in the UK and Haiti, combined with the ease and speed of deployment to some of the known worst-affected areas was a critical moment for many people, as well as local churches. This was perhaps especially so given that no government assistance was forthcoming and that few other agencies were providing support.

The early assessments provided a good snapshot of what the main, priority needs were and thus guided the provision of assistance to a first round of people. What happened next – or rather didn't happen as it should have, was the inconsistent selection of beneficiaries in some parts of the response, together with incomplete and in some instances inadequate or inaccurate assessments of the real needs of different groups of society, in particular in relation to shelter and food security.

With such a short timeframe and limited resources, options for raising peoples' awareness of simple, cost-effective steps that they themselves can take to help strengthen their resilience to future disasters has not happened. Nor was it likely considered possible in the overall timeframe available. That it is now being addressed locally by Tearfund through planned disaster risk reduction trainings is important: this evaluation makes a specific recommendation to this point (Recommendation 7.1.2) to help ensure that as many local actors – DCP, local Pastors and local committees – are involved in this training and subsequent development of local contingency and preparedness plans. Such measure may not protect everyone and their possessions in the event of another major climate event like Hurricane Matthew, but they should go a long way to protecting lives and livelihoods in these communities.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Findings from this evaluation completely support the underlying premise of this programme's intention to support community development in this socially and economically disrupted landscape. This takes into consideration past achievements by Tearfund Haiti and some of its partners, playing to the strengths of the different entities in addressing the most pressing needs of some of the most vulnerable people affected by Hurricane Matthew.

A key highlight from this programme has to be the state of preparedness ahead of the disaster actually happening. This showed good planning, preparation and to a large extent information sharing and on-the-ground and international co-ordination, given that all initial funds were from Tearfund appeals.

While the overall programme was extremely well intended, and has worked within a restricted budget, some aspects of the implementation – from emergency to the "longer term" recovery did not achieve as much as they might have done. Emphasis was in this case given to local implementation of activities, with Tearfund's technical and administrative support where needed, and as needs were identified. This, too, should be applauded, though a number of important lessons have also emerged from both the RTR and this evaluation which should be considered in deciding the next steps for RIHPED, in particular.

According to project documentation and observations made during the course of this evaluation, many of the expected achievements against originally intended outcomes will have been achieved. What is, however, lacking is a comprehensive coverage to certain essential needs such as shelter and food security, in particular.

Further recommendations are presented in the following section.

7. PRIORITISED AND ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

Note: The following recommendations take into account that some of the proposed actions were not envisaged as part of the response/recovery by Tearfund and Partners. A split has been made between what the Evaluation Team sees as urgent and unmet needs (which should be addressed before closure of this project and the predicted start of the hurricane season (June) and those which should form part of the learning process for consideration and refinement for future contexts in Haiti and perhaps elsewhere in the Caribbean.

7.1 IMMEDIATE NEEDS

7.1.1 Assess how the immediate needs of already supported beneficiary households can be made fully secure in terms of shelter requirements.

The provision of shelter materials, in particular, has been inadequate in almost all situations, requiring people to still resort to using plastic sheeting to cover at least some part of their house. This is a real problem given that the hurricane season should commence within three months, which leaves project beneficiaries in an extremely exposed situation should another cyclone happen or high winds move in. Despite the assistance that beneficiaries have realised through this project, they have not – for different reasons – been able to make their homes secure. This situation needs an urgent assessment – on a household, not a generic, basis with the aim to find a quick and lasting solution.

7.1.2 If accepted, provide training on disaster preparedness to DCP staff/volunteers at the district and local levels.

Through its local partners, Tearfund should provide a series of training programmes to DCP staff and volunteers on practical knowledge and actions to take in terms of disaster preparedness. Initially this should include measures on how to protect livestock and assets such as fishing equipment. In time, this could be developed into community disaster action plans. This is seen as an immediate need, again in the lead up to the forthcoming hurricane season. Implementing partners should use this opportunity to engage in helping develop local contingency plans. Where relevant, Pastor Committees should be included in this opportunity.

7.1.3 The role, structure and future operating modality of RIHPED needs to be reviewed and strengthened.

The existence of RIHPED was central to the rapid mobilisation of this response programme, which created the opportunity for subsequent recovery. Subsequently, however, RIHPED involvement in the implementation of the programme was less clear. Given the strong likelihood of another climate event similar to Hurricane Matthew reaching Haiti, RIHPED needs to be operational and prepared to respond on full time readiness.

7.1.4 Tearfund needs to revisit the issue and mechanisms relating to complaint and feedback mechanisms, with partners.

This project demonstrated that while most partners were aware of the need to provide some form of feedback mechanism this was, in most cases, unsatisfactory in terms of its visibility, peoples' understanding of the system, the set-up (number given, for example, should guarantee confidentiality) and its monitoring. At present, partners don't understand or appreciate the importance of this system. It needs to be locally owned but, in order to do this, will need to be

underwritten by some group of external organisations/churches in the meantime. Given the continued high risks this island nation faces from climate change, this should be considered a priority for Integral Alliance.

7.1.5 Tearfund and IPs need to identify, design and use some basic guiding principles and minimum standards of intervention for future early recovery projects.

Much of this guidance already exists within Tearfund, but given staff turnover amongst partners, this should be repeated ahead of the coming cyclone season and at strategic moments thereafter. This should include Tearfund's inclusion of Sphere and Common Humanitarian Standards for consistency with other humanitarian organisations. Lessons learned from this experience should be used to strengthen partner's capacity to better use information (especially from needs assessments) to make better decision when responding to disasters.

7.1.6 Tearfund – Haiti and UK – should revisit the operational arrangements which were in place prior to and immediately following Hurricane Matthew, in advance planning for another climatic event.

Tearfund, as an organisation, needs to reflect on what worked well and what could have been done better and more timely in the lead up to and follow up of Hurricane Matthew. This should be considered between different departments within Tearfund UK and between the offices in Port au Prince and the UK. Consideration needs to be given to what circumstances are appropriate to requesting additional support in-country (to support local staff) from Teddington, taking consideration of skills needed, roles and the time of permanence of external support, which should preferably show a gradual decrease as the situation stabilises.

7.2 FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

7.2.1 Beneficiary selection criteria need to be agreed and applied consistently across a project/ programme for the sake of consistency and transparency.

As noted in the RTR, this was, on occasion, a weakness seen during the relief phase, for a number of reasons. While Tearfund has an established set of criteria for selection in each situation, this needs to be shared with intended partners who then need to respect this and apply and report accordingly. It is recognised that, while some external local actors (e.g. government) may seek to influence such decisions, partners should nonetheless find a way to be able to select (or not) the most vulnerable people within a given community or catchment area and reach a commonly agreed decision on who should receive assistance in the first instance. Follow up needs to be clearly recorded for accountability purposes.

7.2.2 If shelter assistance is being considered, this needs to be examined more broadly, e.g. for social needs.

Some of the beneficiaries met as part of this evaluation were renting shelter at the time of the Hurricane. They received shelter materials, but these of course are not for their own properties. In some instances, landlords have now taken back such shelters so have acquired these materials while, meanwhile, former renters have had to leave these properties and are now reduced to renting accommodation. Such situations should become integral to future needs assessments.

7.2.3 Decide whether it is more appropriate for intended beneficiaries to receive complete rather than partial support in a specific sector.

While beneficiaries will likely be grateful for whatever assistance is provided, by providing households that experienced structural harm with inadequate materials to completely repair their homes to a quality standard leaves them vulnerable to another climate event. Few beneficiaries spoken with as part of this evaluation have completed house repairs to the full extent needed: the quantity of roofing and wood was inadequate, and people cannot afford to purchase the remainder.

7.2.4 Partners, or first responders, should conduct a more thorough needs-based assessment in order to provide a more complete response to everyone targeted.

Early assessments by Tearfund and Partners were especially timely in identifying the broad needs of affected households. However, more in-depth, assessments and better consideration of the extent to which affected households would be supported should have been conducted to ensure that the most vulnerable and affected are at least sufficiently assisted to become better prepared for a future disaster. The decision to provide people whose houses had been partially or completely destroyed with a limited amount of infrastructure support meant that people (including carpenters) had to compromise on quality by re-using old timber and corrugated iron, much of which was not suitable for the intended purposes.

7.2.5 Only use national currency – and not a combination of cash and material – in any future cash-related distribution programme.

Different systems were used in the current recovery programme for cash distribution. While the system seems to have worked extremely well – from all perspectives, beneficiaries, partners and transfer agents were involved – it is strongly advised that any/all future distributions are clearly done in HTG and not in USD, nor in partial exchange for seeds or other materials. If beneficiaries have to convert their HTG coupons they are at risk to exploitation to others who seek to make a profit from their exchanges.

7.2.6 A more comprehensive training package should be envisaged for carpenters and masons.

Carpenters and masons met with as part of this evaluation were extremely grateful for the training they received. One of the most appreciate aspects of the training was diligence, and not making compromises in their work, which many admitted to having previously done. A one-day training, however, is not sufficient to equip these talented people with the needed array of skills for building back better, and for helping instruct their fellows to do the same. People in the construction/reconstruction side of work should be seen as Good Ambassadors of building better: if they are trained in specific disaster prepared techniques (such as tying down a roof) or even just general disaster preparedness approaches and practices they can pass these on to beneficiaries – at no extra cost as their time is being paid for through projects such as this.

7.2.7 In a society where agriculture dominates livelihoods, it is essential to assess soil conditions immediately after a major climatic event.

Given that so many households practice some form of agriculture and with the widespread devastation of crops witnessed as a result of Hurricane Matthew, one of the first activities that many people tried to do was to restart their lucrative agricultural practices. In parts of Grande Anse, at least, the first crops that were sown failed drastically. Soil changes are likely to have happened as a result of the Hurricane, for example, through flushing of nutrients by the heavy rainfall, breakdown of soil structure also by the deluges and introduction of saline elements to the soil on account of water uptake from the ocean, as well as strong winds that bring saline water. This should have been anticipated by the technical services in the relief and early recovery phases: current partners should consider training their technical services to be able to undertake such work and share awareness with local communities.

7.2.8 Partners, such as CEEH, should research and promote a wider range of crops that are better suited to current climatic conditions in Grande Anse.

Events such as Hurricane Matthew present opportunities for change: one of those – in this instance – could have been in terms of crop diversification, with a view to creating broader safety nets for communities by reducing the risk presented by so many people farming the same crops in the same place at the same time. Tearfund has excellent experience of this in other prone situations and the knowledge from these and other projects should be applied in situations like Grande Anse where so much importance is placed on a single crop. Partners should become aware of this – ideally through some research linked with identifying possible early maturing, high yielding and climate resilient crops suitable for the various contexts and environmental conditions in Haiti.

7.2.9 Further thought should be given in all situations that have the resources to transition from relief to recovery.

More consideration should be given earlier on in the project cycle to effectively linking emergency response to longer term development in order to catalyse sustainable development opportunities. This should include identifying critical environments (goods and services) that require restoration to support the development of sustainable food security and livelihoods. In the knowledge that resources will always be limited, consider focusing on the same group of beneficiaries for each phase of the programme to have a better chance to see progress as a result of the process.

7.2.10 Take cross-cutting issues into account for a more relevant response

For institutional or societal reasons, but also to improve effectiveness and efficiency, some concerns need to be tackled across sectors in a coherent and integrated way. Key cross-cutting issues to be considered during the design and implementation of programmes include gender equality, environmental recovery and management, disaster risk reduction, security and accountability. Effectively addressing cross-cutting issues helps to forge links with other programmes and with the work of other agencies. Future response-recovery programmes should focus on promoting and strengthening equity and equality for all, should avoid the marginalisation of affected people and should provide opportunities to shape the agenda of subsequent development.

ANNEX I TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THIS EVALUATION

1. BACKGROUND

Programme Title: Haïti Hurricane Matthew Emergency Response

Background to the Programme

On Tuesday October 4 2016, Hurricane Matthew landed on the southern peninsula of Haïti. Hurricane Matthew was the first Category 4 hurricane to landfall the country in 52 years.⁹ The hurricane moved slowly off the southern peninsula coast, depositing a heavy rains. The hurricane's eye then took a 90° turn moving directly over the eastern tip of the peninsular. Consequently, serious damage was caused to Sud and Grand'Anse Departments. However, significant damage was also caused in Nippes, Nord-Ouest, Artibonite and Ouest¹⁰. Affected areas sustained winds, storm surges, heavy rains and extensive flooding, which resulted in hundreds of deaths¹¹, displacement and extensive damage to crops, livestock, livelihoods, shelter (churches, homes, hospitals schools) roads and infrastructure.

Path of Hurricane Matthew¹²



2.1 million people were affected, and 1.4 million were in need of humanitarian assistance¹³. 806,000

⁹ https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/haiti_hno_2017.pdf (25th November 2017)

¹⁰ <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/six-months-after-hurricane-matthew-food-and-nutritional-crisis-beginning-haiti-we-must>

¹¹ As of 19 November 2016, the Government of Haiti had confirmed 546 deaths and 128 people missing. In https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/haiti_hno_2017.pdf (p.7, 25th October 2017)

¹² <https://www.tropicalstormrisk.com/tracker/dynamic/201614N.html>

¹³ UNOCHA 'Haiti: Hurricane Matthew - Situation Report No. 18 (31st October 2016)' [Online]

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SITREP%2018%20-%20HAITI%20%2831%20OCT%202016%29%20-%20ENG.pdf> (3rd November 2016)

people were in need of urgent food and 141,493 people were displaced to temporary shelters. 894,000 children were affected, 116,000 of whom had their education disrupted¹⁴.

Before Hurricane Matthew, Haïti was recovering from a cholera epidemic, migration from the Dominican Republic, and many people had not fully recovered from the 2010 earthquake¹⁵.

Food production was particularly badly affected. Before Hurricane Matthew, there had been three years of El-Niño-induced drought, resulting in 47.5% of families in drought areas affected by food insecurity¹⁶. Additionally, Hurricane Matthew occurred just before the 2016 harvest for yam, black beans and bananas¹⁷, escalating food insecurity.

In some departments, 80-90% of the harvest was destroyed by Matthew¹⁸. Not only had they lost their crops, but also livestock, equipment and seeds stock. The three most affected departments (Grand'Anse, Sud and Nippes) were also the breadbasket of Haïti, normally producing 85% of the country's corn, rice, sorghum, peas and beans and almost 40% fruit¹⁹.

Consequently, because this area was so reliant on agriculture for food and livelihoods, and the cost of food increased, 6 months after Matthew, a consortium of NGOs raised an alert advocating to address these urgent food insecurity needs.

Shelter was also severely affected. 370,000 homes were impacted by Matthew (30,180 destroyed and 60,000 damaged). Of these, 84,000 were in urban areas, but 286,000 were in rural areas, because they are built of traditional materials (timber, thatch and mud)²⁰.

Haïti's high disaster risk profile is due, not only to its exposure to a number of hazards, but more importantly, its vulnerability to these hazards. Its vulnerability is aggravated by food insecurity, inequality, corruption, low income and lack of access to finance. Consequently, these disasters have weakened the response capacity and resilience of communities.

Hurricane Irma

In early July 2017, Hurricane Irma (a category 5 hurricane) travelled through the caribbean inflicted devastating damage on some islands. On 7th July 2017, it passed by the north of Haïti. Fortunately it moved far enough north to cause only minimal damage to Haïti and Tearfund's partners' response was minimal.

Path of Hurricane Irma²¹

¹⁴ (*ibid*)

¹⁵ https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/haiti_hno_2017.pdf (26th October 2017)

¹⁶ <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/six-months-after-hurricane-matthew-food-and-nutritional-crisis-beginning-haiti-we-must>


¹⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/six-months-after-hurricane-matthew-food-and-nutritional-crisis-beginning-haiti-we-must>

¹⁸ World Food Programme: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wfp287610.pdf>

¹⁹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/six-months-after-hurricane-matthew-food-and-nutritional-crisis-beginning-haiti-we-must>

²⁰ https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/haiti_hno_2017.pdf (p.7, 26th October 2017)

²¹ <https://www.tropicalstormrisk.com/tracker/dynamic/201711N.html>



Tearfund launched a public appeal shortly after the 4th October and by November, had raised £1,153,816. An additional £72,452 was raised over the following months. After Hurricane Irma, £13,718 was raised. In total, £1,239,987 was raised from supporters.

In addition, we received £118,825.37 via Partnerships and £54,268.03 from Tear NL.

List of previous and related reports, evaluations, key documents etc.

- Haïti Country Strategy
- Response Strategy: Haïti Hurricane Matthew
- GMIS
- Haïti Hurricane Matthew Appeal October 2016

Partner profile and history/Operational Programme

Tearfund has supported development work in Haïti from our UK Headquarters office for over 30 years through a portfolio of local and international partner organizations. Before Hurricane Matthew, Tearfund had conducted/established the following activities:

- Developed a Tearfund disaster contingency plans
- Established the RIHPED (Réseau Intégral Haïtien pour le Plaidoyer et l’Environnement Durable) Network, made up of 13 organisations, including Integral Alliance Members and Tearfund partners, with the aim of increasing local capacity to respond to disasters and reduce disaster risk (DRR). As part of this initiative, an emergency FRERE (Fond de Réponse Rapide et Efficente) Fund was established for immediate use in the event of a disaster. Prior to the hurricane, the FRERE Fund totalled \$90,000, of which Tearfund had contributed close to 90%. The FRERE Fund was managed by WCH.

Is this response, Tearfund responded via partners, Integral Alliance members and RIHPED.

Partners registered as INGOs (also member of Integral Alliance and RIHPED):

- World Concern Haïti (WCH)
- World Relief (WR)

Partners registered as Local NGOs (also members of RIHPED):

- Conciles Des Eglises Evangéliques D’Haïti (CEEH)
- Fédération des Écoles Protestantes d’Haïti (FEPH)
- Fondasyon Chanje Lavi (FCL)

Members of RIHPED

- Fondasyon Kominote Kreyen an Aksyon (FOKA)
- Fondation Haïtienne de l’Enseignement Privé (FONHEP)

- Living Water
- Medical Teams International (MTI)
- Micah Challenge
- Union Evangélique Baptiste d'Haïti (UEBH)

Their affiliations can clearly be seen in Partner Mapping - Haïti

Current and planned activities

As Haïti is one of Tearfund's disaster priority countries, disaster risk management is one of the focus areas of the country strategy. Intentionally deciding to promote the 'localisation of aid', actioned by the establishing of RIHPED and the FRERE Fund and contingency planning with local partners, it was decided, not to respond operationally, but exclusively via partners.

Responses were bound by the following parameters:

1. The response will be for 18 months from Oct 2016 to Mar 2018, and will comprise a six week emergency response phase, a 4 month early recovery phase, and a 12 month longer recovery phase.
2. Tearfund will respond through current partners and may add emergency partners depending on gaps and needs that are identified.
3. Tearfund will work in areas most affected by the hurricane, particularly Grand'Anse, Sud, Nippes and Sud-Est²². Whilst most of our current partners already work in some of these areas, some partners will extend to new areas in order to respond to the greatest needs.
4. Tearfund's response will be implemented according to Tearfund's Emergency Response Procedures and Quality Standards. Projects will be designed and screened to ensure they do no harm and take account of the need to protect children and women from violence.

As stated in the Response Plan: Haïti Hurricane Matthew:

In response to the needs identified above, our response in Haïti will address urgent basic needs, recovery, and the building of resilience. The sectoral focus areas will be shelter, livelihoods, and food security.

The method for addressing immediate needs during the emergency phase will be an Assess and Assist approach. The advantage of this approach is that a) it enables a compassionate response to meet urgent and obvious needs and b) it promotes acceptance by the communities to enable proper assessments to be carried out.

The focus of the early recovery phase will be on enabling re-planting of crops during the Nov and Dec planting season, and on promoting building back better of homes and community buildings.

The longer term recovery phase will continue to promote hurricane and earthquake resistant building techniques, as well as engaging in advocacy, improving contingency planning, and providing training in disaster preparedness and response for churches and communities.

RIHPED distributed grants of \$5,000 (plus one £10,000 to WCH), totalling £55,000, of the £90,000 in the FRERE Fund to members to provide rapid assistance (cash, NFIs, food and hygiene kits). Larger grants were made to CEEH, FEPH, WCH and WR. RIHPED members drafted emergency proposals, which were vetted by WCH and Tearfund. Upon approval, WCH disbursed the money, via cheque, to each organisation.

An 'Assist and Assess' approach was used to gain acceptance and address immediate needs.

Requirement and audience for the evaluation report (internal, external, donor etc)

The audience for this review:

- Tearfund Haïti country office and LAC team, with an emphasis on improvements and effectiveness

²² After the Real Time REview (RTR) we decided to focus on Grand'Anse, Sud and Nippes, due to the greater need in those departments.

- International Group, with reference on learning lessons for future disasters
- Partners and Integral Alliance members

Scope of the evaluation (accountability and/or learning purposes)

This review will be used primarily by the LAC Team to inform future planning and prioritise future programming. It is suggested that it is also available to partners as appropriate. It will also be useful for learning in future emergency response situations and shared in an IG Learning Session, and the report made available to those interested and added to the evaluations database.

2. PURPOSE

Goal:

The aim of the evaluation is ‘to assess the relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and localisation of Tearfund’s response, in order to inform future emergency responses’.

Objectives:

1. **Relevance** - Were the types of projects implemented by the partners relevant to the needs of the communities?
2. **Effectiveness** - How effectively did the response help to reconstruct communities’ food security, shelter, agriculture/livelihoods needs in a timely way, to achieve desired outcomes?
3. **Sustainability** - Are communities more resilient to future disasters, especially hurricanes (particularly the most vulnerable)?
4. **Localisation** - Were our systems and procedures sufficiently responsive and flexible enough to allow localised responses? How could they be improved?

3. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team leader is to develop a plan for the review in discussion with the programme team. This is to be agreed by the deputy Geo head prior to departure. The review approach will incorporate:

UK Based (this should be prior to departure where possible)

- Desk review of key documents prior to departure: ERC minutes, current strategy, proposals, needs assessment
- Interviews with key UK based staff and other key stakeholders: Head of ELAC, Deputy Head of ELAC, Programme Officer, Integral members

In Country:

- Carry out in-country learning review session with Haiti team
- Key informant interviews: Representatives of affected population, civil society leaders, clusters (Shelter, Cash coordination group, WASH, Protection, Food Security), local government representatives
- Selection of local partners/consortia, and ask them to arrange a visit with beneficiaries. Random selection once in a location may be possible).
 - Local partners: World Concern Haiti, World Relief CEEH, FEPH
 - Beneficiary consultation: interviews and/or focus groups

- Non-beneficiary consultation
- Direct observation, visits to projects and photography.

Reporting:

- Sharing of emergent thoughts and initial learning with country team in Haïti before departure, including summary powerpoint of first findings
- Written evaluation report, dates for completion TBC
- Discussion of evaluation findings with Haïti team in Teddington, timing TBC
- Additional Annex: CHS Self Assessment

4. TIMING

15 January to 15 February 2018	UK based preparation: briefing, desk review and interviews etc.
17 February to 3 March, including 10 days field work	Evaluation: travel to from Haïti, in-country meetings, field visits and report back initial findings to team and stakeholders
12 March 2018	Submission of draft report and presentation to Tearfund
16 March 2018	Return draft report with comments
20 March 2018	Submission of final report

5. EVALUATION LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

- This assignment will be managed by Guy Calvert-Lee and and Jean Claude Cerin, with planning and logistical assistance from Peter Arthern (Haïti programme officer), Marc Antoine (Haïti Disaster Response Coordinator) and staff in Haïti.
- Proposed team composition (will this be led by an external/internal/peer evaluator(s) and will other Tearfund/partner staff members be part of the evaluation team.
- To whom should the lead evaluator refer to for questions, logistical and other issues as they arise?
- Person(s) responsible for practical arrangements, travel arrangements, hotels etc.

6. STAKEHOLDERS

The team shall be required to collect, analyse and report information on the views of a number of key stakeholders namely but not limited to:

- Direct beneficiaries, e.g. girls, boys, women, men, local leaders
- Indirect Beneficiaries
- Tearfund Haïti country office staff (country representative, disaster response coordinator, sectoral advisors)
- ELAC Geo-Team staff
- HST
- Govt. Departments
- Local partners:

- INGOs (World Concern Haïti, World Relief)
- NNGOs (CEEH, FEPH)
- RIHPED Members: (FOKA, FONHEP, Living Water, Micah, UEBH)
- Integral Members: World Concern Haïti, World Relief)

7. EVALUATION OUTPUT

The expected outputs of the evaluation are:

- A stand-alone evaluation summary (see the Evaluation Summary Template)
- An evaluation report (see Tearfund recommended reporting format) with the following sections:
 - Section 1 – Executive Summary (no more than four A4 sides)
 - Section 2 – Introduction
 - Section 3 – Methodology
 - Section 4 – Context Analysis
 - Section 5 – Project Overview
 - Section 6 – Key Findings
 - Relevance
 - Effectiveness
 - Sustainability
 - Localisation of Aid
 - Section 7 – Conclusions
 - Section 8 – Key Insights
 - Section 9 – Specific Actionable and Prioritised Recommendations
 - Section 10 – Annexes (indicative)
 - Draft Action Plan
 - Terms of Reference for the Evaluation
 - Profile of the Evaluation Team
 - Evaluation Schedule
 - Protocols for the Evaluation
 - Documents consulted during the Evaluation
 - Persons participating in the Evaluation
 - Field data used during the Evaluation, including baselines
 - Bibliography
- A self-evaluation of the evaluation using the BOND evidence principles

8. ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

The following criteria are used to assess the contribution that the intervention has made to the Tearfund Outcomes and the OECD-DAC criteria. The intervention is to be assessed online using this google form as this ensures that the data is automatically captured. The form is also attached at Annex A.

OECD-DAC Criteria: The intervention is to be assessed against the DAC criteria using the following scale:

0	1	2	3	4
Low or no visible contribution to this criteria	Some evidence of contribution to this criteria but significant	Evidence of satisfactory contribution to this criteria but requirement for	Evidence of good contribution to this criteria but with some areas	Evidence that the contribution is strong and/or exceeding that which was

	improvement required	continued improvement	for improvement remaining	expected of the intervention
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9. UTILISATION OF EVALUATION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The dissemination of the evaluation report and any associated risks will be discussed between the evaluation team and the ELAC responsible staff, once the draft report is written. If risks are identified, a separate version of the report may need to be written for external distribution. The ELAC Deputy Geographic Head will decide if additional sign off is needed for dissemination to particular audiences.

Recommendations and key learning identified in the report will be included in the Evaluations database to support future responses.

Specific response findings and/or recommendations from an report are to be co-owned and disseminated by the relevant Response and Geographical Teams for action.

ELAC own and disseminate general organisational learning in emergency response. Results from report should be shared at an ILS sessions.

ANNEX II EVALUATION TEAM PROFILE

David STONE has been working in the humanitarian arena for more than 25 years, primarily in the context of environmental and livelihood security with refugees and internally displaced people, worldwide. A zoologist by training, David is Director of Proaction Consulting, an international consulting group which specialises in environmental rehabilitation, community-based disaster preparedness, climate change adaptation and building resilience through the creation and support of local and appropriate solutions. This expertise is key in David's contextualised approaches to assessments and evaluations in a wide range of situations, worldwide.

Ms Myrta EUSTACHE is an experienced trainer who has spent the majority of her career working in Haiti for various national NGOs, American, Canadian and European private voluntary organisations, international donors, international consulting firms, and private foundations and research institutes. Myrta holds an Agricultural Engineering/Agronomy diploma from the State University of Haiti, has conducted numerous trainings over the past 15 years on strengthening capacities for soil and water conservation, watershed management, sustainable agriculture, the integration of Haitian women into development programmes, poverty eradication and humanitarian aid and relief. Ms. Eustache is considered to be one of Haiti's experts on Participatory Approach and Gender Equality.

Luc SAINT VIL is an agronomist by training and an expert in strengthening the institutional development and capacity of civil society organisations. Luc has more than 20 years of experience supporting agricultural organisations and companies that process, develop and add value to agricultural sectors. Luc also has expertise in risk and disaster management, with a focus on community disaster preparedness, contingency planning and the integration of climate change adaptation and risk reduction into development programmes. He has extensive experience in managing humanitarian programmes and has also worked in risk management in state public sectors.

Norman MOLINA is Tearfund's DM&E Officer for Latin America and the Caribbean, based in Honduras. Norman has seven years of experience working as Project Officer for Central America. His studies have focused around Management and Social Development.

ANNEX III EVALUATION ITINERARY

GRANDE ANSE TEAM

Day	Date	Organisations	Communities	Time	Projects
Tuesday	20	CEEH	Paillant	10:00-12:00	Food Security
	20	CEEH	Bouzi	2:30 – 3:30	Food Security
Wednesday	21	CEEH	Leon/Jeremie	10:00-1:00	Shelter
			Leon	1:30- 4:30	Food security
Thursday	22	CEEH	Abricot	10:00-12:30	Food Security
		CEEH	Abricot	1:30-4:30	Shelter
Friday	23	FEPH	Les Irois	10:00-12:00	Cash Distribution
	23	FEPH	Les Irois	1:00-3:00	Cash Distribution
Saturday	24	FEPH	Dame-Marie	9:00-10:30	Cash Distribution
		FEPH		11:00-12:30	Cash Distribution
		FEPH	Chambellan	2:00-3:30	Cash Distribution
		FEPH		3:45-5:00	Cash Distribution
Sunday	25	Rest	Rest	Rest	Rest
Monday	26	CEEH	Jeremie	9:00-12:00	Shelter
Tuesday	27	-----	-----	8:00	Return
Wednesday	28	Meetings		All day	
Thursday	29	Meetings and debriefing		All day	
Friday	30	International team departs			

SUD TEAM

Day	Date	Organisations	Communities	Time	Projects
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Tuesday	20	CEEH	Paillant	10:00-1:00	Food Security
	20	CEEH	Bouzi	2:30- 3:30	Food Security
Wednesday	21	World Concern	Ferme Leblanc	9:00-12:00	Shelter
			Guilgaud, Bezin	1:00- 4:00	Shelter
Thursday	22	World Relief	Duchity	9:00-4:00	Food Security
Friday	23	World Relief	Fonfrede	9:00-12:00	Food Security
		World Relief	Massee	1:00-5:00	Food Security
Saturday	24	-----	-----	9:00	Return
Sunday	25	-----	-----	11:00	Trip to Port-de-Paix
Monday	26	World Concern	Port-de-Paix	9:00 4:00-	Irma Response
Tuesday	27	-----	-----	8:00	Return
Wednesday	28	Meetings		All day	
Thursday	29	Meetings and debriefing		All day	
Friday	30	International team departs			

ANNEX IV. GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR FGDs AND KIIs

FOOD SECURITY QUESTIONS TO IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

1. Was this the first time you had worked in a context such as this recovery programme as the local implementing partner (localization)?
2. Was this the first experience your organisation had with cash transfer?
3. Were you confident in delivering the support you provided to beneficiaries?
4. Did you have sufficient technical knowledge and experience to undertake this activity?
5. Have you seen concrete evidence of improvement of livelihoods amongst beneficiaries?
6. Can this be attributed to the support you provided? Evidence for this?
7. How successful has your programme been in reaching the most vulnerable? How did you ensure this?
8. What were the biggest challenges in recovery assistance to affected communities in a timely way? How did you address these?
9. How efficient were the approaches used during the implementation of the recovery programme?
10. How cost-effective was the recovery programme? Examples? How could cost-effectiveness be improved?
11. How did the recovery programme link to longer term rehabilitation, development and sustainability? Examples?

12. If you received training from Tearfund, was this relevant and timely? Could anything have been done better?
13. Any examples of innovation and/or excellence in the programme?
14. What food/livelihood security capacities have been strengthened during the recovery and what gaps exist now?
15. Anything else you would like to tell us about your experience on this programme?
16. What, if anything would you change if you had to repeat a similar exercise and use a cash transfer system again?
17. What is the main lesson you have learned from this activity?
18. Do you think that this programme has contributed positively to long-term sustainability with the respective communities?
19. Anything else you would like to add/discuss?

SHELTER QUESTIONS TO IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

1. Was this the first time you had worked in a context such as this recovery programme as the local implementing partner (localization)?
2. Did you have sufficient technical knowledge and organizational experience to undertake this activity?
3. Have you seen concrete evidence of shelter improvement amongst beneficiaries? Please give examples.
4. How successful has your programme been in reaching the most vulnerable? How did you ensure this?
5. What were the biggest challenges in recovery assistance to affected communities in a timely way? How did you address these?
6. How efficient were the approaches used during the implementation of the recovery programme?
7. How cost-effective was the recovery programme? Examples? How could cost-effectiveness be improved?
8. How did the recovery programme link to longer term rehabilitation, development and sustainability? Examples?
9. Any examples of innovation and/or excellence in the programme?
10. What shelter construction capacities have been strengthened during the recovery and what gaps exist now?

11. Many beneficiaries have not been able to 100% complete their house repairs due to a shortage of materials. Do you have any suggestion as to how this will be enabled?
12. Anything else you would like to tell us about your experience on this programme?
13. If you received training from Tearfund, was this relevant and timely? Could anything have been done better?
14. Can this be attributed to the support you provided? Evidence for this?
15. What, if anything would you change if you had to repeat a similar exercise?
16. What is the main lesson you have learned from this activity?
17. Do you think that this programme has contributed positively to long-term sustainability with the respective communities?

For Tearfund

1. What were some of the most efficient approaches used during the implementation of the recovery programme? Could anything have been improved?
2. What were the main pillars of experience that Tearfund was able to build on/draw from that allowed it to respond so quickly and then support the recovery process?
3. What were the main challenges in working with local partners in this project? How were these addressed?
4. Were local actors enabled to express their concern/voice opinions within the broader response and recovery programme?
5. Was Tearfund in a position to help ensure local actors presence in decision-making meetings?
6. From this experience, what were the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints when working through local actors in this context?
7. What, if any, changes would you make if you were to repeat this initiative in a similar context?
8. Please describe your relationship with local government actors through the response and recovery? Are there areas where you would like to have seen improvements?
9. How smooth and effective was the transition from response to recovery? Could anything have been done better?
10. Do you believe that Tearfund provided adequate monitoring to the various partner-led responses? [Also a recommendation from the RTR] Could anything have been done better?

11. What are the key learning/recommendation points from this initiative to inform and improve future response and recovery programme performance? Have these been documented?
12. Were there any areas of innovation/excellence that you saw as a result of this initiative? Can these be attributed to the Tearfund-co-ordinated support?
13. Can you give examples of compliance with quality and accountability standards – CHS, Sphere...? [This was also a recommendation from the RTR but these elements don't always feature in Tearfund reports].
14. Do you think that this programme has contributed positively to long-term sustainability with the respective communities?
15. Anything else you would like to add/discuss?

Additional points to discuss:

Advocacy

Contingency Planning + DRR/Preparedness training

RIHPED capacity Building and FRERE Structure = Lessons Learned and Replication

Exit strategy

ANNEX V PEOPLE MET AS PART OF THIS EVALUATION

NAME	STRUCTURE	LOCATION
Jean Charles	League of Pastors	Pestel/Dichity
Leonard Josil	League of Pastors	Pestel/Dichity
Picard Jean Kelly	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Metellus Jimmy	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Jadson Saint Cyr	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Darbouz Tersono	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Mathieu Jean Harold	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Ezekiel Chery	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Pyters Delinoir	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Yves Jean-Claude Pamy	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Sevéus Jean-Gardy	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Chérismé Jean Désir	League of Pastors	Fonfred/Cayes
Rodrigue Clair	League of Pastors	Massey
Francilien mercival	League of Pastors/APMIE	Massey
Joseph Wilsor	League of Pastors/APMIE	Massey
Marie-Therese Cadet	League of Pastors/APMIE	Massey
Charles Gerson	League of Pastors/APMIE	Massey
Rethone José	Coordonnateur Technique Départemental – Protection civile Nord-Ouest	Nord-Ouest/Port de Paix
Owell Théock	Délégué du gouvernement Nord-Ouest	Nord-Ouest/Port de Paix
Emile Rose Gladys	CASEC 3e section communale SOLON	SOLON/Torbeck
Denise Lizair	CASEC 3e section communale MOREAU	MOREAU/Torbeck
Joseph Bataille	World Relief/Country Director	

Pyram Phatama Esther	World Relief/ Church Empowerment Zone Coordinator	
Oscar Danilo Rivera	WR/Coordonnateur de Programme d'Agriculture	
Naderge Dorvil Lorvilon	WR/Directrice Administrative et Finance	
Archild Pierre	WR/Coordonnateur de Projet	
Kimcy Blaise	World Concern, Country Director	Port au Prince
Joseph Massillon	World Concern, Programme Manager	Port au Prince
James Rod-Mayeur Francois	World Concern, Information Manager	Port au Prince
Roseline Louis	World Concern, Administration and Finance Officer	Port au Prince
Lolo Jean Kistchill	World Concern, Senior Finance Officer	Port au Prince
Marc Shula Joseph	World Concern, Logistics Supervisor	Port au Prince
Joel Hilair	FEPH/Officier de Projet	Port au Prince
Christon Saint Fort	FEPH/Directeur Exécutif	Port au Prince